THE INLAND TRANSPORT SYSTEM OF HUNGARY 1950-60

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• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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Economic Intelligence Report
N? 3
THE INLAND TRANSPORT SYSTEM OF HUNGARY
1950-60
CIA/RR ER 61-24
May 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
SECRET
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SECRET
Economic Intelligence Report
THE INLAND TRANSPORT SYSTEM OF HUNGARY
1950-60
CIA/RR ER 61-24
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
SECRET
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CONTENTS
II A
Page
Summary
1
I. Introduction
3
II. Development and Maintenance
3
A. Organization and Administration
3
1. Railroad Department
4
2. Navigation Department
4
3. Motor Vehicle Department
5
B. Characteristics and Plans
5
1. Railroads 5
2. Highway Facilities 10
3. Inland Water Transport 11
4. Pipelines 13
C. Performance and Future Trends 14
1. Performance
2. Future Trends
III. Finance
14
16
17
A. Price Policies 17
B. Operating Costs 17
C. Comparative Costs 18
1. Factors Affecting Cost 18
2. Effects of Costs on Traffic Shifts Between
Carriers 19
3. Effects of Transportation Price Policies on the
Economy 19
D. Capital Investment 20
1. General 20
2. Investment in Railroads 21
3. Investment in Roads and Bridges 21
4. Investment in Other Modes of Transport . ? ? ? 22
5. Investment Outlook 22
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Appendixes
Appendix A. Statistical Tables
Page
23
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1.
2.
Tables
8
Index of Rates of Growth of Railroad Rolling Stock and
Traffic in HUngary, 1950 and 1960
Investment in Transportation and Communications in
Hungary, 1950-60
25
3.
Transportation Inventories in Hungary, by Mode of
Transport, 1950 and 1956-60
26
4.
Performance of Railroad Transport in Hungary, 1950-60 .
27
5.
Railroad Operating Factors and Freight Car Requirements
in Hungary, 1956-60
28
6.
Performance of Motor Vehicles in Hungary, 1950-60 . .
29
7.
Performance of Inland Water Transport in Hungary,
1950-60 30
Map
(Inside Back Cover)
Hungary: Selected Railroads, Highways, and Inland Waterways
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THE INLAND TRANSPORT SYSTEM OF HUNGARY*
1950-60
Summary
When the Communists assumed power in Hungary immediately after
World War II, they directed the economic system of the country to-
ward heavy industrial development with little provision for the trans-
portation services needed to support this development. Even though
there is no evidence that transportation services have failed to sup-
port economic development up to the present, the transportation system
generally, and the railroad system in particular, will require in-
creased capital investment to prepare for the increasing demands for
service inherent in the 1961-65 economic plans.
After many years of intensive use the physical equipment of Hun-
garian railroads has been reduced to a condition that would be con-
sidered poor by Western standards. Moderately ambitious plans for
improvement have been in existence for some time, but funds and mate-
rials necessary for the fulfillment of these plans have not been allo-
cated. At present, however, there appears to be a growing awareness
of the necessity for directing more of the resources available to the
economy to the transportation sector to make it capable of supporting
future economic growth.
The Hungarian transportation network, which is dominated by the
railroads, is well developed and evenly distributed throughout the
country. About one-tenth of the standard-gauge rail network, which
radiates from Budapest, is multitracked, and only a small part is
electrified. Railroad motive power and rolling stock consist almost
entirely of steam locomotives and two-axle freight cars of low capacity.
The traffic load is unevenly distributed, with nine-tenths of the total
traffic being handled on one-half of the network. Although the rail-
roads have been operating at an apparent loss, a recent revision of
rates and the abandonment of some branch lines may improve their finan-
cial situation.
The Hungarian highway system also radiates from Budapest. Roads
consist chiefly of gravel, crushed rock, or dirt construction, and one-
half of them are in poor condition. The truck inventory is small, and
* The estimates and conclusions in this report represent the best
judgment of this Office as of 15 April 1961.
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the entire highway transport system is not of sufficient quality to
support extensive diversion of long-distance (more than 50 kilometers
Cmj) transportation from the railroads.
The inland water network of Hungary consists primarily of the Danube
River. The inland water fleet is small and of poor quality, ports are
poorly developed, and there is little mechanical cargo-handling equip-
ment. Because there are no current plans for expansion of the inland
waterway system, it is probable that the present, almost negligible,
contribution by inland water transport to the availability of trans-
portation service will not increase significantly during 1961-65.
During 1950-60, Hungary managed to increase the total transporta-
tion performance substantially through more intensive utilization of
labor, plant, and equipment. Traffic has been moved by relying on the
railroads to absorb the bulk of the demand and also by utilizing the
highway and inland waterway systems at a high level of intensity in
spite of their limitations. The highways and, to a lesser extent, the
inland waterways are used to provide feeder-distribution service to
and from the railroad system. Pipelines are not yet a significant
mode of transport, but expansion of pipeline facilities is underway.
The current capability of the transportation system as a whole seems
to be near the level of average demand. Consequently, peak loading
periods, especially in the autumn, create demands in excess of capa-
bility, resulting in some delays in the movement of traffic.
The chief problem in all modes of transport is a shortage of trans-
portation equipment. As a temporary expedient, the Hungarians are
attempting to compensate for the shortage of serviceable railroad
freight cars by renting foreign cars, a decision probably forced on
them because of the scarcity of capital investment funds. The authori-
ties planned to increase the rate of investment in transportation dur-
ing the Second Five Year Plan (1956-60) because they recognized the
need of the transportation system for an increased share of capital in-
vestment. However, the actual annual rate of investment in transporta-
tion has declined since 1954.
The practice of utilizing equipment and facilities intensively
through the application of labor instead of capital has been adequate
to meet the increasing demands for transportation service and may be
expected to continue. Although efficiency can be increased and al-
though there probably is still some degree of underutilization of the
present transportation system, there is a limit in all modes of trans-
port to the traffic increases that can be achieved through increased
utilization. This practice will not be adequate, therefore, to pro-
vide the transportation service needed to support the economic plans
for 1961-65. Consequently, the trend in capital investment must be
reversed, or transportation will become a major problem in the Hun-
garian economy.
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I. Introduction
The level plain of Hungary offers few geographic obstacles to the
development of an efficient transportation network. The railroad
system of the country, which accounts for the major part of all
traffic, was originally developed as a part of the system of the old
Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy. The radial pattern was established
at an early period and was intended to link the Hungarian part of
that joint kingdom to the Hungarian capital at Budapest. Modern roads
have been developed primarily to provide feeder service to and from
the railroad system. During the final phases of World War II the en-
tire transportation system suffered extensive damage. By 1949, how-
ever, this system had been basically restored, and since that time
the performance of all modes of transport has increased considerably.
Following the Soviet pattern of achieving maximum performance from
the system with a minimum of capital input, the present government of
Hungary has relied more on improved operating efficiency than on capi-
tal investment to achieve increases in performance. This statement is
especially true with regard to rail and water transport, where inven-
tories of equipment have increased only modestly since 1955. The ex-
pansion of the Hungarian economy, which has resulted in an increased
traffic load for all modes of transport, together with intensive utili-
zation of transportation facilities and equipment and a policy of barely
adequate capital inputs, has resulted in a transportation system with
little excess capability but one that has met the demands placed on it.
II. Development and Maintenance
A. Organization and Administration
The Hungarian Ministry of Transportation and Postal Affairs
(KPM) functions under the policy direction of the Central Transporta-
tion Council. The Council, chaired by the KPM member and consisting
of representatives from appropriate ministries, sets policy, effects
coordination, and issues directives that are binding on all transpor-
tation organizations. Operational control is vested in various sub-
divisions of the KPM, including railroads (Department I), navigation
(Department V), and motor vehicles (Department VI). Pipeline trans-
port is believed to be under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Fuels
and Power. 1/*
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1. Railroad Department
The Railroad Department (I) of the KPM is responsible for
the operation and administration of the Hungarian State Railroads
(MAV), including the Budapest Suburban Railroad and the Gyor-Sopron-
Ebenfurth Railroad (GYSEV).* Control is exercised through six re-
gional directorates located at Budapest, Szeged, Debrecen, Miskolc,
Pecs, and Szombathely. These regional directorates -- like the
Railroad Department -- are subdivided into appropriate sections such
as those dealing with motive power, operations, maintenance, and
finance. The Railroad Department also controls intercity bus opera-
tions through the Hungarian State Railroad Motor Transport Enterprise
(MAVAUT). 2/
2. Navigation Department
Hungarian inland waterway and maritime shipping is con-
trolled by the Navigation Department (V) of the KPM. The department
was organized in 1955, when the USSR, which during 1946-54 had been a
member of the Hungarian-Soviet Joint Stock Company (MESBART), with-
drew its membership and sold its stock to the Hungarian government.
The Navigation Department is presently divided into four enterprises,
as follows:
a. The Hungarian Danube and Sea Navigation Corpora-
tion (DTRT), which is a maritime shipping enterprise;
b. The Stream Regulation and Gravel Dredging Com-
pany (FOKA), which is a small enterprise engaged in stream regula-
tion and channel dredging;
c. The Hungarian Navigation Company (MABART), which
is the major inland water shipping enterprise in Hungary; and
d. The Hungarian Shipping Cooperative (MAHAJOSZ),
which is a cooperative of small shipowners and rafters organized to
supplement governmental shipping in small local shipments.
The MABART enterprise controls nearly all freight traffic
on Hungarian inland waterways, including freight and passenger trans-
port and transit shipping on the Danube. In addition to 45 passenger
and freight agencies on the Danube and Tisza Rivers, MABART has its
own agencies in Danubian ports in West Germany, Austria, Czechoslo-
vakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Bulgaria. _V
* See the footnote on p. 5, below.
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3. Motor Vehicle Department
All motor transport in Hungary is owned and operated by
the government, but, unlike rail and water transport, its control is
divided among several agencies. Operational control over "special-
purpose" transport enterprises is under the jurisdiction of non-KPM
organizations (such as the Ministries of Chemicals, the Interior,
and others), which own and operate their own vehicle parks for special
transportation needs. Special-purpose vehicles also are owned and
operated by other components of the government such as police, secu-
rity, and army groups.
In addition to these enterprises, the Motor Vehicle
Department (VI) of the KFM owns and operates those divisions concerned
primarily with common-carrier transport (hereafter referred to as the
transport group). This group has two subdivisions, the AKOV's (motor
transport enterprises), which operate various types of vehicles and
apparently are organized on a geographical basis, and the TEFU's
(trucking enterprises), which operate only cargo trucks and are func-
tional groups that perform common-carrier local and intercity transport.
To coordinate the flow of traffic and goods, the KW has
established a nationwide organization of dispatching stations organized
on a geographic basis, with the central dispatching office located at
Budapest and a second major station located at Gyor. There are between
50 and 60 substations in the network. The dispatcher directs the move-
ment of freight from one enterprise to another and also may authorize
the services of the AKOV's to industrial and commercial enterprises
and cooperatives if the transportation requirements of such organiza-
tions exceed their capabilities. V
B. Characteristics and Plans
1. Railroads
The total route length of Hungarian standard-gauge rail-
roads ()-i- feet, 8-1/2 inches wide) in 1960 was about 8,320 km, only 11
percent of which is multitracked and only 5 percent electrified.* The
* The Hungarian railroad system is made up of two separate standard-
gauge railroads -- MAV and the Gyor-Sopron-Ebenfurth Railroad (GYSEV).
The latter line is owned jointly by Hungary and Austria and is under
the jurisdiction of the KlM but is managed by an independent agency
located at Sopron. Because GYSEV is too small to be treated separately,
this report includes only total figures for both systems, which will
be referred to together as MAV. The jootnote continued on p.
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general condition of the Hungarian track structure is poor, necessi-
tating a slow rate of speed and hence reducing the total capacity of
the railroad lines. This situation consequently extends the time in-
volved in traffic movement and materially increases the cost.
The density of the Hungarian railroad network, 1 route-
kilometer for each 11 square land kilometers, ranks between that of
Czechoslovakia and Poland among the European Satellites. The railroad
network provides adequate coverage of most areas of the country, with
all basic lines radiating from Budapest, the principal rail center.
Other major centers are located at Debrecen, Miskolc, Veszprem, and
Gyor. Adequate rail connections are maintained with each of the coun-
tries bordering Hungary.* Particularly good connections exist with
the USSR through Zahony, with Czechoslovakia through Salgotarjan, and
with Austria through Sopron, over which extensive international pas-
senger and freight traffic is moved. The condition of this network
is generally poor because of heavy demands and inadequate maintenance
and replacement. Although domestic production of rails normally would
meet Hungarian needs, a large amount of such production is exported to
the USSR. Replacement of rails has thus been restricted to only the
most pressing requirements, and this policy will compound the problem
in the future. Almost all wooden ties have to be imported, and only
minimum replacements have been made since World War II. The Hungarians
have experimented with concrete ties, but these have been utilized
chiefly on secondary lines, yards, and other supplementary trackage. ;
All electrified main lines utilize single-phase, 50-cycle, 110-
kilovolt industrial power except for a small number of local lines in
and around Budapest, which use 1,000-volt direct current. Distribu-
tion on both sections is by overhead line, and all electrified main
lines are multitracked. //
narrow-gauge line in MAY is approximately 600 km in length, and Soviet
broad-gauge (5-foot) track extends across the Soviet-Hungarian border
to the transloading station at Zahony. This connection, like most
other Satellite-Soviet connections, is actually a transloading complex
composed of four stations that specialize in specific commodities. At
this point, Chop in the USSR is used for general cargo, and the Hun-
garian stations of Zahony, Tuzser, and Komoro are used for general
cargo, grain, and petroleum, respectively. 2/
* Hungary has 20 international railroad connections, including 7 with
Austria, I. with Yugoslavia, 2 with Rumania, 6 with Czechoslovakia, and
1 with the USSR. About seven other connections are closed to inter-
national traffic, and a number of former connections have been severed
by the removal of track or by the failure to replace border bridges. Y
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The poor lateral connections among the main lines radiat-
ing from Budapest dictate that most traffic must move through that
city's installations.* Under normal conditions the facilities are
adequate to meet traffic demands, but any disruption of traffic at
Budapest has far-reaching effects on the entire system. A second
major weakness of the system is the small number of bridges that span
the major rivers of Hungary, which flow north to south. The upris-
ing of October 1956 had little effect on the physical network -- the
level of traffic was restored to normal by about February and March
1957 -- but it did delay the implementation of plans outlined for
railroad improvements during the Second Five Year Plan (1956-60).
The original Second Five Year Plan called for substantial
improvements in the railroad network** and for ambitious increases in
capital additions to the railroads. The plan apparently was designed
to improve the quality of fixed line facilities in order to meet sub-
stantial increases in traffic. If these projects had been carried out,
they would have represented the first really significant additions to
the Hungarian rail network since before World War II. 12/
Official announcements of the Three Year Plan (1958-60),
which superseded the Second Five Year Plan, contained no reference
to improvements planned for railroad lines or structures. Although
some improvements undoubtedly occurred -- possibly on the projects
originally scheduled for 1956-60 -- actual achievement may have been
less than the original goals.
At the end of 1960 the rolling stock inventory of Hungary
is estimated to have consisted of 2,460 locomotives, 62,000 freight
cars, and 5,500 passenger cars.xxx The entire inventory is in poor
condition as a result of intensive utilization and minimal maintenance.
The locomotive inventory is badly mixed, and a number of US Army sur-
plus locomotivesI manufactured during World War II are still in use.
The freight car inventory is composed almost entirely of two-axle
* Badapest has three principal classification yards, two smaller
classification yards, three major passenger terminals, two major
freight terminals, two major repair shops, and a number of small sta-
tions.
** The plan called for 170 km of double tracking, the installation
of automatic block signals on 200 km of line, the renovation of 2,400
km of line, the completion of electrification on the BudaPest-Hatvan-
Miskolc line, the beginning of electrification on the Budapest-Szolnok
line, and the improvement of a number of stations. 2/
XXX, See also Table 3, Appendix A, p. 26, below. These figures do not
include narrow-gauge rolling stock.
t The 2-8-0 series, with a tractive effort of 31,500 pounds. ill
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cars, and only about one-fourth of the inventory is less than 25 years
of age. This inventory consists chiefly of gondolas, boxcars, and
flatcars, thus allowing for little variety in the type of service that
is offered. Although the passenger car inventory contains many modern
four-axle cars, most of the cars are old two-axle and three-axle units
equipped with bare wooden benches. The shortage of passenger cars has
made it necessary to use boxcars in commuter traffic for some time. 12/
Increases in rolling stock and motive power during 1950-60
were not large when compared with the increases in traffic performance
Table 1 shows a comparison of rates of growth of freight and passenger
rolling stock and traffic from 1950 to 1960.
Table 1
Index of Rates of Growth
of Railroad Rolling Stock and Traffic in Hungary
1950 and 1960
1950
= 100
Freight cars p_./
Ton-kilometers 12/
Passenger cars 2_,/
Passenger-kilometers 12/
Locomotives 2,/
1950
1960
100
100
100
100
100
119
246
125
203
110
a. See also Table 3, Appendix A, p. 26, below.
b. See also Table 4, Appendix A, p. 27, below.
The disparity between the indexes of freight cars and ton-
kilometers* does not of itself indicate a present shortage of freight
car space
Increased utilization of the inventory is evidenced by a 25-percent
increase in the average number of tons hauled per car per year during
1953-59 and by a substantial decrease in the turnaround time.**
It is estimated that about 55,500 cars were required to
move traffic in l960, XXX including export, import, and transit freight
Cargo tonnages are given in metric tons throughout this report.
Reported turnaround time for 1960 is not yet available.
See Table 5, Appendix A, p. 28, below.
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as well as domestic traffic. Hungarian cars probably were used for
export and transit traffic (much of which was Soviet traffic through
Hungary), but import traffic, except that from the USSR, usually has
been hauled on cars belonging to other countries. Because of the im?
balance of shipments, problems of car distribution, and the desire to
avoid the payment of per diem rental fees in foreign exchange (French
gold francs) for foreign cars, it is sometimes more expedient to move
these cars back empty than to hold them for homeward loading. Adjust-
ing the car requirements for these factors, the estimated inventory
balanced against requirements indicates that on the average about 10
percent of the total freight car park was in reserve or undergoing
repairs during the year.* This inventory probably was not enough for
peak loading periods when freight car utilization was above average.
car shortages probably are due to general prob-
lems of car distributiqn and car interchange in export traffic rather
than to actual shortages. Refrigerator and tank cars in the past
have been in chronic short supply, and car rentals from Western coun-
tries and from other Satellite countries have been Hungary's source
of supplemental supply for such cars. The magnitude and frequency of
shortages of freight cars, however, point to a delicate
balance between the supply of freight cars and the number required.
Strict enforcement of loading and unloading times as well as increased
demurrage charges (especially on foreign cars for which rent must be
paid in the form of foreign exchange) is frequently emphasized as a
remedy for excessive turnaround time and the resulting shortage of
cars.
Planned inventory acquisitions under the Three Year Plan
placed emphasis on shifting the railroads from steam to diesel and
electric traction.** 1Y No mention was made of total planned freight
car acquisitions during the Three Year Plan period, but the plan for
1958 called for 1,420 freight cars, and the plan for 1959 called for
2,400 cars in addition. Hungary announced that about 6,700 freight
cars were added during 1958-60, and this increment probably resulted
in an absolute inventory inarease of about 3,800 cars. 15/ The normal
annual retirement of freight cars (from accidents and obsolescence)
is about 1.6 percent of the total inventory.
A shortage of freight cars and a lack of adequate alloca-
tions from domestic production in recent years have caused Hungary to
purchase freight cars from other countries -- Rumania; Poland; and,
* See Table 5, Appendix A, p. 28, below, and Table 3, Appendix A,
p. 26, below. A total of 55,500 Hungarian cars were required compared
with an estimated number of 62,000 cars available.
** Hungary planned to add 11 electric locomotives, 152 diesel loco-
motives, and 30 motorized railroad cars to the inventory during 1958-60.
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more recently, Western countries, particularly Austria and the Nether-
lands. 1Y A contract recently signed with the Netherlands indicates
that Hungary will continue to purchase cars from Western countries at
least until 1962. 12/ Purchase of cars from foreign sources is a
direct result of the current Hungarian practice of deemphasizing domes-
tic production (because of the agreements by the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance ZEMg on specialization of rolling stock).
2. Highway Facilities
The Hungarian road network in 1960 consisted of about
29,000 km of all types of roads, only 6 percent of which were classi-
fied as improved roads.* 1.?/ Although this network is extensively de-
veloped by Bloc standards, it is in poor condition and is incapable of
supporting extensive long-haul (more than 50 km) traffic. Hungarian
authorities state that about one-half of the network is in poor condi-
tion, about one-third in satisfactory condition, and only about 16 per-
cent in good condition. 12/ The network is not well maintained, and
this fact is one of the primary reasons why highway transport is not
yet a significant factor in intercity freight movement.
An official Hungarian study indicates that within 15 years
highway transport may account for nearly three-fourths of the total
tonnage carried by the transportation system and about one-fifth of
the total ton-kilometers. The present system is not capable of ac-
complishing these tasks, and the poor condition of the roads greatly
increases maintenance costs. The authorities plan to achieve increased
highway traffic performance chiefly through better organization and
efficiency in the utilization of equipment and labor rather than any
sharp expansion of this transportation sector. 22/
Passenger travel by bus has increased in popularity in
recent years in Hungary with the introduction of bus service to more
and more outlying cities and towns. The addition of bus service
(very often a truck with benches) to areas formerly not served by any
regular commercial facilities for intercity passenger transport has
done much to increase the highway share of the total passenger-
kilometer performance of intercity transport in Hungary.
There was a sharp change in emphasis in road construction
in Hungary during the early 1950's: investment in new construction,
which had dominated the 1950-53 period, gave way to emphasis on the
repair and maintenance of the established system. Moreover, there was
a substantial reduction in the average annual expenditure on the road
system during 1950-55, and the general decline in the investment
* Called both "state" and "public" roads. The figure probably does
not include roads under the jurisdiction of provincial and municipal
governments.
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priority of road construction does not indicate large increases in
investment outlays for new road construction in the immediate future.
Even though the Hungarian authorities planned to make 17,000 km of
road "dust free" during 1956-60, present policies do not point toward
any great improvement in the highway system.
The Hungarian motor vehicle inventory in 1960 is estimated
to have consisted of 25,500 trucks, 4,700 buses, and about 30,800
"other" vehicles.* The truck inventory is composed of a large variety
of vehicles from both foreign and domestic sources, a situation that
compounds the spare parts problem and contributes directly to the high
percentage of trucks under repair. Whether or not the total truck ca-
pacity is in general short supply is not known, but there may be con-
siderable reserve capability available at the present level of oper-
ating efficiency. As in the case of railroads, loading and unloading
practices introduce delays and prevent a rapid turnaround of trucks.
Because of the sizable addition to the truck inventory dur-
ing 1950-60, the average age of the present inventory is not very high.
The poor condition of the roads, however, probably has had an adverse
effect on the condition of these vehicles, and, as a result, the in-
ventory is believed to be in only fair condition. Because this inven-
tory is composed almost entirely of vehicles with a carrying capacity
of about 3 tons, its economic utilization is limited. There probably
is a need for more light delivery vehicles for urban pickup and de-
livery service and more high-capacity trucks for interurban service.
Domestic production of trucks showed only a modest increase during
1950-60, while both exports and imports increased.** The total effect
has been a decrease in the number of trucks available annually for
addition to the inventory.
3. Inland Water Transport
The Hungarian inland waterway system consists of about
1,300 km of navigable routes on which about 1 percent of the total
Hungarian freight traffic is hauled. Inland water transport is little
developed or used in Hungary, principally because of the absence of an
internal connection between the country's two main rivers, the Danube
(on which most water traffic moves) and the Tisza -- travel between
them requires a long detour through Yugoslavia. A Danube-Tisza canal,
See also Table 3, Appendix A, p. 26, below.
** During 1950-60, domestic production increased from 2,499 to 2,918
trucks, exports increased from 5 to 2,528, and imports increased from
787 to a figure estimated at 2,700. The number of trucks available
for additions to the inventory decreased from 3,281 in 1950 to a fig-
ure estimated at 3,100 in 1960.
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presently under construction, may expand waterway traffic, although
there are still problems in making the canal navigable. The inland
waterway system does not greatly supplement either railroad or highway
transport for domestic freight movement. Expansion of facilities and
of the inland water fleet has been slow in the past, and no known
plans exist for significant expansion.
The carrying capacity of the inland water fleet is esti-
mated to have shown only a modest increase during 1950-60* compared
with the increase in tons carried.** Damage from World War II was a
major cause of the lack of growth in fleet capacity, and only in recent
years has this capacity returned to prewar levels.
The original Second Five Year Plan called for only modest
additions to the inland water fleet, XXX
21 and the Three Year Plan
made no specific provisions for inland water transport. Whatever ad-
ditions were made probably did little more than compensate for with-
drawals over the same period, but the quality of the fleet should have
improved slightly. The Second Five Year Plan provided for a sizable
increase in inland waterway performance primarily by increasing the
number of barge operating hours per day by 24 percent. It was hoped
that this increase would partly relieve rail transport, but it has not
done so in any significant quantities, and the importance of inland
water transport has declined steadily during the past decade. It is
estimated that inland water transport wil] at best maintain its pres-
ent position in relation to other modes of transport through 1965.
The recent Soviet proposal of a unified European inland
waterway system envisages a north-south connection between the Danube
and the Rhine-Main and a north-south canal b'etween the Danube and the
Oder, with a lateral connection to the Elbe. Recognizing that the
completion of this plan will enhance the importance of Danube shipping,
Hungarian authorities have expressed the need for improving the anti-
quated fleet and port facilities, particularly the Budapest-Csepel
national and free port. 22/
* No figures on carrying capacity are available for 1950-60. The
deadweight tonn4ge (DWT) increased from about 136,000 in 1936 to
about 159,000 in 1956, or by 17 percent. (Deadweight tonnage is a
measure of the carrying capacity of a vessel expressed in metric
tons -- that is, the difference between the displacement of the vessel
light and its displacement loaded.)
** Tons carried doubled during 1950-60 (see Table 7, Appendix A,
p. 30, below).
XXX The plan called for the addition of 15 motor tugs and 50 dumb
(nonpowered) barges of 1,000-ton capacity each.
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The current composition of the Hungarian inland water
fleet (see Table 3*) is the result of keeping a static inventory
of passenger ships and increasing the number of dumb barges and cargo
vessels** during 1950-60. Tonnage moved by inland water transport
and ton-kilometer performance more than doubled during the same period.
This performance, achieved primarily through increased utilization of
the fleet, appears to be high compared with the small increase in the
number of vessels during 1950-60.
Hungary faces the problem of shortages of tugboatsXXX and
barges, which it is attempting to solve by more intensive utilization
of existing fleet capacity -- that is, a more rapid turnaround and a.
better repair system. 21/ The general condition of the fleet is be-
lieved to be only fair, however, and the ports are poorly developed.
It is estimated that small future increases in performance will be
achieved through modest improvements in efficiency of fleet opera-
tions, although there is a definite limit to the increased performance
that can be achieved by this means. Beyond this limit, additional in-
vestment will be necessary.
4. Pipelines
The use of pipelines as a mode of transport in Hungary has
been limited largely to the movement of natural gas from domestic pro-
ducing wells to industrial and municipal centers for use as fuel. Do-
mestic pipelines have a diameter of about 8 inches and provide a
cheaper and more convenient means of transporting natural gas than
could be provided otherwise. A joint Hungarian-Rumanian pipeline proj-
ect was completed late in 1958 to supply high-grade natural gas to
the Hungarian chemical industry at Tiszapalkonya. The line re-
portedly has an annual capacity of 200 million cubic meters of natural
gas.t 21.:Y
The Second Five Year Plan indicated that a pipeline system
400 km long "should" be constructed to carry gas and petroleum. 22/
* Appendix A, p. 26, below.
** The increase in cargo vessels was due to the addition of several
merchant ships.
XXX Although referred to as tugboats, these are more properly towing
vessels with some carrying capacity.
t The total length of the pipeline is 365 km, of which 135 km are
in Hungary.
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It is not known to what extent the plan was carried out, but the
completion of the joint Hungarian-Rumanian gas pipeline indicates
some degree of plan fulfillment.
The importance of pipeline transport in Hungary will
increase when the Soviet-Satellite pipeline is completed. The Hun-
garian part of this pipeline will be about 130 km long, branching
from the Czechoslovak line south through Dregelypalank, bypassing
Budapest, and terminating at Szazhalombatta -- a small city just
south of Budapest on the Danube River, where an oil refinery will be
built. Construction of this line is scheduled to begin during 1961
and to be completed by mid-1962. ..2.?./ Future plans also call for a
110-km pipeline leading eastward to Cegled for the distribution of
products. el/ The completion of this project should result in a
sharp shift of petroleum transport from railroads and waterways and
thus should partly relieve the present heavy traffic on the Budapest-
Zahony rail line.*
C. Performance and Future Trends
1. Performance
Although the present Hungarian transportation system
leaves much to be desired in the matter of efficiency, it has
proved adequate to fill the freight and passenger traffic demands
placed on it in recent years. In comparison with Western transporta-
tion service and even with that of East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and
Poland, the Hungarian transportation system does not always handle
traffic quickly or safely or at the lowest cost. The system does
meet the demands placed on it, however, and it has not as yet become
a deterrent to economic growth.
Comparison with the average transportation performance of
other countries indicates areas in which Hungarian transportation
could be improved. Other European Satellites operate in general with
the same type of equipment, over similar terrain, and at a comparable
stage of technological development. Thus, other things being equal,
the average performance in these countries should be similar to that
in Hungary.
* Although petroleum accounts for only about 4 percent of the total
railroad tons carried, a large part of this traffic moves on the
Budapest-Zahony line. The small percentage is deceptive also because
of the high percentage of empty haul as cars are moved to the Soviet-
Hungarian border for loading.
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In railroad transport the average load per freight car in
Hungary is exceeded by all the Satellite countries for which data
are available.* In traffic-kilometers per kilometer of route, only
Bulgaria and Rumania rank below Hungary. Hungary also ranks last in
terms of traffic-kilometers performed per railroad worker, indicating
a low level of labor productivity. In terms of traffic-kilometers
performed per capita, however, Hungary ranks fourth, being exceeded
by Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany. Precise comparative data
on inland water and highway transport are not readily available for the
Satellites, but Hungary probably ranks below Czechoslovakia, Poland,
and East Germany in output of both of these modes of transport.
There seems to be considerable room for improvement in the
efficiency of utilization of Hungarian equipment and in the productivity
of the labor force, particularly in rail transport. The alternatives
to an increase in utilization are additions of capital equipment and
perhaps even of labor inputs. The low level of labor productivity
seems to indicate that the major problem in this area is more qualita-
tive than quantitive. The data seem to indicate that Hungary is not
getting as much output from its transportation system as is possible,
and only in this sense can transportation be deemed inadequate, for
shortages might not occur if available labor and equipment were used
more effectively.
During 1950-60 the figure for railroad tons carried more
than doubled, to 96 million tons, although the railroads' share of
the total tons carried by inland transport declined from 78 to 44 per-
cent. Ton-kilometer performance in 1960 was 2.5 times that of 1950,
but the railroads' share of the total performance declined only
slightly.
The performance of motor truck transport** has increased
at a faster rate than that of railroad transport. During 1950-60,
tons carried increased about 10 times, to 121.5 million tons, and the
motor truck share of the total tons carried by inland transport in-
creased from 20 to 55 percent. Ton-kilometer performance increased
about 10 times during the same period, but the motor truck share of
the total transport performance was only about 10 percent.
The performance of inland water transport has shown a
slower rate of growth than that of either railroads or motor trucks,
and although this performance about doubled in terms of both tons
* Excluding Albania the average load in Hungary of 15.5 tons was
exceeded by from 3 to 21 percent in other Satellite countries in 1958.
** See. Table 6, Appendix A, p. 29, below.
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carried and ton-kilometers during 1950-60, the relative position of
inland water transport declined.*
The total number of passengers carried by the Hungarian
transportation system more than doubled during 1950-60, from 287 mil-
lion to about 860 million passengers. A similar increase occurred in
passenger kilometers, while the average length of haul remained almost
the same. Although the performance of all modes of transport increased
in absolute terms, the railroad part of the total performance increased
slightly, the highway share declined, and inland water performance re-
mained an almost insignificant part of the total.
2. Future Trends
The Hungarian uprising of 1956 and the poorly coordinated
and wasteful use of scarce investment funds during 1950-60 both con-
tributed to a scarcity of capital for the transportation system. Be-
cause of the policy of according a low priority to transportation,
this scarcity of capital has prevented railroad and road renovations
as well as additions and improvements to equipment. The input of new
capital has dwindled to the point where it no longer is equal to capi-
tal retirement. The result has been a constantly growing average age
of most transportation facilities and an annual increase in the demand
for capital replacements.
Labor productivity probably will be increased within the
present capital plant but not enough to compensate completely for the
scarcity of capital. In all three modes of transport, capital re-
placements and additions will ultimately be necessary. The present
rate of capital addition will not create an increase in labor produc-
tivity in either railroad or inland water transport sufficient for
projected growth in the demands for service. In motor transport, labor
may be expected to increase capability through improvement in vehicle
utilization.
Shortages may be expected to continue unless transporta-
tion is utilized more efficiently or unless the available capability
is expanded by capital additions and improvements in all modes of
transport. An effective transportation system must combine inputs of
new and replacement capital into all modes of transport with more pro-
ductive employment of the existing system.
During 1961-65 the performance of all modes of transport
will increase in absolute terms. The rate of growth of highway trans-
port will exceed that of either rail or water, but railroads will
* Inland water transport in 1960 accounted for 1.0 and 6.5 percent of
the total amount of transport tons carried and ton-kilometers, respec-
tively.-
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remain the principal mode of transport. Increases in railroaLl per-
formance will be effected chiefly through a program of dieselization
and increases in efficiency, with only modest additions to the inven-
tory of rolling stock. Highway transport performance will be in-
creased through moderate increases in inventory accompanied by in-
creased utilization of the existing truck park. The Hungarian
authorities plan to increase inland water performance through increases
in inventory and a policy of port improvement. There are no indica-
tions, however, that these plans are being implemented, and it is be-
lieved that water transport performance will increase at a slow rate
during 1961-65. The part of the total performance accounted for by
inland water transport probably will decline during the next 5 years.
III. Finance
A. Price Policies
Early in 1959 a simplified railroad freight classification and
rate structure was put into effect in Hungary, designed to increase
revenue; to force diversions of short-haul traffic (less than 31 km)
from railroad to highway transport; and to reduce the number of classes
of goods, which under the new classification system were reduced from
5 to 2 for less-than-carload (LCL) shipments and from 49 to 9 for car-
load (CL) shipments. The new rate structure also increased the
minimum weight charge for LCL shipments from 10 to 50 kilograms. This
change probably will help bring the revenue from small shipments closer
to the costs involved. 22/
Distance zones for CL shipments were revised from 5-km zones
to uniform 10-km zones up to a distance of 500 km, to 20-km zones for
distances between 500 and 800 km, and to 50-km zones for distances in
excess of 800 km. Changes also were made in the classification of
groups, and the nomenclature of goods was simplified. The minimum
tariff distance was raised from 10 to 30 km. 12/ Raising the weight
and distance minimums should have the effect of diverting LCL and
short-distance hauls to motor transport or at least should helP make
such traffic pay its own way. If railroad operations can be made com-
pensatory, the balance of the transport sector account will change
from a net "deficit" to a net profit.*
There is no evidence of changes in the rate structure of either
motor or inland water transport. Motor transport rates need no change
for motor transport to continue to operate without a subsidy. Some
increases in waterway rates may be feasible as a result of increased
railroad rates.
B. Operating Costs
The internal financial condition of Hungarian transportation,
as represented by the official combined profit-and-loss statement of
railroads, motor trucks, and inland water transport before 1959,
* See B, below.
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showed an apparent net deficit. The railroads incurred the major por-
tion of this "deficit," and motor transport showed the only net
"profit." The figures may be deceptive, however, because the railroads
may be simply carrying a higher depreciation (or amortization) rate
than is necessary rather than showing this amount in a cash surplus
fund.* The costs of new road construction are not charged to highway
transport.
Available statements on income show that the net annual
"deficit" of the railroads has been increasing at a rather significant
rate, chiefly because of the percentage increase in the depreciation
account. The percent of total costs assigned to other factors has
remained reasonably constant. It seems possible that this railroad
"deficit" is merely a bookkeeping device, for the depreciation account
has increased in inverse ratio to the amount of capital investment
funds received from the central government. Such a device would serve
the following two primary purposes: first, funds would thus be made
available for capital investment, and, second, the deficit position of
railroad operations would provide a good reason for rate increases. If
rates are increased, investment funds for the railroads could be ob-
tained from customers of the railroad system rather than from taxpayers.
C. Comparative Costs
1. Factors Affecting Cost
Railroads will continue to be Hungary's principal mode of
transport. The density of the network poses a problem of high fixed
cost for rail operations, which in turn keeps the average unit cost of
goods transported at a high level. About 90 percent of all rail traf-
fic is carried on approximately one-half of the total track network. 11/
The average intensity of use of various segments of the line varies
from 10 tons per day on lines of light density to 24,000 tons per day
on lines of heaviest density. 12/ The average operating cost of these
lines is high, but they contribute to the total load of the system and
in many cases offer district economies over the introduction of motor
transport.
Proposals have been made to eliminate or reduce railroad
service in some areas of chronic low traffic density and to replace it
with truck transport, which can be more easily adjusted for areas that
require only periodic service. Trucks also would eliminate some trans-
loading problems. Such proposals would not apply, however, to lines
* The depreciation rate of Class I railroads in the US, where depre-
ciation should be higher than in Hungary because of newer equipment
and more frequent renewals, amounted to 6.4 percent of total costs in
1959 compared with 18.7 percent carried in the Hungarian financial
statement of 1955.
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of light density which are considered to have strategic importance or
to areas in which no satisfactory road system presently exists.
The Minister of Transportation and Postal Affairs on 30
September 1959 ordered immediate termination of railroad passenger and
freight service on some secondary lines, 33/ after which the areas were
to be served by motor trucks. Although this action applied to only
25 km of line, it is highly significant as a step toward abandoning
uneconomic rail facilities and replacing them with less costly service.
2. Effects of Costs on Traffic Shifts Between Carriers
The Hungarian government's attempt to make rail transport
compensatory may have changed the relative cost structure of transpor-
tation service so as to divert some short-haul traffic from railroads
to motor transport. This change would extend the absolute advantage
of motor transport fn cost to the shipper of short-haul movement from
its present range of 10 to 12 km to distances approaching 50 km, thus
improving the cost position of motor transport in comparison with the
railroads.
It is estimated that inland water transport will continue
to be less important than other carriers, with little additional ton-
nage acquired from new traffic or from railroad or motor transport.
The cost structure of inland water transport may change slightly in
absolute as well as relative amounts if efforts are made to reduce or
eliminate the difference between costs and earnings.
3. Effects of Transportation Price Policies on the Economy
If it is assumed that the depreciation account of each
mode of transport has improved its cash flow position, the reported
deficit position of railroad and inland water carriers does not accur-
ately reflect the subsidy that is indicated by the accounts. If the
depreciation account provides funds for adequate replacement of natural
depreciation plus an excess (as may be indicated by the ratio of depre-
ciation cost to total cost), the excess could be used either for capi-
tal additions to transportation or for transference to the central
budget for allocation to some other economic sector. Such a trans-
action would indicate that transportation charges are compensatory
and that the deficit is artificial. If the depreciation account ac-
curately reflects material depreciation and is actually expended during
the fiscal period, however, the deficit would then represent an actual
cash or credit transfer to transportation from the central budget and
thus would indicate a noncompensatory ratio of earned revenues to
costs.
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If transportation revenues do not cover costs and if sub-
sidization from the central government is necessary, the costs of
operating the transportation system are levied on the entire economy.
Conversely, if rates are based on actual costs, the cost of operating
the transportation system is distributed among the shippers. Govern-
ment policy in this matter could affect the geographic distribution of
industry.
D. Capital Investment
1. General
During the past 10 years the share of transportation and
communications in total investment by the central Hungarian government
has varied from a high of 19.3 percent in 1950 to a low of 6.8 percent
in 1954.* After 1950, by which time the war-damaged system had been
partly restored, the rate of investment funds showed a general downward
trend. This curtailment of investment funds (particularly during
1953-57), together with intensive utilization, resulted in a general
deterioration of the transportation system. By 1957 a larger share of
the total central government investment funds apparently was necessary,
and the rate of investment increased during 1958-59, then decreased .
once more during 1960.
The decline in central investment funds allocated to trans-
portation and communications actually represented an internal shift in
emphasis in the allocation of Hungarian investment funds toward the
several sectors of the economy. The share of transportation in total
central investment declined on an annual basis, while annual gross in-
vestment of the economy rose to a peak of 16.8 billion forints** in
1953 and then declined to an annual outlay of 11.1 billion forints in
1957, a 34-percent decrease compared with 1953.
Over the 5-year period 1950-54, transportation received
11.5 percent of the total gross investment. The total 5-year allotment
was sizable yet did not completely restore the war-damaged facilities
to good operable condition. The shift in investment priorities at the
expense of transportation (and communications) was not, therefore, a
result of any absolute satisfaction of the large requirements of trans-
portation for reconstruction, but it represented a diversion of scarce
capital into industry rather than into transportation.
* See Table 2, Appendix A, p. 25, below.
** Forint values in this report are given in current forints and may
be converted at a noncommercial rate of exchange of 23.48 forints to
US $1. This rate does not necessarily reflect the value of forints in
terms of dollars.
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In 1955, an interim year during which plans were made for
the Second Five Year Plan, 7.7 percent of Hungarian gross investment
was expended on transportation. In 1956 the share of transportation
was 8.0 percent of the total gross investment, whereas the Second Five
Year Plan called for transportation and communications to receive
about 12.8 percent of the total gross investment.
The year 1957 was a period of readjustment after the 1956
uprising and was used for formulation of the Second Three Year Plan
(1958-60) (the First Three Year Plan covered 1947-49), which replaced
the Second Five Year Plan (1956-60). The Second Three Year Plan al-
lotted 4,093.4 million forints (12.)# percent of the total gross in-
vestment) to transportation and communications for investment pur-
poses, thus leaving the relative position of the sector largely
unchanged from the percenta8e allotted under the 1956-60 Plan. In-
dications are, however, that the goal of 12.4 percent of the total
gross investment during 1958-60 was not reached, inasmuch as the
transportation and communications sector received only 10.6 and 12.7
percent in 1958 and 1959, respectively, and only 9.4 percent was
planned for 1960.
2. Investment in Railroads
Railroad transport received a greater part of investment
in transportation than the other modes of transport during 1950-54 and
continues to do so. Originally the Second Five Year Plan called for
investing 51.4 percent more in railroad transport than was invested
during the First Five Year Plan. Because of the uprising of 1956, the
original Second Five Year Plan goal of 4,834 million forints for in-
vestment in railroads probably was not accomplished, but it probably
was more closely approached than was anticipated in the formulation of
the Second Three Year Plan.
3. Investment in Roads and Bridges
The need for major efforts in rebuilding roads and bridges
was recognized during the early years following World War II, and
significant outlays were made for roads and bridges. The damage to
roads and bridges was substantially repaired, and a good deal of im-
provement was undertaken. The apparent drop in appropriations for
roads probably was the result of some absolute decrease in funds al-
located for this purpose, but it also appears that the funds allocated
to roads and bridges may have been shifted to be included in the
"other" transportation category after 1956.
Investment in highway transport for 1956-60 was to provide
dust-free cover for 17,000 km of highways. The 1958-60 Plan makes no
mention of the current plans for highway improvement.
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4. Investment in Other Modes of Transport
Investment in the remaining aspects of inland transport
such as waterways, fleet inventory, and motor vehicle inventory has
fluctuated more widely than investment in railroads. A breakdown of
actual amounts invested in each of the above categories is not avail-
able, but it is likely that air transport and inland waterways re-
ceive only modest amounts and that the bulk of the nonrailroad residue
is allocated to highway transport.
The Second Five Year Plan scheduled a total of 10.1 bil-
lion forints for investment in transportation and communications. Of
this total, 4.8 billion forints were to go to rail transport. If
past allocations are any indication, 8 to 10 percent of the total went
to communications, leaving approximately 4.3 billion forints for in-
vestment in all other modes of transport for the 1956-60 plan period.
No information is available as to what allocation was made of this sum
among the modes of transport other than railroads. The suspension of
the Second Five Year Plan in January 1957 left the investment plans for
motor and inland transport somewhat obscure, and the Three Year Plan
announcements made no mention of the investment that could be antici-
pated in these fields.
5. Investment Outlook
The proportion of total investment in transportation going
to each of the various modes of transport is expected to follow a
pattern placing the main emphasis on rail transport and secondary em-
phasis on motor transport. Inland water transport probably will con-
tinue to get a token place in investment allocations. Investment in
transportation probably is greater than it has been since 1954, in
both absolute and relative terms. Progress under the Three Year Plan
probably was better than planned, and if transportation was allotted
11 or 12 percent of the total investment funds, the absolute increase
derived from a growing total annual investment should have improved
the badly deteriorated transportation facilities.
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APPENDIX A
STATISTICAL TABLES
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Table 2
Investment in Transportation and Communications in Hungary
1950-60
Million Current Forints
Year
Total
Capital Investment a
Transportation
and Communications 2/
Total
Transportation 12/
Rail
Transport 12/
Roads /
and Bridges II/
All Other
Transportation 12/
1950
9,665
1,863
1,647
817
382
448
1951
13,127
1,786
1,656
679
324
653
1952
15,953
2,350
2,151
699
472
980
1953
16,848
1,777
1,574
601
256
717
1954
11,771
806
724
397
55
272
1955
11,207
950
866
510
25
331
1956
11,572
1,010
928
485
21
422
1957
1958
1959
11,082
13,663
30,463
876
1,447
3,857
800 2/
1,331 2/
3,652
391 2/
64o 2/
1,865
0/
o El/
o
409 2/
691 2/
1,787
1960
28,600 Li
2,700 II/
2,452 1/
1,156 1/
OdJ
1,296 1/
a.
b.
d. Estimate based
were assumed to be
e.
f. 22. Plan data
on the average percentage for each category during 1950-56
included in the "all other" category during 1957-60.
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except for
roads and bridges, which
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Table 3
Transportation Inventories in Hungary
by Mode of Transport E/
1950 and 1956-60
Units
Mode of Transport
Railroad
Locomotives
Steam
Diesel
Electric
Freight cars
Passenger cars
Highway
Trucks
Buses
Other
Inland water
Tugboats (2/
Barges
Passenger vessels
1950 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
2,231 12/ 2,360 2,420 2,400 2,450 2,460
2,163 12/ 2,270 2,300 2,270 2,200 2,200
5 12/ 20 50 60 180 190
63 12/ 70 70 70 70 70
52,200 y 58,200 58,200 59,500 60,800 62,000
4,400 5,100 5,100 5,100 5,100 5,500
4,400 20,000 21,000 22,300 23,600 25,500
2,800 3,800 3,700 4,000 4,400 4,700
N.A. N.A. N.A. 30,800 2/ 30,800 30,800
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
42 42 42 42 42
75 75 75 75 75
286 292 298 304 304
a. Estimated unless otherwise Indicated. These figures are for standard-gauge railroad equipment and nonmilitary motor vehicles only.
b. i2/
c. _2/. this figure includes 17,900 automobiles and 12,000 "special vehicles." The "special vehicles" probably in-
clude fire trucks, ambulances, police vehicles, and possibly city buses.
d. Although referred ta as tugboats, these are more properly towing vessels with some carrying capacity.
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Table 4
Performance of Railroad Transport in Hungary 2/
1950-60
Freight Transport
Million Metric Tons
Tons Carried
Passenger Transport
Average Passengers Passenger- Average
Narrow-Gauge Standard-Gauge Export, Import Transit , Total Ton-Kilometers di Length of Haul 2/ Carried Kilometers f/ Length of Haul g/
Year Railroads 2/ Railroads 2/ Tonnage 2/ Tonnage 2/ Tonnage 2/ Tonnage Carried 21 (Million) (Kilometers) (Million) (Million) (Kilometers)
1950 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
1951 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
1952 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
1953 2.367 57.887 1.680 5.015 1.815
1954 2.196 53.816 2.011 5.379 2.109
1955 2.231 56.544 2.694 5.756 2.822
1956 2.126 49.661 2/ 2.221 2/ 5.866 2/ 3.376 2/
1957 2.529 55.672 f/ 1.806 f/ 9.313 f/ 3.633 E/
1958 2.363 61.654 E/ 2.517 f/ 7.856 f/ 4.127 Li
1959 2.854 1/ 67.119 1/ 2.619 1/ 8.608 1/ 5.300 1/
1960 2.900 2/ 76.778 1/ 2.900 2/ 8.600 2/ 4.800 2/
41.465
48.236
59.825
68.764
65.511
70.047
63.250
72.953
78.517
86.500
95.9782/
5,420.8
6,273.0
7,442.4
8,173.2
8,168.7
8,801.8
8,164.2
9,490.2
10,235.2
11,711.7
13,346.5
131 255.2 7,134 28
130 339.3 10,586 31
124 354.8 10,628 30
119 362.6 10,656 29
125 363.3 10,491 29
126 365.7 10,262 28
129 327.5 9,204 28
130 354.1 10,398 29
130 397.5 11,875 30
135 437.2 12,837 29
139 483.7 2/ 14,500 1/ 30 1/
a. Including data from
dustrial use.
b. Total reported tons
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
1.
m.
n.
o.
standard-gauge railroads and narrow-gauge railroads for limited public use" but not including data from narrow-gauge railroads for forest and in-
carried less standard-gauge
Ton-kilometers divided by tons carried.
Unless otherwise indicated, passenger-khometers divided by passengers carried.
Reported total tonnage less standard-gauge tonnage.
112/
Estimated to be 3 percent of total tons carried.
Estimated.
Estimated to be 9 percent of total tons carried.
Estimated to be 5 percent of total tons carried.
)1h/
domestic, export, import, and transit tonnage.
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Table 5
Railroad Operating Factors and Freight Car Requirements in Hungary
1956-60
Performance 21
Domestic traffic
Export traffic
Total domestic and,
Import traffic
Transit traffic
Total tons carried
Operating factors
Freight car turnaroupd
Average load per loaied
Times each car used
Tons hauled per car Iper
Average daily carlo
I
Freight car reviremen
Domestic traffic
Export traffic
Domestic and expor
Import traffic
Transit traffic
Total car requiren1
export traffic
time 12/
car y
per year d/
year 2/
ings 1/
requirements
nts
Unit of Measure
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
Million metric tons
Million metric tons
Million metric tons
Million metric tons
Million metric tons
Million metric tons
Days
Metric tons
Units
Metric tons
Units
Units
Units
Units
Units
Units
Units
49.661
2.221
51.882
55.672
1.806
57.478
61.654
2.517
64.171
67.119
2.619
69.738
76.778
2.900
79.678
5.866
TT-6
2,31-a
3.633
7.856
77I7
8.608
8.600
5.300
4.800
61.124
70.424
76.154
83.646
93.078
4.6
14.7
79.3
1,170
11,400
42,600
1,900
44,500
5,030
2,890
52,400
4.2
15.2
86.9
1,320
12,700
42,100
1,370
43,500
7,050
2,750
53,300
3.9
15.5
93.6
1,450
13,500
42,500
1,740
44,200
5,420
2,840
52,500
3.8
16.5
96.1
1,590
13,900
42,400
1,650
44,000
5,430
3,340
52,800
3.7
17.0 2/
98.6
1,680
15,000
45,800
1,730
47,500
5,130
2,860
55,500
a. See Table 4, p. 27, above. Standard-gauge only.
b.
c. Estimated.
d., 365 days divided, turnaround time.
e. Times each car use per year multiplied by average load per loaded car. Data have been rounded to three significant digits.
f. Total tons carried divided by 365 days and the result divided by the average load per loaded car. Data have been rounded to three significant digits.
g. Tonnage divided 10 365 days, with the result divided by the average load per loaded car and multiplied by turnaround time. Data have been rounded to three signifi-
cant digits.
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Table 6
Performance of Motor Vehicles in Hungary
1950-60
Year
Freight Transport
Passenger Transport
Million Metric Tons Carried
Metric Ton-Kilometers
Average
Length of Haul
(Kilometers)
Passengers
Carried i/
(Million
Passenger-
Kilometers 2/
(Billion)
Average
Length of Haul
(Kilometers)
Transport Group 2/
(Million)
Other la/
(Million)
Total 21
(Billion)
Transport Group a/
Other L/
Total 2/
1950
6.66
4.24
10.90
93.5
46.5
0.14
13
28.2
0.40
14
1951
17.92
11.08
29.00
221.3
128.7
0.35
12
51.0
0.72
14
1952
26.79
16.61
43.40
375.7
234.3
0.61
14
66.1
1.03
16
1953
38.37
23.83
62.20
536.2
333.8
' 0.87
14
90.7
1.47
16
1954
34.59
21.51
56.10
600.3
349.7
0.95
17
114.4
1.80
16
1955
36.76
22.84
59.60
590.1
359.9
0.95
16
138.0
2.04
15
1956
39.69
24.61
64.30
588.4
371.6
0.96
15
146.3
2.15
15
1957
40.33
24.57
64.90
600.5
359.5
0.96
15
172.6
2.48
14
1958
43.92
27.28
71.20
604.1
395.9
1.00
14
216.1
2.89
13
1959
53.43
33.07
86.5o
702.4
417.6
1.12
13
269.4
3.40
13
1960
70.64 51
50.86
121.50
897.4 e
682.6
1.58
13
372.3 5./
4.20 2/
13
07.7
b. Estimated total performance less
c. Estimated.
d.
e.
f.
Ton-kilometers divided by
tons
transport group performance.
carried.
Passenger-kilometers divided by passengers carried.
g? 22/
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Table 7
Performance of Inland Water Transport in Hungary 91
1950-60
Year
Freight Transport Passenger Transport
Metric
Average
To is Carried Ton-Kilometers Length of Haul
housand (Million) (Kilometers)
12/
1950 1,110 478.4 431
1951 1,514 660.5 436
1952 i 1,659 775.8 468
1953 1,883 862.0 458
1954 I 1,760 842.7 479
1955 1,749 764.7 437
1956 1,509 598.0 396
1957 1,543 671.3 435
1958 1,891 856.6 453
1959 2,104 888.8 422
1960 2/ 2,310 1,030.0 441
Passengers Passenger- Average
Carried Kilometers Length of Haul
(Thousand) (Million) (Kilometers)
3,287 59.6 18
2,841 65.0 23
2,603 60.3 23
2,801 61.6 22
2,357 58.0 25
2,809 67.1 24
3,418 86.2 25
3,626 74.7 21
3,637 79.0 22
3,699 79.1 21
3,660 87.0 24
a.
b. Ton-kilometers divided by tons carried and passenger-kilometers divided by passengers carried.
c. Estimated.
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