AGRICULTURAL PLANS OF THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES THROUGH 1965

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• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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t N? 86
Economic Intelligence Report
AGRICULTURAL PLANS
OF THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES
THROUGH 1965
CIA/RR ER 61-43
October 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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Economic Intelligence Report
AGRICULTURAL PLANS
OF THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES
THROUGH 1965
CIA/RR ER 61-43
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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FOREWORD
This report estimates the prospects for fulfillment of the agri-
cultural plans of the European Satellites for 1965. An examination
is made of past trends in production and consumption of food as an
aid to projecting the manner in which production and consumption of
food in the Satellites may develop for major groups of agricultural
commodities during the next 5 years. Because of the limited plan
data available and the many variables that determine agricultural
production, all projections include a large element of judgment. One
important assumption is made in evaluating the future level of pro-
duction -- that average weather will prevail during 1961-65.
The European Satellites covered in this report are Czechoslovakia,
East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania. Each has announced planned
goals for agricultural production ending in 1965.* Both the amount and
the quality of information available on the agricultural plans, how-
ever, varies widely among the Satellites. Because of the collectiviza-
tion campaigns waged during 1959-60 in Hungary and East Germany, sub-
sequent to the announcement of their 1965 plans, statistical revisions
probably can be expected in the original goals set for 1965. Data on
1965 plans for Albania and Bulgaria were too incomplete, to be included.
* Plan periods are as follows: Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland,
1961-65; East Germany, 1959-65; and Rumania, 1960-65.
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Summary and Conclusions
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CONTENTS
I. Agricultural Production, 1956-60
Page
1
5
A. General 5
B. Production of Crops 5
C. Production of Livestock 6
II. Agricultural Production Plans for 1965 9
III.
A. Production of Crops
B. Production of Livestock
Planned Means of Achieving Production Goals
11
13
15
A. Investments
15
B. Mechanization
18
C. Land Improvement
19
D. Farm Buildings
20
E. Agricultural Chemicals and Seed Improvement . ? ?
?
21
1. Fertilizers, Pesticides, and Herbicides ? ?
?
21
2. Improvement of Seed
22
F. Agricultural Labor
23
IV.
Institutional Factors Affecting Production
23
A. Socialization
23
B. Other Institutional Factors
25
V.
Prospects for Fulfillment of Agricultural Production
Goals
25
A. General
25
B. Czechoslovakia
? 26
C. East Germany
27
D. Hungary
29
E. Poland
29
F. Rumania
31
VI.
Availability of Food
32
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Appendix
5
Page 0X1
Tables
1. Indexes of Gross Agricultural Production for Selected
European Satellites, Prewar, 1955-60, and 1960
Plan
2. production of Major Crops in Selected European Satel-
lites, Prewar, 1955-59, 1960, and 1965 Plan
6
7
3. Numbers of Livestock and Production of Livestock
Products in Selected European Satellites, Prewar,
Selected Postwar Years, and 1965 Plan 8
4. Planned Increases in the Value of Gross Agricultural
Production and Annual Rates of Growth in Selected
European Satellites, 1956-60 and 1961-65 10
5. Yields of Selected Major Agricultural Commodities
in Selected European Satellites, Prewar, 1955-59,
1960) and 1965 Plan 12
6. Numbers of Livestock per 100 Hectares of Agricultural
Land in Selected European Satellites, 1955, 1960,
and 1965 Plan 14
7. Gross Fixed Investments in Agriculture in Selected
European Satellites, 1961-65 Plan Compared with
1956-60 Actual 16
8. Share of Agriculture in the Total Gross Fixed Invest-
ments in Selected European Satellites, 1956-60 and
1961-65 Plan 17
9. Planned Structure of Investment Outlays for Agricul-
ture in Selected European Satellites, 1961-65 . . . 17
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Page
10. Inventory of Tractors in Selected European Satellites,
1950, 1955, 1960, and 1965 Plan 18
11. Availability of Mineral Fertilizer to Agriculture
in Selected European Satellites, 1955, 1960, and
1965 Plan 21
12. Consumption of Mineral Fertilizer per Hectare of
Arable Land in Selected European Satellites,
1954/55, 1959/60, and 1965 Plan
22
13. Annual Per Capita Availability of Selected Foods
in the European Satellites, 1965 Plan 33
Chart
Selected European Satellites: Percentage of Total Agri-
cultural Land in State and Collective Farms, 1956-61
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AGRICULTURAL PLANS OF THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES
THROUGH 1965*
Summary and Conclusions
The agricultural sector of the economies of the European Satellites
continues to give the Communist planners considerable trouble. Whereas
long-term planned increases in gross industrial output have been ful-
filled or exceeded, no Satellite has ever fulfilled a 5-year or a 6-
year plan for agricultural output. The average value of gross agri-
cultural production for the European Satellites during 1955-59 was
only 8 percent above the pre-World War II average compared with an
average increase of 27 percent for Western Europe.
The plans of the European Satellites for 1965 call for an average
annual rate of increase in gross agricultural production of about 3.5
to 4.5 percent, except in Rumania, where a more ambitious annual rate
of growth of 9.2 to 10.3 percent is planned. Although these rates of
growth are about the same as those planned for 1956-60, the actual rate
achieved during that period was less than 2 percent, except in Poland
(3.2 percent). The Communist regimes, however, have planned substantial
increases in agricultural investments for 1961-65 in comparison with
1956-60, ranging from about 60 percent in Czechoslovakia and Rumania
to 93 percent in East Germany. The largest share of the investment is
to be used for agricultural machinery and farm buildings. Except for
Poland, collectivization has been essentially completed. The organi-
zation of large production units, in Communist theory, will permit
more efficient utilization of the new machinery and the widespread
application of technological improvements. No increase in farm labor
is planned in any Satellite during the next 5 years.
To achieve the planned increases in inputs, industry during 1961-65
is to provide greater support to agriculture. Mineral fertilizers and
agricultural machinery available to agriculture are to increase sharply
along with production of pesticides and other chemicals. Extensive
land improvement is planned throughout the Satellites, including an
expansion of the irrigated areas in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania.
A common goal of the various agricultural plans is to increase pro-
duction of livestock products at a rate faster than or about equal to
* The estimates and conclusions in this report represent the best
judgment of this Office as of 15 September 1961.
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that of production of crops. The planned targets for production of
livestock are to be achieved by increases both in productivity per
animal and in numbers of animals. More feeds as well as feeds of
better quality, improved breeding stock, and more barns are planned
to improve the productivity of livestock. To help alleviate the
perennial problem of fodder shortages in the Satellites, the large
production increase planned for silage corn and legumes is to be
achieved both by an extension in sown area and by increased yields
per hectare. For other feed crops, bread grains, and root crops the
increases in production are based largely on increases in yield per
hectare, as there are only limited possibilities for extending the
total cultivated area.
Many factors seem to favor a somewhat higher rate of growth in
agricultural production in the future. These factors are increased
investment, coming partly from the increased capacity of industry to
supply means of production; increased productivity as a result of
past investments in land improvement and farm education, which are
beginning to have an effect; increased opportunity to apply improved
technology; and fewer disruptions from collectivization drives. Never-
theless, many institutional, managerial, and other problems that remain
to be solved will continue to depress the growth of agricultural pro-
duction. Among the problems are the determination of the optimum size
for collective farms, the status of private plots, the payment of wages
in money or in kind, the most effective type of collective, and the
role of the machine tractor stations (MTS's). Furthermore, the Com-
munists still have to overcome the deep-rooted preference of most
peasants for private farming and to train men accustomed to small-
scale farming to operate large collective farms.
It is estimated that the planned rates of increase in agricultural
production will not be achieved. The rate of growth, however, prob-
ably will be larger than during the past 5 years -- except possibly in
Poland -- and should exceed the rate of increase in population. Poland
may have difficulty in maintaining an average annual rate of 3.2 per-
cent. Relative to the other Satellites, Rumania and Hungary may show
the largest increase in agricultural production by 1965 compared with
1960. Agriculture in these countries is less developed and stands to
gain substantially from increases in physical inputs and technology.
Furthermore, the level of production for Rumania and Hungary in 1960
was no higher than in 1955, whereas the level reached in 1960 repre-
sents a postwar high for the other Satellites.
Contrary to plans the indications are that production of crops in
the Satellites will increase at an average annual rate higher than
that for production of livestock. Most Satellites can reap greater
short-run benefits from increased inputs of fertilizers and improved
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Varieties of seed, especially on grain and root crops, than from
measures aimed at improving production of livestock. The probable
lag in production of fodder crops in the northern Satellites will
continue to restrict the growth of production of livestock. Also,
measures to decrease the number of livestock on private plots in
favor of collective ownership may have unfavorable repercussions on
increases in livestock numbers. Some increase in the productivity
of livestock can be expected, but considerably less than planned,
especially in Rumania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.
The main objective of agricultural policy in the Satellites is
to increase agricultural output as rapidly as possible in order to
insure an increase in the quality and variety of the average diet.
The Satellite plans for 1965, except for Rumania, aim at achieving
the current levels of per capita consumption of high-quality foods
such as meat, milk, and -sugar in the more developed Western European
countries. Rumania has planned the most ambitious increases for per
capita consumption of quality foods, but consumption even if achieved
would still be below Western European levels.
Although the various plans for 1965 do not state self-sufficiency
as the ultimate aim, it is apparent that a larger share of the needs
for domestic food is planned to be covered from indigenous production.
The plans for food consumption, therefore, are largely dependent on
achievement of goals for agricultural production. Improvement in the
diet is expected, but because the production goals for some food crops
and for livestock products are overly ambitious, the improvement in
the variety and quality of the diet probably will fall short of planned
goals. This shortfall could be most serious for Hungary, Rumania, and
Poland, Where the industrial worker's demand for livestock products al-
ready exceeds supply, where additions to the industrial labor force may
be the largest during the next 5 years, and where the pressure to in-
crease agricultural exports exists. Furthermore, food has a heavy
weight in the budget of the average Satellite family, and per capita
consumption as well as the demand for nearly all staple foods has in-
creased. Planned increases (25 to 4o percent in 5 or 6 years) in the
income of workers is expected to create an additional demand for more
high-quality foods, especially animal products, fruits, and vegetables.
Because the supply of these foods will not be able to satisfy this in-
creased demand, complaints of shortages and high retail prices for
these foods are expected to continue throughout all the Satellites.
By 1965, East Germany and Czechoslovakia will still be large importers
of meat, fats and oils, and grain. These two Satellites, as well as
Poland (for grain), may have to depend more on non-Bloc sources for
such commodities than previously.
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I. Agricultural Production, 1956-60
A. General
During 1956-60 the agricultural policy of the European Satel-
lites was characterized by increased state investments in agriculture,
by increased availability of production inputs, by higher farm prices,
and by pressures to socialize agriculture (except in Poland). All
these measures were officially stated to be aimed at increasing agri-
cultural production, which, by 1955, was seriously lagging behind in-
dustrial rates of growth and was showing tendencies to stagnate.
Furthermore, in 1955, gross agricultural production was still below
prewar levels in the more highly industrialized Satellites of Czecho-
slovakia, East Germany, and Poland, as shown in Table 1.*
Planned increases in gross agricultural production from 1955
to 1960 ranged from 17 to 66 percent. No Satellite country, however,
achieved the planned level of gross production in 1960. The only
Satellite that registered a favorable increase in agricultural pro-
duction was Poland (17 percent), whereas production in Hungary and
Rumania was no better than in 1955.
The low level of investment in agriculture combined with the
institutional and organizational upheavals during the past 5 years
had an adverse effect on the development of agricultural production,
except in Poland, which supported private farming. The collectiviza-
tion of agriculture proceeded faster in most of the Satellites during
1956-60 than in the previous 5 years, but Poland registered a decline.
B. Production of Crops
Industrial and fodder crops continued to be expanded at the
expense of grain crops, especially wheat and rye. The increased
yields of grain crops were planned to overcompensate for any loss in
sown area. However, as shown in Table 2,** the average production of
grain and potatoes for 1955-59 was below prewar levels in all Satel-
lite countries except Rumania. On the other hand, the increase in
area devoted to industrial crops (oilseed and sugar beets) resulted
in a substantial increase in production, although yields per hectare
were below prewar levels.
The low yields per hectare for grain and potatoes created a
shortage of these crops for use as fodder. Whereas fodder crops
* Table 1 follows on p. 6.
** Table 2 follows on p. 7.
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Table 1
Indexes of Gross Agricultural Production
for Selected European Satellites 2/
Prewar, 1955-60, and 1960 Plan
1955 = 100
Year
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
Hungary
Poland
Rumania
1934-38 b/
105
105
79
106
84
1956-60W
104
107
96
115
95
1955
100
100
100
100
100
1956
102
99
go
111
82
1957
102
106
95
115
102
1958
104
112
90
116
88
1959
103
107
104
115
103
1960
109
log
99
117
100
1960 Plan 21
127
117
127 2./
125
166
a. The index series was constructed by using European regional weights
developed by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the UN and
by the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and based
on 1952-56 price relationship to the production figures. To make in-
dexes conform to Communist reporting of gross agricultural production,
feed and seed have not been deducted.
b. Average.
c. Preliminary estimates.
d. Long-term plan.
e. The 1960 plan was based on the increase above the average pro-
duction in 1950-54.
showed little or no increase in production, numbers of meat animals
(cattle and hogs) were increasing during 1955-59, as shown in
Table 3.* To support the larger numbers of livestock, East Germany,
CzechoSlovakia, and Poland were required to import quantities of grain
larger than planned.
C. Production of Livestock
Production of livestock during the past 5 years increased more
rapidly in the northern Satellites (East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and
* Table 3 follows on p. 8.
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Table 2
Production of Major Crops in Selected European Satellites W
Prewar, 1955-59, 1960, and 1965 Plan
Thousand Metric Tons
1965 Plan
as a Percent
of 1955-59
1934-38
1955-59
1960
1965
Commodity and Country
Average
Average
Preliminary
Plan
Average
Grain
Czechoslovakia
5,636
5,211
5,174
7,040
135
East Germany
6,464
5,296
5,500
7,62512/
144
Hungary
6,521
6,377
6,757
N.A.
N.A.
Poland
13,279
13,155
13,010
15,560
118
Rumania
7,982
8,003
8,550
15,000 c/
187
Total
39,882
38,0142
38,991
N.A.
N.A.
Potatoes
Czechoslovakia
9,635
7,844
5,254
9,360
119
East Germany
13,567
12,140
13,000
18,80012/
152
Hungary
2,166
2,439
2,750
N.A.
N.A.
Poland
38,000
33,791
35,960
41,850
124
Rumania
1,318
2,242
2,300
4,750 g
212
Total-
61,686
58,456
59,264
74,760
128
Sugar beets
Czechoslovakia
4,664
5,881
8,404
7,970
136
East Germany
5,412
5,620
6,800
8,600 ID/
153
Hungary
886
2,163
3,100
3,500
162
Poland
5,962
7,154
10,017
11,400
159
Rumania
392
2,148
3,400
5,000
233
Total
17,316
22,966
31,721
36,1470
159
Oilseeds
Czechoslovakia
7
50
55
N.A.
N.A.
East Germany
41
171
198
N.A.
N.A.
Hungary
53
129
77
120
93
Poland
72
108
loo
157
145
Rumania
48
314
522
750
239
Total
221
772
952
N.A.
N.A.
a. Barn harvest unless otherwise indicated.
b. Biological harvest.
c. Midpoint of the planned range of 14 million to 16 million.
d. Midpoint of the planned range of 4.5 million to 5.0 million.
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Table 3
Numbers of Livestock and Production of Livestock Products
in Selected European Satellites
Prewar, Selected Postwar Years, and 1965 Plan
Commodity and Country
1934-38
Average
1955
1959
1960
Preliminary
1965
Plan
1960
as a Percent
of 1955
1965 Plan
as a Percent
of 1960
Cattle
Thousand Head 2/
Czechoslovakia
4,296
4,107
4,303
4,387
4,800
107
109
East Germany
3,577
3,760
4,465
4,675
5,030
124
108
Hungary
1,905
2,128
2,004
1,971
,270
93
115
Poland
9,924 hj
7,912
8,353
8,695
10,500
110
121
Rumania
3,653
4,630
4,394
4,450
5,800
96
130
Cows
Czechoslovakia
2,384
2,084
2,072
2,047
2,3001
98
112
East Germany
1,945 hi
2,100
2,158
2,175
2,603 2./
104
120
Hungary
915
859
962
949
1,110
111
117
Poland
6,294 hj
5,455
6,025
5,885
6,600
108
112
Rumania
1,787 12/
1,914
2,137
2,156
2,900
113
135
Hogs
Czechoslovakia
3,144
5,285
5,687
5,962
5,510
113
92
East Germany
5,744
9,029
8,283
8,316
8,733
92
105
Hungary
3,620
5,818
6,225
5,356
6,990
92
131
Poland
9,684.51
10,888
11,209
12,615
15,500
116
123
Rumania
2,761
4,370
4,008
4,300
7,500
98
174
Meat di
Thousand
Metric Tons
Czechoslovakia
629 Ej
768
903
929
1,280 I/
121
138
East Germany .6/
615
667
685
719
N.A.
108
N.A.
Hungary g/
280
311
315
290
N.A.
93
N.A.
Poland
1,534 hj
1,703
2,098
2,150
2,855
126
133
Rumania
763
886
903
962
1,750 lij
109
182
Milk!"
Czechoslovakia
4,500
3,521
3,771
3,832
5,531
109
144
East Germany lj
4,952
4,962
5,826
5,700
7,658
115
134
Hungary
1,700
1,525
2,085
2,050
2,780
134
136
Poland
11,100 hj
9,903
12,302
12,263
15,707
124
128
Rumania
1,496
1,830
2,203
2,453
5,200 hi
134
212
Butter 1/
Czechoslovakia
14.3
43.2
55.4
61.8
81.2
143
131
East Germany
105
144
161
175
241
122
138
Hungary
9.4
11.4
16.5
16.3
N.A.
143
N.A.
Poland
N.A.
61.3
93.3
94.6
154.0
154
163
Rumania
N.A.
6.9
11.0
12.0
30.0
174
250
Eggs
Million
Czechoslovakia
1,900
1,734
2,135
2,230
3,000
129
135
East Germany
1,300
2,043
3,127
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Hungary
N.A.
1,200
1,850
1,870
2,320
156
124
Poland
3,200
4,160
5,127
5,525
7,000
133
127
Rumania
1,354
1,546
2,160
2,250
4,750
146
211
a. Census dates: 1 January for Rumania, June for Poland, March for Hungary, and December for East Germany and Czechoslovakia.
b. 1938.
c. Based on planned numbers per 100 hectares of agricultural land.
d. Live weight basis, except where otherwise indicated. Including hogs, cattle, sheep, and horses.
e. 1936.
f. Including horse meat, sheep, and poultry, which are not included for other years.
g. Trimmed carcass weight.
h. Midpoint of the planned range of 1.7 million to 1.8 million.
i. Cow milk.
j. 3.5 percent butter fat content.
k. Including sheep and buffalo milk.
1. Commercial butter.
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Poland) than in the southern Satellites (Hungary and Rumania). Live-
stock numbers trended upward during the early part of the period
1956-60 and then leveled off in the northern Satellites. Hungary and
Rumania, however, experienced a decline in numbers of hogs and cattle
during the period, so that numbers of hogs and cattle in 1960 were
les 6 than those in 1955 (see Table 3*). However, numbers of both
hogs and cattle in 1960 were above prewar levels in all the Satellites
except for cattle in Poland. Livestock numbers everywhere fluctuated
with variations in monetary incentives and fodder supplies and with
the phases of collectivization, but more so in Hungary and Rumania.
Somewhat larger increases occurred in output of livestock
products than in livestock numbers. During the last 5 years, gains
were registered by each Satellite in production of milk and in yields
per cow -- apparently, efforts to improve feeding practices and breeds
of cattle were beginning to pay off. The largest gains were made by
Rumania, Hungary, and Poland -- countries in Which milk yields had been
law. By 1960, Czechoslovakia was the only Satellite that had not ex-
ceeded prewar levels in the numbers of cows or the total production of
milk. With the exception of Hungary, production of meat trended upward
during 1956-60 but showed signs of weakening by 1960 in several Satel-
lites. Poland achieved the largest increase in production of meat dur-
ing the past 5 years and also relative to prewar levels. Production of
commercial butter and eggs increased throughout the Satellites, and '
production of each in 1960 greatly exceeded both the level in 1955 and
the prewar level.
Although production of livestock products increased in most of
the Satellites during the past 5 years, the increases were below ex-
pectations of the economic planners in the various countries. Also,
the increase in production of meat was not sufficient to meet the de-
mands of an expanding urban population with rising incomes. By the
end of 1960, therefore, most Satellites were reporting difficulties in
meeting the demand for meat and animal fats -- higher prices and/or some
form of rationing were being used to curtail demand.
II. Agricultural Production Plans for 1965
In all Satellite countries the over-all value of gross agricul-
tural production planned for 1965 calls for an acceleration of past
rates of growth of output, though to a lesser extent in Poland than
in the other countries. As shown in Table 4,** Rumania again, as in
the last long-term plan, has planned the most ambitious rate of growth,
annually averaging 9.2 to 10.3 percent. Planned increases in over-all
* P. 8, above.
** Table 4 follows on p. 10.
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Table 4
Planned Increases in the Value of Gross Agricultural Production
and Annual Rates of Growth in Selected European Satellites
1956-60 and 1961-65
Average Annual Rate of Growth Lai
Total Growth
1961-65 Plan 1956-60 b/ 1961-65
Country (Percent) Actual Plan
Czechoslovakia 22.8 1.7 4.2
East Germany 24.5 J 1.7 4.5
Hungary 19 d -0.2 3.5
Poland 22 3.2 4.1
Rumania 55 to 63 2./ 0 9.2 to 10.3
a. Average annual rates of growth are computed at the compound rate
for the stated period, including the terminal years.
b. Derived from Table 1, p. 6, above.
c. Based on the average annual rate of increase planned, 4.5 percent
for 1959-65.
d. Computed from the announced increase of 30 to 32 percent in the
volume of gross agricultural production above the 1954-58 average.
e. The Six Year Plan (1960-65) indicates an increase of 70 to 80 per-
cent in agricultural production.
production are to come largely from more intensive farming operations --
shifting of acreage from lower to higher valued crops and from increased
productivity of land, labor, and animals. The Satellites have no large
areas of uncultivated farm land that can be brought into production to
effect a sharp upward trend in production such as occurred in the USSR
during the past 7 years. A larger rate of growth has been planned for
the livestock sector than for the crop sector in all the Satellites
excepting Czechoslovakia and Hungary.*
The production goals for agricultural commodities in 1965 are
largely based on attaining or preserving self-sufficiency in supplies
of basic foods, while at the same time raising consumption levels of
quality foods; insuring a better supply of raw materials to industry;
* Because of the unfavorable situation currently prevailing in the
livestock sector as a result of collectivization drives in 1959 and
1960, a downward revision in the 1965 plan for production of livestock
may be forthcoming.
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and in some opuntries expanding exports. Furthermore, the planned
levels of productivity in agriculture (other than labor) appear to
have been highly influenced in Czechoslovakia and East Germany by
current levels of productivity in the more developed countries in
Western Europe, such as West Germany, while the agriculturally less
developed Satellites hope to achieve a level of productivity comparable
to current levels in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.
A. Production of Crops
The pattern of output is to continue the past trend of raising
the relative importance of industrial and fodder crops to food crops.
Large increases in yields are to account for the major share of planned
increases in production of crops by 1965. A lesser influence will be
that of expanding acreage because the possibilities for expanding the
sown area are very limited in each Satellite. Some shifting within the
present area sown to grains from oats and miscellaneous grains to corn
for silage and legumes is planned in the northern Satellites. Hungary
is the only Satellite that has planned a sizable reduction in the bread
grain area -- one-fifth below that of the 1954-58 average. The area
devoted to corn, however, is to increase in the same proportion. In
contrast, Rumania plans a small increase in the area sown to bread
grains and a drop in the harvested area of corn for grain. Increases
in the area devoted to oilseeds, sugar beets, and vegetables are
planned in most Satellites.
The planned yields per hectare in 1965 for major crops in five
Satellites are shown in Table 5.* Among these Satellites the planned
increase for 1965 in comparison with the average in 1955-59 for each
crop is very ambitious for Rumania and more modest for Poland and
Hungary. Generally the largest increases in yield are expected for
potatoes and industrial crops. In the northern Satellites the average
yields of these crops in 1955-59 were still below the prewar average.
Except for oilseeds, the planned yields for 1965 not only exceed pre-
war levels but represent an all-time high. In absolute terms, East
German agriculture in 1965 would still have the highest level of pro-
duction per unit of land among the Satellites. However, the spread
in yields between the least productive Satellite, Rumania, and the
most productive, East Germany, is planned to decrease.
Although plan data are incomplete, statements by officials
indicate that all the Satellites are expecting substantial increases
in production of corn silage and hay. For example, East Germany has
planned an increase of 94 percent in comparison with the average yield
in 1958-60 for green silage, and Poland has planned an increase of
* Table 5 follows on p. 12.
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Table 5
Yields of Selected Major Agricultural Commodities
in Selected European Satellites
Prewar, 1955-59, 1960, and 1965 Plan
Country and Commodity
Czechoslovakia
Quintals per Hectare
1965
as a Percent
1934-38 1955-59 1960 1965 of 1955-59
Average Average Preliminary Plan Average
Wheat 17.1 20.7 20.0 27.0 130
Rye 16.0 19.4 19.0 25.0 129
Barley 17.0 20.3 22.0 26.5 131
Corn 21.4 25.6 29.0 36.0 141
Potatoes 134.8 127.5 92.3 180.0 141
Sugar beets 285.8 259.0 347.0 327.4 126
Rape 14.7 13.5 14.0 N.A. N.A.
Milk b/ 2,004 2./ 1,718 1,785 2,350 137
East Germany
Grain 20.5 21.4 23.3 30.5 di 142
Potatoes 173.0 152.7 168.6 245.0 160
Sugar beets 291.0 257.4 289.4 385.0 150
Oilseeds 19.1 13.3 14.4 18.5 139
Milk bi 2,532 2i 2,535 2,646 , 2,942 116
Hungary
Bread grains 13.0 li 14.0 15:6 18.8 134
Barley 13.6 li 17.9 19.3 N.A. N.A.
Corn 18.7 li 22.4 24.0 29.2 130
Sunflower seed 9.5 f/ 11.4 11.1 13.0 114
Potatoes 68.7 li 104.8 109.1 130.4 124
Sugar beets 205.2 f 208.5 233.1 243.0 117
Milk bi 1,586 e 1,903 2,105 2,700 142
Poland
Grains 13.7 14.7 14.6 17.6 120
Potatoes 138.0 123.0 125.0 155.0 126
Sugar beets 265.0 196.0 250.0 260.0 133
Oilseeds 10.8 9.9 10.5 12.5 126
Milk bi 1,760 2./ 1,865 2,023 2,311 124
Rumania
Wheat 10.3 10.9 12.9 18.0 165
Corn 10.4 11.5 11.2 26.5 gi 230
Potatoes 87.3 84.6 82.1 150.0 177
Sugar beets 150.8 142.3 170.0 250.0 176
Sunflower seed 8.6 9.0 10.4 15.0 167
Milk b/ 812 !/ 905 1,102 1,534 170
a. Barn harvest unless otherwise indicated. (One hectare equals 2.471 acres; 1 metric quintal
[equivalent to a metric centner] equals 100 kilograms, or 220.46 pounds avoirdupois.)
b. Liters per cow.
C. 1937.
d. Biological yield, which should be reduced by at least 10 percent to be comparable, or a barn yield
of 27.4 quintals and a percentage increase of 128. Thus the percentage increase is overstated.
e. 1938.
f. 1931-40 average.
g. Midpoint of the planned range, 25 to 28 quintals per hectare.
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57 percent in production of forage crops above the levels in 1960.
Of the food crops, production of vegetables in 1965 compared with
that in 1958 is to be expanded the fastest in the southern Satellites,
as indicated by the following percentages: Czechoslovakia, 35; East
Germany, 11; Hungary, 51; Poland, 33; and Rumania, 106. Rumania once '
again stands out as setting the most optimistic goal of the five
Satellites.
B. Production of Livestock
Although the plans for 1965 call for an expansion of live-
stock herds, the larger share of the planned increase in livestock
products is to be derived from increased productivity per animal.
Rumania and Hungary, which are less developed agriculturally, have
planned for larger percentage increases in both livestock numbers
and livestock products than have East Germany, Poland, and Czecho-
slovakia. As shown in Table 6,* in both Rumania and Hungary the
number of livestock per 100 hectares of agricultural land was lOwer
in 1960 than in 1955, so that the planning of larger increases than
in the northern Satellites during the next 5 years is to be expected.
Czechoslovakia is the only Satellite that has planned a re-
duced number of hogs by 1965. All Satellites, however, expect a re-
duction in the number of horses because of the planned increase in
mechanical draft power. The reduction in horses will release feed
for other types of livestock. Data on livestock numbers and produc-
tion of livestock for selected years, including the 1965 plan, are
given in Table 3.** Rumania once again is the most ambitious planner
both in terms of the number of livestock and in productivity per
animal. Even though the productivity of livestock in Rumania is among
the lowest in the Satellites, past trends hardly justify the expecta-
tion of a doubling of production of milk and an increased production
of meat of more than 80 percent within 5 years.
The large increases planned in production of livestock prod-
ucts -- meat, milk, and eggs. -- in all the Satellites are to provide
for an improvement in the quality of the average diet and for an in-
crease in exports by Poland, Rumania, and Hungary. East Germany and
Czechoslovakia are striving to attain self-sufficiency in production
of meat by 1965.
To a certain extent the Satellite governments have less control
over production of livestock than over production of crops. Whereas,
except for Poland, 80 to 95 percent of the land has been socialized,
* Table 6 follows on p. 14.
** P. 8, above.
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Table 6
Numbers of Livestock per 100 Hectares of Agricultural Land
in Selected European Satellites 2/
1955, 1960, and 1965 Plan
Country and Livestock
1955
1960
1965 Plan
Czechoslovakia
Cattle
56.3
59.3
64.9
Hogs
72.4
80.6
74.5
East Germany
Cattle
58.4
72.9
78.0
Hogs
125.9
129.7
135.4
Hungary
Cattle
29.4
27.5
31.5 12/
Hogs
80.3
74.5
97.1 -121
Poland
Cattle
38.8
42.6
51.5
Hogs
53.4
61.8
76.0
Rumania
Cattle
47.9
45.2
58.0
Hogs
51.2
43.7
75.0
a. One hectare equals 2.471 acres.
b. Computed from the planned increase in the numoers of livestock
given as a percent of 1958.
most of the livestock are still privately owned. During the coming
years, emphasis will be placed on increasing the share of collectively
owned livestock in the total. Governments probably will be careful not
to force the private owner out of the livestock business too fast, be-
cause of the adverse effects such a move could have on production of
meat and milk. Czechoslovakia is the only Satellite that has openly
advocated elimination of the private plot of collective members as a
means of raising production of livestock on the collective farms, but
no deadline has been set for implementation.
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III. Planned Means of Achieving Production Goals
One important reason for the law rate of increase in agricultural
production in the Satellites has been the very limited and slaw appli-
cation of modern technology in farming. During the past 15 years,
most Western European countries have registered significant gains in
the productivity of labor and land by the use of improved farming
techniques. The most important of these factors have been mechaniza-
tion, fertilization, plant breeding, control of plant diseases and
pests, and management of grasslands. The current Satellite plans put
greater stress than in any previous period on the wider application of
new technology (except for mechanization) as a means of effecting an
acceleration in the growth of agricultural production.
Except for Poland, all of the Satellites have about completed
collectivization. With increased central control over farming opera-
tions, the governments should be able to introduce improved technology
much faster than previously. In addition to supplying the physical
inputs, however, the regimes must supply the trained agriculturalists
to teach new techniques to the farmers. The problem of keeping enough
trained agriculturalists in the countryside has been chronic for all of
the Satellite regimes. Improved housing, cultural centers, and higher
pay for trained personnel are expected to attract them to the villages
and collectives in the future.
The Polish government has introduced several laws to insure that
the increased technical means made available to agriculture are effec-
tively used. These laws are aimed at forcing the private farmers to
use new seed stock periodically, to use pesticides, and to use improved
breeds of livestock. A peasant's failure to comply with the law can
mean payment of a fine and/or confiscation of his property. The extent
to which the laws will be enforced is not predictable, but they do pro-
vide the government with a limited control mechanism that other Satel-
lites now have through extensive collectivization.
A. Investments
The Satellite regimes have planned a substantial increase in
agricultural investments for 1961-65 compared with 1956-60, ranging
from 58 percent in Czechoslovakia to 93 percent in East Germany, as
shown in Table 7.* Also, an increase in the share of the total in-
vestments allocated to agriculture is planned in East Germany, Poland,
and Hungary compared with the previous 5-year period (see Table 8**).
* Table 7 follows on p. 16.
** Table 8 follows on p. 17.
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Table 7
Gross Fixed Investments in Agriculture
in Selected European Satellites
1961-65 Plan Compared with 1956-60 Actual
Billion
Constant Currencies
1961-65
1956-60 1961-65 as a Percent
Country Actual Plan of 1956-60
Czechoslovakia (crowns)
East Germany (DME Lill)
Hungary (forints)
Poland (zlotys)
Rumania (lei)
27.1
5.5 22/
21.212/
49.5
12.1
42.8
10.6
38.0 sj
90.9
19.6
158
193
179
184
162 1/
a. Deutsche Mark East (East German marks).
b. Estimate.
c. Midpoint of the range of 37.0 billion to 39.0 billion.
d. The Six Year Plan (1960-65) called for a doubling of agricultural
investment above that of the period 1954-59.
The recent collectivization drives in East Germany and Hungary,
in 1959 and 1960, will result in the requirement for large expenditures
of state funds for mechanization and farm buildings. In addition, the
collectives will be expected to increase their expenditures for capital
improvements above previOus years. The major share of the planned
Polish investments are to come frbm private capital. Although there
has been a gradual increase since 1956 in private investments in Poland,
the projection of this trend until 1965 seems unrealistic because of
governmental pressures to tighten controls over private farming. In
Rumania the share of agriculture (13 percent) in the total state in-
vestments appears small relative to the importance of agriculture in the
economy and especially in relation to the ambitious goals set for agri-
cultural production in 1965.
In addition to the direct investments in agriculture, state
investments will increase to those industries supporting agriculture,
such as the chemical and agricultural machinery industries. The
Polish government claims that the total of direct and indirect in-
vestments planned for agriculture accounts for 20 percent of all in-
vestments. In Hungary the share could well exceed 20 percent if in-
direct investments are included.
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Table 8
Share of Agriculture in the Total Gross Fixed Investments
in Selected European Satellites
1956-60 and 1961-65 Plan
Percent
Country 1956-60
1961-65 Plan
Czechoslovakia
16.2
15.4
East Germany
9.0
9.5
Hungary
16.1
19.0
Poland
11.3
14.6
Rumania
14.3
13
The end use of the investments allocated to agriculture is
not given officially for every Satellite, nor, when the end use is
given, is it clear that statistics are comparable between Satellites.
However, as shown in Table 9 and based on physical inputs to be sup-
plied to agriculture during the next 5 years, mechanization, farm
buildings, and land improvements represent the order of priority.
Although investments for agricultural machinery will continue to re-
ceive a large share of investment funds, the percentage share for
farm buildings and land improvement has increased at the expense of
machinery.
Table 9
Planned Structure of Investment Outlays for Agriculture
in Selected European Satellites
1961-65
Percent
Agricultural Farm Land
Country Machinery Buildings Improvement
Czechoslovakia
East Germany a/
Poland
38.0
45.0
39
50.0
16.4
36
12.0
N.A.
18
a. 1959-65. Not including investment from state budget that
accounts for about 40 percent of the total investment for
agriculture.
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B. Mechanization
The Communist regimes have pushed the mechanization of agri-
culture since their takeover of eastern Europe. On the basis of in-
creased inventories of tractors, the regimes have been relatively
successful, as shown in Table 10. The Satellites most successful in
mechanization, East Germany and Czechoslovakia, also were the ones
most in need of mechanizing agricultural operations because of a de-
clining and aging agricultural labor force.
Table 10
Inventory of Tractors in Selected European Satellites
1950, 1955, 1960, and 1965 Plan
Units
Country
1950
1955
1960
' 1965 Plan
Czechoslovakia a
25,97912/
40,804
94,300
154,000
East Germany a
17,134 2/
48,308
72,170
131,535 sy
Hungary
12,708
23,645
40,000
62,500
Poland
28,411
48,342
62,450
135,000
Rumania
13,713
23,033
44,194
100,000
a. Units of 15 horsepower.
b. 1951.
c. Excluding privately owned tractors.
d. Computed by the addition of planned deliveries to agriculture,
1959-65. Obviously, depreciation will decrease the actual inventory,
but because the intention of this table is to show only general
magnitude, no estimate of or deduction for depreciation has been
made.
During the next 5 years, planned additions to the inventories
of tractors and other agricultural machinery will exceed any previous
5-year period. More emphasis is to be given to the supply of har-
vesting machinery (combines and root harvesters). Because past de-
liveries of the latter type of machinery have fallen far short of
planned goals, harvesting losses on those state farms and collectives
with a shortage of labor have increased.
To support the 1965 plan for agricultural machinery, increased
investments and priority have been allocated to the agricultural ma-
chinery industry in the respective Satellites. In addition, specializa-
tion of production as agreed on through the Council for Mutual Economic
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Assistance (CEMA) is expected to improve the quality of machinery and
production of spare parts.
There is no evidence to indicate that earlier mechanization
in the Satellites has had a favorable effect on raising productivity
per unit of land. It has, of course, raised labor productivity in
East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and the further mechanization planned
dnring the next 5 years for these countries probably will result in
further net gains. However, in a farm labor surplus country such as
Rumania, and to a somewhat lesser extent in Poland and Hungary, the
planned increases in mechanization will require large expenditures of
capital that could better be directed into inputs with a higher rate
of return, such as fertilizers, pesticides, and breeding stock. The
major advantage of mechanization to these latter countries will be to
replace animal draft power with tractors and thereby release feed for
other livestock. The number of horses may not decline as fast as ex-
pected, however, because of their importance in peasant transportation
and small plot farming.
C. Land Improvement
More attention in the current plans is to be given to land
reclamation and irrigation than previously. Whether plans can be
fulfilled is questionable, but at least larger sums of money have
been allocated, and collective farms may provide the mechanism for
obtaining the necessary work cadres. Poland, lacking a large
socialist sector, will continue to have difficulty in coordinating
plans for land improvement on a local level and in gaining the co-
operation of the private peasant labor force.
Poland and Rumania have planned the largest program for land
improvement and probably the most ambitious. Poland and Rumania,
however, also are the two Satellites that stand to gain the most from
land improvement. Poland has large areas in need of drainage and
flood control, while Rumania, which experiences marginal rainfall,
plans to irrigate some 800,000 hectares by 1965.
The area affected by land improvement work during the current
long-term plans for each
of the Satellites is as follows:
Thousand Hectares*
Drainage and
Country and Time Period
Flood Control
Irrigation
Total
Czechoslovakia (1961-65)
200
174
374
East Germany (1960-65)
N.A.
N.A.
420
Hungary (1959-65)
345
135
480
Poland (1961-65)
2,362
8
2,370
Rumania (1960-65)
1,000
800
1,800
* One hectare equals 2.471 acres.
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Although land improvement plans may not be fulfilled 100 percent,
even partial fulfillment will contribute to raising agricultural pro-
duction over the long run. Poland admits that most of the land im-
provement work to be done during 1961-65 will not bear resulte until
after 1965.
D. Farm Buildings
All the Satellites plan a step-up in the construction of farm
buildings during 1961-65. The previously low priority that agricul-
ture has had for construction materials, inadequate capital funds, and
lack of peasant incentive has restricted new construction on both col-
lective and private farms. Of the Satellites, Czechoslovakia has made
the greatest effort in meeting the need for new buildings. With the
increase in the number of collective farms during the past 2 years,
especially in Hungary, East Germany, and Rumania, a pressing need
exists for more livestock barns, machine sheds, silos, and other farm
buildings on the collectives.
If the plans of the Satellites to increase the numbers and
productivity of livestock on collective farms are to be successful, a
top priority must be placed on construction of livestock barns. The
lack of proper housing for livestock on collectives is one reason why
some Satellites have moved very slowly in their campaign to restrict
private ownership of livestock. The large share of agricultural in-
vestment allocated for farm buildings (largely livestock shelters) in
Czechoslovakia (see Table 9*) probably is related to the regime's
stated intention to reduce livestock holdings of collective members
on their personal plots.
There are two major reasons why the 1965 plan for farm build-
ings probably will not be fulfilled in most Satellites. First, con-
struction of farm buildings will be in direct competition with the
high-priority residential housing programs for limited supplies of
construction materials. Second, a large share of the investment for
farm buildings must come from the collective's indivisible fund, which
is insufficient in the majority of collectives to satisfy other invest-
ment requirements. In Poland the private peasant faced with the threat
of eventual collectivization is unlikely to spend funds for other than
residential housing and the repair of standing farm buildings.
* P. 17, above.
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E. Agricultural Chemicals and Seed Improvement
1. Fertilizers, Pesticides, and Herbicides
An important means of increasing crop yields, especially
grain, potatoes, and pastures, is by the use of more and better mineral
fertilizer. The planned percentage increases by 1965 in the avail-
ability of mineral fertilizer are largest for the less developed Satel-
lites, such as Hungary and Rumania (see Table 11). However, the planned
consumption per hectare for most Satellites in 1956 still falls. far
short of the level in East Germany and the developed countries of
Western Europe. In 1965, Rumania will still have the smallest input
of fertilizer per hectare of arable land of the five Satellites (see
Table 12*). The largest increases of mineral fertilizer are expected
in the use of nitrogenous and phosphatic types. In addition to ex-
panding the use of mineral fertilizer, better care and increased utili-
zation of manure are called for on collective farms.
Table 11
Availability of Mineral Fertilizer to Agriculture
in Selected European Satellites
1955, 1960, and 1965 Plan
Country
Index
(1955 = 100)
1955 1960 1965 Plan 1960 1965
Thousand Metric Tons 2/
Czechoslovakia 325.7 522.0 961.2 12/ 160 295
East Germany 768.0 962.0 1,378.0 2/ 125 179
Hungary 54.4 171.7 336.4 316 618
Poland 543.9 744.6 1,243.0 137 229
Rumania 10.7 62.0 500.0 579 4,673
a. In terms of nutrient content.
b. Based on the planned agricultural land of 7.2 million hectares and
on the consumption of 133.5 kilograms per hectare in 1965. (One hec-
tare equals 2.471 acres; 1 kilogram equals 2.205 pounds avoirdupois.)
c. 1965 Plan computed from kilograms per hectare of agricultural land.
* Table 12 follows on p. 22.
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Table 12
Consumption of Mineral Fertilizer per Hectare of Arable Land
in Selected European Satellites lai
1954/55, 1959/60, and 1965 Plan
Kilograms per Hectare 12/
Country
1954/55
1959/60
1965 Plan
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
Hungary
Poland
Rumania c/
_
44.6
113.2
10.1
35.3
1.1
69.4
148.2
31.8
48.6
6.3
133.5
212.0
62.3
80.0
50.0
a. Net weight. Agricultural land for Czechoslovakia and East Germany;
arable land for Hungary, Poland, and Rumania.
b. One hectare equals 2.471 acres; 1 kilogram equals 2.205 pounds
avoirdupois.
c. Computed from Table 11, p. 21, above.
Production and use of pesticides and herbicides in most of
the Satellites was largely neglected until about 1955, and the avail-
able supply was limited to the collective and state farms. Next to fer-
tilizers in importance for short-run results, more intensive use of
pesticides could give a boost to production of crops in most Satel-
lites. For example, in 1959 less than 10 percent of the sown area was
supplied with insecticides in Poland, but the 1965 plan calls for 70
percent of the sown area to be supplied. Gomulka, at the Sixth Plenum
in 1960, stated that conservative estimates placed tM annual loss to
crops caused by insects, diseases, and weeds at 9 to 30 percent. Even
though Satellite production of crop-protection chemicals may be stepped
up during the next 2 years, the problems of educating the farmers in
the proper application and of supplying the necessary equipment may de-
press the effectiveness of more intensive application.
2. Improvement of Seed
Satellite plans for 1965 call for increased production and
use of improved and new varieties of seed stock. State farms desig-
nated as the main suppliers of selected seed stock and private seed
producers have not been able to produce sufficient quantities, because
of the pressure to deliver grain, potatoes, and the like for consump-
tion. Agriculturalists in the northern Satellites attribute the law
yields of potatoes partly to the deterioration of planting stock.
Also, the major corn-producing Satellites -- Hungary and Rumania --
did not start using hybrids until about 1956. In Rumania, by 1960
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only about 25 percent of the corn area was planted to hybrid seed.
By the end of 1965 the entire corn area is to be planted with hybrid
seed. Through the agricultural committee of CEMA, specialization in
production of selected seed and improved varieties for export to other
Bloc countries is planned. Also, the exchange of information between
the agricultural research institutions may be of considerable benefit
to improving the use of better varieties of seed for certain crops. If
mechanization of field operations is to be successful, plants must be
grown that are adaptable to machine cultivation and harvesting.
F. Agricultural Labor
All of the plans, except for Poland's, presuppose a decline
in the agricultural labor force by 1965. In POland the agricultural
labor force is expected to remain rather stable until 1975, although
transfers among rural districts are envisioned. Czechoslovak and
East German complaints of shortages of agricultural labor have been
registered for several years. The shortage of labor has been further
aggravated by the rising average age of the agricultural worker in
both countries. Efforts to encourage the farm youth to stay in the
countryside have failed substantially, and it is doubtful if the migra-
tion can be arrested during the next 5 years.
The planned declines in agricultural employment are based on
the ,expected manpower savings to be derived from collectivization
and/or increased mechanization. One of the major problems of coun-
tries such as East Germany and Hungary, however, will be to keep the
decline in the agricultural labor force within planned limits. Unless
these countries can restrict the movement of skilled workers out of
agriculture, the production goals for 1965 will be even more difficult
to attain.
IV. Institutional Factors Affecting Production
A. Socialization
During the past 2 years (1959-60), collectivization drives
were waged in all the Satellites except Poland. Thus state and col-
lective farms* at the beginning of 1961 covered about 95 percent of
the agricultural land in East Germany and about 83 to 87 percent in
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania (see the chart**). By contrast,
Poland had only about 13 percent of its agricultural land in the
socialist sector.
* Except in Rumania the Satellite regimes use the word cooperative.
** Following p. 24.
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The Polish regime has maintained that complete agricultural
socialization is the final goal, but policy since late in 1956 has
been aimed at promoting more efficient farming in the private as well
as the socialist sector. Gomulka, while giving lip service to collec-
tive farming, has gone slow so as not to endanger the more important
short-term goal of raising agricultural output. Instead, agricultural
circles -- independent cooperative associations of peasants -- have
been promoted and now constitute the main institutional element in
Polish agricultural policy. The agricultural circles are to be used
in the Second Five Year Plan (1961-65) as the principal means of
channeling investment resources into agriculture and for enlightening
the peasants about the advantages of cooperative ventures in the hope
that collectivization eventually will be voluntarily accepted.
One effect of recent drives to complete the socialist trans-
formation of farming enterprises in the other Satellites, especially
in East Germany, Hungary, and Rumania, has been to increase sharply
the number of large farms. Before collectivization the average size
of a private farm was less than 10 hectares, but at the end of 1960
the average collective farm ranged from 280 hectares in East Germany
to 800 hectares in Rumania. This shift in size of farming enterprises
creates an immediate need for different types of farm machinery,
managerial personnel, farm buildings, and other facilities. None of
the Satellites was prepared to fill these needs immediately. There-
fore, the governments now face the problem of spreading limited in-
vestment funds and production inputs over a much larger agricultural
area and among a greater number of collective farms than previously.
In contrast to the period of collectivization, when the socialist
sector was given priority for the limited supplies of production in-
puts, the regimes now must decide within the socialist sector which
farms have the greatest need and/or ability to utilize efficiently
the available means of production.
Although socialization of farming enterprises is nearly com-
plete, two phases of collectivization remain to be completed during
the next 5 years, -- the amalgamation of collectives and the trans-
formation of. thelower forms of collectives to the higher or more
advanced type. The disruptive effect of these two phases to agri-
cultural production may be less severe than the initial collectivi-
zation drives, but the transition probably will not be smooth,
especially if it includes elimination of private plots as indicated
in Czechoslovakia.
The success or failure of the plans for agricultural produc-
tion in 1965, except in Poland, will depend for the first time almost
entirely on socialist farming. Government officials can no longer
use the private peasant and the small farm as reasons for failures in
agriculture.
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SELECTED EUROPEAN SATELLITES
Percentages of Total Agricultural Land
in State and Collective Farms,1956-61
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
December
1956
,
W
/
/
/
/
/
...
n \
/
,
/
/
/
/
t
? 6/
4/
)
4%
/
/
/
/
/
...0 .... ...? .. ..
....."
/
1
/
/
0%
Ge
APIA:t
????
.....- ????" 'noel
vwn.
/
..1
/
/
/
/
...-
---
.........
Poland
35322 8-61
December
1957
December
1958
December
1959
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1960 1961
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B. Other Institutional Factors
The trend toward less central control or direction over local
planning of agricultural production, greater flexibility in procure-
ment systems, and a declining role of the machine tractor station (MTS)
is expected to continue during the next 5 years. Czechoslovakia is
the only Satellite thus far to abolish the MTS as previously done in
the USSR. Most of the other countries are permitting collectives to
purchase agricultural machinery, but none plans an expansion of the MTS
network. It is currently of little political influence in the country-
side, and as the supply of farm machinery becomes more plentiful in
other Satellites, the MTS probably will be gradually relegated to the
role of a repair tractor station as in the USSR and Czechoslovakia.
In the future, more agricultural specialists and politically
reliable personnel will be attached to collectives and village Peoples
Councils. The local Peoples Councils are receiving more responsibility
for agricultural planning and procurement of agricultural products. De-
centralizing agricultural planning should have a favorable effect on
production unless local officials become overzealous in setting and
trying to achieve unrealistic output targets. In Poland, where the
large private farming sector predominates, the role of the Peoples
Councils is becoming extremely important in directing implementation
of national agricultural policy. It seems obvious that the village
Peoples Councils will be called on to insure that the agricultural
circles and private farmers are fully utilizing the means of produc-
tion made available by the government. The implementation of recent
laws dealing with productivity of farms, mentioned earlier, will be
largely the responsibility of the Peoples Councils. According to the
Polish Minister of Agriculture, M. Jagielski, "90 percent of the means
earmarked for agriculture during 1961-65 are managed by Peoples
Councils." The implementation of their increased powers by the Peoples
Councils must be conducted in a very slow and careful fashion, or the
adverse effect on peasant attitudes will be reflected in lower produc-
tion.
V. Prospects for Fulfillment of Agricultural Production Goals
A. General
The ambitious plans for agricultural production in 1965 in
the Satellites probably will not be achieved, but the growth of out-
put should exceed that of the period 1956-60, except possibly in
Poland. Hungary and Rumania, because of the relatively low level
of agricultural production in 1960, may show the largest percentage
increase in total agricultural production by 1965. Contrary to of-
ficial 1965 plans, it is estimated that most Satellites probably will
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increase output in the crop sector somewhat faster than in-the live-
stock sector.
The annual increases in agricultural production during 1961-65
should be larger near the end of the period. Benefits from increased
capacities of the fertilizer and agricultural machinery industries,
land improvement schemes, improved farming practices, and the like are
not expected to mature in most Satellites until 1963-65. The fact that
collectivization has been virtually completed, except in Poland, elimi-
nates an element of uncertainty that has depressed individual efforts
and prevented government agricultural policies from being based solely .
on economic needs. Nevertheless, institutional and other problems re-
main to be solved. The final organization of the collective farms has
not been completed. Neither have the wage systems, the role of private
plots, and the distribution of labor been determined. (Because of the
wide differences existing between Satellites in their stages of agri-
cultural development, their degrees of socialization, and their levels
of planned inputs, an evaluation of the prospects for agricultural
production for each Satellite in 1965 is discussed separately below.)
B. Czechoslovakia
Increases in the means of production, especially fertilizers,
and improvements in agricultural technology and farm price policy
should contribute to an increase in agricultural production in Czecho-
slovakia during the Third Five Year Plan (1961-65). It is unlikely,
however, that the increase will be large enough to fulfill the goal
for agricultural production in either 4 or 5 years.* As in other
Bloc countries, past agricultural production goals in Czechoslovakia,
both annual and quinquennial, have been unfulfilled. As shown in
Table 1,** even with an announced increase of 7 percent in 1960, pro-
duction fell far short of the Second Five Year Plan (1956-60). The
low rate of growth between 1955 and 1960 resulted in spite of in-
creased applications of fertilizer and other agricultural inputs.
The relatively poor performance has been due in part to the constant
organizational changes in agriculture caused by forced collectiviza-
tion, which should be less of an adverse factor in the future. Future
amalgamations of collectives, however, will have some disruptive effect
on the efficiency of operations of collective farms and on the incentives
of the members.
The value of gross agricultural production by 1965 probably
will increase about 15 percent above that in 1960 compared with an
* The Czechoslovak government has exhorted the farmers to fulfill
the Third Five Year Plan in 4 years.
** P. 6, above.
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estimated increase of 9 percent between 1955 and 1960. The develop-
ment in production of livestock probably will be less successful than
in production of crops. In 1955-59, production of crops trended down-
ward while production of livestock increased according to the follow-
ing index:
Year
Production of Crops
Production of Livestock
1955
100
100
1956
99
101
1957
95
110
1958
100
111
1959
95
115
1965 Plan
131
149
The past improvement in production of livestock has been facilitated
by expanding the domestic fodder base and by importing large quanti-
ties of feed grain. However, the position that the government now
takes with regard to private plots of collective members could be the
chief factor restricting production of livestOck during 1961-65.
Recently the Czechoslovak regime has been more outspoken on the "evils"
of the private plots than any other Bloc country, including the USSR.
A major effort to withdraw these holdings from the peasants would have
a detrimental effect on production of livestock. Also, planned in-
creases in livestock productivity are too optimistic in the light of
past performance and the probable shortfall in plans for production
of fodder crops. The Czechoslovak government, constantly complaining
about the high per unit cost of agricultural output, will not solve
this problem during the next few years.
C. East Germany
Adequacy of management and the responsiveness of farm labor
to full-scale socialized farming probably are the two most important
factors that will influence the effectiveness of increased physical
inputs and hence the rate of agricultural growth in East Germany dur-
ing the next 5 years. The economic impact of the full socialization
of agriculture -- attained in April of 1960 -- may not be fully noted
until 1961 or 1962, but the general decline of initiative and a
sluggish readjustment to planned work programs in agriculture usually
foreshadows a static or at best a minimum rate of growth. It is esti-
mated that the numerous economic adjustments in management and plan-
ning brought on by the work slowdowns and the movement of agricultural
labor to the cities will reduce the effectiveness of the planned
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investment programs and lessen the possibility for attaining the
planned rate of agricultural growth during 1961-65.
The expansion of mechanized farming operations is a key fac-
tor in the future agricultural development of East Germany and is
necessary in order to compensate for the loss of farm labor. Offi-
cials had stated that 1959 and 1960 would be the most critical years
for the development of the agricultural machinery industry, evidence
suggesting that the planned expansion of the industrial capacity has
undergone a downward adjustment. It is believed, therefore, that
the planned goal for 1959-65 to deliver a total of 74,360 tractors and
12,270 combines may not be fulfilled. A cutback in construction of
farm buildings also has occurred. These cutbacks, although not a major
deterrent to the short-run growth of agriculture, could affect the
ability of the collective sector to achieve expected efficiencies in
operation.
The more productive uses of funds in agriculture are found in
providing increased availability of fertilizers and insecticides and
in expanding programs of land reclamation, livestock breeding, and
farm education. It is estimated that the planned quantity of fer-
tilizers for 1965 can be produced. The expected increase in the avail-
ability of these inputs to the agricultural sector should be influen-
tial in raising the yields of selected crops. Inputs other than agri-
cultural chemicals, however, will have only a small effect on produc-
tivity in the short period of 5 years.
An evaluation of all factors influencing agricultural produc-
tion in East Germany suggests that the annual rate of growth through
1965 may exceed the average rate of 1.7 percent in 1956-60 but fall
short of the planned rate of 4.5 percent. Also, the estimated growth
during the first 2 years of the plan probably will be less than the
average.
Within the bounds of probable agricultural growth, it is esti-
mated that the livestock sector will increase more rapidly than that
of field crops. The present percentage relationship between the two
sectors of agriculture shows that livestock accounts for approximately
55 percent and crops 45 percent of the total gross output. The more
rapid rate of growth of the livestock branch is premised on (1) fuller
utilization and larger production of domestic feed supplies, (2) more
rigid control over breeding, (3) continuation of current price incen-
tives for livestock and livestock products, (4) the continued high im-
port level of feeds and feed concentrates, and (5) no restrictions on
the private ownership of livestock by collective members.
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D. Hungary
Agricultural production in Hungary during the Second Five Year
Plan (1961-65) is expected to increase but not by 19 percent as planned.
It is possible, however, that the average annual rate of increase will
exceed the 1.8 percent of the last decade. Although present long-term
plans for agricultural production are optimistic, especially in view
of the drag on production created by the rapid collectivization drives
of 1959 and 1960, it is believed that after 1962 the larger investment
program and the creation of a more disciplined management on collective
farms will permit a somewhat more efficient use of agricultural resources
than in the past. Larger farms also will permit a wider application of
improved agrotechniques.
Although evidence suggests that the agricultural labor force
will continue to decline, it is believed that manpower mobilization
plans sponsored by the government during the peak periods of agricul-
tural activity can solve the labor requirements of agriculture. It
is possible, moreover, that the farm labor shortage will be lessened
during the next 5 years by a rapid increase in mechanization. The
general long-term outlook for the agricultural sector in Hungary, there-
fore, is one of positive growth, particularly if the organizational changes
are accepted by the peasant and the government carries out its planned
investment program in agriculture. Cost per unit of output will re-
main high, however, and could increase over the next few years because
of inefficient management on the collective farms.
The gains in production probably will be greater for the live-
stock sector of agriculture than for crops compared with the past 5
years. In 1960 the percentage relationship of the two sectors of agri-
cultural production showed that the livestock sector accounted for
only 41 percent of the total gross output. The greater emphasis on
production of forage and fodder crops should permit an increase in
both the number and the productivity of livestock by 1965. Neverthe-
less, production of livestock products will not be sufficient to attain
planned levels of per capita consumption and/or to increase exports.
E. Poland
It seems unlikely that Poland will achieve the planned in-
crease of 22 percent in agricultural production during the Second
Five Year Plan (1961-65). Polish government officials have even ex-
pressed doubts about the feasibility of the plan. In spite of plans
to increase nonlabor inputs, the average annual rate of increase of
4.1 percent necessary to achieve the over-all increase in agricultural
production appears ?nrealistic in the light of past performance. It is
even doubtful that the estimated average annual rate of growth achieved
during 1956-60 of 3.2 percent can be maintained.
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A large share of the planned investment scheduled in support
of agriculture will not begin to have an effect on agricultural pro-
duction until the latter part of the Second Five Year Plan period, if
then. This is especially true for land improvement work, mechaniza-
tion, and increased use of fertilizers, which are dependent on im-
proved or new industrial capacity to provide increased production of
these inputs. Furthermore, assuming that planned production levels
of fertilizers, pesticides, and machinery are achieved, it is unlikely
that the peasant demand for these inputs would approach availability,
because of the present structure of farm ownership and the low level
of technology in Polish agriculture. State investment plans seem to
be aimed at providing a base -- agricultural machinery and chemical
industries -- necessary to support large-scale farming after 1965.
In contrast to the First Five Year Plan (1956-60), the current
Five Year Plan does not appear to be relying as much on added incen-
tives as a means of rapidly boosting agricultural production. For
example, at the beginning of the last Five Year Plan, prices paid for
farm produce were raised, compulsory deliveries were reduced, supplies
of industrial goods to rural areas were increased, and collectivization
was halted. The result was an immediate increase in agricultural pro-
duction, especially livestock, which continued through 1958. Then;
with no new incentives and unfavorable weather for some crops, produc-
tion tended to level off in the last 2 years of the plan. The govern-
ment hopes to reactivate the production reserves in agriculture during
the current Five Year Plan primarily through Improved farm management
(technology and education). A large potential exists for increasing
agricultural production through better farm management, such as in-
creased use of fertilizers, improved seeds, insecticides, high protein
feed mixtures, and the like, but their use requires additional expendi-
tures by the farmer. Although making the additional expenditures may
be profitable, convincing the average farmer of this may take many
years. There is no evidence that the Polish government, like Western
European governments, plans to subsidize costs of fertilizers, insec-
ticides, and the like as a means of expanding the use of these on a
large scale among private farmers. Any increase in yields of crops
expected from production inputs probably will be slight, and the ex-
pected results from education and new technology will require more
than 5 years.
It is difficult to see how production of livestock in Poland
can increase at a rate faster than or even as fast as during the last
Five Year Plan. Achieving the planned level of production for grain
and potatoes, essential for providing the fodder base required to sup-
port the planned numbers of cattle and hogs, is unlikely. Therefore,
production of livestock, currently at a peak postwar level, unless
supported by larger imports of feed concentrates than presently
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planned, will increase during 1961-65 at a much lower rate than dur-
ing 1956-60. In addition, better feeding practices, more and better
housing, better breeds, and disease controls are all essential to
achieving the planned increase in livestock productivity. However,
the technological improvements for production of livestock, like those
for crops, raise production costs and thus require additional finan-
cial incentives and mass education of the farmers. It seems improb-
able that both of the latter requirements can be provided on a scale
sufficient to give the results expected in the short period of 5 years.
The Polish government has admitted that the successful ful-
fillment of the current Five Year Plan for agriculture largely de-
pends on the expansion and influence of the agricultural circles in
the countryside. The agricultural circle is the organization through
which the government must work to increase mechanization, to expand
land reclamation, and to introduce and expand technological advances
in agriculture. However, as the government moves to gain control over
the Union of Agricultural Circles and to infiltrate the village circles
with Party people, the peasant will become more reluctant to join for
fear of the next step -- collectivization.
peasant suspicions were aroused when the government introduced
the agricultural development fund in 1959. Thus it is very likely
that the growth of the agricultural circles will be very slow in the
coming years, with a resultant adverse effect on achieving the planned
level of state investment and of technology in the private sector of
agriculture. This slow development could precipitate a showdown on
collectivization between the government and farmers by 1965.
F. Rumania
Rumania, next to Albania the least agriculturally productive
of the European Satellites, possesses resources favorable to the fur-
ther development of agriculture. In spite of this potential, however,
the goal of an increase of 70 to 80 percent in agricultural production
in 1965 compared with 1959 appears to be completely unrealistic in the
light of planned levels of inputs, the adverse effects of continued
collectivization, and the restricting effect that the low average annual
level of precipitation will still have on crop yields. Although more
than 80 percent of the agricultural land has been socialized and al-
though large expenditures on the means of production will be undertaken
to lessen the effects of adverse weather on production of crops, it is
not probable that these measures will be sufficient to permit a high
average annual rate of growth of 9.2 to 10.3 percent* compared with
* Albania is the only Bloc country that has a long-term plan calling
for an annual rate of growth (10.4 percent) of agricultural production
similar to that in the Rumanian plan.
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less than 1 percent during 1956-59. No other country is known to
have sustained such an annual rate of growth over a 5-year period.
It is believed to be possible that the rate of growth could average
as high as 4.2 percent during the Six Year Plan (1960-65) to give a
total increase in agricultural production of 28 percent above the
levels of 1959. This forecast of agricultural development in Rumania
represents the largest annual average rate of output for any of the
Satellites considered in this report. Indexes of estimated value of
gross agricultural production* in Rumania for 1965 and of actual pro-
duction for selected years are as follows:
Year 1959 = loo
1955 97
1956 80
1957 99
1958 85
1959 loo
1965 (estimate) 128
It is estimated that the increase in production of croPs probably will
exceed that of production of livestock during the plan period. This
large increase in production of crops is premised on achieving the
planned consumption of fertilizer, the increased use of hybrid corn
seed and new varieties of wheat, and the expansion of the area devoted
to industrial crops. In spite of an estimated increase in production
of fodder, the lack of improved livestock management practices needed
to utilize efficiently the increased availability of feed, the depres-
sive effect of transferring livestock from private to collective
ownership, and the fact that gains in production of livestock normally
lag behind increased availability of fodder by as much as 18 months
all support the estimate of a lower-rate of growth for production of
livestock than for production of crops.
VI. Availability of Food
All Satellite plans for 1965 call for an improvement in the quality
and variety of the diet. This improvement is to be accomplished by in-
creasing the per capita availability of animal products, fruits, and
vegetables (see Table 13**) accompanied by a slight decline in the
* Based on the methodology of the Food and Agricultural Organization
(FAO) of the UN and of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation
(OPEC) and based on 1952-56 price relationship to the production figures.
** Table 13 follows on p. 33.
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Table 13
Annual Per Capita Availability of Selected Foods
in the European Satellites 2j
1965 Plan
Country and Commodity
1965 Plan
(Kilograms Per Capita) 12/
Index
(1959 = 100)
Czechoslovakia
Meat 1/
65.0
2/
116
Fats and oils
22.5
111
Milk and milk products 21
247.0
126
Sugar
39.2
108
Vegetables
83.0
106
Eggs (number)
200.0
112
East Germany
Meat li
59.2
105
Milk
141.0
129
Butter
13.5
132
Eggs (number)
250.0
139
Fish
18.0
134
Hungary
Meat L./
52.0
114
Milk and milk products
182.0
127
Sugar
31.0
120
Eggs (number)
162.0
129
Flour
129.0
99
Poland
Meat g/
44.9
120
Milk and milk products z/
240.9
114
Sugar
35.0
125
Vegetables
110.0
159
Fruit
35.0
250
Eggs (number)
166.4
116
Flour
135.0
94
Rumania 12/
Meat
38.0
224
Milk
53.0
424
Sugar
16.0
219
Butter
2.4
200
a. Because the categories meat, milk, and milk and milk products are not defined in plan docu-
ments, comparison of data between countries is difficult. For the same reason, official data
were used for the base year rather than the estimates of this Office derived from food balances
that do not necessarily agree with official data.
b. One kilogram equals 2.205 pounds avoirdupois.
c. 1960 = 100.
d. Including beef, veal, mutton, goat, pork, game, and edible offal.
e. Excluding butter.
f. Including beef, veal, mutton, pork, poultry, and edible offal.
g. Including beef, veal, mutton, pork, and edible offal.
h. Consumption based on planned state sales of food. Because state sales are largely to the
nonagricultural population, the data do not represent the national per capita levels of con-
sumption, except for sugar.
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availability of cereals and potatoes. According to the plans for 1965,
the differences between Satellites in the average per capita consump-
tion of quality foods will not be as great as at present. Also, Czech-
oslovakia would replace East Germany as having the highest per capita
consumption of high-quality food.
Meeting the demand for meat and other animal products as the in-
come of workers increases has been, a growing problem for most Satel-
lites since the early 1950's. Because incomes of workers and peasants
are planned to increase during the next 5 years, the demand for quality
foods also will increase. Also, if the Satellites should convert the
work payments of collective members entirely to cash wages and/or re-
strict private ownership of livestock, another group of consumers will
compete in retail markets for the available supply of livestock prod-
ucts.
Because the increase in production of livestock products probably
will be less than planned, planned per capita consumption of meat and
milk for 1965 appear to be ambitious for all the Satellites, except
possibly for Poland. It is estimated that East Germany and Czechoslo-
vakia will have to increase rather than decrease imports of meat if
per capita consumption targets for 1965 are to be realized -- targets
nearly equal to the 1958/59 per capita consumption levels in France
and the UK.
The trade planned in agricultural products that would directly con-
tribute to improving diets is limited primarily to larger imports of
fruits and vegetables by the northern Satellites from the southern
Satellites as well as to imports of tropical products. The major
Satellite importers of grain -- Poland, East Germany, and Czecho-
slovakia -- are planning to maintain imports at the levels of 1959-60,
a necessary measure to support the planned increase in production of
livestock products. Over-all imports of food commodities by both East
Germany and Czechoslovakia are planned to decline. Nevertheless, to
prevent popular discontent, imports of food may have to be retained at
a level higher than that planned.
Planned exports of food products include livestock products by
Poland and Hungary, corn by Rumania, and sugar by all the Satellites.
Although quantities have not been stated, the value of agricultural
exports during the respective planning periods is to increase above
the base period. The pressure to earn foreign exchange by exporting
agricultural products will hold down increases in per capita consump-
tion of these products.
Although the various plans of the Satellites do not state self-
sufficiency as a goal, it is apparent that only a very small percentage
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of the food supplies will be derived from imports. Thus any improve-
ment in the quality of the diet is largely dependent on the achievement
of the goals for agricultural production in 1965. Because the goals
for commodity production are estimated to be too ambitious, the planned
per capita availability of quality foods probably will fall far short
of expectations. This shortfall could be more serious in the southern
Satellites, where the industrial worker's demand for livestock prod-
ucts already exceeds supply and where additions to the industrial
labor force may be, the largest during 1961-65.
An improvement can be expected in both the quality and the variety
of the average diet in the Satellites by 1965, but the periodic short-
ages of foods caused by fluctuations in production and faulty distribu-
tion will continue. During the early part of the period 1961-65, fur-
thermore, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, because of expected
production difficulties, may experience a slight drop in the per capita
availability of meat and fats compared with 1959/60 unless imports are
increased by the first two countries and unless exports are decreased
by Hungary.
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