RESPONSE TO FOLLOW-ON QUESTIONS ON INTERAGENCY MEMORANDUM, 'THAI FOREIGN POLICY IN THE FRONT-VIETNAM PERIOD,' 25 APRIL 1975

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01142A000500040001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 21, 1975
• Content Type: IM

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No Foreign Dissem
May 21, 1975
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Response to Follow-On Questions on Inter-
agency Memorandum, "Thai Foreign Policy
in the Post-Vietnam Period," 25 April 1975
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I. What is the impact of the Mayaguez incident
on Thai US relations?
1. The Mayaguez incident is unlikely to cause
serious damage to the US-Thai relationship. The
Khukrit government is attempting to minimize the
impact by ignoring highly emotional demands from
the Thai press and various pressure groups for
drastic reprisals against the US, such as ex-
pelling US forces from Thai air bases or expelling
some senior US official from Thailand. Indeed,
the remarks of Prime Minister Khukrit, as well as
those of his outspoken foreign minister, suggest
that the government would like to sweep the entire
matter under the rug as quickly as possible in
order to preserve its relationship with the US.
2. The Thai are clearly worried, however,
that the US, by its actions in recovering the
Mayaguez and in recent speeches by President Ford,
has written off Thailand as an important ally.
The Thai foreign ministry has recommended that
Khukrit travel to the US as soon as possible to
clarify US intentions.
3. The domestic implications of the Mayaguez
incident are less apparent, but the episode is
sure to harden the lines drawn between the politi-
cal left and student radicals, on the one hand,
and the conservative politicians and military
officers on the other. While it will strengthen
the argument of those in the foreign ministry
and the cabinet who favor a faster withdrawal of
US forces, Khukrit made it clear in his May 16
press conference that the government would not be
stampeded into taking precipitate action. He did
say, however, that in reviewing US-Thai agreements,
officials would have to give consideration to
strengthening Thai government control over US ac-
tivities at Thai air bases.
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4. The Thai military are not likely to create
problems for Khukrit over the affair. The mili-
tary have publicly supported the government pro-
test over the Mayaguez operation, since from the
Thai point of view the US violated Thailand's sover-
eignty by introducing marines into the Thai bases
without Bangkok's n[?rmiccinn
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II. What does neutralism mean in the Thai context?
1. The Thai are moving toward a neutral foreign
policy by dissociating themselves from US policies
and accelerating efforts toward a rapprochement with
Asian communist regimes. This is a clear trend, but
events are still moving too fast for the Thai to have
determined just how "neutral" they expect their
foreign policy to become. The impetus for this
new direction is not an emotional hostility toward
the US, but a belief that the balance of power in
Southeast Asia has shifted in favor of the com-
munists and that the US is no longer prepared to
play an active role in the area.
2. Although moving away from open identifica-
tion with US policy in Asia, the Thai would like
to maint in a cordial and close relationship with
the US.
More
__F J
importantly, Prime Minister Khukrit is known to
have expressed his interest in traveling to the
US to confirm to President Ford Thailand's "close
and lasting" friendship, and to seek better US
understanding of Thailand's current difficulties.
Khukrit believes that US support to Thailand has
become increasingly important in the wake of com-
munist victories in Indochina.
3. In sum, Thai foreign policy is in a state
of flux. The course of its future evolution is
not clear. There appears to be little prospect
that Thailand will move into the ranks of those
whose brand of neutralism equates with total op-
position and distrust of the US. Instead, Thai
foreign policy will probably mirror the pattern
established by Indonesia and Malaysia -- countries
that are generally accepted as neutral in their
foreign policy, but who also maintain and culti-
vate good relations with the US.
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III. What are the differing perceptions of the
threat to Thailand?
1. There are at least four differing per-
ceptions Within Thailand of the threat posed by
North Vietnamese and Chinese support to the in-
surgency.
(a) Important elements in the Foreign
Ministry and the military believe
that the insurgency is principally
a diplomatic problem created by
Thailand's close cooperation with
US policies in Indochina; conse-
quently, these individuals tend to
downplay the threat. This view-
point, almost certainly shared by
Foreign Minister Chatchai Chunhawan,
holds that Hanoi and Peking have
supported the insurgency largely
in retaliation for Bangkok's allow-
ing US aircraft to be based in
Thailand.
(b) Another view, held by many well-
educated Thai both in and out of
the government, recognizes a pro-
blem but maintains that the insur-
gent ranks are composed predomi-
nantly of "misguided" persons
temporarily estranged from Thai
society because of official corrup-
tion. Holders of this view argue
that the solution to the problem
is political rather than military.
(c) A third viewpoint is common among
influential persons outside the
government who are openly skeptical
of the insurgent threat, believing
it was deliberately overblown by the
former military regime to justify
martial law and large military
budgets.
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(d) A small number of government officials
who are actively involved in the counter-
insurgency programs are convinced that
the insurgency is a major security threat.
Their views, however, have not carried
significant weight in-the decision-making
process in Bangkok.
2. These notions, of course, could change if
the insurgents were to become more "visible" by
stepping up attacks against government outposts
closer to population centers. Thus far, however,
Thai communist strategists, turning Bangkok's
parochialism to their advantage, have avoided
spectacular acts that would force the government'
to resort to harsher policies and possibly awaken
the general populace to the threat. A change in
the insurgents' approach seems unlikely for the
near future.
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IV. How do the foreign ministry and the senior
military leadership view the North Vietnamese
threat over the next 1-3 years?
1. Thai officials generally assume that Hanoi
will step up the level of its support to Thai in-
surgents in the form of increased advisors; arma-
ments and training programs. Most, however, dis-
count the possibility of an overt North Vietnamese
attack in the next few years. There are differ-
ences between the military leadership and the
diplomats over how best to deal with the problem
of increased North Vietnamese subversion. The
generals want a larger share of the budget to
strengthen the armed forces. The foreign ministry
believes that the problem can best be solved by
improved relations with the North Vietnamese.
Specifically, ministry officials believe that the
removal of US military forces from Thailand would
eliminate a serious irritant to better relations
with the North Vietnamese, thereby undercutting
Hanoi's rationale for aiding the Thai insurgents.
In short, the foreign ministry believes that
Thailand's security can be best assured by
accommodating Hanoi.
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V. To what extent do the military and the foreign
ministry want to retain the alliance with the US?
1. Most officials want to maintain good relations
with the US, but they believe that the current situa-
tion dictates that these relations be less close than
in the past. At the moment there is general disappoint-
ment over what the Thai believe to be a lack of staying
power on the part of the US in honoring commitments to
Phnom Penh and Saigon. The generals appear to have
been particularly upset that US aircraft based in Thai-
land were not sent into action over Indochina to stem
communist advances. Army commander Krit Sivara's re-
ported statement to the effect that Thailand will have
to move closer to the Soviet Union was largely an emo-
tional reaction to communist victories in Indochina and
will probably pass. The foreign ministry, however, is
convinced that it is no longer in Thailand's interest
to be closely tied to the US or to any other foreign
power. Ministry officials believe that Thailand's
sovereignty can best be maintained by striking a bet-
ter balance in its foreign relations -- by abandoning
Thailand's open identification and cooperation; with
US policy in the interest of gaining better relations
with its communist neighbors.
2. The Thai will seek to shift the emphasis of
their relationship with the US toward economic and
trade matters and away from overt military coopera-
tion. Those in the foreign ministry who once felt
that there were more advantages than disadvantages
in close alignment with the major anti-communist power
now believe this to be a diplomatic liability. They
now believe that Thailand must seek a rapprochement
with the communist governments in Indochina and that
the US security commitment is no longer of value.
3. Senior military officers would like to main-
tain a close relationship with the US. Although many
military officers have also begun to question the
value of the US security commitment to Thailand, most
continue to see the US as an important counterbalance
to communist influence in the region. Moreover, the
Thai military continue to look to the US as the pri-
mary supplier of military supplies and equipment and
are reluctant to jeopardize access to US-manufactured
spare parts.
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VI. What Thai interest does each see in a continued US
force presence now that i's essentiall
one r -Indochina
1. The military have long looked upon the presence
of US aircraft in Thailand as an implicit guarantee of
a US security commitment. They also have viewed these
aircraft as the best assurance of a continued US mili-
tary assistance program. Most senior military leaders
would prefer a limited US presence at one or more bases
such as Utapao, but realize that the political climate
in Thailand probably rules out such an option. The
military probably would be willing to grant re-entry
rights for US aircraft on an advance basis, but the
foreign ministry would consider any arrangement al-
lowing the US advance re-entry rights as a serious
impediment to the normalization of relations with
Hanoi. As noted earlier, the foreign ministry gen-
erally believes that the usefulness of a US military
presence has long since past.
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VII. How could US actions on military assistance and
the US military 2resence in Thailand influence
each of the principal actors?
1. An increase in US military assistance would
be regarded by the Thai military as a clear indica-
tion of US willingness to stand by Thailand. The mili-
tary have long measured the depth of the US commit-
ment to Thailand by the dollar value of the US mili-
tary assistance program. Since the Thai armed forces
are almost totally dependent on US equipment, as-
surances of a continued or increased assistance pro-
gram would strengthen the military's argument within
the government that it is in Thailand's interest to
maintain a relatively high degree of cooperation with
the US. While the military probably would not accept
a continuation of the free-wheeling cooperation that
existed between the US and Thailand during the 1960s,
the generals would probably continue to give strong
support to US interests in Thailand as long as they
believed this would contribute to the strengthening
of the Thai armed forces.
2. Unlike the military, the foreign ministry
would not be easily persuaded that the US commitment
to Thailand was being strengthened by an increase in
US military assistance. Indeed, many would probably
see such a gesture as an attempt by the US to "compro-
mise" their efforts to accommodate to the increased
political and military influence of Asian communist
regimes.
3. Most Thai expect all US forces to be with-
drawn within one year. Any delay in this timetable
could seriously weaken the government. Most military
and some in the foreign ministry probably could ac-
cept an indefinite presence of a limited number of
US forces -- a number well under 10,000 -- but it
seems highly unlikely that the political climate
would permit such a presence.
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VIII. How far will senior military leaders allow the
Foreign Ministry to go in pursuinn a more purely
di'p om is solution to the North Vietnamese threat
before they assert themselves more forcefully?
1. The generals, at least for the present, are
willing to allow the foreign ministry to try to deflect
the North Vietnamese threat by means of diplomacy. The
military are clearly aware of their inability to cope
with, much less stop, a North Vietnamese attack, either
overt or indirect. The generals believe that talking
with the North Vietnamese will buy them time to
strengthen their own forces for what they believe
will be an increased threat over the long term.
2. At the same time it is also clear that there
are distinct limits to the military's forebearance
with the foreign ministry's approach. The military
have strongly objected to Foreign Minister Chatchai's
recommendation that all South Vietnamese military
equipment brought into Thailand be returned to the
Vietnamese communists. Their reaction was conditioned
in part by the knowledge that much of that equipment
was earmarked for their own use and in part by the
concern that such equipment could some day be used
against Thailand. The military can be expected to
block any foreign ministry effort that would directly
strengthen North Vietnam's hand vis-a-vis Thailand.
They will also press the foreign ministry on the is-
sue of repatriation of the sizable number of former
Vietnamese refugees who live in northeast Thailand
and whose presence the military believes to be a
security threat.
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X. Will Hanoi likely insist on Thai severance of the
alliance with the US as a condition for normaliza-
tion of relations with Bangkok?
1. It seems highly unlikely that the Thai would
go so far as to sever their good relationship with
the US -- which they do not perceive of in terms of
a formal "alliance" -- in return for diplomatic rela-
tions with Hanoi. It also seems unlikely that Hanoi
would insist on the severance of the US-Thai rela-
tionship.
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ABJECT: Response to Follow-On Questions on
Interagency Memorandum, "Thai Foreign
:Policy in the Post Vietnam Period"
REMARKS:
1. The attached, drafted by the
Office of Current Intelligence and
coordinated within the Agency, is in
response to your follow-on questions
concerning Thai foreign policy...
2. If you have any further ques-
tions, etc, please give us a call. .
25X1
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