CURRENT PROBLEMS OF SOVIET AGRICULTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01141A002100060001-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 29, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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192/ N? 94
CURRENT PROBLEMS OF SOVIET AGRICULTURE
July 1961
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED IN WHOLE OR
IN PART WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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NOTICE
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Washington 25, D. C.
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CURRENT PROBLEMS OF SOVIET AGRICULTURE
CIA/RR ER 61-34
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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FOREWORD
Agriculture continues to be one of the major domestic problems facing
Soviet leaders. In no other principal sector of the economy have produc-
tion plans been so consistently underfulfilled. In January 1961 a Com-
munist Party Plenum was held to discuss agricultural shortcomings. This
report discusses the Plenum and subsequent developments and their probable
impact on agricultural production:.
Long-run goals for the economy are to be published in the USSR on
30 July 1961 for internal discussion prior to the Party congress which
is to be held in October 1961. The material in this report should be
useful as background for the evaluation of such agricultural goals as
may be published.,
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CONTENTS
Summary . . ? 6a 0 ? 6 0 6 ...... 0 0 ? ? to 0
Page
I. Agricultural Situation in 1960 and Prospects
Through 1965 3
A 1954-58 Period 3
B. Lack of Progress Since 1958 3
C. January 1961 Party Plenum 5
D. Outlook for Crops and Livestock in 1961 6
E. Prospects Through 1965 7
II. Priority Position of Soviet Agriculture 9
,III. 1961 Reorganization of Agricultural Administration . 17
IV. An Examination of the Validity of Soviet Agricultural
Statistics 23
A. Agricultural Statistics and Statistical
Procedures 23
B. Reliability of Statistics on Agricultural
? Production 24
1. Statistical Manipulation and Falsification . ? 25
a. Dissolution of the Machine Tractor
Stations (MTS's) 26
b. Pressure on Officials and Farm Managers
to Maximize Production . . . . . 0 b 26
2. Nature of Statistical Falsification, 28
3. Extent of Statistical Manipulation and
Falsification 30
4. Quantification of Statistical Falsification . 32
Tables
1. Capital Investment in Soviet Agriculture; 1953-65 ^ ./ ' 10
2. Estimated Kolkhoz Capital Investment in 1959 . ? . ? 12
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CURRENT PROBLEMS OF SOVIET AGRICULTURE
Summary
In 1960, agricultural production in the USSR for the second consecu-
tive year remained at about the level of 1958, the base year of the Seven
Year Plan (1959-65). This performance is in sharp contrast to gross in-
dustrial production, which increased by 22 percent in the 2-year period
1959-60.
The lack of progress in agriculture in the past 2 years, in part,
can be attributed to the weather. Production in 1958 benefited from
unusually good weather, whereas drought affected a number of major agri-
cultural areas in 1959. In 1960 a number of weather factors -- excessive
winterkill, dust storms, and excessive rainfall during harvest in some
areas and drought in others -- combined to affect adversely production
of crops. Output of livestock products in 1960 decreased in comparison
with 1959 as a result of a late spring and reduced feed supplies from
the 1959 harvest. In part, the lack of progress has been caused by the
usual shortcomings of the agricultural sector -- inadequate investment,
as reflected in a shortage of critical machinery, spare parts, and min-
eral fertilizers; overcentralized direction; and inadequate material
incentives to the farmers.
Estimates of the present status and future prospects of Soviet agri-
culture are made more complicated by the apparent widespread falsifica-
tion of agricultural statistics at several administrative levels. Many
Soviet officials have recently been accused of manipulation of statistics
on agricultural production and procurement. For some commodities the
difference between reported and actual production appears to have been
very large.
The goal of the Seven Year Plan of a 70-percent increase in gross
agricultural output is unrealistic, and there is little likelihood of
the achievement of more than one-third of the planned increase. Agri-
culture will probably continue to act as a brake on the growth rate of
the Soviet economy as a whole.
At the Party Plenum in January 1961, several courses of action were
proposed to improve the agricultural situation. Highlighting these
courses of action were an extensive reorganization of agricultural admin-
istration and an apparent upgrading of the priorities given to agriculture
in the allocation of resources.
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During the remaining years of the Seven Year Plan period the amount
of capital that the state will invest in agriculture is to be increased
above that called for in the original plan directives, and emphasis is
to be placed on production of machinery and fertilizers, expansion of
irrigation, and rural electrification. At present, it is not clear
whether or not the total amount of capital already invested and cur-
rently planned to be invested in agriculture by both the state sector
and kolkhOzes during the remainder of the Seven Year Plan is larger
than originally planned.
? Some reductions have been made in the prices of machinery, fuel, and
spare parts purchased by kolkhozes; tax concessions have been made on
income received from production of livestock; and loan periods for ma-
chinery purchased from the machine tractor station's (MTS' s) have been
extended. The effect of all these measures should result in a savings
of about 1 billion rubles, which is to be used to increase wages as
well as investments.
The Ministry of Agriculture, which is now headed by M.A. Olishanskiy,
-a scientist who replaced V.V. Matskevich, has been reorganized and largely
reduced to a research and eXtension service charged with the direction of
agricultural research institutes and the publication of technical jour-
nals. Planning had been transferred earlier to Gopplan, USSR, and the
important functions of procurement, repair, and supply now repose in
newly created organizations. A preliminary appraisal of the reorganiza-
tion suggests that it will probably have little effect in stimulating
agricultural output.
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I. Agricultural Situation in 1960 and Prospects Through 1965
A. 1954-58 Period
Inheriting an agricultural economy which had become stagnant and
unable to provide the growing needs of a nation rapidly becoming indus-
trialized, Soviet leaders reacted vigorously to revitalize this important
sector of the economy after the death of Stalin in 1953. Under the aegis
of Khrushchev, who has continued to maintain a keen, personal interest in
agriculture, a number of measures, culminating with the dissolution of the
MTS's and the revision of the procurement system in 1958/ were implemented,
thus giving a temporary "new look" to Soviet agriculture. State invest-
ments were increased substantially, especially for expanding the sown
area, as epitomized by the new lands program whereby about 35 million
hectares* were added to the sown area.
The over-all effect of these measures brought about a dramatic
increase in agricultural production. In the 5-year period 1954-58, gross'
agricultural output increased by 35 percent in comparison with the pre-
vious 5-year period, and in 1958, a record crop year in the USSR, agri-
cultural output was about 50 percent greater than in 1953.
B. Lack of Progress Since 1958
The amazing progress achieved by Soviet agriculture in the 1954-58
period can be explained partly by the fact that with relatively small in-
vestments production responses were exaggerated because of the extremely
low level of output prevailing in 1953. However, after 2 years of the
Seven Year Plan, agricultural production in the USSR remains at about the
level of 1958, the base year of the plan period. Khrushchev at the Janu-
ary 1961 Party Plenum on Agriculture stated that industrial production
(that is, gross industrial production) during the,first 2 years of the
Seven Year Plan had increased by 22.1 percent, considerably higher than
the planned 17-percent increase. Although Khrushchev can point with con-
siderable pride to official data on industrial production, the relatively
poor performance in Soviet agriculture has had the effect of reducing the
growth rate achieved by the economy as a whole during the 2-year period.
In attempting to explain agriculture's lag behind the growing
demands of the population and its being out of step with industrial
growth, Khrushchev stated that "it should also be noted that the first
2 years of the Seven Year Plan were unfavorable for agriculture because
of the rather difficult climatic conditions." Khrushchev can rightly
* One hectare equals 2.471 acreas.
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tag weather as a major factor inhibiting the growth of agricultural out-
put during the 3-year period 1958-60. Weather in 1958 was unusually
favorable, and bumper harvests of most crops were gathered. The USSR
has referred to 1958 as the year of highest yields..
Weather during 1959 and 1960 was relatively unfavorable for agri-
cultural production and in sharp contrast to that in 1958. Spring arrived
early in 1959, but limited precipitation soon resulted in a shortage of
soil moisture in a number of areas. This shortage of moisture had an
adverse effect on production of crops and growth of pasture. Soviet
spokesmen describe 1959 as a year in which drought prevailed over a num-
ber of the major agricultural areas of the USSR.
Unlike 1959 a shortage of moisture was not the primary weather
factor restricting agricultural production in 1960. Winterkill during
the winter of 1959/60 and severe dust storms in southern European areas
of the USSR in March and April 1960 caused sufficient damage to necessi-
tate the reseeding of more than 8 million hectares of fall-sown grains
to spring crops, and undoubtedly the remaining acreage of fall-sown
grains was also damaged. Spring arrived late in 1960, thus prolonging '
?the period during which livestock had to be fed without pasture and
causing difficulties because of the limited supplies of feed from the dry
1959 crop season. The late spring delayed planting, but precipitation
associated with this weather augmented the supply of moisture in certain s
regions. In 1960 the area adversely affected by dry weather was confined
to parts of the Ukraine and the central region of the RSFSR. Cool, rainy
weather tended to delay further the development of the late-planted spring
wheat throughout much of the new lands area. Moreover, this weather re-
sulted in heavy weed infestation in the new lands area, and extensive
lodging of the spring wheat occurred.
Harvesting difficulties in 1960 were encountered in both the new
lands area and in the European part of the USSR. Beginning with an un-
usual cold spell during the latter half of August, cool, rainy weather
with occasional snow flurries was characteristic of the fall season in
the new lands area. This weather further complicated the harvesting of
the weed-infested, lodged grain. Moreover, some of the wheat ih the new
lands did not ripen until September, and ripening was uneven. In the
European part of the USSR the harvesting of late crops was made difficult
by abnormally heavy rainfall. In October, rainfall in the Ukraine, the
central black soil area of the RSFSR, and along the Volga was about
double the normal amount.
_
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, C. January 1961 Party Plenum
As revealed at the January 1961 Party Plenum in the USSR and in
the months following, a factor which should be taken into account in
evaluating official data on agricultural output in recent years is sta-
tistical malpractice by officials at practically all administrative
levels. "Ochkovtiratel'stvo" (eyewash) in the compilation of agricul-
tural statistics has apparently become almost standard procedure in the
USSR. Statistical falsification has probably increased in recent years
and has perhaps caused some difficulties in the operation of the economy,
particularly in the light and food industry sectors. Unusual distortions
in agricultural data seem to have begun in 1958 and to have become greatly
accentuated in 1959 and 1960. The extent of statistical falsification in
Soviet agricultural data cannot be quantified with confidence on the basis
of available information. However, the distortion in data on Soviet pro-
duction of grain in the past 2 years may have been about 25 percent. A
more detailed discussion of the problem of falsification in Soviet agri-
cultural data is contained in Section IV.*
In addition to initiating a widespread discussion of statistical
malpractices, the January 1961 Party Plenum on Agriculture proposed an
extensive reorganization of agricultural administration. This proposed
reorganization,, which was enacted into law by Party and governmental de-
crees in February 1961, was a reaction to the unsatisfactory agricultural
situation. Events in the months immediately preceding the Plenum suggest
that the organizational changes adopted were decided on at a rather late
date without thorough preparation. Unlike the December 1959 Plenum,
which was announced in June 1959, the announcement of the 1960 agricul-
tural Plenum was not made until a month and a half before the scheduled
date of 13 December. A prolonged Communist ideological conference and
Khrushchev's case of influenza reportedly were the causes of a postpone-
ment of the Plenum until 10 January 1961. In the interim, however, V.V.
Matskevich, Minister of Agriculture, USSR, was replaced by M.A. 01'shanskiy.
The Plenum was highly critical of the agricultural situation and proposed
far-reaching changes in agricultural administration. The reorganization
initiated at the Plenum is very extensive and is another of the series of
attempts on the part of the Soviet leadership to find a solution to their
agricultural problem through organizational change. This reorganization
of the administration of Soviet agriculture is being implemented at pre-
sent. A preliminary appraisal, based on published informationon the
roles and functions of the various components associated with agricul-
tural:administration, .strongly suggests that' the reorganization will have
little effect in stdimulati4pg a renewed increase in agricultural output-
*
3, below.
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A more detailed discussion of the reorganization of agricultural admin-
istration is presented in Section III.*
The proceedings at the January 1961 Plenum also revealed that
the priority to be given to Soviet agriculture in the allocation of
resources has probably been raised somewhat. The amount of capital
that the state will invest in agriculture during the remainder of the
Seven Year Plan period is to be increased above that called for in the
original plan directives. Khrushchev stated in his speech at the Plenum
that "we are now in a position to increase appreciably the capital in-
vestments envisaged by the Seven Year Plan for expanding agriculture as
well as those industries supplying agriculture." Mention is made of ad-
ditional capital investment being needed to build more plants manufactur-
ing chemical fertilizers and agricultural machines and of the increased
emphasis to be given to the expansion of irrigation facilities and rural
electrification. All of these are activities into which state capital
investments would be channeled.
The question as to whether or not the total amount of capital
already invested and currently planned to be invested in agriculture by
both sovkhozes and kolkhozes during the remainder of the plan period is
larger than that envisaged by the original directives of the Seven Year
Plan (1959-65) is still not clear. Some increase in state capital in-
vestment above that originally planned is necessary, for, in the past
year or so) the pace of conversion of kolkhozes into sovkhozes has been
accelerated, apparently to a higher rate than planned. Planned kolkhoz
investment must be contingent on planned kolkhoz income. The measures
adopted by the Plenum to give assistance to the kolkhozes are an indica-
tion of the financial plight of the kolkhozes. This assistance can also
be taken as an indication that the kolkhozes have probably fallen far
short of their capital investment plans. Thus the state could increase
its share of capital investment substantially to offset the shortfall in
collective farm investment before the total amount of investment in agri-
culture would exceed that originally planned. A more detailed discussion
of capital investment in Soviet agriculture is contained in Section II.**
D. Outlook for Crops and Livestock in 1961
Following 2 mediocre crop years, prospects for the output of
crops and livestock in the USSR in 1961 appear better than average at
present. An unusually mild winter and a favorable spring should assure
a good winter grain crop in European USSR. Prospects for spring grains,
* P. 17, below.
** P. 9, below.
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however, are still uncertain, particularly in the new lands area, where
soil moisture reserves are low and the critical summer months are still
to be weathered. Also, harvesting is a perennial problem in the new
lands because of the short time available and the generally poor weather
conditions under which the crops must be harvested.
Larger herds and better feed supplies from the 1960 harvest point
to a somewhat better year for the Soviet livestock industry than in 1960.
Although production of meat at state slaughterhouses during the first
quarter of 1961 was below that of the same period in 1960, better feed
supplies probably indicate greater herd buildups. In 1960, distress
slaughtering of livestock, which was brought on by feed shortages during
the first quarter, abnormally increased production of meat.'
E. Prospects Through 1965
Net agricultural production by 1965 in the USSR under normal
weather conditions, according to current analysis, will probably increase
by 20 to 25 percent in comparison with the 1958 level of output. This
increase is roughly one-third of the increase of 55 to 60 percent im-
plied in the Seven Year Plan* and implies for the 7-year period an an-
nual rate of growth of about 2.5 to 3 percent in terms of the 1958 base.
Because of the lack of progress in the first 2 years, the projected in-
crease in agricultural output must take place in the remaining 5 years.
Thus, in relation to 1960, the net agricultural production will have to
increase by about one-fourth, or at an annual rate of almost 5 percent.
Even so, this rate is somewhat less than the planned rate of increase in
industrial production, and as a result the dampening effect of agricul-
ture on the growth rate of the Soviet economy as a whole Will continue
throughout the plan period.
The effects of much of the increased state capital investment
are not expected to yield results in the form of increases in agricul-
tural production for several years, or almost until the end of the plan
period. Increasing manufacturing capacity for agricultural machinery
and agricultural chemicals, as well as the expansion of irrigation net-
works and construction of facilities for rural electrification, are all
time-consuming undertakings. Thus, annual rates of increase in agricul-
tural production are expected to increase as the plan period progresses.
Moreover, a continuation of a rather high priority is expected to result
in a relatively rapid rate of increase in agricultural production being
maintained through 1966.
* The goal for the Seven Year Plan calls for an increase of 70 percent
in gross agricultural output, which is equivalent to an increase of 55 to
60 percent in net agricultural output.
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II. Priority Position of Soviet Agriculture
At the January 1961 Central Committee Plenum in the USSR, Khrushchev
advocated raising the economic status of the Soviet consumer to correct
the growing imbalance between producer and conslumer goods and to contain
suppressed inflation. Implying that the productivity of capital inputs
in heavy industry ma,s exceeding initial expectations, he stated, "We
are now in a pbsition to increase seriously capital for expanding agri-
culture and those industries which supply agriculture." The plenum
resolution stated that this increased capital would be in addition to
that originally planned for the Seven Year Plan period but did not quote
any figures -- the central committee and council of ministers were in-
structed to work this out. According to a TABS home service broadcast
on 21 February 1961, additional financial resources amounting to 15 bil-
lion to 20 billion rubles* will become available during the Seven Year
Plan period, a large share of which will be invested in agriculture.
These vague statements hardly provide a basis for a meaningful
analysis of agricultural investment. Furthermore, the above remarks
apparently pertain only to state investment. Because of the recent
trend toward building up the state agricultural sector at the expense
of the kolkhoz sector, the available data reflect the effect of recent
institutional changes, as well as possible actual changes in amounts of
investment. This trend in the expansion of the state sector, which was
not provided for in the original directives of the Seven Year Plan, has
generated a need for additional state investment in agriculture. In
1960, for example, the sown area in the state sector increased by 25
percent, primarily as a result of the conversion of kolkhozes into
sovkhozes. To match this transition, state investment in agriculture
in 1960 increased by 20 percent to 2.4 billion rubles, a figure well
above the annual average of 2.1 billion rubles planned in the:soriginal
directives of the Seven Year Plan, as shown in Table 1.** The 1961
plan for state investment was revised upward to 2.7 billion rubles in
December 1960, but, in view of the rapid pace of conversion in the
first few months of 1961, this amount probably will not be sufficient
to cover the needs of the expanding sovkhoz system. If the state sec-
tor in agriculture continues to expand its sown acreage through 1965
* Ruble values throughout this report are given in prices of 1 July
1955 adjusted to the new 1961 rate of exchange. This rate of exchange
may be converted to US dollars at a rate of 0.90 rubles to US $1.
** Table 1 follows 5/1a p. 10.
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Table .1
,Capital Investment in Soviet Agriculture 21
1953-65
Billion Rubles 121
Year
State
Kolkhoz
Total 21
1953
0.9
1.2
2.1
1954
1.5
1.4
2.9
1955
2.0
2.1
4.1
1956
2.1
2.2
4.3
1957.
2.4
2.2
4.6
1958
2.3
2.8
5.1
1959
2.0
3.5
5.5
1960
2.4
3.2
5.6
Revised 1961 Plan
2.7 2./
Original 1959-65
Plan (total)
15.0
34.5
49.5
Original 1959-65
Plan (annual
average)
2.1
4.9?
7.0
. -
a. The figures exclude outlays for "establishment of herds." The
kolkhoz investment figures elude outlays for capital repairs, and it
is believed that the state investment figures also exclude such out-
lays.
b. In prices of 1 July 1955 adjusted to the new 1961 rate of exchange.
This rate of exchange may be converted to US dollars at a rate of 0.90
.
rubles to US $1.
c. The figures exclude outlays for tractors and agricultural machinery
which formerly belonged to the MTS system. It is believed that the
figures also exclude purchases of livestock.
d. Although the USSR adds the state and kolkhoz series to arrive at
total agricultural investment, the two series are not compatible.
State investment figures exclude outlays for housing and cultural con-
struction, but kolkhoz investment figures include such outlays'. Fur-
thermore, it is believed that state investment excludes outlays for
forest planting but that kolkhoz investment Includes such outlays.
e. An increase of 12.8 percent in comparison with 1960.
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at the same rate as in 1960* and if state investment per hectare is
merely held at the 1959 level, state investment in agriculture will
reach 22.4 billion rubles during the Seven Year Plan period, or 7.4
billion rubles more than planned in the original directives of the
Seven, Year Plan (see Table 1**).
The analysis of kolkhoz investment is complicated by the fact that,
unlike state investment, it cannot be realistically planned. Kolkhoz
investment is financed largely from kolkhoz income, as shown in
Table 2.xxx Kolkhoz income, in turn, is highly dependent on the weather,
price levels, and other factors. In 1958, for example, the collective
farms set aside more than 3 billion rubles in capital (to the indivisible
fund) in contrast to a "plan" of 2.5 billion rubles. A combination of
factors produced this sizable discrepancy. As a result of excellent
weather conditions during the growing season and an increase in the
level of procurement prices, kolkhoz income rose sharply in 1958. More-
over, the percentage of kolkhoz income set aside for the indivisible
fund was increased in 1958. Long-term state credits are available to
the kolkhozes butlbecause the loans must be repaid, investments from
these credits, at least in the long run, are also functionally dependent
on savings from income. The "flexible" procurement price system, effec-
tive 1 January 1958, was advertised as a means of eliminating year-to-
year fluctuations in kolkhoz income. An examination of the Soviet pro-
curement price index for the years 1958 (a bumper crop year) and 1959
(a mediocre crop year), however, reveals little if any flexibility, in-
dicating that the burden of risk has not been shifted from the kolkhoz
to the state.
This burden was especially heavy in the mediocre crop years of 1959
and 1960, leaving many koikhozes in poor financial condition. A large
Investment load had been shifted from the state sector to the kolkhozes
because of the 1958 MTS reform. In March 1958, Khrushchev -- with his
usual cavalier approach to economic calculations -- stated that the
leading collectives would be able to pay for MTS equipment and facili-
ties in 1 or 2 years, average collectives in 2 or 3 years, and poor
collectives in 5 years. Now, 3 years later, the state has found it
necessary to extend these payments for an additional 5 to 10 years.
* This increase could be accomplished without expanding total sown
acreage beyond the 1959 level and without reducing private sown acreage.
Thus, by 1965, sown acreage in the state sector would equal the 1959
sown acreage in the kolkhoz sector. Conversely, by 1965, sown acreage
in the kolkhoz sector would equal the 1959 sown acreage in the state
sector.
** P. 10, above.
*** Table 2 follows on p. 12.
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Table 2
Estimated Koikhoz Capital Investment in 1959
Million Rubles 2../
Investment account in Gosbank, 1 January 1959
466
Deducted from income for the indivisible fund
3,325
"Other kolkhoz means"12/
600
Long-term state credits
531
Available forinvestment
4/922
Investment account in Gosbank, 31 December 1959
-325
Invested in 1959
4,597
Invested in 1959, excluding outlays for livestock and MTS.
tractors and agricultural machinery _s/
-3,527
Outlays for livestock and MTS tractors and agricultural
machinery 1,070
a. In prices of 1 July 1955 adjusted to the new 1961 rate of exchange.
This rate of exchange may be converted to US dollars at a rate of 0.90
rUb1e0 to US $1.
b. Probably the Social-Cultural Fund.
c. See footnote c, Table 1, p. 10, above.
The share of kolkhoz income set aside for the indivisible fund,
which had been ranging from 16 to 18 percent since 1950, was jumped to
23 percent in 1958 and to 24 percent in 1959 and 1960. In spite of
these increases in the rate of current capital accumulation, kolkhoz
investment outlays (including outlays for livestock and MTS tractors
and agricultural machinery) were so heavy that, by the end of 1959,
the kolkhoz investment reserves (per unit of sown area) had fallen to
50 percent of the 1956-57 level.. Although investment reserve figures
for the end of 1960 are not available, investments per hectare remained
heavy in 1960, and qualitative information suggests that the financial
condition of the kolkhozes did not improve.
Since the beginning of 1961 the regime has introduced a series of
measures designed to alleviate the poor financial condition of the
kolkhozes. Effective 1 February, the price of gasoline and spare parts
sold to collective farms was reduced 40 percent, that of trucks an
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average of 17 percent, and that of tractors 9 percent. In addition to
these price reductions, there is to be an 80-percent reduction in the
tax on incomes derived from animal husbandry during 1961-65. Also,
interest on long-term state credits is to be lowered. It is estimated
that these measures will add about 1 billion rubles annually to kolkhoz
income. Theoretically, 24 percent of this income, or a quarter of a
billion rubles, will be set aside annually for investment purposes, an
insignificant addition to the total sum normally available for kolkhoz
investment (see Table 2*).
In March 1960 the plan for production of agricultural machinery
(including combines but excluding tractors) in 1960 was raised by about
20 percent. In May 1960 the goals for the delivery of tractors and
grain combines to agriculture during the period 1959-65 were raised by
30 percent and 35 percent) respectively. In December 1960 the plan for
the delivery of tractors during 1959-65 was raised another 12 percent,
and the plan for the delivery of grain combines was raised another 13
percent.** The latest plan for production of agricultural machinery in
1961 calls for a 24-percent increase in comparison with the 1960 level.
These recently revised plans for the production and delivery of
tractors and other machinery to agriculture reflect an increase in the
priority of agriculture. This increase, however, is apparently from a
modest base. The original goal of the Seven Year Plan for the produc-
tion of agricultural machinery in 1960 was well below the 1956 level.
Even the new 1961 plan for agricultural machinery is below the peak
1957 level of output. The original goals of the Seven Year Plan for
the delivery of tractors also appear to have been unambitious in rela-
tion to the deliveries made during 1954-58.
Plans for rural electrification for 1959-65 have been raised a sub-
stantial 30 percent above the original goals of the Seven Year Plan.
In summary, Khrushchev's thesis on the Seven Year Plan was delivered
while the USSR was riding the crest of the 1958 bumper harvest, and,
like Malenkov before him, he evidently believed that the Soviet grain
problem was solved. The luxury of regional specialization was to be
indulged in -- many republics were to be relieved of the obligation to
deliver grain to the state in order to permit them to concentrate on the
* P. 12, above.
** In September 1960 the name of the large, unfinished PavlonFir Com-
bine Plant was changed to the Pavlodar Refrigerator and Compressor
Plant. At the January 1961 plenum, Kazakh Party First Secretary
Kunayev indicated that Khrushchev had advised him to change the name
of the plant back to the original name and to plan to produce com-
bines.
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production of such commodities as meat, milk, fruit, and cotton. In
contrast to both the past 7-year record and the abandoned SiXth Five
Year Plan (1956-60), the Seven Year Plan was to concentrate investment
in labor-saving equipment rather than in machinery for the production
of grain. The major share of investment during this period was to
originate from collective farm funds, and intercollective enterprises
were to handle the bulk of the kolkhoz construction work, including
rural electrification and irrigation networks which previously had
been built with state resources.
Grain growing and harvesting conditions in 1959 and 1960 were much
less favorable than in 1958, however, and the planning climate has
changed accordingly. Every republic, whether it can grow grain profit-
ably or not, must now deliver grain to the state, and thus the program
for regional specialization, although not abandoned, may be delayed.
In the next few years, 8 million additional hectares of new land are
to be brought under the plow. Machinery for the production of grain
Again is to receive priority.
The direct approach to the problem of underdeveloped kolkhozes is
being applied -- after 2 years of relative inactivity (1958 and 1959),
poor kolkhozes are again being converted into sovkhozes. This recent
unplanned growth of the sovkhoz system has, in itself, dictated heavier
expenditures of state capital. Furthermore, because kolkhoz income
(per household) and, consequently, intercollective funds have failed
to grow, the state must increase its investment in rural electrifica-
tion and irrigation. Therefore, on the basis of the meager financial
investment information available, it is not possible to determine
whether the priority of all socialized agriculture or merely the pri-
ority of state agriculture has been raised.
Revised plans for allocation of equipment and rural electrifica-
tion, on the other hand, reflect an increase in the priority of all
socialized agriculture. In regard to allocation of equipment, how-
ever, the original goals of the Seven Year Plan were modest in rela-
tion to the allocations made during 1954-58, and thus the revision
represents a reassessment of the inputs required by agriculture to
overcome the lack of progress thus far in the Seven Year Plan. Khru-
shchev has characterized his revised program as "compensation for lost
opportunities."
Khrushchev's remarks at the January 1961 Plenum imply that much of
the additional investment earmarked for agriculture will be long range
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in nature (irrigation, electrification, and chemical facilities) but
that in the short run the regime will continue to place primary reliance
on organization and leadership. After discussing investment plans, Khru-
shchev added, "I have been speaking of long-range questions. Now to
the next 2 to 3 years ,.." Then he launched into a description of his
proposed reorganization of agriculture.
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III. .1961 Reorganization of Agricultural Administration
Following the lines of Khrushchev's proposal) the Communist Party
and the Soviet government issued a series of resolutions in the first
quarter of 1961 Which radically changed the administration of Soviet
agriculture. The Ministry of Agriculture) USSR -- already weakened
by the loss of its planning responsibilities in 1955) the abolition of
its MTS system in 1958, and the loss of its supply function in 1960 --
wati divested of administration of state and collective farms and forestry
and control over state purchases of agricultural products and repair of
agricultural machinery. These functions have been scattered among
several government organizations (Cosplan, USSR, the republic Councils
of Ministers0'a new Soviet Agricultural Machinery and Supply Association,
and a new Soviet State Committee for Agricultural Procurement) leaving
no clear delineation of primary administrative responsibility. As a
confused agricultural inspector from Stalingrad Oblast asked recently)
"Just Who will direct agriculture?"
The materials dealing with the reorganization do not provide an
obvious answer to this question, and the answer will probably not be-
come apparent until the readjustment has been completed.* Furthermore)
there is evidence of resistance and apathy toward the reorganization at
both the republic and local levels) a condition which should prolong
the confusion.
Resistance to the reorganization apparently also existed at the
center. In a Pravda article, dated 11 December 1960) Belorussian
Party First Secretary Mazurov asked that the Ministry of Agriculture,
USSR, be strengthened by reinstating its lost responsibilities for
planning and supply, thus taking a position directly opposite to that
stated publicly by Khrushchev a month later. Because Mazurov is a
candidate member of the ruling Party presidium, it does not seem likely
that his statement stemmed fram ignorance. The postponement of the
Plenum from Mid-December to mid-January may have been motivated by the
need to bring such resistance into line and to prevent a repetition of
the December 1959 Plenum, which ended its consideration of new organize-
tiona?orms in a deadlock. This analysis is strengthened by the fact
that Matskevich: who rocked the boat of monolithic unity at the December
1959 Plenum, was conveniently placed out of the way between mid-December
and mid-January by being relieved of his duties as Minister of. Agriculture.
* As an initial estimate, it appears that the new produrement committee
will be the most influential and responsible of the several government
agricultural organizations. The relative strength of these organiza-
tions is discussed below.
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The fragmentatiin of government administration resulting from the
reorganization will apparently weaken the position of the governmental
managerial class and enhance the position of the Party in agricultural
administration. Party administration may compromise agricultural
progress, for the main characteristics of the Seven Year Plan for
agriculture -- regional crop specialization, intensification, and in-
creased labor productivity -- appear to call for greater dependence on
deliberate managerial decisions and the recommendations of specialists,
in contrast to the new lands and corn programs, which relied to a large
extent on the agitatorial talents provided by a strong Party organiza-
tion. Although in recent months the. Party has embraced the cause of the
agricultural specialist, apparently this move has been twisted around
to the point where Party leaders will be among the "specialists." All
Party workers, at least in the Ukraine, down to the rayon level must
now attend seminars for specialists. And, of course, Khrushchev fancies
himself to be the top specialist on Soviet agriculture.
The Party will apparently administer agriculture primarily through
the new State Committee for Agricultural Procurement of the USSR, whose
local inspectorates are to be staffed by "politically mature" and ex-
perienced people. Although other organizations have been vested with
certain administrative responsibilities, this committee, headed by
Nikolay Ignatov, appears to be the most influential and responsible
fragment of the divided government administration.' Ignatov, a full
member of the ruling Party presidum, has handled the Party's day-to-
day. responsibilities in agriculture almost continuously since 1957.*
The charter of the committee for procurement gives it wide powers
beyond the mere control over procurements. Procurement inspectors
(each assigned to a group of from three to seven kolkhozes and sovkhozes)
are empowered to participate in the planning of farm production, to
check on the implementation of such plans, and to report instances of
noncompliance through the procurement and local Party and government
channels. These inspectors also have the power to limit or stop loans
and cash advances to farms which do not live up to their obligations.
Permanent advisory councils of farm managers will be attached to the
local inspectorates, presumably to enhance the democratic facade of the
new arrangement.
To balance these powers, a heavy load of responsibility has been
allotted to the committee for procurement.' Procurement goals for the
* Following the lead of the Soviet committee for procurement, responsible
Party chiefs have been placed at the head of several republic procurement
ministries.
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next few years have been increased steeply, and because the wages of
the procurement inspectors are tied to the level of procurements, pro-
curement workers will be under extreme pressure to meet these goals.
At the same time, these inspectors have been enjoined not to hurt the
farm economy by procuring too much. Such incompatible conditions place
the committee for procurement in an ideal scapegoat position and may
force procurement workers to again resort to the falsification of ac-
counts, in spite of the recent laws establishing severe penalties for
those caught engaging in this historical procedure.
The new Soviet Agricultural Machinery and Supply Association will
provide the collective and state farms with machinery, spare parts,
fertilizer, and other needs and will be responsible for the repair
and testing of agricultural machinery. Thus the association will
handle some of the functions of the former MTS system, and, appro-
priately, the former MTS chief, Pavel Kuchumov, has been appointed
chairman of the association. Although the charter of this organiza-
tion does not specify any wide administrative powers, the supply
association -- acting as a middleman between industry and the farms --
could develop considerable influence over the direction of agriculture
through regulation of a priority system of supply and repair. Like the
committee for procurement, the association will also have an advisory
council of farm managers to give it a semblance of democratic leader-
ship. In addition, the republic supply associations will have juris-
diction over kolkhoz and sovkhoz construction and electrification work
and thus will probably supervise the intercollective farm construction
enterprises) which hitherto had not been tied into the government ad-
ministrative bureaucracy.
Gosplan? USSR (as a staff of the Council of Ministers, USSR), having
been commissioned to "handle problems of state farm production," appar-
ently will direct the administration of the sovkhozes through the re-
public Councils of Ministers. At the republic level, there are Chief
Directorates of State Farms attached to most of the republic Councils
of Ministers.* Gosplan, USSR, has also been vested with some responsi-
bilities for forestry, land use, irrigation projects', and the "analysis
of implementation of current agricultural production plans and of the
financial affairs of state and collective farms and the preparation
of recommendations concerning these subjects." Inasmuch as both Gas-
plan, USSR, and the State Committee for Agricultural Procurement of the
* There are exceptions. The RSFSR has a Ministry of State Farms
attached to the Council of Ministers, RSFSR. Tselina Kray in northern
Kazakhstan has a Chief Directorate of State Farms attached to the Kray
Executive Committee. The remainder of Kazakhstan has a Chief Directorate
of State Farms attached to the Kazakh Council of Ministers.
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USSR will be involved in farm planning and administration, it is likely
that there will be jurisdictional conflicts.
The Ministry of Agriculture, USSR -- stripped of its responsibili-
ties for planning, procurement, supply, and repair -- retains no eco-
nomic levers with which it can effectively exercise administrative
control over Soviet agriculture. Aside from its jurisdiction over
intermediate and higher agricultural education establishments, the
ministry has been reduced to a research and extension service charged
with the direction of agricultural research institutes and the publica-
tion of technical journals.
M.A. 01'shanskiy, a protege of T.D. Lysenko, has succeeded Matskevich
as Minister of Agriculture, USSR, and almost all the republic Ministers
of Agriculture have been replaced by members of the Lenin Academy of
:Agricultural Science and its affiliates. Matskevich -- chosen as the
most recent scapegoat for the poor performance of Soviet agriculture
in recent years, particularly in the new lands -- is now, ironically,
Chairman of the Tselina Kray Executive Committee, located in the new
lands area.
At the local level the Ministry of Agriculture is to establish model
farms in almost every rayon to demonstrate good farming practices. The
Rayon Agricultural Inspectorates, formerly the basic administrative
unit in the ministry, are being abolished, and the specialists formerly
employed by the inspectorates are being sent to rayon model farms and
to local procurement agencies. Sovkhozes and kolkhozes, according to
Khrushchev, will pay for the consultant services of these specialists.
Like both the committee for procurement and the supply association, the
model farms will also have an advisory council of farm managers and
leading farm workers. Apparently, farm management personnel will devote
a great deal of their time to attending Meetings.
Although the press during the last 2 years has carried much comment
on needed changes in the organization of agriculture, the January re-
organization did not resolve the major institutional issue involved
and thus appears to be the arbitrary result of a last-minute compromise.
The major instituional issue, debated at the December 1959 Plenum and
kept alive at the June 1960 all.-union conference of agricultural spe-
cialists, was whether to establish kolkhoz unions to replace the Ministry
of Agriculture in the administration of collective farms or whether to
strengthen the authority of the Ministry of Agriculture. Sidestepping
the issue, the reorganization weakened the authority of the ministry
but did not establish kolkhoz unions. Last-minute resistance to the
reorganization at both the center and local levels, a condition dis-
cussed earlier in this section, also reflects the arbitrary nature of
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the move. In addition, the transfer of material and technical supply
functions from the ministry to Gosplan and then to the new Agricultural
Machinery and Supply Association, all in the short span of 10 months,
suggests vacillation and snap judgment rather than an orderly, evolu-
tionary process.
In summary, the reorganization appears to have been hastily con-
ceived and may merely add to the long list of unsolved problems which
plague Soviet agriculture. Although it may be argued that in some re-
spects the present organization is an improvement in comparison with
the 1960 organization)* other alternatives might have proved more effec-
tive. For example, an organizational form which placed greater reliance
on the decision of managers and specialists, although imperfect under
the present set of crude incentives for local decision making) would
be better than the current emphasis on the leadership of Party officials.
The majority of the Party officials, up to and including Khrushchev,
know little of what can be accomplished on the farm. Furthermore,
Khrushchev has placed both Party and procurement officials in an in-
tolerable position by insisting that they adopt unrealistic pledges
and then making it clear that their careers depend on meeting these
pledges. Thus many local officials will again be tempted to speculate
with the farm resources at their disposal and/or to condone the falsifi-
cation of records, in spite of the additional hazards recently attached
to such procedures.
* Soviet planners, for example, argue that procurement and supply
have now been centralized, thus avoiding duplication and confusion.
In answer to this argument, it is evident that the present administra-
tion of agriculture invites jurisdictional conflict and confusion. In
the Turkmen Republic, there are seven separate government organizations
currently involved in agricultural administration, including no fewer
than three organizations (the Ministry of Water Economy, the Chief
Directorate for Land Reclamation and Construction of Virgin Land State
Farms, and the Chief Directorate for State Farms) directly engaged in
irrigation work on state farm.
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IV. An Examination of the Validity of Soviet Agricultural Statistics
A. Agricultural Statistics and Statistical Procedures
Agricultural statistics in the USSR are used to exercise con-
trol over the production of basic products in the quantities which are
needed for supplying cities and industrial centers, for foreign trade,
and for the creation of state reserves.
The Central Statistical Directorate (CSD) is responsible for
the collection of agricultural statistics. This work is carried out
through the agricultural departments in the respective republic and
oblast or kray statistical directorates. In the rayons the rayon in-
spectors of statistics collect agricultural statistics. Kolkhozes,
sovkhozes, and all other agricultural enterprises submit their reports
to the rayon inspectorates of the CSD according to the system and time
schedule established by the CSD. State statistical organs are sup-
posed to check systematically on the status of the reports in agricul-
tural enterprises.
During the growing and harvest seasons in the USSR, reports
are submitted on a regular basis in an attempt to estimate the size of
the harvest. For this purpose the crops are divided into two categories,
and the USSR is divided into three zones. Two estimates of crop pros-
pects are submitted between 15 June and 31 August, the time of submittal
depending on the crop and the zone within which it is grown. For in-
stance, in Zone I, which would include themore southerly regions of
the USSR, the first estimate of the winter wheat crop is submitted by
15 June and the second estimate by 15 July. The estimate of harvest
prospects for winter crops refers to the area which survived the winter
and for spring crops to the area sown in the spring, without taking
stock of losses during the summer.
The factual harvest (fakticheskiy sbor) is based on the
data on the gathering of the harvest (sbor urozhaya) contained in the
reports submitted by kolkhozes and sovkhozes as well as other materials.
These. reports, which include a wide range of crops, are submitted on
two different accounting dates, The first report, which includes an
accounting of the harvest of small grains, must be submitted by 1 Sep-
tember or 10 September, depending on the region. The second 'report must
be submitted by 10 November for all regions and includes all grains;
potatoes; and the principal technical, fodder, and vegetable crops.
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B. Reliability of Statistics on Agricultural Production
Before the publication of the statistical handbook Narodnoye
Khozyaystvo SSSR v 1958 Godu in 19591* the availability of statistics
on agricultural production in the USSR since the early 1930's was
severely limited. Data on agricultural production, as well as sta-
tistics on other sectors of the economy, were treated as state secrets,
and their publication was either suppressed or concealed. Often, data
were presented only as percentage increases over a previous year for
which firm data generally had not been published.
The few published statistics on production, especially for
grain, during this time -- 1933 to 1958 -- were unreliable. In 1933
the USSR began reporting the official yield figures for grain in
terms of the standing or biological crop forecast before the harvest.
That is, harvest losses would not be deducted from the biological
yield in order to determine the actual barn harvest. A correction
factor up to 10 percent for "technically unavoidable" losses apparently
was made for a short time after the new system went into effect, but
in the late 1930's this practice was stopped. In 1939 this method of '
reporting production was extended to include other important crops --
cottOn, flax fiber and seed, hemp fiber and seed, sunflowers, castor
beans, sugar beets, and potatoes.
Thus, from 1933 to at least 1953, the USSR officially perpe-
trated the overestimation of production of agricultural crops by not
deducting harvest losses from their statistics on production. However,
following Stalin's death in 1953, the new Soviet leadership indicated
its awareness that the misleading nature of Soviet statistics on agri-
cultural production was masking the critical situation in the agricul-
tural economy. In August 1953, Malenkov, the Soviet premier at the
time, stated that "it is necessary to put an end to the incorrect
practice whereby the results of the collective farm's work in produc-
tion of grain and other crops were assessed not by the actual harvest
but by the apparent harvest yield ... . Our collectives can be rich
only in crops actually stored in the barn, not in crops still out in
the fields."
Although publication of statistics on agricultural production
Improved somewhat after Malenkov's denunciation, data continued to be
mainly of a fragmentary nature. The 1,956 statistical handbook
Narodnoye Khozyaystvo SSSR v, 1956 Godu contained only percentage in-
creases in comparison with. 1950 in gross production and yields per
* Some of the data contained in this statistical yearbook were re-
leased earlier by Khrushchev at the December 1958 Party Plenum.
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hectare for the mcst important crops, but the 1950 base figures were
not published. Production statistics for grain, in particular, con-
tinued to be guarded as a state secret until Khrushchev's revelation
in December 1958.
1. Statistical Manipulation and Falsification
As pointed out above, falsification of statistics on
agricultural production was the official Soviet policy from 1933 to
at least 1953. Following World War II, there was actually a prohibi-
tion on the gathering of data on the threshing of crops in the kol-
khozes while the process of estimating yielas was being carried out,
for -- as the head of the Soviet crop estimating organization indi-
cated -- such information "distorts the actual situation with respect
to yields and makes it possible to underestimate the actual size of
the crop."
Because the payments to the. MTS's) which were servicing
such needs of the collective farms as plowing, sowing, and harvesting,
were based on the yields received, overestimation of the official crop
yields was an additional means for the state to acquire a larger share
of agricultural production.
Falsification of statistics on production during this
period, however, was not confined solely to the state. Although the
rigid controls imposed by Stalin undoubtedly made statistical falsi-
fication at lower levels more difficult, farm administrators and local
Party and government executives, faced with impossible tasks levied
from above, had to resort to various machinations. For example, in
cotton growing, procurement prices were such that substantial bonuses
were paid for above-plan deliveries to the state. It was common
practice in the cotton growing areas to sow more than the planned
acreage, although only the planned area was reported, so that above-
plan yields could be achieved, thus making the producer eligible for
bonus payments.
Whereas the official policy of overestimating agricultural
production was apparently discontinued after 1953, the publicity de-
voted to the falsification of statistics on agricultural production,
especially after 1958, indicates quite clearly that malpractices at
the lower levels increased. Several circumstances were apparently
related to the increase in statistical falsification after 1958.
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a. Dissolution of the Machine Tractor Stations (MTS's)
It is possible that the dissolution of the MTS's at
the beginning of 1958 had an important bearing on increased cheating
at the lower levels. With the dissolution of the MTS's, the state and
Party lost a control mechanism which was directly involved in agri-
cultural production. Control over statistics on agricultural produc-
tion then was the responsibility of the state statistical organs and
to a much lesser degree the responsibility of primary Party organi-
zations on kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Although legally empowered with
control functions, the CSD probably could not exercise the same con-
trol as the MTS's, which were directly involved in production. Like-
wise the primary ?Party organizations on the kolkhozes, without the
same degree of motivation as the MTS's? could not be expected to
exercise rigid control, for they are generally composed of the most,
influential elements on the kolkhozes, especially the managerial cadres
whose personal interests and fortunes are closely associated with the
kolkhoz.
b. Pressure on Officials and Farm Managers to Maximize
Production
The pressure to which local Party and government
officials and kolkhoz managers in the USSR have been subjected to
maximize agricultural production has been partly responsible for some
of the statistical falsification in recent years. Although these
officials have always been subjected to pressure, since 1957 Soviet
administrators and kolkhoz managers have been confronted with seem-
ingly Impossible tasks of achieving the necessary production to catch
up with the US in the per capita production of meat and milk and to
fulfill the overly ambitious goals of the Seven Year Flan. These
pressures have been further compounded by Khrushchev's great personal
interest in agricultural progress and his insistence that pledges be
undertaken by the producing elements in order to insure fulfillment
or exceeding of the assigned tasks. Often these pledges.have not re-
flected the real possibilities for increasing farm production but have
been fabricated by oblast or rayon officials and passed on to the
kolkhozes.
It is evident that these pressures have not been
alleviated. In fact, Khrushchev at the January Plenum literally
dictated the pledges which individual regions should undertake. Ad-
monishing the 'Tarty First Secretary of Krasnodar Kray, G.I. Vorobyev,
for his statement that his region 'within the next few years ... would
sell the state more than 100 million poods of grain annually," Khru-
schev stated:
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Comrades, I am speaking seriously. When I
come to the Kuban [Krasnodar Kray] for a confer-
ence, I'll talk witn the Cossacks and ask them
what "more than 100 million" means. If you hold
to the figures you have mentioned, you'll be
falling down on the job. Do you know how much
grain the Kuban should provide? A minimum of
150 million poods. Maybe more. I'll sit down
with you and not just talk it over. But, with
pencil in hand, we'll think it over together and
we'll see how many hectares of suitable land
there are and what the crop structure is. We'll
figure out which crops to leave, which to dis-
card, and what to replace the lower yielding crops
with. If you sell less than 150 million poods
of grain, there will be no point in my coming to
see you.
The next day, Krasnodar Kray pledged to sell 150 million poods of grain
to the state in 1961.
Glory seekers and "careerists" have also contributed
significantly to the recent wave of statistical falsification. In a
bid to gain nationwide prominence as outstanding leaders and workers
whose methodologies for success will be broadly publicized for "social-
ist emulation," unscrupulous individuals, in hopes of rapid promotion
in the Party or government apparatus, have undertaken ridiculously
high pledges, which were subsequently "fulfilled" by all sorts of
machinations and fraudulent practices.
The extremes to which some of these "careerists" will
go is exemplified by the case of A.N. Larionov, former Party First
Secretary in Ryazan' Oblast. At the beginning of 1959, Larionov
pledged that the kolkhozes and sovkhozes in his oblast would produce
280 percent more meat in 1959 than was produced in 1958. He further
pledged to sell 150,000 tons* of meat to the state, or 200 percent
more than in the preceding year. Fulfillment of these pledges was
reported prior to the convening of the December 1959 Party Plenum, and
Larionov was privileged to speak before it. At the Plenum, Khrushchev
congratulated Larionov on his successes, generously praising his ex-
ploits as an example of exceptional organizational ability.
* Tonnages are given in metric tons throughout this report.
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During 1960, however, it was revealed that illegal
practices and fraud were instrumental in the fulfillment of the 1959
pledges. At the January 1961 Plenum, Khrushchev stated that "some
far= Lin Ryazan' Oblast], in an attempt to fulfill the plan at any
cost, reduced the number of cattle and thus undermined their oppor-
tunities for the coming year. There were cases of doctoring the
records and cases of outside purchases of cattle and inclusion of
these animals in kolkhoz and sovkhoz production." Larionov's death
amidst the accompanying circumstances of fraud and deception have
given rise to speculation that he may have committed suicide rather
than face the shame and disgrace which he had brought on himself.
2. Nature of Statistical Falsification
Statistical falsification and manipulation in the USSR
have developed along several lines. Certainly the nature of agri-
cultural production and the end uses of agricultural products have
provided convenient entries for deception and double-dealing. Al-
though the government has fairly firm statistical control over that
part of agricultural production which is procured, farm managers are
left with considerable latitude to manipulate the statistics relative
to the share of farm production which remains on the farm. On those
farms which lack the necessary weighing scales, Soviet farm managers
can conveniently overestimate the share of production which remains
on the farm.
Animal husbandry, in particular, lends itself to statis-
tical fabrications. For instance, the fact that milk fed by hand to
animals (not suckled) is included in Soviet production of milk is a
useful means of increasing production of milk and one which can be
utilized for padding accounts with relatively complete freedom of
detection if not greatly abused. However, some overzealous farm
managers have created absurd situations for themselves. For in-
stance, on the Lenin Bayrogi kolkhoz in Surkhan Darya Oblast in
Uzbekistan, in the first quarter of 1961, there were no young pigs
on the farm. However, 7 tons of milk was registered as "drunk" by
them -- as much as was needed to fulfill the plan for production of
milk. Because most feedstuffs remain on the farm, it is relatively
easy to increase production of feedstuffs by padding the accounts.
Shortcomings can be disguised by writing off livestock which pre-
sumably perish from disease, weather, and predatory animals.
Fraudulent practices have been especially common in the
fulfillment of plans for producing and procuring livestock products.
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In order to fulfill procurement plans ahead of the scheduled time or
simply to fulfil them, many sovkhoz and kolkhoz managers purchase
products such as meat, milk, or eggs on the kolkhoz market or from
the populace and credit them to the production and procurement plans
of the kolkhoz. Some kolkhoz managers even permit and encourage an
excessively expanded private sector on the kolkhoz) the production of
which can be utilized as a "reserve" for fulfilling a plan or a pledge.
More enterprising kolkhoz managers send agents into other provinces
and districts to purchase livestock from the populace. Easily one of
the most widespread illegal practices is that of purchasing butter in
state stores for delivery to the state to be credited to the procure-
ment plan of the kolkhoz or sovkhoz.
Other than crude padding of production and procurement
reports for various crops, falsification in production of crops has
also been noted in sown acreages. A favorite gimmick has been that
of "hidden sowings," which includes the area seeded outside the plan
for a specific crop but not reported, or it may be reported as sown
with another crop. Before the elimination of bonus payments for above-
plan deliveries to the state in 1958, the 'hidden sowings" was a con-
venient means for achieving above-plan production and thus earning
bonuses. Now it is used as insurance for fulfilling a plan or a pledge.
The reverse of the "hidden hectares" is the reporting of sown areas
that have not been seeded. For example, 20 hectares of a specific crop
may actually be sown) but 25 hectares will be reported. Corn acreage
statistics are relatively easy to pad in this manner, primarily because
corn can be grown for green feed) silage, or for dry grain, which com-
plicates statistical verification. One of the most common malpractices
in the procurement of crops has been the delivery of feed and seed
stocks of grain in order to fulfill or exceed the plan for procurement
of grain.
It should also be pointed out that statistical manipulation
has not been confined solely to production, procurements, and sown
acreages. Malpractices have been noted in the introduction of money
wages in kolkhozes. In Estonia, "officials from a number of collective
farms, wishing to retain the appearance of monetary payment by whatever
means, sometimes issue products to the collective farmers for sale on
the [kolkhoz] market'. 'You will receive money for them and so you have
monetary payment,' they say." In other regions, kolkhozes have been
pushed into finding the cash for introducing money wages by borrowing
from the collective farmers. Such practices exaggerate farm income.
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3. Extent of Statistical Manipulation and Falsification
Prior to the convening of the January 1961 Party Plenum
to discuss agriculture, the Soviet press had already indicated that
a national scandal in connection with production or procurement pledges
and falsification of statistics was in the making. One of the more
publicized episodes was the imprisonment of several kolkhoz managers in
Kazakhstan in July 1960 for "criminal activity," which included the
falsification of statistics after many cattle died because of a short-
age of winter feed. Another important case was the release of the
Bryansk Oblast Party First Secretary for tacitly condoning illegal
practices of kolkhoz chairmen, which included the issuing of fictitious
receipts to kolkhozes and bovkhozes by procurement organizations at the
insistence of Party and government leaders in various rayons for prod-
ucts presumably delivered.
The widespread manipulation and falsification of statistics
on agricultural production and procurement was soon to be revealed at
the January Plenum. At the Plenum, Khrushchev bitterly denounced the
practice whereby a union republic, oblast? or rayon reports fulfillment
of the procurement plan for bread grain, but the next day asks the
state for seed grain and cattle feed.
Amazingly similar admissions of "fraud and deception" were
made by most of the Party First Secretaries in the constituent repub-
lics of the USSR. As one of the more complete confessions at the :
Plenum, the statement of D.S. Fblyanskiy, Party First Secretary from
the RSFSR, deserves particular attention and is presented below.
Serious shortcomings exist in our republic
in the organization of Socialist competition.
Some officials rashly assume increased pledges
and impose them on others without taking into
account the practical possibilities. Others
assume realistic pledges but do not back them
up with organizational measures . But in
order to create the appearance of success and
give an effective account of themselves, such
officials take the path of outright deception
of the Party and the government and engage in
fakery and report padding, including in their
reports output that has not been produced and
putput that has not been delivered. Cases of
this kind have been uncovered in Yaroslavl',
Kirov, Tula, Ryazan', Lipetsk and other
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provinces. ... Some provinces report fulfill-
ment of the plan for grain procurements and at
the same time petition the state to give them
seed for sowing and to allocate grain for feed-
ing livestock.
Citing Omsk Oblast and Mari ASSR as Cases in point, Pblyanskiy referred
to them as "not isolated examples."
Not only have statistics on the production and procurement
of just about all crops and livestock products been falsified, but
also there have been cases of falsified figures on sown areas. Khru-
shchev drew an open admission from N.V. Podgornyy, First Party Secre-
tary of the Ukraine, that corn acreages in the Ukraine, an important
corn-growing republic, were falsely reported.
As the post-Plenum days have revealed; the uncovering of
statistical fraud in the USSR at the Plenum was only the beginning.
Since January the Soviet press has revealed that statistical fraud and
deception has been uncovered in varying degrees in every republic in
the USSR.
Perhaps the most hapless and ironic case of all is that
concerning Tadzhikistan. This republic has been highly publicized as
having achieved the highest yields of cotton in the world, and it has
been the only republic to fulfill consistently state plans for procure-
ment of cotton. At the January Plenum, T.U. Uldzhabayev, Party First
Secretary of Tadzhikistan, only hinted at serious shortcomings which
had been tolerated in the management of cotton growing, but he did not
make an open admission of statistical fraud. However, at the Tadzhik
Party Plenum held in April 1961, it was revealed that in the past
3 years, the Tadzhik plan for cotton procurement was never fulfilled
although the leaders of the republic reported the preschedule fulfill-
ment of the plan each year. False data on plan fulfillment were
fabricated at first by exaggerating the figures, by direct forgery,
and by pressure on kolkhoz chairmen and directors of cotton-ginning
plants. The systematic padding of accounts on cotton procurement
necessitated fabrication of distribution of fictitious surpluses to
cotton-ginning plants and fats and oils plants. In some cases, plant
directors had to pay for the nonexistent cotton. The agencies of the
Central Statistical Directorate in the republic also participated in
the fraud by padding official data over and above the amounts repre-
sented by fictitious reports from other organizations. The top-level
Party and government administrators, including Uldzhabayev and the
Chairman of the Tadzhik Council of Ministers, were implicated as the
chief organizers of the hoodwinking and double-dealing practices.
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4. Quantification of Statistical Falsification
Although it is clear that statistical falsification and
manipulation have been widespread throughout the USSR, it is im-
possible now to quantify their over-all effect. Even the Soviet
leaders probably do not know precisely the extent of the exaggera-
tions.
Before the recent revelations of falsification, analysts
of Soviet agriculture had felt that statistics on procurement of
grain were probably fairly accurate. This confidence was unwarranted.
At the January Plenum, Khrushchev stated that in the RSFSR in 1959,
1,643 million poods of grain were delivered to the state, but 361 mil-
lion poods -- 22 percent of the total -- were taken back by the farms.
Normally, some of the grain procured by the state will be returned to
the farms for feed or seed purposes. However, the implication in
Khrushchev's statement is that 22 percent of the total procurement of
grain is much too high. This statement implies that grain procure-
ments in 1959 in the RSFSR represented a larger share of the total
crop than formerly.
In 1960, in one rayon in Pavlodar Oblast in Kazakhstan,
13,000 hectares of uncut grain and 10,000 hectares of unthreshed grain
were added to the harvested area with 21,800 tons of grain added to
production of grain. In Tadzhikistan the figures on production were
padded by "tens of thousands" of tons of cotton. In Leninabad Oblast
alone, from 1957 to 1959, 62,000 tons of cotton were falsely reported.
In Azerbaydzhan in 1960, more than 3,000 hectares of "hidden" cotton
sowings were discovered. Pbdgornyy's admission at the January Party
Plenum that 20 hectares of corn are sown but 25 reported suggests that
the falsification of sown area for corn in the Ukraine may have
amounted to 25 percent.
The USSR has not given any indications as to the combined
magnitude of these statistical aberrations. Of all the agricultural
products, statistics on production of grain appear to be the most
perplexing. In spite of unfavorable weather conditions during 1959
and 1960, the Soviet claims for their grain harvest imply higher yields
than those obtained in the US in roughly analogous areas* from 1947 to
1956. Some of the overestimation of grain by the USSR can probably be
attributed to the fact that threshed grain is reported in terms of
"bunker weight," which would not take into account moisture and trash
content.
* Includes Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Nebraska, Kansas, Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. These areas generally
have a more favorable climate for grain than does the USSR.
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