GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM OF NORTH VIETNAM
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Publication Date:
October 1, 1962
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REPORT
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SECRET,
Economic Intelligence Report
GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT
OF THE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
OF NORTH VIETNAM
CIA/RR ER 62-30
October 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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N? 97
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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SECRET
Economic Intelligence Report
GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT
OF THE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
OF NORTH VIETNAM
CIA/RR ER 62-30
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
SECRET
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Summary and Conclusions
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CONTENTS
Page
1
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . 3
II. Development of the Transportation Network . . 3
A. Railroads ? ? ? . ........ . ...... . . ? 3
B. Highways 5
C. Waterways 6
III. Transportation Performance 7
A. Railroads
B. Highways
C. Inland Waterways
D. Coastal Shipping
IV. Inventory and Operating Efficiency of the Various Modes of
Transportation
7
9
lo
11
12
A. Railroads 12
B. Highways 13
C. Inland and Coastal Shipping ? ? 14
V. Labor and Labor Productivity 15
VI. Investment 17
VII. Aid from the Sino-Soviet Bloc 18
VIII. Prospects for 1965 19
Appendixes
Appendix A. Statistical Tables
21
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Tables
Page
1. North Vietnam: Estimated Composition of the Labor Force
Engaged in State-Owned Transportation and Communications
Enterprises, 1961 16
2. North Vietnam: State Investment in Transportation and
Communications, 1955-60 17
3. North Vietnam: Tons Carried by the Transportation System,
1955-61 23
It.. North Vietnam: Performance of the Transportation System
in Ton-Kilometers, 1955-61 24
5. North Vietnam: Passengers Carried by the Transportation
System, 1955-61 25
6. North Vietnam: Performance of the Transportation System
in Passenger-Kilometers, 1955-61 26
7. North Vietnam: Average Length of Haul of Commodities and
Passengers, by Mode of Transportation, 1955-60 27
8. North Vietnam: Selected Operating Data on Railroad Trans-
port, 1955-60 28
9. North Vietnam: Selected Operating Data on State-Owned
Motor Vehicles, 1955-60 29
Map
(Inside Back Cover)
North Vietnam: Transportation
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GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
OF NORTH VIETNAM*
Summary and Conclusions
The transportation system of North Vietnam, which was badly damaged
during the Franco - Viet Minh War (1946-54) has been partially rebuilt
but is not yet up to the standard of the original French system. Al-
though North Vietnam, like other underdeveloped countries, is emphasiz-
ing the rapid industrialization of its economy, the country remains
largely agrarian (four out of five of its workers are engaged in agri-
culture), and its transportation is rudimentary.
The railroad network of North Vietnam, which was designed by the
French for military purposes and for hauling agricultural products and
minerals to the ports, is now being called on to support the country's
embryonic program for industrial development. Consisting of five
single-track lines radiating from the Hanoi area, the railroad network
serves most of the urban and industrial centers in the northern part
of the country and provides-two links with Communist China. Perform-
ance by the railroads has increased dramatically during the period
1956-61 (the average annual increase was 63 percent in ton-kilometers
and 43 percent in tons carried). These gains are more apparent than
real, however, because they represent at best only incomplete recovery
from the very low level of performance immediately following the war.
The highway network of North Vietnam consists of more than 10,000
kilometers (Km) of roads, about 1,000 of which are all-weather. Badly
damaged during the war, this network has not yet been fully restored.
The civilian truck park consists of about 2,000 trucks, many of which
are of French and US origin (plus a number of vehicles from the Bloc).
The ton-kilometers hauled by highway transport increased from 93 per
day in 1955 to 228 in 1960. This increase in performance probably was
accomplished by overloading, multiple-shift operation, and the limited
use of trailers. Operating efficiency in 1961, however, is estimated
to have fallen short of that of 1960. The out-of-service rate in-
creased sharply, there was a shortage of parts, and the short-sighted
management practices of the preceding years took their toll.
* The estimates and conclusions in this report represent the best
judgment of this Office as of 15 September 1962.
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Waterborne transportation in North Vietnam is no more advanced than
the other modes of transportation and, compared with them, is declining
in importance. The inland waterway network, which is concentrated in
the Red River Delta, is about 5,440 km long, about 1,450 km of which
are navigable by modern vessels during the entire year. Coastal ship-
ping is restricted to traffic between Haiphong, the primary ocean port,
and the lesser ports of Hon Gay, Cam Pha, and Ben Thuy. The entire
fleet, inland and coastal, has no more than 30 or 40 modern vessels,
the largest of which is about 900 deadweight tons. The rest of the
fleet consists of tugs, motorized fishing vessels, junks, sampans,
and rafts.
North Vietnam has been dependent on other members of the Bloc for
assistance in developing the transportation sector of the economy.
Since 1955, Communist China and the USSR have been the main contribu-
tors. According to the Five Year Plan (1961-65), aid from Communist
China, the USSR, Poland, and Rumania is to be used (1) to rebuild a
major part of the railroad network to conform to the Chinese standard
gauge, (2) to expand the truck park, and (3) to develop facilities for
the repair of trucks and rolling stock. By the end of the plan period,
performance by rail transport is planned to be 140 percent above that
of 1960, and performance by highway and inland waterway transport is to
be 50 percent higher. Achievement of these goals is dependent on the
extension of substantial aid to North Vietnam by other members of the
Bloc.
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I. Introduction
The transportation system of North Vietnam was badly damaged during
the Franco - Viet Minh War (1946-54) and has been only partially rebuilt
and is not yet up to the standard of the original French system. North
Vietnam,* like other underdeveloped countries, is emphasizing the rapid
industrialization of its economy, but the country remains largely
agrarian (four out of five of its workers are engaged in agriculture),
and its transportation is rudimentary.
The development of modern forms of land transport generally has
been restricted to the Tonkin and coastal plain areas because of the
high cost of construction and maintenance in the mountainous terrain
outside the plain region. In addition, modern inland water transport
also has been largely restricted to the Tonkin Plain because of the
large variation in the depth and flow of the major rivers. Neverthe-
less, for political and military as well as economic reasons, North
Vietnam is pushing ahead with its program to improve transportation,
primarily railroads and roads, outside the plain region.
II. Development of the Transportation Network
A. Railroads**
The pre-World War II rail network of North Vietnam, except for
the large section between the Song Ma River and the frontier with South
Vietnam at the 17th parallel, has now been rehabilitated. In 1954 the
war-damaged rail system of North Vietnam comprised approximately 1,150
kilometers (km) of meter-gauge track, only 100 km of which were usable.
By 1961 the rail system consisted of about 875 km of track,*** a density
of 1 km of rail route, to 181 square kilometers of land area. By com-
parison the rail route density in Communist China is 1 route-kilometer
to 292 square km, whereas the route density in Burma is 1 route-kilometer
to 211 square km.
The rail network of North Vietnam consists of five single-track
lines radiating from the Hanoi area and serving most of the urban and
* The total area of North Vietnam is about 158,750 square kilometers,
approximately the same size as the state of Florida.
** For the location of the railroad network serving North Vietnam, see
the map, inside back cover.
*** All rail kilometrage in North Vietnam is meter-gauge track. The
new Dong Anh - Thai Nguyen line, however, has been constructed with the
roadbed prepared for standard-gauge track.
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industrial centers in the northern part of the country. An international
rail connection with the rail system of Communist China is provided by
the Hanoi - Dong Dang line, which extends northeast from Hanoi to the
Kwangsi Chuang Autonomous Region of China. Because of the difference in
rail gauge,* however, transloading i$ necessary at Ping-hsiang, approxi-
mately 16 km inside Communist China.** A second rail line, paralleling
the Red River, runs northwest from the Hanoi area through Lao Kay, on
the North Vietnam - China border, to Klun-ming, the capital of Yunnan
Province of China. This line, which also is meter-gauge track within
Yunnan, requires no transloading at the border, but it does not connect
with the main Chinese rail system. A rail line about 50 km long has
been completed from Dong Anh (north of Hanoi) to the steel complex under
construction at Thai Nguyen. This line is the only major new rail line
in the North Vietnamese system. To the east of Hanoi, a rail line crosses
the Tonkin Plain to the port of Haiphong. Southeast of Hanoi the Hanoi-
Saigon Railroad has been reconstructed south as far as Ham Rong, on the
north bank of the Song Ma River.
In general, construction of railroads in North Vietnam is inferior
to the pre-World Wax II French construction, although the quality of con-
struction varies considerably, apparently depending on the priority of
the particular rail line. For example, the Hanoi - Dong Bang line, which
is of vital importance to the North Vietnamese, was relatively well con-
structed, but the Hanoi - Lao Kay line, which is of more importance to
the Chinese Communists than the North Vietnamese,*** appears to have been
relatively poorly constructed. Construction materials such as steel rails
and treated wooden crossties are in short supply in North Vietnam, and a
great deal of track reconstruction was accomplished with used, and fre-
quently mismatched, rails and wooden crossties that usually were untreated
against rot.
The majority of rail construction during the Five Year Plan
(1961-65) probably will consist of conversion of the Hanoi - Dong Bang,
Hanoi - Lao Kay, and Hanoi-Haiphong rail lines to Chinese standard-gauge
track and the extension of reconstruction southward toward the 17th par-
allel. At present, construction, reportedly leading to the widening of
the track, is underway between Dong Bang and Hanoi 2/
* The gauge of the Chinese rail system is 1.435 meters, or 4 feet
8-1/2 inches.
** The volume of traffic through the Change-of-gauge point at P'ing-
hsiang in 1961 is estimated to have been 1,000 to 1,500 tons per day
passing south from Kwangsi to North Vietnam and about 770 tons per day
passing north into Kwangsi. (Unless otherwise indicated, tonnages are
given in metric tons throughout this report.)
*** See III, A, p. 7, below.
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B. Highways
The highway network of North Vietnam consists of more than
10,000 km of motorable roads, V
This network is fairly dense in the Tonkin
Plain but has few roads extending into the mountainous regions beyond
the plain area. During the Franco - Viet Minh War the road net was
heavily damaged. Although considerable rehabilitation has been accom-
plished, the roads of North Vietnam have not been restored to the engi-
neering standards of the original French construction.
The primary highway network of North Vietnam consists of roads
radiating from Hanoi either paralleling the railroad lines or extending
into areas not served by rail -- to the north, the west, and the south.
The most important and the longest highway in the country is route 1,*
which runs from the 17th parallel through Hanoi to Dong Dang on the
border of Communist China. Other important highways extend from Hanoi
east to Haiphong (route 5); north through Thai Nguyen to Cao Bang
(route 3); and northwest through Hoa Binh and Lai Chau to Ban Nam Cuong
on the North Vietnam - China border. In addition to this primary road
system, North Vietnam has numerous roads, tracks, and trails extending
westward into Laos.**
At present, road construction in North Vietnam appears to be pri-
marily improvements of the main routes through widening, surfacing, and
strengthening of bridges and construction of "simple highways," earth
roads or tracks suitable for oxcarts, jeeps, or trucks in dry weather.
Most new construction of these earth roads or tracks has occurred out-
side the Tonkin Plain, particularly in the mountainous northern section
and in the North Vietnam - Laos border area.
* For the location of the primary roads of North Vietnam, see the map,
inside back cover.
** A road has some form of improvement such as grading, drainage, or
stabilization; a track is considered to be an unimproved road; and a
trail is a path usable at best by animal carts.
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C. Waterways*
The inland waterway system of North Vietnam, which is concen-
trated in the Red River Delta, consists primarily of the Red River and
its tributaries, the Black and Claire Rivers, and the Song Thai Binh
waterway system. The inland waterways of North Vietnam total about
5,440 km, of which 2,400 km are navigable by modern vessels in the high
water season Nay to October) and 1,450 km are navigable by modern ves-
sels perennially. .g../
The Red River, which flows southeast across the Tonkin Plain
and empties into the Gulf of Tonkin, is the main inland water transport
route of North Vietnam. This river, although affected by relatively
large seasonal changes in water level and volume of flow, is navigable
for its entire length lying in North Vietnam. During the low-water
season, vessels of about 5-foot draft can reach Hanoi and Yen Bay.
Between Yen Bay and Lao Kay in the low-water season, the Red River is
navigable only by shallow-draft vessels. In the high-water season,
however, it is theoretically possible for vessels with up to 7-foot
drafts to reach Lao Kay on the Chinese border. The Black and Claire
Rivers join the Red River in the area of Viet Tri. The Black River,
the southern tributary of the Red River, is navigable to Van Yen by
vessels with up to 2.5-foot draft in the low-water season. Vessels of
2.5-foot draft also can reach Tuyen Quang on the Claire River during
this time of the year. Both streams are navigable farther upstream by
native craft.
The Song Thai Binh system drains the Tonkin Plain north of the
Red River. This system, which is connected to the Red River by the
Canal des Rapides and the Canal des Bambous, is a relatively short sys-
tem consisting of two streams joining to form the Song Thai Binh in the
area of Sept Pagodes. During the low-water season, vessels of about 5.5-
foot draft can navigate as far as Sept Pagodes, and vessels of 5-foot
draft can reach Lang Lau.
Construction activity on the inland waterways appears to be
mainly improvements of existing facilities rather than expansion of the
network. This restriction is due primarily to the mountainous terrain,
which generally limits usable waterways to the Tonkin Plain and to the
extreme lower regions of larger rivers. Investment in the inland water-
way network is mainly in the form of dredging, harbor improvement, and
navigational aids.
* For the location of the primary waterways of North Vietnam, see the
map, inside back cover.
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North Vietnam has 1 principal port, 2 secondary ports, and 10
minor ports. Haiphong, which is located approximately 21 km up the
Cua Cam River, is the principal river and international shipping port,
where normally between 30 and 50 foreign vessels call each month, about
one-half being vessels from the Free World, At present it is reported
that six Liberty-type vessels can be accommodated at the wharves simul-
taneously. The two secondary ports, Cam Pha and Hon Gay, are primarily
coal export ports. Of the minor ports, Ben Thuy probably is the most
important. This port, located on the Song Ca River, is reported to
have been improved by dredging to allow the entrance of oceangoing
vessels of 1,200 deadweight tons (DWT). _91/
III. Transportation Performance
Although the performance of the transportation system of North
Vietnam has increased sharply since 1955, the system does not appear
to be adequate for the needs of the economy. This inadequacy appears
to be qualitative as well as quantitative. During 1955-61 althou&
national transportation plans appear generally to have been fulfilled,
the consumers of the service were not satisfied, Industrial construc-
tion and production reportedly were constricted by the lack of trans-
portation facilities to haul needed materials. 12/ It was reported in
1960 that "transportation is still unable to keep pace with the develop-
ment of the economy," 11/ and apparently, in spite of investment in
transportation and communications amounting to 25 percent of the total
state investment in fixed assets during 1955-60, the transportation
system is still so rudimentary that it cannot adequately support the
industrialization program. In addition, the inability of the trans-
portation system to fulfill its requirements is also due to poor plan-
ning at the national and local levels as well as to the use of large
numbers of unskilled personnel, the lack of equipment and storage
facilities, and an uncoordinated and inefficient organization.*
A. Railroads
The most significant trend in transportation in North Vietnam
has been the expansion of rail performance since 1955.** During 1956-61
the average annual increase in rail ton-kilometer performance was about
63 percent and in tons carried about 43 percent per year. By 1965, the
end of the Five Year Plan, rail performance is expected to be about 140
percent above the level of 1960.
* In 1959 it was reported that three-fourths of the time of the various
transportation activities was used for unloading, loading, and waiting
for accounts to be settled. 12/
** See Tables 3 through 6 Appendix A, pp. 23 through 26, below.
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Railroads are the primary form of transportation in North Vietnam
when the measure is ton-kilometers but in terms of tonnage carried are
exceeded by highways and inland waterways. In 1955 the railroad system
carried 14 percent of the total volume of goods transported and performed
22 percent of the total ton-kilometers. By 1961 the railroad share of
the total probably amounted to about 22 percent of the tons carried and
about 59 percent of the ton-kilometers performed. The high rate of in-
crease in railroad performance during 1955-61 can be accounted for, first,
by the relatively small amount of rail activity in 1955 and, second, by
the reconstruction and improvement of the railroad network during the
period that made it available for intensive use in the reconstruction of
the economy and in the industrialization program. This rate of increase,
however, is limited by aging equipment and concurrently an increasing
out-of-service rate, the low technical ability of railroad personnel,
construction and maintenance difficulties due to the mountainous terrain
and heavy monsoonal rainfall, and the need to rely on imports for most
equipment and spare parts.
The commodities carried by the rail system of North Vietnam are
mainly construction materials, machinery, coal, petroleum products, min-
eral ores, foodstuffs, and consumer goods. Transit traffic moving from
Kwangsi to Yunnan Province in Communist China by way of the Hanoi - Dong
Dang and the Hanoi - Lao Kay rail lines consists of such commodities as
petroleum products, industrial machinery and equipment, construction ma-
terials, and consumer goods moving into Yunnan. Tin, lead, phosphates,
bamboo, timber, and agricultural products are transported over these
lines from Yunnan into Kwangsi.
Roughly two-thirds of the import-export traffic carried on the
Hanoi - Dong Dang line during 1958-61 was Chinese freight in transit
across North Vietnam. The average density of freight traffic on the
railroads of North Vietnam increased from more than 108,000 ton-
kilometers (tkm) per route-kilometer in 1955* to about 933,000 tkm
per route-kilometer in 1961. Between 1957 and 1958 this ratio rose
sharply, probably reflecting the beginning of the use by the Chinese
Communists of the North Vietnamese railroad system for transit traffic.
Another indication of Chinese Communist use of North Vietnamese track
as well as the progressive rehabilitation of the network is the in-
creased length of haul. As shown in Table 7,** the average length of
haul increased from 111 km in 1955 to 242 km in 1960, with the sharpest
rise in 1958, when China-to-China rail operations began.
* Based on the assumption that the railroad network totaled 400 km in
1955.
** Appendix A, p. 27, below.
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The railroads of North Vietnam have accounted for 56 to 66 per-
cent of the passengers carried and 46 to 61 percent of the passenger-
kilometers performed by the transportation system since 1955. As shown
in Table 5,* passengers transported by rail increased from 3.1 million
in 1955 to about 16 million in 1961. During the same period, as shown
in Table 6,** passenger-kilometers performed by rail increased from 148
million passenger-kilometers to about 723 million passenger-kilometers
in 1961. Passenger traffic in the form of passenger-kilometers per-
formed per route-kilometer increased from 370,000 passenger-kilometers
per route-kilometer in 1955 to about 826,000 in 1961.
B. Highways
The highway transport of North Vietnam, both modern and primi-
tive, also has recorded impressive increases in tonnage carried and
ton-kilometers performed since 1955. As a percent of the total trans-
portation performance, highway transport increased its share of the
total tonnage carried from 23 percent in 1955 to about 38 percent in
1961 but recorded a decreasing share of the total ton-kilometer per-
formance, dropping from 16 percent in 1955 to about 9 percent in 1961.
In absolute terms the volume of highway tons carried in 1961 was
slightly more than nine times that of 1955, whereas ton-kilometer per-
formance was only about four times that of 1955, indicating through
this decrease in the average length of haul that the performance of
primitive forms of highway transport probably increased faster than
that of the modern sector.
Truck transport serves as a long-haul carrier in the mountainous
areas outside the Tonkin Plain not provided with rail facilities and
provides local service in the plain area in the urban and industrial
centers. In the mountainous northwestern part of North Vietnam it was
reported that highway transport volume in 1960 was 13 times the volume
in 1957. la/ The commodities carried by highway transport consist pri-
marily of foodstuffs, construction materials, handicraft products, and
consumer goods.
Passenger traffic on highway vehicles increased from 1.4 million
passengers in 1955, which was about 30 percent of the total passenger
traffic, to about 8.3 million passengers in 1961, approximately 34 per-
cent of the total. During this period, however, passenger-kilometers
performed by highway transport declined from 49 percent of the total
passenger-kilometers performed to about 36 percent of the total.
* Appendix A, p. 25, below.
** Appendix A, p. 26, below.
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Although modern transport has accounted for an increased share
of the total highway performance in recent years, primitive road trans-
port remains the primary method of short-haul transport. In 1961, pri-
mitive road transport carried about 61 percent of the tonnage and ac-
counted for approximately 48 percent of the ton-kilometers performed by
the highway sector. Most primitive road vehicles, althouel not owned
by the government, are under government control. It is reported that
80 percent of the owners of pedicabs and carts are in cooperatives. 12.?/
By 1965, the end of the Five Year Plan, highway transport per-
formance is expected to be 50 percent above the level of 1960. 12/ How-
ever, expansion of modern highway transport -- trucks and buses -- is
limited by North Vietnam's need to import vehicles, parts, and petroleum
products as well as skill in employing the resources that it already pos-
sesses. For example, in 1959 it was reported that an average of only
9.6 percent of the available trailers were used. lg On the other hand
it appears likely that primitive transport will continue to expand at a
rapid rate, for the government is encouraging construction and increased
use of primitive vehicles as well as construction of new roads, which
appear to be primarily "simple highways," cart tracks, and trails of
more advantage to the primitive than the modern vehicle.
C. Inland Waterways
The inland water transport of North Vietnam, which is centered
in the Red River Delta, has declined in importance relative to the rail-
roads and highways.* During 1955-61 the inland waterway share of the
tonnage carried by the transportation system of the country declined from
about 62 percent to about 37 percent of the total, and the ton-kilometers
declined from about 60 percent to 26 percent. This relative decline in
importance is due in part to the fact that the inland waterway system
suffered less damage than other forms of transportation during the
Franco - Viet Minh war and consequently increased its performance at a
rate lower than the highway or railroad sectors, which received rela-
tively large amounts of investment capital for reconstruction.
Most traffic on the inland waterways of North Vietnam occurs in
the first, second, and fourth quarters of the year. In the third quarter,
because of heavy rains, the waterways become swollen and dangerous for
smaller craft, and less freight is available for transportation by water-
ways because of deteriorated feeder roads to and from port areas. The
Hanoi-Haiphong waterway probably has the highest volume of traffic, ac-
counting in 1958 for about 30 million tkm, approximately 17 percent of
the total inland waterway performance. 17/ The commodities most commonly
carried on the inland waterways are agricultural and forest products,
* See Appendix A, Tables 3 and 4, pp. 23 and 24, respectively, below.
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mineral products, and local manufactures. The transportation of passen-
gers is of little importance on the inland waterways because most vessels
are of small size. In 1955, passengers carried by the inland waterway
system amounted to 200,000 and reached about 500,000 by 1961.
State-owned inland waterway transport accounts for only a small
part of the performance of the inland waterway system. It is likely,
however, that most nongovernment vessels are under some form of govern-
mental control, for it was reported in February 1961 that 6,500 boat
owners had joined cooperatives. 1?./ In 1960, state-owned inland water-
way transport carried only about 12 percent of the total tonnage carried
by the inland waterways and performed about 26 percent of the ton-
kilometers.
It appears unlikely that the performance of the inland waterway
system will increase as rapidly as other modes of transportation. Aside
from the lack of modern vessels, performance is limited by extreme fluc-
tuations in the water level and volume of the rivers and by heavy silting,
which requires constant dredging to keep open channels and ports. The
government of North Vietnam has not invested heavily in the inland water-
way system, and it is doubtful that it will shift scarce investment capi-
tal into long-term projects to improve the inland waterways.
D. Coastal Shipping
Limited by a small fleet, North Vietnam's ocean shipping is re-
stricted to coastal transport. The tonnage carried by the coastal ship-
ping vessels of North Vietnam has remained small, although relatively
long hauls have increased its ton-kilometer performance to slightly more
than half the performance of the highway sector.* In 1955 the depleted
and war-damaged coastal shipping fleet** could carry only 21,000 tons,
which was less than 1 percent of the total carried by the entire trans-
portation system. By 1961 the tonnage carried by the coastal fleet
amounted to about 286,000 tons, or 2 percent of the total. During this
period, ton-kilometer performance increased from 5.6 million tkm (3 per-
cent of the total) to about 78 million tkm (about 6 percent of the total).
The coastal shipping of North Vietnam centers around Haiphong,
its primary inland waterway and ocean port, and the usual movement of
coastal trade is between Haiphong, the coal ports of Hon Gay and Cam Pha,
and the southern port of Ben Thuy. xxx Most coastal traffic between North
* See Tables 3 and 4, Appendix A, pp. 23 and 24, respectively, below.
** Most undamaged vessels were removed before the Communists took
control.
*** Ben Thuy is the port for the city of Vinh.
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Vietnam and Communist China probably is carried on Chinese vessels. Al-
though the extent of this trade is not known, it has been reported that
at least 55 motorized junks of between 80 and 100 tons augmented by an
unknown number of smaller junks transport goods between Kwangtung Prov-
ince, China, and North Vietnam. 12/ The passive posture of North Vietnam
is more pronounced in its seaborne trade. At the present time, North
Vietnam has no seag9ing merchant fleet, all of its seaborne trade being
carried in foreign merchant vessels. The usual pattern of seaborne
freight traffic is imports throuel the port of Haiphong and exports from
Haiphong and the coal ports of Cam Pha and Hon Gay.
The commodity composition of coastal traffic consists primarily
of agi.icultural and forest produce moving toward Haiphong, with construc-
tion materials, machinery, and consumer goods being carried in the op-
posite direction. Coal is shipped southward along the coast from the
coal ports located in the northern part of the country. Seaborne im-
ports, which enter through Haiphong, consist of such commodities as
machinery, steel, vehicles, petroleum products, fertilizer, and food-
stuffs. Coal exported from the ports of Cam Pha and Hon Gay and apatite,
cement, and mineral and agricultural products exported from Haiphong con-
stitute the majority of the exports.*
IV. Inventory and Operating Efficiency of the Various Modes of Trans-
portation
During 1955-61 the inventory of the equipment of all modes of trans-
portation in North Vietnam increased significantly, although the shortage
of equipment continued to restrict the performance of the transportation
system. Railroads, motor trucks, and the inland and coastal fleets all
attained decided improvements in almost every index of operating effi-
ciency relative to their performance in 1955. In 1960, North Vietnam
planned to reduce the cost of transportation an average of 9 percent and
probably achieved it. 22/
A. Railroads
One of the principal weaknesses of the North Vietnam railroad sys-
tem is the shortage of rolling stock. The rolling stock park is estimated
to contain about 1,300 freight cars and 80 steam locomotives, which are be-
lieved to be generally in poor condition because of the limited repair fa-
cilities and the practice of keeping equipment on the rails for long periods
of time without proper maintenance. In addition to the rolling stock park
of North Vietnam, the meter-gauge rolling stock of the K'un-ming Railroad
* It is estimated that in 1961 the seaborne trade of North Vietnam
amounted to about 1.7 million tons, consisting of about 400,000 tons of
imports and about 1.3 million tons of exports.
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Administration of Yunnan Province, China, is used on the North Vietnam
rail network, particularly on the Dong Dang - Hanoi, Hanoi - Lao Kay,
and Hanoi-Haiphong lines. However, the extent of the interchange of
equipment between North Vietnam and the K'un-ming Railroad Administra-
tion is not known.
The efficiency of the utilization of freight cars and locomotives
has improved since 1955, but shortages of freight cars have been reported
as well as a general lack of coordination of facilities. 21/ As shown in
Table 8,* freight cars have been more heavily loaded since 1955, and
turnaround time has decreased. At the same time, the average length of
haul increased from 111 km in 1955 to 242 km in 1960, with the sharpest
rise occurring in 1958, when the Chinese Communists began using the North
Vietnam network for China-to-China operations between the Kwangsi Chuang
Autonomous Region and Yunnan Province. Locomotives, which are predomi-
nantly French, British (of pre-World War II vintage), and Chinese models,
recorded increased efficiency in the use of coal per 10,000 tkm during
1955-60, although the out-of-service rate probably increased in 1961, as
it was reported that the rate of locomotive breakdown was "very high." 22/
At one time, for example, 49 locomotives required repairs at the same
time. 22/
Repair facilities for locomotives and freielt cars and manufactur-
ing facilities for light freight cars appear to be centered at the Gia Lam
factory, north of Hanoi. Limited production of light freight cars prob-
ably began about 1959, 211/ and production in 1961 was reported to have
reached 422. 25/ In addition, repair and possibly limited manufacturing
facilities exist at Hanoi** 2g and at Haiphong. 22/
B. Highways
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The civilian truck park of North Vietnam is estimated to contain
approximately 2,000 trucks.*xx The composition of the park is varied,
containing old French and US trucks as well as vehicles from the Bloc.
It has been reported that North Vietnam's vehicle park consists of as
many as 48 different makes and types of vehicles. 29/ Among the vehicles
reported are
Chinese Communist 3-wheel trucks 111; and Soviet tank trucks. The most
numerous of the trucks in North Vietnam probably is the 2-1/2-ton to
3-ton variety. In general, the trucks under civilian control probably
are older than the trucks used by the military, for it appears that
most recently imported trucks have been assigned to military rather than
civilian control.
* Appendix A, p. 28, below.
** Probably located at Duong Son near Hanoi.
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As shown in Table 9,* North Vietnam's civilian truck park re-
ported an increasing efficiency of operations during 1955-60. The
average ton-kilometer performance per truck increased from about
93 tkm to 228 tkm per day, an annual increase of about 20 percent per
year, and the operating capacity used increased from slightly more
than 92 percent to almost 97 percent. It is likely that this in-
creased efficiency was achieved by overloading, multiple shift opera-
tion, the availability of an improved road net, and the limited use
of trailers. In 1961, however, efficiency appears to have declined.
The out-of-service rate increased sharply, indicating that excessive
use without proper maintenance and the poor roads have reduced the
efficiency of the truck park as well as the in-service inventory. In
addition, poor planning apparently misallocated vehicles, resulting
in patches of surplus transport capacity while other areas suffered
from the lack of truck transport. Trucks also were reported to be
used for storage because of the lack of storage facilities. 32/
Aggravating North Vietnam's truck transport problem is the fact
that all vehicles, spare parts, tires, and petroleum must be imported.
Given the varied composition of the truck park, spare parts probably are
in general short supply. Parts for US-manufactured vehicles usually are
obtained by either cannibalizing or hand-making parts. 13./ Because of
poor road conditions, tires, which usually are imported from the USSR,
Communist China, or Japan, last only about 2,000 km. In addition, petro-
leum products, which are imported primarily from the USSR, are strictly
rationed.
The inventory of primitive road transport equipment is less
clearly defined. The government claims to have 10,000 animal carts.
Oxen and buffalo are common throughout the country, and, in addition,
it is estimated that 35,000 horses are available (primarily in the north
and northwest provinces) for short-haul transport. It appears, however,
that one of the most important factors limiting primitive road transport
is the lack of animal power. Carts and wagons, which normally are pulled
by domestic animals in South Vietnam, are pulled by manpower in North
Vietnam. Another limiting factor is the lack of roads as well as the
deterioration of earth roads and tracks during the wet season, particu-
larly in the mountainous terrain outside the plain areas. These factors
notwithstanding, primitive transport is estimated to have carried 61 per-
cent of the freight hauled by highway transport in 1961 and performed an
average length of haul of about 17 km.
C. Inland and Coastal Shipping
The waterborne transport of North Vietnam, both coastal and in-
land, has been seriously restricted by lack of equipment. In 1959, North
* Appendix A, p.291 below.
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Vietnam had approximately 31 modern vessels (excluding barges and fish-
ing boats) in addition to its fleet of native craft, 22/ and in 1961 the
inventory of modern vessels may have been increased by imports of small
coasters. 2.6./ At present the modern fleet is believed to consist pri-
marily of small vessels (the largest of which is 900 DWT), tugs used
on the inland waterways and along the coast, and motorized fishing
vessels and barges. The remainder of the fleet consists of sail junks
used along the coast and a multitude of smn11 junks, sampans, and rafts
employed on the inland waterway system.*
The ability of North Vietnam to construct its own vessels is
very limited. There are at least five shipyards located in the Haiphong
area capable of constructing small vessels, 19./ and a naval dockyard
capable of handling 300-ton ships is in operation at Nam Dinh, Although
North Vietnam has announced plans to construct a shipyard capable of pro-
ducing vessels up to 5,000 DWT, the largest vessels produced in 1961
probably were small tugboats and barges. As North Vietnam provides its
coastal and inland waterway fleets with additional units of modern equip-
ment, the operational efficiency of the fleet will increase. In 1960 it
is likely that the relatively high cost of shipping by inland waterway
was reduced by the introduction of some units of modern equipment, but
it is unlikely that the planned reduction in costs of 17.8 percent was
achieved. 20/
V. Labor and Labor Productivity
As of March 1960 the transportation and communications labor force
of North Vietnam consisted of approximately 102,000 persons, Lgi account-
ing for about 1.25 percent of the working population.** Of the total en-
gaged in transportation and communications in 1961, it is estimated that
22,500 persons were employed in state-owned transportation and communica-
tions enterprises, with the majority of the remainder being engaged in
primitive road, inland water, and coastal transport. The estimated com-
position of the labor force employed by the state-owned transportation
and communications sector is shown in Table 1.*
During 1955-59 the productivity of workers in the state-owned trans-
portation activities is reported to have increased by an average of
* The capacity of the inland waterway fleet in 1961 was reported to be
60,000 DWT. 17./
** The smn11 percentage of the working population engaged in transpor-
tation is typical of Southeast Asia, where a large part of the working
population is employed in agriculture. Of the total working population
of North Vietnam as of March 1960, slightly less than 79 percent, or
6,377,024 persons out of a total of 8,119,286, were employed in agri-
culture.
*XX Table 1 follows on p. 16.
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97 percent,)21/ and a further increase of productivity of 9.4 percent
was expected in 1960.lig/ The rising level of labor productivity prob-
ably was due to the reconstruction of the transportation system and the
introduction of newer equipment as well as the increasing technical skill
of the North Vietnamese in the transportation field. Compared with other
nations, however, the transportation labor force of North Vietnam is not
particularly skillful or technically competent. 43/
Table 1
North Vietnam: Estimated Composition of the Labor Force
Engaged in State-Owned Transportation
and Communications Enterprises
1961
Enterprise
Labor Force
(Persons)
Percent of Total
Railroad 14,000 2/ 62
Highway 5,00012/ 22
Inland and coastal shipping 1,200 2/ 6
Post and telecommunications 2,300 1/ 10
Total 22,500 100
a. Estimate
b. Estimate
c. Estimated.
d. Estimated.
From 1955 to 1959 the labor output per railroad worker reportedly in-
creased 145 percent.)12/ It is estimated that the 14,000 persons engaged
in rail transport in 1961 accounted for about 816 million tkm and 723 mil-
lion passenger-kilometers, or about 110,000 combined tkm* per employee.
By comparison, the 472,000 operating railroad workers of Communist China
accounted for 480,000 combined tkm per worker in 1958.
* The term combined ton-kilometers refers to the simple addition of
freight ton-kilometers and passenger-kilometers.
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It is estimated that about 5,000 persons were employed in state-
owned highway transportation enterprises in 1961, an average of approxi-
mately 2.5 workers for each civilian motor vehicle. During 1955-59 it
was reported that the productivity of these workers increased about 101
percent while the productivity per worker in state-owned inland water
transportation enterprises increased 45 percent. Lei Slightly less than
70 percent of the primitive transportation labor force in North Vietnam
is in cooperatives or collectives.
VI. Investment
State investment* in transportation and communications in North
Vietnam during 1955-60 was about 25 percent of the total state invest-
ment in fixed assets, an amount second only to investment in industry.**
As shown in Table 2, however, the percentage of state investment in
transportation and communications has declined since 1955 because abso-
lute investment in transportation and communications has remained rela-
tively stable while the total state investment has increased.
Table 2
North Vietnam: State Investment in Transportation
and Communications 2/
1955-60
Total Transportation
State Investment Transportation and Communications
in Fixed Assets and Communications as a Percent
Year (Million Dong) (Million Dong) of Total
1955
140
88
63
1956
260
88
34
1957
251
60
24
1958
314
72
23
1959
494
109
22
1960
716
136
19
* State investment in fixed assets amounts to about 80 percent of the
total investment in North Vietnam.
** The total state investment in fixed assets during 1955-60 amounted
to 2,175 million dong, and investment in transportation and communica-
tions amounted to 553 million dong. Dong values in this report are given
in current dong and may be converted to US dollars at a rate of exchange
of 4 dong to US $1. This rate does not necessarily reflect the value of
the dong in terms of the dollar.
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Historically, investment in transportation and communications in
North Vietnam can be divided into two phases: the reconstruction
period (1955-57) and the Three Year Plan (1958-60). During the re-
construction phase, relatively large amounts of capital were invested
to restore the war-damaged transportation system. During this period
the transportation and communications sector was allocated the largest
part of the state investment funds. During 1955-57, slightly more than
36 percent of the total state investment in fixed assets was used in
this sector of the economy. Of the total transportation and communica-
tions allocation, almost 53 percent was used to rehabilitate the rail-
road system, and a large part of the remaining 47 percent probably was
used to restore the road network. During the Three Year Plan, state
investment was concentrated primarily in industry, with the allocation
to transportation and communications being about 21 percent of the
state investment in fixed assets. The investment in railroads during
this period wasslightly less than 33 percent of the allocation to
transportation and communications. During this period it is likely
that increased capital was made available for inland waterways, coastal
shipping, and harbor development. In 1960, investment in transportation
ana communications was allocated primarily to construction of the Thai
Nguyen - Dong Anh rail line; to road construction; and to the purchase
of railroaa cars, motor vehicles, ferryboats, and tugboats.
VII. Aid from the Sino-Soviet Bloc
North Vietnam has been dependent on other members of the Sino-Soviet
Bloc for aid to the transportation sector of its economy and will con-
tinue to be dependent during the period of the Five Year Plan (1961-65).
Because North Vietnam does not produce transportation equipment, except
for the limited manufacture of light freight cars, virtually all of its
transportation equipment must be imported. During 1955-60, almost two-
thirds of these imports were financed by Bloc grants and credits. North
Vietnam possibly could have imported additional units of transportation
equipment without aid, but such imports would have reduced the number of
imports of other high-priority equipment and materials.
Most members of the Bloc have contributed some aid to the transpor-
tation sector of North Vietnam since 1955, Communist China and the USSR
having been the primary contributors. Generally, Communist China has
centered its aid activities on railroads, in particular the reconstruc-
tion of the Dong Dang - Hanoi and the Hanoi - Lao Kay lines, and on road
and bridge reconstruction. The USSR has contributed motor trucks and
dredging equipment, and Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland have
contributed motor vehicles.
During the Five Year Plan the primary aid for the transportation
sector will come from Communist China, the USSR, Rumania, and Poland.
Communist China's aid in the transportation sector will be the widening
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of the Dong Dang - Hanoi rail line from meter gauge to conform with the
Chinese standara gauge. It is planned that this line when reconstructed
will be 156 km long, with 57 additional km at various stations. 50/
Work on this project, which is now under construction, is to be completed
by 1964. In addition, the Chinese Communists will aid in the construction
of a rail and road bridge,* a railroad station at Yen Vien,** and an air-
field near Vinh. The Lao Kay - Hanoi and the Hanoi-Haiphong rail lines
will be widened to standard gauge with credits extended by Rumania, this
project being part of Rumania's aid program to expand apatite production
in the Lao Kay area near the China - North Vietnam border. Construction
on this project is now underway between Hanoi and Lao Kay. The USSR will
extend aid in the form of a motor vehicle repair shop capable of handling
1,000 vehicles per year,*** along with a small automobile accessories
plant, and Poland will enlarge the locomotive and freight car repair shop
at Gia Lam. It is reported that the USSR will supply North Vietnam with
800 .21/ to 3,500 22/ trucks during 1961-65 and that Communist China will
provide about 2,000 trucks. 23./
VIII. Prospects for 1965
By 1965 the value, ofagricultural production in North Vietnam is
planned to be 61 percent above the level of 1960, and the gross value
of industrial productiont is planned to increase by 150 percent. Rail
transport performance, however, is planned to increase 140 percent above
1960. The performance of highway and waterway transport is planned to
increase 50 percent during the same period. 22..il Although transportation
performance in North Vietnam increased at the same rate as industrial
production during 1955-61, much of this increase was the result of re-
habilitation from the war and took the form of increased support to agri-
culture as well as to industry. Because a large part of the transporta-
tion capacity of North Vietnam is used to support agriculture and also
Chinese transit traffic moving between Kwangsi and Yunnan, it is quite
possible that the transportation goals announced for 1965 will be suf-
ficient to support the planned increases in agricultural and industrial
production.
* This construction will be over the Song Ma River, a major obstacle
in the reconstruction of the railroad south toward the 17th parallel.
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*** To be constructed at Haiphong.
t The gross value of industrial production for North Vietnam has been
calculated by using constant 1956 prices. Because industrial commodities
are weighted in proportion to their estimated gross value of production
(physical output multiplied by price) in 1956, an increase of 150 per-
cent in the gross value of industrial production does not necessarily
imply an increase of 150 percent in output measured in tons.
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By 1965 the railroad network should be greatly improved by the
planned widening of the meter-gauge track to conform with the Chinese
standard gauge. This improvement should augment capacity and help to
eliminate delays caused at present by the necessity to transload all
traffic at the change-of-gauge point at P'ing-hsiang. The full impact
of this improvement, however, will be dependent on such imponderables
as the quality of the track construction and the extent of Sino-Soviet
aid in the form of rolling stock and technical assistance. In other
fields of transportation -- highway, inland water, and coastal ship-
ping -- North Vietnam also will be dependent on aid and on its ability
to import transportation equipment. In general, the long-term trans-
portation problems probably will remain -- lack of transport capacity,
dependence on imports for additions to the inventory of transportation
equipment, poor planning and coordination, and a lack of trained per-
sonnel.
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APPENDDC A
STATISTICAL TABLES
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Table 3
North Vietnam: Tons Carried by the Transportation System 2/
1955-61
Year
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960 '
1961 1./
a.
b. Including both modern and primitive transport.
c. 5g
d. Estimated.
Thousand Metric Tons Carried
Percent of Total
Railroad
Highway 12/
Inland
Waterway12/
Coastal
Shipping 121
Total
Railroad
Highway
Inland
Waterway
Coastal
Shipping
392
626
1,671
21
2,710
14.5
23.1
61.6
0.8
960
1,574
2,426
60
5,020
19.1
31.4
48.3
1.2
1,016
2,238
2,137
70
5,461
18.6
41.0
39.1
1.3
1,430
2,758
2,639
172
6,999
20.4
39.4
37.7
2.5
2,230
3,916
4,047
236
10,429
21.4
37.5
38.8
2.3
2,915
5,008
4,838
239
13,000
22.4
38.5
37.2
1.9
3,378
5,806
5,610
286
15,080
22.4
38.5
37.2
1.9
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North Vietnam:
Table 4
Performance of the Transportation System in Ton-Kilometers W
1955-61
Year
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960 J
1961
Million Metric Ton-Kilometers
Percent of Total
Railroad
Highway 12/
Inland
Waterway 12/
Coastal
Shipping12/
Total
Railroad
Highway
Tnl and
Waterway
Coastal
Shipping
43.4
32.5
119.8
5.6
201.3
21.6
16.1
59.5
2.8
109.1
46.3
151.4
25.4
332.2
32.8
13.9
45.6
7.7
135.8
45.3
161.8
24.2
367.1
37.0
12.3
44.1
6.6
293.9
50.6
181.6
40.7
566.8
51.9
8.9
32.0
7.2
517.5
78.4
242.7
64.9
903.5
57.3
8.7
26.8
7.2
704.2
107.5
313.6
67.6
1,192.9
59.0
9.0
26.3
5.7
816.4
124.6
363.9
78.4
1,383.8
59.0
9.0
26.3
5.7
a.
b. Including both modern and primitive transport.
c.
d. Estimated.
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Table 5
North Vietnam: Passengers Carried by the Transportation System 2/
1955-61
Year
Million Passengers
Percent of Total
Railroad
Highway
Inland Waterway
Total
Railroad
Highway
Inland Waterway
1955
1956
195712/
1958 12/
1959
196012/
1961 .2/
3.1
6.0
10.8
9.5
10.3
13.8
16.0
1.4
4.2
7.1
6.8
7.5
7.2
8.3
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
o.4
o.4
0.5
4.7
10.5
18.3
16.8
18.2
21.4
24.8
66.0
57.1
59.0
56.5
56.6
64.5
64.5
29.8
40.0
38.8
40.5
41.2
33.6
33.6
4.2
2.9
2.2
3.0
2.2
1.9
1.9
a.
b. /
c. Estimated.
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S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002500070002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002500070002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 6
North Vietnam: Performance of the Transportation System in Passenger-Kilometers 2,/
1955-61
Year
1955
1956
1957 12/
1958 12/
1959 Li
1960 12/
196l/
Million Passenger-Kilometers Percent of Total
Railroad
148.1
268.6
11.53.0
380.9
462.1
622.9
722.8
Highway Inland Waterway
150.3
303.1
425.2
406.0
402.0
372.6
11.32.0
7.7
13.4
29.9
29.3
25.4
27.5
32.0
Total Railroad Highway Inland Waterway
306.1
585.1
908.1
816.2
889.5
1,023.1
1,186.8
48.4 49.1
45.9 51.8
49.9 46.8
46.7 49.7
51.9 45.2
60.9 36.4
60.9 36.4
2.5
2.3
3.3
3.6
2.9
2.7
2.7
a. This information was
passenger-miles)"; however)
the above data. It is assumed,
performance.
b. /
c. Estimated.
under the following title: "Volume of Round Trip Passengers (in million
the total passenger-kilometers given for 1955-56 closely approximates
therefore, that the information for 1955-56 listed above is passenger-kilometer
-26-
S-E-C-R-E-T
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50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002500070002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 7
North Vietnam: Average Length of Haul of Commodities and Passengers, by Mode of Transportation 2/
1955-60
Kilometers
Year
Freight
Passengers
Railroad
Highway 12/
Inland Waterway 12/
Coastal Shipping 12/
Railroad
Highway12/
Inland Waterway12/
1955
111
52
72
267
48
107
38
1956
114
29
62
423
45
72
45
1957
134
20
76
346
42
60
75
1958
206
18
69
237
40
60
59
2959
232
20
60
275
45
54
64
1960
242
21
65
283
45
52
69
a. Computed from Tables 3 through 6. Appendix A, pp. 23 through 26, above.
b. Including both modern and primitive transport.
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S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002500070002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002500070002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
North Vietnam:
Table 8
Selected Operating Data on Railroad Transport 2/
1955-60
Factor
Unit of Measure
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
Average gross tonnage per
freight car 12/
Metric tons
17.3
18.3
18.2
18.6
18.6
18.6 2./
Average turnaround time per
freight car 1/
Days
3.00
2.40
2.56
2/
2.26
2/
2.17
2/
2.28 2/
Average freight train speed,
including stops
Kilometers per hour
N.A.
14.9
14.0
16.0
18.3
19.0 2/
Average freight train speed,
excluding stops
Kilometers per hour
N.A.
22.3
21.2
22.3
26.1
27.1 2/
Average passenger train speed,
including stops
Kilometers per hour
N.A.
16.2
17.2
18.4
21.0
N.A.
Average passenger train speed,
excluding stops
Kilometers per hour
N.A.
23.1
23.8
24.4
27.8
29.1 2/
Average daily run per freight
locomotive
Kilometers
175.4
205.2
213.1
239.6
263.5
262.3 2/
Coal consumption per freight
Kilograms per 10,000
locomotive
metric-ton-kilometers
814.0
525.5
441.3
371.0
324.5
354.1 .2/
50X1
.
c.
d.
Given
Given
a "average tonnage of one freight car."
as "turnaround time for a freight train."
-28-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002500070002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002500070002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 9
North Vietnam:
Selected Operating Data on State-Owned Motor Vehicles
1955-60
Factor Unit of Measure
Days in good condition Percent
Days in operation Percent
Operating capacity used Percent
Average length of haul
per truck Kilometers
Amount transported Thousand metric ton-
kilometers per truck-ton
per year
Average performance Metric ton-kilometers per
per truck day
Average performance Thousand passenger-
per passenger vehicle kilometers per year
1955 1956
68.74 73.93
59.17 59.50
92.30 90.80
38.56 2/ 38.63 2/
11.7
92.51
N.A.
12.3
98.44
N.A.
1957
74.07
60.32
89.15
36.20 12/
13.5
108.57
546.9
1958
75.88
62.29
93.96
37.4312/
16.2
129.95
824.6
1959
74.37
65.18
94.97
47.90 2/
20.5
177.63
944.5
1960
80.89 2/
71.29 2/
96.74 2/
28.93 2/
24.4 12/
228.39 12/
N.A.
a.
b.
C.
- 29 -
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