PORTUGUESE POLICY AND ROLE IN ANGOLA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01142A000700060001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 24, 1975
• Content Type: MF

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/20: CIA-RDP79RO1142A000700060001-5
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Senior Review Group
SUBJECT : Portuguese Policy and Role in Angola
1. At the SRG meeting last week on the Angola
problem, Deputy Secretary Clements asked for an assessment
of Portuguese policy and attitudes in Angola. The
attached response was prepared in CIA and has been
discussed with State/INR and with DIA.
2. Briefly, it concludes that:
-- The more moderate leaders in Lisbon favor
Savimbi, and the more radical ones the MPLA.
The FNLA has virtually no support among
Portuguese leaders.
insofar as Lisbon now has a policy
it is one of impartiality between the factions.
-- This reflects Lisbon's awareness of its
diminishing ability to affect events and
its desire to be on good terms with the new
Angola no matter who is in charge.
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Portuguese Policy and objectives in--
SUBJECT
Angola
1. Insofar as the AFM has an agreed policy on the
subject, it perceives its ties with Angola after inde-
pendence on November 11 as a bridge between Europe and
the Third World. By developing a favored relationship
with its former colony, it hopes to preserve its economic
interests there, which are major, to gain special access
to African and other Third World markets for Portuguese
trade, and. in general to chalk up a plus for Portugal in
the Third World.
2. Portuguese objectives will of course be more
easily realized if Lisbon can withdraw gracefully and on
good terms with whatever group is in charge in Luanda.
But the recent fighting in Angola and the prospect of
more to come complicates Lisbon's task.
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5. Despite publicly adhering to the doctrine of
neutrality, different elements within Portugal's military
leadership privately support those factions in Angola
which most closely represent their own political style.
--Thus, moderate officers in the Movement, for
example, favor Jonas Savimbi of UNITA. These
moderates, most notably President Costa Gomes
and Foreign Minister Antunes, believe Savimbi is
more likely to deal even-handedly with the white
population of Angola. They also hope that the
emergence of Savimbi over Neto's Communist-backed
MPLA would discredit the Communists and radical
Movement leaders in Lisbon.
--A substantial minority, however--probably including
Prime Minister Goncalves and Admiral Rosa Coutinho,
who as former high commissioner in Angola was prin-
cipally responsible for setting up the decoloniza-
tion machinery there--would still prefer to see
the MPLA prevail over its rivals, but they probably
will not press this point as long as it continues
to be a minority position.
--The third major Angolan faction, the National Front
for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), is viewed as a
puppet- of Zaire President Mobutu and the US and has
virtually no political support in Portugal.
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6. The Portuguese people in the metropole over-
whelmingly want the country to put its military involve-
ment in Angola behind it. Portuguese citizens in Angola
see their livelihoods and families threatened both by
the violence and by independence itself. Salaried
workers and small entrepreneurs are expected to get
out as soon as possible. Those with a larger economic
stake in the territory will probably stay on and attempt
to strike the best bargain they can with the new govern-
ment?
7. A resumption of the fighting will only increase
the "white flight" from the territory. It is estimated
that as many as one-third of the 300,000-400,000 Portuguese
in Angola have already left, with many returning to Portu-
gal. This mass exodus of Portuguese technicians and
administrators lessens the chances of post-independence
stability in Angola, and greatly exacerbates Portugal's
domestic unemployment. It also introduces into Lisbon's
highly charged political atmosphere elements who are
alarmed in general by Portugal's drift to the left and
upset in particular by the new leadership's decolonization.
policy.
8. During the most recent flareup of violence,
Portuguese Foreign Minister Antunes reminded the Portu-
guese public that Portugal's military forces in Angola?
which number 24,000--are obligated to play a more active
role in controlling the fighting. This is not a popular
view, however. It is generally acknowledged that the
Portuguese troops in Angola have neither the will or the
wherewithal to do much but protect their own nationals.
This attitude was painfully obvious recently when a token.
group of military reinforcements initially refused em-
barkation. No Portuguese soldier wants to die in Africa
at a time when his country is in the process of disengage-
ment.
9. Faced with the danger of civil war in Angola,
Portugal can'be expected to pursue a policy which will
seek to protect its future economic interests in the
territory and discourage a further influx of embittered
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refugees. Therefore, it will probably do what it can to
help restore the political and military balance in Angola,
but its capacity to affect events is diminishing. The
weakness of its military force there leaves little that
Lisbon can do other than exhort the rival factions toward
an amicable settlement of their differences and hope for
the best.
cLIr+nLIm
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ESTIM T NtThE E
TITLE
PORTUGUESE POLICY AND-ROLE IN ANGOLA
LOGGED BY
DATE
COPY NO.
ASSIGNED TO*
6/25/75
1
{
CRS/DSB
6/25/75
1
Finished Intelligence Program
6/25/75
1
Presidential Library
6/25/75
1
Agency Archives
6/25/75
1
NIO/Master File
1
NIO/Workin File
Requests for supplemental copies must be checked with the NIO
responsible for that estimate.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/20: CIA-RDP79RO1142A000700060001-5
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SENIOR REVIEW GROUP, 24 June 1975
SUBJECT: Portuguese Policy and Objectives in Angola
O/D/DCI/NIO/WE:KCClark/mee
Distribution
Orig - Dr. ::issinger
1 - Deputy Secretary Clements
1 Lt. General John Pauly, JCS
1 - Mr. Edward Mulcahy, Acting Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs
1 - Mr.. WillDePree, Policy Planning Staff, State
1 - Mr. George Bader, ISA
1 - Mr. James Noyes, ISA
1 - Mr. Harold Horan, NSC Staff
6 - Mr. James Barnum, NSC Staff
DCI
DDCI
D/NIO
C/Africa Division, DDO
C/OCI/WE
NIO/WE
NIO/RI
ER
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