ALUMINUM IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC 1950-65

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 69
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
ALUMINUM IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC
1950-65
January 1962
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED IN WHOLE OR
IN PART WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
NOTICE
This report has been loaned to the recipient by
the Central Intelligence Agency. When it has
served its purpose it should be destroyed or
returned to the:
CIA Librarian
Central Intelligence A.gency
01 25, D. C.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
ALUMINUM IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC
1950-65
C1A/RR ER 62-4
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
FOREWORD
This report is concerned with the recent and projected develop-
ments in the aluminum industry of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The following
aspects of these developments are discussed: (1) the achievements in
1950-60 in production of primary aluminum, alumina, and aluminum-bearing
ore; (2) the prospects for fulfilling the goal for production of alumi-
num in 1965; (3) the total and average unit investment outlays in the
aluminum industries of the Bloc; (4) the actual trend during 1950-60
and the probable trend during 1961-65 in the average cost of producing
primary aluminum; and (5) the trade in aluminum among the countries of
the Bloc and between the Bloc and the Free World during recent years
and the probable trend of that trade during 1961-65.
Two aspects of the aluminum industry of the Bloc that are not in-
cluded in this report are production of secondary aluminum and produc-
tion of alumina and ore used in the manufacture of abrasives, ceramics,
and commodities other than aluminum metal.
The Soviet Decree on State Secrets in 1956 and similar decrees of
earlier years have severely restricted the publication of data on
aluminum and other nonferrous metals. The latest absolute data to be
released by the USSR on production of aluminum, for example, are for
1937.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
CONTENTS
Page
Summary and Conclusions 1
I. Production: Expansion During 1950-60 and Planned
for 1961-65
A. Aluminum
5
5
1. 1950-60 5
2. Planned for 1961-65 7
B. Alumina and Ore.
11
1. 1950-60
11
2. Planned for 1961-65
17
Prospects for 1961-65
19
A. Reserves of Ore
19
1. Current Reserves
19
a. USSR
19
b. European Satellites
20
c. Communist China
20
2. Future Reserves
21
B. Supply of Electric Power
21
C. Expansion of Capacity
22
1. Construction Plans
22
a. Aluminum Reduction
22
b. Alumina Refining
25
c. Mining ?
27
2. Prospects for Construction
28
D. increased Production from Existing Capacity . . . .
30
- v -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Page
III. Trade
31
A. 1959
31
B. 1960
34
C. Prospects for 1961-65
3)4
IV. Investment
35
A. Total Investment
35
B. Average Investment Outlays
36
V. Trends in the Average Cost of Production
39
A. 1950-60
39
B. Prospects for 1961-65
41
Appendixes
Appendix A. Methodology
43
Appendix B. Source References
57
Tables
1. Production of Primary Aluminum in the Sino-Soviet Bloc,
Selected Years, 1950-60, and 1965 Plan 6
2. Production of Primary Aluminum in the Sino-Soviet Bloc
and the Free World, Selected Years, 1950-60
3. Production of Aluminum in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, by
Plant, 1960 8
4. Production of Alumina in the Sim-Soviet Bloc,
Selected Years, 1950-60, and 1965 Plan 12
5. Alumina Refineries in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1960 and
Planned for 1961-65 14
- vi -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Page
6. Production of Aluminum-Bearing Ore in the Sino-Soviet
Bloc, Selected Years, 1950-60, and 1965 Plan 16
7. Trade in Aluminum Between the Sino-Soviet Bloc
and the Free World, 1959 32
8. Origin and Distribution of Aluminum in the Sino-Soviet
Bloc, 1959 33
Sino-Soviet Bloc: Locations of Aluminum Resources and
Production Facilities, 1960 and 1965 Plan (Map)
inside back cover
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
ALUMINUM IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC
1950-65
Summary and Conclusions
Production of aluminum in the Sino-Soviet Bloc increased from. only
170,000 tons* in 1950 to nearly 1 million tons in 1960 -- an average
annual rate of growth of 19 percent. In comparison, production of
aluminum in the Free World increased from about 1.3 million tons in
1950 to about 3.5 million tons in 1960 -- an average annual rate of
about 11 percent. Of the total production of aluminum in the Bloc in
1960, the USSR and China contributed about 73 percent and 10 percent,
respectively, and the European Satellites contributed the remainder.
The Bloc plans to continue the rapid growth in production of alumi-
num during 1961-65, the goal for 1965 being. about 2 million tons, or
roughly twice the level of production achieved in 1960. Increases are
planned by each of the countries currently producing aluminum, and
some of these increases are rather large, particularly that planned
by the USSR. Also during 1961-65, Rumania plans to begin production,
leaving Albania and Bulgaria as the only European Satellites without
plans for producing aluminum. The estimates of output in 1960 and of
the planned output in 1965 in the Bloc, by country, are as follows:
Country or Area
Thousand Tons
1960
? 1965 Plan
USSR
700
1,400 to 1,500
Communist China
100
250
,.European Satellites
166
290 to 300
Czechoslovakia
56
85
East Germany
35
55
Hungary
49.5
55
Poland
26.0
75
Rumania
0
20 to 30
Total 970 2,O00 to 22 100
_
* Tonnages are given in metric tons throughout this report.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
The total production of aluminum, by the Bloc in 1965 probably will
fall short of the established goal. The USSR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia,
East Germany, and Poland probably will expand their production as
rapidly as planned. This probability is strengthened by such positive
considerations as the availability of large reserves of ore and appar-
ently good prospects for obtaining the larger supplies of electric
power needed and also for completing most of'the construction and
modernization programs in the aluminum industries. Communist China,
on the other hand, probably will not expand production as rapidly as
planned, and Rumania probably will not succeed in initiating produc-
tion, largely because of failures in construction. In Communist China,
construction for the aluminum industry undoubtedly has been severely
disrupted as a result of the general decline of the economy, a condi-
tion that may well prevail for at least 3 or 4 years. Capacity and,
therefore, production in Communist China in 1965 probably will be much
less than planned.
A major exception to the favorable outlook in the USSR is that the
planned expansion of mining capacity may not be fully accomplished. TO
offset any resulting deficits in production of ore, the USSR may import
bauxite, either from Greece, as was done during 1954-60, or from coun-
tries such as Guinea and Ghana, where large reserves of high-grade
bauxite exist.
In contrast to the practice by the Free World of using only bauxite
as.a commercial source of aluminum, the Bloc has used and will continue
to use both bauxite and nonbauxite ores. During 1961-65 the bulk of
the aluminum in the Bloc will continue to be produced from bauxite, but
the plan is to raise the proportion produced from nonbauxite ore to
nearly 30 percent by 1965, or about double that in 1960. The USSR,
continuing to rely mainly on bauxite, plans to be using by 1965 such
nonbauxite ores as nepheline,* alunite,** and possibly also silli-
manite.xxx All production by Communist China is to continue to come
from indigenous nonbauxite ores, and that by the European Satellites
from bauxite.
Planners in the Bloc apparently feel that the disadvantages of using
nonbauxite ores, which generally have a smaller content of alumina and
a larger content of reactive silica, are outweighed by a number of fac-
tors. First, the enormous reserves of nonbauxite ore will support the
continued expansion of production for many years; second, the deposits
can be mined by comparatively low-cost strip methods; and third, the
deposits, particularly in the USSR, generally are near sources of
A silicate of sodium, potassium, and aluminum.
** A hydrous sulfate of aluminum and potassium.
*** An aluminum silicate. -
- 2 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
low-cost fuel and power. Finally, a substantial share of the total
costs of producing alumina from nonbauxite ores is offset by the gain
of valuable byproducts, such as raw materials for cement and caustic
soda. These byproducts are recovered from nonbauxite ores by newly
developed technologies and are urgently needed for the continued ex-
pansion of the economies of the Bloc.
The expansion of capacity in the aluminum industries of the Bloc
probably will require lower average investment outlays during 1961-65
than in earlier years. This decrease would result mainly from economies
associated with such factors as the construction of large strip mines
and large refineries and smelters. Reductions in investment, however,
probably will be less than planned in the USSR and Poland and possibly
in other countries of the Bloc as well.
The rise in production of aluminum in the countries of the Bloc
during 1961-65 is expected to be accompanied by a reduction in the
average cost of production, thus continuing the general trend of 1950-60.
In the USSR, average costs should decrease mainly because of investment
in large, highly mechanized strip mines and in advanced, production
equipment (particularly reduction cells) and rectifiers and because of
layer unit costs for fuel and power. -Varying combinations of these
factors, together with improvements in operating procedures, should
contribute to reducing the average costs in the European Satellites
also. In Communist China; however, the average cost may not change
appreciably during 1961-65, but a small reduction may result if pro-
duction by the less efficient plants is curtailed.
In contrast to its trade position as a net exporter of aluminum
throughout 1955-59, the Bloc may be a net importer throughout most of
1961-65, just as it apparently was in 1960. The quantities of aluminum
required by the countries of the Bloc during 1961-65, primarily for
programs calling for the substitution of aluminum for costlier metals
such as copper, probably will exceed production in most years'. The USSR
plans to increase substantially its consumption of aluminum, particu-
larly in electric power transmission systems, but probably will be able
to continue exporting to countries outside the Bloc. Accomplishment
of similar plans of the European Satellites is partly dependent on Sub-
stantially larger imports from the USSR, particularly by East Germany;
and also may require continued imports from ountries outside the Bloc.
Communist China certainly will have to continue importing aluminum from
outside the Bloc to offset deficits in production. The imports of alu-
minum from outside the Bloc by the European Satellites and China may
well exceed the exports by the USSR to non-Bloc countries throughout
most. of 1961-65.
3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12: CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
I. Production: Expansion During 1950-60 and Planned for 1961-65
A. Aluminum
1. 1950-60
Production of primary aluminum by the Sino-Soviet Bloc ex-
panded rapidly during 1950-60, growing from 170,000 tons in 1950 to a
total of about 970,000 tons in 1960. This rapid growth, at an average
annual rate of about 19 percent, resulted mainly from the expansion of
production in the USSR and Hungary and also from the initiation and ex-
pansion of production in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, and
Communist China. For data on production by the Bloc in selected years
during 1950-60, see Table 1.*
Although the USSR remained the predominant producer of
aluminum in the Bloc, the Soviet share of the total output decreased
from about 90 percent in 1950 to about 73 percent in 1960. The Chinese
Communist share of the total output grew from 2 percent to 10 percent
during 1955-60. Similarly, during 1950-60 the European Satellite share
of the total Bloc production grew from about 10 percent to 17 percent,
with Hungary accounting for the largest share in most years.
During 1950-60 the average rate of growth of production of
primary aluminum was higher in the Bloc than in the Free World. As a
result, the Bloc share of the total world production grew from about
12 percent in 1950 to about 22 percent in 1960. Nevertheless, in abso-
lute production the lead of the Free World widened substantially, as
shown in Table 2.**
Primary aluminum was produced by the Bloc in 1960 in a
relatively large number of reduction plants, but the bulk of that out-
put came from a comparatively small number of the plants. In that
year, perhaps as many as 50 reduction plants were in operation, includ-
ing 10 in the USSR, 6 in the European Satellites, and probably more
than 30 in Communist' China. Among individual plants, production ranged
between 20,000 and 160,000 tons in the USSR, 10,000 and 56,000 tons in
the European Satellites, and 1,000 and 40,000 tons in Communist China.
About two-thirds of the total production in the USSR was accounted for
by four large plants, including two in the Urals Economic Region and
one each in the Volga and West Siberia Economic Regions:*** About 40
percent of production in China took place in the plant at Ft-shun in
Table 1 follows on p. 6.
** Table 2 follows on p. 7.
*** The numbers and titles of the economic regions used in this report
are those that existed before the changes announced in the Soviet press
in May 1961.
5
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Table 1
Production of Primary Aluminum in the Sino-Soviet Bloc/
Selected Years, 1950-60, and 1965 Plan
Thousand Metric Tons
Country or Area
1950 1955 1958 1959 1960 1965 Plan
USSR
Communist China
European Satellites
155
430
510
600
700
1,400 to 1,500
0
1T.7
10
157.2
50
123
70.4
17--
100
250
166
290 to 300
Czechoslovakia
0
24.4
26.4
41
56
85
East Germany
0
26.4
35
35.3
35
55
Hungary
16.7
37.0
39.5
45.7
49.5
55
Poland
0
20.4
22.4'
22.8
26.0
75
Rumania
0
0
0
0
0
20 to 30
Total
170
550
690
820
970
2,000 to 2,100
a. For the methodology, see Appendix A. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
6
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Table 2
' Production of Primary Aluminum in the Sino-Soviet Bloc
and the Free World a/
Selected Years,
1950-60
Thousand Metric Tons
Country or Area
1950
1955
1959
1960
Free World b/
11222
2,580
3,230
31500
US
652
1,420
1,772
1,828
Canada
360
556
511.11.
691
Others
279
608
910
1,000
Sino-Soviet Bloc c/
170
820
970
_
USSR
155
.22C2.
430
600
Too
Others
17
120
215
266
Total
1,11.60
3,130
11.,050
4 5oo
a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
b. Data on production in the Free World in 19501 1955, and 1959 are
from source 2/*; for production in 19601 from source 2/.
c. Data on production in the Bloc are from Table 1, p. 6, above.
Liaoning Province. Two plants, one in Czechoslovakia and the other
in East Germany, contributed about 55 percent of production in the
European Satellites. Details on production by plants are given in
Table 31** and the locations of the plants are shown on the map.***
2. Planned for 1961-65
Under current plans of the Bloc, the rapid expansion in
production of aluminum is to be continued during 1961-65. The goal
for the total production in 1965, estimated to be about 2.0 million
to 2.1 million tons, will necessitate an average annual rate of in-
crease during 1961-65 of about 16 percent, which, though more moderate
than the average rate of 19 percent that was achieved during 1950-60,
is still imposing. The rise in the total production is to be broughtt
For serially,numbered source references, see Appendix B.
XX Table 3 follows on p. 8.
*** Inside back cover.
Text continued on p. 11.
7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Table 3
Production of Aluminum in the Sino-Soviet Bloc by Plant 2/*
1960
Country Economic Region12/
Plant
Location
Production
(Thousand Metric Tons)
USSR Ia (Northwest)
Kandalaksha Aluminum Plant
Nadvoitsy Aluminum Plant
Volkhov Aluminum Plant
Kandalaksha, Murmanskaya Oblast
Nadvoitsy, Karelian ASSR
Volkhov, Leningradskaya Oblast
20
20
?25
III (South)
Dnepr Aluminum Plant
Zaporozhlye, Zaporozhskaya Oblast,
Ukrainian SSR
6o
V (Transcaucasus)
Sumgait Aluminum Plant
Sumgait, Azerbaydzhan SSR
6o
Kanaker Aluminum. Plant
Yerevan, Armenian SSR
20
Kirovabad Aluminum Plant
Kirovabad, Azerbaydzhan SSR
? 1/ 2/
VI (Volga)
Stalingrad 1/ Aluminum Plant
Stalingrad, Stalingradskaya Oblast
100 d.
VIII (Urals)
Bogoslovskiy Aluminum Plant
Krasnotur'insk, Sverdlovskaya Oblast
120
Urals Aluminum Plant
Kamensk-Ural'skiy, Sverdlovskaya Oblast
110
IX (West Siberia)
Stalinsk LI/ Aluminum Plant
Stalinsk, Kemerovskaya Oblast
160 z/
Myski Aluminum Plant
Myski, Kemerovskaya Oblast
0/
Xa (Kazakhstan)
Pavlodar Aluminum Plant
Pavlodar, Pavlodarskaya Oblast, Kazakh SSR
0/
XI (East Siberia)
Bratsk Aluminum Plant
Bratsk, Irkutskaya Oblast
o
Irkutsk Aluminum Plant
Shelekhov, Irkutskaya Oblast
o 1./
Krasnoyarsk Aluminum Plant
Krasnoyarsk, Krasnoyarskiy Kray
o 2/
Total,- USSR
* Footnotes for Table 3 follow on p. 10.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
700
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Table 3
Production of Aluminum in the Sino-Soviet Bloc by Plant 21
1960
(Continued)
Country
Production
Plant Location E/ (Thousand Metric Tons)
Communist China FU-shun Aluminum Plant Fu-shun, Liaoning Province 4o
Others!/ 60,
Total, Communist China
European Satellites
100
Czechoslovakia
' Ziar Aluminum Plant
Ziar nad Hronom
56
East Germany
VEB Elektrochemisches Kombinat
Bitterfeld
35
Lauta Aluminum Plant
Lauta
Total, East Germany
35
Hungary
Inota Aluminum Plant
Inota
30
Ajka Aluminum Plant
Ajka
10
Tatabanya Aluminum Plant
Tatabanya
10
Total, Hungary
50
Poland
Skawina Alumihum Plant
Skawina
26
Konin Aluminum Plant
Konin
0/
Total, Poland
26
Rumania
N.A.
Slatina
o
Total, European Satellites
166
Grand Total
970
9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Table 3
Production of Aluminum in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, by Plant 2/
1960
(Continued)
a. For the methodology, see Appendix A. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
b. The economic regions listed in this column are those that existed before the changes announced in the Soviet press in May 1961.
c. Unless otherwise indicated, locations in the USSR are in the RSFSR.
d. These plants either were under construction in 1960 or were to be constructed during 1961-65.
e. Originally this plant was intended to produce alumina and several byproducts from alunite, but an article in the Soviet press of April 1961 states that
the plant will be producing aluminum as well. 1/ Whether or not aluminum will be produced during the current planning period is unknown.
f. In November 1961, Stalingrad was renamed Volgograd, and Stalingradskaya Oblast was renamed Volgogradskaya Oblast.
g. As a result of new capacity brought into operation during 1960, these plants together probably can produce annually at least 70,000 tons of aluminum
more than they produced in 1960.
h. In November 1961, Stalinsk was renamed Novokuznetsk. '
i. Additional reduction plants have been identified at the following locations. Except for those for which coordinates are unknown (indicated by an
asterisk), the locations are shown on the map, inside back cover.
Ch'ang-ch'un
Yung-jen (Ch'u-dhou)
Kuei-yang
Peking (experimental)
Tsam-kong*
Cheng-chou
Ho-fei
Lan-chou
Sian
Wu-han
Ch'eng-tu ,
Ching-yuan*
Hsia-ling*
Huan-pu
Nan-ch'ang-fang*
Pao-ting
T'ai-yuan
T'ang-shan
Yang-ch'uan
- 10 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
about by an increase of about 110 percent* in Soviet production, 150
percent in Chinese Communist production, and 78 percent* in European
Satellite production. For specific information on the planned output
of aluminum in the Bloc, by country, see Table l.**
B. Alumina and Ore
1. 1950-60
Production of alumina by the Bloc is estimated to have in-
creased from about 350,000 tons in 1950 to about 2 million tons in
1960, a trend paralleling production of aluminum. The initiation and
expansion of production of alumina by Communist China, East Germany,
and Czechoslovakia took place during 1950-60. The USSR remained the
largest producer in the Bloc and Hungary the second largest, even
though the shares of these two countries in the total production of
the Bloc decreased appreciably. Data on production of alumina in
selected years during 1950-60 are given in Table 4.***
Production and consumption of alumina in 1960 were about
equal for the Bloc as a whole but not for all of the individual coun-
tries. In 1960, production of alumina by Hungary exceeded its domestic
requirements as in previous years, and part of the surplus was used
to supplement East German production and to satisfy all Polish re-
quirements.t In the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and China, production ap-
parently equaled requirements.
In 1960, alumina was produced in the Bloc in a large num-
ber of plants, including 6 in the USSR, 5 in the European Satellites,
and probably 20 to 30 in Communist China. The titles and locations of
the known alumina plants, together with the types of raw material
processed by each, are given in Table 51tt and the locations of the
plants are shown on the map .ttt
During 1950-60, production of aluminum-bearing ore in the
Bloc expanded rapidly but not so rapidly as requirements. By 1960,
* This percentage is calculated from the midpoint of the planned
range for production.
** P. 6, above.
*** Table 4 follows on p. 12.
t The total export of alumina by Hungary, 121,000 tons, 4/ exceeded
substantially the import requirements of East Germany and Poland. Some
part of these exports probably went to the Free World.
tt Table 5 follows on p. 14.
ttt Inside back cover.
-11-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Table 4
Production of Alumina in the Sino-Soviet Bloc 2/
Selected Years, 1950-60, and 1965 Plan
Thousand Metric Tons
Country or Area
1950
1955
1958
1959
1960
1965 Plan
USSR
Communist China
European Satellites
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
Hungary
Rumania
Total
310
880
1,000
1,200
1,14.00
2,900 to 3,100
o
3.7.4
32
200.3
_
110
140
200
500
221.2
330
390
520 to 540
o
0
34.4
0
350
o
46.2
154.1
0
1,100
o
51.5
169.7
0
1,400
80
55.3
191.6
0
1,700
110
58.9
218
0
2,000
170
60
250
4o to 6o
4,000 to 4,200
a. For the methodology, see Appendix A. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
- 12 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
as shown in Table 6,* the total production of ore in the Bloc was about
6.4 million tons, or about 280 percent more than in 1950. Beginning
in 1955, however, in order to meet the total requirements, the Bloc
supplemented domestic production with imports, averaging about 361,000
tons annually during 1955-60. These imports, consisting entirely of
Soviet imports of bauxite from Greece, were as follows (in thousand
tons)**:
Year
Amount Year
Amount
1955
122
1958
450
1956
306
1959
454
1957
405
1960
432
These imports represented about 3 percent of the total supply of ore
in the Bloc in 1955 and 6 percent in 1960.
In 1960, large underground bauxite mines in the Urals Region
of the USSR and in northwestern Hungary supplied most of the ore in
the Bloc. Strip mines, probably including many small mines in Com-
munist China, supplied the remainder.xxx
The variety of ores used by the Bloc for producing alumina in-
creased during 1950-60, as shown in Table 6. Whereas only bauxite was
used in 1950, nepheline concentrate, shale, and clay represented about
16 percent of the total supply of ore used in 1960. In the USSR in
1960, about 93 percent of the alumina was produced from bauxite, and
the remaining 7 percent was produced from nepheline concentrate; in
Communist China, all of the alumina output was produced from shale and
clay.
Nonbauxite ores generally are inferior to bauxite because
in the former the content of alumina is lawert and the content of
reactive silica is greater. For each part of reactive silica content,
1 to 2 parts of alumina and 0.7 to 1.75 parts of caustic soda, antt
Table 6 follows on p. 16.
** Data for 1955-59 were compiled from source 5/, and the figure for
1960 was obtained from source 6/.
*** The locations of the principal mines are shown on the map, inside
back cover.
An important exception to this is China's shale and clay, the
alumina content of which apparently is about as large as that for
bauxite.
tt
Text continued on p. 17.
-13-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Table 5
Alumina Refineries in the Sino-Soviet Bloc
1960 and Planned for 1961-65
Country or Area
USSR
Economic Region 2.1
Ia (Northwest)
III (South)
V (Transcaucasus)
VIII (Urals)
Xa (Kazakhstan)
XI (East Siberia)
* Footnotes for Table 5 follow on p. 15.
Plant
Tikhvin Alumina Plant
Pikalevo Alumina Plant
Volkhov Aluminum Plant
Dnepr Aluminum Plant
Akhtinsk Mineral-Chemical
Combine 2/
Kirovabad Aluminum Plant 2/
Bogoslovskiy Aluminum Plant
Urals Aluminum-Plant
Pavlodar Aluminum Plant 2/
Achinsk Alumina Plant 2/
Location 12/
Boksitogorsk, Leningradskaya Oblast
Pikalevo, Leningradskaya Oblast
Volkhov, Leningradskaya Oblast
Zaporozh'ye, Zaporozhskaya Oblast,
Ukrainian SSR
Razdan, Armenian SSR
Kirovabad, Azerbaydzhan SSR
Krasnotur'insk, Sverdlovskaya
Oblast
Kamensk-Ural'skiy, Sverdlovskaya
Oblast
Pavlodar, Pavlodarskaya Oblast,
Kazakh SSR
Adhinsk, Krasnoyarskiy Kray
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Basic Raw Material
Bauxite
Nepheline concentrate
Nepheline concentrate
Bauxite
Nepheline syenite
Alunite
Bauxite
Bauxite
Bauxite
Nepheline
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Table 5
Alumina Refineries in the Sino-Soviet Bloc
1960 and Planned for 1961-65
(Continued)
Country or Area Plant Location 10/ Basic Raw Material
Communist China
European Satellites
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
Hungary
Rumania
Fu-shun Alumina Plant
Kuei-yang Alumina Plant
Nan-ting Alumina Plant
T'ang-shan Alumina Plant
Wei-pei Alumina Plant
Others 2/
Ziar Aluminum Plant
VEB Chemiewerk Lauta
Almasfuzito Alumina Plant
Ajka Aluminum Plant
Mosonmagyarovar Alumina
Plant
N.A. _di
FU-shun, Liaoning Province
Kuei-yang, Kweichow Province
Nan-ting, Shantung Province
T'ang-shan, Hopeh Province
Wei-pei, Shensi Province
Ziar nad Hronom
Lauta
Almasfuzito
Ajka
Mosonmagyarovar
Crisana Regiunea
Shale and clay
Shale and clay
Shale and clay
Shale and clay
Shale and clay
Bauxite
Bauxite
Bauxite
Bauxite
Bauxite
Bauxite
a. The economic regions listed in this column are those that existed before the changes announced in the Soviet press in May 1961.
b. Unless otherwise indicated, locations in the USSR are in the RSFSR.
c. These plants either were under construction in 1960 or were to be constructed during 1961-65.
d. The names and locations of additional alumina refineries have not been identified ih the Chinese Communist press, but the majority of the aluminum re-
duction plants listed in Table 3, footnote i, p. 10, above, are believed to have integrated alumina refineries. On this basis, about 25 additional alumina
refineries may be estimated for 1960.
- 15 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved ForRelease2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Table 6
Production of Aluminum-Bearing Ore in the Sino-Soviet Bloc a/
Selected Years, 1950-60, and 1965 Plan
Thousand Metric Tons
Country or Area
Type of Ore
1950
1955
1958
1959
1960
1965 Plan
USSR
Total USSR
Communist China
European Satellites
Hungary
Rumania
Total
Bauxite
Nepheline concentrate b/
Other c/
Shale and clay
Bauxite
Bauxite
1,100
0
0
1,100
2,600
130
0
2,700
3,000
160
0
3,200
3,600
24o
3 800
4,10?
400L
o(
41500
8,000 to 9,000
3,000
11,000 to 12,000
-_
0
_
577.8
110
380
490
70o
1,800
1,241
1?053
956.7
1,189
1,650 to 1,720
577.8
o
1,700
1,241
o
4,100
1,053
o
4 600
956.7
o
5,300
1,189
o
.6.22122
1,510
140 to 210
14,500 to 15,500
a. For the methodology, see Appendix A. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
b. This material is a byproduct obtained by the mineral fertilizer industry from processing apatite-
nepheline ore.
c. Including nepheline, nepheline syenite, and alunite.
-16-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
important input, are lost during processing. Thus the quantity of ore
processed is greater, the loss of soda is greater, and the recovery of
alumina is smaller when a nonbauxite ore is used for producing alumina.
The conventional methods used for producing alumina from
bauxite -- for example, the Bayer process, the modified Bayer process,
and the lime-soda-sinter process -- are not suitable for processing
ores that contain as much reactive silica as is found in the nonbauxite
ores used by the USSR and Communist China. Exploitation of the non-
bauxite ores thus followed development of new processing techniques in
the USSR and (with Soviet aid) in Communist China. The use of these
techniques results in production not only of alumina but also of large
quantities of such byproducts as soda, potash, and raw materials for
producing cement and bricks. Proceeds from the sale of these byprod-
ucts apparently offset a.large share of the higher cost of producing
alumina from nonbauxite ore. 1/
2. Planned for 1961-65
The achievement of the estimated goal for production of
aluminum in the Bloc in 1965 would require about 4.0 million to 4.2
million tons of alumina in 1965, or about twice the quantity produced
in 1960. Consequently, the USSR probably plans to increase its out-
put of alumina by about 110 to 125 percent, Mina by about 150 percent,
Czechoslovakia by 55 percent, Hungary by 14 percent, and East Germany
by merely 2 percent. Rumania proposes to begin producing alumina dur-
ing 1961-65.*
If these goals are achieved, the proportional distribution
of the total production by the Bloc in 1965 will be roughly the same
as in 1960. The only important exception is that Communist China will
be the second largest (after the USSR) and Hungary the third largest
producer of alumina in the Bloc, thus reversing their relative stand-
ings in 1960. Furthermore, the USSR and Hungary will have enough
alumina not only to satisfy their own requirements and those of Poland
but also to supplement production in East Germany. Czechoslovakia,
Communist China, and Rumania will have enough to satisfy their respec-
tive requirements.
On the assumption that the Bloc intends to rely on its own
production for supplies of ore, the goal for the total production of
ore by the Bloc in 1965 should be about 14.5 million to 15.5 million
tons, or 130 to 140 percent above production in 1960. Concomitantly
the relative importance of nonbauxite ores is certain to rise. The
European Satellites will continue to use only bauxite, and Communist
* See Table 4, p. 12, above.
-17-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
China only shale and clay, for producing alumina. The USSR, however,
plans to expand the variety of ores used to include not only bauxite
and nepheline concentrate as was the case in 1960 but also nepheline,
nepheline syenite, alunite, and possibly sillimanite. By 1965, non-
bauxite ores may account for about 27 to 30 percent of the total supply
of ore in the USSR and 30 to 35 percent of that in the Bloc. The share
of the total production of aluminum in the Bloc derived from nonbauxite
ores, however, will be somewhat smaller than 30 percent.*
* For estimates of production of ore planned in 1965, see Table 6,
p. 16, above.
-18-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
II. Prospects for 1961-65
Production of aluminum probably will expand about as rapidly as
planned during 1961-65 in each of the countries of the Bloc except
Rumania and Communist China. With production shortfalls in these
countries, the total production of aluminum in the Bloc in 1965 will
be below the planned range of 2.0 million to 2.1 million tons. This
estimate is based on an evaluation of the following: the requirements
for aluminum-bearing ore and electric power and the available reserves
of ore and the supply of power, respectively, as well as the prospects
for achieving plans for the expansion and modernization of capacity and
for more intensive use of existing capacity.
A. Reserves of Ore
1. Current Reserves
a. USSR
As of January 1961 the largest reserves of aluminum-
bearing ores in the Bloc were in the USSR. Soviet reserves included
about 600 million tons of bauxite,* having an estimated aluminum con-
tent of about 80 million tons,** or more than 100 times the quantity
of aluminum produced by the USSR in 1960. Those reserves also in-
cluded several low-quality ores, such as nepheline, alunite, and
sillimanite, whose combined content of aluminum probably was several
times as large as the content in the reserves of bauxite.
Soviet reserves are dispersed among many regions
The general locations of the principal deposits are as followsxxx
Type of Ore Locations of Deposits 21/
Bauxite Sverdlovskaya Oblast, RSFSR
Boksitogorsk, Leningradskaya Oblast, BSFSR
Turgay, Kustanayskaya Oblast, Kazakh SSR
Nepheline Kola Peninsula, Murmanskaya Oblast, RSFSR
Uzhur, Krasnoyarskiy Kray, RSFSR
Kiya Shaltyr, Kemerovskaya Oblast, RSFSR
Alunite Zaglik, Azerbaydzhan SSR
* This estimate is based on (1) the report that reserves of bauxite
in 1929 were 1.815 million tons 8/; (2) the report that reserves near
the end of 1957 were 287 times those in 1929, or about 520 million
tons 9/; and (3) the evidence that reserves increased in 1958-59. 10/
XX The content of aluminum in the reserves of bauxite is a rough ap-
proximation based on an assumed ratio of bauxite to aluminum of 7 to 1.
*XX These and other locations are shown on the map, inside back cover.
-19-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
b. European Satellites
Additional reserves of aluminum-bearing ore are in
the European Satellites. These reserves include about 115 million
tons of bauxite in Hungary, 12/ most of which are in the Bakony and
Vertes Mountains in the western part of the country. J___V The reserves
also include about 20 million tons of bauxite in Rumania, 11-.V the prin-
cipal deposits being located in Crisana Regiunea.* The average quality
of the Hungarian bauxite probably is higher than that of the Rumanian
bauxite.
The remaining European Satellites, however, apparently
do not have reserves of aluminum-bearing ores of industrial significance.
Some of them have deposits of low-grade shale and clay but lack the
technologies for economic production. A new technology for processing
law-quality clay has been developed in Poland and is to be applied in
a pilot plant recently constructed at Gorka, 12/ but the prospects for
achieving economic production cannot be judged at this time.
The reserves in Hungary, however, are large enough to
support the expansion of the entire aluminum industry of the European
Satellites planned for 1961-65. The estimated reserves in Hungary in
1960 were about 100 times as large as the quantity of bauxite used in
that year by Hungary, East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia together
for producing aluminum.
c. Communist China
Communist China also has reserves of aluminum-bearing
ores that unquestionably are large enough to support the expansion of
its aluminum industry planned for 1961-65. The reserves of aluminum-
bearing shale and clay in China probably total at least several billion
tons,** or hundreds of times as much as required for production planned
in 1961-65. The major deposits of shale and clay are dispersed among
the provinces of Liaoning, Hopeh, Shantung, Shansi, Anhwei, Chekiang,
Kweichow, Szechwan, Yunnan, and Shensi, and additional deposits of un-
known size are in the provinces of Tsinghai, Kansu, and Sinkiang.* 1//
* These locations are shown on the map, inside back cover.
** This estimate is based on (1) the report that reserves in the
late 1940's in the Shantung Peninsula alone were about 810 million
tons ly and (2) the presence of major deposits in most of the remain-
ing provinces.
-20 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
2. Future Reserves
The reserves of aluminum-bearing ores in the Sino-Soviet
Bloc, particularly the nonbauxite ores in the USSR and Communist China,
probably will increase during 1961-65 as a result of further geological
exploration and advances in technology which would broaden the grades
and types of ore that could be processed economically. Advances in
technology also may result in an increase in the proportion of the
alumina recovered from the ore. Such advances in technology occurred
during 1950-60 and may be anticipated during 1961-65.
B. Supply of Electric Power
The expansion in production of aluminum planned by the Bloc
for 1961-65 probably will not be retarded by shortages of electric
power. The aluminum reduction plants to be expanded or constructed
during 1961-65 generally are situated fairly close to hydroelectric
or thermal powerplants that are to be expanded or constructed during
that period. These powerplants should be able to supply the large
additional quantities of electric power that will be needed by the
aluminum reduction plants and other Important consumers. The outlook
appears to be particularly favorable in the USSR, where, for example,
the aluminum industry will be able to obtain large quantities of power
from plant developments at or near Stalingrad,* Pavlodar, Krasnoyarsk,
and Irkutsk. The European Satellites may not succeed in expanding pro-
duction of electric power during 1961-65 as rapidly as planned. In
spite of possible shortfalls in production of power in that area, how-
ever, most of the requirements of the aluminum industry probably will
be met.
Furthermore, during 1961-65 the task of supplying the electric
power needed by the aluminum industry of the USSR particularly, as
well as by the aluminum industries of the European Satellites, should
be eased somewhat because the growth in the total consumption of power
by the aluminum industry probably will not be so great as the growth in
the total production of aluminum. The introduction of more efficient
reduction cells and rectifiers and more extensive application of improved
operating procedures in Soviet and European Satellite plants should result
in a reduction in the average quantity of electric power consumed per unit
of aluminum produced.
In Communist China the supply of electric power probably will
be adequate for achieving the planned expansion in production of alumi-
num.
* In November 1961, Stalingrad was renamed Volgograd.
- 21 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
C. Expansion of Capacity
1. Construction Plans
a. Aluminum Reduction
During 1961-65, new capacity for production of primary
aluminum in the Bloc is to be added mainly through l construction of new
plants. Of the total increment in production planned, about 85 percent*
probably will be obtained from new capacity, two-thirds of which is
represented by new plants and the remainder by expansion and moderniza-
tion of existing plants. Most of the new plants planned are large com-
pared with existing plants in the Bloc, and the predominant share of
capacity to be added to existing plants is earmarked for the largest
plants. Except in Communist China, plans call for the installation of
production and auxiliary equipment of advanced design and for extensive
introduction of mechanization and automation.
In the USSR during 1961-65, more than 700,000 tons of
the planned production increment apparently will have to come from new
reduction capacity. Four new reduction plants under construction in
the eastern regions of the USSR may account for about three-fourths of
the total capacity planned for the entire country. These plants are
at Pavlodar in Kazakh SSR; at Myski in West Siberia; and at Krasnoyarsk
in Krasnoyarskiy Kray and Bhelekhov in Irkutsk Oblast, both in East
Siberia, as shown on the map.** The remaining one-fourth of the total
probably will consist of additions to capacity at existing plants, most
of which are to take place at the four largest plants in the country,
which include the two reduction plants in the Urals and the plants at
Stalinsk and Stalingrad.*** If current plans are realized, these plants
together with the four new plants may account for nearly 80 percent of
the total Soviet production of primary aluminum in 1965.
The Soviet press has stressed both the size of the re-
duction cells and the type of rectifierst that are to be installed
during 1961-65. The reduction cells are designed to operate at current
loads of 120,000 to 130,000 amperes 1?./ and should have an annual out-
put of about 300 to 320 tons each,tt whereas cells in use at many of
* Of the remaining 15 percent of the production increment planned,
about one-half is to be obtained from more intensive use of existing
capacity (see D, p. 30, below) and the remainder from new capacity
brought into operation during 1960.
** Inside back cover.
*** In November 1961, Stalinsk was renamed Novokuznetsk, and Stalingrad
was renamed Volgograd.
t A rectifier is a device used for converting alternating current (AC)
to direct current (DC).
tt Output per cell-year is calculated by using the approximate ratio
of 2.5 tons to 1,000 amperes.
-22-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
the existing plants range in size from 40,000 to 80,000 amperes* and
have an annual output of only 100 to 200 tons. Moreover, a larger
cell, designed to operate at about 150,000 amperes 21/ and to produce
about 375 tons of aluminum annually, may be installed in reduction
lines during the current planning period. Installation of rectifiers
of advanced design (including semiconductor rectifiers) that are more
efficient than converters** and rectifiers now in use at many plants, 22/
also is planned.
The expansion of the capacities of existing Soviet re-
duction plants is to be achieved not only by construction of new reduc-
tion lines but also by modernization measures designed to increase the
current load at which the reduction lines operate. The Dnepr plant in
the Ukrainian SSR, for example, proposes to effect measures whereby the
current load on existing lines will be raised 20 percent, resulting in
a corresponding increase in output. 23/
The Soviet program provides also for high levels of
mechanization and automation at new plants and for more extensive use
of mechanization and automation at existing plants. 24/ The object of
these measures is to increase the productivity of labor, thus reducing
labor costs and alleviating labor supply problems, even though labor
costs are not a major component of the total costs and even though
labor requirements are relatively small. Because the problem of labor
supply is more serious in the eastern regions, where skilled labor not
only is in short supply but also is difficult to attract from other
regions, 25/ greater emphasis is being given to the mechanization and
automation of the plants in those areas. The potential availability
of large supplies of low-cost power in the eastern regions is a further
inducement for more extensive application of mechanization and auto-
mation.
Although the standard electrolytic method of reducing
'alumina to aluminum is being used in all existing Soviet plants and is
to be used in those plants under construction, a radically different
technique, called electrothermal reduction, may be instituted during
1961-65. In December 1960 a large experimental electrothermal unit
began operating at the Irkutsk plant. In this unit, sillimanite ore
is reduced directly to aluminum and silumin.xxx The new reduction
method is alleged by Soviet authors to result in substantial savings
* The range was derived by using an index of the operating amperage
of cells in use at each of the plants, reported in source 22/, and the
operating amperage for the cells in use at one of those plants, re-
ported in source 22j.
** A converter is a device used for converting alternating current
(Ac) to direct current (DC).
*** An alloy of aluminum and silicon.
-23-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
in investment outlays, in labor and in power costs, and hence in lower
average costs of producing both primary aluminum and silumin. .2.g The
construction of two similar units, one at the Stalingrad* plant and the
other at the Zaporozh'ye plant, is planned during 1961-65. 21/ The capac-
ity for electrothermal reduction on an industrial scale may be installed
at Irkutsk and other locations, possibly before the end of the current
planning period, to supplement the capacity for electrolytic reduction of
alumina. Success in this venture would broaden the resource base of the
Soviet aluminum industry substantially by moving sillimanite and other
ores from the category of ores considered to be too costly to process into
the category of ores that can be processed economically.
In the European Satellites, about 100,000 to 110,000
tons of the production increment planned for 1961-65 are expected to
come from new reduction capacity. About 70 percent of the new capacity
planned by the European Satellites is represented by three new plants,
one at Konin in Poland, another at Lauta in East Germany, and the third
at Slatina in Rumania.** The remaining 30 percent will be accounted for
by expansion of the only existing Czechoslovak plant.
In the Polish and East German plants also, the installa-
tion of modern equipment and the extensive use of mechanization and auto-
mation are planned. For example, cells designed to operate at 120,000
to 130,000 amperes are to be installed in the Konin plant in Poland .2132/
and in the Lauta plant in East Germany.*** In -contrast, the Skawina
plant in Poland uses 6o,000 ampere cells, and the Bitterfeld plant in
East Germany probably uses 32,000 ampere cells. Ei Production pro-
cesses are to be partly automated and televisional techniques are to
be employed at the Konin plant, 2./ and more extensive application of
mechanization is planned at the Bitterfeld plant.
In Communist China the estimated planned production
increment of about 150,000 tons apparently will have to come from new
reduction capacity planned for 1961-65. Of the total new capacity
planned, at least a predominant share is to be obtained by expanding
the reduction plants located at Sian, Kuei-yang, Lan-chou, Huan-pu,
and Ho-fei. These five plants, at which small sections began operating
either in 1959 or early in 1960, may produce as much as 200,000 tons
by 1965. 33/
In sharp contrast to the Soviet and European Satellite
programs, the Chinese Communist construction program apparently calls
* *
***
In November 1961, Stalingrad was
These locations are shown on the
The operating load for the cells
derived from information contained in
and the annual output planned.
- 214 -
renamed Volgograd.
map, inside back cover.
earmarked for the Lauta plant was
source 221/ on the number of cells
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
for the installation of very small reduction cells and for virtually
no mechanization and automation. The reduction cell, designed to
operate at a current load of about 5,000 amperes and to produce about
12.5 tons annually, is of the same type that was installed in the other
plants constructed in the country since 1957. 34/
The decision of the Chinese Communists to install small
reduction cells rather than larger cells of more advanced design is
attributed to several factors. One of the most important factors is
reported to be the much smaller requirements for capital investment
associated with the use of smaller cells, 35/ and another is reported
to be a shorter time period required for bringing new capacity into
operation. 1W Certainly the choice of small reduction cells also is
prompted by the shortage of skilled labor, technicians, and engineers
and by the general availability of cheap, unskilled labor. As a final
consideration, the small cells provide greater flexibility in responding
to changes in the supply of power.
b. Alumina Refining
During 1961-65, perhaps as much as 95 percent of the
planned increment in production of alumina in the Bloc will come from
new capacity. Of this new capacity, about two-thirds may consist of
new plants, the majority of which are intended to process nonbauxite ores
by new technologies. The remaining one-third of new capacity may be ob-
tained by the expansion and modernization of existing alumina plants,
primarily the largest plants. In general, the Bloc plans to install
equipment of advanced design and, except in Communist China, to use
mechanization and automation extensively.
In the USSR, of the increment in production of alumina
planned for 1961-65, 1.5 million to 1.7 million tons, about 95 percent
may come from new capacity. About two-thirds of the new capacity may
be represented by four plants that are under construction -- large
plants at Pavlodar and Achinsk in the eastern regions and smaller plants
at Kirovabad and Razdan in the Caucasus.* The remaining one-third of
the new capacity is expected to be obtained by expansion and moderniza-
tion of existing plants, principally the large plants in the Urals
Region.
The most modern equipment and technology are to be
utilized in the new Soviet alumina facilities. For example, large
modern processing units, such as rotary furnaces that are four to five
times as productive as current models and grinding mills that are three
* For the titles of the new plants, see Table 5, p. 14, above, and
for their locations, see the map, inside back cover.
-25-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
times as productive as standard models, are planned for installation. 37/
Newly developed processes, such as fluosolid roasting, which is said to
be much more efficient than standard processes, also are to be used. lf.3.1
In addition, the extensive application of mechanization and automation,
particularly at the new plants in the eastern regions, is planned. 39/
New technologies designed for processing nonbauxite ore
are to be used in much of the new capacity planned by the USSR for
1961-65. Of the four alumina plants under construction, only one, the
Pavlodar plant, is intended to process bauxite. The Achinsk plant will
process nepheline; the Kirovabad plant, alunite; and the Akhtinsk plant,
nepheline syenite. Moreover, the USSR probably is planning to expand
capacity at the Pikalevo plant and possibly at the Volkhov plant, both
of which produce alumina from nepheline concentrate, and evidently is
considering the conversion of the Tikhvin plant fram bauxite to nepheline
concentrate. L[2./ Finally, an experimental unit under construction at
the Pavlodar plant is designed to extract alumina from nepheline
syenite, )..11/ large reserves of which are found nearby. If this unit
proves to be successful, the Pavlodar plant probably will extract
alumina from both bauxite and nepheline syenite. Any sillimanite ex-
ploited on an industrial scale by the Soviet aluminum industry before
the end of the current planning period probably will be used for direct
reduction to metal rather than for production of alumina.
Soviet planners apparently believe that output of a
variety of useful byproducts compensates for some of the difficulties
associated with the use of nonbauxite ore. At the Achinsk plant,
where nepheline is to be processed, for example, with each ton of
alumina, Soviet planners expect to obtain about 300 kilograms (kg) of
caustic soda, 100 kg of potassium sulfate, 20 kg of soda-potash, and
6 to 9 tons of slime suitable for use in producing high-quality port-
land cement. 42/ Byproducts expected from processing other nonbauxite
ores include sulfuric acid; yerevanite (a raw material for producing
high-quality crystalline glass); silica for use in the manufacture of
semiconductors; and certain rare elements. 43/ Furthermore, Soviet
planners expect that the cost of these byproducts will be lower than
the cost of producing them conventionally. 14W
In the European Satellites, about 100,000 to 120,000
tons of the planned increment in production of alumina during 1961-65
is to be obtained from new capacity. From 50 to 60 percent of the new
capacity planned by the European Satellites probably will be obtained
by expanding and modernizing the Ziar plant in Czechoslovakia and the
Almasfuzito plant in Hungary, the two largest alumina plants in the
European Satellites. The remaining new capacity is expected from a
new plant planned by Rumania. Although the installation of modern
equipment and the extensive use of mechanization and automation probably
- 26 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
are planned, the basic technology of producing alumina in the European
Satellites during 1961-65 is expected to remain essentially unchanged.*
In Communist China the entire increment in production
of alumina estimated for 1961-65, about 300,000 tons, probably will be
produced in new capacity. Presumably all of the new capacity is to be
obtained by the expansion and probably by the modernization of existing
plants. A predominant share of this expansion and modernization may be
designated for a comparatively small number of alumina plants or de-
partments committed to supplying the reduction plants at Sian, Kuei-
yang, Lan-chou, Huan-pu, and Ho-fei, which are to be expanded consider-
ably during 1961-65.
c. Mining
New capacity probably will have to contribute virtually
all of the 8 million to 9 million tons of the increment in production
of aluminum-bearing ore expected in the Bloc during 1961-65, assuming
that domestic supplies are to be relied on entirely during that period.
The USSR probably will account for about eight-tenths of the increment
in mining capacity, Hungary and China for approximately equal shares
of practically all of the remainder, and Rumania for a very small share.
In the USSR the addition to mining capacity during
1961-65 is to be achieved partly by the expansion of existing mines
and partly by construction of new mines.** Probably about half of the
planned increase in mining capacity is to be attained by the expansion
of the bauxite mines in the Urals Region. Most of the remainder is
to be represented by five new strip mines that are under construction.
The general locations of the new strip mines and the types of ore to
be mined at those locations are as follows L2/:
Location Type of Ore
Turgay, Kazakh SSR Bauxite
Uzhur, Krasnoyarskiy Kray, RSFSR Nepheline
Kiya Shaltyr, Kemerovskaya Oblast, RSFSR Nepheline
Zaglik, Azerbaydzhan SSR Alunite
Akhta, Armenian SSR Nepheline syenite
As noted in A, 1, b, p. 20, above, Poland recently completed a pilot
plant intended to test a new technology for producing alumina from low-
quality clay, but the outcome of this venture is not predictable at this
time.
** The expansion in the scale of use of nepheline concentrate in the
Northwest Economic Region planned for 1961-65, estimated to be at least
200,000 tons, apparently can be achieved by exploitation of the tailings
dump at the Kirovsk Apatite Combine at Kirovsk in Murmanskaya Oblast of
the RSFSR.
- 27 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Should results from an experimental production unit
now in operation at Irkutsk and another under construction at Pavlodar
be considered by Soviet planners to be favorable, added capacity will
be constructed for strip mining of sillimanite near Irkutsk and of nephe-
line syenite near Pavlodar.
2. Prospects for Construction
The prospects for construction during 1961-65 vary among
the countries of the Bloc. In the USSR and the European Satellites,
mainly because of continued improvements in construction performance,
most of the additional capacity planned for the aluminum industry
probably will be realized. The major exceptions are that the capacity
for the Rumanian industry and some of the additional mining capacity
for the Soviet industry may not be achieved. Similarly, because of
continued shortages in the supply of equipment, plans for mechaniza-
tion and automation in the USSR and the European Satellites and for
the installation of rectifiers of advanced design in the USSR may be
substantially underfulfilled. In Communist China, on the other hand,
as a result of disruptions stemming from the general economic decline,
most of the additions to capacity in the aluminum industry probably
will not be attained.
In the USSR, recent construction performance has varied
sharply among projects of the aluminum industry. On some projects,
construction has lagged because of errors in planning and because of
shortages of materials, labor, power, and production and construction
equipment. For example, the plan for construction and installation at
the new aluminum-alumina plant at Pavlodar was underfulfilled by 29.2
percent in 1959 and by about 35 percent in 1960. lig On other projects,
construction has proceeded as scheduled or even faster. To illustrate,
construction of each of the first three reduction buildings of the Sumgait
plant took 2 years, but construction of the fourth took only 7 months.2E/
As a result, the Sumgait plant expects to attain by 1963 the level of pro-
duction that had been planned for 1965. !Igi Similarly, construction of
each of the first two reduction buildings of the Stalingrad plant took
about 18 months, but construction of the third took only 7 months, 1 month
less than scheduled. 14.21/ On balance, however, the scheduled construction
of projects for the aluminum industry in the USSR definitely has lagged.
For 1961-65 the outlook for the expansion of capacity in the
Soviet aluminum industry is considered to be better. The large projects
have been under construction for several years -- those at Pavlodar,
Krasnoyarsk, Achinsk, and Irkutsk are carryovers from the abandoned Sixth
Five Year Plan (1956-60) -- so that most of the buildup of the construc-
tion base for these projects probably has been completed. Moreover, the
-28-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
present construction schedules are more reasonable than those estab-
lished earlier. Inadequate supplies of some important building ma-
terials may continue to handicap construction operations. Supplies
of cement at several construction sites should improve, however, in-
asmuch as cement is to be a byproduct of the exploitation of nonbauxite
ore during the latter part of the current planning period. Supplies
of construction equipment should improve more than envisioned earlier
because of the recent supplemental allocation of investment to the
construction equipment industry. 50/ To add to its own output of
production equipment, the USSR plans to import equipment from France. 51/
During 1961-65 the USSR probably will succeed in expanding
the capacity for refining alumina and for reducing aluminum as planned
but probably will not succeed in expanding capacity for mining. As a
result, Soviet ore may have to be supplemented by imports, probably in
the form of bauxite from Greece, as in the past. A more speculative
possibility is that the USSR will begin importing bauxite from Guinea
or Ghana, both of which have huge reserves of high-grade bauxite that
could be substituted advantageously for the comparatively lower quality
Soviet ores, particularly those of the nonbauxite varieties.
The outlook for the realization of the planned additions
to capacity for 1961-65 is considered to be generally favorable in the
European Satellites also. This estimate is based on the probability of
a continuation of the generally rapid rates of economic growth and on
evidence that the construction program will be supported by both the
USSR 52/ and France. _IV The lone important exception to this outlook
is that the capacity for producing ore, alumina, and aluminum planned
by Rumania is not likely to be completed as scheduled during 1961-65.
In fact, it is doubtful that Rumania will produce any aluminum at all
by 1965.
Although Soviet and European Satellite plans for adding
capacity in the aluminum industry during 1961-65 are expected to be
fulfilled generally, plans for extensive mechanization and automation
both in the USSR and in the European Satellites and plans for the
installation of rectifiers of advanced design in the USSR may be sig-
nificantly underfulfilled. The equipment needed to implement these
plans probably will continue to be in short supply during 1961-65.
Failure to carry out plans for mechanization and automation would re-
sult in underfulfillment of goals for labor productivity both in the
USSR and in the European Satellites. In the USSR the failure to provide
rectifiers of advanced design would mean somewhat higher investment out-
lays than planned and larger consumption of electric power than antici-
pated.
- 29 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
In Communist China, in sharp contrast to the general out-
look in most of the Bloc, the chances of accomplishing the estimated
additions to capacity that are programed for 1961-65 appear to be highly
unfavorable. Severe shortages in the supply of construction materials
and production evipment, resulting from a continuing decline in the
economy, preclude the possibility that more than an insignificant share
of the additional capacity will be constructed.
D. Increased Production from Existing Capacity
In addition to the increments in production of aluminum and
alumina that are to be obtained from new capacity, some gains in pro-
duction from existing capacity during 1961-65 also are provided for
in the plans of the Bloc and probably will be realized. About 80,000
tons of aluminum, or 8 percent of the total increment planned for
1961-65, probably will be obtained by more efficient use of existing
capacity, by improvements in supply, and by better organization of
production. The USSR is to account for about 94 percent and Hungary
for the remainder of the increment in production of aluminum expected
from existing capacity. Similarly, about 130,000 tons of alumina, or
more than 5 percent of the total increment planned for 1961-65, may be
obtained by more intensive and efficient use of existing capacity.
Of the added production of alumina expected from existing capacity
during 1961-65, the USSR is expected to contribute about three-fourths
and Czechoslovakia the remainder.
- 30 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
III. Trade
The Sino-Soviet Bloc, a net exporter of aluminum throughout 1955-59,
apparently was a net importer in 1960. Moreover, the Bloc may continue
to be a net importer throughout most of 1961-65, even should the large
planned increases in output of aluminum be achieved. The USSR, the
principal exporter of aluminum to the Free World, has planned to increase
both its domestic consumption of aluminum and its exports of aluminum to
the European Satellites during 1961-65. Communist China, the principal
importer of aluminum from the Free World, undoubtedly will be forced to
continue to rely on markets of the Free World to satisfy a part of its
requirements.
A. 1959
Essentially because of the surplus production in the USSR, the
Bloc in 1959 was a net exporter of aluminum to the extent of about 16,000
tons. The total exports to the Free World were about 42,000 tons, in-
cluding 35,000 tons from the USSR, and the total imports from the Free
World were only 26,000 tons. Data on trade in aluminum between the Bloc
and the Free World in 1959 are given in Table 7.*
Although the Bloc as a whole was a net exporter of aluminum in
1959, some of the individual countries were net importers. In that year,
as shown in Table 8,** five Bloc countries were entirely dependent on im-
ports, and three countries, East Germany, Poland and Communist China,
were partly dependent. The imports of? aluminum by the European Satel-
lites in 1959 originated almost entirely within the Bloc, mainly from
the USSR and Hungary. The imports by Communist China in 1959, on the
other hand, originated almost entirely in the Free World.
Soviet exports of aluminum to the Free World in 1959 continued
a trend that began in 1955, when the goal of the Fifth Five Year Plan
(1951-55) for production of aluminum was exceeded by about 6.5 percent.
The USSR exported an average of about 29,000 tons annually to the Free
World during 1955-59, as shown in the following tabulation (in thousand
tons) 22/:
**
**X-
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959
Exports 5.2 28.3 29.5 49.3 34.7***
Table 7 follows on p. 32.
Table 8 follows on p. 33.
Text continued on p. 34.
- 3i -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Table 7
Trade in Aluminum Between the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the Free World a/
1959
Thousand Metric Tons
Destination
Exports
Imports
USSR
Czechoslovakia
'Total
Origin
Bulgaria
Communist
China
East
Germany
Poland
Rumania
Total
Belgium
2.8
0
2.8
Austria
0
0.4
0
0.2
? 0.5
1.1
Finland
6.8
0
6.8
Benelux
0
0.3
0
0.2
0
0.4
Greece
0.2
0
? 0.2
Canada
0.2
9.4
0
1.2
0
10.8
India
1.0
0
1.0
France
0
0.8
0
0
0
0.8
Netherlands
6.5
0
6.5
Italy
0
0.3
0
0
0
0.3
UK
17.1
0
17.1
Norway
0
7.8
0
2.0
1.1
11.0
West Germany
0
7.6
7.6
Switzerland,
0
0
0
0.7
0
0.7
Yugoslavia
0.3
0
0.3
Yugoslavia
0
0
0.9
0
0
0.9
Total
34.7
7.6
42.3
0.2
18.9
0.9
4.2
1.7
25.8
a. Data were coppiled from source .212/. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
32 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Table 8
Origin and Distribution of Aluminum in the Sino-Soviet Bloc 2,/
1959
Thousand Metric Tons
Origin
Distribution
Imports
Exports Production
Bloc as a Percent
Total Internal To Countries To Countries of Internal
Country or Area Production I)/ USSR c/ Hungary Non-Bloc I/ Supply Use of the Bloc e/ Outside the Bloc 0 Use
USSR
Communist China
North Korea and North Vietnam
600
7o.4
1.3
0.6
oo
o18.9
_
o
600
9o.6
515
50.3
34.7
116
78
o
90.6
o
_
oo
o
_
o
o
0.6
0.6
European Satellites
145
48.4
6.9
20011/
192.5
7.6
75
Albania
0
0
0
0
0
o
o
o
0
Bulgaria
0
1.7
0
0.2
1.9
1.9
0
0
0
Czechoslovakia
41
6.6
o
o
47.6
4o.o
o
7.6
102
East Germany
35.3
30.0
6.4 i/
0.9
72.6
72.6
o
o
49
Hungary
45.7
0
0
45.7
37.4
8.3
0
122
Poland
22.8
5.4
1.9 li
4.2
34.3
34.3
o
o
67
Rumania
o
4.7
o
1.7
6.3
6.3
o
o
o
Total
820
26
841 ig
799
42
102
a. The trade within the Bloc included rolled aluminum, Duralumin, and bare aluminum wire, as well as primary aluminum. The trade between the
Bloc and the Free World included primary aluminum and unwrought alloys. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
b. Data in this column are from Table 1, p. 6, above.
c. Data in this column were compiled from source 2Y.
d. Data in this column are from Table 7, p. 32, above.
e. Data in this column are from source
f. Data in this column are from Table 7, p. 32, above.
g. The percentages in this column are derived by dividing the respective figures in Column 1 by those in Column 6.
h. Excluding trade among the European Satellites.
i. This quantity is the difference between the total export by Hungary (as shown in Column 7) and its export to Poland (as shown in Column 3).
The import by East Germany was assumed because the available data on trade by the remaining countries of the Bloc and by the Free World failed
to show any imports from Hungary.
j. 2_EY
k. Excluding trade within the Bloc.
- 33 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
B. 1960
In contrast to its trade position throughout 1955-59 the Bloc
apparently was a net importer of aluminum in 1960. Although the avail-
able data on trade in aluminum between the Bloc and the Free World in
1960 are incomplete, the total import by the Bloc was at least 29,000
tons and the total export about 18,000 tons, thus leaving a net import
of at least 11,000 tons of aluminum.
C. Prospects for 1961-65
The Bloc may continue to be a net importer of aluminum throughout
most of 1961-65. The large increase in production of aluminum planned by
1965 in the USSR and the European Satellites may be achieved, but this in-
crease is necessary to provide the supplies of aluminum that will be needed
for their internal programs. In the USSR, for example, more than 1 million
tons of aluminum are earmarked for use in construction of electric power
transmission systems during 1959-65. This allocation partly reflects the
plans to use aluminum as a substitute for about 300,000 tons of lead in
cable sheathing and about 1+oo,000 tons of copper in cable conductors. 2//
Soviet planners expect that the use of aluminum and plastics combined will
reduce the amount of lead required by the cable and battery industries by
about 100,000 tons in 1965 alone. 211./ The Soviet authorities also plan
to expand the use of aluminum in the manufacture of vehicles so that by
1965 the amount used per vehicle will be double that used in 1958. ?2.1
The USSR also plans to increase the use of aluminum in the manufacture of
machinery and consumer goods and in shipbuilding and construction. _62/
Similar plans for increasing consumption of aluminum in the European
Satellites L3./ are based in part on the promise of larger imports from
the USSR. In Communist China, as a consequence of a sharp reduction in
requirements stemming from a continuing general decline of the economy,
consumption of aluminum undoubtedly will not rise so rapidly as had been
planned. To offset certain deficits in production, Communist China will
be forced to continue to import aluminum from the Free World. During
most of 1961-65, therefore, the imports of aluminum by the Bloc from the
Free World may exceed the exports to the Free World, as was true in 1960.
Data on the plans for allocating aluminum among the countries of
the Bloc during 1961-65 are not available, but the general pattern of al-
location can be estimated. The bulk of Soviet production during 1961-65
probably will be used to satisfy internal requirements, with most of the
remainder going to East Germany, Bulgaria, and Albania, and possibly
other European Satellites (for example, Rumania) that might suffer short-
falls in production. The USSR has already agreed to supply 85,000 tons
of aluminum to East Germany in 1965.62A/ Such a quantity is 69 percent
greater than the total export in 1959 by the USSR to all countries of the
Bloc. Communist China and the European Satellites are expected to use
the entire output of aluminum that they produce.
- 31+ -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
IV. Investment
For each unit of investment outlay in the aluminum industry of the
Bloc, the increments in capacity during 1961-65 probably will be larger
than in previous years but mailer than planned, with the result that
supplemental funds may be needed to carry out the planned expansion of
the aluminum industry of the Bloc. Because the expansion program appar-
ently has been assigned a high priority, needed funds presumably would
be allocated.
A. Total Investment
Data on investment are available for only two countries, the
USSR and Poland. The USSR allocated .about 20 billion rubles* to carry
out the expansion planned for 1959-65, and Poland allocated about 370
million zlotys** to effect the expansion planned for 1961-65. The invest-
ment allocation for the Soviet aluminum industry represents a much larger
proportion of the total allocation for the nonferrous metals industry
for 1959-65 than was true in 1952-58. The sum of 20 billion rubles is
about 35 percent of the planned total of 55 billion rubles allocated to
the Soviet nonferrous metals industry, whereas in 1952-58 the Soviet
aluminum industry received only about 8 billion rubles,*** or about
* Pre-1961 rubles in 1955 prices. This figure was derived by multi-
plying the planned capital outlay of 20,000 rubles per ton for 1959-65,
(see B, p. 36, below) by the increment in production of 900,000 to 1 mil-
lion tons planned for 1959-65 (see Table 1, p. 6, above).
** This figure, expressed in 1958 prices, was obtained by multiplying
the capital outlay of 12,200 zlotys per ton planned for the Konin plant
(see B, p. 36, below) by the estimated production of 30)000 tons planned
for that plant in 1965. A much larger figure of 2.5 billion zlotys has
been reported as the planned total investment for the Konin plant,
but this figure apparently is the total cost of the complex planned for
Konin, including not only reduction facilities but also fabricating
facilities and possibly others. Also, it may cover reduction facilities
and other capacity scheduled for construction after 1965.
*** This figure (X) was estimated by using the formula X = ABC, where
A = 20,000 rubles, the average investment outlay per ton of
capacity planned for 1959-65 (see B, p. 36, below);
B = 1.25, the factor expressing the approximate ratio of unit in-
vestment outlays made in 1952-58 to unit outlays planned for
1959-65, based on the report that unit investment outlays
planned for 1959-65 are 20 to 22 percent below the actual
outlays of 1952-58 ...1/; and [footnote continued on p. 36]
-35-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
25 percent of the total investment of about 30 billion rubles* in the
nonferrous metals industry.
B. Average Investment Outlays
In both the USSR and Poland the planners expect that the average
investment outlays per unit of capacity in their aluminum industries will
be much smaller in 1961-65 than in previous years. Similar results prob-
ably are anticipated by the planners in other countries of the Bloc.
Soviet planners expect that the cost for all capacity in mining, alumina
refining, and aluminum reduction during 1959-65 will average about 20,000
rubles per ton, 12/ or about 20 percent below the average for 1952-58. 11/
Polish planners expect that investment outlays per ton of new capacity
for aluminum reduction will average about 12,200 zlotys, or 13 percent
less than the average investment outlay planned for the second section of
the Skawina plant and 34 percent less than the actual average investment
outlay for the first section of the Skawina plant, which was completed
in 1954. 12/ A comparison of the capital outlays planned in the USSR and
Poland with the average outlay in the US of about $1,700 per ton for all
capacity for mining, alumina refining, and aluminum reduction (which in-
cluded about $900 for a ton of capacity for aluminum reduction) indicates
a ruble-dollar ratio of about 12 to 1** and a zloty-dollar ratio of about
14 to 1, expressed in 1958 prices.
The reduction in the average investment outlays planned by the
USSR is to be accomplished by the construction of large strip mines and
of plants having larger capacities; by the installation of larger equip-
ment and of less expensive rectifiers; and by the expansion of capacities
of existing plants, particularly by modernization. The installation of
large reduction cells alone, according to a Soviet publication, reduces
the investment cost 12 to 13 percent. 13./ The planned reduction in the
C = 320,000 tons, the increment in production achieved in 1952-58.
Production in 1958 was about 510,000 tons, as shown in Table 1,
p. 6, above. Production in 1951 was estimated to have been
about 190,000 tons, by assuming that production increased at
the constant rate of 24.5 percent between 1950, when produc-
tion was 155,000 tons (see Table 1, p. 6, above), and 1954,
when production was about 370,000 tons, or 2.4 times produc-
tion in 1950. Z./
* The derivation of this figure is based on the information that the to-
tal investment in the nonferrous metals industry planned for 1959-65, 55
billion rubles, is 1.8 times the investment for 1952-58. 162/
** This ratio was calculated by assuming that the 1958 ruble prices did
not differ appreciably from the 1955 ruble prices.
-36-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
average investment outlays per unit of capacity in Poland, and probably
in other countries of the Bloc, reflects similar anticipated savings.
The reductions in average investment outlays for new capacity
may be realized during 1961-65, but the reductions probably will not be
so large as the Bloc planners anticipate. In the USSR, for example, the
planned reduction rests in significant measure on investment costs for
several large plants under construction in the eastern regions. For ex-
ample, the average investment outlay for one of these, the Krasnoyarsk
plant, is expected to be 17 to 25 percent below that for other plants
under construction and 50 percent below that for existing plants./
Because the construction work in the eastern regions is retarded by many
problems, the expectation of such lower investment costs in those regions
is considered to be visionary.
- 37 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
V. Trends in the Average Cost of Production
The average cost of producing aluminum probably will decrease in
the Bloc during 1961-65, continuing the estimated general trend of
1950-60, but the reductions probably will not be so large as planned.
The reduction projected for 1961-65 should result mainly from invest-
ment in more efficient equipment and modernization, from improvements
in the quality of materials, from lower transportation costs brought
about by better juxtaposition of plants and sources of supply, and
from generally lower unit costs of power and fuel. Most of these
factors also contributed to the reduction of costs achieved during
1950-60.
A. 1950-60
The average cost of producing aluminum in the Bloc is believed
to have decreased generally during 1950-60. In the USSR the average
cost decreased 30.5 percent during 1950-55 /2/ and apparently continued
to decrease generally during 1956-60.* From the limited evidence of
increasing efficiency during that period, /V it is estimated that the
average cost of producing aluminum decreased generally during 1950-60
in the European Satellites and in Communist China but that the reduc-
tions were not large.
In the USSR by 1958 the average cost of production was much
lower for aluminum than for several other major nonferrous metals. In
that year the average cost of producing a ton of aluminum was reported
to be about 90 percent of that for copper, 65 percent of that for lead,
and 5 percent of that for tin. y131**
* The estimate that average costs decreased during 1956-60 is based
on numerous reports in the Soviet press of rising efficiency in the
Soviet aluminum industry during 1956-58, particularly with respect to
consumption of electric power, and on the report that average costs
decreased during 1959-60. /?.1
** The relative cost of producing aluminum apparently was even less
than is indicated in this comparison. One of the components of the
cost of producing these metals, the cost of electric power, was calcu-
lated not on the basis of the rates actually charged for the electric
power but on the basis of the actual costs of producing the electric
power. These actual costs are higher than the preferential rates charged
to consumers of large quantities of electric power, such as aluminum re-
duction plants. Thus the figure for the average cost of producing alu-
minum used in making the comparison was greater than the actual cost of
producing aluminum. These comparisons, therefore, favored copper, lead,
and tin, production of which does not require large quantities of elec-
tric power.
-39-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
The approximate levels of the average costs of producing alumi-
num in the USSR and China in 1960, together with the respective cost/US
price ratios for 1960, are presented in the following tabulation:
Average Cost Cost/US Price
Country per Ton Ratio*
USSR 4lo00 rubles** 7.0 : 1
China 4,000 yuan*** 7.0 : 1
The general downward trend of the average cost of producing
primary aluminum in the USSR during 1950-60 came about mainly through
decreased costs for alumina and electric power, each of which repre-
sents a major part (about 30 percent) of the total cost. The reduc-
tion in the cost of alumina appears to have been rather large, judging
from the reported reductions in the average cost of producing alumina
at individual plants.t A reduction of at least 12 percent in the cost
of electric power per ton of aluminum during 1950-60 is indicated
by reports on the average quantity of power consumed during 1950-59. ,?_/
Lower costs for alumina and electricity, in turn, were brought
about by a variety of factors. The reduction in the average cost of
producing alumina in the USSR during 1950-60 resulted primarily from
the following: (1) lower average costs for producing bauxite, brought
about principally by investment in mechanization and improvements in
organization, and (2) greater efficiency in using steam and fuel,
* The US price used for deriving the ratios shown in this column
is $573 a ton, based on the price of $0.26 a pound.
** This estimate is based on information presented in source
The average cost apparently may have been reduced to approximately this
level as early as 1957 and probably did not decrease appreciably be-
tween 1957 and 1960.
*** This figure is a rough approximation derived by using available
data on the consumption of electric power in reduction, on rates for
electric power, and on the proportion of the total cost represented
by the cost of electric power in the Chinese aluminum industry. ..?2.11/
t The average cost of producing alumina was 29.2 percent lower at
the Urals Plant and 52.1 percent lower at the Bogoslovskiy plant in
1955 than in 1950 and was 27.2 percent 1oWer at the Dnepr plant in
1959 than in 1956. 11/
-4o-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
primarily because of investment in more efficient processing units. 163./
The reduction in the average quantity of electric power consumed was
brought about (1) by investment in more efficient reduction cells, (2) by
replacement of motor converters with more efficient mercury-arc recti-
fiers, (3) by improvements in the quality of the electrolyte and anodes,
and (4) by improvements in operating procedures. L3.!2/ In view of the
intra-Bloc cooperation in the nonferrous metals industry, .E_32/ these
factors are presumed to have contributed to reductions in the average
cost of producing aluminum in other countries of the Bloc as well.
B. Prospects for 1961-65
Throughout the Bloc, in a continuation of the general trend of
1950-60, the plan is that the average cost of producing aluminum will be
lower in 1965 than in 1960. Under the Seven Year Plan (1959-65) of the
USSR the average cost of producing aluminum by 1965 is to be reduced
20 to 22 percent compared with 1958. 2/ Plans to reduce the average
cost of producing aluminum in the European Satellites either have been
announced or may be inferred from stated goals to reduce the cost of
industrial production. Li2/ The Chinese press declares that much em-
phasis is to be given to reducing the cost of producing aluminum. 2/
The sharp reduction planned by the USSR in the average cost of
producing aluminum is predicated largely on several expected developments
within the industry and on one important expected development outside the
industry. Within the industry, reductions are anticipated in (1) the
average quantity of electric power consumed per unit of aluminum produced,
primarily through the use of improved reduction cells, rectifiers, elec-
trolytes, and anodes ,11.11/; (2) the average cost of producing alumina,
partly through investment in modernization and equipment of advanced
design and partly through exhaustive exploitation of nonbauxite ores for
byproducts (for example, caustic soda, cement, and sulfuric acid) as well
as alumina 22/; (3) the average cost of mining, as a result of lower labor
and capital costs that are to be achieved by emphasis on strip-mining 211/;
and (4) the average freight cost, reflecting fewer ton-kilometers per ton
of aluminum produced (by 1965 a decrease of 30 percent is expected from
the level of 1957), 22/ because of improvements in the location of plants
relative to sources of ore, coal, soda, and other materials. Also, econ-
omies of scale -- from the use of more specialized types of capital and
increased specialization of labor, for example -- are expected to con-
tribute to lower costs.
The important development outside the industry is a reduction
in the unit costs of electric power, fuel, and steam. This reduction
reflects (1) an expected decrease in the average cost of producing
fuels and electric power to result from the general shift of the fuel
balance from coal toward the less costly oil and natural gas and
(2) the expectation that costs of fuel, steam, and particularly electric
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
power in the eastern regions, where several large plants and mines are
under construction, will be much lower than similar costs elsewhere
in the country.
Varying combinations of the factors involved in reducing the
cost of producing aluminum in the USSR also apparently are expected to
bring about similar reductions in the European Satellites and Communist
China. Improved operating procedures, however, probably are expected
to play a greater relative role in reducing average costs in the Euro-
pean Satellites and in China than in the USSR.
Soviet planners apparently expect that the average cost of
producing aluminum will remain below that for certain other major non-
ferrous metals, and at the same time they expect some changes in the
cost relationships for those metals. Along with the reduction of
about 21 percent* in the average cost for aluminum, a reduction of
15 percent for lead and of about 25 percent for copper is planned by
1965 compared with costs in 1958. 21/ Should these reductions be
achieved, the average cost of producing aluminum in 1965 would be about
94 percent of that for copper (compared with about 90 percent in 1958)
and about 61 percent of that for lead (compared with 65 percent in 1958).
The expectation of the Bloc for a reduction in the average cost
of producing aluminum during 1961-65 appears in general to be optimistic.
In the European Satellites, primarily because of shortcomings in the
construction and modernization programs, the gains in efficiency, and
hence the planned reductions in average cost, will be smaller than
planned. In Communist China the average cost of producing aluminum
may not change significantly by 1965 compared with costs in 1960. Pro-
duction of aluminum probably will be curtailed during at least the first
half of 1961-65. Such a curtailment can be expected to affect mainly
the less efficient plants and to result in some small reduction in the
average cost of producing aluminum. In the USSR, for several reasons,
the reduction almost certainly will be much smaller than planned. First,
prices to the Soviet aluminum industry for fuel and electric power
probably will be higher than anticipated by the planners because ?costs
of producing fuel and power are not likely to be so low as now foreseen.
Second, efficiency in consumption of electric power in the Soviet alu-
minum industry probably will not rise so much as planned, for the in-
stallation of rectifiers of advanced design probably will fall short of
plans because of shortages in supply. Third, planned improvements in
the quality of anode materials, necessitated by increasing reliance on
carbon obtained from crude oil from the Urals and Volga regions, which
has a high sulfur content, will be difficult and costly to effect.
Finally, the average cost of producing alumina from nonbauxite ore al-
most certainly will be much higher than now foreseen by Soviet planners.
* The midpoint of the planned range of 20 to 22 percent.
- 42 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
APPENDIX A
METHODOLOGY
The figures in Tables 1, 3, 4, and 6, rounded before presentation,
were derived as follows:
1. Table 1*: Production of Primary Aluminum
a. USSR
1950: estimated by using the equation X = ABCD, where
X = the level of production in 1950;
A = 37,700 tons, production in 1937 .2ii;
B = 1.59, the factor relating production in 1940
to that in 1937 95/;
C = 1.44, the factor relating production in 1945
to that in 1940 2g; and
D = 1.80, the factor relating production in 1950
to that in 1945. 97/
1955: 2.77 times production in 1950. 2?./
1958: 3.3 times production in 1950. 99/
1959: based on (1) the assumption that the increase planned
for 1959 was about 16 percent, roughly the average
annual rate of increase required to reach the 1965
goal, (2) the report that the 1959 production goal
was met, 1001 and (3) evidence that new capacity was
brought into operation during the year. 101/
1960: based on (1) the assumption that the increase in pro-
duction planned for 1960 was about 16 percent,
roughly the average annual rate of increase required
to reach the level of production planned for 1965;
(2) the report that the level of production planned
for 1960 was reached on 26 December 1960 102/; and
(3) evidence in the Soviet press that new capacity
was commissioned during the year. 103/
1965 Plan: 2.8 to 3.0 times production in 1958. 104/
* P. 6, above.
- 43 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
b. Communist China
1955: based on (1) the prewar annual capacity of China's
one plant, at Fu-shun, 15,000 tons 105/; (2) the
assumption that originally the designed capacity
of the plant constructed at Fu-shun in the postwar
period and partly restored to operation late in
1954 106/ was the same as its capacity in the pre-
war period; and (3) the assumption that the plant
was operating well below capacity in 1955.
1958: 71 percent of production in 1959, as indicated by
the report that production in 1959 was 41.2 per-
cent above that in 1958. 107/
1959: 108/
1960: based on (1) evidence that Communist China constructed
24 aluminum plants during 1959 109/ and (2) the esti-
mate that each of those plants is capable of produc-
ing about 1,000 tons per year and that all of the
plants were fully operational by the beginning of 1960.
1965 Plan: derived as the sum of
(1) 65,000 tons, including 40,000 tons for the Fu-shun
plant and about 25,000 tons for a group of 24 small
plants, assuming that no change from the levels of
production reached in 1960 is planned for 1965;
(2) 145,000 tons, the production goal for five plants,
including Sian, 100,000 tons; Lan-chou, 23,000 tons;
Huan-pu, 10,000 tons; Ho-fei, 10,000 tons; and
T'ang-shan, 2,000 tons 110/; and
(3) 4ol000 tons, the estimated production goal for the
plant under construction at Kuei-yang. The estimate
is based on the interpretation of the term "large"
used in describing the plant. 111/
c. European Satellites
(1) Czechoslovakia
1955: 112/
1958: 113/
- 114-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
1959: based on (a) production of 23,762 tons in the
first 7 months 114/ and (b) the assumption that
the average monthly production in the remaining
5 months was the same as in the first 7 months --
that is, 23,762 + (3,395 x 5) = 41,000 tons.
1960: based on the assumption that the planned level of
production 115/ was achieved.
1965 Plan: 51 percent above production in 1960. 116/
(2) East Germany
1955: 117/
1958: 118/
1959: 119/
1960: based on the assumption that production in 1960
did not change substantially from that in 1959.
1965 Plan: based on (a) the estimated production of
35,000 tons in 1960 and on (b) the report that
a new plant under construction at Lauta is de-
signed to produce 20,000 tons per year. 120/
(3) Hungary
1950-59: 121/
1960: 122/
1965 Plan: 123/
(4) Poland
1955-59: 124/
1960: 125/
1965 Plan: 126/
(5) Rumania
1950-60: no production (see
1965 Plan: 127/
-45-
p?
52, below).
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
2. Table 4*: Production of Alumina
a. USSR
1950: developed by assuming that production of alumina and
requirements for alumina for production of aluminum
are approximately equal. The requirement was esti-
mated by assuming an approximate ratio of 2 to 1 for
alumina to aluminum.
1955: 2.82 times production in 1950. 128/
1958: estimated requirement, derived by the same methodology
used for 1950, above.
1959: developed as the sum of (1) the estimated requirement
for production of aluminum (see 1950, above) and
(2) 10,000 tons, the quantity exported to Poland. 129/
1960: estimated revirement, derived by the same methodology
as used for 1950, above.
1965 Plan: developed as the sum of (1) the estimated
requirement for production of aluminum (see 1950,
above) and (2) 60,000 tons, the estimated planned
export to Poland.
b. Communist China
1955: the sum of (1) 20,000 tons, the approximate require-
ment for production of aluminum developed by assum-
ing a ratio of 2 to 1 for alumina to aluminum and
(2) 10,000 tons, the quantity of alumina exported. 130/
1958: the sum of (1) 100,000 tons, the estimated require-
ment for production of aluminum (see 1955, above, for
the description of the methodology) and (2) 10,000
tons, the quantity exported. 131/
1959, 1960, and 1965 Plan: the estimated requirement for
production of aluminum (for the description of the
methodology, see 1955, above).
* P. 12, above.
-46-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
c. European Satellites
(1) Czechoslovakia
There was no production of alumina before 1959.
1959, 1960, and 1965 Plan: developed by assuming that
production of alumina and requirements for alumina for
production of aluminum are approximately equal. The
requirement was estimated by assuming an approximate
ratio of 2 to 1 for alumina to aluminum.
(2) East Germany
1955, 1958, and 1959: 132/
1960: 133/
1965 Plan: 134/
(3) Hungary
1950, 1955, 1958, and 1959: 135/
1960: 136/
1965 Plan: 137/
(4) Rumania
1950-60: no production (see p. 52, below).
1965 Plan: estimated by assuming that production of
alumina and requirements for alumina for production
of aluminum are approximately equal. The requirement
was estimated by assuming an approximate ratio of
2 to 1 for alumina to aluminum.
3. Table 6*: Production of Aluminum-Bearing Ore
a. USSR
1950: 43 percent of the production of bauxite in 1955, as
indicated by the report that production in 1955 was
2.33 times that in 1950. 138/
* P. 16, above.
-47-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
1955: Bauxite: estimated production, derived by using the
equation X = [A - (B C + D)] E, where
X = total production of bauxite;
A = 880,000 tons, the estimated total production of
alumina;
B = 65,000 tons, the estimated quantity of alumina
produced from 200,000 tons of bauxite imported
from Hungary, 139/ assuming an approximate ratio
of 3 to 1 for ore to alumina;
C = 35,000 tons, the estimated quantity of alumina
produced from 122,000 tons of bauxite imported
from Greece, 140/ assuming an approximate ratio
of 3.5 to 1 for ore to alumina;
D = 30,000 tons, the estimated quantity of alumina
produced from nepheline concentrate (see
Nepheline concentrate, below);
E = 3.5, the estimated ratio of bauxite to alumina.
Nepheline concentrate: estimated by using the
equation X = (A B) C, where
X = the requirement for nepheline concentrate at the
Volkhov Aluminum Plant, the only Soviet alu-
minum plant using this material for production
of alumina;
A = 300,000 tons, the quantity of cement produced by
the Volkhov plant 141/;
B = 9, the ratio of the quantity of cement produced to
the quantity of alumina produced at the Voikhov
plant 142/; and
C = 4, the approximate ratio of nepheline concentrate
to alumina. 143/
1958: Bauxite: estimated production, derived by using the
equation X = [A - (B + C)] D, where
X = total production of bauxite;
-48-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
A = 1.03 million tons, the estimated quantity of
alumina produced;
B = 130,000 tons, the estimated quantity of alumina
produced from 450,000 tons of bauxite imported
from Greece, 144/ assuming an approximate ratio
of 3.5 to 1 for ore to alumina;
C = 40,000 tons, the estimated quantity of alumina
produced from nepheline concentrate at the
Volkhov plant. This estimate was derived by
interpolating between production estimated for
1955, about 30,000 tons, and for 1960, about
50,000 tons.
D = 3.5, the approximate ratio of bauxite to alumina.
Nepheline concentrate: estimated quantity required
for production of 40,000 tons of alumina, using the
ratio of 4 to 1 for concentrate to alumina.
1959: Bauxite: estimated production, derived by using the
equation X = LA - (B + C)] D, where
X = total production of bauxite;
A = 1.21 million tons, the estimated production of
alumina;
B = 130,000 tons, the estimated quantity of alumina
produced from 454,000 tons of bauxite imported
from Greece, 145/ assuming an approximate ratio
of 3.5 to 1 for ore to alumina;
C = 60,000 tons, the estimated quantity of alumina
produced, from nepheline concentrate, including
50,000 tons by the Volkhov plant and 10,000
tons by the Pikalevo plant;
D = 3.5, the approximate ratio of bauxite to alumina.
Nepheline concentrate: estimated quantity required for
production of 60,000 tons of alumina, using the ratio
of 4 to 1 for concentrate to alumina.
-49-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
1960: Bauxite: estimated production, derived by using the
equation X = [A - (B + C)]D, where
X = total production of bauxite;
A = 1.4 million tons, the estimated production of
alumina;
B = 120,000 tons, the estimated quantity of alumina
produced from 432,000 tons of bauxite imported
from Greece, 146/ assuming an approximate ratio
of 3.5 to 1 for ore to alumina;
C = 100,000 tons, the estimated production of alumina
from nepheline concentrate. This figure includes
50,000 tons for the Volkhov plant, estimated on
the basis of (1) the assumption that the designed
capacity of that plant was about 30,000 tons, or
about the same as the level of production reached
in 1955 and (2) the report that production in
1960 exceeded the designed capacity by 70 per-
cent. 147/ The remaining 50,000 tons is the
estimated production of the Pikalevo plant.
D = 3.5, the approximate ratio of bauxite to alumina.
Nepheline concentrate: estimated quantity required for
production of 100,000 tons of alumina, using the ratio
of 4 to 1 for concentrate to alumina.
1965 Plan: Bauxite: estimated goal for production of bauxite,
derived by using the equation X = (A - B) C, where
X = total production of bauxite;
A.= 2.9 million to 3.1 million tons, the estimated
goal for the total production of alumina;
B = 600,000 to 700,000 tons, the estimated quantity
of alumina to be produced from nonbauxite ore.
This figure is the sum of the estimated levels
of production planned for the plants at Volkhov,
Pikalevo, Razdan, and Achinsk that are to process
nepheline and for the plant at Kirovabad that is
to process alunite. The level of production planned
at each of these alumina plants was estimated on
the basis of the alumina requirement estimated
-50-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
for the reduction plant identified as the in-
tended consumer.
C = 3.5, the approximate ratio of ore to alumina.
Nonbauxite ore: estimated production, based on (1) the
estimated level of production of alumina from non-
bauxite ore planned for 1965, about 650,000 tons,*
and (2) an approximate ratio of 5 to 1 for ore to
alumina. The basis for using this ratio is the esti-
mate that the average ratio of ore to alumina for the
four nepheline processing plants will be in the range
of 4 or 5 to 1, close to the actual ratio reported for
the Volkhov plant, and the information that for alunite
the ore to alumina ratio is 6.7 to 1. 148/
b. Communist China
Estimated production of aluminum-bearing ore, developed by
assuming that production of ore and the requirement for ore
for production of alumina are approximately equal. The re-
quirement was developed by assuming an approximate ratio of
3.5 to 1 for ore to alumina, based on the information pre-
sented in source 149/.
c. European Satellites
(1) Hungary
1950, 1955, 1958, and 1959: 150/
1960: 15l/
1965 Plan: 152/
(2) Rumania
Plan for production of bauxite in 1965, developed by assum-
ing that production of ore and the quantity of ore required
to achieve the level of production of primary aluminum
planned for 1965, 20,000 to 30,000 tons, are approximately
equal. The requirement was calculated by using an approxi-
mate ratio of 7 to 1 for ore to aluminum.
During 1950-60, bauxite was produced by Rumania. For a lack
of evidence that the Rumanian ore was used in production of
The midpoint of the estimated planned range of 600,000 to 700,000
tons.
-51-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
aluminum, however, this production (most of which was ex-
ported) was not included in the Bloc totals but is shown
for selected years during 1950-60 in the following tabula-
tion (in metric tons) 153/:
1950 1955 1958 1959 1960
5,000 37,000 73,000 71,000 88,000
4. Table 3*: Production of Aluminum in the Sino-Soviet Bloc,
by Plant, 1960
a. USSR
(1) Urals and Bogoslovskiy Aluminum Plants
Production by the two plants in the Urals (X) was estimated
by using the equation X = ABCD, where
A = 490,000 tons, Soviet production of aluminum in 1957,
or 13.2 percent above production in 1955 1511./ (for
production in 1955, see Table 1, p. 6, above).
B = 0.45, the approximate proportion of total production
in 1957 contributed by the two plants in the Urals.
One report stated that those plants contributed
almost one-half of the total Soviet production, 155/
and another that they contributed more than 40 per-
cent, 156/ in that year;
C = 1.055, the ratio of production in the Urals in 1959
to that in 1957, according to source 1571; and
D = 1.0, the ratio expressing the assumption that produc-
tion in 1960 did not differ appreciably from that in
1959.
A slightly larger share of production in the Urals in 1960
was assigned to the Bogoslovskiy plant on the basis of a
report that it was the larger of the two plants in the
Urals Region. 158/
* P. 8, above.
-52-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
(2) Stalinsk* Aluminum Plant
Production was estimated on the basis of (a) the assump-
tion that production of this plant in 1959 was about as
large as that of the Bogoslovskiy plant, or about 120,000
tons (see Table 3, p. 8, above); and (b) the report that
production increased 31.2 percent in 1960, compared with
1959. 159/
The capacity of the new potline is estimated to be about
60,000 tons and the capacity of the plant at the end of
1960 about 180,000 tons, from (a) the assumption that the
capacity of the Stalinsk plant at the beginning of 1960
was about 120,000 tons; (b) the estimated increase in
production in 1960, about 4o,000 tons; and (c) the com-
missioning of the first building of a new potline about
mid-November 1959 and the second building of the new
potline about mid-October 1960. .160/
(3) Stalingrad** Aluminum Plant
Production was estimated on the basis of (a) the assumption
that this plant, which began operating at the beginning
of 1959, 161/ accounted for about 50,000 tons of produc-
tion in that year, or the bulk of the estimated increase
in national production.) about 90,000 tons (see Table 1,
p. 6, above); and (b) the report that production in 1960
was twice that in 1959. 1.62/
If the estimate of 100,000 tons is reasonably close to the
actual production of the plant in 1960, the evidence that
there was brought into operation during the year a new
potline, made up of one building commissioned in October
and another in December, 261/ suggests that the capacity
of the Stalingrad plant at the end of the year was in the
range of 150,000 to 200,000 tons.
(4) Dnepr Aluminum Plant
Production was estimated (a) by assuming that this plant
processed all of the 432,000 tons of bauxite imported from
Greece in 1960 (see p. 13, above) and (b) by assuming an
approximate ratio of 7 to 1 for Greek bauxite to aluminum.
In November. 1961, Stalinsk was renamed Novokuznetsk.
** In November 1961, Stalingrad was renamed Volgograd.
-53-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
(5) Voikhov Aluminum Plant
Production of aluminum by this plant was estimated on the
basis of (a) the estimated production of alumina by the
plant in 1960, about 50,000 tons (see p. 50, above);
(b) the assumption that all alumina used by the plant was
obtained from its own alumina department; and (c) an ap-
proximate ratio of 2 to 1 for alumina to aluminum.
(6) Kanaker, Kandalaksha, Nadvoitsy, and Sumgait Aluminum
Plants
The sum of the estimates of production by these four plants,
about 125,000 tons, is calculated as a residual. The
approximate distribution of this sum among these four
plants was made as follows:
At the beginning of 1959 the Sumgait plant apparently
had one potline in operation; the annual capacity of
of which is assumed to be about 30,000 tons. A new
potline, composed of one building Commissioned early
in June 1959 and another commissioned late in November
1959, 164/ is estimated to have an annual capacity ap-
proximately the same as the older potline, or about
30,000 tons. The combined period of operation by the
two sections of the new potline is roughly equal to
operation at full capacity of the entire potline for
about 4 months, so that production in 1959 by the new
potline can be estimated to have been about 10,000
tons and the total production by the plant about 40,000
tons. -Planned production in 1960, 53.8 percent above
production in 1959, .165/ or about 60,000 tons, was re-
ported to have been achieved. .166/
The remaining 65,000 tons of the residual were distributed
equally among the other three plants. New capacity was
to be commissioned at the Nadvoitsy plant during
1960, 167/ but the commissioning had not been reported
as of the end of 1960. Because of this delay, it is
assumed that the new capacity at Nadvoitsy was not
-commissioned until after the end of the year.
b. Communist China
(1) Fu-shun Aluminum Plant
All production in Communist China in 1957, 39,700 tons, 168/
was accounted for by the FU-shun plant. The capacity of
this plant apparently has not changed since 1957.
-54-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
(2) Others
The figure for the remaining plants is the residual but
is not distributed among them.
c. European Satellites
(1) Hungary
(a) Ajka Aluminum Plant 169/
(b) Tatabanya Aluminum Plant 170/
(c) Inota Aluminum Plant
Production estimated as the residual.
(2) East Germany
All production of aluminum in the country was accounted
for by the VEB Kombinat Bitterfeld.
(3) Czechoslovakia
All production of aluminum in the country was accounted
for by the Ziar plant.
(4) Poland
The Skawina plant accounted for all production in the
country. At the end of the year the annual capacity
of this plant apparently was about twice that at the
beginning of the year, 171/ or about 46,000 tons.
-55-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
APPENDIX B
SOURCE REFERENCES
1. Metal Statistics, 1960, published by the American Metal
Market, p. 583.
2. Interior, Bureau of Mines. Mineral Trade Notes, Aug 61,
P. 3-7.
3. Bakinskiy rabochiy, 1 Apr 61, p. 1.
4. Hungary. Statisztikai havi kozlemenyek, Feb 61, p. 24-25.
5. USSR, Ministerstvo Vneshney Torgovli SSSR, Planovo-
Ekonomicheskoye Upravleniye, Vneshnyaya torgovlya Soyuza SSR
za 1956 god, statisticheskiy obzor (Foreign Trade of the USSR
for 1956, Statistical Review), Moscow, 1958. (hereafter referred
to as Vneshnyaya torgovlya 1956)
Ibid., 1957, Moscow, 1958. (hereafter referred to as Vneshnyaya
torgovlya 1957)
Ibid., 1959, Moscow, 1960. (hereafter referred to as Vneshnyaya
torgovlya 1959)
6. Greece. Monthly Bulletin of External Trade Statistics, Dec 60.
7. Churilovich, L.M. Uchet proizvodstva i kal'kulyatsiya v tsvetnoy
metallurgii (Accounting of Production and Estimating in Non-
ferrous Metallurgy), Moscow, 1960, p. 263.
8. Gubkin, I. Geologicheskaya izuchennost i mineralino-syriyevaya
baza SSSR (Geological Exploration and the Mineral Raw Material
Base of the USSR), Moscow-Leningrad, 1939, p. 50.
9. Gornyy zhurnal, no 11, 1957, p. 32.
10. Soviet Broadcast, Rostov, 29 Nov 58.
Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya_gazeta, 15 Jul 59, p. 3.
Soviet Broadcast, Alma Ata, 6 Nov 59.
Ibid., Moscow, 20 Nov 59.
Ibid., Moscow, 17 Mar 6o.
Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 28 Oct 60, p. 2.
11. Mazel', V.A. Proizvodstvo glinozema (Production of Alumina),
Moscow, 1955, p. 19.
Breyterman, A.D. Ekonomicheskaya geografiya SSSR (Economic
Geography of the USSR), Leningrad, 1958, p. 246-248.
Vechernyaya Moskva, 13 Jul 57.
Ekonomicheskaya gazeta, 31 Jul 60, p. 1.
Gt Brit, BBC. Summary of World Broadcasts, pt 1, Weekly Sup-
plement no 52, 8 Apr 60, p. B/6 (Tass, 1 Apr 60).
Gornyy zhurnal, no 12, 1958, p. 65-66.
12. Hungarian Exporter, Jun 60.
13. Hungary. "Hungary's Aluminum Industry," Hungarian Heavy Indus-
tries, no 22, 1958, p. 4.
14. Interior, Bureau of Mines. Mineral Facts and Problems, 1960
Edition, p. 21.
-57-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
15. Trybuna luau, no 227, 19 Aug 61.
Polish Broadcast, Warsaw, 19 Aug 61.
Ibid., Warsaw, 15 Sep 61.
16. Yuen, H.I., et al. A brief Description of Shantung Bauxite
and Its Alumina Extraction by West Process, published by the
Shantung Aluminum Company, N.R.C., undated.
17. China. Ministry of Economic Affairs, Chinese Economy in the Last
Ten Years, 1948.
18. Gratsershteyn, I.M. Razvitiye alyuminiyevoy promyshlennosti
SSSR (Development of the Aluminum Industry of the USSR),
Moscow, 1959, p. 114.
Referativnyy zhurnal, metallurgiya, no 3, 1959, p. 79, item 5495.
Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 15 Jul 58, p. 4.
19. Gratsershteyn, 22. cit. (18, above), p. 142.
20. Tekhnika molodezhi, no 6, 1957, p. 15.
21. Izvestiya, 28 Jan 61, p. 3.
22. Tsvetnyye metally, no 8, 1960, p. I-VIII.
Planovoye khozyaystvo, no 12, 1960, p. 80.
Soviet News Bulletin, 24 Feb 58.
23. Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta, 24 Feb 6o.
24. Ibid.
Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 4 Jun 6o, p. 3.
25. Planovoye khozyaystvo, no 10, 1960, p. 83-84.
26. Izvestiya, 30 Dec 60, p. 1.
Soviet Broadcast, Irkutsk, 6 Dec 60.
Ibid., Moscow, 30 Dec 60.
Ibid., Moscow, 28 Dec 60.
27. Ekonomicheskaya gazeta, 8 Sep 60, p. 2.
28. US Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS). 7732, 7 Feb 61,
p. 72.
29. Gt Brit, BBC. Summary of World Broadcasts, pt II, Weekly
Supplement no 69, 4 Aug 60, p. B/10.
30. Commerce, Office of the Publication Board. Rpt no 204, The
Electro-Chemical Industry, Bitterfeld Area, undated, p. 9.
JPRS. 7732, 7 Feb 61, p. 72.
31. Trybuna ludu, no 235, 24 Aug 60.
32. Neues Deutschland, 16 Mar 61.
33. Sian jih-pao, Sian, 10 Jul 53.
Yeh-chin pao, Peking, no 46, 20 Nov 59.
Ibid., no 41, 16 Oct 59.
New China News Agency, 18 Sep 58.
Ta kung pao, Hong Kong, 5 Dec 57.
34. JPRS. 6174, 31 Oct 60, p. 83-84.
35. Ma, Ying-ch'u. "My Philosophical Thinking and Economic Theory,"
Hsin chien-she, no 11, 7 Nov 59.
36. JPRS. 6174, 31 Oct 60, p. 89-90.
Ibid., 3444, 29 Jun 60, p. 38-39.
Ibid., 6174, 31 Oct 60, p. 90-94.
-58-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
37. Tsvetnyye metally, no 6, 1959, p. 1-10.
38. Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta, 27 Feb 59.
Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 15 Jul 58, p. 4.
39. Ibid.
40. Pravda, 15 May 60, p. 2.
41. Soviet Broadcast, Moscow, Apr 60.
42. Narodnoye khozyaystvo Kazakhstana, no 4, 1960, p. 89-90.
43. Pravda, 15 May 60, p. 2.
Gt Brit, BBC. Summary of World Broadcasts, pt I, Weekly Sup-
plement no 47, 4 Mar 60, p. B/8.
Planovoye khozyaystvo, no 9, 1959, p. 61.
44. Planovoye khozyaystvo, no 9, 1959, p. 61.
Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta, 20 May 60, p. 3.
Referativnyy zhurnal, metallurgiya, no 3, 1959, p. 75.
45. Izvestiya, 24 Nov 56, p. 6.
Ibid., 24 Apr 60, p. 3.
Ibid., 27 Apr 61, p. 6.
Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 25 Nov 59, p. 2.
Kistanov, V.V. Budushcheye Sibiri (The Future of Siberia),
Moscow, 1960, p. 86-87.
Kommunist, 26 Aug 60, p. 2.
Sovetskaya Kirgiziya, 14 Jun 6o.
46. Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 11 May 60, p. 2.
Narodnoye khozyaystvo Kazakhstana, no 8, 1961, p. 37.
47. Stroitel'naya gazeta, 7 Feb 60, p. 2.
48. Bakinskiy rabochiy, 31 Oct 59, p. 2.
49. Sovetskaya Moldaviya, 10 o# 6o.
50. Stroitel'noye i dorozhnoye mashinostroyeniye, no 9, 1960, p. 2.
51. Sovetskaya Rossiya, 26 Aug 59, p. 4.
52. Gt Brit, BBC. Summary of World Broadcasts, pt II, Weekly Sup-
plement no 73, 1 Sep 60, p. NiqW73/B/7.
American Metal Market, 20 Sep 58, p. 5.
Vneshnyaya torgovlya, no 12, 1960, p. 4.
53. American Metal Market, 20 Oct 61, p. 11.
54. Vneshnyaya torgovlya 1959 (5, above).
OREC. Statistical Bulletin, Foreign Trade, vol I, Jan-Dec 59.
Minerals et metaux, Jul 60, p. 124.
Commerce, Bureau of Foreign Commerce. Country by Commodity
Series, Jan-Dec 59.
American Metal Market, 3 Mar 61.
Poland. Statystyka handlu zagranicznego 1959 (Statistics of
Foreign Trade, 1959), Warsaw, 1960, p. 29.
Yugoslavia. Statistics of Foreign Trade of the FDR Yugoslavia,
Year 1959, Belgrade, 1960.
55. Vneshnyaya torgovlya 1956 (5, above).
Vneshnyaya torgovlya 1957 (5, above).
Vneshnyaya torgovlya 1959 (5, above).
56. Vneshnyaya torgovlya 1959 (5, above).
- 59 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
57. Ibid.
Hungary. Statisztikai havi kozlemenyek, Feb 60, p. 23.
58. Poland. Handel zagraniczny, Warsaw, no 10, 1960.
59. Kommunist, 26 Mar 59, p. 2.
Tsvetnyye metally, no 2, 1960, p. 1-6.
60. Planovoye khozyaystvo, no 2, 1959, p. 32-43.
61. Kommunist, 26 Mar 59, p. 2.
62. Ibid.
63. JPRS. 7951, 20 Mar 61, p. 9.
Ibid., 4840, 3 Aug 61, p. 2.
Ibid., 1099N, 9 Jan 59, p. 32-40.
Poland. Przeglad techniczny, 22 Jun 60, p. 9-11.
64. Die Wirtschaft des Ost Blocks, Berlin, no 28, 17 Jul 58.
65. Trybuna ludu, no 235, 24 Aug 60.
66. Tsvetnyye metally, no 1, 1959, p. 2.
67. Planovoye khozyaystvo, no 2, 1959, p. 33.
Pervushin, S.A., et al. Ekonomika tsvetnoy metallurgii SSSR
(Economics of Nonferrous Metallurgy in the USSR), Moscow,
1960, p. 463.
68. Izvestiya, 8 Feb 55.
69. Pervushin, et al., 2E. cit. (67, above), p. 64.
70. Voprosy ekonomiki, no 1, 1960, p. 28. .
Pervushin, et al., 2E. cit. (67, above), p. 463.
71. Planovoye khozyaystvo, no 2, 1959, p. 33.
Pervushin, et al., 2E. cit. (67, above), p. 463.
72. Poland. Przeglad techniczny, 18 Mar 59, p. 10-11.
73. Pervushin, et al., 2E. cit. (67, above), p. 457.
74. Pravda, 13 Jan 59, p. 3.
75. Gratsershteyn, 2E. cit. (18, above), p. 113-114.
76. Ekonomicheskaya gazeta, 8 Sep 60.
77. The Metal Bulletin, 4 Jul 61, p. iv.
JPRS. 3444, 29 Jun 60, p. 38-39.
78. Planovoye khozyaystvo, no 2, 1959, p. 32-43.
79. Khachaturov, T.S., ed. Ekonomicheskaya effektivnost' kapital'nykh
vlozheniy i novoy tekhniki (The Economic Efficiency of Capital
Investment and New Techniques), Moscow, 1959, p. 367-369.
80. Communist China. People's Daily, Peking, 20 Dec 58.
81. Gratsershteyn, 2E. cit. (18, above), p. 127-130.
Tsvetnyye metally, no 5, 1957, p. 6.
Planovoye khozyaystvo, no 5, 1960, p. 33-35.
82. Planovoye khozyaystvo, no 5, 1960, p. 33-35.
Shershov, S.F. Ekonomika organizatsii energeticheskogo
proizvodstva (The Economics of the Organization of Energy
Production), Moscow, 1957, p. 37.
83. Gratsershteyn, op. cit. (18, above), p. 69, 118, 120-124.
84. Ibid., p. 127-130, 132, 141.
Referativnyy zhurnal, metallurgiya, no 6, 1958, p. 102.
- 6o -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Pervushin, et al., 2E. cit. (67, above), P. 133, 197.
Ekonomicheskaya gazeta,M7 Dec 60, p. 3.
Kommunist, 20 Jul 60, P. 2.
85. Gt Brit, BBC. Summary of World Broadcasts, pt II, Weekly Sup-
plement no 73, 1 Sep 60, p. EF/W73/B/7.
Ibid., no 81, 27 Oct 60, p. EE/WB1/B/5.
SBZ Archly, Cologne, no 20, Oct 60, p. 309-310.
86. Gratsershteyn, op. cit. (18, above), p. 160.
Planovoye khozyaystvo, no 2, 1959, p. 32-43.
87. JPRS. 5851, 14 Oct 61, p. 8-10.
The Metal Bulletin, 8 Nov 6o, p. 60.
88. JPRS. 3444, 29 Jun 60.
89. Pervushin, et al., op. cit. (67, above), p. 141-142, 457, 477.
Planovoye khozyaystvo, no 12, 1960, p. 80.
Ibid., no 2, 1959, p. 39.
Tsvetnyye metally, no 8, 1960, p. 1-8.
Kommunist, 19 Apr 60, p. 2.
Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta, 24 Feb 60, p. 2.
90. Tsvetnyye metally, no 6, 1959, p. 1-10.
Ekonomicheskaya gazeta, 7 Jun 60, p. 3.
USSR, Verkhovnyy Sovet SSSR. Zasedaniya verkhovnogo soveta
SSSR, pyatogo sozyva, tret'ya sessiya (27-31 okt 59 g)
stenograficheskiy otchet (Proceedings of the Supreme Soviet
of the USSR, 5th Convocation, 3rd Session (27-31 Oct 59),
Stenographic Report), Moscow, 1959, p. 329.
Planovoye khozyaytsvo, no 9, 1959, p. 61.
Kommunist, 10 Sep 59, p. 2.
Akhundov, V. 4o let sovetskogo Azerbaydzhana (4o Years of Soviet
Azerbaydzhan), Moscow, 1960, p. 33.
Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta, 19 Aug 59, p. 3.
91. Planovoye khozyaystvo, no 7, 1959, p. 87-92.
Yerofeyev, B.N., and Belyayevskiy, N.A. Geologiya po sluzhbe
semiletki (Geology in the Service of the Seven Year Plan),
Moscow, 1960, p. 14-15.
Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 4 Feb 56.
92. Planovoye khozyaystvo, no 2, 1959, p. 32-43.
93. Pervushin, et al., 2E. cit. (67, above), p. 388.
Benuni, A.Kh. Razvitiye tsvetnoy metallurgii v 1959-65 gg
(Expansion of Nonferrous Metallurgy in 1959-65), Moscow, 1960,
p. 90.
94. USSR. Itogi vypolneniya vtorogo pyatiletnogo plana razvitiya
narodnogo khozyaystva Soyuza SSR (Results of the Fulfillment
of the Second Five Year Plan for Development of the National
Economy of the USSR), Moscow, 1939, P. 24.
95. Voznesenskiy, N.A. Economic Results of the USSR in 1940 and the
Plan of National Economic Development for 1941, Moscow, 1941,
P. 37.
-61-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
96. Izvestiya, 2 Apr 46.
97. But, A.I. Planirovaniye i ekonomika predpriyatiy tsvetnoy
metallurgii (Planning and Economics of an Enterprise of Non-
ferrous Metallurgy), Moscow, 1957, p. 21.
98. Gratsershteyn, sal. cit. (18, above)) p. 55.
99. Stroitel'stvo turboprovodov,_ no 2, 1959, p. 6-9.
100. Sovetskaya Rossiya, 27 Dec 60, p. 1. ?
101. Pravda, 15 Jun 59.
Bakinskiy rabochiy, 22 Nov 59, p. 1.
Stroitelinaya gazeta, 20 Nov 59, p. 1.
Sovetskaya Rossiya, 18 Jan 59.
Izvestiya, 9 Aug 59.
102. Sovetskaya Rossiya, 26 Dec 60, p. 1.
103. Sovetskaya Litva, 16 Oct 6o.
Stroitel'naya gazeta, 9 Oct 60, p. 1.
Ibid., 30 Dec 60, p. 1.
104. Pravda, 28 Jan 59, p. 3.
105. Nishikawa, Organ of Japanese Coal Association, Oct/Nov issue,
1954.
106. New China News Agency, 20 Sep 56.
107. JPRS. 6174, 31 Oct 60.
108. New China News Agency, 20 Jan 60.
109. JPRS. 6174, 31 Oct 60.
110. Sian jih-pao, Sian, 10 Jul 58.
Yeh-chin pao, Peking, no 41, 16 Oct 59.
Ta kung pao, Hong Kong, 5 Dec 57.
Yeh-chin pao, Peking, 18 Dec 59.
Hopeh jih-pao, Tientsin, 14 Jan 59.
111. Yeh-chin pao, Peking, 18 Jan 60.
112. Czechoslovakia. Statisticke zpravy, statnihe uradu statistickeho
Republiky Ceskoslovenske (Statistical Bulletin, National Sta-
tistical Report of the Czechoslovak Republic), Prague, 1959,
p. 2.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid.
115. Austrian Broadcast, Vienna, 12 Nov 56.
116. Prague. Rude pravo, 9 Jul 60.
117. Yearbook of the American Bureau of Metal Statistics, New York,
Jun 61, p. 89.
118. Metall, Feb 60, p. 154.
119. New York Times, 29 Aug 6o.
120, Neues Deutschland, Berlin, 25 Aug 60.
121. Hungary. Statisztikai havi kozlemenyek, Feb 60, p. 23.
122. Ibid., Feb 61, p. 25.
123. Hungary. Statisztikai szemle, Dec 59, p. 1172-1173.
124. Poland. Rocznik statystyczny 1960 (Statistical Yearbook for 1960),
P. 99.
125. Poland. Biuletyn statystyczny, Feb 61, p. 10.
-62-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
126. Polish Broadcast, Warsaw, 13 Oct 60.
127. Romania, Chamber of Commerce of the RPR. Prospects for the
Development of the National Economy of the Rumanian People's
Republic (enclosure to Information Bulletin, Jun 60),
Bucharest, p. 5.
128. Gratsershteyn, a. cit. (18, above), p. 56-57.
129. Vneshnyaya torgovlya 1959 (5, above).
130. Japan. Annual Returns of the Foreign Trade of Japan, Tokyo,
1956.
131. USSR. Ministerstvo Vneshney Torgovli, Planovo-Fkonomicheskoye
Upravleniye, Vneshnyaya torgovlya Soyuza SSR za 1958 god,
Moscow, 1959. (hereafter referred to as Vneshnyaya torgovlya
1958)
132. East Germany. Statistisches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen
Republic, 1959 (Statistical Yearbook of the German Democratic
Republic, 1959), Berlin, 1960, p. 344-345.
133. Ibid., 1960.
134. Brandenburgische neueste Nachrichten, Potsdam, 14 Oct 59.
135. Hungary. Statisztikai havi kozlemenyek, Feb 60, p. 22.
136. Ibid., Feb 61, p. 24.
137. Hungary. Statisztikai szemle, Dec 59, p. 1172-1173.
138. Tsvetnyye metally, no 5, 1957, p. 7.
139. Hungary. Statisztikai evkonya, Budapest, 1957.
140. Vneshnyaya torgovlya 1956 (5, above).
141. Pravda, 26 Feb 56.
142. Stroitel'naya gazeta, 22 May 57, p. 2.
143. Referativnyy zhurnal, metallurgiya, no 3, 1959, p. 79, item 5496.
144. Vneshnyaya torgovlya 1958 (131, above).
145. Vneshnyaya torgovlya 1959 (5, above).
146. Greece. Monthly Bulletin of External Trade Statistics, Dec 60.
147. Izvestiya vysshikh uchebnykh zavedeniy, tsvetnaya metallurgiya,
no 3, 1961, p. 155-158.
148. Ibid., no 3, 1958, p. 142-148.
149. Yuen, et al., a. cit. (16, above).
150. Hungary. Statisztikai havi kozlemenyek, Feb 60, p. 22.
151. Ibid., Feb 61, p. 24.
152. Hungarian Broadcast, Budapest, 9 Aug 60.
153. Rumania, Central Statistical Office. Anuarul statistic al
EPR 1961, p. 135.
154. Trud, 25 Apr 58.
155. Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta, 12 Apr 57, p. 2.
156. Gt Brit, BBC. Summary of World Broadcasts, pt I, The USSR,
no 875, 28 Oct 57, p. 43.
157. Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta, 27 Jan 60, p. 2.
158. Gt Brit, BBC. Summary of World Broadcasts, pt I, The USSR,
Supplement no 5, 15 May 59, p. B 28.
- 63 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
159. Soviet Broadcast, Kemerovo, 28 Dec 60,
160. Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta, 13 Nov
Sovetskaya Litval 16 Oct 60.
161. Sovetskaya Rossiya, 18 Jan 59.
162. JPRS. 7817, 22 Feb 61, p. 12.
163. StroitelTnaya gazeta, 9 Oct 60, p. 1.
Ibid., 30 Dec 60, p. 1.
164. Pravda, 15 Jun 59.
Bakinskiy rabochiy, 22 Nov 59, p. 1.
165. Bakinskiy rabochiy, 19 Dec 59, p. 2.
166. Ibid., 4 Jan 61, p. 1.
167. Pravda, 28 Apr 60, p. 1.
168. Hsueh hsi, Peking, 3 Mar 58.
169. The Metal Bulletin, 4 Jul 61, p. 1.
170. Ibid.
171. Polish Broadcast, Warsaw, 29 Oct 60.
59, p. 2.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002300100002-2
/ 1. \,. \ \
' Declassified and Approved For Release,2013/08/12 : CIA-RDP79R' 01141A002300100002-2
44. \
s.."(
??? t.D
(Zs''
tiM
AL Bitterteld .,) '
GERMANY ,.'-'\
:ODA Lauta
POLAND
Konin
A Skawina
-nad-Hronom
yN/