(Sanitized) PROJECT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01142A001700020001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 98
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: AG

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Thursday
8/7
Monday
8/11
Tuesday
8/12
Wednesday
8/13
s
SCHEDULE - NEXT FEW DAYS
s rve 4.1 CT 6.14
Ote AI 1.?? 1.1 A, CO. Vra' v* e s t-41 1_12 i-t wIrt?to(J 1 Pm
t87-1-5-tuirft1-10A-Conference Room. Br+ef
mceting to-fveuld out "New $papers
i4-eemplete?otherwise-to by-
c-ro-b---)-and to discuss problems-asesired.
No meeting. Redraft of all sections of the
"Organization and Management" paper to all
members by c.o.b. Lehman to get a consolidated
"New Structure" paper to us by c.o.b.
(Ivz/r)
Meetingl/to discuss entire "Organization and
Management" paper (please read Monday p.m.)
EL,dele/eve, A., fr ..., 6:10
Discuss twol I papers-"External
Oversight" and "Sources and Methods."
0 I.S.C14%I. 2-e-re."...?6?T pig 1.0.e 4,5?4,44q4S
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STAT
STAT
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UUILLDI1IIIS
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STAT MEMORANDUM FOR:
STAT
STAT
SUBJECT
7 August 1975
Mr. Dirks
Mr. Lehman
? ^ The Structure Paper
Attached is my input to our continuing dialogue
on the optimum outline of a new structure. In deference
to Mr. Lehman's needs and to keep him from committing
technical illegalities over the coming weekend, I have
not stamped a classification on any of the pages of this
memorandum. Nonetheless, it is a sensitive working
document. In the interest of time, I have not bothered
to retype the few corrections and marginal insertions made
in ink.
George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
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A NEW STRUCTURE
I. POSTULATES:
The Study Group's assessments of the management and
organizational requirements of a national intelligence
structure adequate to meet the demands likely to be placed
on it over the next quarter century have been framed
in light of certain postulates. These may not be entirely
self-evident but they are propositions which the Group
considers so readily demonstrable that there is little
point in developing arguments to support them:
As a major world power, the United States will
need the best intelligence attainable both
to protect itself from surprise attack
(particularly nuclear attack) and to assist
in the formulation and execution of its foreign
and national security policy.
As used here, "intelligence" means not only
raw information but -- even more -- assessed,
analyzed and collated information distilled into
appreciations, judgments and estimates.
The information required as a basis for the quality
of intelligence needed will have to be collected
by overt means, by technical .devicesand by
covert human sources -- i.e., espionage.
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?
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The past two decades'quantum increases in
technological resources and capabilities
have not diminished the need for intelligence
from human sources; for the latter remain
the most reliable and satisfactory fount of
information about the intentions of foreign
groups, leaders and nations.
The intelligence developed by those U.S.
Government components responsible for its
collection and production will frequently
be used by policy-level officials as the basis
for military or political action, often action
which the U.S. Government will want and try
to implement covertly.
To protect its own intelligence collection
and production capabilities, the United States
will need concomitant capabilities in the field
of counterintelligence.
The United States will also need counterintelligence
capabilities to ascertain the extent to whichaand +ht.-
means through whichjforeign groups and nations are
attempting, to influence U.S. policy and actions
by their own covert action programs.
( Givens in the EquAion:
There are other considerations which bound and define
the problems we have to address which are not exactly postulates
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but which constitute, at least at this writing, "givens."
Some of these may be ephemeral and may change markedly
within a relatively brief span of time. Others are
likely to be more durable or change at a much slower pace.
(A) Public Attitudes:
Public attitudes are, of course, not homogeneous.
Different sectors of the public have different perceptions
of various aspects of the problems posed by an intelligence
service in a free society. Not all of these attitudes
are mutually consistent and some sectors of the public
give scant, if any, consideration at all to these
problems. Furthermore, the most vocal and articulate
segments of the public who address such issues -- including
journalists and editorial writers --.are often far less
representative of public attitudes than they claim or
presume themselves to 6. To the limited extent thiwi-
generalizations are meaningful, "the public" probably:
Wants the benefits and protections of a strong
intelligence structure, but has little detailed
understanding or sophisticated appreciation about
what that desire means in concrete terms.
Is perplexed and confused by a number of the issues
which are currently the focus of both press and
Congressional attention -- cowert action,
proprietaries, domestic collection, etc.
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Wants to be reassured that the U.S. intelligence
structure is not an uncontrolled, rogue elephant
and is, in some way, both accountable to and
effectively controlled by the public's elected
representatives, i.e., the President and Congress.
(B) Congressional Attitudes:
At this writing, Congress also speaks with a multiplicity
of voices and should not be thought of as a monolithic
body with any single set of opinions. To the extent that
we can make generalizations about Congressional attitudes,
they appear to include the following:
A desire for a strong intelligence system, or at least
for the benefits of a strong intelligence system.
-- A less than perfect
understanding of the
organizational and structural requirements necessary
for attaining these benefits, especially for
preserving and protecting the degree of secrecy
essential if they are to be attained.
A desire for an independent analytical and production
entity under the control of any single Cabinet
department, especially the Defense Department or
(above all) the military services.
A recognition of the need for at least some degree
of clandestine collection, but without a matching
willingness to face up to the secrecy requirements
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thus entailed.
-- A recognition of the need for covert action
in some context4t41411.14h Congrescwants -- or
thinks it wants -- a larger voice in the approval
of such actions but is uncomfortable about accepting
the accountability and responsibility such a voice
in approval entails or the need for discretion it
imposes.
-- A desire to a larger share in the intelligence product,
4 irk. 0,y4k +14C,
444.Q...W-1-1,-10.40 implications of and obligations imposed
by receiving classified intelligence are also matters
Congress is reluctant to face.
(C) The Presidency:
In discussing "the President's" attitudes, a distinction
has to be drawn between the abstract needs of the office
and the concrete attitudes of any specific incumbent therein.
The former -- especially as perceived or defined jpy<
by persons never likely to hold that office --may not
always square with the latter. Generically, any President
will probably
-- Want a strong intelligence system, including a
strong, flexible and responsive covert action
capability.
-- Will want reassurance that that system is under
control -- meaning his control and not anyone
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Will want that system run efficiently,
with due regard for budgetary considerations.
Will not want the intelligence system or its
activities to be a source of political difficulty
or embarrassment.
Will want independent advice, particularly in
times of crisis, from capable people primarily
loyal to the Presidency.
Will need a system that can function in peace as
well as war, though the problems here involved --
e.g., the national/tactical question -- have
not been thought through extensively or clearly
articulated.
(D) A Given President:
The particular requirements or attitudes of any
specific, given President will be very much shaped by his
own personality, working style and confidence in (-1,1-1-a-G4(
C"
t-tre-re-o-f-) his immediate associatesli Here, sweeping
generalizations are of little value. Given the formidable
pressures and obstacles involved in being elected the
President, however, there is one generalization which
probably has .some validity. The holders of this office,
especially those who attain it via their own election, are
likely to be strong-minded men with considerable vanity )
inclined to place a high premium on loyalty in their
subo terdinac. xtn_i
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confidence. No President is likely to be charitably
'it
disposed
disposed toward, support any intelligence
organization -- or head thereof -- does not
acknowledge the primacy of its, or his, responsibilities
to the Executive Branch and the President.
(E) The Defense Department:
There are several fertile sources of inherent
conflict between the Department of Defense (including
the senior officials thereof, both civilian and military)
and an independent intelligence structure reporting
directly to the President and/or the NSC, particularly
one headed by a civilian or any person not subordinate
to the Secretary of Defense and the military services.
.For a number of reasons, including the high cost
of technical collection systems, the bulk of the
national foreign intelligence program budget
involves Defense Department funds, controlled by that
Department, plus personnel and physical assets also
belonging to it.
-- In a wartime situation)the military services' need
? for certain types of intelligence will be paramount.)
and neither they nor their civilian chiefs will be
comfortable with any arrangement which does not
give them control over the assets providing this
needed support.
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-- Even in peacetime, the military services are
geared toward insuring that the intelligence needs
of major US force commanders are met (again, the
national/tactical problem reappears).
- The wartime/peacetime problem is complicated by
a conceptual ambiguity inherent in the Defense
Department's notion of the "bational Command
Atuthorities," a concept which includes the
. President -- but as Commander-In-Chief -- and
Dit-kwat if21-
other offices or officers of the
government such as the Secretary of State and the
DCI.
-- There is an inevitable human tension generated by
the Defense Department's irritation, to which the
uniformed military services are understandably most
susceptible, 'A-any group -- especially a group
of "civilians" -- providing independent interpre-
tations and analyses to the President on matters
with military dimensions or which affect decisions
regarding the size, composition, funding and
use of U.S. military forces.
(F) The Heisenberg Factor:
The Heisenberg phenomenon, a staple of modern physics,
is the complication engendered in the conduct of certain
experiments by the fact that the observer inevitably
becomes a distorting part of the process. It has its
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analogue in the intelligence profession when intelligence
officers have to address situations in which the
actions (or non-actions) and behavior of their own
government is a major factor influencing if not determining
these situations' evolution and outcome. One given
in our intelligence equation, however, is the fact that
the foreign situations in which the US Government, particularly
its Executive Branch, are likely to be most interested or wAAt1.
have the most direct bearing on US interests are almost
invariably situations in which this "Heisenberg" factor
amommet, very large.
(G) The Access Problem:
Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 was
written in part to prevent another Pearl Harbor by
insuring that theft would be some independent collating and
analyzing entity, not under departmental control, which would
have access to all information known to all components of
the US Government. This ideal never has been
realized nor will it ever be:
Some departmental, especially military,information
will always be regarded as "too sensitive" for the
eyes of uninitiated outsiders.
In all government components, especially the military
services, departmental definitions of what constitutes
"operational" as opposed to "intelligence" data will
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be used to deny pertinent information to any
independent (or even departmental) intelligence
entity.
--At the Presidential/NSC level, detailed knowledge
of what the US is doing -- e.g., the status or
even existence of delicate negotiations -- will
not be surfaced to the Intelligence Community or,
sometimes, any members thereof,including the DCI.
This problem is greatly compounded by the personal
attitudes and working style of Dr. Kissinger, but
the problem would exist if he were still a Harvard
professor
A problem will always be affected by the work style and
attitudes of any given President and his trueAcorps
of advisors (i.e., those to whom he actually listens,
regardless of what offices they may or may not
hold). It will also be affected by the degree of 44.s.-
trT-t-i-rm-and trust the President feels he can place in
his Intelligence Community and/or its head 411di.
that what e tells the
Intelligence Community will not be passed without his
prior approval -- or, indeed., save at his express
direction -- to Congress or the press.
(H) Secrecy and Surrogates:
Regardless of what provisions are made or what
institutional mechanisms are developed for approval and
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oversight -- Congressional, Executive or public
two facts will remain unalterable:
-- Anything told to "the AmeriCan
people" will b
almost instantaneously known to every interested
government, general staff or foreign group around
the world.
The degree of secrecy essential for the operation of
an intelligence structure cannot be maintained unless
a circle of people with access to certain types
of information or knowledge is kept very small.
Given the above, if the US is to have an intelligence structure:
, approval supervision and oversight will have to be conducted
by surrogates. In other words, members of Congress -- and
the public -- will have to be willing to delegate these super-
visory and oversight responsibilities to a small number of
people (e.g., peers) whom they are willing to trust, and will
have to accept these surrogates' judgments includingjudgments
implicit in their silence. Such a system may not he palatable
in our society or possible in our current national mood and
political climate. Without it, however, we will not have a
functional intelligence structure.
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III. THE BUILDING BLOCKS
An intelligence structure able to meet the US Govern-
ment's intelligence needs over the next two to three decades --
including its needs for the "services" (from covert action
to secure message passing) hich intelligence organizations
are best equipped tohrT-Ilave traditionally provided -- will
have to be simple, flexible and adaptable. Its shape and
nature will also have to be framed in light of the postulates
and "givens" outlined above. Such a structure can be
developed from four basic elements:
(1) A principal intelligence officer, who can serve
as the President's principal advisor on intelligence o1
4.M.P. intelligence-related matters, vested with sufficient
authority to be able to ensure that all of the US
Government's intelligence organizations functien as
an integrated system in servicing national needs and
requirements, even though many of those organizations
will also have departmental responsibilities.
(2) One independent intelligence organization not
subordinate to any Cabinet department which can be
t?e,15s>,srt. me el 1-,s,
solely devoted to national t..4.s.k.s and be vested with
responsibility for performing those functions and tasks
best performed centrally.
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(3) A viable Congressional oversight structure which
strikes a workable balance between the requirements
dictated by constitutional considerations the
practical considerations of the current political
climate and the requirements of secrecy essential to
the functioning existence of any intelligence structure.
(4) Some form of review and audit mechanism capable
of serving the public's interests and, in the current
political climate, requirements while -- again --
preserving a threshold of essential discretion and
secrecy.
IV.. THE BASIC STRUCTURE
A. The Principal Officer.
If the US Government's intelligence structure is
to work as an organic entity, it has to have a head
with no other duties and responsibilities. There is,
hence, a need perceived by the drafters of the
National Security Act of 1947 -- for an office whose
holder would be the US Government's principal intelli-
gence officer.
(1) He can be called by any of a variety of
titles. Director of Central Intelligence is fine;
but if, for cosmetic reasons, the title needs to be
??
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changed)he could be styled either the Director of
National Intelligence or the Director G6neral
of Intelligence.
(2) This office should be created by statute
?and its incumbent appointed by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate.
(3) The DGI on the one hand has to have some
measure of independence from the President in order
to be able to resist the kind of pressures
engendered during President Nixon's administration.
At the same time, he cannot be totally independent
or regarded by tha incumbent President as a
potentially alien force not subject to that
President's direction and control. Perhaps the
best way to achieve this is to have the DCI
)1"
appointed for a term of five years. He could
be eligible for re-appointment at the end of that
period to one additional term, provided the Senate
advises and consents to that re-appointment. To
prevent any President from saddling his sucCessorCE"PloulL
ow_ G h7);ever,s'tere should
also be a provision in the statute that no appointment ILLEGIB
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to the office of DCI may be made within one calendar
year of the quadrennial Presidential election
or during.the period between an election and the
new President's inauguration. There should also
be a proviso that the President may require the
resignation of the DGI if a majority of the
Congressional Joint Committee on Intelligence (see
below) so concurs.
This last proviso is designed to make
it possible for a President to remove
a DCI without going through the
cumbersome process of impeachment but,
at the same time, making the process
sufficiently difficult so that no
President can remove a DCI without
very good reason (going well beyond an
unwillingness to carry out improper
Presidential instructions).
(4) The DCI would be the President's principal
substantive foreign intelligence officer and advisor
on foreign intelligence matters. He would also
be the fount through which intelligence services --
including covert action -- were provided and commissioned.
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He would report to the President in the latter's
capacity as Chairman of the National Security
Council and would be -- by statute -- an advisory
member of the NSC. (The current climate may not
permit this, but the system would work best if the
DCI had personal Cabinet rank.)
(5) The DCI would be responsible annually for
submitting a National Foreign Intelligence Program
Budget to the President and the NSC and for presenting
to the Congressional Joint Committee on Intelligence
the NFIPBP/approved by the President acting as
Chairman of the NSC.
(6) In time of hostilities or imminent hostilities,
the DCI could be made responsible to the Secretary
of Defense if the President should so direct by
Executive Order (which the President would b
empowered by statute to issue at hi S discretion),
provided that the DCI 464 retainAis statutory role
IrzwkiNeA
as an advisory member of the NSC and ARI's responsible
for providing the President and the NSC with
independent intelligence appreciations and
appraisals.
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(7) The DCI would have line control over our
system's second building block -- the independent
intelligence organization described below. He would
also be vested with the chairmanship of all major
Community committees -- e.g., the USIB, IRAC or
their restructured successors -- and be at least
a member of all intelligence-related EXCOMs.
B. The Independent Organization.
The functions performed over the past 28 years by
CIA need to be performed and need to be performed
centrally, even though the current political climate
may necessitate some cosmetic re-arrangement and a new
name. There should thus also be created, by statute,
a successor organization to the CIA for which the best
name might be the National Foreign Intelligence Agency.
(1) Its Director should be appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate
to serve at the President's pleasure. The
Director of the NFIA should be one notch in the
+40.4.14
executive hierarchy below the DCI.
1)(
(2) The NFIA's Director should report to the ...1 Skc+z- 1-ke
-01)etA-A-Sf"4?4"1 National Security Council through the DCI and be
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recognized as the latter's line subordinate. He
should be designated as the.DGI's principal deputy
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and act for the DGI whenever the latter is
absent.
(3) Should the office of DGI fall vacant
Within one calendar year of a quadrennial Presidential
7r
election (or during the period between election and
inauguration), the Director of'NFIA would assume
the duties of Acting DGI until a new DGI was
Ofses'incle.:4:142.1.)
appointed (by the ne A resident) and confirmed by
the Senate. The NFIA should have collection,
analysis, production and support responsibilities
essentially similar to those now discharged by
CIA. It should also have responsibilities for
carrying out sensitive actions)including covert
action programs)and the other intelligence services
discussed earlier in this paper.
C. Congressional Oversight.
It may not be politic for us to recommend how
Congress should structure itself, but the only possible
route we see through the contrary demands for -7/thorough
supervision on the one hand and the needs of minimal
security on the other, is via a joint committee of both
Houses of Congress with virtually full jurisdiction over
intelligence-related matters.
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(1) This joint committee would have to be of
manageable size but nonetheless would also have to
include appropriate representation (say, three
members each) from the Senate and House Committees
on Appropriations, Armed Services and Foreign
Affairs/International Relations. It should probably
also include about three other members chosen at
large from either House, making a total membership
of about 21.
(2) This joint committee should have a small
permanent staff, selected for judgment and
discretion and required to sign secrecy agreements
analagous to those now signed by CIA employees.
C3)This committee should be charged by the Congress
as a whole with continuing oversight of the national
foreign intelligence program and, simultaneously, 41:1-1-1
-(44 ensuring the maintenance of the degree of
secrecy essential to the conduct of such a program.
(1k) Current statutes should be amended so that
it is this committee (alone) with which covert action
proposals are checked or to which they are reported.
3) The four current oversight committees --
e.g., the Intelligence Subcommittees of the House
and Senate Committees on Armed Services and
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Appropriations -- should yield their oversight
responsibilities to the new joint committee. When
the joint committee is considering the appropri-
ation of funds, however, and reviewing intelligence
budget presentations, the Chairman plus one majority
and minority member of the Senate and House
Committees on Appropriations should sit with the
Joint Committee on intelligence,)with the Acting
Chairmanship of thdTCommittee being assumed,
by some mutually agreeable principle of rotation,
by the respective chairmen of the Senate and House
Committees on Appropriations.
D. The Public's Surrogates.
To protect the public's interest and to meet the
current demand for public oversight of the US Government's
intelligence activities -- without compromising the
essential secrecy -- the present PF1AB should be expanded
and changed in both nature and function.
(1) There should be established by statute a
Board of Intelligence Overseers, consisting of five
public members appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate.
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(2) Each member of that Board should serve for
a term of three years, once renewable -- except
that on the initial Board, two members should serve
for one year, two for two, and one for a full
term, with the determination to be made by lot.
(3) the Board should elect its Chairman who
should serve in that capacity for two years. (At
the outset, the member elected Chairman should
probably be the one to serve a full three-year
term as a member, with the other initial-term
determinations then being made by lot.)
(4) The Board should have a small but suitable
permanent staff, appropriately cleared and
signing appropriate secrecy agreements as a
condition of employment.
(5) The Board should be responsible for advising
the President and the Chairman of the Joint
Congressional Committee on Intelligence, on a
continuing basisron the adequacy, effectiveness
and propriety of the National Foreign Intelligence
Program. Public concerns, complaints or allegations
of improper actions could be submitted directly
to the Board for consideration and for such subsequent
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action recommendations as the Board deems it
advisable to submit to the President, the DGI and/
or the Congressional Joint Committee.
(6) The DCI should be required to regularly
with the Board togive at lea'.31 summary
account of the whole national foreign intelligence
program.
E. Interrelationships Among the Above.
(1) This structure, in effect, splits the DCI's
two hats. It makes the DCI and the head of the NFIA
two separate people. The split is not total, however,
because it leaves the DGI control of the NFIA by
A
making the latter'shead the DGI's line subordinate
and principal deputy. This degree of control is
essential if the DCI is to have the staff support
and directly taskable resources necessary to do
his job.
(2) The DGI's immediate staff -- separate from
the NFIA apparatus -44kould be fairly small: I am
?against moving the bulk of what are now CIA's
analysis and production components to the new DGI's
office. . If this route were taken, the Director of
the NFIA would probably feel compelled to develop
at least some complementary'capabilities within his
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own organization and the end result would almost
certainly be unnecessary duplication and bureaucratic
layering.
(3) Instead, we should build on the present
serviceable models of the NIO structure and the JC
Staff, i.e., have the DCI supported by two staff
entities, one assist him in the field of substance
and action, the other in the sphere of resource
management. Both of these entities can be fairly
small butfcomposed of able, broad-gauged, experienced
P
senior officers. Through such a mechanism the DCI
would be able to draw on, and utilize, all the
resources of the entire Intelligence Community,
preserving the independence of those elements under
his line jurisdiction but at the same time not
giving them a judgmental or product monopoly which
would be both resented and resisted by other
Community components and would probably encourage
car-{-t?to (*Pk ttt S e,IJ .-
strong-Jllinded NSC memberss to develop large parallel
structures within their own departments.
(4) These schematic outlines of the basic
structure obviously do not address, let alone_answer,
all of the organizational questions and problems
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involved in developing a new Intelligence Community
adequate to meet both the political and substantive
needs of our government, during the balance of this
century. Once a basic core structure is agreed on,
however, it will be much easier to tackle the
remaining problems seriatim and to ascertain how +14t"-
..t.44.o can best be fitted within or related to that
basic core.
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ugW
KEY ISSUES DEFINING "NEW STRUCTURE"
There are a number of basic principles which must be
taken into account in any restructuring of the Intelligence
Community.
1. The need for an independent organization charged
with production of national intelligence. Independent
here refers to independent from DOD operating elements
and responsive directly to the National Security Council
and the President.
2. The need for coordination of all intelligence
production. Coordination in this sense does not imply
resolution of differences, but rather implies manage-
ment of the process to insure appropriate representation
of differing views on important issues when they exist.
Also it is important to insure that a process exists
whereby alternative interpretations of events recieve.
adequate attention and resolution.
3. Independent collection resources. Just as in
the case of production, it is important to insure that
no one organization has total control of.all principal
collection resources. This is particularly true in the
case of technical collection, but may also have some
parallels in human resources.
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4. Overall resource management and/or allocation.
Given the large budgets required to support current and
projectedintelligence requirements, it is critical that
one senior official be in a position to review resource
allocation and defend the total budget to congress.
5. Coordination of collection operations.
6. Coordination and rationalization of intelligence
support to military commanders.
7. Acceptable and practical management of covert
action.
8. Evaluation/audit of the entire Intelligence
Community including both collection and production elements.
In all of the above considerations, the role of the DCI
is critical. The fundamental issues having to do with specific
form that the new structure should assume largely hinge on
judgments on how strong the DCI needs to be in his various
areas of responsibility and in the practical world how best
to arrange institutions and mechanisms so as to provide the
DCI with the necessary strength to carry out his assigned
responsibilities. For a number of reasons, which will not be
reviewed here, none of the key points mentioned above can be
totally relegated to the DOD. Therefore the new structure
must provide the DCI with some authorities and equities in
resource management, collection management, intelligence
production, military commander intelligence support, and
evaluation and audit of the entire community.
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In broad terms there are three ways the DCI could be
placed in relationship to the President and the NSC on the
one hand, and the Intelligence Community on the other. These
Will be discussed in more detail later in this paper, but
for now these three different positions can be defined as:
1. Current DCI with two deputies and some
increase in the IC Staff.
2. A DCI who reports directly to the President
as a member of the NSC and is directly supported byt
a large staff including major elements of the current
DDI. In this case a Director of Foreign Intelligence
(D/FIA) would be established to manage the remainder
of the current CIA plus perhaps an augmented National
Reconnaissance Organization.
3. DCI reporting directly to the President and
.a member of the NSC as in Option 2, but with a much
smaller staff, with the major intelligence production
staff replaced by an NIO-like organization.
One of the major differences among these three options is
the degree to which the DCI can take an objective view of his
various responsibilities (or perceived to have an objective
view by other elements of the community). In.option I he has
under his direct management, both major collection and major
production resources. He has line management responsibilities
as well as coordination and resource allocation roles to play,
and a senior staff role to the President and the NSC. In
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option 2 he is divested of a major set of management
responsibilities, but retains a large direct equity in the
production of national intelligence. Option 3 establishes the
DCI in a position of maximum objectivity while retaining
through an arrangement of boards, committees, and staffs
visibility and leverage.
Another variable across these several options is the
degree of real influence that the DCI can achieve over intel-
ligence resources and quality of the intelligence product.
In the practical world where the DCI cannot achieve total line
authority over the entire community, it is important to assure
that no other agency or other department gains total control
over the entire community or even over critical segments of
the community with no counter-balancing external forces.
Common to all three options outlined above is a need for
certain mechanisms or instruments through which the DCI can
acquire visibility and exercise influence. These mechanisms
are of three kinds and focus respectively on resources,
production and technical coordination. In the resources area
there is a need for two or perhaps three EXCOMs. First, the
current NRO EXCOM should be continued and expanded to three
members including a "White House" member drawn from the NSC
or the newly constituted President's Science Adviser. There
is a need for a new EXCOM to function as the Board of Directors
for NSA. Membership probably should be essentially the same
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as the NRO EXCOM. Both cases, however, there is a question
about the appropriate DOD member. There is also a question as
to the appropriate authority of the Secretary of Defense. There
is a possibility of a third EXCOM to serve as the Board of
Directors for human resources. Membership of the Human Resource
EXCOM, however, should be different in that there should be a
senior State Department official as a participating member,
and a different DOD member, or perhaps no.DOD member at all.
The USIB in its current form should be abolished and
reconstituted into three entities. As has been suggested in
other papers, the USIB for production coordination is required
without the AEC, FBI and perhaps Treasury as members. A USIB
for collection also is needed and probably should have some
common membership with the production coordination USIB, but
als6 should be augmented to include membership from the collection
community. These will be discussed in more detail later. The
concept of collection requirements needs to be re-evaluated
in the current and projected world of essentially real-time
technical collection systems. The USIB for collection should
focus principally on insuring that adequate mechanisms exist
for coupling collection managers to the production community
and evaluating the performance of the collection community
against production needs.
A third USIB-like group may also be needed to address the
intelligence support to military commanders. As was discussed
in an earlier paper, these needs are similar to the national
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community in some regards and very different in other regards.
The membership on the USIB for military commander intelligence
support would be different and draw heavily on the military as
well as the collection community.
The utility of IRAC is a mechanism need to be carefully
examined. The 'R&D Council has proven to be extremely useful
for information exchange and coordination. This mechanism
needs to be continued in any case. In the increasingly techno-
logically complex world of the future, the DCI must have some
mechanism for overviewing the technical establishment separate
from the other mechanisms provided by EXCOMs and USIBs. IRAC
and subsidiary committess may well be the best way of
accomplishing this function.
To operate and participate in all this machinery, the
Director will continue to need the IC Staff. The Staff needs
to be strengthened, if not necessarily expanded, and depending
upon other features of the new structure, it may be preferable
to establish the Director of the IC Staff as a civilian. In
any case a strong DOD participation both civilian and military
will be essential.
In addition to establishing the appropriate community level
instruments for management and cooridnation, there is a need
to examine the structure of the community itself. Particularly
in the world of technical collection and related processing,
it is important to establish clear authoritative management
structures. NSA is a good example of such a structure with
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respect to SIGINT. NSA through NSCID 6 has a clear management
handle on all of the CCP. The CCP in turn, includes most of the
relevant resources. Hwoever, even in this case there are
problems. NSA has an organization includes major telecommunications
? security functions which are more naturally related to tele-
communications in the DOD than to the intelligence. The reason
for this arrangement is historical and has no practical, current
rationale or significance.
The NRO in its current form is an anomolous arrangement
which was cobbled together out of considerable bureaucratic
strife and cannot persist in its current form. Two major
alternatives exist which are important to discuss in this paper
only because the DCI authority over the NRP is at stake.
There are two major alternatives for theNRO. One is to contin ue
the organization in its current form with essential staff and
a director, but no operational capability
Nftwool
25X1
In any case the
Director, NRO should not occupy a military billet. The D/NRO
could either report directly to the Secretary of Defnese or to
the DCI. The second major alternative is to establish the
NRO as operating organization including all the staffing and
support necessary to manage programs. This organization could
either report to the Secretary of Defense analogous to DARPA
or to the DCI in the case of option 1 or the D/FIA in the case
of options 2 and 3.
An NRO restructured along the lines of NSA has considerable
appeal. First, there is growing concensus the NRO in its current
form is no longer viable. The competitive elements within the
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NRP are not as important in the present and future as they
were in the past. Therefore, the problems of coordinating within
a competitive structure are becoming increasingly difficult.
Second, the needs for military commanders to derive direct
support from satellite collection resources are becoming
increasingly important. At the same time the cost and efficiency
of allowing each military service to pursue its own satellite
collection programs are prohibitive and unnecessary. Again
the
Air
and
current NRO organization with the Under Secretary of the
Force as director is not well suited for
effective military support. There are a
providing efficient
collection of other
reconnaissance programs, both ground based and aircraft based,
strewned throughout the DOD which relate to NRP programs in
terms of technology and capablities, but are not managed
through the same organizational structure. These include
IJ-2s, SR-71s, ground based radars, reconnaissance equipment
for RF4s, S3s, etc. Again the NSCID 6 model has considerable
appeal in that it provides a solid charger for the Director
of NSA to coordinate and direct as necessary the activities
of the various services in this case the security agencies,
without directly assuming line management on each and every
project and program.
The main argument in favor of retaining some semblance of
the current structure, is that the current DCI has managed to
achieve considerable direct line leverage over a large segment
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of the NRP. This has been in the past and still is a source
of considerable strength for the DCI. On the other hand, with
the current organizational arrangement, it is extremely
improbable that the DOD would surrender all control over the
NRP and hand total management ot the DCI. In the cases of
organizational opstions 2 and 3, a different situation exists.
Here a newly constituted NRO could be the equalizer balancing
the DOD control of NSA. The NRO in its line Organizational
realization under the D/FIA or staff realization directly under
the DCI might be politically feasible objectives. It serves
as an excellent technique for distributing responsibility for
intelligence collection without generating needless duplication
and competition.
Another area which needs critical attention is collection
management. The current scheme has USIB through its various
committees establishing collection requirements. These requirements
are intended to drive on the one hand the day to day operations
of current collection assets and on the other hand stimulate
development of new assets and the phasing out of old. While
the USIB committees spend large amounts of time exercising this
process, it in fact is a fiction. The only area where USIB
collection guidance has any serious impact is, in the area of
targeting guidance to the photographic Satellite systems. USIB
has little or no influence over SIGINT resources and human
resources. On the other hand, it is not clear that photography
is better for USIB guidance or SIGINT or human resources worse
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for the lack of it. In any case two alternatives for the
future exist: (1) beef up the USIB process and all the support
it requires down through the various production offices and
agencies, or (2) formally charge the collection managers
with responsibility for understanding intelligence needs
sufficiently well so as to efficiently employ the collection
resource under their direct control. This approach would
require the establishment of effective communications between
production elements of the community and collection elements
of the community. It would also require that the DCI take
on responsibility for evaluating the performance of the
collectors in managing their programs and the effectiveness
of the production community in supporting collection.
In any case, the current world of essentially real time
technical collection systems is likely to defacto obsolete all
the current requirements processes and force a rethinking of
the collection management function.
A concept which has been eluded to several times in the
preceding pages has been that of evaluation and audit. Evaluation
in this context is referring to substantive evaluation of
performance and assessment of effectiveness when applied to
collection activities, this process would have. as its objective
(a) the efficiency of the collection operation, (b) the
effectiveness of the collection operation, (c) its relevance
to the needs of the production community and the needs of the
military commanders. Evaluation would also be looking for
major gaps in the total collection program,duplications in the
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program, and collection capabilities which have outlived their
.1101wei Usefulness. Another key aspect of evaluation would be the
effectiveness of disseminating the collected information to
the users whether it would be elements of the production
community or military commanders. In this context processing
and exploitation elements would be included as part of the
total collection process.
The audit function cannot and should not be separated
from the evaluation function. Here, however, the major focus
is dollars. Audit in this context does not refer to the
bookkeepers use of the term where the objective is insuring
adherence to standards and the law, but rather is concerned
with efficient money management in the broadest sense. There
are dramatic differences throughout the hardware community that
spends intelligence budgeted monies some of which are justified
and appropriate and others which are not. While there -is
considerable concern in congress and the executive branch about
efficient use of money, particularly in the face of rapidly
increasing cost in the intelligence community, there is at
? present time no good mechanism for directly examining the
management process from this perspective.
The evaluation/audit function needs to be studied in
considerable detail in order to define the type of activity
that would be constructive and useful and the level of effort
that should be expended on these tasks. But it is clear that
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the DCI will be stronger and more effective if he has under
Nkomo/ his direct control a staff group performing evaluation and
audit tasks. Not only will it assist him in influencing
community effectiveness, but will be a mechanism for him to
acquire access to data and information. It will also put him
in a better position to defend the intelligence community
programs and budgets, both to the OMB and ultimately to Congress.
(The remainder of this paper will address the pros and
cons of organizational options 1, 2 and 3.)
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A NEW STRUCTURE
The preceding papers have explained the nature of the roles
played by the DCI within the collection, production, and action elements
of the Intelligence Community. We have discussed the DCI's role
with respect to resource review in the Community as set forth in
the Presidential letter of November 1971 and some of the problems
presented by the "national-tactical" issue. We have also explained
that the DCI is himself the head of an independent Agency and thus
responsible for its actions, and that he is an advisor on substantive
matters to the National Security Council (NSC).
In considering the possibility of organizational/management change,
it is important first to consider what, exactly, such change is intended
to accomplish. The preceding papers suggest five principal problem
areas which merit improvement if an opportunity should arise, Or
if the Administration should find it desirable to create such an
opportunity. These are set forth below. Identification of these
problem areas also suggests the basic principles we believe should
guide any consideration of options for structural change in the
Intelligence Community.
1. An important problem identified in developing the 1947
Act was that existing intelligence organizations were unwilling to
share with each other raw data on the various problems with which
they were concerned. Recognition (after Pearl Harbor) of the need
for access to and analysis of information by a central authority led
to the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947. Twenty-eight
years after passage of the 1947 Act, this problem is still with us,
though to a much lesser degree than formerly. Organizational and
managerial changes in the structure of American intelligence for the
future should improve the ability of the DCI (or whoever is designated
to exercise his substantive correlation and coordination role) to
solve this information flow problem. Because knowledge is so
ng Copy
jy
ished
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often perceived as power, there can never be a total solution to this
problem, and the sensitivity of certain information will always
require limiting th,e number of peopie who have access to it. But
improvements are still possible, and organizational/managerial changes
in the Intelligence Community should help improve the ability of
some overall manager to solve the information flow problem.
Z. Partially because if this information flow problem,
it has often not been easy for managers within the American
intelligence structure as it has evolved to identify important new
substantive problems, which should be the object of collection and
production efforts, or to orchestrate the coordinated management steps
which will permit these problems to be solved. The IcI0 process
linking information gaps to programs and resources is a credible
attempt to grapple with this problem, but it is (of necessity under
present arrangements) a collaborative effort depending upon
cooperation; no one has real authority to enforce adherence to this,
or a like, approach.
3. CIA and the various Defense intelligence agencies have
long seen their most important customers as different. The "targeting"
of all collection, processing, and analytical activity within the
Intelligence Community has been subject to relatively constant debate
between those in CIA who would like to see all organizations in the
Community focusing their efforts on major problems of interest to
so-called "national" (mostly civilian) customers and those in Defense
who would use those organizations to solve the intelligence problems
considered by military leaders to be of greatest importance. This
conceptual difference as to the importance of various customers of
information is the basis for most major differences of opinion as to
how limited collection, production, and other resources should be
employed. Because no one in the Community has overall responsibility
for balancing the needs of all customers (and hence for balancing how
all available resources will be employed) decisions reached all too
often do not stand the test of reason. If there is an opportunity,
or the need, to change present organizational/managerial arrangements
within the Community, this issue should be squarely addressed.
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4. Related to this is the point that the American intelligence
apparatus which was partially established by the 1947 Act and which
has evolved in the intervening years' lacks machinery to force rational
decision making about a large number of problems in which both
CIA and Defense have important interests. We do not now have
a management process in which it can be said that all decisions
about resource use across the Intelligence Community are made
with an eye to reasonableness or cost effectiveness. The continuing
debate between CIA and Defense over how (or whether) to make available
information derived from I to theater commanders is STAT
a good example of this problem. (Better examples needed. ) CIA
manages the system which will provide the data in the first instance,
but it is not responsible for insuring that the data gets to military
customers outside of Washington. There is uncertainty as to whether
?the data should leave Washington at all; yet the recognition that the
Services will find a way to get it leads ultimately to the conclusion
that it must be supplied. In considering basic change, it would
be desirable to produce arrangements which can reduce or at least
contain the management problems which surround consideration of
issues of this type involving both Defense and CIA. Steps should be
taken to produce an organizational strucutre in which American
intelligence can accomplish its fundamental missions with the greatest
efficiency commensurate with quality product.
5. Finally, attempts over the years to give the DCI a role
in coordinating the Intelligence Community as a whole while he
simultaneously serves as the head of an independent Agency have not
been satisfactory. Both the 1947 Act and the President's letter of
November 1971 give the DCI important responsibilities in the
Community as a whole. His ability to exercise these responsibilities
has been compromised by his role as head of the CIA both externally
in the Community and internally within the Agency. Major changes
in the overall organization and management "rules" for the conduct
of American intelligence should reduce, if not eliminate, this
continuing problem.
Three Broad Approaches to the Intelligence Organization/Management
Problem
Broadly speaking, there would appear to be three basic approaches
which might be taken to solve the problems outlined above. We could:
3
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-- Transfer most intelligence activities out of the Department
of Defense into a reconstituted and renamed Central Intelligence
Agency responsible for servicing the fundamental intelligence needs
of both the nation's top civilian and military leadership.
-- Absorb the Central Intelligence Agency within the Department
of Defense, eliminating the DCI's role as it has been conceived since
1947 and placing responsibility for effective coordination of all
American intelligence within a Deputy Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence who would absorb the Community responsibilities now
exercised by the DCI as well as those exercised by the present
Assistant Secretary of Defense/Intelligence.
-- Leave essentially unchanged the divigion of labor between
Defense and CIA which has evolved since 1947, while making a
series of changes to enhance the ability of the DCI to play a more
effective role in the overall direction of the Intelligence Community
while at the same time reducing his direct involvement in managing
the CIA program.
The first of these basic approaches would involve consolidating
all or most existing US intelligence into a new independent agency under
th.e command and control of one individual responsible to the President
or the National Security Council. This approach is appealing in that
it would create an organization with control over all aspects of the
intelligence process, establishing the preconditions for solution
of the management problems outlined above. In the real world,
however, we believe this basic approach is a "loser," for several
reasons. First, we doubt Defense (for good reasons) could be
persuaded to give up all control over the intelligence program now
conducted within Don. Military leaders who are entrusted with
our nation's defense must have a measure of control over their
"eyes and ears, " in peace time as well as war time. Second, over
the short term (and probably for many years to come) the manpower
needs of the programs now carried out in Defense, but incorporated
by this approach into a new agency, could probably only be met by
military personnel, except at extraordinary cost. Thus, some
continuing Defense involvement would be required in any event.
Finally, and most fundamentally, there is the political problem.
We doubt either the President or Congress could be persuaded to
4
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agree to the establishment of a very large
organization which we feel certain would be widely characterized,
fairly or not, as the beginnings of a Gestapo.
The second broad approach identified above would involve
consolidating all US intelligence, including CIA, within the Department
of Defense. This approach too would allow control over all US intelli-
gence to be consolidated in the hands of one individual, though it is
questionable how "real" such control would be unless all existing
intelligence organizations were placed under his line command--a
remote possibility at best. There are, however, more fundamental
disadvantages to this approach. First, there is the question of the
"objectivity" or "independence." This approach would effectively
repeal the most basic provision, insofar as intelligence is concerned,
of the 1947 Act: the establishment of an independent CIA. We doubt
anyone would seriously consider this a good idea. The need for an
independent intelligence view seems well accepted everywhere.
Second, we do not believe that intelligence as a discipline would
receive the attention it ought to have in Defense, where it always has
been, and always will be (legitimately) regarded as a support function.
Finally, although we can envision steps which might be taken to allow
the new head of CIA within Defense a measure of independence, in
the real world bureaucratic, budgetary, and other pressures would
build to deny that independence.
The third broad approach--trying to find a way to assert greater
central control over the whole intelligence process while leaving
both Defense and CIA in the intelligence business?seems to us the
only one which offers much hope. This approach recognizes that
two basic facts must be confronted in trying to set forth any
suggestions for overall improvement in the management and
organization of American intelligence. Simply stated, these are:
first, that there exist important arguments for the continuing
existence of an intelligence organization (CIA) not subject to the
control of any other line department or agency within the USG; and
second, that the Department of Defense, charged with responsibility
for defending the nation, requires (or will not relinquish without a
fight no one will be willing to start) a measure of control over important
collection, processing and other intelligence activities which also
contribute in major ways to the solution of problems faced by CIA.
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These two facts are on the one hand the basis for many of the problems
which have characterized the overall management of American intelligence
since World War II and, on the other hand, the reason why workable
solutions to these problems are so difficult to develop.
Toward a Solution
Before considering options within the third broad alternative
suggested above, two important points should be addressed. The
first relates to the relationship between Defense and CIA during
peace and during war. The second involves certain tactical aspects
of any recommendation to change existing organizational and/or
management arrangements within the Community.
With respect to the first point, the role of the Secretary of
Defense in war time is very clearly established and is embodied
in the NCA concept. The role of the DCI in war, on the other hand,
is fuzzy indeed. This is the basis for many differences between
Defense and CIA. it causes bureaucratic guerrilla -warfare across a
wide front. There is much skirmishing for authorities, access,
systems, resources--Defense because it will need them in war time,
CIA because it needs them in peace.
As a result of this and other factors, we still do not have a
truly national intelligence system. Moreover, at the onset of war,
or at various undefined points in a major crisis, national intelligence
assets would be transferred piecemeal to Defense control under
chaotic conditions. The nation would not be well served. If we consider
the question of reporting relationships from the war time end rather
than, as we have since 1947, from the peace time one, the problem
is more easily solved. The National Security Act of 1975 might
read more or less as follows:
The DCI shall be responsible to the President through the
National Security Council, except that in the event of major
hostilities he shall be responsible to the President through the
Secretary of Defense, unless the President directs otherwise.
When he is subordinate to the Secretary of Defense he shall retain
the right to render substantive assessments independently to
the President.
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Such a formulation would help to cause the interests of the
Aft, SecDef and DCI to converge where they are now adversary. The
SecDef would be more interested in 'seeing that the DCI built a strong
national intelligence system in time of peace; the DCI would be
more concerned that the system be designed to meet Defense's needs
in peace time or war. In the event of war, the entire system, including
the DCI, would move to Defense as a unit with far less disruption
of internal command mechanisms than would take place under present
understandings. The door would be open to develop a more unitary
system, with a unitary budget, in peace. At the same time, the
Congress could be assured that the peace time DCI was in fact
independent of the Department of Defense.
? The second issue to be considered in this section concerns the
tactics which must surround any discussion of major changes in
existing arrangements. We are faced with a paradox: there are
strong pressures to strengthen the DCI, and we believe this would
be desirable; there appear also to be some pressures to weaken
him. The two may be reconcilable, however. The solution may be
to balance a needed increase in the DCIls overall management powers
with a decrease of his line authority where he can do without.
A particular issue is CIA itself. Some would argue that the
organization is so tarnished in the public eye that total reorganization
and/or dismemberment is called for. We do not agree, but we
believe that organizational arrangements that permit the DCI to distance
himself from CIA; or portions thereof, should be considered.
CIA's public reputation is unfortunately a fact. A DCI not closely
identified with it would be far more politically acceptable and
available as the senior national intelligence officer. Indeed, a
President would find it easier to give a DCI the access and confidence
upon which his power must ultimately rest if the DCI were not himself
considered an intelligence operator. Moreover, we have already
noted that present arrangements require the DCI to carry out a number
of very complex responsibilities; if we increase further his overall
management and budgetary role, these arrangements must change
if he is to cope.
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STAT
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On the other hand, the DCI cannot do his job by himself. If he
is to manage national intelligence, he must have strong staffs in the
resource and collection guidance fields. If he is to be the President's
intelligence officer, he must have a strong substantive staff. In fact,
we believe these three functions so closely depe_nd on one another
that they must be maintained under single management in any case.
Thus, it appears essential that the DCI retain under his direct control
the production elements (or portions of them) of CIA.
At the opposite end of the scale is the DDO. It is the primary
target of outside criticisms, and thus the element of CIA with which
the DCI should have the least association. This must be balanced,
however, against the DDO's usefulness--and contribution to the
DCI's power--as an agent of covert action.
Two Options
We have argued that consolidating command and control of all
intelligence operations in the hands of one man, either within a
reconstituted and renamed CIA or within Defense, is both unwise
and impractical. Within a broad requirement to preserve important
roles for both Defense and CIA in the intelligence business, are there
options available which might advance some or all of the goals
discussed above? While there are an infinite number of variations,
we see only two basic options. The first involves definitively separating
the DCI from CIA and appropriating most intelligence funds to him
under rules established by Congress while requiring him to turn
over or delegate those funds to existing organizations for program
operation. The second would separate the DCI from CIA less definitively
but give him a vote in EXCOM arrangements for the NRC and
(as now) and the CCP. Further discussion of these two options follows.
Option 1. In summary, this option would provide for the
creation of a new intelligence organization headed by a Director with
production and overall Community management responsibilities.
Residual elements of CIA would be consolidated, together with the
NRC, into a new Foreign Intelligence Agency
headed by a Director. This is a "clean" arrangement, given the
constraints above. In detail:
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STAT
STAT
STAT
Neril
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a. Amend the National Security Act of 1947 to create
a new Intelligence Production and Management Agency (with some such
deliberately "unacronymic" and unpronouncable title) headed by a
Director who is by law a member of the NSC. Transfer existing
CIA production components, the NI0s, and the IC Staff to this organizatioa
and make the Director IPMA responsible for meeting the basic pro-
duction requirements of top civilian and military leaders (though this
effort will cb viously need to supplemented by various departmental
production components), collection guidance for all collection
organizations in the Community, and preparation of an overt total
intelligence budget covering his own organization, residual CIA
programs, the NROIii land the Consolidated Cryptologic
Program. Leave budgetary responsibility for the GDIP (except
entirely within Defense.
b. Simultaneously, create a new civilian Foreign
Intelligence Agency to be risponsible for operation ofl
he NRO, the CIA Clandestine Services
and related support, and other residual CIA programs under a
Director FIA responsible to the President through the NSC for
operational matters and to the Director IPMA for resource matters.
Funds for this organization would be appropriated by Congress
to the Director IPMA but transferred to the FLA for expenditure
under rules established by the amended Act.
c. Leave Defense in charge of actual operation of
the Consolidated Cryptologic Program. Give the D/IPMA a strong
hand in CCP operation by appropriating funds for these programs to
him while requiring that he transfer them to the head of the CCP
for actual operations in accordance with applicable Defense law
and procedures.
This approach would be similar to one established during
the 1960's under which funds were appropriated to the Director of
the Office of Economic Opportunity but then delegated to the Department
of Labor for actual program operation. A similar procedure is
followed today in the case of
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Advantages. This option would:
-- Give the Director command and control over the
intelligence production process while eliminating his direct association
with, or management responsibility for, all Community operational
activities.
-- Give the Director IPMA a strong role in the overall
management of the Community while leaving day-to-day operations
in the hands of individual program managers. It would do this by
giving the Director effective authority over the budget process within
which most questions of broad direction and resource use--but not
the details--could be decided. Thus, the Director IPMA would use
his control over the broad directions of the resource process to
"manage" collection rather than relying on actual command and
control authority.
-- End the divided management of NRO programs and
reduce the associated bureaucratic battles about resource use
within that program.
-- Further remove residual CIA elements from the
White House, interposing another management layer short of the NSC.
-- Place responsibility for meeting the important
substantive needs of the nation's military leaders in the hands of one
individual, giving him the authority to balance those needs against the
needs of top civilians but requiring him to do so.
-- Separate present CIA production elements from
operational components, reducing some of the problems of "guilt
by association" which have affected the production world and those
with whom it deals in the public.
Disadvantages.
-- This approach calls for major change, never easy.
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-- It remains to be proven that the D/IPMA could meet
military needs adequately, even if the military could be persuaded
in the first instance that this should be tried.
-- This option may suggest to some a variation which
could substantially reduce the overall effectiveness of American
intelligence, namely, the idea that the[ NRO should be managed
by the Air Force and that the balance of CIA not transferred to the
D/IPMA should be folded into either State or Defense.
-- It would separate producers and collectors more fully
than they now are, increasing problems of access to information
and--particularly in the highly technical programs?reducing the
important interaction between these two groups.
Option 2, is a less ideal, but still desirable, approach which
again emphasizes the DCITs production and Community management roles.
In summary, this option would involve reorganization within CIA
to emphasize the DCIts production and Community management roles
while removing him further (but not separating him entirely) from
remaining CIA responsibilities. His actual authority over other
components in the Community would be increased slightly from the
status quo but not enough to give him a definitive voice. In detail:
a. Reorganize CIA to consolidate all DDI and DDS&T
production elements, and the NI0s, into one directorate reporting
to the Director. Establish a civilian Deputy Director as the line manager
of the DDO, the DDA, and the balance of DDS&T, legally reporting
to the DCI but, de facto, an independent individual.
STAT
b. Create (in statute) three Executive Committees to
make resource decisions about the NRO, and the CCP. STAT
As in the first option above, ignore the GDIP except as regards STAT
Give the DCI a vote in each Executive Committee (as now) but leave
final decisions up to the Secretary of Defense (with a right of appeal
by the DCI to the President). Make major changes in existing procedures
for budgetary review of the CCP within Defense by taking program
out of the Joint Review Process and consolidating it in the CCP
EXCOM. Transfer funding of CIA third-party programs to Defense.
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c. Reorganize the DCI's Intelligence Community Staff
to support the DCI's role in the three EXCOMs and to review the
resource requirements of his Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
d. Amend the 1947 Act to make the DCI a statutory
member of the National Security Council.
e. Physically separate the DCI, the IC Staff, and the
new production organization from the rest of CIA.
f. Leave responsibility for meeting the production
needs of the nation's senior military with Defense (avoid the "national-
tactical" problem).
Advantages.
-- The DCI's role with respect to the existing two
EXCOM programs would remain essentially untouched; he would gain
a voice in broad decision making about the CCP.
-- CIA as an institution would remain largely unchanged
in overall size, though it would be managed quite differently.
-- The DCI's responsibilities would be better focused
on the Community aspects of his job, and he could 'rely on a civilian
manager to handle CIA operational activities directly.
-- Requires considerably less legislative and other
change than Option 1 above.
Disadvantages.
-- No one individual would be empowered to cope with
thelhational-tactical"problem, though military officers would no
doubt consider it a plus that the DCI was not given this task.
DCI's ability to affect decision making on a wide
variety of issues would be considerably less than under the arrangements
outlined in Option 1 above, though more than at present.
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-- The EXCOM arrangement for management of NRO
which many consider awkward and unwieldy at best,
would be perpetuated and even expanded.
-- The DCI would not be definitively separated from
the CIA. This will reduce his credibility in carrying out his Community
role while leaving him more "troops" to carry out that or any other
responsibility.
Recommendation. Try for Option 1; settle for Option 2.
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7 August 1975
COMMENT ON STRUCTURE
1. This paper is prepared without options. I see
three levels of command authority which have to be dealt
with in any discussion of revising the 1947 National Security
Act. These are: the policy decision level; the resource
requirements and review level; and the implementation level.
2. The policy decision level. Ultimate policy
decision lies with the President. Paradoxically we
wish to protect the President from his decisions in intelli-
gence and covert action matters. It is, therefore necessary
to include at the i3olicy decision level an organizational
structure which will protect the President. The framers of
the 1947 Act set up the National Security Council.
We may need to restructure the duties of the Council. It
was created, apparently, for peace-time administration, The
Defense Department has recently established a National
Command Authority to be exercised in the event of major
hostilities. There is good reason to be clear about the
policy decision level in both peace and war. The 1947 Act
could be rewritten to include provisions for a National
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2
Security Council in peace-time and a National Command
Authority in war-time. The membership of each will be the
same; the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary
of State and a newly constituted member of the Council and
the Authority, the DCI. The DCI will be appointed by the
President, confirmed by the Senate and will be the President's
principal intelligence advisor, He will be responsible for
submission to the President of an annual budget (to be pre-
pared by the Resource and Collection Board of his office).
The DCI will administer the intelligence community (as
discussed below) through three boards constituting his office.
3. The resource requirements and review level, The
functions of the Director of Central Intelligence should
include the administration of three boards--a production
board, a resource and collection board, and a review board,
A. The production board will have the task of
research, analysis and preparation of finished intelligence
documents for the use of the policy decision level, primarily,
and, as appropriate, for the rest of the government. All
information available to the U.S. Government will be pro-
vided to the production board. The production board will
establish requirements for the entire U. S. Government
collection program.
B. The resource and collection board will have
the responsibility to determine the extent of the basic
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3
collection program to be undertaken by the United States
and the amount of resources which will be obligated to
accomplish these collection programs. The resource and
collection board will work closely with the Office of
Management and Budget. This board will have both budgetary
and audit functions.
C. The review board. The review board will
undertake for the DCI the inspection and review of the intelli-
gence community at both the resource and requirements level
and at the implementation level. Its review powers will be
plenary for the Intelligence Community, and it will report
through the DCI to the NSC and to the President. The review
board will also work directly with the joint oversight
committee of Congress should the latter decide to create
a joint oversight committee and will publish annual public
statements on national intelligence activities.
D. The tasking of both human and technical
intelligence will be done by the production board and the
resource and collection boards acting in concert. All human
source collection responsibilities will be placed under the
Foreign Intelligence Agency excepf field intelligence for
combat units in war-time. The requirements for technical
collection at both the national and tactical level will be
established by the production board (except for covert action)
and placed on the FIA, the Defense Department and the JCS by
the resource and collection board. The responsibility for
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4
implementation of technical collection will be worked out
between the FIA and the JCS in an EXCOM relationship which
will consider each collection mechanism and present its
planning to the resource and collection board, Problems
which cannot be resolved by committee action will be referred
to the DCI for resolution. Some portions of the NRO, the
and the CCP will continue to be administered under
SECDEF.
4. The implementation level will consist of the current
Central Intelligence Agency which will be renamed the
Foreign Intelligence Agency and the Departmental level
Defense Intelligence organizations and agencies responsible
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff including the Defense Intelligence
Agency which should be restructured to report directly to
the JCS and serve the joint departmental responsibilities of
the Joint Staff. The DCI production board will provide
similar services for the Secretary of Defense.
5. The Foreign Intelligence Agency will have two
primary responsibilities--collection and action, Collection
will include both technically-procured and human source
intelligence. The technical collection effort would
include some portions of NRO, programs currently administered
by the DDSU and third party technical programs (liaison
with foreign intelligence) technical efforts now undertaken
by the DDO.
The human collection program would include the
current DDO programs in both positive intelligence and
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5
counterintelligence fields and those portions of the military-run
human source program not an integral part of the combat
commander's force structure.
6. This would be the general structure. Under this
plan the separate units would have the following authorities
and would include parts of or all of the following current
organizations:
A. The Office of the DCI would include;
1) An intelligence briefing officer to
keep the DCI up to date, a legal advisor, a small support
staff to provide communicationsjt.-ansport (including interface
111.0
with military transport)xa security staff, all located in
an office in the immediate vicinity of the President.
2) A production board co-located with the
Office of the DCI and including portions of OCI, OER, OSR,
OPR and the CIA operations center. (Elements of DIA would
also be co-located in the production board including portions
of the current Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence,
the Deputy Director for Attaches and Human Resources and the
Deputy Director for Estimates. Most of the officers and
structure of the DIA would remain in DIA to serve JCS, The
purpose of moving portions of DIA into the production board
would be to create a complete production board to serve the
Secretary of Defense as a separate intelligence and analysis
function. The Secretary of Defense, of course, would be free
to draw upon JCS and DIA through Defense channels),
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6
The production board would also include the National Intelli-
gence Officers and portions of the intelligence community
staff, specifically those involved in establishing production
policy. Some portions of NPIC, OSI and OWI should probably
be placed in the production board, but just how would
await the organization of that board. Portions of the Depart-
ment of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research would be
included.
B. The Resource and Collection Board would include
a part of the Office of the Comptroller of the CIA, the
USIB function which together with the Collection Guidance
and Assessments Staff would be reformed into an active
collection allocation staff, portions of the CIA Office of
Finance,
officers
portions
portions of the Office of Joint Computer Support,
from the Plans and Operations Staffs of the DDO, and
of the Office of the Deputy Director for Collection
and Surveillance of the DIA.
C.
CIA IG Staff,
of DIA.
7. The Foreign Intelligence Agency would include the
remaining offices of the CIA/DDI, the CIA/DDO, the CIA/DDSU,
the CIA/DDA and portions of the DOD DIA Deputy Director for
Attaches and Human Resources, portions of the U.S. Army
Intelligence Agency, ONI and the Office of the Air Assistant
Chief of Staff for Intelligence.
The review board would include the PFIAB, the
and portions of the Inspector General Staff
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7 August 1975
External Oversight Mechanisms
The Need ?
Oversight of the intelligence mechanism of a-democracy
is a vital function. Even in an open society such as ours,'
there is a need for secrecy in the collection of intelligence
and the conduct of intelligence operations. This condition
of secrecy can be used as a means of subverting the intelli-
gence organ into an instrument of power if there are no
checks upon its activities. We believe further that the
existence of a strong oversight mechanism guarantees the
credibility of the intelligence process to the public.
As we believe, an oversight mechanism performs three
functions. It assures the executive and congressional branches
that the intelligence component of government is performing
its job properly and well. Secondly, it provides a vehicle
for establishing credibility of the need for an intelligence
organization and the quality of its product with the public.
Thirdly, it provides the means for assuring the people of the
U.S., including those engaged in governing, that the actions
of the intelligence agency are carried out with appropriate
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regard for the society's standards of propriety.
The Basic Dilemma
We do not believe that the existence of an intelligence
organization is inconsistent with the principles of American
democracy. Indeed, we strongly believe that such an organ-
ization is essential to the preservation of the American
nation in which such a democracy exists. We do believe also
that the existence of a central intelligence organ coupled
with the need for oversight poses a basic political dilemma
to those who would oversee whether within the executive
branch or within Congress. The overseer can be credible
only if he is totally aware of the broad spectrum of intelli-
gence activities. He may become aware of these activities
before or after the fact. In either event, the requirements
of secrecy limit him to silence about these activities. Such
silence can be construed as acquiescence in the conduct of
the activities. If the activities prove to be failures Or
unpopular, his knowledge and his attendant silence can
politically affect him adversely in his relationship with
his constituents. The basic contradiction is that those
involved with oversight need to know all to provide credibility
but cannot know all if they are to be politically effective.
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The Present Situation
The Central Intelligence Agency has been and is presently
undergoing a considerable degree of investigations. One
investigation, that of the commission on CIA Activities
Within the United States, has been completed. The findings
of that commission have resulted in certain recommendations
which would improve oversight mechanisms relative to the
Central Intelligence Agency. These include strengthening
the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, an
enlarged role for the Inspector General Staff, the infusion
of broader experience into the General Counsel Staff and
the establishment of a joint congressional oversight committee,
presumably modeled along the lines of the joint committee on
atomic energy. These measures will undoubtedly be instituted
by executive action during the next 60 days. Such measures
probably will be viewed as stop gaps by Congress. The
congressional urge to reestablish a degree of parity with the
executive branch will force that former institution to devise
feasible means of effective external oversight in which it is
involved. Then Congress will be in a position individually
to assure their constituents that the "rogue elephant" is
indeed being controlled by congressional vigilance.
In order to develop the means of oversight which will
be effective, we need to explore several facets of the inter-
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relationship between CIA and its masters. Immediately, we
have identified one problem because the Central Intelligence
Agency reports to many masters. The pluralism of our society
is reflected in the plurality of our intelligence institutions.
Just as there are many consumers of intelligence, so there are
many who exert some form of subordination over some aspects of
the intelligence community. The DCI, in any of his several
roles, is subject to this pressure from above from several
sources. The National Security Act of 1947 stipulates that
the Director of Central Intelligence shall report to the
National Security Council. Who is the National Security
Council? The National Security Council consists of the
Secretaries of State and Defense, and is chaired by the
President of the United States. In practice the influence
of the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs
can be dominate depending upon the President's style and the
personality of this Assistant. Presently, the same person
occupies the rote of Presidential Assistant and Secretary of
State. We can see that the Director of Central Intelligence
reporting through this specific mechanism serves the Secretary
of State, Secretary of Defense, some segments of the White
House Staff and the President of the United States. But in
addition to this channel, we have already seen that the
Director of Central Intelligence is, or should be, the chief
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intelligence advisor to the President. The President needs
a direct access to intelligence which is not colored by the
specialized departmental views of the Secretary of State or
of the Secretary of Defense.
There has always been an oversight relationship with
Congress. Part of that oversight mechanism is interleaved
in the normal legislative actions of that body, particularly
the appropriation procedure. In addition, Congress estab-
lished a specialized oversight mechanism which functioned
with a degree of success which varies directly with one's
point of view. The history of legislative efforts to over-
see the Central Intelligence Agency also included the
utilization of the General Accounting Office for some portions
of the Agency's activities. This effort proved to be
ineffective without access to the totality of the Agency
activities.
The Director of Central Intelligence clearly reported
and reports to the Congressional oversight mechanism. From
all we know, those committees were kept fully advised of all
Central Intelligence Agency activities to the extent that
they wanted to be advised. Essentially, the chairmen of those
oversight committees took the position that there were some
things about which they did not want to know. This position
was taken for essentially two reasons, both of which we have
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noted in our previous discussion. They felt that the
interests of security could be best protected if they didn't
know all facts. In effect, Congress maintained its oversight
by delegating the responsibility to a small group of men.
They in turn relied upon the probity of the DCI to protect
both intelligence activities and the political effectiveness
of the congressmen concerned.
The DCI, like any other head of a large institution, is
subject to being called to account by the media and by the
public when something commands the attention of these elements
We see that phenomena taking place today with a vengeance.
In addition, we have currently a DCI who feels strongly that
we should find some way of serving the public by intelligence.
He would like some means of making the intelligence product
available to at least selected parts of the public such as
the academic community.
The question of oversight is further complicated in
this country by a change in the locus for responsibility
of intelligence actions. The tradition in all nations has
been to preserve the chief executive's capability for
political action by protecting him from involvement in
intelligence failures. Thus, the executive has always
reserved for itself as an option the action of disavowal.
This has been true of all nations. It was true of the
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United States, too, until President Eisenhower changed
that tradition by publicly admitting his knowledge of and
responsibility for the flights of the U-2 over the Soviet
Union. This reversal of tradition was continued when
President Kennedy assumed responsibility for the failure
of the invasion of the Bay of Pigs. There has been some
indications of readjustment to the traditional role. In
the case of the exposure of the Glomar Explorer, President
Ford made, and has continued to make, no comment. Nonethe-
less, there is a shift in the relationship between the DCI
and the chief executive in this regard. What its ultimate
affect will be is unclear.
Existing Executive Branch Constraint Possibility
The most obvious and strongest means of executive branch
oversight is the relationship between the President and the
DCI. The extent and depth of that relationship is a variable
thing, depending upon the chemistry between the two individuals
and also depending upon how the President likes to do things.
Unfortunately, during the ascendancy of an imperial president,
oversight can be exercised in a malevolent fashion. Oversight
then becomes negative rather than reassuring. The misuse of
the organs of intelligence by the Nixon administration demon-
strates that the oversight mechanism should be an overt one
which carries within it some degree of public accountability.
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This is a most difficult area to accomplish a publicly
accountable mechanism. So much of the interchange must take
place in a restricted arena, because of the classified
nature of the information. Clearly, in an interrelationship
between a President and a DCI, the preponderance of power is
on the side of the President. The inherent tendency of a DCI
is to respond to a Presidential request with an "aye aye sir."
Little can be done to change this relationship. If that is
the case, then other changes must take place in the executive
which will permit other organs to know when the presidency
has overstepped its limits.
Covert action has been controlled by a committee of the
National Security Council known by various names. Presenly,
this committee is the 40 Committee. It formulates U.S.
policy decisions to undertake covert activities against other
states. All covert actions which have been initiated by the
CIA have been approved by this body. Whatever its name, the
committee has served as a means of insulating the presidency
from participation in the making of decisions which have
failed. It has functioned as an executive branch solution
to the basic dilemma. It does have a major weakness. Generally
speaking, the committee members are by definition those
individuals who are desirous of initiating action. Frequently,
the request for an action plan will arise with one of the
committee members. Thus, to a certain extent, this committee
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STAT
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is one judge, jury and prosecuting attorney. Perhaps the
committee mechanism should be restructured to introduce
into it a membership element which does not have the inherent
conflict of interest which presently exists.
Some of the other elements of executive branch over-
sight have not been structured as oversight mechanisms but
exist because of the nature of the executive branch. In
The relationship with the Department of Defense does
not depend upon such a subtlety. The overwhelming size of
the Department of Defense intelligence budget automatically
gives it a real edge in any relationship with the Agency.
We have already discussed the fact that these two (Defense
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and CIA) perceive their intelligence needs and targets
quite differently. The fact of the matter is that the
Central Intelligence Agency must present points of view
which at times are at variance with those of the Department
of Defense, but it must also satisfy the legitimate needs
of that huge colossal for intelligence.
The most apparent channel for executive branch over-
sight is the budgetary relationship between the Agency and
the Office of Management and Budget. This can provide an
oversight mechanism which can be either reassuring or detri-
mental. The Office of Management and Budget through its
normal processes becomes aware of the intimate details of
how the Agency spends its money and for what purposes. The
recommendations of that body shape the Agency's size and
financial resources. The public and Congress cannot be
reassured of. the efficacy of this mechanism, when only a
single budget examiner is assigned to the Agency. Even
that exposure is limited, because most of his Agency contact
is compressed into the period of annual budget examination.
The chief executive has established the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board as a means of involving
a part of the public in the oversight function. This board
is made up of distinguised citizens many of whom have had
some previous connection with the federal government. It
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has a small permenent staff of two. It has been an active
board in some senses of the word, meeting regularly six
times a year for two days at a time. The board has been
thoroughly briefed on the activities of the Agency in which
it has taken great interest. It haa seen its role as that
of stimulating improvement in the quality of intelligence.
The membership of the board are all extremely busy individuals
whose interest in intelligence is intent but who are burdened
with many other activities. Consequently, the board is
limited to its involvement by its perceived role and by the
limited availability of its personnel.
The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board,
like other of the executive branch mechanism we have discussed,
is an influencing factor upon the activities of the CIA, but
clearly also not intended to be a mechanism which would review
the propriety of those actions. The present operating con-
cepts of the PH:AB would have to be restructured if it were
to function in this capacity. Nonetheless, it is an available
executive branch mechanism which could be used for an over-
sight purpose. For this reason, the Rockefeller Commission
Report sought to strengthen the role of PFIAB. The thrust
of this recommendation was repeated by the Commission on the
Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign
Policy. The intent of both sets of recommendations is to
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change PFIAB from a relatively passive advice giving mechanism
into an organization with an active oversight responsibility.
The utilization of an active, wide-ranging Inspector
General Staff can also be considered as part of the executive
branch oversight. This was noted by the Rockefeller Commission
in their recommendation to not only expand the activities of
the Inspector General Staff, upgrading the stature of the
Inspector General Staff, but also providing the Inspector
General with a direct reporting relationship to the PFIAB.
We have not discussed the role of the Department cy.!
Justice as an oversight mechanism. Obviously, the Justice
Department could serve a very important restraining role
through its prosecution, capabilities where illegal activities
are involved. For many years it has chosen not to exercise
that capability lest it endanger intelligence sources. The
agreement by the Department of Justice and the Central Intel-
ligence Agency in this regard has been abrogated. Presumably,
this means that the department can fulfill the same role with
regard to CIA as it does with regard to illegal acts of other
agencies.
Existing Congressional Oversight Mechanisms
Today, most, if not all, of the former congressional
oversight bodies are in disarray. The onslaught of inves-
tigative bodies has taken precedence over the formerly
established methods for reviewing the activities of this
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Agency. Although the oversight committees exist, they are
for all practical purposes not functioning. The treatment
of Representative Nedzi in his role as Chairman of the House
Investigating Committee represents, to some extent, the
changed view of the function of oversight now held by some
congressmen. Formerly, it was sufficient for the oversight
committee members to acquaint themselves with given situations
and to endorse the actions by silence, in terms of their
colleagues, or to remonstrate with the DCI on a direct basis.
Those courses of action are no longer acceptable options in
the eyes of some of the more liberal members of Congress.
Whether Congress can return to this role of oversight by
delegation is unclear.
The absence of an effective working oversight mechanism
has not been felt by the Agency. In its place has been sub-
stituted a plethora of congressional organs, each of which
feels it is its responsibility to ascertain in great detail
precisely what activities the Agency has been, or is, engaged
in. These investigatory actions are not limited to the
special committees which have been established for that
specific purpose. Indeed, we see the chairperson of a
subcommittee of the government operations committee of the
House conducting what amounts to a wide-ranging investigation
of CIA activities under the guise of reviewing the Agency's
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performance under the Freedom of Information Act and its
intended performance under the provisions of the Privacy
Act.
Clearly, Congress wants a much more active role in
terms of reviewing the activities of the intelligence
community. As clear as this but not as universal is the
desire of individual congressmen to gain access to the
product of intelligence. The DCI has initiated the practice
of providing segments of Congress with the National Intelli-
gence Daily. The recipients have already indicated their
strong resistance to any action which would deprive them of
this source of information. Thus for the future, we will
be confronted with a Congress whose desires relative to the
intelligence community will be driven by the intent to gain
greater and more effective oversight over the actions of
that community, and, at the same time, driven by the desire
for increased access to the information developed by that
community.
Existing Oversight Capabilities for the Public
There are no formal mechanisms for public oversight.
As we have noted in our discussion of executive branch
mechanisms, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board consists of public members. There are other ways in
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which members of the public become aware of or informed about
selected activities of the CIA. The regular meetings and
briefings with the Brookings Institute constitute one such
vehicle. Likewise, the presentations made to the Presidential'
Classroom provides a similar means of making information
available to segments of the public. There are other
similar avenues in which Agency representatives publicly
present information about activities of the Agency. All
such programs are designed to provide information to the
public in order to educate the public. It is part of a
training program, not part of an effective device to over-
see the activities of the Agency from the standpoint of
propriety or legality. We must conclude that at this time
there is no effective oversight mechanism available to the
public.
Probable New Oversight Mechanisms
We see little need for change in executive branch over-
sight capabilities beyond those which have been recommended.
The recommended increased scope of activity for the PFIAB
should provide the President with greater insight as to
Agency activities. At the same time, it should provide
the capability for gaining credence with the public that
indeed the Agency is properly performing its tasks. We
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believe that we can anticipate a more rigorous budgetary
examination process in order to forestall or diminish
similar congressional action as well as to evidence the
administration's determination to more effectively control
expenditures. This is likely to be true of the Agency as
well as the community.
If the administration wishes to demonstrate its
commitment to vigorously overseeing the activities of the
entire intelligence community, we might see some variant
of an intelligence community inspector general develop
reporting to the President through the NSC. While such a
development would probably serve no real purpose beyond
window dressing, it might be useful for the purpose.
Changes in congressional oversight will be hampered
by the dilemma we have discussed which we believe will
require a mechanism which will keep the President or Congress
from being tainted with the allegation of approving unpopular
actions. Certainly, a new oversight structure will be created
which will have a broader basis of representation than the
previous one.
Its charter will require that it receive some
sort of periodic report on Agency activities but will probably
also permit the chairman some discretionary authorities.
This should permit both he and the committee to avoid being
saddled with the responsibility for necessary actions which
may be viewed by some as immoral or unethical. Beyond that,
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it can be anticipated that Congress will urge greater
involvement by the GAO and the auditing of the Agency's
expenditure of funds. This can be resolved if the General
Accounting Office audit report is a classified document
which is distributed solely to the oversight committee.
Obviously, the auditors would have to be cleared, even so,
there would still remain sensitive areas which probably will
have to be withheld from audit. Obviously, Congress is going
to exercise stringent budgetary reviews for the next several
years. These will be severe examinations of Agency funding
not only because of Congress' desire to reduce federal
spending levels but also because of the members' political
desires to appear to be doing something about active over-
sight.
We believe that the strengthening of the available
institutions and their own resolute pursuit of oversight
responsibilities could, when coupled with the right kind
of internal management practices, provide the President,
Congress, and the public with the reassurances needed and
the accountability desired for the activities of this Agency.
New Initiatives
Single Oversight Mechanism
We have explored the idea of the establish-
ment of a mixed commisssion; a body of perhaps
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25 individuals selected in such a fashion as to
represent the President, the Congress, and the
public. This body, in its composition, could
replace the PFIAB, the NSC, and the existing
congressional oversight committees. The DCI
would be answerable to this body for the
legality and propriety of Agency activities.
By the nature of its composition, it probably
would not be made aware of activities until
after the event. Such a concept has certain
attractions. It is a vehicle for credibility.
It provides a means for making the three instru-
mentalities involved feel that they are served by
the Agency. It provides a believable mechanism
against excesses. We believe, however, that the
concept has serious constitutional defects and
have not pursued it.
Congressional Initiatives
It is obvious that Congress will undertake action
to establish a revised and more active congressional
oversight mechanism. Our initial analysis leads us
to believe that Congress will not be satisfied by
using the existing oversight mechanism and instructLng
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the membership of those committees to do more
better. We also believe that the idea of a joint
committee is viewed with merit by most of the
members of Congress because of the success of the
joint committee on atomic energy. If that model
is followed, a joint committee could be structured
on top of the existing committees. That conceivably
could give us a total of seven congressional
committees who could view themselves as having an
oversight responsibility toward CIA. These would
be the two committees on foreign relations, the
two committees on armed services and the two
appropriation committees plus the joint committee.
We believe that the requirement for reporting to
so many committees is impractical and would
hamper the efficient management of the Agency.
Obviously, a preferable oversight committee
would be a joint committee functioning as does
the joint committee for atomic energy. That
would be the only congressional oversight mechanism
but, functioning as does the other joint committee
coupled with the appropriations process should give
Congress what it needs for reassurances.
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Executive Initiatives
The capabilities of options for the executive
branch have been noted in previous sections. We
believe that there is the opportunity for one
additional oversight mechanism which could be
considered within the language of the National
Security Act of 1947. Section 102 (e) reads as
follows: "To the extent recommended by the National
Security Council and approved by the President,
such intelligence of the departments and agencies
of the Government, except as hereinafter provided,
relating to the national security shall be open
to the inspection of the Director of Central
Intelligence, ...."
Using this portion of the law or by Executive
Order, the President could establish an Inspector
General corps which would be responsible for
investigating the conduct of all intelligence
activities of the intelligence community and
establishing the propriety or lack thereof.
Obviously, to be effective, such a corps would
need highly qualified personnel with unrestricted
access to all aspects of the intelligence community.
Integrity, intelligence, and willingness to serve
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would be a prerequisite for the members of such
a corps. Once confidence had been established
by this corps, it could fulfill all of the needs
for oversight.
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DRAFT
1 August 1975 .
STAT
Intelligence Sources and Methods
The National Security Act of 1947 states in Section 102
(d) (3);
"And provided further, That the Director
of Central Intelligence shall be responsible
for protecting intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure..."
The definition of sources and methods was intentionally imprecise
to provide the DCI with a maximum degree of flexibility in pro-
viding protection for future sources and methods not yet con-
sidered. In attempting to define sources and methods for the
purpose of providing guidelines for the declassification of
documents, the Security Committee of USIB developed the
following:
"Sources can be identified as the origins
of information and methods as the ways by which
intelligence data and/or intelligence sources
are developed. In many cases, sources and
methods are inseparable.
Another attempt has been made to define sources and methods
in draft legislation presently being coordinated within the
Executive Branch.
follows:
That draft defines sources and methods as
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"(2) For the purposes of this subsection,
the term "information relating to intelligence
sources and methods" means sensitive information
concerning --
(A) methods of collecting foreign
intelligence;
(13) sources of foreign intelligence,
whether human, technical, or other: or
(C) methods and techniques of analysis
and evaluation. of foreign intelligence which,
in the interests of the security of the foreign
intelligence activities of the United States,
has been specifically designated for limited
or restricted dissemination or distribution,
pursuant to authority granted by law or
Directive of the National Security Council,
by a department or agency of the United States
Government which is expressly authorized by
law or by the President to engage in intelli-
gence activities for the United States."
Historically, national intelligence services have been
extremely sensitive to the need to protect their sources of
intelligence. These sources were the human beings who were
providing information to the intelligence service. It was
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obvious in the 16th century, and it remains obvious today,
that if a government knows that one of its citizens is
providing information to another nation, it can take steps to
eliminate that flow .of information. Consequently, there is
a long tradition associated with intelligence services of
protecting source identities when it is in the interest of
the intelligence service. As long as the source provides
the intelligence acquiring agency with information which
suits the latter's needs, that agency has considered itself
obligated to protect the identity of the source. There has
been an implicit, and sometimes explicit, fiduciary relation-
ship under which the intelligence organization is responsible
for this protection to its agents as long as 'those agents are
useful to it. However, clearly the agent is a tool of the
organization and can be sacrificed any time that organization
perceives such to be in its best interest. Thus, when agents
elect to become spies, they look to their spy master to
protect them, but, the risks and dangers of being a spy must
be accepted, including their deliberate sacrifice to the ends
of the agency driving the spy master. For this reason,
clandestine operatives are aware that their actions may be
disowned by their sponsors. Thus, the U.S. Government as a
matter of policy publicly disavowed any relationship with
Fecteau and Downey until it was determined in our national
interest to so do.
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Methodology had to be protected in the early history
of espionage because the embryonic nature of the business
meant that a given methodology, such as a specific cipher,
could give an intelligence apparatus.a considerable edge
over the counter-intelligence service of another country,
as long as that specific methodology was unknown. Most of
the early methodology was concerned with the transmission of
information from the agent to the collector of information.
This could be done by cipher, by secret writing, or by
concealment. Little concern was given to concealing the
methodology of acquiring the intelligence, because it was
normally acquired in the course of the agent's overt
activities.
In World War 1, the concerns of the counter-intelligence
apparatus continued to be focused on means of transmitting
information. The Black Chamber grew up out of the need to
read the ciphers of other nations. The Office of Censorship
concentrated upon letters being mailed from the U.S. to
foreign destinations or into the U.S. which might carry
hidden messages looking for secret writing or innocent text
messages. The Germans were successful in their use of
microdots for a considerable period of time until censors:aip
techniques uncovered this application. Once discovered, it
was put to use by the allies.
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The concept of source and method protection was a
tradition not embodied in law or statute. The U.S. history
of espionage prior to World War II was centered upon the
activities of the attache service, and some agent chains
run by G-2, ONI and Foreign Service reporting. The need
for secrecy in these operations was met by compartmentation
and pragmatic application of the need-to-know rule. The
first mention of sources and methods as an American formula
that we have been able to find occurs in 1940. [The setting
of this initial appearance is in terms protecting military
information from civilians.] The formula as a shorthand
method of covering the needs for secrecy of intelligence
organizations appears to have met with favor by the users.
As a blanket term, it was accepted by Congress in the
National Security Act of 1947. The intelligence community
has steadily enlarged the scope of the original definition
to encompass much, if not all, of the entire apparatus of
intelligence. Within this agency today, we operate under
a blanket concept that everything which touches upon our
human collection effort, our technical collection effort,
and our production of classified intelligence is part of
the sources and methods rubric. The original concept of
sources and methods was a valid one and served a useful
purpose for several hundred years. As long as we were
concerned solely with human collection of intelligence and
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the transmission of that through a communications channel
available to somebody else's counter-intelligence apparatus,
it was useful. Rapid advances in technology have changed
the picture and tend to becloud the formerly simple
application of the rule. The existence of an earth satellite
with intelligence potential cannot be hidden from the
scientific instruments of another nation. Yet, clearly
overhead satellite photography is a very important intel-
ligence methodology. To attempt to keep secret that
methodology is almost ridiculous. Yet, there is a need to
keep secret some of the technology involved in order to
prevent counter-actions which would deny the intelligence
collection capability of that methodology. There is also
a need perceived by the Soviet Union and to a certain extent
by the U.S. to keep the fact of such collection activity
secret. Neither nation wishes to openly admit that the
other nation spies with impunity upon it. Neither wish to
admit that their boundaries are no protection against this
technical apparatus of the other nation. So we cloak
satellite photo intelligence with the term "national means
of verification" and the satellites continue to fly.
The development of new and sophisticated sensor plat-
forms will continue this trend. The presence of the intel
ligence collection device cannot be hidden and its existence
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and purpose will be known. But, "the fact of" becomes an
acceptable means of national face saving and permits us to
treat technological collection activities as though they
were the emperor's new suit of clothes.
Technological advances in methodology have tended to
render obsolete the concept of total protection of techniques
which are used to collect intelligence. The same satellites
which circle the earth and photograph missile installations
also photograph the antenna arrays which collect the telemetry
from the Russian space and missile ranges. They photograph
the large NSA installations that were operating in
STAT Our satellites collect the same kind of information against
Now massive Russian sensing capabilities. \
/And
the other side knows what we are doing.
The question of source protection we have seen is a one-
way street. It's invoked when in the intelligence agency's
interest to so do but rejected when sensed that that course
of action is in the best national interest. Perhaps we need
to develop some new words and some new definitions which
better state what we are attempting to protect and establish
some means of providing the protection.
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The need to protect certain aspects of our intelligence
world indicates the necessity for some form of security
classification system which will do at least two things.
It will identify the fact that the item needs protection
and it will further identify the level of protection needed.
This system should have built into it some means of which
classifying information on a regular basis and some means
of enforcing the protection of information. The intent
would be to protect that information which needs protection,
but permit the release of information when that protection
is no longer needed. Much of the types of methodology and
indeed some of the product of methodology would fall into
the category of "the fact of" can be released at some finite
time although not necessarily predictable time. We think
that the question of this "the fact of" material will have
to be recognized in any national classification system. As
collection systems proliferate, and as the means for collect-
ing information on collection systems likewise proliferate,
considerable knowledge about such systems will be available
to the other guy. But, need to prevent the disclosure of
"the fact of" will call for the creation of a classification
pigeonhole for political and negotiating purposes.
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The statutory injunction that the DCI shall be responsible
for protecting intelligence sources and methods from un-
authorized disclosure was not accompanied with any authorities
for doing so. No other head of agency is charged with this
responsibility so, from time to time within the intelligence
community, the assumption has been made that the DCI bears
the responsibility for the entire community. The lack of
authority with relationship to the national intelligence
organs has left the DCI in a position where he can effectively
exercise this responsibility only within the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. There, he exercises his authority as head of
agency to carry out the prescribed legislated responsibility.
His relationship with other agencies in this regard is
limited to suasion and his representation on the Security
Committee of the USIB. The only means of enforcing sources
and methods within the other agencies is through their line
managers. Those positions carry no statutory responsibility
for the protection of the techniques of covert collection of
intelligence.
As a consequence, the community grapples with this
responsibility from the individual perspectives of each agency.
The Security Committee functions like most committees, as a
forum for presenting individual agency views. Agreements are
reached by discussion and compromise and no one is totally
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satisfied with the results. Community leadership is lacking
because of the lack of authority. Because of the lack of
leadership, the definition of what it is is fuzzy and dis-
parate.
Traditionally, the DCI has assumed that his responsibility
applies to the community as a whole. He has sought to exer-
cise his responsibilities with greater or lesser vigor
depending upon his relative influence with his peers by
particularly pursuing the matters of leaks of intelligence
material. In so doing, some DCIs have authorized action
against American citizens to determine if they were the
perpetrators of intelligence leaks or the purveyors of
unauthorized intelligence information. In doing so, the
DCI has assumed that the right to so do was implicit in his
statutory responsibility.
This interpretation has been rejected by the Rockefeller
Commission Report. That commission clearly states its belief
that the DCT can only enforce his responsibility within his
own agency by virtue of his authority as line manager. This
view obviously leaves gaps in any protective system which
the DCI can devise because the dilemma of lack of authority
is not resolved.
The basic problems with the concept of sources and nethods
as we have discussed them are twofold: the lack of precision
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in the use of the terms and the lack of authority to pursue
the intent to protect the means of covert collection of
intelligence. We believe that the significance of the
capability to protect this type of information is such
that it should be addressed by legislation. As we have
noted, the protection of sources is considered as a sine
qua non, where the national interest dictates other-
wise. We have also noted that "methodology" covers a wide
spectrum of techniques, some of these are commonplace and
accepted, others are more esoteric and exotic. In the latter
case, some of the methodology can be observed by the target
country but, for various national reasons, "the fact of"
its existence is a matter not to be openly acknowledged by
either side.
There is another category of intelligence-related
information which needs protection. This might be referred
to as the mosaic category. It is a body of information which
is composed of various individual segments which in and of
themselves may not require significant protection or any
protection but when put together give a comprehensive picture
of an aspect of intelligence which-merits protection. The
item in question could be an intelligence study of a strategic
weapons system with some of the sources for such a study being
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drawn from the public literature. Perhaps the most appro-
priate example of this type of mosaic information is the
intelligence budget. There is no great significance in
the release of a single line item for.a given budget year
if that line item represents the total U.S. budget for
intelligence. There is an accretion of significance and
of the need for protection if the practice continues and the
single line item representing the total U.S. intelligence
budget is released publicly year after year. Then our
potential enemy can build up a pattern of our expenditures
on intelligence and begin to postulate the relative importance
of intelligence. Further, this practice of publishing single
line items could begin to unravel the whole skein. Congres--
sional pressure Or public pressure could increase for
reIasing other elements which compose the intelligence budget
which are not of critical significance in and of themselves.
Thus, a next logical step might be to release the line item
which reflects the amounts spent for analysis. The process
could then continue to reflect in succeeding years, the
amount spent for analysis for each geographical area and
slowly the picture which would represent 50 U.S. priorities
could be built. We conclude therefore that there is indeed
a need to establish a protection mechanism for broader areas
than merely the individual specifics relating to sources or
relating to certain types of methodology.
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These factors lead us to the development of a legislative
definition of sources and methods which would charge the DCI
with the responsibility and authority to protect in a manner
somewhat as follows:
a. The DCI would be given the optional
authority and responsibility to protect sources;
especially human ones. This authority and respon-
sibility would be mandatory, but could be over-
ridden by the highest level of the Executive
Branch when determined to be in the national
interest. This decision to override should be
consciously and formally taken in order to
protect the DCI from subsequent charges of
dereliction of duty.
b. The DCI will also be responsible for
the protection of methodologies. He is further
responsible and authorized to determine which
methodologies are to be protected. He is also
responsible and authorized to determine when
protected methodologies no longer require that
protection.
c. The determination to protect a
methodology because of "the fact of" is not a
matter of intelligence concern, but rather a matter
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of the conduct of foreign relations. The deter-
mination to protect a methodology for this reason
is to be made by the National Security Council.
Once this formal finding is made, the DCI will
then be responsible and authorized to protect the
same under his revised statutory authority.
d. The determination to protect the component
information of a major segment of intelligence related
information when such component information may in
and of itself have little significance but when the
active disclosure will reveal or could reveal sig-
nificant trends or direction of U.S. intelligence
interests shall be at the direction of the National
Security Council which shall exercise this respon-
sibility for the intelligence community as a whole.
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