AN EVALUATION OF THE PROGRAM FOR REDUCING THE WORKWEEK IN THE USSR

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01141A001900130001-5
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• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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N? 99
AN EVALUATION OF THE PROGRAM
FOR REDUCING THE WORKWEEK IN THE USSR
March 1961
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED IN WHOLE OR IN PART
WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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NOTICE
This report has been loaned to the recipient by
the Central Intelligence Agency. When it has
served its purpose it should be destroyed or
returned to the:
CTA Librarian
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.
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AN EVALUATION OF THE PROGRAM
FOR REDUCING THE' WORKWEEK IN THE USSR
CIA/RR ER 6 1-1 5
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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STAT
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CONTENTS
Page
Summary and Conclusions .... . ...... . ? ? ?
I. Provisions of the Wage and Hours Program 3
A. Historical Development and Future Plans 3
B. Success of the Program in 1959-60 5
II. Relationship of the Reduction in Hours to Important
Economic and Social Problems 8
A. Problems Facing the Soviet Leadership
B. Impact of the Shortened Hours
8
10
1. On Levels of Living
10
2. On the Adjustment of Wages and Work Norms .
?
?
11
3. On Efficiency
11
4. On the Tight Urban Labor Market
12
III.
Rationale for the Reduction in Hours
12
A. Motivation for the 1956 Announcement
13
B. Leisure in 195660
11+
1. Leisure as a Free Good
16
2. Leisure at a Cost
16
C. Leisure During the 1960's
18
1. Motives and Costs
18
2. Prerequisites and Prospects
21
Appendix
Source References 23
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Tables
1. Time Schedule for Adjustments in the Workweek and in,
Wages in the USSR, 1959-62
2. Planned and Actual Increases in Output and Productivity
in Soviet Industry, 1959-60 . . ?
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AN EVALUATION OF THE PROGRAM
FOR REDUCING THE WORKWEEK IN THE USSR
Summary and Conclusions
In 1956 the USSR reduced the workweek for all workers and employees
from 48 to 46 hour's and announced plans for a further gradual reduction
to 41 hours by the end of 1960... After lagging badly 'during 1,957-58,
the program was sharply accelerated in 1959-60, and by the end of 1960
all workers and employees had been transferred to the shorter workweek.
The reduction of the workweek was accomplished largely without lowering
average weekly earnings, without underfulfillment of production plans,
and with substantial increseS in output per man and per man-hour,' In
addition, higher "technically based" work norms have been established,
the wage and bonus structure has been rationalized, and prbgressive
piece rates have been deemphasized. The Seven Year Plan (1959.-65),
published in February 1959, specified that an additional hour was to.
be cut from the workweek in 1962 and that the shift to a 35-hour work-
week was to begin in 1964 and to be completed in 1968.
'Reduction of the workweek during 1956-60 has contributed to the
solution of several important problems facing the Soviet leadership in
recent years, including the need to reestablish control over wages, to
improve economic efficiency, and to adjust to a tightening urban labor
market. By means of the program, levels of living have been raised
(through increased leisure), and the resistance formerly. experienced to
upward adjustments in work norms has been quieted. Soviet managers have
been forced to make beneficial but formerly neglected changes in Methods
of operation, thereby sharply raising efficiency in the nonagricultural
sector with a minimum amount Of new investment Finally, the shorter '
workweek, together with the higher hourly pay, has helped to relieve
the pinah of the tightening urban labor market by proViding a particular
inducement for housewives and young people to seek employment.
Although the reduction in the workweek contributed to the solution
of these important problems, the real motivation is not so apparent.
The original (1956) decision to shorten the workweek probably was mo-
tivated by political considerations and was closely connected to the
intra-Communist Party strugle at that time. The primary motivation
may have changed from political to economic in 1958, when the program
for the reduction of the workweek and the program-for the establishment
of new wages and work norms were formally linked.
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There is considerable evidence that the reduction in hours of work
is a basic goal and commitment of the Communist movement and the Soviet
state. One of the first decrees of the Council of Peoples Commissars
of the Russian Federation in 1917 established the 8-hour workday, and
a 1927 decree sought with only partial success to establish a 7-hour
workday for production workers in industry. In addition, Nikita
Khrushchev has talked recently of a workday under Communism of 3 to
4 hours.
On the other hand, the program to reduce the workweek -- both in
1956-60 and in 1964-68 -- appears to be motivated Primarily by the
Soviet desire to prevent the volume of. consumption from increasing
at a rate greater than planned under the pressures of the, current and
prospective tight urban labor market. Stringencies in the urban labor
market -- which create pressures for increases in real wages -- result
from the declining increments to the population of labor-force age
(until 1962), from the regime's policy of restricting rural-urban
migration, and possibly also from the very rapid increase in invest-,
ment planned for 1959-65. Soviet doctrines concerning the primacy of
heavy industry, the relationship between the growth of real wages and
productivity, and the role of public consumption under Communism imply
that the desire to restrict the growth of consumption is a basic moti-
vational factor in the plans for a shorter workweek. Finally, the
clear intent of Soviet leaders not to compete with the US in consumer
durables, notably in automobiles, also supports this conclusion.
Although the increased leisure obtained by the Soviet worker-con-
sumer during 1956-60 may have been "free" or "low-cost" in terms of
foregone potential output, this result appears to have been a unique
one, occasioned by the existence of substantial "internal reserves"
in many ,Soviet enterprises and_by the short-run difficulties (costs)
of converting these reserves into increased physical output. The
.cost of further reductions in hours during 1964-68, in terms of fore-
gone output, probably will be much higher and could represent either
the costs of fulfilling a long-term Communist goal or, alternatively,
the costs of maintaining a planned "mix" of physical output in which
consumption goods are accorded a relatively low priority. The further
reduction in hours without a consequent reduction in real weekly
earnings, therefore, may depend heavily on the successful introduction
of new technology and on the ability of the Soviet planning-management,
system to install new equipment and to use the new techniques efficiently.
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I. Provisions of the Wage and Hours Program
A. Historical Development and Future Plans
In February 1956 the Twentieth Party Congress of the Soviet
Communist Party amended the Sixth Five Year Plan (1956-60) to provide
for the transfer of all workers and employees* from a general 48-hour
workweek to a 41-hour workweek by the end of 1960. The workweek was
to be shortened by 2 hours in 1956, and thereafter the reduction was
to proceed industry by industry, starting with those with the most
arduous working conditions, such as coal mining. In general, the
shift in the workweek was to be accomplished by cutting the workday
from 8 to 7 hours on weekdays, with a 6-hour workday on Saturdays.
Where "conditions permit," a 5-day week of 8 hours per day was to be
established. 1/** The Sixth Five Year Plan also provided for a major
reform of the wage and salary system 2/ through substantial increases
in minimum wage levels, revision of the antiquated system of work norms,
and readjustment of occupational, regional, and industrial wage differ-
entials.
Although both of these programs were administered under the
general guidance of the State Committee of the Council of Ministers,
USSR, on Questions of Labor and Wages, x xx they proceeded separately
at first, and even by early 1958 neither program had progressed much
beyond the experimental stage: In March 1956 the workweek for all
workers and employees was cut from 48 to 46 hours by reducing work-
hours from 8 to 6 on Saturdays, and in July 1956 a 36-hour workweek
was established for persons Under 18 years of age 2/ During 1956-57,
selected enterprises in ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy and in the
automobile, machine tool, and other industries experimented with a
shorter workweek, and other plants in the metallurgical, consumer goods,
food, construction materials, coal, and construction industries made
experimental changes in wages and work norms. In some establishments,
changes in norms, wages, and hours were made simultaneously. Effective
1 January 1957, basic minimum wages were raised to 270 rubles per month
for all workers and employees in rural areas (such as workers on state
farms) and to 300 rubles for those in towns and in workers' settle-
ments.t
* Workers and employees is a technical term used by the Soviet govern-
ment. It includes all wage and salary earners but excludes members of
the armed forces, members of producers cooperatives, and collective
farmers.
XX For serially numbered source references, see the Appendix.
*4* Gosudarstvennyy Kamitet Soveta Ministrov SSSR po Voprosam Truda i
Zarplata.
t Ruble values in this report are given in terms of pre-1961 current
rubles and may be converted to US dollars at the rate of exchange of
4 rubles to US $1. This rate does not necessarily reflect the value of
rubles in terms of dollars.
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During this period of experimentation, considerable inertia
and opposition were encountered to the upward adjustment in work
norms, and some difficulty was experienced in maintaining production
while reducing. weekly work-hours : As a result of these experiments
during 1956-57, the regime apparently concluded that the two programs
should be. combined. Accordingly, in April 1958 the government decreed
that both the wage adjustment and the reduction in hours were to. be.
introduced 'simultaneously and were to be completed by theendof 1958
in ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy and in the cbal, chemical, and:
cement industries 2/ ?Although target dates for other industries
including machine building were subsequently established, these' goal*
were not met, and the program lagged throughout 1958 and much of 1,959,
apparently for the following reasons.:
1. The inability of some managers to satisfy
the preconditions. of the transfer -- that is, their
inability to assure their superiors that the re-
duction in hours could be accomplished without
shortfalls in production and productivity and
without unwarranted increases in the wage bill,
and
2, .The lack of close administrative control
over the, program in the period after the abolition
of the economic ministries and the establishment of
the councils of national economy (sovnarkhozy) in
mid-1957.
The Seven Year Plan, published in February 1959, reaffirmed the
goal for completion of the transfer to, the 41-hour workweek by the end
of 1960. The plan also specified that another hour was to be cut from
the workweek in 1962 and that the transfer to a 35-hour workweek -- a
universal 5-day week of 7 hours per day -- would begin in 1964.*
Minimum wages are to be raised to 400 and 450 rubles per month by 1962,
and minimum wages are to be increased further in 1966 to 500 and 600 .
rubles per month for rural and for urban workers and employees, respec-
tively. 6/ The plan also stated that establishment of a workweek of
30 to 35 hourswas to be completed in 1968.**
* For underground workers a 30-hour, 5-day workweek is to be estab-
lished.
** The program for establishing "the shortest workday and workweek in
the world" is more fully explained in the November 1959 issue of
Planovoye khozyaystvo. 7/
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On 20 September 1959 a new time schedule for the wage adjustment
and the transfer to the shorter workweek was decreed (see Table 1).* 8/
The decree also provided that transfers were to be made on a regional
basis rather than on an industry basis. The regional councils of national
economy thus were assigned the primary responsibility for control over
the preparation and the timing of the transfers in individual plants.
This shift to a regional approach probably was intended also to prevent
the undesired movement of labor from plants in industries where the
reduction in hours had not yet been made to plants already on the shorter
workweek.
Before the councils of national economy, ministries, or depart-
ments granted permission to an enterprise to adopt a shorter workweek,
the management and engineering staff of the enterprise had to develop
acceptable plans for the changes. in technique, organization, and tech-
nology necessary to utilize existing "internal reserves" so a6 to ful-
fill production and productivity plans during the conversion period
with a minimum expenditure of additional labor and/or capital. 2/
B. Success of the Program in 1959-60
After the initial experimental period of 1956-57 and the lags
experienced during 1958 and early 1959, the implementation of the program
was sharply accelerated late in 1959 and in 1960. The following trans-
fers were announced 10/:
As of
? Total Number of Workers
.and Employees on the
Shorter Workweek
(Million Persons)
31 December 1959 13
31 March 1960 16
30 June 1960 20
30 September 1960 ?4o
31 December 1960 All
There wereapproximately 62 million workers and employees in mid-1960.
Plan fulfillment reports-indicate that the changeover to a
shorter workweek in industry has been accomplished largely without under-
fulfilling production or productivity goals. During 1959 and the first
* Table 1 follows on p. 6.
5
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Table 1
Time Schedule for Adjustments in the Workweek and in Wages
in the USSR
1959-62
Economic Branch and Geographic Area
Industry
In the North, the Far East, Siberia, the Urals, Kazakh-
stan, Moscow and Moscow Province, Leningrad and Lenin-
grad Province, and Ivanovo.Province
In all other Areas
Construction and geological survey work
In the North, the Far East, the Urals, and Kazakhstan
In all other areas
Transport and communications
Establishment
Of the Shorter Workweek
Lith quarter 1959--
4th quarter 1960
Introduction of New Wage
Scales and Work Norms
4th quarter 1959-
4th quarter 1960.
3d and 4th quarters 1960 3d and 4th quarters 1960
2d quarter 1960
lith quarter 1960
4th quarter 1959-
4th quarter 1960
State agriculture iith quarter 1960
Scientific research and design organizations 2d and 4th quarters 1960
Trade, public catering, procurement, material and
technical supply, educational, public health, cultural,
art and other establishments as well as governmental
and other "nonproductive" branches
2d quarter 1960
4th quarter 1960
1960-61 2/
1960-61 2/
1960-61 2/
3d and 4th quarters 1960 1962 2/
a. Inthose cases where changes in wages and work norms are not to be made concurrently with the reduction in
hours, wage schedules presumably are being adjusted arithmetically at the time of the changeover to shorter hours
in order to maintain earnings until the detailed wage adjustments can be completed.-
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9 months of 1960, plans for both labor productivity and manpower were
overfulfilled, leading to a substantial overfulfillment of output.plans.*
As shown in Table 2, however, labor productivity plans for 1960 were
underfulfilled.
Table 2
Planned and Actual Increases
in Output and Productivity in Soviet Industry .9,_/
1959-60
Percentage Increase Above Previous Year
Productivity Manpower
Output 12/ (Output per Employee) 2/ (Implicit Series)
. Planned Actual Planned Actual Planned Actual
1959 7.7 11 5.4 7.4 2.2 3.4
a, 1960 8.1 10 sl./ 5.8 More than 2.2 Less than
5.0 d/ 4.8 d/
1 .
1
a. 11/
b. Official Soviet index.
c. Based on "industrial-production personnel."
d. During the first 9 months of 1960, compared with the first 9 months
1
1 of 1959, output rose by 10 percent, output per employee by 6 percent,
I
and manpower by 3.8 percent.
In both years, output per employee remained high -- at a level
.equal to or only slightly below that achieved in 1956, 1957, and 1958 --
even though work-hours per employee were reduced substantially. In
1959, when plants in heavy industry were being transferred to a shorter
workweek, 62 percent of the overfulfillment of the output plan may be
* Because of the overfulfillment of output plans, the restructuring of
base-wage rate differentials between industries, and the incorporation
of higher minimum wage levels in the new schedules of wages and work
norms, average weekly wages in many enterprises also have increased.
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attributed to overfulfillment of the productivity plan. The remainder
of the overfulfillment in 1959 was associated with overfulfillment of
manpower goals. Inl.960 the overfulfillment of manpower goals prevented
a shortfall in the output plan because yearly productivity did not in-
crease as rapidly as planned.
As a result of the shorter workweek, output per man-hour rose
substantially faster in both 1959 and 1960 than output per employee
and was reported to have increased by 10.5 percent in 1959 and 10 per-
cent in 1960. 12/
II. Relationship of the Reduction in Hours to Important Economic
and Social Problems
A. Problems Facing the Soviet Leadership
In 195556, when the, decision to reduce work-hours was made,
the Soviet leadership was aware of a complex of problems related to
wages and hours of work. ..These included the need,(1):to increase
living standards, (2) to overhaul the wage structure and revise work
norms, (3) to improve managerial efficiency, and (4) to adjust to a,
temporarily tightening labor market.*
Since the death of Stalin the Soviet leadership has been
politically committed to raising the level of living for its people,
and during the post-Stalin period the Soviet worker-consumer has
benefited from moderate increases in the availability of consumer
goods. The Soviet people have come to expect further improvements
In levels of living.
Furthermore, a wholesale revision of the system of work norms
and incentive schemes had become imperative. As capital stocks in-
creased and workers' skills improved over the years, established work
norms became obsolete and-reflected very poorly the growing output
potential of the individual worker. As a result, bonus-payments and/or
payments on progressive piece rates for overfulfillment of these unduly
low work norms formed-an increasing.proportion of workers' total earn-
ings.. In addition, little care had been taken over the years to equalize
wage rates and work norms for comparable activities between plants.
Finally, a general upgrading of jobs and workers had occurred, with the
result that the labor grade and job classification system had become
severely distorted.
As a result of the chaotic wage system,- the planning of output
levels, wage funds, and consumption needs was becoming increasingly
* For an excellent presentation of the problems, see source 11/.
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complicated. Most workers were regularly overfulfilling their norms
by large margins and were being compensated with substantial bonuses
or by the rapidly progressive piece rates in effect in many indus-
tries. Moreover, as long as the system of wages and work norms was not
changed, the regime was implicitly committed to a future course of
rapidly increasing wage levels as capital stocks and productivity rose.
Reestablishment of control over wages, therefore, was a major impera-
tive for the Soviet leadership.
Soviet leaders also have sought greater efficiency. in the use
of existing resources of capital, labor, and raw materials, particu-
larly in industry: Soviet planners recognized that existing work
patterns were not the most efficient ones available to the managers,.
and the Soviet press regularly stressed the need to utilize "internal,.
reserves" and to reduce costs. In spite of considerable exhortation
in the past, however, managers tended to overlook or ,dismiss benefi--
cial organizational changes -- such as better. flow methods of produc-
tion and the elimination of idle time -- largely because their bonuses
were tied not to reduction in cost or to other efficiency criteria but
to fulfillment and averfulfillment of the output plan and because these
beneficial changes often temporarily interrupted production.
Many Managers sought to insure themselves against underfulfill-
ment of the output plan by maintaining a reserve of, labor and .other in-
puts for use toward the.end of.the plan period or for the fulfillment of
other lucrative priority output goals. This reserve of labor has been
reflected in chronic underfillment of labor productivity goals in many
areas of the economy, especially during 1950-55, as well as in under-
fulfillment of reduction in cost or profit plans,
Another problem faced by the Soviet leadership was the pros-
pect of a temporarily tightening urban labor market. This situation
resulted from (1) a deliberate government policy of, restricting migra-
tion from the rural areas and (2) the sharp decline in the annual
growth of the population of labor force age after 1955, a result of
the low birth rates during World War II.
The traditional way for plant managers to Maintain their
re-
serves of labor was to encourage migration from therrural areas.
Although the effect of these migrations on agricultural production
is not clear,* the cost Of housing and retraining large numbers of
migrants was becoming progressively greater.bythe mid-1950's In
order to reduce this migration and to encourage agricultural produc-
tion, the government raised income levels of collective farmer's by
* That is, its effect on production cannot be separated from the
effects of temperature, moisture, soil conditions, work habits, mana-
gerial skills, and other factors.
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upward adjustments in state procurement prices during 1953, 1954, and
1956. LI/ In addition, internal passport regulations were tightened
up in some cities, including Moscow, after 1956, 12/ and increased
diversification of work in rural areas (such as the construction of
small food-processing centers and the building of rural roads) is now
being encouraged. 1_6_/
The reduction of migration from the rural areas has intensi-
fied the pinch in the urban labor market caused by the declining in-
crements to the population of labor force age (15 through I 59). These
increments declined from 1.7 million in 1956 to about 0.2 million in
1961. This tight urban labor market situation provided the potential
for sharp wage increases as enterprise managers sought to maintain
their reserves of labor. By 1959-60, plants of "national economic
importance," which pay relatively high wages, probably still had ample
reserves of labor, whereas plants in the low-wage light and, local in-
dustries were less fortunate.
The potential for sharp wage increases resulting from the tight
labor market has been dampened considerably by a number of government
actions 11/ to provide more urban workers. Educational arrangements
have been adjusted to permit the employment of more young people, and
increased efforts to employ more urban housewives are being made, in
part by establishing more creches and kindergartens to care for their
children during work-hours. In addition, the demobilization or pros-
pective demobilization of 1.2 million servicemen in 1960-61 has reduoed
the upward pressure on wages. Whereas it is not possible to judge de-
finitively the net effect of all these changes, Soviet press complaints
of overrating (that is, the placing of persons in job categories for
which they are unqualified) suggests that some "bidding-up" of wages
has occurred.
B. Impact of the Shortened Hours
1. On Levels of Living
The reduction of the workweek from 48 to 41 hours without
reducing average weekly wages provides increased "pay" in the form of
leisure rather than in the form of goods. Thus the program fulfills
the political commitment of the leadership to provide a significantly
higher level of living for the people. In addition, the program to
shorten hours has firm Soviet historical precedent and favorable ideo-
logical connotations. One of the first decrees of the Council of
Peoples Commissars of the Russian Federation in 1917 was the estab-
lishment of the 8-hour workday, and a 1927 decree sought with only
partial success to establish the 7-hour workday for production workers
in Soviet industry. 1/
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2. On the Adjustment of Wages and Work Norms
By linking changes in wages and work norms to the short-
ening of the workweek, the Soviet leadership apparently has quieted
the opposition to these changes experienced during 1956-57. Under
the new system, norms are being raised by as much as 75 percent in
some cases, and perhaps 70 percent of an individual's pay is now ob-
tained by meeting his output target as against, say, 4o percent under
the old scales. Progressive piece rates are much less extensively
used, bonuses are more closely controlled, and basic wages have been
tied to much higher "technically based" norms. Whether these changes
represent a "speed-up" or merely a recognition of realistic rates of
output made possible by the growth of capital and labor skills cannot
be determined. Nevertheless, the adjustments in hours and wages have
forced Soviet workers to trade the opportunity of higher wages in the
future for increased leisure in the present. Thus the new system has
provided the Soviet government with the increased control over wages
that it desired.
3. On Efficiency
The reduction in hours has forced the managers of Soviet
enterprises and institutions to operate more efficiently. During the
period of preparation for the shorter workweek, Soviet managers and
engineers at each establishment were required to concentrate on those
cost-saving changes in their methods of operation that permitted the
shift in hours (1) without shortfalls in the output plan, (2) without
requiring new capital, and (3) without overspending the wage fund
(except where specifically authorized). In plants, such as those in -
heavy industry, favored by high wages and having a reserve of labor
under the old methods of operation, the objectives generally have been.
achieved both by better use of workers and by introducing formerly neg-
lected beneficial changes in organization. Particular attention was -
paid to the synchronization of production flows, better allocation of
primary and secondary workers, and the elimination of idle time ap-
parent in many time-and-motion studies. Attempts also were made to
reduce tardiness of employees and "down-time" on machines. In other
areas -- particularly in light and local industry, in the labor-short
regions of the Soviet North and East, and in plants usingcontinuous
processes -- the sharp cut in the workweek could not be fully compen-
sated for by such organizational changes, and additional labor and/or
capital had to be supplied to avoid production shortfalls. Some plants
have overspent their wage funds either through wage increases above
planned levels or by the recruitment of additional workers. Thus in
1959, when many plants in heavy industry were being transferred to the
shorter workweek, the overfulfillment of output plans could be attrib-
uted primarily to substantial improvements in productivity, whereas
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in 1960, when the conversion began in the light industries, the over-
fulfillment of output plans was accomplished solely through the em-
ployment of additional persons, as shown in Table 2.*
The. increased cost consciousness forced by the, reduction
in hours has been institutionalized and reinforced by two decrees
promulgated late in 1959 and early in 1960. 121/ ,The first of these .
decrees links the regular managerial bonuses primarily to reduction .
in cost rather than to fulfillment and overfulfillment of the output
plan.- Bonuses for reduction in,cost, however, are contingent upon
meeting the plans for output, new technology, and other key indicators.
The second decree links bonuses for development and the use of new
technology to the savings in cost made possible by new techniques or
by new equipment.
4. On the Tight Urban Labor Market
In spite of superficial appearances, the shortening of the.
workweek is not inconsistent with the tight urban labor market cur-
rently being experienced in the USSR. Rather, the tight urban labor
market increased the pressure on the regime to raise labor compensa-
tion. . The program-for the reduction of the workweek raises levels of
living by increasing leisure without lowering Weekly wages and thus .
is in line with rather than. opposedto.the forces operating in the
labor market to drive up the compensation of workers.'As long as
"internal reserves" could be mobilized and efficiency increased, as
described above, no shortfalls in production would result from the
shorter hours, hourly productivity would be sharply increased, and
the additional leisure would be virtually cost-free to the Soviet
leadership in terms of current goods and services. In addition; the.
shorterworkweek (and the higher hourly wages) are in themselves a
particular inducement, formore housewives and young people to seek
full or part-time employment, thus helping to alleviate the tight labor
market situation.
III. Rationale for the Reduction in Hours
Although the reduction in hours has contributed to the solution
of some problems facing the Soviet leadership, the real motivation
for the program for the reduction of the workweek is not so apparent.
There, are a number of possible answers to the related questions of
why the Soviet leadership originally decided in 1956 to reduce the
length of the workday and workweek, why they chose to do so in the
1956-60 period, and why they plan a further reduction in the workweek
during the 1960's. These possible explanations are closely connected
with one or the other of the problems discussed above but are not
* P. 7, above.
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always mutually exclusive. Some explanations are buttressed more'
strongly than others by the evidence presently available, and much
of the evidence will support several explanations. Exposition of
the common and conflicting elements in the various explanations and
of the evidence supporting each proposition,' however, provides con-
siderable insight into the possible motivations and goals of the
Soviet leadership.
Because the reduction in hours helped to solve a number of impor-
tant problems, it is conceivable that the Soviet leadership originally
thought of the program for the reduction of 'the workweek as a satis-
factory simultaneous solution to all of these problems. This possi-
bility, however, is contradicted by,the late (1958) linking of the
wage program and the program for the reduction in hours and also by
the late (1959) announcement of plans for further reduction in the
workweek after 1960. Although the regime apparently did not view
the program initially as a solution to the entire set of problems set
forth above, but only to one or some of them, its conception of the
program may have broadened as the reduction in hours progressed --
from a program intended to solve a particular problem to one that
served well on many fronts.
A. Motivation for the 1956 Announcement
'Considerable evidence suggests that the original proclamation
of a planned reduction in hours was primarily a political maneuver, a
maneuver that was closely related to the intra-Communist Party conflict
and that perhaps provided a partial alternative to Malenkov's "new
course" proposals. This possibility is supported by the fact that the
proposal for shortening the workweek did not appear in the original
draft directives of the Communist Party on the Sixth Five Year Plan
(1956-60) but was included in the version approved by the Twentieth
Party Congress and published about a month later. 22/ Moreover, any
such political proposal for raising the scale of living primarily by
granting more leisure rather than more consumer goods in the manner
suggested by the "new course" could be supported by powerful ideo-
logical principles and firm historical precedent. Unlike the "new
course," the program for a shorter workweek did not require or threaten
eventually to require a diversion of investment from production of
producer goods and other high-priority objectives to production of
consumer goods. The program, therefore, did not violate the doctrine
of the primacy of heavy industry. The charge of violating this doc-
trine was specifically leveled at the "new course" approach in February
1955, 21/ about the time of Malenkov's resignation as Premier. The
specific historical precedent was provided by the 1927 program of the
Council of Peoples Commissars for the transfer of all production
workers in industry to a 7-hour workday. The provisions of the early
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decree, which was only partly successful and was rescinded in 1940,
are strikingly similar to those of the present program for the reduc-
tion in hours. The action proposed in the draft directives of the
Sixth Five Year Plan, therefore, had the familiar appeal of an estab-
lished and socially approved program.
B. Leisure in 1956-60
Whether the original motivation for the 1956 announcement was
political or not, it may be asked Idly the program was granted such
prominence and actually carried out in the 1956-60 period instead of
earlier or later. Because complaints about unused reserves of labor
had been made for years, the timing of the program cannot be explained
satisfactorily as an information lag. One answer to the question of
timing, and one that is backed by considerable evidence, is related to
the condition of the labor market and to the need to change the system
of wages and work norms. Even though increased leisure may be a long-
run goal of the Soviet leadership, the regime would not necessarily
have to implement this goal in any given short-run period. During the
recent period of a tight urban labor market, however, the regime could
expect the pressures of wage bidding and a stiffening of worker resist-
ance to changes in norms and piece-rate systems. Shorter hours clearly
could make the requisite Changes in wages and work norms more palatable
to the workers and partly blunt the pressures for higher money wages
implicit in the tight urban labor market situation. As noted above,
Soviet planners evidently were aware that internal reserves existed at
a number of plants even thou& labor was becoming increasingly in short
supply. Previous exhortations and pressures had failed to induce mana-
gers to "mobilize" these reserves. The Soviet leadership, therefore,
may have realized that two effects of reducing hours -- the "mobiliza-
tion of internal reserves" and the inducement to students and house-
wives to enter the labor force -- would more than offset the effects of
the reduction in hours on the input of labor, thereby stretching the
available labor force While raising productivity and increasing levels
of living. This realization could have come in 1958, When the reduc-
tion in hours was linked with the wage program.
This explanation of the rationale for carrying out the reduc-
tion in hours during 1956-60 implies (1) that labor was or was becom-
ing a constraint on production and more efficient ways of using it had
to be found; (2) that the regime was feeling more intensely the pres-
sures for a higher scale of living than it had in the recent past; and
(3) that managers, if forced, could obtain savings in labor force uti-
lization. Although evidence for (1) and (2) has been cited, the avail-
able evidence for (3) does not eliminate the possibility that some
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other method could have been found that would have "mobilized" these
reserves and utilized them to obtain even greater increases in output.*
A second possible answer to the question of why the regime
chose 1956-60 as a period in which to increase leisure is provided by
A. Volkov, Chairman of the State Committee of the Council of Minis-
ters, USSR, on Questions of Labor and Wages. Volkov maintains that
leisure has always been a goal highly regarded by the Soviet leader-
ship and that the 1956-60 period was the proper historic time for a
major step toward fulfillment of this goal. In discussing this thesis,
Volkov states 22/:
Under Socialism, the productive forces are not developed by
squandering the basic productive forces -- the human being. On the
contrary, this development is subordinated to the fuller satisfaction of
the requirements of society as a whole, of the interest of the all?round
physical and mental development of man ... . The 20th and 21st
Congress Epf the Communist Party], developing the Marxist?Leninist
teachings on Socialism and Communism, placed measures for reducing
the working day at the top of the program to improve the material well?
being of the people in the period of the comprehensive construction of
a Communist society in the Soviet Union.
Whether the motivation for the 1956-60 hours program was pri-
marily political, economic, or ideological or was some combination
thereof, a whole sequence of questions regarding the costs of the pro-
gram and the goals of the leadership needs to be answered. Was the
gain in leisure largely a free good, obtainable by the reorganization
of production (or, in the Soviet terminology, the mobilization of in-
ternal reserves)? If not, what is implied about the goals of the
Soviet leadership? Even if the increased leisure was a free good in
the 1956-60 period, can it be considered a free good over a longer
period of years -- say 1960 through 1968? If leisure is not free in
the near future, what is implied about the goals of the Soviet leader-
ship? For example, has the Soviet leadership knowingly or uninten-
tionally committed itself to giving up an opportunity for increased
physical output -- including perhaps missiles and other military or
scientific products -- in order to obtain a higher, Communist-style,
scale of living for Soviet workers and employees?
* This possibility is discussed further in 2, p. 16, below.
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1. Leisure as .a Free Good
If the increased leisure was obtained for the Soviet
citizen during 1956-60 without sacrificing output or potential out-
put of physical goods:--- through the utilization of internal reserves 7-
the reduction in hours was both rational.and highly beneficial to the
Soviet leadership. This conclusion also applies if the program was ac-
complished during 1956-60 with a relatively small loss in output or
potential output. If, as is indicated by a considerable amount of
evidence, the Soviet economy was producing during these years at close
to maximum output under current technological conditions (including
the manner in Ndalieh labor was used), the utilization of untapped in-
ternal reserves of labor might produce a reduction in cost but could
not increase output significantly. in the short run. Thus the Soviet,
leadership may have reasoned that the free or, at 'worst, the low-cost
leisure obtainable from the program could be distributed to the Soviet
worker-consumers to satisfy partly their desires for higher levels
of living, to fulfill a long-run Soviet goal, or to,compensate them for
the deprivation of the potentially higher incomes built into the old
structure of wages and work norms.
2. Leisure at .a Cost
Although the new leisure might have been considered by the
Soviet leadership to be free or at least low-cost, very special circum-
stances (as outlined above) are necessary before such leisure is in fact
free or low-cost, and, therefore, the program for increased leisure might
have been costly in terms of the output or potential output that was
foregone.
In view of- the regime's apparent penchant in the past for
everexpanding output of physical_goods at maximum rates, any action
that substantially reduced the potential for increased output might be
regarded as irrational. It might be surmised that a l'proper" set of re-
wards, incentives,-andinstructions could be devised to induce and.
force Soviet managers to reschedule production, shift the newly re-
dundant manpower to other areas, and increase total output. This sur-
mise, however, implies either that reserves exist in the utilization
of other factors of production throngbout the economy -- such as
capital and raw materials -7 or that labor was substitutable for other
factors of production in Ei_short period of time. The experience of
many plants in overfulfilling their production and productivity goals
suggests that some reserves did exist in the utilization of existing
amounts of fixed capital and raw materials. It is not surprising that
plant managers, intent on finding better ways of using labor, also
would discover methods of economizing on rawmaterials and equipment,
thereby permitting greater output. Soviet articles often describe
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such gains, however, as fortuitous and spotty rather than widespread.*
If these accounts are wrong and such reserves are widespread, however,
the Soviet leadership could have paid a substantial cost in foregone
Output for the grant of addltional leisure.
Several possibilities emerge from this line of reasoning.
First, the regime may have been aware of the costs of the program at
some point in the process of policy formation but was willing to fore-
go the potential increase in output in order to move toward the goal
of increased leisure, to check the potential for rapid wage increases
by altering work norms, or to crack the whip on-Soviet managers.
Alternatively the regime may have mistakenly evaluated the program .
as one without costs.
Volkov's comments concerning Soviet motivations certainly,
are consistent with the possibility that the new leisure was purchased
at the price of foregone output. Also consistent with this explana-
tion are the regular budgetary allocations "for the implementation" of
the program -- for example, the allocation of 11 billion rubles in the
1960 budget.2)1/ Although the intended use of such budgetary alloca-
tions is not known, their existence suggests that out-of-pocket costs
of at least this amount were contemplated.
Alternatively the regime may have become politically com-
mitted to a program that it erroneously considered as costless, either
in the short run or in the long run. A growing awareness of the actual
or potential costs of the program could explain the slow implementation
of the program for the reduction in hours in 1956-58, until the regime
discovered the benefits of linking the program for reduced hours with
the wage program. Viewed in this way, it would be reasonable to expect
corrective action, now that the short-run objectives largely have been
accomplished -- that is, winning the intra-Party struggle and moderat-
ing the opposition of workers to changes in work norms. Corrective
action might be a reinstatement of the longer workweek on some pretext
or, more likely, might take the form of pressuring Soviet workers to
contribute "voluntary" labor to state projects. Recent articles on
the appropriate use of leisure, the widespread establishment of peoples
guard units, and the provisions for the financing of private home
building (recently repealed) could support this view. As mentioned
below, however, evidence of planned leisure also fits other evalua-
tions of the goals of the Soviet leadership.
The most crucial evidence against the "mistake and cor-
rection" explanation of the reduction in hours in 1956-60 is the plan
for a further reduction of, the workweek to 4o, hours in 1962 and
* For an example of this type of saving, see source
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35 hours by the end of 1968 (for most workers). Unless the pressure
for "voluntary" labor or "planned leisure" reaches large proportions
or unless some other device for relengthening the Workweek is insti-
tuted, the "mistake and correction!' thesis Would appear to have little
support.
C. .Leisure During the 1960's
1. Motives and Costs
Three major possibilities stand out as reasons for a
further reduction in hours of work during the 1960's. As in the
case of the 1956-60 rationale, the first is connected with the goals
of the Soviet leadership, and the second and third are connected with
the state of the labor market and the problems of distribution in a
planned economy.
First, the Soviet leadership now may feel that the ex-
plicitly stated, long-run goal of providing increased leisure under
Communism can and should be implemented* -- that the Soviet economy
is sufficiently vital to provide both a\faster rate of economic growth
and a shorter workweek than the countries of the "capitalist camp."
By one or another means, all societies establish socially approved
limits on the length of time -- in hours, in years, or in both -- that
a person may work, and there is evidence (as cited above) that reduc-
tion in work-hours is a basic goal and commitment of the Communist
movement and the Soviet state. In making this decision the Soviet
leadership may have knowingly chosen to forego some increased output
of physical goods in order to obtain increased leisure for its people
(together with any attendant benefits from propaganda). Even if the
leisure that was provided to the Soviet people during 1956-60 was a
"free" good, it was free only because of the existence of large "in-
ternal reserves" and the short-run difficulties (costs) of converting
these reserves into increased production.
Attempts to use this new leisure in socially approved
ways -- such as raising levels of education and participating in
voluntary labor brigades -- of course would reduce the long-run costs
of the additional leisure to the leadership. Finally, attempts to
plan leisure might moderate the dissatisfactionof those persons who
are bored and those for Whom the new workweek is too short at given
income levels. For the latter category the inducement of public ap-
proval or some compensation might elicit a substantial response.
* In October 1959, Khrushchev noted that "the time is not far-off"
when Soviet workers will work only 3 to 4 hours a day.
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A second possible explanation for the planned further re-
duction in work-hours is related to Soviet plans for economic growth,
the Conditions of the labor market, and the problem of distribution.
During 1959-65 the Soviet regime plans a massive investment program --
an 80-percent increase above the amount of investment during 1952-58,
a period of already high investment. The plans include the establish-
ment of automated production and the widespread reequiping of the
capital stock in many sectors of the economy The rate of growth of
the population of labor force age, however, will decline until 1961-62,
after which an increase is expected. The much more rapid increase in
investment suggests a continuation of the tight labor market, presum-
ing that the new equipment on net balance is not highly labor saving
and that the regime intends to keep most of the present agricultural
work force in the rural areas.
If the regime believes that the future rate of growth of
the national income (as measured by Soviet definitions) will be deter-
mined exclusively or primarily by the magnitude and type of new in-
vestment, two key questions must be settled by the leadership, as
follows:
1. How will the investment share of the,
national income in the desired "mix" be main-
tained?
2. In what form will the Soviet worker-
consumers be compensated for their labor?
It is obvious that the answers to these questions may be
contradictory. In a market economy the result of a tight labor market
(presuming no migration) would be a rise in money earnings, increased
efforts by managers to conserve on labor, and increased pressure for
most consumer goods.* In the Soviet planned economy, accommodation to
such pressures -- by secularly increasing the proportion of investment
flowing into the consumer goods industries and into consumer-oriented
agriculture -- would implicitly commit the leadership to a consumer
goods policy of the Malenkov type. Furthermore, it would partly sub-
ject the economy to the unplanned and perhaps changing complex of
consumer tastes.
Viewed in this way, the plan to increase leisure during
the 1960!s 12ay.be an, attempt to divert or deflect future pressures
* For simplicity, such matters as the complex questions of changes
in the interest rate, the role of consumer savings, and the possible
readjustments of original plans for investment have been omitted.
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for levels of consumption above those planned -- to the degree that
an increase in the relative share of total investment flowing into
light industry, certain areas of agriculture, and other consumer-
oriented sectors is required. In this context the costs previously
ascribed to the regime's desire to fulfill a long-term goal of Com-
munism reappear as the costs of maintaining a certain level of "ac-
cumulation" and, more specifically, a certain "mix" of physical out-
put.* It follows also that much of the cost in foregone output would
be in consumer goods. The reduction in the workweek in 1956-60, in
fact, may have been regarded as a first step in this direction whether
leisure was a free good in the short run or not. Indeed, the attempt
to deflect pressures for higher levels of consumption may be the thread
of continuity running through the original, presumably political, com-
mitment to a shorter workweek, the acceleration of the program in
1959-60, and the plans for still further reductions in hours.
In addition to the. explanation 'suggested above, there is
evidence that the Soviet leadership is consciously attempting to sub-
stitute leisure and public consumption for private consumption. Khrush-
chev has specifically excluded from the US-Soviet economic "race" any
major competition in production and ownership of private automobiles, 2g
and a similar prejudice against wasteful or socially unapproved con-
sumption is apparent throughout Sovieteconomic publications. In like
fashion the doctrine of the primacy of heavy industry ascribes a rela-
tively low priority to output of consumer goods. Furthermore, Soviet
wage theory, as enunciated in articles on the wage and hours adjust-
ments and in textbooks, insists that the rate of increase in average
wages be less than the rate of growth in productivity. 21/ If plans
are met, therefore, the relative share of production being distributed
as wages will decline secularly. This pattern has been justified ideo-
logically as the natural concomitant of the movement toward Communism,
during which an increasing share of a worker's real income is derived
from his "needs" rather than from his "work." 2.?1 In practice the
ideology coupled with wage theory suggests that social benefits (or
governmental transfer payments) -- such as old age and disability pen-
sions, the provision of kindergartens, boarding schools, rest and va-
cation areas, and other State grants like "free" housing -- will.
increase more rapidly than average wages, therefore representinga
* The costs of foregone output may be alternatively described as that
larger amount obtainable by a more labor-intensive method of production.
It should be noted, however, that the output "mix" resulting from this
method of production may not suit the tastes of the leadership for rock-
ets, missiles, space research, steel, and coal or for social insurance,
public catering, and other forms of public consumption.
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growing proportion of each individual's real income.* Whatever may
be the justification for this policy in Marxist or humanitarian terms,
it gives the government control over the allocation of the bulk of the
annual increase in national income.
Finally, the further reduction in length of the workweek
might be explained as an attempt to disguise a growing level of un-
employment. Demographic data suggest that annual additions to the
Soviet population of labor force age will begin to grow rapidly after
1962 as the post-World War II babies reach labor force age. 29/ If,
in addition, the new automated equipment is highly labor-saving on net
balance, a "surplus" of labor might result. This interpretation im-
plies that further (above-plan) increases in output are effectively
prevented by some capital, raw material, or other constraint and that
the redundant labor cannot be substituted for these factors even in
the long run in order to eliminate or ease the constraints.
There is little evidence to date to support this explana-
tion of the Soviet rationale, and previous experience suggests that
the Soviet government would attempt to reduce any such "surplus" by
means other than a shortening of the workweek. Most probable would be
programs for increased and perhaps compulsory retirement of aged per-
sons** and for an expansion of educational opportunities for young
people. These actions, of course, would work in the opposite direc-
tion from those now employed to increase the participation of young
people and housewives in the labor force.
2. Prerequisites and Prospects
As noted above, minimum wages are to be raised to 400 rubles
(rural) and 450 rubles (urban) per month by 1962 and again to 500 and
600 rubles per month in 1966. These increases in minimum wages will
benefit primarily the low-paid groups such as guards, junior service
personnel (such as janitors and sweepers), apprentices, and clerical
personnel -- that is, those persons who do not directly participate in
the rising wage levels resulting from growth in productivity.
Because it seems unlikely that the newly established sys-
tem of wage rates and "technically based work norms" will be overhauled
* This statement, of course, waives the vital questions of (1) the
"equitable" distribution of the social benefits, (2) whether the social
service rendered is valued as highly by the recipient as by the giver
(that is, the state);'and (3) whether social, political, or market con-
ditions permit dissatisfaction to be communicated to the policymakers.
** According to the Seven Year Plan (1959-65), minimum pensions also
are to be increased in 1963 and in 1966.
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again so soon, the reduction of the workweek could bring a reduction
in weekly earnings for those workers whose earnings are closely tied
to productionyunlessthe reduction.in hours is compensated for by
increases in output. The Soviet leadership expects such increases in
output from its highly touted automation and complex mechanization
program The early,announcement-of the plan for further reductions in
the workweek and the long (5-year) period established for its imple-
mentation suggest that a period of preparation similar to that used
during 1956-60 maybe employed. The object of this new preparatory
period would be the same as for the present one -- to assure that
weekly wages, output, and productivity do not decline as weekly hours
per person are reduced.*
If this preliminary analysis is. correct, a further reduc-
tion of' the workweek may depend heavily on the successful introduc-
tion of new technology and on the ability of the Soviet planning-
management system to install and use these new techniques efficiently.
If. the output gains from new technology are not sufficient to provide
for this increased leisure without reducing weekly wages (presuming.
that the alternative of increasing labor's wage share of the total
product is inadmissible), the reduction in hours may not take place.
It is possible, moreover, that in 1 964768, an additional amount of
leisure will not be so highly regarded by the Soviet worker-consumer
as it apparently was in 1956-60.:
* A different sequence of events may occur. To the degree that the
new capital can be employed to increase output per person much faster
than average wages during the 1960-68 period, an upward adjustment in
hourly wages could be made at the time of the changeover that would be
sufficient to offset the effects of the reduced hours on weekly earn-
ings, with no increase above 1960 in the relative share of the total
product being used for consumption.
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APPENDDC
SOURCE REFERENCES
1. Pravda, 26 Feb 56.
2. Ibid.
3. Sbornik zakonodatel'nikh aktov o trude (Handbook of Legisla-
tive Acts Concerning Labor), Moscow, 1960, p. 137-138 and 314.
4. Pravda, 9 Sep 56.
5. Ibid., 22 Apr 58.
6. Ibid., 8 Feb 59.
7. Antosenkov, Ye., and Moskalenko, V. "Programma sokrashcheniya
rabochego dnya i rabochey nedeli v SSSR" (The Program for
Reducing the Workday and the Workweek in the USSR), Planovoye
khozyaystvo, no 11, Nov 59, p. 30-38.
8. Sbornik zakonodatelinikh aktov o trude (3, above), p. 133-136.
9. Sukharevskiy, V. "Rabochiy den' i zarabotnaya plata v SSSR"
(The Working Day and Wages in the USSR), Kommunist, no 3,
Feb 60, p. 22-37.
Sovetskiye profsoyuzy, no 11, Jun 60, p. 50-53.
10. Izvestiya, 13 Jul 60.
Pravda, 22 Jan 60.
Ibid., 6 May 60.
Ibid., 14 Oct 60.
11. Pravda, 14 Oct 60.
Ibid., 22 Jan 6o.
Ibid., 26 Jan 61.
Izvestiya, 23 Dec 58.
Komsomol'skaya pravda, 15 Mar 59.
12. Pravda, 22 Jan 60.
Ibid., 26 Jan 60.
13. ,Bulganin, N.A, 0 zadachakh po dal'neyshemu podflyemu promy-
shlennosti, tekhnicheskomu progressu i uluchsheniyu organizatsii
proizvodstva (Concerning Tasks for the Ftrther Development of
Industry, Technical Progress, and Better Organization of Pro-
duction), Moscow, 1955,, p. 33-42.
14. Silin, A. "Glubzhe izuchat' ekonomiku kolkhozov" (To Study
Deeply the Economics of the Collective Farms), Vestnik
statistiki, no 2, Feb 60, p. 22-34. ?
Partiya-organizator krutogo pod"yema sel;skogo khozyaystva
(Party Organizers of the Sharp Increase of Agriculture),
Moscow, 1958, p. 5-90, 241-257, 373-380, 417-424, and 430-432.
15. Byulleten' ispolnitellnogo komiteta Moskovskogo gorodskogo
soveta deputatov trudyashchikhsya (Bulletin of the Executive
Committee of the Moscow City Soviet of Workers' Deputies),
no 19, Oct 58.
-23-
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16. Strumilin, S. "0 differentsialinoy zemel'noy rente v
usloviynkh sotsializma" (Concerning Differential Land Rent
Under Conditions of Socialism), Voprosy ekonomiki, no 7,
Jul 60, p. 81-97.
17. Trud, 22 Jan 59.
18. Schwartz, Solomon M. Labor in the Soviet Union, New York,
1951, p. 258-303.
19. Izvestiya, 3 Jul 60.
"Novoye v premirovanii rukovodyashchikh, inzhenerno-tekhnicheskikh
rabotnikov i sluzhashdhikh" (New Premiums for Managers,
Engineering-Technical Workers, and Employees), Sotsialistidhe-
skiy trud, no 10, Oct 59, p. 58-63.
20. Pravda 26 Feb 56.
Izvestiya, 15 Jan 56.
21. Ivanov, P. "Tyazhelaya promyshlennost' osnova mogu-
shchestva sovetskogo gosudarstva i blagosostoyaniya naroda"
(Heavy Industry -- The Basis of the Strength of the Soviet
State and the People's Welfare), Planovoye khozyaystvo, no 2,
Feb 55, p. 44-56.
22. Volkov, A. "Outstanding Gain of Socialism," Soviet News
Bulletin, no 210, Ottawa.
23. Maksimov, A. "0 sokrashchenii rabochego dnya v SSSR" (Con-
cerning the Reduction of the Working Day in the USSR),
Kommunist, no 10, Jul 60, p. 63-71.
24. Pravda, 28 Oct 59, p. 4-5.
25. Ibid., 10 Oct 59, p. 1.
26. Ibid., 29 Nov 57.
27. Ibid.
Aganbegyan, A.G., and Mayer, V.F. Zarabotnaya plata v SSSR
(Wages in the USSR), Moscow, 1959, p. 24-72.
Karpukhin, D. "Sootnosheniye rosta proizvoditel'nosti truda i
zarabotnoy plati v semiletke" (Relationship Between the
Increase in Labor Productivity and Wages in the Seven Year
Plan Period), Planovoye knozyaystvo, no 1, Jan 60, p. 27-37.
28. Sukharevskiy, a. cit. (9, above).,
Pravda, 27 Feb 59.
Strumilin, S. "Mysli o gryadushchem" (Thoughts About the
Future), Oktyabr', no 3, 1960, p. 140-146.
29. Bureau of the Census, Foreign Manpower Research Office.
Estimates and Projections of the Population of the USSR:
1950 to 1976, by Campbell, A.A., and Brackett, J.W.,'ser
P-95, no 52, May 59.. .
Ibid., unpublished estimates, 1959-60.
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