TRANSPORTATION IN NORTH KOREA: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 1951-61 AND 1967 PLAN

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• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
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• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 1, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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-B-reREz_ N? 83
Economic Intelligence Report
TRANSPORTATION IN NORTH KOREA:
ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS
1951-61 AND 1967 PLAN
CIA/RR ER 62-36
November 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
1-eRE?T_
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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SECRET' ?
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington 25, D.C.
19 December 1962
83
MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of CIA/RR ER 62-36, Transportation in North
Korea: Achievements and Prospects, 1956-61 and 1967 Plan,
November 1962, SECRET
SUBJECT
Correction of cover and title page
The date in the title on both the cover and the title page should
read as follows:
1956-61 AND 1967 PLAN
FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, RESEARCH AND REPORTS:
SECRET
Chief, Publications Staff
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic down-
grading and declassification
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SECRET
Economic Intelligence Report
TRANSPORTATION IN NORTH KOREA:
ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS
1951-61 AND 1967 PLAN
CIA/RR ER 62-36
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
SECRET
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FOREWORD
An attempt is made in this report
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to evaluate North Korean
plans for development of the transportation system through 1967. The
Seven Year Plan (1961-67) of North Korea has now been underway for
nearly 2 years, and the time is approaching when the phase of the plan
to expand heavy industry, scheduled for 1964, will begin creating sub-
stantial service requirements on the transportation system.
The North Korean government has been vociferous with information
regarding its progress and plans for the modern transport industry ex-
cept for certain information that might have military intelligence
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CONTENTS
Page
Summary and Conclusions 1
I. Introduction
II. Development of the Transportation Network
3
2+
A. Railroads 2+
B. Highways 6
C. Waterways 7
D. Civil Aviation 8
III. Transport Performance and Relationship to Output in Other
Sectors of the Economy
A. Performance
8
8
1. Freight Transport 8
a. Railroads
B. Motor Trucks
c. Waterways
9
10
10
2. Passenger Transport 11
3. Primitive Transport 11
B. Relationship to Output in Other Sectors of the
Economy 12
IV. Inventory of Equipment and Operating Efficiency 12
A. Railroads 12
B. Motor Trucks 13
C. Waterways 15
V. Administration and Labor Force 16
VI. Investment 17
VII. Problems and Prospects 18
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Appendixes
Appendix A. Statistical Tables
Page
21
Tables
1. North Korea: Performance of the Modern Transport System,
1956-61 and 1967 Plan
2. North Korea: Average Length of Haul by Modern Transport,
1956-61 and 1967
3. North Korea: Volume and Amount of Passenger Transport
by the Modern Transport System, 1956-60
4. North Korea: Selected Operational Data of Railroads,
1956-61
23
24
25
26
5. North Korea: Capital Investment in the Transportation
and Post and Telecommunications Sector of the Economy
Compared with the Total Capital Investment, Selected
Years, 1954-67 27
Illustrations
Figure 1. North Korea: Transportation, August 1962 (Map)
inside back cover
Figure 2. North Korea: Transportation and Economic Re-
sources, 1960 (Map) following page 6
Figure 3. North Korea: Tons Carried by Modern Transport,
1956-61 and 1967 Plan (Chart) following page . . 8
Figure 4. North Korea: Performance of the Modern Transport
System, 1956, 1961, and 1967 Plan (Chart)
following page 10
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TRANSPORTATION IN NORTH KOREA: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS*
1956-61 AND 1967 PLAN
Summary and Conclusions
Modern transport** in North Korea achieved a level of performance
in 1961 about 2.5 times that of 1956, and prospects for nearly trip-
ling by 1967 the level of tons carried in 1961 appear to be reasonable.
The high rate of growth in transportation during 1956-61 was achieved
mainly through intensive utilization of the rail system, but the acq3A-
sition of relatively large numbers of motor vehicles for highway trans-
port also was a factor. Increases in transportation performance have
been adequate to meet the demands of the "flying horse" drive for rapid
industrialization that began in 1958.
The Seven Year Plan of North Korea calls for modern transport to
carry nearly 220 million tons*** in 1967, slightly more than that
carried by modern transport in Communist China in 1953, and to perform
nearly 20 billion ton-kilometers, about one-half the Chinese ton-
kilometer performance in 1950. This level of performance is expected
to be attained through improvements in the rail system and the expan-
sion of motor vehicle transport. Rail capacity is to be expanded mainly
by electrification of the major rail lines. Motor vehicle transport
undoubtedly will increase rapidly by the utilization of domestically
produced trucks to provide feeder service for railroads and waterways.
In general, the North Koreans have the capability to produce and use
the basic equipment required to carry out their transport plan. There
is some doubt, however, whether sufficient investment is being allocated
to transport during the early years of the Seven Year Plan. Investment
in transport will not be emphasized until the last 4 years of the plan
period. Although the goals for transport performance in 1967 are ambi-
tious, they probably will be accomplished provided the industrial and
agricultural sectors of the economy move forward according to plan and
generate sufficient traffic.
* The estimates and conclusions in this report represent the best
judgment of this Office as of 1 October 1962.
** The term modern transport as used in this report fefers to rail-
roads, motor trucks and trailers, buses, and modern ships in the North
Korean inland water and coastal fleets. The term native transport refers
to animal-drawn and man-drawn carts, porter, and primitive craft such
as junks and wooden sailing vessels.
*** Unless otherwise indicated, tonnages are given in metric tons
throughout this report.
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Since 1954 the value of industrial production in North Korea has
expanded slightly faster than the volume of tons carried by modern
transport. Future industrial growth is planned to require a propor-
tionately smaller number of tons carried. Such a relationship will be
possible if the commodity composition of the traffic changes as expected.
There may be proportionately less coal to be hauled as electric power
production increases, and the industrial goods to be transported may con-
sist of a higher percentage of high-value, low-volume products as indus-
trial output increases and becomes more complex.
In 1961, performance by all modes of transport in North Korea reached
77 million tons carried and 10.4 billion ton-kilometers (tkm). The rail
system continued to be the major form of transport, accounting for 95 per-
cent of the ton-kilometer performance. Motor truck transport, however,
carried an increasing share of the total tons carried, 45 percent of the
total in 1960 compared with 32 percent in 1956. Water transport, in
spite of considerable effort to expand its services more rapidly, has
accounted for less than 5 percent of the total performance.
During 1956-61 the operating efficiency of the railroad system in-
creased significantly, as indicated by a decrease in turnaround time of
railroad freigbt cars from 5.1 days in 1956 to 2.96 days in 1961. This
improvement, however, does not compare very well with the achievement
in Communist China of a turnaround time of 2.47 days in 1959 with an
average length of haul twice that of North Korea. During 1957-61 the
average tonnage of freight trains was increased by 32 percent through a
program to increase the carrying capacity of cars by the reconstruction
of existing cars and by the addition of larger cars to the park. It is
estimated that North Korea had 10,800 freight cars in 1961, about 600
more than in 1956, with the additions coming mainly from domestic pro-
duction and reconstruction of war-damaged cars. Also contributing to
the increased rail efficiency were improvements in the rail network,
which included a modest amount of electrification of certain key lines
and the installation of some automatic block signaling, welded rails,
and mechanized loading and unloading facilities.
Improvements in efficiency in truck transport have resulted in in-
creases in output per truck of about 30 percent in terms of ton-kilometers
and nearly 90 percent in terms of tons carried during 1957-60. It is es-
timated that North Korea had 23,000 trucks at the end of 1961 compared
with 10,000 at the end of 1956. , During 1956-59, trucks were imported
from the USSR, but recently domestic production has reached about 3,000
2-1/2-ton trucks annually.
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I. Introduction
North Korea is a comparatively primitive country in which human
carriers using the A frame and oxcart and horsecart transport are still
common, but modern transport has expanded rapidly since the rehabilita-
tion of the devastation caused by the Korean War. Primitive transport
continues to support local handicraft and agriculture, but modern trans-
port has kept pace with the industrial development of the country. Tons
carried by all forms of modern transport are estimated to have grown at
an annual average rate of 22 percent from 1956 through 1961, resulting
in a total of 77 million tons carried in 1961. Much of the growth was
achieved during the economic drive called the "flying horse" program to
accomplish by 1959 the goals of the First Five Year Plan (1956-60) in
4 years. The drive reached a peak of activity in 1959 and began to slow
down during 1960. In most sectors of the economy the goals for 1960
were completed in 1959, but the plan continued through 1960. Although
some maladjustments in the economy occurred in 1960 and 1961, the eco-
nomic problems have not been nearly so serious or prolonged as those in
Communist China. Apparently because of the setback in 1960 and 1961,
the Seven Year Plan (1961-67) as originally announced in August of 1960
was revised downward in 1961 and made considerably more moderate.
The present plan for economic development is an ambitious program,
however, which, if successfully carried out, will make heavy demands on
the physical and human resources of North Korea and also will involve
rapid technological advances in industry and agriculture. This plan
calls for industrial output by 1967 to be 3.2 times the level of 1960;
agricultural output, 2.4 times; and national income, 2.7 times. During
the first 3 years the plan is intended to alleviate shortages in con-
sumer goods for a population of 11.5 million (as of the end of 1962)
and during the last 4 years to develop further the already productive
industrial sector of the economy.
The development of the economy will place an enormous task on the
transportation system, according to the North Korean press, and the
railroads especially are expected to meet the growing requirements
through technological improvements and the intensive use of the exist-
ing facilities. Plans call for doubling the volume of freight to be
transported by railroads, and the capacity of the railroads is expected
to be expanded through electrification of the rail system. Investment
in transportation, however, will not be emphasized until the last 4 years
of the plan period. These plans lead to several questions which are dis-
cussed here but which cannot be completely answered. Is the plan for
transport in equilibrium with plans for agriculture and industry as a
whole? Is enough emphasis being placed at present on technological
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improvements in transportation, and does North Korea have available the
technological knowledge and capability to carry out the planned improve-
ments in transportation?
The importance of making such an analysis of transportation in North
Korea does not stem from the level of transportation performance in com-
parison with other countries, because the transportation system of North
Korea accounts for only a small percentage of the total transportation
performance of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. In spite of its rapid growth, trans-
portation performance in North Korea is less than that of any country of
the Bloc except Albania and North Vietnam. This analysis is important,
however, because of the significant role of transportation in the North
Korean economy and because of the possibility of future hostilities be-
tween North Korea and South Korea. Together with the communications
sector, transportation directly accounts for about 9 percent of the
gross national product. The modern transport industry employed about
72,000 persons in 1960, or about 5 percent of the total number, ex-
cluding cooperative members, employed in all branches of the state-
operated sector of the economy. 1/*
II. Development of the Transportation Network
A. Railroads
At the end of 1961 the length of rail network in operation in
North Korea amounted to about 3,850 kilometers (km), 85 percent of which
was standard gauge and the remainder narrow gauge. Since 1956 the length
of the network has been extended about 200 km. 2/ The network is nearly
all single track except for a few short sections of double track near
major cities (see the map, Figure 1**). The major rail line along the
west coast from the Chinese border to Kaesong was double tracked origi-
nally, but the rails and crossties of one track were removed by the
Japanese during World War II for use as replacements on other lines.
Although it seemed for a few years that the North Korean government
would have the second track replaced, present plans to increase the ca-
pacity of the route call for the electrification of the single-track
line rather than for the restoration of the second track. 1/
Although the entire rail network has been extensively rehabil-
itated and improved since the Korean War with the help of various coun-
tries of the Bloc, it still lacks uniform standards. The weight of the
rail varies considerably on any one line, and sharp turns and steep
grades on some lines impose restrictions on speed and limit the loads
of trains. Work is continuing to improve these conditions, however,
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** Inside back cover.
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and speeds of more than 100 km per hour on major trunk lines have been
claimed.)1/ The system is being modernized with the installation of
some automatic block signaling, considerable amounts of heavy-duty and
welded rails, and mechanized loading and unloading facilities. Elec-
trification of all main lines is being undertaken to replace steam pro-
pulsion, and work to convert the entire network to standard gauge is
underway.
The Japanese were responsible for the first period of extensive
rail construction on the Korean Peninsula, which took place immediately
before and during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05). Military consider-
ations governed the construction of the lines, and emphasis was placed
on north-south lines that provided Japan with direct routes to Manchuria
and the USSR. The rail system also was planned to serve the economic
needs of Japan, the north-south lines tieing the resources of Manchuria
and Korea into the production complex of Japan. Lateral lines were neg-
lected. The mountainous terrain has influenced further the establishment
of railroads in a longitudinal pattern. _.5./ The division of the peninsula
into North Korea and South Korea created additional problems in utilizing
the rail system for internal development of the North Korean economy.
Although work is progressing toward adapting the rail system to the
needs of the economy and developing other modes of transportation to
supplement the rail system, some major features of an integrated and ef-
ficiently operating system may not be completed even by the end of the
Seven Year Plan.
The principal north-south lines are still connected with only
one east-west line. Although the east-west line has been electrified
to expand its capacity, it is congested by the exchange of goods between
east-coast and west-coast industrial centers. On the second east-west
line a 38-km section from P'yongsan to Chiha-ri is now in operation,
but the remaining section of about 100 km through extremely mountainous
terrain from Chiha-ri to Pokkye-ri is not scheduled for completion until
1964. Another important link of the rail network under construction is
located along the east coast between Ch'ongjin and Najin near the Soviet
border. The completion of this 78-km section, planned for 1963, will
speed up the delivery of coal from northern collieries to the industrial
centers ./.; shorten the distance to the junction with the Soviet rail
system at Podgornaya*; and relieve congestion on the main line extending
north from Ch'ongjin, which has considerable traffic in iron ore and
forms one of the major connections with the Chinese rail system at Sang-
sambong and Namyang (see the map, Figure 2**).
* The section between Hongui in North Korea and Kraskino in the USSR
constitutes the transloading area. This section crosses the Tumen River
at Podgornaya, a village in the USSR.
** Following p. 6.
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By electrifying the major rail lines, the North Korean govern-
ment expects that the rail system will be able to carry the increased
traffic generated by the Seven Year Plan. Electrification of rail lines
did not progress as planned under the First Five Year Plan (1956-60),
which contemplated that all rail lines would be electrified by 1967.
Actually, only 202 km had been electrified by the end of 1961. // Plans
now call for electrification by 1967 of about 1,500 km of main line,
about 40 percent of the present system, which will carry from 65 to 70
percent of the total volume of rail freight in the country. L8/ Lines
to be electrified include the east-coast line as far north as Ch'ongjin
and the west-coast line from Sinuiju to Kaesong. Past progress does not
indicate that the goal will be accomplished, but, with trained workmen
and experienced administrators, which by now are likely available, and
with the diversion of sufficient resources for the purpose, progress
may be rapid. The present electrified line consists of three sections:
the 129-km section of the east-west line between Sinsongch'on and Kowon,
one section on the east-coast line, and another short section on the
line that connects with the Chinese system at Manpiojin. During the
first half of 1962 the east-coast line extending south from Songjin
(Kimch'aek) to Hongwon was reported to have been electrified. 2/
Although North Korea has little excess capacity for hydroelec-
tric or thermal electric power production, new powerplants of both types
currently are under construction throughout the country. Production of
electric power is planned to increase from 10.4 billion kilowatt-hours
(kwh) in 1961 to 17 billion kwh in 1967. Hydroelectric powerplants
furnish nearly all production at present, but thermal electric powerplants
being constructed principally near coal mines will provide an increasing
share of the total production. The railroad system, however, has con-
sumed an insignificant proportion of the electric power and in 1967 will
still require less than 2 percent of the planned output of electric power
to transport the planned level of rail freight traffic by electric
traction.
B. Highways
At the end of 1961 the highway network in North Korea consisted
of about 20,000 km of roads of varying quality. Beginning in 1957, the
goal was to improve the quality of the network, which had been recon-
structed hurriedly for makeshift use after the war because of possible
resumption of hostilities. By the end of 1959, most major roads and
bridges had been reconstructed with permanent structures according to
standards adopted by the North Korean government. EV In 1960 and
1961, major emphasis was placed on further improvement of principal
roads. Only 335 km were reported as newly constructed or expanded during
1957-60. 11/ In spite of extensive reconstruction the highway network
consists mainly of gravel or dirt roads, intended for light traffic only.
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NORTH KOREA: Transportation and Economic Resources, 1960
5 0 X 1
Figure 2
giHydroelectric power
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Paving is limited to a few long sections leading to P'yongyang and pos-
sibly to a few short sections near other main cities. Other heavily
traveled sections are scheduled to be paved during the Seven Year
Plan. 1E/
Early in 1960, all the principal highways of North Korea (com-
prising Classes I and II in the North Korean government road classifi-
cation) generally were in good condition. These highways are built and
maintained by the central government. Class I highways connect provin-
cial capitals and foreign countries with P'yongyang; Class II highways
connect seats of local government with the main highway system. Al-
though a small number of bad curves and grades still existed in 1960,
the general alignment of all principal highways had been greatly Im-
proved. New bridges were for the most part built of concrete, with a
roadway width of 6 meters. However, all secondary roads, classified as
Class III, were in poor condition. The old bridges, built during the
Korean War, were still in use in many places. Maintenance of Class III
and other local roads is the responsibility of the local or provincial
governments. 11/
C. Waterways
About 3,200 km, or 20 percent of the river system of North
Korea, are deep enough to sustain cargo-carrying vessels. 111/ The Yalu
River has the longest navigable distance and serves as the only means of
transportation in some of the mountainous regions. The Tumen River is
important for the shipment of timber. In general, however, the rivers
of North Korea are shallow routes that are suitable mainly for junks and
native craft. Navigation is interrupted by freezing from December to
March and by floods from June to August. The only improvements under-
taken have been dredging and maintenance of deepwater channels in or
near the estuaries of the most important rivers.
Important coastal ports, which are mainly natural harbors along
the east coast, include Ch'ongjin, Najin, Wonsan, and Hungnam. On the
west coast the only port of sufficient depth for oceangoing ships is
Nampto, located about 30 km from P'yongyang, in the estuary of the Tae-
dong River. As a result of the wartime destruction of a large part of
the fleet, ports, and shipyards, water transport has not been important,
and the ports are used mainly by the Korean fishing fleet and by vessels
moving in short-distance coastal traffic. The North Korean government
developed extensive plans for the reconstruction of water transport to
relieve the railroads of some of the foreign trade traffic and heavy
domestic traffic along each coast, but these plans have been only mod-
estly successful. In the past several years, European and Bloc ships
have been calling at several ports, especially Nampto and Ch'ongjin,
but only at Ch'ongjin is quay-side anchorage available for ships with
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a draft of more than about 20 feet. Small Japanese ships have called
at Chiongjin and Chtaho since about 1955, and a number of Soviet ships
from the Soviet Far East have called each month, particularly at Najin
and Unggi. Reports from all ports indicate that stevedoring and lighter
service is scarce and poor. Dredging and expansion of port facilities
are being carried out to meet the requirements of foreign ships, and
increased shipping activity can be expected, although progress in these
areas likely will be slow.
D. Civil Aviation
North Korea expended considerable effort to reconstruct and im-
prove the country's most important airfields after the Korean conflict,
but very few of the fields are used to provide civil air service. Most
of the good airfields are located along the west coast, near the China
border, or near P'yongyang. Only one airfield can sustain heavy trans-
ports of the Tu-104 type, and 17 can sustain only light transport planes
of the Li-2 type. Most of the latter airfields have concrete runways
4,000 feet long or more but were constructed for jet fighter operations
and therefore are considered incapable of sustaining heavier aircraft.
Roads between the airports and the rail network or cities are mainly
earthroads. 15/
Civilian air service is operated by the national airlines on at
least one domestic route: from P'yongyang to Ch'ongjin, with a stop at
Hamhung. The North Korean national airlines also operate a twice-weekly
international service from P'yongyang to Peking, and China provides re-
ciprocal service on the same route. Weekly service between Moscow and
P'yongyang is maintained by the USSR via Novosibirsk with 11-18 planes.
North Korea probably has only four aircraft in civilian service, three
Li-2's and one I1-14, which are Soviet-built, piston-engined aircraft.
III. Transport Performance and Relationship to Output in Other Sectors
of the Economy
A. Performance
1. Freight Transport
In 1961, performance by the modern transport system of
North Korea reached 77 million tons carried and 10.4 billion ton-
kilometers (tkm), both about 2.5 times the level of performance in
1956 (see Table 1* and the chart, Figure 3**). The share of tons
carried by the railroads decreased during the period from about
Appendix A, p. 23, below.
** Following p. 8.
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Million Metric Tons Carried
300
200
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
.9
8
.7
1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961
NORTH KOREA
TONS CARRIED BY MODERN TRANSPORT
1956-61 AND 1967 PLAN
:t TiDfAl...7-_TR?ANSPORT_
=4-
Figure 3
MN
MMIMMI
WM=
EIMINEMEN
EMENNEMEN
11111111111MUMMEN
IIIMMEMEMMEM
-MMM-==ffiMMMMWM-
RAILROADS
/MOTOR-TRUCKS
=
---
-EMEMENEELIEE_
MEEP --E-10.F1/46-ffig
- Main mama?
-11111121112IMME-
MEE-
-M;Em
- -
MaliailliMEMMEN.Ttimmdla
.11IIMACIMMYEEll
mum mom=
_
=MB
F. I===
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1967
Plan
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64 percent in 1956 to a little more than 50 percent of the total in
1960 and 1961. In terms of ton-kilometers, however, the railroads
continued to perform more than 95 percent of the total, indicating the
importance of the railroad system in long-distance traffic. During
1956-60, motor truck transport carried an increasing share of the total
tonnage, a trend that had continued since the years before the Korean
War, when motor trucks accounted for less than 10 percent of the total
tonnage carried. From 32 percent of the total tonnage in 1956, the
share carried by motor trucks increased to a high of 45 percent in 1960
(see the chart, Figure 4*). In 1961 the share performed by water trans-
port was about 4 percent of the total tonnage and less than 2 percent
of the ton-kilometers, in both cases only slightly higher than in 1956.
Air transport has accounted for less then 1 percent of the total per-
formance in any one year.
If the Seven Year Plan is successful, the proportion of tons
carried by rail and by motor vehicles in 1967 will be nearly reversed
from their 1956 positions: motor vehicles will carry 61 percent of the
total tonnage compared with 32 percent, and railroads will carry 34 per-
cent compared with 64 percent. Although plans have not been announced
for ton-kilometer performance, it is estimated that the railroads will
continue to perform nearly 90 percent of the total, and motor vehicles
as well as water transport will show only modest increases in their re-
spective shares of the total.
a. Railroads
Performance by rail transport from 1956 through 1961
increased at an average annual rate of about 18 percent in terms of
both tons carried and ton-kilometers. The high rates of growth in the
earlier years have tapered off since 1959. In order to achieve the
planned goal of 75 million tons carried and 17.5 billion tkm in 1967, 1.?./
an increase of 10 to 11 percent annually will be required during 1962
through 1967. An increase of 6.5 million tons, or nearly 16 percent
above the level of 1961, is planned for 1962. 17/ The average length
of haul of all freight by rail remained between 220 and 240 km from
1956 through 1961, and only a slight decrease is planned by 1967.
Of the major commodities transported by rail during
1956, coal accounted for 26 percent of the total tonnage; construction
materials including cement and timber, 29 percent; and minerals and
metals, 12 percent. Although detailed information is not available for
any year since 1958, these same commodities accounted for 27 percent,
32 percent, and 15 percent, respectively, during that year, indicating
a trend toward greater reliance on the rail system to transport
* Following p. 10.
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industrial and construction materials for the industrial expansion
program. Grain accounted for about 4 percent of the rail tonnage
carried in 1956 and in 1958, or about the same percentage as in Commu-
nist China during 1958. More than 95 percent of the coal imported and
produced in North Korea moved by rail in 1957. At present the rail-
road system is a principal consumer of coal in the country, but it is
possible that the percentage of the total rail tonnage occupied by coal
may be reduced as electrification of the railroads progresses. The
North Korean planners expect that when the main rail lines are electri-
fied, only one-fifth of the coal now being used by the railroads will
suffice to produce the electric power needed for railroad operation.
b. Motor Trucks
It is estimated that tons carried by motor trucks in-
creased from about 9.2 million tons in 1956 to about 32.6 million tons
in 1961, indicating an average annual rate of growth of nearly 29 per-
cent. Although such a rate of growth seems high, increases in inventory
and improvements in operating efficiency (which are discussed in the fol-
lowing section) put this increase within reason.* The Seven Year Plan
calls for tonnage carried by motor transport by 1967 to be 3.9 times
the level of 1960, which amounts to an average annual rate of growth of
about 21 percent. If motor transport grows as planned, by 1967 it will
carry nearly 80 percent more tonnage than that carried by the rail sys-
tem. Such a performance in 1967 is possible if motor transport continues
to expand to provide feeder service for rail and water transport; to
replace primitive transport, especially in rural areas; and to support
production at mines and industrial plants not located on the rail net-
work. The average length of haul by motor vehicles, which has decreased
from about 14 km in 1956 to 10 km in 1961, apparently will remain short,
as the Seven Year Plan forecasts that the rail transport system will
continue to be the major form of long-distance transport (see Table 2**).
c. Waterways
In spite of considerable investment, effort, and prop-
aganda directed toward the expansion of water transport, performance
by this means of transport, in terms of tons carried, increased at a
* Data for motor truck transport given in North Korean official re-
leases, however, indicate a level of performance since 1958 of more than
double this estimated tonnage. Apparently the inflated performance an-
nounced for 1958,i the first year of the "flying horse" program, has
never been publicly revised, and because the data for performance during
each of the following years have been announced merely as percentage in-
creases above the previous year, the mistake has been carried forward.
** Appendix A, p. 24, below.
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NORTH KOREA
PERFORMANCE OF THE MODERN TRANSPORT SYSTEM
1956, 1961, AND 1967 PLAN
THOUSAND METRIC TONS CARRIED
981 3.496
3,350 4.4%
1956
MILLION TON-KILOMETERS
1961
RAILROADS
MOTOR TRUCKS---,,,
WATERWAYS
1967 Plan
RAILROADS
MOTOR TRUCKS.?
9,900 4.5% WATERWAYS
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100%
129 2.9%
31 0.796
100%
339 3.3%
165 1.6%
100%
1,340 6.796
MOO 5.5%
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slower rate than that by motor vehicles from 1956 through 1961. The
average length of haul increased by more than one-half to nearly 50 km,
with the result that the ton-kilometer performance showed a slightly
higher increase than did that of motor transport. Nevertheless, the
North Korean government states that water transport, which carried only:
about 3.4 million tons in 1961, is lagging behind. By 1967 the volume .
of water transport is planned to be 3.3 times the level of 1960 and ton-
kilometers eight times. 12/ Although it is doubtful that these increases
will be achieved, the failure of water transport to fulfill its plan
will not be significant, as it will continue to account for a relatively
small proportion of the total transportation performance.
2. Passenger Transport
the validity of data 50X1
released by the North Korean government on passenger transport, but the
released data seem reasonably in line with the rates of growth in freight
transport North Korea has 50X1
emphasized motor bus transport as the principal mode of passenger trans-
port. Motor buses have been imported and some have been produced domes-
tically. Official travelers are given priority in rail travel, and it
is difficult for unofficial travelers to obtain railroad tickets. Al-
though bus service does not extend to many mountainous areas, bus routes
do reach county seats and laborers' districts where no railroad exists.
As a result, the number of passengers traveling by motor transport in-
creased from about 17 percent of the total of 46 million passengers
carried by modern transport in 1949 to nearly 80 percent of a total of
about 294 million passengers in 1960. The number of passengers travel-
ing by motor transport in 1960 was 3.6 times the number in 1956, slightly
less than the increase estimated for motor truck freight during the same
period. Rail transport carried only 20 percent of the passengers and
accounted for about 70 percent of the passenger-kilometers in 1960,
leaving less than 1 percent of the total performed by water transport
(see Table 3*).
3. Primitive Transport
In contrast to the practice in Communist China, primitive
transport is seldom mentioned in official releases of information by
the government of North Korea. a common form of 50X1
transport in North Korea is the human porter using an A-shaped frame to
carry large loads on his back. Apparently the government would rather
not publicize the fact that primitive transport not only has continued
in North Korea but probably has expanded. Teams of oxen and horse carts
have been organized and are administered at the provincial level. In
1958 the volume of freight transported in the whole country by such
teams was announced as 4.2 times the 1953 level, and freight turnover
was about 2.2 times. 22/
* Appendix A, p. 25, below.
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B. Relationship to Output in Other Sectors of the Economy
In 1960 the index of industrial production, measured in terms
of value added in mining and manufacturing in North Korea, was 442
(1954 being the base year), and the index of total tons carried by
modern transport was 384. A simple,correlation between the two indexes
was computed for the years 1954-60, and a formula was derived for the
regression line. By assuming that the same relationship between the
indexes will continue through 1967 and by substituting the planned
level of industrial production for 1967 in the formula, it was found
that the index of tons carried should reach 1,186 by 1967. The index
of tons carried planned for 1967 is 1,106, or only 93 percent of what
would be expected if the trend line were followed. This plan indicates
that North Korea expects to reach the planned level of industrial pro-
duction with a proportionately smaller number of tons carried. Such a
relationship will be possible in 1967 if the commodity composition of
traffic changes as expected. For example, if consumption of coal is
greatly reduced by the electrification of the rail lines and if the
goods produced by industry gradually consist of a higher percentage of
high-value, low-volume goods, the value of industrial production un-
doubtedly will increase at a faster rate than transportation performance.
Agricultural output, moreover, is planned to increase at a slower rate
than other sectors of the economy and therefore will generate propor-
tionately less volume to be transported.
IV. Inventory of Equipment and Operating Efficiency
A. Railroads
It is estimated that the inventory of railroad freight cars in
North Korea increased only slightly from about 10,200 cars in 1956 to
10,800 cars in 1961. 21/ The rolling stock sent by other Bloc countries
to North Korea arrived before 1956 for the most part and was reported
to have included nearly 2,000 boxcars from Communist China and 45 refrig-
erator cars from East Germany. 22/ Since 1956, additions to the inven-
tory have been mainly from domestic production and from reconstruction
of war-damaged cars. According to North Korean official announcements,
more than 2,000 freight cars were produced domestically during 1957-61,
although these data undoubtedly are inflated by the inclusion of non-
main line cars. On the assumption that the rolling stock park includes
1 locomotive for each 30 freight cars, the park probably includes at
least 360 locomotives, between 30 and 50 of which probably are electric
locomotives. The Seven Year Plan envisions an annual output of 2,000
freight cars by 1967, for a total production of 13,000 cars during the
plan period. Also, a total production of 200 electric and diesel loco-
motives and more than 450 passenger cars is planned during 1961-67.
Two electric locomotives reportedly were produced during 1961 as well
as the first railroad passenger car made from North Korean materials. 2.3_/
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In recent years, railroad operating efficiency in North Korea
has not improved as planned, although the improvement has been substan-
tial (see Table )1.40. Freight car turnaround time was reduced from 5.1
days in 1956 to 3.1 days in 1960 but not to the 2.5 days desired by the
Minister of Transportation. A further improvement to 2.96 days was re-
ported for 1961, and a goal of less than 2.5 days has now been set for
1967. 2/1/ The average load per loaded car was said to be 30 tons in
1958, and although the goal for 1959 apparently was 35 tons, an average
of 33.1 tons was reported for 1959. The goal for 1967 for the average
load per loaded car has not been announced, but a program is underway
to increase the carrying capacity of cars both by reconstruction of
existing cars to carry heavier loads and by adding larger cars to the
park. The average tonnage of freight trains was 32 percent higher in
1961 than in 1956. If the average freight train tonnage is raised by
another 20 percent as planned by 1967, it seems reasonable to assume
that the average load per loaded car will be at least 35 tons and may
reach 40 tons.
About 9,000 cars were required in 1959 to carry the reported
performance of 35.1 million tons, assuming an average load per loaded
car of 33.0 tons and a turnaround time of 3.1 days. This figure rep-
resents an operating park** of about 88 percent of the estimated in-
ventory of 10,200 cars for that year. Similar computations for 1960
and 1961 indicate that the proportion of the total inventory in oper-
ation increased to about 93 percent. Such high ratios may reflect an
improved maintenance and repair capability, as new railroad car build-
ing plants and repair shops have been built in the past few years, but
these high ratios may also indicate either some degree of inaccuracy in
the various reported operating factors or an inventory larger than esti-
mated. To carry 75 million tons in 1967, with a turnaround of 2.5 days
and an average load of 35 tons per loaded car, an operating park of
14,700 cars will be needed. If the average load increases to 40 tons,
an operating park of only 12,840 cars will be required. The addition
of 13,000 cars to the park during the plan period would seem to be more
than ample to replace old cars and to permit some shortfall in the goals
for the various operating factors.
B. Motor Trucks
It is estimated that North Korea had 23,000 civilian trucks at
the end of 1961, and the inventory of civilian trucks, which increased
* Appendix A, p. 26, below.
** The operating freight car park is calculated by multiplying the
number of cars loaded per day by turnaround time. The difference between
the total park and the operating park is the so-called reserve park,
which includes cars idle for lack of assignment as well as those idle for
repairs.
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rapidly from about 10,000 units in 1956, can be expected to continue
its expansion. The increases during 1956-59 resulted principally
from imports of about 6,000 trucks from the USSR. Although North
Korea may continue to import large-size or specialized trucks, future
increases in the inventory will come mainly from domestic production,
as a small but well-balanced motor vehicle industry has been developed.
Production is confined as yet to 2-1/2-ton, 4-by-2 trucks based on the
Soviet GAZ 51. 2.52 Output of these so-called "Victory 58" trucks at
the Tokch'on Factory increased from 100 trucks in 1959 to 3,100 in
1960 and 3,300 in 1961. Plans call for production of 4,700 trucks in
1962 and 10,000 in 1967. If the planned level of tons carried by
motor trucks in 1967 is to be achieved, it will be necessary for all
of the domestically produced trucks to be added to the North Korean
truck park, although the country probably will export a few trucks
to increase national prestige abroad. The machine building industry
also produces spare parts, except tires, for most of the truck in-
ventory. Buses and small automobiles also are reported to be in
series production. Experimental production is underway on 6-ton and
10-ton trucks, but production of such vehicles will prove uneconomical
in North Korea. Even if large trucks are produced, they would have
limited use in the country, for the roads for the most part are not
constructed to sustain heavy traffic.
About 47 percent of the total truck inventory in 1958 was as-
signed to the Vehicle Transport Bureau (VTB) of the Ministry of Trans-
portation, and the remainder was assigned to organizations and enter-
prises under other ministries. 2.Y A similar breakdown for any year
since 1958 is not available, but at present the percentage probably
greatly favors the VTB. The policy has been to increase the inventory
of trucks under the VTB faster than the number assigned to nontransport
organizations because it was found that trucks under nontransport enter-
prises have very low operational rates. According to North Korean of-
ficial statistics, the number of trucks under the VTB increased by 25
percent in 1958 compared with 1957, while those under nontransport
enterprises increased by only 1 percent. It was also announced that in
1960 the number of vehicles under the VTB increased by 40 percent com-
pared with 1959. Eyi The higher utilization rate of trucks under the
VTB undoubtedly has been one of the factors contributing to the increased
efficiency of the truck park.
By using inventory and performance data, computations show that
the annual ton-kilometer output per truck in North Korea increased by
29 percent in 1960 compared with 1956 and that tons carried per truck
increased 87 percent in the same period. In 1961, however, performance
per truck decreased 11 percent in terms of ton-kilometers and 17 percent
in terms of tons carried compared with 1960.
the increases shown in earlier years were achieved mainly by improved
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coordination, such as arranging loads for the trip both ways; by im-
proving maintenance and repair of vehicles; by increasing the use of
trailers hauled behind conventional trucks; and, most important, by
implementing the two-shift system. There is nothing to indicate that
trucks were overloaded as they were in Communist China during the "leap
forward" campaign, but there are numerous references in North Korean
publications to the poor maintenance and repair of vehicles that caused
mechanical troubles while the trucks were on the road. Apparently such
troubles were the reason why one transport group in P'yongyang achieved
a net operational rate* of only 80 percent compared with the planned 95
percent. Ejti The decline in output per truck indicated for 1961 pos-
sibly can be attributed to a shortage of cargo to be transported; to
the transfer of numerous trucks to rural areas to bolster agricultural
production; and to the increased use of domestic fuels, which undoubt-
edly reduced efficiency.
Because all petroleum products consumed in North Korea must be
imported and because North Korea is short of foreign exchange, truck
transport has been forced to conserve gasoline. In 1958 the North
Korean Cabinet ordered that every year, beginning with 1959, 75 percent
of the total number of trucks and 50 percent of the automobiles exist-
ing at the beginning of the year should be modified within a few months
so as to use substitute fuels. This order included all trucks except
those with a loading capacity of more than 5 tons. Devices to save gas-
oline were ordered attached to all vehicles permitted to use gasoline. 22/
Substitute fuels included anthracite coal, briquets, charcoal, and car-
bide. Work norms for trucks and drivers were adjusted to require less
time in operation for trucks burning substitute fuels, with a lower rate
for trucks using coal and carbide than for trucks using charcoal. Judg-
ing from a fairly constant rate of imports of gasoline for a number of
years, the conversion of some vehicles at least must have been accom-
plished. Just what effect the conversion had on efficiency has not been
announced at the national level, but propaganda from various provincial
groups claims that trucks powered by indigenous fuels operate as well as
gasoline-powered trucks. One such announcement claimed that remodeled
trucks climb hills 1,000 meters above sea level as well as gasoline-
powered trucks, even with 5-ton to 7-ton trailers behind them. 2iV
C. Waterways
In 1958, North Korea had about 500 small craft of all kinds,
only 3 of which were more than 100 tons. The government recently
stated that there was a pressing need for more ships. So far the ship-
building industry has produced only a few small ships, but it now claims
* Proportion of the total time actually spent in transport work, ex-
cluding time for repairs and going to and from the work site.
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to have the capacity to produce 3,000 deadweight (DWT) cargo vessels.
The first such ship, which was launched in 1961, was equipped with a
coal-fired Steam engine that also was said to have been built in North
Korea. The industry expected to complete a 31500-DWT fish refrigeration
ship by the end of 1961. _32/ In addition to building vessels, North
Korea has acquired a 31032-DWT cargo ship from Bulgaria. 2/ Although
the ship is reported to be flying the North Korean flag, no information
is available concerning its activities.
V. Administration and Labor Force
At the present time, although the railroads were formerly admin-
istered separately from other forms of transport, the Ministry of Trans-
portation, headed by Kim Hoe-il, controls all forms of modern transport
in North Korea. The executive branches of the Ministry include various
bureaus and departments, a number of which deal with the operation, con-
trol, and construction of the railroads. One of the most important
bureaus controlling railroad transport at the national level is the
Transportation Bureau, which at the end of 1961 was authorized to
organize headquarters for combined control over railroad transport ac-
tivities at railroad stations, factories, and enterprises. It was ex-
pected that these headquarters could more efficiently operate freight
cars entering the premises of factories and enterprises and could help
the factories solve various transportation problems related to their
production activities. 13./ Responsibility for the actual operation of
the railroads is assigned to four regional administrations, with head-
quarters located in P'yongyang, Kaech'on, Hamhung, and Ch'ongjin.
The Motor Vehicle and Road Management Bureau, which was placed under
the Ministry of Transportation in 1957, allocates all motor vehicles,
distributes and manages fuel and oil, directs the construction of roads
and bridges on Class I and Class II highways, and supervises the business
activities of the provincial motor vehicle divisions. The Marine Trans-
portation Management Bureau manages the operation of all North Korean
vessels, directs construction of new vessels, and controls the ports and
the local organs that control transportation on each of the rivers. The
Air Bureau has similar responsibilities for civil air transport and
civilian airfields.
The number of persons employed in modern transport in North Korea
increased about 31 percent from 1956 to 1960, from 55,000 to 72,000,
compared with increases in employment during the same period of 80 per-
cent in all state-operated enterprises and 138 percent in modern in-
dustry. The following tabulation shows that althouel employment in
transportation is an insignificant part of the total estimated nonagri-
cultural labor force, which includes workers in handicraft industry, it
accounts for an important part, about 5 percent, of the labor force
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employed in state enterprises in 1960. Also noteworthy is the fact
that transportation employed about one-tenth of the number of persons
employed by modern industry in 1960. 3)2/
Total labor force
Nonagricultural labor force
Labor force in state enterprises
Of which:
Thousand Persons
4,00o
1,600
1,50o
Industry 700
Transportation 72
The productivity of labor in the transportation industry was re-
ported to be about 80 percent higher in 1960 than in 1956. 151 Pro-
ductivity in motor transport increased at a higher rate than the aver-
age for the industry as a whole, and productivity in rail transport
made only modest gains during these years.
VI. Investment
After the reconstruction of the transportation system during 1954-56
was basically completed, investment in the transportation sector (includ-
ing communications) decreased in absolute terms and as a percent of the
total capital investment. In 1957-60, transportation received 7.7 per-
cent of the total capital investment in the economy made through the
state budget compared with 13.1 percent during 1954-56 (see Table 5*).
The actual proportion of the total investment going to this sector during
1957-60 was considerably less than the allocated 10.1 percent in the orig-
inal 1957-61 plan. 36/ The absolute amount invested each year in terms
of 1950 prices declined from a high of 50 million new won** in 1954 to
17 million in 1957, but since 1957 the amount has gradually increased. Ej
Neither the amount of investment in transportation in 1961 nor the pro-
portion of the total investment of 7 billion won planned for 1961-67 allo-
cated to the transportation sector has been announced. It has been re-
ported, however, that investment in transportation as a sector of the
economy will not be emphasized until the last 4 years of the plan. In
Appendix A, p. 27, below.
** Won values in this report are presumed to be in new won and may be
converted to US dollars at a rate of exchange of 2.57 won to US $1. This
rate does not necessarily reflect the value of the won in terms of the
dollar.
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the first 3 years, investment will be concentrated on expanding and
consolidating established productive facilities in the machine build-
ing and chemical industries and also in light industry and in fishing
and agriculture. During the last 4 years, new construction in trans-
portation, fuel, power, mining, and other key undertakings as well as
in the chemical and machine building industries will be emphasized.
If the extensive plans announced for transportation are to be accom-
plished by 1967, it would seem that the sector should receive about
700 million won, or about 10 percent of the total investment, about
the same proportion as it received during 1954-60.
Even the investment of 10 percent of the total is small, however,
compared with the rate of investment in transportation in other coun-
tries. During 1953-57, Communist China allocated 13 percent of the
total capital investment, including nonbudgetary investment, to trans-
portation and communications, and it is believed that the proportion
increased after 1957. Although North Korea has not been attempting to
expand the transportation network as Communist China has, North Korea
has invested large sums in the electrification of parts of the rail
network.
In North Korea the part of the total investment in the transpor-
tation sector allocated to railroads has been about 55 percent, accord-
ing to data available for 1957 and 1958. 38/ In Communist China the
comparable figure was 66 percent in 1953-57. 12/ Another 15 percent of
North Korean investment in transportation went to highways and 8 percent
to post and telecommunications, leaving about 22 percent for waterways
and civil aviation.112/ Waterways must have received by far the larger
share of the latter figure because the plan for each year has emthasized
the importance of developing water transport. Air transport has re-
ceived little attention.
VII. Problems and Prospects
The goals for transportation in North Korea in 1962 and 1967 are
ambitious, but they probably can be accomplished provided the industrial
and agricultural sectors of the economy move forward according to plan
and generate sufficient traffic. There is some doubt that the plans for
production of rolling stock will be fulfilled, but failure in this field
would not be crucial. In case of necessity, North Korea could continue
to import rolling stock. Plans to improve water transport have had re-
markably poor success in the past, but again this deficiency is not im-
portant, because water transport contributes only a small part of the
total transport performance.
Regarding technical and industrial knowledge required for the long-
range development of North Korea, it may be significant that the
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government has informed the scientists of the country that certain in-
formation is essential if the Seven Year Plan is to be completed suc-
cessfully. In the field of transportation the desired information in-
cludes information on the automation of signals and other safety de-
vices for rail transport, research on new types of steel for truck parts,
mass production casting techniques for automobile parts, and information
regarding production of large trucks and of ships up to 10,000 tons. It
is doubtful, however, that this information is absolutely essential for
the transport industry to reach its goal for 1967. In the case of the
rail system, automatic block signaling would improve efficiency, but
certainly more significant is the electrification of main lines, for
which technical knowledge apparently is available. Production of large
trucks and ships is not necessary in North Korea, and if such were avail-
able, they would have limited use. A higher grade of steel for truck
parts would alleviate some maintenance problems, and mass production
casting techniques would speed up production of trucks, but neither is
essential. The basic requirements for increasing transportation per-
formance are present already or the essentials can be obtained with a
reasonable investment program.
It seems to be characteristic of Communist-planned economies that
the amount of investment allocated to develop the transportation system
is barely sufficient to permit transportation to meet the demands placed
on it by industrial expansion, and such is believed to be the case in
North Korea. Although the transportation system will not have excess
capacity if this happens, it will meet the demand for service. It also
seems characteristic of Communist economies that plans for transportation
generally underestimate the transportation performance needed to reach
industrial goals but that the goals for transportation generally are ex-
ceeded. If this experience is repeated in North Korea during the next
few years, transportation performance will expand roughly in the same
relationship to industrial production as in the past.
The progress already made by the transportation industry of North
Korea undoubtedly has greatly increased the ability of the country to
wage war. Future progress no doubt will enhance this ability further.
Major emphasis has been placed on the improvement of international rail
connections with the USSR and Communist China and of the rail system in
the southern part of the country near the line of demarcation, improve-
ments that may serve military as well as economic goals.
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APPENDIX A
STATISTICAL TABLES
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Table 1
North Korea: Performance of the Modern Transport System 2/
1956-61 and 1967 Plan
Year
Thousand Metric Tons Carried
Percent of Total
Railroads
Motor
Trucks
Waterways 12/
Total
Railroads
Motor
Trucks
Waterways
1956 1/
1957 2/
1958
1959 1/
1960 ly
1961 g/
1967 Plan
18,281
21,455
28,200 2/
35,132
38,645
41,000
75,000 la/
9,169
13,891
17,500 2/
28,878
34,348
32,600
134,000 li
981
1,095
1,980 2?/
2,754
2,990
3,350
9,900 1/
28,431
36,441
47,680
66,764
75,983
76,950
218,900
64.3
58.9
59.1
52.6
50.9
53.3
34.3
32.3
38.1
36.7
43.3
45.2
42.3
61.2
3.4
3.0
4.2
4.1
3.9
4.4
4.5
Million Metric Ton-Kilometers
Percent of Total
1956 2/
4,288
129
31
4,448
96.4
2.9
0.7
1957 2/
5,072
189
37
5,298
95.7
3.6
0.7
1958
6,300 2/
213 2/
69 2/
6,582
95.7
3.2
1.1
1959 1/
7,798
304
104
8,206
95.0
3.7
1.3
1960 I/
9,123
332
136
9,591
95.1
3.5
1.4
1961 g/
9,850
339
165
10,354
95.1
3.3
1.6
1967 Plan
17,500 J.2/
1,340
1,100 1/
19,940
87.8
6.7
5.5
a. Excluding performance by civil air transport, which accounts for less than 1 percent of the total modern transport performance.
b. Including both inland and coastal waterways, for which separate estimates are not available. Data were converted from nautical miles at the
rate of 1.853248 km per nautical mile.
c.J.
d. 212/, giving percentage increases above 1946 and the previous year.
e. In 1959. highway freight tonnage was 165 percent of the level in 1958, and highway freight turnover was 143 percent. La/
f. 45/.
h. III/.
i. Freight carried by motor vehicles will increase more than 2.9 times during 1961-67. 1418/
j. During 1961-67 the volume of water transport will increase 2.3 times and freight turnover more than seven times. L9/
k. Estimated, assuming an average length of haul of 10 km.
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Table 2
North Korea: Average Length of Haul by Modern Transport 2/
1956-61 and 1967
Kilometers
Year
Freight Traffic
Railroad
Highway
Waterway
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1967
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960W
235
236
223
222
236
240
233
14.1
13.6
12.2
10.5
9.7
l0.4
1012/
Passenger Traffic
32
34
35
38
45
49
111
59
55
55 12/
56
57
6.5
5.9
6.0
6W
6
18
19
16
16W
15
a. Information computed from data in Tables 1 and 3, pp. 23, above, and
25, below, respectively, unless otherwise indicated.
b. Estimated.
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North Korea:
Table 3
Volume and Amount of Passenger Transport by the Modern Transport System 2/
1956-60
Year
Railroads
Highways
Inland and Coastal
Waterways
Total
Railroads
Inland and Coastal
Highways Waterways
Thousand Passengers
Percent of Total
195612/
36,853
64,759
882
102,494
36.0
63.1
0.9
1957 12/
43,529
94,481
1,280
139,290
31.3
67.8
0.9
1958
42,700 ../
137,000 gl/
1,466 2/
181,166
23.6
75.6
0.8
1959 1/
55,300
190,000 E./
1,600 h/
246,90o
22.4
77.0
0.6
1960
59,500 E/
233,000 E/
1,700 la/
294,20o
20.2
79.2
0.6
Million Passenger-Kilometers
Percent of Total
1956 12/
2,179
419
16
2,614
83.4
16.0
0.6
195712/
2,374
562
24
2,960
80.2
19.0
0.8
1958 1/
2,349
820
24
3,193
73.6
25.7
0.7
1959 1/
3,100
11140
26
4,266
72.7
26.7
0.6
1960 1/
3,390
1,11.00
26
4,816
70.4
29.1
0.5
a. Data are believed
was 0.2 percent or les
c. Estimated, assumin
e. 2/
f.
g. Estimated, assuming
h. Estimated, assuming
J.14/
to exclude intracity traffic. Excluding passengers carried by civil aviation, which
s of the total passenger-kilometers performed by modern transport in 1956-57.
g an average haul of 55 km in 1958 and 57 km in 1960.
an average haul of 6 km.
an average haul of 16 km in 1959 and 15 km in 1960.
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Table 4
North Korea: Selected Operational Data of Railroads
1956-61
Year
Freiglit Car
Turnaround Time
(Days)
Locomotive Running
Distance
(Kilometers per Day)
Average Technical
Speed of Train 21
(Kilometers per Hour)
Average Operational
Speed of Train12/
(Kilometers per Hour)
Average Tonnage
of Freight Trains
(Metric Tons)
1956 2/
1957 2/
1958
1959 s/
1960
1961
5.1
4.4
3.7 2./
3.1
3.11/
2.96/
223.6
244.o
260 d
284.
293.8 V
N.A.
27.2
29.7
30.6 I/
33.0
33.3 E/
N.A.
18.7
20.3
19.6 1/
20.4
20.8 B./
N.A.
628
659
712 2/
785
806 1/
830 12/
a. Average speed during running time only, excluding stops.
b. Average speed, including stops.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
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Table 5
North Korea: Capital Investment
in the Transportation and Post and Telecommunications Sector of the Economy
Compared with the Total Capital Investment 2/
Selected Years, 1954-67
Year
Total Capital Investment
Through the State Budget
for the Economy
(Million Current New Won)
Transportation and Post and Telecommunications
Total
(Million Current New Won)
Percent of the
Total Capital
Investment
for the Economy
1954
330
66
20.0
1956
351
28
7.9
1954-56 average
357
47
13.1
1959
620
55
9.0
1960
567
42
7.4
1957-60 average
500
39
7.7
1961
590 12/
N.A.
N.A.
1961-67
7,000
700.J
l0/
b. 6
c. _1/
d. Estimated.
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FIGURE 1
41
40
39
38
37
NORTH KOREA
TRANSPORTATION
AUGUST, 1962
STANDARD GAUGE RAILROADS (4'8A")
Ii
Double track
Single track
Single track, under construction
Single track, electric
NARROW GAUGE RAILROADS (2,6")
' Single track
ROADS
- Main surfaced road
Secondary surfaced road
4," Selected port
0 25 50 75
I--1 1---1 II ____I
Statute Miles
0 25 50 75
I--i F---i II I i
Kilometers
124
125
43
42
126
127
128
129
SUNGARI
RESERVOIR
hOtesL
(Lung.ching-t un
Ho-lung
(Samtao-kou)
n'.1\ ?
oeryong
dong
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LINE
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\
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hasuji
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KYONGNY61.81.-YOLTO
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ANMYON-DO
124
125
Boundaries and names ate not necessarily
those recognized by the U.S. Government.
126
127
TAEa,
128
129
gdOk
130
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