TRANSPORTATION GROWTH AND TRENDS IN THE USSR 1950-65

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• Publication Date: February 1, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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Economic Intelligence Report
N? 122
TRANSPORTATION GROWTH AND TRENDS IN THE USSR
1950-65
CIA/RR ER 61-3
February 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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Economic Intelligence Report
TRANSPORTATION GROWTH AND TRENDS IN THE USSR
1950-65
CIA/RR ER 61-3
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
SECRET
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FOREWORD
During 1950-65, certain basic trends in inland transport are being
established in the USSR, and other trends established before this time
are being continued or reversed. These trends in transport have sig-
nificant influences on the economic growth and military potential of
the country. The purpose of this report is to point out these trends
and to measure the extent of their effect. Inland transport includes
railroads, highways, inland waterways, coastal shipping, and pipe-
lines -- the modern carriers that comprise the Soviet capability to
move freight and passengers within the country. Comparisons with in-
land transport in the US are incorporated when they are helpful for
obtaining an understanding of Soviet problems. Every effort has been
made to effect complete comparability in the basic data used in these
comparisons.
It has been necessary to provide only gross analysis of many per-
tinent aspects of Soviet transport in order to keep the length of the
report within manageable limits.
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Summary
I.
II.
CONTENTS
Page
and Conclusions
Introduction
Transport Performance and the Economy
1
5
5
A. Freight Service
5
B. Passenger Service
6
C. Relationship of Transport Performance to Economic
Growth
7
III.
Development and Maintenance of the Transport System . .
9
A. Railroads
9
1 Administrative Organization
9
2. Plant
10
a. Network
10
b. Inventory of Freight Cars and Locomotives
12
(1) Freight Cars
12
(2) Locomotives
14
3. Labor Force
16
B. Highways
18
1. Administrative Organization
18
2. Plant ..
19
a. Network
19
b. Vehicle Inventory . ..
20
3. Labor Force
21
C. Inland Waterways
21
.4
1. Administrative Organization
21
2. Plant
22
a. Network
22
b. Fleet Inventory
23
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3. Labor Force
D. Pipelines
1. Administrative Organization
2. Plant
Page
24
25
25
25
IV.
Trends in Freight Traffic on Individual Carriers
?
?
?
27
A. Railroads
27
1. Freight Traffic by Major Commodity Groups
.
?
?
27
2. Freight Traffic by Region
28
B. Motor Transport
28
C. Inland Water Transport
29
D. Pipelines
30
V.
Operating Efficiency
31
A. Railroads
31
B. Motor Transport
33
1. Utilization of Equipment
33
2. Utilization of Network
33
C. Inland Water Transport
34
1. Utilization of Equipment
34
2. Utilization of Network
35
D. Pipelines
35
VI.
Rate Structures and Policies
36
A. Railroads
36
B. Motor Transport
38
C. Inland Water Transport
39
D. Pipelines
14.0
VII.
Costs, Revenues, and PrOfits
140
A. Railroads
40
B. Motor Transport
42
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C. Inland Water Transport
D. Pipelines
Page
43
VIII. Capital Inputs and Productivity
44
A. Capital Allocations
44
B. Capital Investment) Fixed Assets, and Capital
Productivity
44
1. Railroads
46
2. Motor Transport
49
3. Inland Water Transport
49
4. Pipelines
50
Appendixes
Appendix A. Statistical Tables
51
Appendix B. Methodology
85
Tables
1. Ton-Kilometer Performance by Inland Transport in the
USSR and the US, by Mode of Transport, 1950, 1955-59,
and 1965 Flan 52
2. Passenger-Kilometer Performance by Inland Transport in
the USSR and the US, by Mode of Transport, Selected
Years, 1950-58, and 1965 Plan
3. Passengers Carried by Inland Transport in the USSR, by
Mode of Transport, Selected Years, 1950-58, and 1965
Plan
4. Indexes of Performance of Inland Transport and Other
Economic Indicators in the USSR and the US, Selected
Years, 1938-65
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53
54
55
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Page
5. Railroad Network in the USSR, 1950, 1958-59, and 1965
Plan 56
6. Estimated Inventory of Railroad Freight Cars in the
USSR, Selected Years, 1945-59, and 1965 Plan 57
7. Estimated Inventory of Mainline Locomotives in the
USSR, Selected Years, 1946-65 58
8. Railroad Labor Force, Productivity, and Earnings in the
USSR and the US, 1950-58 and 1965 Plan 59
9. Volume and Selected Characteristics of Motor Freight
Traffic in the USSR, Selected Years, 1950-59, and 1965
Plan 60
10. Length of the Highway Network in the USSR and the US,
Selected Years, 1950-59, and 1965 Plan 61
11. Estimated Inventory of Motor Vehiclesin the USSR,
Selected Years, 1950-58, and 1965 Plan 62
12. Mainline Petroleum Pipeline Transport in the USSR,
1950-59 and 1960 and 1965 Plans .... .. ? ? ? ? 63
13. Commodity Composition of Railroad Traffic in the USSR
in Ton-Kilometers, 1950-58 64
14. Commodity Composition of Railroad Traffic in the USSR
in Tons Originated, 1950-58 and 1965 Plan 65
15. Average Length of Haul per Metric Ton of Railroad
Freight in the USSR, by Principal Commodity,
1950-58 66
16. Railroad Freight Traffic in the USSR, by Economic
Region, 1940, 1950, and 1955 67
17. Tons Originated by Inland Transport in the USSR, by
Mode of Transport, Selected Years, 1950-59, and 1965
Plan 68
18. Distribution of Total River Cargoes in the USSR, by
River Basin, 1955 69
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Page
19. Performance of River Transport in the USSR, Selected
Years, 1945-58, and 1965 Plan 70
20. Average Freight Car Performance of Railroads in the
USSR, 1950-58 and 1965 Plan 72
21. Average Freight Train Performance of Railroads in the
USSR, 1950-58 and 1965 Plan 73
22. Profits, Revenues, and Costs of Railroad Operations
in the USSR, 1940, 1950-58, and 1959 and 1965 Pla.ns 74
23. Average Revenue Rates for Selected Commodities as a
Percent of Unit Costs of Railroad Freight Traffic in
the USSR, Selected Years, 1949-56 75
24. Profits, Revenues, and Costs of Railroad Passenger
Operations in the USSR, 1940, 1950-58, and 1965 Plan 76
25. Profits, Revenues, and Costs of Railroad Freight
Operations in the USSR, 1940, 1950-58, and 1965 Plan 77
26. Profits and Budget Transaction of the Ministry of
Railroad Transportation of the USSR, 1950-59 and 1965
Plan 78
27. Profits, Revenues, and Costs of Inland Water Transport
Operations in the USSR, 1950-59 and 1965 Plan . . . . 79
28. Estimated State Budget and Nonbudget Allocations for
Transport and Communications in the USSR, 1950-51,
1956-57, 1952-55 Plan, and 1958-59 Plan 80
29. Estimated Capital Investment in the National Economy,
Transport and Communications, and Railroad Transport
in the USSR, by Plan Period 81
30. Capital Inputs of Railroad Transport in the USSR,
1950-59 and 1965' Plan 82
31. Estimated Capital Investment in Transport in the USSR
and the US, 1951-59 83
32. Estimated Fixed Assets, Depreciation Charges, Output,
and Capital-Output Ratios for Railroads in the USSR,
1950-58 and 1965 Plan 84
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Illustrations
Figure 1. USSR and US: Ton-Kilometer Performance of
Inland Transport, by Mode of Transport, 1950,
1955-59, and 1965 Plan (Chart) following
page
Figure 2. USSR and US: Comparative Indexes of Inland
Freight Transport and Industrial Production,
Selected Years, 1950-65 (Chart) following
page
Figure 3. USSR and US: Comparative Indexes of Inland
Freight Transport and Gross National Product,
Selected Years, 1950-65 (Chart) following
page
Figure 4. USSR and US: Index of Ton-Kilometers Performed
by Inland Transport per Metric Ton of Basic
Production, Selected Years, 1938-58 (Chart)
following page
Figure 5. USSR: Railroad Systems, Summer 1960 (Map)
inside back cover
Figure 6. USSR: Railroads, 1960 (Western, Central, and
Eastern Sheets) (Map) inside back cover
Figure 7. USSR: Typical Freight Yard on Rail Network
(Photograph) page
Figure 8. USSR: Typical Four-Axle Freight Car in General
Use (Photograph) page
Figure 9. USSR: Obsolete Two-Axle Freight Cars
(Photograph) page
6
8
8
10
10
13
13
Figure 10. USSR: 95-Ton Six-Axle, All-Steel Gondola
Cars Equipped with Roller Bearings
(Photograph) sage 13
Figure 11. USSR: Typical Mainline Steam Locomotive and
Tender (Photograph) page 15
Figure 12. USSR: VL-23 Electric Locomotive (Photograph)
page 15
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0
Figure 13.
Figure 14.
Figure 15.
Figure 16.
Figure 17.
Figure
Figure
Figure
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USSR: TE-3 Diesel Locomotive (Photograph)
page
USSR: Typical Gang of Railroad Workers
(Photograph) page
USSR: Selected Highways (Map) inside back
cover
USSR: ZIS-355 M Truck (Photograph) page
USSR: Principal Inland Waterways, 1956 (M.4)
inside back cover
18. USSR: Timber Rafts Being Towed on the
Kuybyshev Reservoir (Photograph) page ? ?
19. USSR: Tuymazy-Irkutsk Oil Pipeline Under
Construction (Photograph) page
20. USSR: Profit and Cost Segments of Unit Revenue
of Railroads, 1950-58 and 1959-65 Plan (Chart)
following page
Figure 21. USSR: Net Contribution of the Ministry of
Railroad Transportation to the State Budget,
1951-58 (Chart) following page
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15
17
20
23
25
42
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TRANSpORTATION GROWTH AND TRENDS IN THE USSR*
1950-65
Summary and Conclusions
Soviet inland transport has been developing since 1950 at a rate
adequate to support current economic growth. Its development has
been restricted, however, by a policy of keeping just ahead of re-
quirements and obtaining maximum productivity from limited inputs of
capital. The high-utilization-of existing facilities tends to-create
transport shortages at specific times and places, and the lack of al-
ternate service often leads to excessive transport costs.
Hope for greater economy in the use of transport is indicated by
the current Soviet Seven Year Plan (1959-65) in spite of the fact
that, since 1955, transport has grown at a more rapid rate'than the
economy of the USSR as a whole. Economy is to be realized through '
plans for a rapidly changing fuel balance in combination with more
rational shipping policies and location-of industry. Increased use
of pipeline transport, however, is not .occurring at planned rates,
and the average length of haul for railroads is still increasing in '
spite of plans for its decrease.'
The USSR is incurring more rapidly increasing demands for trans-
port in relation to over-all economic growth than the US is at the
present time. This trend in the USSR isbelieved to be the result of
several factors, the most significant-of which is the increasing
traffic between the traditional 'production and consUmption centers of
the western USSR and the areas- being developed in Kazakhstan-and-in
eastern and central Siberia Although the 'USSR will continue to re-
quire greater increases in transport input per unit of economic L
growth than the US will require, the rate at which these demands in-
crease will not continue to accelerate "during the period of this
estimate as it has in the past.
? Inland freight traffic by all modes of transport in the USSR in-
creased to about 1,530 billion ton-kilometers (tin)** in 1958 from
about 700 billion in 1950 and probably will increase to about 2,400
billion tkm in 1965. Absolute annual traffic increases are to average
* The estimates and conclusions in this report represent the. best
judgment of this Office as of 1 January 1961: ?
** Tonnages are given in metric tont throughout this report.
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about the same during the 7-year period 1959-65 as during the 8-year
period 1950-58. The average annual rates of growth* for 1951-58 and
for the 7-year period 1959-65 will decelerate from 10.4 percent dur-
ing the earlier period to 6.4 percent during the later period. Total
inland transport performance in the USSR was 67 percent of comparable
US performance in 1958, and by 1965 it may increase to about 76 per-
cent.
Railroads performed about 85 percent of total inland freight traf-
fic in 1959 and should perform about 78 percent by 1965. Their share
was 87 percent in 1950. The principal increase in the carrier share
of total transport during 1950-58 occurred in motor transport. The
shares of both motor transport and petroleum pipelines in total traf-
fic will gain during 1959-65. The US depends much less than the USSR
on railroads. Only 37 percent of the total inland freight traffic in
the US was performed by rail carriers in 1958 compared with 85 percent
in the USSR.
Soviet policy.seeks to limit expansion of private passenger trans-
port. Public carriers are expanded sufficiently to handle the neces-
sary urban commuting and long-distance official travel'. Development
of good roads and production of passenger automobiles have low pri-
ority. Railroads handle a major share of passenger transport, cur-
rently accounting for about 50 percent of total passenger-kilometers.
By 1965 the railroads' share of total passenger traffic is to decrease
to about 40 percent with significant expansion of intercity bus and
long-distance air transport.
Soviet pOlicy has limited.capital investment in transport so that
a larger share of available capital could be devoted to increasing in-
dustrial capacity. ,Consequently, transport equipment is kept in oper-
ation for a longer time than would be considered economical in most
Westerncountries,:and investment is concentrated in the existing net-
work to bring it to a?high level of productivity before any expansion
is undertaken. This policy is expected to continue. ,
Inj.ecent years, there has been a tendency to increase investment
in nonrail transport faster than in railroads This policy has been
carried out in motor transport to relieve the railroads of costly
short-haul traffic and in maritime and inland water shipping, together
with petraeum_pipelines,.to divert petroleum traffic from the rail-
roads to lower. cost carriers.
AveraEe annual rates of growth throughout this report are computed
at the compound rate for the stated period, including the terminal
years.
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Soviet investment in transport amounted to about 20 billion rubles*
in 1958, nearly double the amount invested annually during 1946-50. As
a share of total investment in all sectors of the economy, however, the
transport sector received only 10 percent during 1958 compared with
14 percent during 1946-50. During 1950-59, Soviet investment in trans-
port averaged about 10 percent of total investment, with a slight down-
ward trend, while the comparable US transport share of domestic invest-
ment was about 20 percent.
Fixed assets of the transport sector represented about 20 percent
of total Soviet assets in 1956 compared with about .26 percent in 1950.
This decline is a direct result of the relatively low level of invest-
ment in transport since 1950.
Soviet transport investment and rate policies have led, neverthe-
less, to increasing productivity and profit from railroad operations in
recent years. Railroad operating indexes reflect lower operating costs
per unit of output. Steady growth in traffic together with a policy of
not lowering rates to the same extent as the costs have decreased cause
profits to increase to an extent that more than offsets losses by other
modes of inland transport. Until 1953, railroad operations had been
subsidized, but net accrual to the state budget from such operations
was 12.2 billion rubles in 1959 and is planned to be 22 billion rubles
in 1965. Railroad earnings are more than adequate to support the cap-
ital investment planned through 1965.
Soviet inland transport is growing at a more rapid rate than com-
parable US transport. As the Soviet economy has developed in recent
years, a greater increase in transport input per unit of economic
growth has become necessary. Diversification of transport facilities
is expected to continue in both countries through 1965, although Soviet
diversification by 1965 will not reach the level already achieved in
the US.
* Unless otherwise indicated, ruble values in this report are given in
current rubles and may be converted to US dollars at a rate of exchange
of 4 rubles to US $l. This rate does not necessarily reflect the value
of rubles in terms of dollars. All dollar values in this report are
given in terms of current US dollars.
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I. Introduction
The method and the rate of development of transport in the USSR
have been markedly influenced by the political and economic framework
within which they took place. In order to maximize the short-run
productivity of available capital for over-all economic growth, in-
vestment policy for transport facilities appears to keep one step ahead
of the current requirement for transport. Planned economic development
as practiced in the USSR does not require advance capital investment in
transport facilities to stimulate industrial growth.
Surpluses of some inputs have been substituted for deficiencies in
others. There was extensive use of labor, including forced labor,
until the early 1950s, when labor became more critical in relation to
available capital and materials. Investment to modernize the existing
plant and facilities then began to receive emphasis, with increased
production and improved labor productivity as a result. The current
Seven Year Plan (1959-65) continues the emphasis on modernization, with
extension of transport facilities concentrated in areas of new indus-
trial development.
II. Transport Performance and the Economy
The performance of the Soviet inland transport system in recent
years has not been a limiting factor in the aggregate development of
the Soviet economy. Soviet transport, however, has failed to satisfy
certain specific plan goals contained in ministerial directives and
has demonstrated localized inadequacy from time to time: Traffic has
tended to expand more rapidly than transport facilities since 1928.
Although theresultant high-density transport system has managed to
move substantially all the freight offered, little excess capacity
exists, and transport operations have been oriented toward producing
maximum output rather than optimum service. Although present capacity
would allow for considerable increases in military traffic without a
serious reduction in essential economic activity, the transport network
is not so diversified as in the US and most Western European countries.
A. Freight Service*
Freight traffic in the USSR has increased rapidly during the
? postwar period. Performance by the inland transport system in 1959
was nearly 1,700 billion tkm compared with about 700 billion in 1950,
an average increase of 10.4 percent.per year. The increase in the
last few years was more rapid than in the earlier postwar years because
* Table 1, Appendix A, p. 52, below, and the chart, Figure 1, fol-
lowing p. 6.
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of the intensified economic development of the eastern regions* and
the consequent increase in the average length of haul. The increase
is not expected to be as rapid during the period of the Seven Year
Plan. Total inland freight traffic is planned to reach about 2,400
billion tkm in 1965, requiring an increase of 6.4 percent per year
during the plan period. Even with the rapid growth achieved in the
past and that planned for the future, the total freight traffic in
the USSR in 1965 probably will be only at about the same level as
the US performance during 1958.
Rail freight traffic in the USSR will constitute a smaller
share of the total than heretofore -- it will decline from about 87
percent of the total in 1950 to about 78 percent in 1965. A rapid ex-
pansion of motor transport was principally responsible for the decline
in the railroads' share of the total during 1950-59, and petroleum
pipeline transport will be largely responsible for the shift expected
by 1965. Motor transport increased its share of the total from about
3 percent in 1950 to about 5 percent in 1959 and in 1965 may account
for about 6 perceht. The share performed by petroleum pipeline trans-
port increased from less than 1 percent in 1950 to more than 2 percent
in 1959, and the plan for 1965 calls for pipeline transport to perform
about 8 percent of total ton-kilometers. The share of freight traffic
performed by inland water transport declined a little during 1950-59,
and although some increase is expected, the share in 1965 probably will
not regain the 1950 proportion.
Modern freight transport .service in the US has always'been more
diversified than in the USSR. Of the total inland freight traffic in
the US during 1958, railroads accounted for about 37 percent compared
with 85 percent in the USSR. Railroads in the USSR carried more traf-
fic than railroads in the US for the first time in 1955, and the Soviet
performance in 1958 was 55 percent more than that of the US railroads.
Freight transport by all other inland carriers in the US is much more
developed than in the USSR.. Performance by each of the other modes of
transport in 1958 averaged more than five times the comparable level
in the USSR.
B. Passenger Service**
The USSR has relatively little long-haul passenger traffic.
Although Soviet passenger traffic has increased considerably in recent
* The economic regions referred to in this report are those definec
and numbered
** See Tables 2 and 3, Appendix A, pp. 53 and 54, respectively, below.
The data include both intercity and intracity movement by all modes of
transport.
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2,010
. .
PETROLEUM PIPELINES ?' 9.4%
?
. ?
SHIPS IN COASTAL AND
INTERCOASTAL TRAFFIC
INLAND WATERWAYS
MOTOR VEHICLES
RAILROADS
29360 12-60
4;f4
45.6%
692
87%
USSR AND US
TON-KILOMETER PERFORMANCE OF INLAND TRANSPORT
BY MODE OF TRANSPORT, 1950, 1955-591 AND 1965 PLAN
USSR
US
0 7%
2.7%
6.7%
2.9%
2,396
"13.2%,
39.8%
1,129 3%
3.0%
3.8%
6..`? '
85.9%
2,509
W4
4-1*.2
1,252
...
39.3%
86.3%
1 6%
2.6%
3.9%
Billion Ton-Kilometers
2,467
.?,..?? ?
?:13:2X.
"44
38.2%
1,405 19%
X5.41g
86.3%
4.4%
2,289
1,533
20:7%
36.6%
84.9%
2 2%
2.3%
NO BREAKDOWN
AVAILABLE
1,690
Ot.:BO
84.6%
2.5%
22%
Figure 1 50X1
3,100
2,371
77-
-
78%
2.1%
1950 1955 1956
1957 1958
1959 1965
Plan
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years; absolute performance remains rather low, especially when com-
pared with that in the US. In 1950, about 127 billion passenger-
kilometers were produced in the USSR,. less than 10 percent of the level
of the US. By 1957, passenger-kilometers in the USSR had doubled, The
Seven Year Plan calls for another 70-percent increase, to 470 billion
passenger-kilometers, by 1965, a level that would be less than one-half
of the US performance in 1938.
. In the USSR, railroads are the principal mode of:passenger
transport,. whereas in the US passengers travel mainly by automobile..
In 1950 the Soviet railroads produced 69 percent of the total passenger-,
kilometers:compared with less than 4 percent by the US railroads. In
the same year, automobiles in the USSR performed, only about 1 percent
of total passenger-kilometers, whereas automobiles in the US were re-
sponsible for about 85 percent of the US total passenger-kilometers.
During the 1950's, automobiles in both countries increased their pas-
senger traffic more rapidly than did the railroads.
, The motorbus has rapidly enlarged its share of intercity pas-
senger traffic-in the USSR.. In 1958 the number of intercity passengers
traveling by bus was more than eight times the level of 1950 compared,
with an increase of about 20 percent by rail. Buses were responsible
also for a large portion of the growth in local and urban passenger
traffic, The over-all number of local and urban passengers* increased
by 163 percent in.1958 compared with 1950, and the share carried by
buses rose from 11 percent to 34 percent of the total. Again', these
gains were made concurrently with slower growth in urban streetcar and
suburban railroad traffic'. The growth trends for individual carriers
established during the 1950's are expected to continue through 1965,
with buses increasing their share to about 55 percent of the total.
C. Relationship of Transport Performance to Economic Growth
Certain comparisons of the development of the economy and of
transport performance in both the USSR and the US help to assess the
past and future demand for transport services in the USSR. Industrial
production grew slightly faster than freight transport from 1950 to 1955
in both the USSR and the US (see Table 4** and the chart, Figure 2***).
In 1955 or 1956 the trend was reversed in the USSR, and freight transport
has grown faster than industrial production since that time. Whether
or not this reversal of the trend is a temporary or secular development
* Passenger movement by automobiles other than taxis is not included.
Taxis, however, carried more than one-half of the total automobile pas-
sengers.
** Appendix A, p. 55, below.
*** Following p. 8.
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cannot yet be accurately ascertained. The indexes for industrial pro-
duction and freight transport have a general tendency to parallel each
other over extended periods, and the recent reversal of lead relation-
ships probably does not alter this long-run relationship.
Data on industry and transport for the Seven Year Plan indicate
that a return to the relationships of 1950-55 is planned in the USSR.
A 55-percent increase in freight traffic is planned, whereas industrial
production is planned to increase by 80 percent. The plan implies con-
siderable economy in the use of transport compared with the trend in
1956-58. The USSR may hope to achieve this objective in the following
two ways: (1) a change in consumption from coal to gas and oil for
fuel and power and (2) a reduction in the average length of haul.
There is no doubt that the change in fuel consumption patterns will
reduce the rate of growth for rail transport performance, although
pipeline transport has not met planned rates* and increasing amounts
of petroleum are transported by rail each year. Expected decreases in
the average length of rail freight haul also have been overly optimis-
tic. Decreases planned each year bince 1950 were only partly realized
in 1952 and 1958. Increases in every other year caused the average
length of haul in 1959 to reach 810 kilometers (km), 88 km greater than
in 1950.**
A comparison of transport performance with the gross national
product (GNP) demonstrates that demands for transport in support of
growth have been greater and have increased more rapidly in the USSR
than in the US (see the chart, Figure 3***). Soviet planners, how-
ever, do not expect growth in production through 1965 to require equal
concurrent growth in demand for transport. Although transport input
necessary to produce a given unit of GNP in the USSR has increased
over recent years, plans for future growth of GNP and transport in-
dicate a reduction in unit transport input. Several factors, however,
including the probable degree of success with plans for fuel balance
and industry location, cast serious doubt on the validity of esti-
mating any significant reduction in unit transport input.
Comparing freight traffic with the total tons produced of a
comprehensive list of basic commoditiest for the USSR and the US demon-
strates the extent of transport economy practiced in the past in the
* See III, D, p. 25, below.
** For a fuller discussion of the length of haul, see IV, A, 1,
p. 27, below.
XXX Following p. 8.
t The 24 commodities used include the most important ores, fuels,.
agricultural products, and chemicals.
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Figure 2 50X1
COMPARATIVE INDEXES OF INLAND FREIGHT TRANSPORT AND INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
SELECTED YEARS, 1950-65
240
220
200
180
160
140
120
100
USSR
US
? Inland
Freight Transport _
Production
Industrial
?
/
/
/V/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
".
? ?
.?,........
o? 00'
_...0000,.
N
/_.
/
/
,?''
*-
--N
/
//
1950
29361 12-60
1955 '56
'57 1958
1965
Plan
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USSR AND US
Figure 3 50X1
COMPARATIVE INDEXES OF INLAND FREIGHT TRANSPORT AND GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
SELECTED YEARS, 1950-65
240
220
200
180
160
140
120
100
'
.
USSR US
?
Inland Freight
Gross National
Transport
Product
?
/
/
/
/
,
I
I
?
/
/
//
..................?............
?.....?
),
......?
...----'
/
1
/
./
I......'
.....?
1 1
i
.?
-,'
1950 1955 1956 1957 1958
29362 12-60
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USSR* (see the chart, Figure 1+**). On the basis of US experience
(1938-58) and Soviet experience (1950-58), it would seem likely that
the Soviet requirement for transport during the current phase of economic
development will continue through 1965 to increase at least as fast as
the US requirement.
III. Development and Maintenance of the Transport System
A. Railroads
1. Administrative Organization***
Throughout the recent postwar years, there has been a tend-
ency to shift some operating and traffic responsibilities in the Soviet
transport system to lower organizational levels. There have been two
significant administrative changes in this respect. Most industrial
and line organizations formerly assigned to the Ministry of Railroad
Transport (Ministerstvo Putey Soobshcheniya -- MPS) have been shifted
to divisional level, and the railroad system has assumed increased?
responsibility for traffic planning and car distribution. These dele-
gations of power and increases in authority of local administration
probably have not enhanced efficiency to any marked degree but were
consistent with and in part stemmed from the general industrial reor-
ganization of 1957 that created the sovnarkhozes (councils of national
economy). Before the reorganization, 67 percent of the total freight
shipment plan was arranged for by the MPS working directly with other
ministries at the national level. Now that some industrial ministries
have been abolished, much of the information necessary for planning
shipments is gathered by the railroad system and its divisions at the
sovnarkhoz level and is passed on to the central planners assigned to
the MPS. Each railroad system also is responsible for car distribution
in its area, within the framework of a general plan worked out at the
ministerial level.
Attempts have been made to introduce close cooperation and
joint study of transportation problems between the local transport units
and the sovnarkhozes. The major problem is that there is usually little
relationship between the boundaries of the divisions and the sovnar-
khozes. The MIS attempts to shape the boundaries of the operating di-
visions so as to increase operating efficiency. Although cooperative
traffic planning will be stressed in the future, the MIS very likely
will continue to determine the boundaries of the operating divisions on
the basis of operating efficiency.
* Comparison with the US is believed to be particularly useful be-
cause the average hauls in both countries are relatively long.
** Following p. 10.
xxx See the map, Figure 5, inside back cover.
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At the same time that the responsibilities of the systems
and the operating divisions have increased, the size of these units
also has increased. In 1952, in addition to 56 systems and 277 divi-
sions, there existed another administrative echelon (the okrug), which
stood between the NTS and the systems. Today the okrug no longer ex-
ists; there are only 35 systems; and the operating divisions, which
now number 230, have become larger and have assumed many of the powers
of the system. The major reorganization took place in July 1959 after
a few large systems had been tried on an experimental basis early in
1959. The new systems are expected tc make better use of high-caliber
personnel, utilize equipment more efficiently, and fulfill expanded
traffic planning responsibilities more effectively.
2. Plant
a. Network*
The route length of the Soviet railroad network oper-
ated by the NTS was officially reported to be 122,800 km** at the end
FIGURE 7. USSR: Typical Freight Yard on Rail Network.
For data on the network, see Table 5, Appendix A, p.
and for a map of the network, see Figure 6, inside back
also the accompanying photograph, Figure 7.
** Trackage nearly equal to the length operated by the
ated by other organizations. All long-distance traffic,
enters the MPS system.
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56, below,
cover. See
MPS is oper-
however,
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160
140
120
100
USSR AND US
INDEX OF TON-KILOMETERS PERFORMED BY INLAND TRANSPORT
PER METRIC TON OF BASIC PRODUCTION; SELECTED YEARS, 1938-58
Figure 4
USSR
- US
1938
29363 12-60
1950
*Ton-kilometer performance divided by total production of 24 basic commodities, which
include ores, fuels, chemicals, and agricultural products.
1955 '56 '57 1958
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of 1958. Of this total, about 27 percent was double tracked. Eight
percent of the route had been converted to electric traction and
9 percent to diesel operation. Automatic block signaling was in-
stalled on about 18 percent, and 2 percent was equipped with central-
ized traffic control. About 96 percent of the route is broad gauge
(5 feet). Of the total network operated by the MPS, about 73 percent
is concentrated in the European USSR and only 27 percent in the Asi-
atic USSR. 1/*
Soviet plans for construction of new railroads have
been consistently underfulfilled. The Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55)
was only about 54 percent fulfilled, 2/ and construction completed
during 1956-60 probably will amount to only about 66 percent of that
called for under the original Sixth Five Year Plan (1956-60). The
Seven Year Plan (1959-65) calls for about 9,000 km of new trunk lines,
plus about 2,700 km of logging railroads. The route length of rail-
roads of the MPS in 1965 must therefore be planned at about 131,800 km.
This figure does not include the logging railroads, some of which may
be transferred to the MPS at a later date, as has occurred in the past.
In view of past experience, it would not be surprising if the present
plan for line construction should, like its predecessor, also prove
to be overly ambitious.**
Important construction scheduled for the current Seven
Year Plan includes completion of the South Siberian and Central Sibe-
rian Railroads, the Aktogay-Gosgranitsa section of the Trans-Sinkiang
line, and the Yesil'-Turgay, Suoyarvi-Lendery, and Miass-Uchaly lines
as well as construction of the new Gur'yev-Astrakhan' and Pavlograd-
Zolotonosha-Zhashkov lines. It is planned during 1959-65 to double
track about 8,000 km of line, an increase of about 24 percent above
the 1958 length. Instead of new construction and double tracking of
other lines, the capacity of the railroads on certain heavily traveled
or difficult sections has been increased by electrification, automatic
blocking, and centralized traffic control.
Railroad electrification is now being intensively car-
ried out under the pressure of increasing traffic.xxx The route length
of electrified railroads was scheduled to be increased from 5,361 km in
1955 to 13,361 km in 1960. Electrification plans were exceeded every
year during 1956-59, bringing the length of electrified lines to about
11,600 km at the end of 1959. A total of 30,000 km of electrified
route is planned by the end of 1965.
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By 1965, automatic block signaling is to be installed
on 18,000 to 20,000 km of additional route, nearly doubling the amount
installed by the end of 1958. Plans call for the introduction of cen-
tralized traffic control on about 10,000 km of route by 1965, which,
would extend it to more than five times the length existing at the ehd
of 1958. Rail lines under diesel operation totaled 3,432 km in 1950,
located principally in the water-deficit areas of Central Asia. By
1958 the total dieselized route had expanded to 11,100 km. These lines
were still concentrated largely in Turkmen, Tadzhik, Uzbek, and Kazakh
SSR's; in the Trans-Volga area; and in the Caucasus. Dieselized lines
by 1965 are to total 70,000 km, including many heavy-density, primarily
single-track lines requiring an increase in capacity but not scheduled
for electrification. Lines on which water supply is inadequate and
fuel coal is not readily available also are included.
b. Inventory of Freight Cars and Locomotives
(1) Freight Cars
. The freight car inventory in 1958 represented about
14 percent of the value of the fixed assets of the railroads in the
USSR. 2/ On 1 January 1959 the railroads are estimated to have had
889,000 freight cars, 27 percent of which are still the old two-axle
types. During 1952-59 the inventory increased by about 86,000 cars and
is expected to.increase to 969,700cars by 1965, with two-axle cars
then constituting only 14 percent of the total. -Compared with the US,
the USSR is handling about 50 percent more freight traffic on its rail-
roads with about one-half of the total number of freight cars. Additions
to the inventory in recent years have been in higher capacity units,
causing the freight-carrying capacity of the freight car inventory in
the USSR to increase about 170 percent since 1945, although the unit
increase was only about 46 percent (see Table 6*). Three types of
freight cars in use in the USSR are shown in the accompanying photo-
graphs, Figures 8, 9, and 10.**
Most Western countries attempt to achieve quantity
manufacture of spare parts and a reduction in the spare parts inventory
by using a high degree of standardization throughout a wider range of
types, whereas the USSR follows a policy of. reduction in the number of
types themselves. 'There exist two types of standard wheel sets, the
latest of 1.ihich is a version of the earlier design having all-coil
springs and shock absorbers. Standardization of car types is currently
achieved with only two designs of four-axle chassis having cast steel
frames. Two-axle cars are no longer produced and are being retired as
rapidly as practicable.
Appendix A, p. 57, below.
** P. 13, below.
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FIGURE 8. USSR: Typical Four-Axle Freight Car in General Use.
FIGURE 9. USSR: Obsolete Two-Axle Freight Cars. These types
of cars are still widely used but are being retired as rapidly
as practical.
FIGURE 10. USSR: 95-Ton Six-Axle, All-Steel Gondola Cars Equipped with Roller
Bearings. These types of cars are now operating in limited but increasing
numbers.
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The backbone of the working freight car inventory
consists of open-top gondolas and hopper cars, types that carry more
than 40 percent of the freight traffic in terms of both tons and ton-
kilometers. The following tabulation shows the distribution of freight
traffic by type of car, probably for 1954 g:
Percent of Total Percent of Total
Type of Car Tons Ton-Kilometers
Box 21.8 28.4
Flat 25.6 18.7
Open-top 45.7 41.6
Tank 6.1 9.9
Refrigerator 0.8 1.4
Total
100.0 100.0
,The 60-ton four-axle, open-top car with steel
frame and wooden body is the most representative type now in produc-
tion. Production has Commenced on a 93-ton six-axle, all-steel open-
top car, but only a few hundred are in use. Large-scale production of
wooden body types probably will continue through 1965 because of a
limited supply of steel plate for freight cars.
(2) Locomotives
On 1 January 1959 the Soviet railroads are esti-
mated to have had 36,000 operable mainline locomotives of all types.*
Coal-fired steam locomotives predominate (88 percent), although about
one-third of rail freight traffic in 1959 was moved by diesel and elec-
tric locomotives. A significant transition in motive power is in prog-
ress, which, while increasing the capacity of the locomotive inventory,
will lower the total number of units to about 26,300 by 1965. The in-
ventory will then consist of approximately equal magnitudes of steam,
electric, and diesel units (see Table 7**). ?The ultimate motive power
'goal of the Soviet railroads is to effect a complete changeover to
electric and diesel traction by about 1970, with about 55 percent of
total railroad freight traffic to be hauled by electric locomotives. .
Three types of locomotives in use in the USSR are shown in the accom-
panying photographs, Figures 11, 12, and 13.***
** Appendix A, p. 58, below.
*** P. 15, below.
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FIGURE 11. USSR: Typical Mainline Steam Locomotive
and Tender. About two-thirds of the rail traffic is still
handled by steam traction.
FIGURE 12. USSR: VL-23 Electric Locomotive.
This type of locomotive is the backbone of the
current electric locomotive inventory.
FIGURE 13. USSR: TE-3 Diesel Locomotive. This locomotive is
the most typical of the current inventory of diesel locomotives,
which are to handle nearly one-half of the rail traffic by 1970.
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The Soviet conversion from steam to diesel and
electric traction is taking place at a rate considerably slower than
the conversion to diesel traction in the US after World War II, in
spite of the already higher and still increasing traffic density on the
Soviet network. US railroads, which were hauling more than 90 percent
of freight traffic by steam in 1945, were handling more than 85 per-
cent by diesel traction in 1955 and are now, for all practical purposes,
completely dieselized.*
Considering the availability to the USSR of Western
experience, as well as its own experience with diesel and electric lo-
comotives, Soviet capability to date to develop and produce really ef-
ficient electric or diesel locomotives has been incredibly unimpressive.
Soviet authorities themselves admit that they do not yet have suitable
passenger electric or diesel locomotives, and lack of adequate success
with the development of AC electric locomotives has necessitated im-
ports from France and West Germany to take advantage of completed AC
line electrification.
The last steam locomotive was built in the USSR in
1956, and increasing production of existing standard electric and die-
sel locomotive designsl plus a measure of exploration into new lines
of development, is indicated. Steam locomotives are being either rel-
egated to light traffic lines and switching service or exported to
Communist China as they are replaced by more efficient types. Some
locomotives may be held in reserve, and others may be scrapped. Diesels
will be transferred from area to area within the USSR. Locomotive units
of about 6,000 horsepower (hp) (two units of 3,000 hp each in the case
of diesels) probably will predominate eventually, possibly supplemented
by gas turbine locomotives burning low-grade oil or diesels modified to
run on compressed natural gas, depending on the outcome of current ex-
perimentation. Electric locomotives powered by atomic energy either
directly or through power substations also are a long-range possibility,
although Soviet railroad officials have stated that they do not con-
sider the former to be a practical approach.
3. Labor Force
In recent years the labor force of the MPS has amounted to
about 3.4 million employees, or about 5.7 percent of the total state-
employed labor force. About 2.3 million of this total are engaged in
functions comparable with those performed by US railroads (see Table 8**
and the accompanying photograph, Figure 14.***)
** Appendix A, p. 59, below.
*** P. 17, below.
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FIGURE 14. USSR: Typical Gang of Railroad Workers. Observe the large number of
women.
Although traffic on the railroads of the USSR continues to
increase, gains in labor productivity have largely offset requirements
for additional personnel for several years. Investment in moderniza- ?
tion of plant and equipment, especially dieselization and.electrifica-
tion, together with the supplementary facilities necessary to utilize
the advantages of the modern traction, has been largely responsible
for the impressive gains in labor Productivity.
Even so, the US railroads, with their transition from steam
to diesel traction virtually completed, have continued to register
about the same absolute gains in traffic-kilometers per employee as the
railroads of the USSR. The US railroad laborer is still about 60 per-
cent more productive than the comparable Soviet worker, and by 1965,
if present traffic and productivity trends continue, each US railroad
employee probably will still outprodude'his Soviet counterpart' by more.
than 50 percent. What this 'Statement really means is that investment ?
in modernization of railroads in both countries is paying handsome div-
idends in increased labor productivity.' Because labor is a relatively
more costly input in the US than in the USSR, it may be argued that
greater increases in labor productivity are necessary in the US (see
Table 8*)._ It will become increasingly important to the USSR, however,
to keep its railroad labor requirement to a minimum as the labOr?supply
Appendix A, p. 59, below.
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becomes more critical. A reduction in the labor force for certain ac-
tivities should not be difficult, because labor is used inefficiently
and even lavishly in many instances on the railroads.
Current productivity gains in the US are now largely the
result of improved signaling and mechanized maintenance of way, whereas
the USSR still has much to gain from the changeover to diesel and elec-
tric traction, which probably will not be completed until about 1970.
Average annual earnings of US and Soviet railroad employees
since 1950 have increased at a somewhat faster rate than productivity
in the US and at a much lesser rate than productivity in the USSR. In
both countries, however, the average railroad worker is paid better
than the average worker in the economy as a whole.*
B. Highways
1. Administrative Organization
The administration of both freight and passenger motor
transport and the highway network in the USSR is largely decentralized.
If the element of private ownership is disregarded, it may be said that
the administration of motor transport in the USSR is similar to that in
the US, although there is in the USSR considerably more centralized 1
control over the operating pools, especially in matters of policy. Re-
sponsibility for highway. construction and maintenance also is consider-
ably decentralized. Roads of "All-Union significance" are financed by
direct centralized allocations. Each republic is responsible for the
maintenance and development of all highways within its borders. Some
of this responsibility is established at the republic level, and some
is assumed by administrative districts within the republics. KOlkhozes
and industrial enterprises also construct and maintain roads for their
own use.
The administration and operation of the civilian freight
motor vehicle inventory may be divided into the following four major
categories: (a) common carrier, (b) agricultural, (c) industrial, and
(d) trade. .Responsibilities, subordination, and administration of the
inventory of these vehicles have changed considerably in recent years.
Common carrier trucking** is now subordinate to republic transport or-
ganizations and is being significantly expanded. A reorganization in
motor transport in 1956 transferred vehicles from many ministerial
pools to common carrier organizations.' The reason given for this
change was that the ministries were not Utilizing their vehicles nearly
Common
carrier
trucking includes considerable
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as effectively as the common carriers'. Consequently, more transport
and less expensive transport could be produced by expanding the common
carrier system. The need for more effective control over unauthorized
use of vehicles also probably influenced the decision. During 1953-58
the share of motor freight ton-kilometers performed by common carrier
trucks increased from 8 to 24 percent, and by 1965 common carrier
trucks are to perform 44 percent of the total 12/ (see Table 9*).
More recently, centralized industrial pools have been cre-
ated within the sovnarkhozes from vehicles formerly owned and operated
by individual enterprises, and the common carrier pools have been re-
organized into larger units. In addition to operating at lower costs,
the larger pools are believed to be more flexible and hence better able
to meet shipper demands. Agricultural vehicles, formerly controlled by
the machine tractor stations, are now controlled entirely by the kol-
khozes and sovkhozes.
Practically all passenger service by motor vehicles is by
common carrier. Intercity buses are administered by common carrier
organizations of the republics, and taxis and urban bus organizations
are controlled by the governments of the cities in which they operate.
2. Plant
a. Network**
Development of a good road system has been assigned a
relatively low priority in the USSR. In 1950 the Soviet highway system
had only 2 percent of the US mileage of paved roads.*** Total Soviet
highway expansion during 1950-58 was equal to only about 75 percent of
annual US expansion in recent years. There were still only 58,500 km
of paved roads in the USSR at the end of 1958 (see Table 10t). Oper-
ating efficiency of motor vehicles often suffers because of adverse
road conditions, and motor traffic is practically nonexistent in many
areas that could benefit from such service. Service stations and re-
pair points are few and far between, and their stock of spare parts is
often inadequate. Planned expansion by 1965 is to increase the Soviet
network of paved roads to only about 158,500 km. Even if construction
is somewhat less than planned,tt the anticipated traffic load will not
strain the capacity of the network.
Appendix A, p. 60, below.
For a map of the highway network, see Figure 15, inside back
cover.
*-)HE Roads that are graded and surfaced with either a water-resistant
material or a material that facilitates drainage.
t Appendix A, 61, below.
tt During the 5 years ending in 1955 the program for construction of
new hard-surfaced roads was fulfilled only 65 percent. 11/
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b. Vehicle Inventory
The motor vehicle inventory in the USSR has expanded
rather significantly since the end of World War II, and annual produc-
tion of motor vehicles is to increase from 511,000 in 1958 to a level
of 750,000 to 856,000 by 1965.* 1.V The motor vehicle inventory by
1958 had reached 3.4 million vehicles, and if plans for increasing
production are successful, the 1965 inventory will consist of about
5.4 million vehicles, an increase of about 57 percent above the level
of 1958 (see Table 11** and the accompanying photograph, Figure 16).
Although trucks will continue to make up the largest share of the in-
ventory, production of passenger vehicles is expanding rapidly. Auto-
mobiles and buses together will account for about 25 percent of the in-
ventory in 1965 compared with 10 percent in 1950.
FIGURE 16. USSR: ZIS-355M Truck. This size of truck is typical of the current inventory, al-
though limited numbers of larger and specialized types are beginning to be produced.
Recent expansion of the truck inventory has aided the
growth and improvement of transport services to some extent, but the
* Although Soviet production of all motor vehicles is only about
10 percent of US production of all motor vehicles, Soviet truck produc-
tion is 34 percent of US truck production, based on 1957 data. 12/
** Appendix A, p. 62, below.
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quality and quantity of motor transport services are still below West-
ern standards. Operating characteristics of some vehicles are poor,
and there is a high degree of obsolescence as well as a lack of suffi-
cient research and development. Too few types of vehicles are produced
to satisfy the varied needs of industry and agriculture. The majority
of trucks produced are 2.5-ton to 4.5-ton vehicles. The output of
light, heavy, and specialized trucks is inadequate. Most of the vehi-
cles in agriculture can utilize only 75 percent of their weight capac-
ity, and trucks are used where trailers or semitrailers could be used
to greater advantage. An analysis of truck types in 1956 recommended
the following desired distribution:
Capacity
Percentage in the
1956 Inventory
Desired
Percentage
1.5 tons and under
13
30
2 to 5 tons
85
60
Above 5 tons
2
lo
Total
100
100
By 1958, most of the basic models of both trucks and
passenger vehicles made in the USSR had been in production from 10 to
12 years. In recent years, new designs have been prepared and proto-
types constructed which, if successfully introduced into serial produc-
tion, should help alleviate some of the Weak spots in motor transport.
3. Labor Force
Data are not available from which estimates of labor force
and productivity of labor can be made
force is believed to be substantial.
that labor productivity has increased
is still believed to be very low as a
highways and equipment.*
for motor transport. The labor
Although Soviet sources indicate
considerably in recent years, it
result of the poor condition of
C. Inland, Waterways
1. Administrative Organization
In June 1956 the administration of river transport, which.
had been centralized under an All-Union Ministry, was transferred
* Labor productivity for common carrier operations increased by 48 per-
cent between 1940 and 1950 and by 72 percent between 1950 and 1956.111/
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to the control of the individual republics. At the present time, in
all republics except the RSFSR, the administrative organizations of
river transport have the status of main administrations. Ministerial
status has been retained in the RSFSR only. This ministry accounts for
approximately 95 percent of the total freight ton-kilometers and 90 per-
cent of freight tons originated on the inland waterways of the USSR.*
At the time of the 1956 reorganization the shipping activi-
ties of all private and state organizations (noncommon carrier), ex-
cepting those essential to their own productive needs, were transferred
to common carrier steamship agencies. Before this change the volume of
freight carried by noncommon carriers normally exceeded that of the
common carrier organizations but was hauled for short distances only.
No substantial changes in Soviet river transport operations
appear to have resulted from decentralization of river fleet management
or from absorption of the noncommon carriers. The practical effects,
if any, would scarcely be reflected in statistics available since that
time, because of the dominating influence of river operations in the
RSFSR on total river statistics in the USSR.
2. Plant**
a. Network
. The length of, navigable rivers in the USSR is estimated
to be 527;000 km, about 135,000 km of which were used in 1958 for river
transport. River transport in 1950 operated on about 130,000 km, using
navigation aids on 112,000 km, of which lighted aids were on 66,000 km.
By 1965, river transport is expected tO extend operations to 142,000 km.
Common carrier steamships operated on 65 percent of the operating net-
work in 1958.
In recent years, most new routes have been opened in
the Siberian regions where the rivers are the longest and least uti-
lized in the USSR because of short ice-free navigation periods and the
presence of shallow beds, fast currents, and rapids. Exploitation of
the eastern rivers, concurrent with the projected industrial growth of
* All coastal shipping, including that on the Caspian, is under the
jurisdiction of the All-Union Ministry of the Maritime Fleet. Although
that part of the total performance of the maritime fleet which is do-
mestic has been included in the over-all performance data in this re-
port, the maritime fleet is excluded from this discussion.
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*** For a map of the inland water network, see Figure 17, inside back ?
cover.
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this area,. shoulft account for the greatest share of. new routes to .be
opened.
b. Fleet Inventory
In 1945-46the river ,fleet in the USSR.had 612,000 hp
in telfpropelled units and 4.2. million deadweight tons,(DWT)* in non-.
self-propelled units,,but about 40 percent of each fleet was inoperable
or in limited service. ,By the end of 1959 the river fleet totaled
about 1.6 million. hp in self-propelled units, of which 45 percent Were
diesel propelled.- Non-self-propelled, unitswere estimated to total
DWT, of which 54 percent were steel .(see the accompanying
photograph, Figure 18).
FIGURE 18. USSR: Timber Rafts Being Towed on the
Kuybyshev Reservoir.
A large percentage of the existing fleet has?always
been out Of service and undergoing repairs., thus imposing heavy demands--
on shipbuilding facilities, especially those of outside transport or..."
ganizations on which the Ministry of the River Fleet was considerably
* 'Deadweight tohnage isa measure of the carrying capacity of a ship
expressed in metric tons that it, the differente-betWeen the AisL-
placement of the Ship light and its displacement loaded.'
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dependent. Because of high building costs, the scarcity of metal re-
sources, and a limited capability for producing diesel engines in the
USSR, ambitious plans for expanding the fleet with large numbers of
new and modern ships were never fulfilled.
Detailed plans for future river fleet acquisitions are
not available, but the relatively small increase in traffic projected
for the period indicates that growth will be limited. The fleet, how-
ever, will be modernized to some extent. In 1959 a program was begun
to convert the steamships built since World War II to diesel propulsion.
By 1965 these ships should represent 84 percent of the total horsepower
in the fleet. Obsolete wooden barges, replaced by metal ones, will be
retired. By 1965, metal barges should account for 92 percent of the
hon-self-propelled tonnage. It is planned to increase the load capac-
ity of the self-propelled cargo fleet by ,320 percent. This is to be
accomplished both by new construction and by converting non-self-
propelled ships. In 1958, self-propelled cargo ships made up 12 per-
cent of the dry deadweight tonnage and 2.3 percent of the oil dead-
weight tonnage. In 1965, 23 percent of the dry cargo fleets and 27 per-
cent of the oil fleets will be self-propelled. Turnaround time of self-
propelled ships is 2 to 2.5 times faster than that of non-self-propelled
ships. Their over-all productivity is more than three times as great,
and their operating costs are 25 to 30 percent lower.
3. Labor Force
Common carrier river transport organizations employ about
340,000 persons in the USSR, 8 percent more than in 1950. Less than
27 percent of this force is engaged in hauling cargoes -- that is, in
actual operations. The remainder is employed in port operations, in-
dustrial enterprises belonging to river transport organizations, and
other nonoperating activities. Increased labor productivity result-
ing from modernization of plant and equipment should keep total river
transport employees to fewer than 370,000 persons (122,300 operating)
through 1965. Not included in this total are employees of consumer
organizations, who perform a large share. of the loading and unloading.
The labor productivity of operating employees of the com-
mon carrier fleet increased only 7 percent by 1957 compared with 1950.
By 1965 an increase of about 40 percent above the level of 1958 is
planned, to an average of about 1.2 million tkm per operating em-
ployee.*
* In view of plans in progress to increase the use of push barges and
diesel tows, both of which supposedly release crews and increase labor
productivity, this low planned increase is surprising. Although labor
productivity increased 20 percent in 1958, the average annual increase
in the Seven Year Plan is only 4.9 percent.
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D. Pipelines
1. Administrative Organization
The administration of petroleum pipeline transportation in
the USSR, formerly controlled to a large extent by a main administra-
tion of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, has recently been decen-
tralized. Responsibility for the administration of the entire system
of trunk oil pipelines and oil distribution bases has been turned over
to the republic councils of ministers. Organs subordinate to either
the republic councils of ministers or the republic Gosplans have been
given the responsibility for petroleum distribution and presumably,
therefore, for operation of the pipelines. 161
2. Plant
"Emphasis on petroleum pipeline transport is relatively new
in the USSR. The petroleum pipeline network consisted of only 5,400 km
of trunk lines in 1950, none of which exceeded 14 inches in diameter or
had capacities of more than 1.5 million tons per year. Three-fourths
of these lines had been installed before World War II.* By the end of
1956 the length of the network had more than doubled, and 33 percent of
the network (3,800 km) consisted of 20-inch pipe. 11/ By the end of
1959 the network had increased to 16,700 km, and substantial quantities
of 28-inch pipe were being installed. Expansion of the pipeline net-
work, however, has not occurred at anticipated rates. The 3,915 km of
pipeline put in operation during 1956-58 were only 60 percent of the
plan for the 3-year period. 1.8_/ Lack of large-diameter pipes has been
the major obstacle to network expansion (see the accompanying photo-
graph, Figure 19).
FIGURE 19. USSR: Tuymazy-Irkutsk
Oil Pipeline Under Construction.
See Table 12, Appendix A, p. 63, below. Gathering lines that are
employed extensively in the producing fields are considered to be in-
dustrial transport and not a part of the mainline system.
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Original data from the Seven Year Plan indicated that net-
work length was to increase by about 200 percent, to 43,000 km, by the
end of 1965. More recently, a semiofficial Soviet source indicated
that the goal may have been revised down to about 35,400 km, 12/ pos-
sibly because of difficulty in obtaining pipe. Of the six major trunk-
lines under construction at the beginning of the plan period, three
were of 28-inch diameter. 22/
- The Soviet petroleum pipeline network is designed primarily
to transport crude oil from the producing fields to the refineries,
most of which are located in the vicinity of the fields. A large por-
tion of the network, therefore, is characterized by relatively short
crude oil pipelines. In 1958, about 84 percent of the total volume of
petroleum shipped on the system was crude oil, and the average distance
that all petroleum freight was pumped was only 357 km.
The heaviest concentration of pipelines in the USSR is in
the Ural and Volga Regions, where about 65 percent of the tonnage car-
ried by pipeline originated in 1958. Most of these pipelines also
terminate within the area at the important refinery complexes of Kuyby-
shev and Ufa. The most important interregional pipelines also originate
in these areas.*
The Seven Year Plan for expansion of the petroleum pipeline
network consists primarily of a series of trunklines that are to trans-
port crude oil from the Ural-Volga area to refineries which are either
under construction or to be constructed in the major consuming areas.
When the plan is completed, the longer interregional crude oil pipelines
will have become the dominant feature of the network. It is estimated
that the average distance that petroleum is pumped will increase from
357 km to approximately 1,100 km by 1965. The most ambitious of the
planned pipelines is a system that is to originate at Kuybyshev and
supply crude oil to refineries in the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Eu-
ropean Satellites and to the port of Klaipeda on the Baltic Sea. A
petroleum product line to be built from Kuybyshev to Bryansk is already
under construction between Syzran' and Penza.
Two additional pipelines of considerable importance, which
are to be completed before 1965, will originate in the Volga area. One
of these is the Al'met'yevsk-Chistopol'-Gor'kiy pipeline (probable diam-
eter, 20 inches), which will be completed to Moscow via Ryazan' and to
Yaroslavl'. The other line is a 28-inch crude oil carrier being con-
structed from Romashkino in the Tatar fields to Saratov via Kuybyshev.
Plans for a pipeline from Stalingrad to Tuapse via Tikhoretskaya have
been completed, and construction should commence in the near future.
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Although it has not been announced, it is more than likely that the
line will be used to facilitate the southward movement of Ural-Volga
crude oil. In the Urals, two intraregional crude oil pipelines are to
be constructed. A second pipeline is being installed between the Shka-
povo fields and the Salavat refining area, and a pipeline to the Orsk
refinery to the south from Ishimbay is planned.
Of the four pipelines that now terminate in West Siberia,
at least two are to become Trans-Siberian trunk lines. The gasoline
pipeline that is completed to Novosibirsk is being extended to Irkutsk,
and the second crude oil line now under construction is to be completed
to the site of a refinery also under construction at Angarsk near Ir-
kutsk. The crude oil line also will supply the refinery to be con-
structed at Bogotol in west central Siberia. This line is large enough
to transport considerably more crude oil than the two new refineries
will require. The excess capacity will be used to carry crude oil des-
tined for Far Eastern consumption and possibly for export. A branch
crude oil line is to be constructed from the vicinity of Omsk to the
site of a new refinery at Pavlodar in northern Kazakhstan, and a branch
product line is under construction from Chelyabinsk to Atbasar, also in
northern Kazakhstan.
IV. Trends in Freight Traffic on Individual Carriers
A. Railroads
1. Freight Traffic by Major Commodity Groups
About 80 percent of Soviet rail freight traffic in ton-
kilometers consists of the transport of a few bulk commodities -- coal,
coke, wood, petroleum, mineral construction materials, ferrous metals,
ore, and grain. Coal and coke account for more than one-fourth of
total ton-kilometers. In 1958, wood and petroleum together accounted
for another 26 percent. The commodity distribution of ton-kilometers
and tons originated in 1950-58 is shown in Tables 13 and 14.* These
bulk commodities, both as a group and individually, have changed their
relative roles in total traffic only slightly over the years.
The average length of haul, by commodity, given in
Table 15,** indicates why the share occupied by the individual commod-
ity in total ton-kilometers differs from its share in total tons origi-
nated. The difference is particularly striking in the case of mineral
construction materials, which account for almost 20 percent of tons
originated but less than 9 percent of ton-kilometers.
* Appendix A, pp. 64 and 65, respectively, below.
** Appendix A, p. 66, below.
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The most significant change expected in the commodity com-
position of Soviet rail freight traffic in the near future is a de-
crease in the relative importance of coal. Although the volume of
coal (excluding coke) transported on the railroads is planned to in-
crease from 457 million tons in 1958 to 552 million tons in 1965, the
share of coal in total rail tonnage is to decline from 28 percent in
1958 to about 23 percent in 1965. Simultaneously the share of petro-
leum is scheduled to increase from 7 to 9 percent. If pipelines do not
absorb much of the expected increase in the demand for transport of
petroleum, the amount of petroleum moved by rail will be considerably
greater. Planned loadings of various bulk commodities in 1965 are com-
pared with loadings in 1958 in Table 14.*
Goals for ton-kilometers and average length of haul by com-
modity in 1965 are not available. It is known, however, that a decrease
in the average length of haul of coal and an increase in the average
length of haul of petroleum are anticipated, so that the change in the
role of coal and petroleum in total rail traffic will be even more pro-
nounced in ton-kilometers than in tons originated.
2. Freight Traffic by Region
The more densely populated and industrially developed west-
ern part of the USSR has always generated more rail traffic than the
eastern, but the role of the eastern regions has been steadily growing
(see Table 16**). The share of the eastern regions in total tons orig-
inated on Soviet railroads increased from about 28 percent in 1940 to
36 percent-in 1955. This growth of traffic has been especially great
in the Urals (Region VIII), Siberia (Regions IX and XI), and Kazakhstan
(Region Xa).
During the Seven Year Plan an increase of about 47 percent
in freight tons originated on the rail network as a whole is expected.
Freight dispatched on the railroads of Kazakhstan is to increase by
120 percent, that on East Siberian railroads by 88 percent, and that
on West Siberian railroads by 60 percent. 22/ Almost 40 percent of
the total increment in loadings is to take place on the railroads of
the Urals, Siberia, and Kazakhstan. 23/
B. Motor Transport
Since the late 1930's, motor truck transport has assumed in-
creasing importance in the Soviet transport system. .Throughout the
postwar period the rates of groWth Of truck freight traffic hav been
* Appendix A, p. 65, below.
** Appendix A, p. 67, below.
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higher than those for rail and water transport. The importance of
truck transport in the USSR is best illustrated by freight tons origi-
nated, for truck traffic is primarily short-haul, intracity, or farm
to market or railhead and industrial traffic. The share of total tons
originatea performed by motor vehicles, which was 55 percent in 1940,
increased from 66 percent in 1950 to 77 percent in 1958 (see Table 17*).
Although motor vehicles will account for a large portion of additional
tons originated, they will not be able to increase their own share sig-
nificantly. In 1965, motor vehicles should account for about 78 per-
cent of the total.
Motor vehicles do not carry a large volume of freight in long- .
distance transport. Although considerable growth took place in terms
of ton-kilometers during 1950-59, motor vehicle performance in 1959
remained at about 5 percent of total inland transport performance (see
Table 1**). The average length of haul during the period increased
only fromt 10.8 to 11.9 kilometers (see Table 9***). The nature of mo-
tor freight traffic probably will remain substantially the same through
1965. The average length of haul for trucks is planned to be about
14 km for 1965, and the motor transport share of total performance will
still be only 6 percent.
C. Inland Water Transport
River shipping in the USSR is slow and unreliable and is em-
ployed primarily for low-priority bulk cargoes. Use of river trans-
port by shippers (with the exception of its use for rafted timber) is
usually a function of the availability of other carriers. The share
of river shipping in total freight ton-kilometers in the USSR was
6.7 percent in 1950 and had been reduced to 5.5 percent in 1959t (see
Table 1**).
Cargoes carried on the Volga River and its tributaries (the
Central Basin) account for 90 percent of the petroleum products,
51 percent of the rafted timber, and 60 percent of all-dry cargoes
carried on Soviet inland waterways. The long navigation seasons and
even the river beds are suitable to long, deep-draft hauls, and both
operating costs and tariff rates are relatively low. In the Siberian
Appendix A, p. 68, below.
** Appendix A, p. 52, below.
Appendix A, p. 60, below.
These data include that portion of performance of the maritime
fleet which is domestic. This section, however, deals with freight
handled by the river fleets only. Performance by ship in coastal and
intercoastal traffic together with river shipping accounted for 9.4 per-
cent of total inland traffic in 1950 and 7.7 percent in 1959.
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regions the short seasons and adverse route conditions limit river
shipping, but rivers are often the most important mode of transport
because no alternate bulk transport facilities are available. At
present, tons originated on Siberian rivers account for approximately
16 percent of the inland water total in the USSR (see Table 18*).
Inadequate ports and landings and a lack of suitable ships
have resulted in low efficiency of river transport, and, in spite of
the advantage of comparatively lower rates, shipment by rail and pipe-
line is usually preferred. In recent years, service 'problems have
been increased as a result of changes in the waterways occasioned by
the construction of power dams, particularly on the important Volga
system. A reduction in currents and the creation of large reservoirs
have slowed traffic and have made certain shipping practices obsolete.
The practice of hauling a large share of the timber in the form of log
rafts, at low rates to consumers and high profits to the shippers, has
been especially affected. The equally profitable petroleum traffic
also has been slowed. ,Other river shipping operations formerly were
subsidized by profits from both rafted timber and petroleum.
Traffic goals announced for the current Seven Year Plan call
for an increase of 64 percent in ton-kilometers and 50 percent in tons
originated above the level of 1958. The planned rate of growth is
consistent with past performance and probably will be carried out. It
is significant, however, that the rates of increase for the 1957 and
1958 navigation seasons were higher than the average annual increases
planned through 1965. The emphasis appears to be on increasing the
number of long petroleum hauls and dry cargo hauls at the expense of
a relative reduction in the haulage of timber rafts. This plan should
be accomplished if sufficient self-propelled cargo ships are made
available. Increases in river traffic by major commodity are shown in
Table 19.**
D. Pipelines
In 1950, mainline petroleum pipelines * accounted for less
than 1 percent of total tons originated and ton-kilometers performed
in inland transport in the USSR. During 1951-58, tons originated in-
creased at an average annual rate of 26 percent, and ton-kilometers
increased at an average annual rate of 27 percent. In 1958, tons
originated and ton-kilometers represented 1.1 and 2.2 percent, re-
spectively, of the totals for all inland transport (see Tables 1, 12,
and 17t). Data for the Seven Year Plan specify that ton-kilometers
Appendix A, p. 69, below.
Appendix A, p. 70, below.
Field gathering lines are excluded.
Appendix A, pp. 52, 63, and 68, respectively, below.
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performed by pipelines are to increase to about 185 billion and will
constitute 7.8 percent of the total in 1965. An average annual rate
of increase of about 27 percent will be necessary to achieve this goal.
Performance during 1959 showed an increase of 23 percent above the
level of 1958. Tons originated are scheduled to reach about 170 mil-
lion tons in 1965 and will comprise 1.3 percent of total freight orig-
inated.
The growing significance of pipeline traffic also may be illus-
trated by a comparison with the petroleum traffic of other carriers.*
The share of pipelines in the total tons of petroleum originated in-
creased from 18 percent in 1950 to 37 percent in 1958. It is esti-
mated, however, that the share of each mode of transport in the total
will not be altered substantially during the Seven Year Plan. In.
1950, pipelines performed 6 percent of petroleum ton-kilometers and
in 1958 increased this performance to 14 percent. The 185 billion tkm
to be performed by pipelines in 1965 should account for 30 to 34 per-
cent of the total petroleum traffic.
In 1950, pipelines originated cargo equal to 4o percent of
the total crude oil extracted in that year, yet performed only 6 per-
cent of total petroleum ton-kilometers by all modes of transport. In
1958, pipelines originated cargo equal to 83 percent of total extrac-
tions and performed 14 percent of petroleum ton-kilometers. The aver-
age distance that petroleum is pumped declined from 320 km in 1950 to
a low of 257 km in 1954. The distance had increased to 374 km in 1959.
If the ambitious construction program of the Seven Year Plan is com-
pleted on schedule, the average distance that petroleum is pumped on
the network in 1965 should be approximately 1,100 km (see Table 12**).
Average network traffic density has increased considerably be-
cause of the increased use of large-diameter pipes. Density increased
from 0.9 million to 2.3 million tkm per kilometer of line between 1950
and 1958 and is expected to reach 4.3 million tkm by 1965.
V. Operating Efficiency
A. Railroads
Soviet railroad operations are characterized by the concept of
maximum utilization of the freight car. Success in the accomplishment
of this objective is much more attainable under the conditions encoun-
tered in the USSR than in the US. Concentration in the origin and
* Motor vehicle transport of petroleum is small in volume and local
in character and is therefore excluded from this discussion.
** Appendix A, p. 63, below.
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termination of tonnage as a result of the location of resources, the
manufacturing capacity, and the urban population in a limited number
of major centers has made the Soviet problem one primarily of handling
long-haul carload business originating and terminating at a limited
number of major points. The traffic mix includes higher proportions
of bulk commodities and lesser proportions of manufactures than in the
US. With few competitive or alternate routes, a minimum of branch
lines, and no shipper control over routing, it becomes easy to mini-
mize intermediate yard work. There also is, in sharp contrast to US
practice, effective pressure on shippers to accept and unload freight
immediately. Soviet seasonal variations also are much less marked '
than those ih the US
The highly concentrated and remarkably even flow of traffic,
resulting in exceptionally high traffic densities, has created ideal
conditions in the USSR for intensive utilization of plant. Require-
ments of a competitive economy resulted in the US railroad plant be-
ing substantially overbuilt both to encourage traffic generation and
to handle peak demands over which the railroads have no control.
Results of the conditions described above are clearly reflected
in certain key operating indexes (see Tables 20 and 21*). Soviet freight
car turnaround time, which has been reduced almost steadily since World
War II, was reported to be 5.83 days** in 1958. Freight car turnaround
time in the US is about 15 days and has never been much below 11 days.
Most of the difference is accounted for by loading and unloading time
for shippers.; ,with same lesser time requiredin yards and terminals in
the USSR. The average operating freight car in the USSR spends 34 per-
cent of its time in trains between terminals, whereas the average
operating freight car in the US spends only 10 percent of its time in
trains between terminals.
? Gross ton-kilometers per freight train hour, generally regarded
as the best single index of line-haul efficiency, increased by 82 per-
cent during 1950-58 in the USSR. US performance in this respect is
still more efficient than Soviet performance, principally because of
longer, heavier trains and higher average speeds in the US. Acquisi-
tion of more powerful electric and diesel locomotives,' considerable
upgrading of existing steampower, lengthening of sidings, and improve-
ment of signaling and yard facilities are planned to enable the USSR
to increase efficiency in terms of gross ton-kilometers per freight
train hour, by 42 percent from 1958 to 1965. :Diversion of extremely
short-haul traffic from the rail system to motor transport, together
* Appendix.A, pp. 72 and 73, respectively, below.
** Soviet statistical methodsAend:to understate this figure, but it
is nevertheless significantly less than its comparable US counterpart.
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with technological developments, should continue to develop more fa-
vorable operating indexes through 1965.
B. Motor Transport
1. Utilization of Equipment
The operating efficiency of Soviet motor vehicles is very
poor. Nearly one-half of the civilian motor park is chronically unfit.
for service, and trucks and buses are more often than not engaged in
hauling traffic for which they were not designed. Partly because of
the short-haul nature of Soviet trucking, it is difficult to provide
back haul, and nearly 50 percent of truck-kilometers are run empty, as '
shown in the following tabulation LY:
Serviceable vehicles
1940
- 1950
1955
1956
1957
1958
(percent of total)
39.0
48.0
52.0
54.4
56.9
60.8
Utilization of vehicle
kilometers (percent of
total truck-kilometers
that run loaded)
55-0
53.7
52.5
53.0
53.5
53.1
Repair facilities, supplies of spare parts, and trained
personnel have not been adequate to meet requirements. Although these
shortcomings have long been recognized as a handicap to efforts to in-
crease motor vehicle operating efficiency and decrease operating. costs,
few effective measures have been taken to alter the situation.
The consolidation of motor pools that began recently has
?
alleviated the situation somewhat by making possible the application
of mass repair techniques, which could not be used previously. Con-
solidation also has improved utilization by reducing empty runs to
some extent and by increasing the size of loads carried.
During 1959-65 the expanding motor freight traffic is to
be handled by increasing the average volume of ton-kilometers per-
formed per vehicle by 32 percent. Ton-kilometer performance of civil-
ian trucks is to increase by 90 percent with an increase in inventory
of only about 20 percent.
2. Utilization of Network
,
Most of the good roads in the USSR have only recently been
constructed, and their full capacity has not yet been developed. Given
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the modest increment in intercity movement expected, this situation
should continue through 1965. In most cases, highway construction
is undertaken not because maximum density has been reached but rather
to permit the existing or proposed future traffic levels to operate
more efficiently. In some cases, construction is simply a matter of
providing a passable road. There is a pressing need for farm-to-market
highway links. Even within urban and industrial centers, traffic is
not heavy, and, except in a few large cities, it has not been necessary
to increase the traffic capability of city streets.
C. Inland Water Transport
1. Utilization of Equipment
During 1950-55, all utilization indexes for tugs with rafts
and for petroleum barges showed declines except in technical speeds.*
The increase in technical speeds, however, does not necessarily indi-
cate faster deliveries, because the over-all operating time of ships
between terminal points has increased. The faster running time proba-
bly can be traced to the acquisition of new diesel tugs, push tugs,
and metal barges that are speedier and can operate more effectively
when underway. There are no detailed breakdowns available after 1955,
but 1958 productivity figures for, tugs with rafts and for petroleum
barges indicate that tug utilization per horsepower continues to de-
crease, while the productivity of petroleum barges per deadweight ton
increased to the 1950 level. The productivity of dry cargo barges has
slowly, but consistently, increased during this period.
The general decline in performance of the river fleet may
be explained by a number, of factors. Decreased loadings per horsepower
and deadweight ton unit may have been caused by surplus shipping capac-
ity stemming from an inability to attract traffic or by a deliberate
reduction in loads (particularly timber rafts) in order to insure tugs
better control of their tows. Navigation probably has deteriorated to
such an extent that a large proportion of the ships are incapable of
maintaining or-achieving efficient operations under existing circum-
stances. Although the declines noted are not drastic, they will con-
tinue until ships suitable for shipping under lake and reservoir con-
ditions are provided.**
* Technical speed is the average speed of movement between terminal
points and includes only the net running time. Route speeds -- or
the gross running time -- of a. ship operating between terminal points
include all delays en route.
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2. Utilization of Network
On river networks of the USSR the average freight density*
is approximately 1 million tkm per kilometer of route. The Volga has
an average density of 10 million thin, but some of the longer Siberian
rivers average less than 400,000 thin. Freight increases scheduled for
1959-65 are relatively higher for the eastern regions, which should
result in increasing utilization of the Siberian networks. Average
freight density should total about 1.5 million thin per kilometer of
route by 1965.
D. Pipelines
Although the USSR has been successful in achieving substantial
annual traffic increments on its petroleum pipeline system for a num-
ber of years, analysis of operating indexes and literature on pipelines
indicates that the low level of pipeline technology has been an obsta-
cle to even more significant increases. In constructing the pipelines,
emphasis has been placed on getting the pipelines into the ground and
ready for low-pressure operation. Relatively less attention has been
given to increasing traffic by the installation of more and better
pumping and control facilities.
The diameter of pipe used in the construction of new petroleum
pipelines in the USSR is excessively large when the other factors that
determine capacity are considered. This situation is contrary to cur-
rent Western design practice in which operating capacities are high
relative to pipe diameter. Soviet pipelines of 15-inch, 20-inch, and
24-inch diameters are planned for capacities of 3 million, 7 million,
and 10 million to 12 million tons, respectively, per year. 2Y US
experience indicates that pipelines of these diameters operate most
economically when used at capacities of about 5 million, 10 million,
and 12 million to 15 million tons, respectively. 22/
The installation and operation of pipelines at even the low
capacities presently planned are goals that are not now being met in
* Freight density figures used in this report are derived from ton-
kilometer performance of common carrier river transport steamship
agencies and the length of route operated by them during given navi-
gation periods. Figures for noncommon carrier operations are not
available. An accurate estimate of river network utilization in the
USSR is complicated as a result of the inclusion in river statistics
of some coastal traffic performed by some inland waterway agencies and
the exclusion of river route lengths where common carrier deliveries
may not have been carried out. The extent of these variations, how-
ever, should not substantially alter the estimates made above.
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the USSR. This situation is largely due to shortcomings in production
and installation of pumping facilities. The inability to coordinate
new refining capacity with pipeline completion dates and inadevate
storage and.distribution facilities contributes to the problem. Dur-
ing 1956, only 5 of the planned 22 pumping stations were built. 2/
This situation has not improved. In 1958, one pumping station was
completed for operation. Automatic control systems have been limited
to one or two lines and must be considered experimental.
In 1955 the level of utilization of designed capacity of the
network was 74 to 75 percent, and in 1958 the network operated at only
68.2 percent of designed capacity. 21/ Full utilization of existing
capacity is apparently not planned until some time after 1965. Al-
though emphasis is being placed on pipelines as a method of relieving
the railroads of much burdensome long-haul freight, the savings will
not be as great as they might be, because of the low technical level
of installation and utilization of the pipelines.
Consideration of the problem of steel allocation in the Soviet
economy and of the fact that pipe-producing capacity has not been able
to keep up with pipeline construction makes it seem reasonable to as-
sume that the over-all design of pipelines and production and instal-
lation of pumping facilities are hindering and will continue to hinder
the application of the improved petroleum pipeline technology neces-
sary for a high level of operating efficiency.
VI. Rate Structures and Policies
A. Railroads*
Before World War II and during the immediate postwar period ?
the general direction of Soviet rail rates had been upward in order
to help achieve solvency. The revision of rates on.1 January 1949, ?
which was intended to enable the railroads to support themselves at
current levels of traffic, brought the rates to a level 68 percent 33/
aboVe that of 1939. Since 1949, freight tariffs have been revised six
times, generally downward. By 1955 the rates had decreased 30 percent
and stood at about 21 percentabove the level of 1939. 311/ At the ?
same time, the railroad operating ratio has improved steadily every
year since 1949 (see Table 22**). This improvement has been possible
because unit operating costs declined even more rapidly than unit op-
erating revenue throughout the period. Cost and profit data in the
Seven Year Plan indicate that rates will be held at current levels
Appendix A, p. 74, below.
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rather than continuing to decrease as costs decrease. Essentially
this situation indicates the establishment of a new rate policy,
which, in retrospect, can be seen to have developed during the past,
few years. Railroad revenues in the USSR have been sufficiently high
to accrue operating surpluses that not only cover capital investment
in rail transport and other nonoperating expenses but produce net
surpluses that accrue to the central budget for allocation to other
carriers or other sectors of the economy. The new financial policy
appears to be designed to increase operating surpluses rather than
lower rates. Results obtained from this policy are contained in the
discussion of profits and surpluses.*
Rate structures, in addition to influencing the financial
status of the railroads by their general level, also have been used
to influence economic development. The latter has been accomplished
by so constructing rates and rules as to influence traffic patterns
and marketing areas. Another device for influencing industrial de-
velopment has been the use of preferential rates for industrial raw
materials and producer goods at the expense of consumer goods and
passenger traffic.** In effect, this policy has amounted to a sub-
sidy to heavy industry or a hidden tax paid by the consumer (see
Table 23 XXX).
The new system of rates introduced.in 1949 generally accentu-
ated certain distinguishing features of the 1939 rates.t Restriction
of marketing areas for most industrial commodities continued. These
restrictions were achieved by increasing the charge per unitr.of dis-
tance as the distance increased after the agreed optimum haul had been
reached. 12/ For certainrcommodities, chiefly coal, petroleum, and
mineral construction materials, a combination of prohibitive surcharge
rates and exceptions was introduced to control the market area.
The surcharge rates of between 50 and 100 percent established tariff
barriers at traffic divides, which usually persuade the ,purchasing
* See VII, p. 40, below.
** Although there is a tendency in other countries for bulk cm.,
modity rates that are essentially industrial to be lower than con-.
sumer
sumer goods rates, the extent of the discrepancy is very seldom as
great as in the USSR.
*** Appendix A, p. 75, below. This table shows average revenue rates
for selected commodities as a percent of unit costs of railroad freight
traffic for selected postwar years. The data presented indicate the"
differences between commodities that are essentially industrial and.
consumer goods. .
t In 1942, certain special reduced.rates that favored heavy indus-
try were abolished. Military shipments; :which had, been exempt from
paying freight charges, lost their privileged position and were
treated as normal commercial traffic.
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industry to resort to local sources of supply. In practice the use of
surcharge rates and exceptions has been more effective than the manip-
ulation of distance rates.
Heavy industry lost more of its privileged position in the
1949 revision. The freight rates for industrial raw materials and
producer goods were increased relatively more than those for consumer
goods. In spite of the disproportionate change, revenues from con-
sumer goods and passenger traffic continued to account for most of the
operating surpluses.* The rates for most industrial commodities were
simply brought closer to their transport costs, whereas rates for con-
sumer goods remained considerably above their transport costs. Pas-
senger fares, which were at their peak in 1948, also have declined
since 1949, although not as much as freight rates. In 1951 suburban
fares were reduced and the use of season tickets was increased.
Railroad rates, which are applied to such a large portion of
the total inland traffic movedj provide a natural base on which rate
systems for the less developed modes of transport can be built. In
instances where it is desired to divert traffic from the railroads to
another mode of transport and where the rail tariff is low enough to
compete with the costs of the alternate mode, increases and penalties
are applied to bring about the desired results. Rate structures thus
also are used as an instrument for preserving the noncompetitive,
maximum-use aspect of Soviet transport.
B. Motor Transport
Motor freight traffic in the noncompetitive transport system
in the USSR is assured not so much by the motor freight rate structure
as by certain other factors. Because of the relatively limited extent
Of railroad and water networks in the USSR and because of the fixed
nature of railroad and water networks in general, certain hauls must
necessarily be made by motor vehicles. Also, a penalty rate for rail
shipments under specified distances tends to force shippers to use
motor vehicles for short hauls even when railroad service also is
available.
In general, however, the rate structure for motor freight
traffic is not unreasonably high. It is believed that the motor-ve-
hicle rates are sufficiently high to cover operating costs in most
instances.** If the cost reductions that are now forecast occur,
considerable profits will result. These profits probably will be
* The consistently low operating ratios for passenger service are
shown in Table 24, Appendix A, p. 76, below,
** See VII, p. 40, below.
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reinvested in motor transport, although a rate reduction also is a
possibility.
C. Inland Water Transport
The current tariffs for inland water transport, which became
effective on 1 January 1957, represent the first complete revision of
the river freight rate structure since 1940. The new tariff, in addi-
tion to adjusting rates to bring them closer to costs, simplified rate-
making and made more rational the application of the rate policies al-
ready in existence.
Several elements of rate policy are evident in each of the tar-
iffs and in the changes from one to the other. Unlike railroad rates,
which apply to the whole network, river rates vary from one steamship
company to another. Before 1957, rates varied from one river to an-
other.* In general, the level of rates applicable to a given steamship
company bears some relationship to operating costs. Rates, which are
generally lowest in the Volga Basin, become higher as one progresses
from the Volga Basin to other river systems northward and eastward.
Thus the Lena and Pechora Rivers have the highest rates and the highest
costs. E/ Unlike rail rates, there is no attempt to limit length of
haul, and almost without exception charges per unit of distance de-
crease as the length of haul increases.
Rates applicable on waterways that are connected with or are
parallel to railroad lines are manipulated so as to induce shippers
to utilize water transport as much as possible. There are 68 excep-
tion rate classes, which are grouped under two categories mid which
apply to shipments between ports, also connected by railroads. One
category is for through water traffic, and the other category is for
the water part of combined rail/water through shipments. The rates
are computed at a certain percent below the rail rate for the all-rail
distance between the ports -- that is, 10 to 20 percent below the rail
rate in the case of through water traffic and 20 to 50 percent below
the rail rate for combined through rail/water traffic where a through
water route is not available. 2/
Great success has been claimed for the policy. The volume of
combined hauls had already increased considerably before the introduc-
tion of the new tariff. Between 1946 and 1957 the volume increased
200 percent. In 1958 alone, combined hauls increased 35 percent and
accounted for 20.6 percent of all freight hauled. 39/
As a result of the policy of giving inducements to water ship-
ments and the relatively low level of rates, substantial operating
* Steamship company lines generally coincide with individual rivers.
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losses are incurred each year on dry cargo shipments. The deficit ?is
made up by revenues from oil and rafted timber traffic, the rates for
which, although low, are significantly higher than the very low oper-
ating costs. The following operating ratios for the various types of
freight computed from 1950 plan data are illustrative
Kopecks per
Ton-Kilometer
Revenue
Cost
Operating Ratio
Rafted timber
2.2
1.4
63.6
Oil
4.2
2.4
57.1
?Dry cargo
5.9
7.2
122.0
All freight
4.0 ,
4.0
100.0
Subsequent changes in the structure of freight hnd rates have not sig-
nificantly altered the situation.
D. Pipelines
Pipelines in the USSR are owned and operated by the petroleum
industry. For this reason, no rates for the transport of petroleum
have been announced, and none is believed to exist.
VII. Costs, Revenues, and Profits
A. Railroads
. Unit operating costs,* probably the most useful single indi-
cator of changesin over-all operating efficiency, have decreased
spectacularly for a number of year on Soviet railroads. Because con-
current decreasesdn'unit operating revenue have been less, the opera-
ting ratio** for both.freight and passenger service has declined'suf-
ficiently for the railroads to move from :a position of financial de-
pendence to a position of financial independence during the past dec-
ade. Unit operating costs for combined freight and passenger service
decreased about 36 percent, from 5.252 to 3.349 kopecks per traffic-
kilometer, between 1950 and 1958. Unit operating costs for freight
* The cost of performing 1 ton-kilometer or 1 passenger-kilometer.
** The operating ratio (operating costs as a percent of operating
revenues) illustrates the relationship between operating income and
expenditure. The operating ratio is used as an indicator of financial
condition resulting from operations alone and does not include nonop-
erating income or expenditures such as taxes and investment.
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service declined about L[o percent, from 4.861 to 2.930 kopecks per
ton-kilometer, and unit operating costs for passenger service de-
clined about 16 percent, from 8.058 to 6.793 kopecks per passenger-
kilometer. Unit operating costs for combined service are expected to
decline 21 percent, to 2.64 kopecks per traffic-kilometer, during
1959-65 (see Tables 22, 24, and 25* and the chart, Figure 20**).
AS a result of declining unit costs, obtained by modernization
of plant and equipment, Soviet railroads have been able to handle a
spectacular increase in traffic and at the same time hold increments
to total cost of their services to a minimum. Between 1950 and 1958,
performance in terms of traffic-kilometers increased at an average
annual rate of about 10 percent, whereas total operating costs in-
creased only 3.8 percent per year. It is estimated that operating
costs will increase only 10 percent by 1965, whereas traffic will in-
crease by nearly 40 percent.
Operating revenue per traffic-kilometer declined somewhat dur-
ing 1950-58 as a result of tariff changes and changes in the general
composition of freight and traffic patterns. As a result of traffic
increases, however, operating revenues increased at a much faster rate
than costs. The operating ratio for combined freight and passenger
services declined from 85.2 to 71.9, and total operating profits grew
accordingly, from 6.3 billion to 19.1 billion rubles. Most of the de-
cline in the combined ratio was due to consistent decreases in the
ratio for freight service, which was lowered from 90.2 to 73.3. The
ratio for passenger service remained at approximately 70 throughout
the period. Until very recently, high passenger receipts were used to
offset low income from freight operations. In 1950, profits from pas-
senger operations accounted for 50 percent of total operating profits.
By 1958, however, profits from passenger operations had dropped to
25 percent of total operating profits.
By the end of 1953, total profits had increased sufficiently
to provide a net surplus of 363 million rubles for the year .XXX Def-
icits had occurred for several years before 1953. Since that year the
net surplus has increased steadily. By 1958 it had reached 9.8 billion
* Appendix A, pp. 74, 76, and 77, respectively, below.
** Following p. 42.
*** The net surplus or deficit indicates the financial status of the
railroads after payments to and allocations from the state budget. The
railroads pay to the state budget from profits, from funds resulting
from the sale of property, and from the turnover tax and receive from
the budget funds for capital investment and expansion of working capi-
tal. In short, net deficits are covered by the state budget and net
surpluses accrue to the state budget. Table 26, p. 78, below, shows
profits surpluses and deficits for 1950-59 and the 1965 Plan.
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rubles and was planned to increase to 12.2 billion in 1959. It is ex-
pected that by 1965 the annual surplus will reach 22 billion rubles and
that during 1959-65 a total of 121 billion rubles will accrue to the
state budget for allocation to other sectors (see the chart, Figure 21*).
B. Motor Transport
The only published financial data on motor carriers are oper-
ating costs. It is not known, therefore, to what extent motor vehicle
operations are profitable and to what extent capital investments are
self-financed ?**
Motor vehicle operating costs are high as a result of certain
technical and organizational weaknessesxxx but have undergone some de-
cline in recent years. Between 1950 and 1956, operating costs decreased
one-third, to 70 kopecks per ton-kilometer for all motor freight car-
riersW and to 49 kopecks per ton-kilometer for the common carrier
park. 2/ As a result of reductions in operating costs, the annual cost
of motor freight service has increased much more slowly than traffic
turnover. Total operating costs increased 62 percent, from 21 billion
rubles in 1950 to 34 billion rubles in 1956, whereas freight turnover
increased 141 percent during the same period.
The high total cost of motor freight service also indicates the
importance of the service in the economy, as do tons originated. In
1950, total operating expenditures by motor freight carriers were
72 percent of the total operating expenditures by railroads, and by
1956 these expenditures had increased to 95 percent.
C. Inland Water Transport
Attempts to reduce unit operating costs of inland water trans-
port have been less successful than for railroad transport. Although
plan data have consistently indicated that costs would be lowered, rel-
atively little actually has been accomplished. Serious underfulfill-
ment of investment plans and changing navigational conditions have been
largely responsible.
Between 1950 and 1958, costs per traffic-kilometer decreased
24 percent. During the same period, unit costs for railroad transport
decreased more than 36 percent. Data for the Seven Year Plan specify
that operating costs are to be lowered about 24 percent during 1958-65.
* Following p. 42.
** Analysis of the motor vehicle freight tariff and composition of
freights suggests that operating income is slightly higher than opera-
ting costs.
*** See V, B, p. 33, above.
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Current
Kopecks
7
3
1
Figure 20 50X1
USSR
PROFIT AND COST SEGMENTS OF UNIT REVENUE OF RAILROADS
1950-58 AND 1959-65 PLAN
P'
,,, ?,-;,/
rj
il
m
viiiii
riti
,
1,111
ir,7,777://fill,A
m
riff/Zg713/94
COST
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954.. 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959
Plan
29365 12-60
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1965
Plan
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Billion Current Rubles
25
20
15
10
5
Figure 21
USSR
NET CONTRIBUTION OF THE MINISTRY OF RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION
TO THE STATE BUDGET, 1951-58
SURPLUS
DEFICIT
1951
29364 12-60
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
PAYMENTS TO THE
STATE BUDGET
APPROPRIATION FROM
THE STATE BUDGET
1958
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This reduction will be possible only if the investment plan is adhered
to strictly.
The relationship between inland water operating costs and rail-
road operating costs indicates the seriousness of the cost problem. In
1950, unit operating costs for inland water transport were only 79 per-
cent of those for railroads. By 1958 they had risen to 94 percent (see
Table 27*).
Operating ratios for inland water transport are very high as a
result of relatively low tariffs and high operating costs. The ratio
exceeded 100 until 1953, and in 1957 the ratio was still above 95.**
The inland water fleet incurred operating losses throughout the post-
war period until 1954. Since that year, there have been small operat-
ing profits. These profits have not been sufficient, however, to
offset other nonoperational expenses. In order to cover all such ex-
penses, it would be necessary to lower the operating ratio, currently
above 90, to about 85.
Capital investments in inland water transport are completely
subsidized through the All-Union and republic budgets. It is not
likely that the inland water fleet will become financially self-
sufficient in the foreseeable future, as the operating ratio would have
to be lowered to about 57 to bring this result about.
D. Pipelines
As a result of accelerated network expansion and the use of
larger diameter pipes that are potentially more efficient, operating
costs of petroleum pipelines have decreased faster than those for other
modes of transport. Consistent cost data for petroleum pipeline opera-
tions, which are available for 1954-56, indicate that the unit cost de-
creased 31 percent, from 2.38 to 1.65 kopecks per ton-kilometer, for
these 3 years alone. /IV Thus although the number of ton-kilometers
performed doubled during the 3-year period, total operating costs in-
creased only 39 percent.
Because of certain technical and operational difficulties, op-
erating costs are still higher than they should be. Operating costs
for petroleum pipelines of a given diameter and annual throughput for
the USSR and the US indicate that unit operating costs in the USSR are
about one-third of the average cost per rail ton-kilometer and such
* Appendix A, p. 79, below.
** Operations on the Volga-Kama River system, where most of the traf-
fic is handled, are somewhat more profitable than the over-all ratios
indicate.
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costs in the US are only about 7 percent of the average cost per rail
ton-kilometer. )12/
No tariff or revenue data have ever been found for Soviet pe-
troleum pipelines. Inasmuch as the pipelines are not common carriers,
Soviet planners probably consider cost to be the only measure of price
paid for the transport of petroleum by pipeline in the USSR.
VIII. Capital Inputs and Productivity
A. Capital Allocations
The term capital allocations as used in this report is a Soviet
financial term describing the total disposable financial resources
available to the economy or any of its sectors.. These allocations pro-
vide funds for new fixed investment; expansion of working capital; cap-
ital repairs; and various other outlays, including health, welfare,
housing, and education. Funds for capital formation are made from the
state budget and from internal organizational funds. Sources of funds
allocated.through the budget are primarily state accumulations from the
turnover and profits taxes. Sources for organizational allocations are
primarily amortization allowances, retained profits, and surpluses re-
sulting from savings in investment costs.
The portion of total allocations made available to the trans-
port and communications sector has decreased significantly in recent
years (see Table 28*). Between 1950 and 1953, estimated allocations
to this sector alone** averaged nearly 14 percent of total investment
in the Soviet economy. In 1958 and 1959 these allocations had dropped
to 7.8 and 9.9 percent, respectively. The relative significance of
allocations from the state budget alone to the transport sector has de-
clined, although the allocations have not decreased absolutely. During
1951-55 they averaged 8.6 percent of total state budget allocations,
and since then they have averaged 7.1 percent.
B. Capital Investment, Fixed Assets, and Capital Productivity
The Soviet economy has developed a policy of minimum capital
investment in transport. In general, Soviet practice has been to use
relatively large amounts of labor to keep equipment in operation:for
much longer periods.before overhaul or retirement than is the practice
in Western Countries and to increase the capability of the existing
network while holding construction of new lines to a mimimum.
* Appendix A, p. 8o, below.
** Communications have generally taken from 3 to 5 percent of the
total allocated to transport and communications.
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Only limited manufacturing and construction capacity has been
allocated to transport, although the demand for transport services by
the economy has increased rapidly. A reversal of these trends is not
envisioned in the near future. The increases in capital investment
planned for the Seven Year Plan period are modest when consideration
is given to the expected levels of transport performance and to in-
vestment increases in other sectors of the economy. A consequence of
the investment program is the strong tendency to continue to increase
over-all traffic density on the existing carrier network.
In recent years, there has been a tendency to increase nonrail-
road investment faster than railroad investment. This trend has oc-
curred mostly in motor transport, in order to relieve the railroads of
costly short-haul traffic, and in maritime and inland water shipping,
together with petroleum pipelines, in order to relieve the railroads
of burdensome petroleum traffic.
Absolute capital investment in transport has increased through-
out the period of Communist control. However, the relative share of
investment in the national economy accruing to transport has declined.
Table 29* shows estimated capital investment in transport and communi-
cations and the share of total investment allocated to transport, by
plan period.
Average annual investment in transport and communications dur-
ing the immediate prewar years was 8.5 billion rubles, or about 20 per-
cent of total investment. During the Fourth Five Year Plan (1946-50)
and the Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55), average annual investment rose
to 9.6 billion and 13.2 billion rubles, respectively, but these figures'
as a percent of total investment dropped to 14.2 percent and 10.1
percent, respectively. During the first 2 years of the original
Sixth Five Year Plan, investment in transport and communications con-
tinued to increase, averaging 17.9 billion rubles per year. At the
same time, the share of total investment declined to 9 percent. Invest-
ment data for the Seven Year Plan indicate that the share of total in-
vestment that will go to transport is to remain at about the present
level and that an annual average of about 30 billion rubles is planned.
The budget figure for 1959 was 23.3 billion, and the investment plan
was exceeded.
Although the data that are readily available are not completely
comparable, valid investment comparisons can be made between the USSR
and the US that confirm the relatively low level of investment in trans-
port in the USSR. The share of US investment that went to transport
remained constant at about 19 percent between 1951 and 1957. In 1958
* Appendix A, p. 81, below.
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and 1959 the percentages increased sharply to 22 and 25 percent, re-
spectively, because of stagnation in general investment and increases
in highway building programs. During the same decade, Soviet transport
investment averaged 11 percent of total investment, with a slight down-
ward trend (see Table 31*). In absolute figures, annual transport in-
vestment in the US averaged $6.5 billion during 1951-57. On the basis
of a 5.5-to-1 ruble-dollar ratio, comparable annual investment in the
USSR amounted to about $3.3 billion.**
As a result of the relatively low level of investment in trans-
port, the transport share in total Soviet fixed assets has declined
throughout the period of Communist control. Estimates for selected
years are as follows /iY: 1913, 36.4 percent; 1928, 34.9 percent; 1940;
29.3 percent; 1950, 25.6 percent; and 1956, 20.1 percent. Soviet offi-
cial estimates state that the productive assets of industry and con-
struction organizations increased 32.6 times between 1913 and 1956 and
that the assets of the transport and communications sector increased
only 8.2 times. Lg./
1. Railroads
Capital investment in railroad transport has increased in
recent years as investment has increased generally in the Soviet econ-
omy. Representative, however, of the trend in total transport invest-
ment, investment in railroad transport has not grown as fast as invest-
ment in the economy as a whole. During the 8 1/2 years immediately
preceding World War II, 14.3 percent of total investment went to the
railroads. In the Fourth Five Year Plan, 10.4 percent went to the rail-
roads. Their average share declined to 6.0 percent during 1952-58. Ac-
tual investment in railroad transport averaged 7.0 billion rubles during
1946-50 and 9.8 billion rubles during 1951-55. In 1959, 14 billion
rubles were invested (see Tables 29 and 30xxx). Average annual invest-
ment in railroad transport is planned to be about 16.1 billion rubles
during 1959-65.
The portion of investment in all modes of transport that
has gone to railroad transport has remained very high throughout the
Soviet period, although it has shown a slight decline in recent years.
Investment in railroad transport accounted for nearly 74 percent of all
Appendix A, p. 83, below.
** The appropriate dollar valuation of the ruble varies greatly ac-
cording to the composition of the goods and services comprising the in-
vestment ruble for various investment programs. The ratio of 5.5 to 1 is
an estimate based on the ruble-dollar cost of the components of the
transport investment plan and cannot be applied to any of its compo-
nents.
XXX Appendix A, pp. 81 and 82, respectively, below.
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investment in transport during 1945-55 and probably averaged between
60 and 65 percent during 1956-59.* Data in the Seven Year Plan in-
dicate that the share of transport investment going to railroad trans-
port will decline only about 3 percent by 1965.
In contrast to the high share of transport investment ab-
sorbed by the railroads in the USSR, the relative share of transport
investment in the US that has gone to railroad transport has been very
low. Between 1950 and 1959, railroad investment in the US declined
from about 29 to 10 percent of the total** (see Table 31 XXX).
Railroad transport investment policy in the USSR has been
dominated almost entirely by a single financial consideration. This
consideration has been the necessity of keeping capital inputs at a
minimum level consonant with increasing performance at sustained high
rates. The desire to reduce transport costs, although of significance,
has been a secondary consideration. It has been true, however, that
investment which had been planned to increase capacity, and hence per-
formance, also has served to decrease operating costs.
A comparison of the relative effectiveness of new construc-
tion with an increase in the capacity of existing railroads in terms of
annual increases of freight traffic (expressed in ton-kilometers per
ruble of new capital investment) indicates that investment savings have
accrued from the increases in capacity but also points up the decreas-
ing practicability of pursuing this policy with such single-mindedness
in the future. During 1946-50, each ruble of capital investment in re-
construction of the existing network resulted in five to six times
greater traffic increases than each ruble invested in the construction
of new railroad lines. The ratio of investment in existing network to
construction of new lines during 1951-55 was 1 to 3, and in the plan
for 1959-65 it is expected that this ratio will change to 1 to 1.
One result of Soviet railroad investment policy discussed
above has been to limit construction of new lines to areas of the
highest priority. During 1917-58 the length of the network increased
only 75 percent, while freight traffic increased nearly 20 times.
Since 1950 the length of the network has increased 5 percent and
freight traffic 116 percent. Average freight density per kilometer
of line was 10.6 million thin in 19585 about three times greater than in
* Because of the noncomparability of Soviet data, it has not been
possible to determine exact percentages for the latter years.
** Although transport investment figures for the US and the USSR are
not entirely comparable, the significance of the comparison offered is
not altered. See Table 31, footnote a, p. 83, below.
*** Appendix A, p. 83, below.
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the US. The resultant concentration of traffic on the relatively re-
stricted network has brought about strains and imbalances in the rail-
road system that are costly to the national economy and that tend to
be hidden by impressive operating indexes. Because of the lack of
direct connections, circuitous routing is frequent. Another result of
Soviet railroad investment policy is that adequate transport in depth
often is not available to areas which have recently been brought under
development.
Comments on the investment program for railroad transport
under the Seven Year Plan have emphasized that funds for the construc-
tion of new lines are not adequate. T.S. Khachaturov, a prominent
transport economist, has stated that an annual average of 3,000 km of
new lines should be constructed through 1975 if the railroads are to be
able efficiently to support general economic development. /12/ The plan
calls for the construction of about 9,000 km of new lines during
1959-65. This plan implies a slower rate of construction than was
planned for the 1946-50 and 1951-55 Plans, which were considerably un-
derfulfilled.
A capital-output ratio series for Soviet railroads pre-
viously constructed. by a US economist indicated that the ratio declined
to about 2.4 in 1939, rose to a high of 3.7 in 1947, and declined again
to about 2.9 in 1952. 22/ The sharp postwar decline was the result of
extremely high rates of growth that in the early years represented re-
covery of lost traffic with but limited capital investment. The de-
cline is confirmed by more recent analysis, which in addition indicates
that the ratio has leveled off during the last few years and that at
some point in the next few years it will begin to move slowly upward.
The validity of the recent direction of the ratio is supported by sev-
eral observations of decreasing capital efficiency that have recently
become apparent* (see Table 32**).
. The marginal value of Continued investment in the existing
network as opposed to network expansion has been noted. As Soviet
railroads approach maturity and achieve a lower labor-capital ratio,
a leveling off or a rise of the capital-output ratio should be experi-
enced.
* The calculation of a capital-output ratio for railroad transport
in the USSR is difficult because assets are figured at book value
rather than at current prices and have to be adjusted accordingly.
The ratios presented here were constructed largely on the basis of -
estimates of value that have been made by Soviet economists. . An in-
dustry-wide inventory is now underway that should allow more accurate
analysis of capital-output ratios in the near future.
** Appendix A, p. 84, below.
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A comparison of incremental output and new investment for
the two 7-year periods 1952-58 and 1959-65 serves as further corrobo-
ration of the analysis of declining capital efficiency. It was found
that during the earlier period, for each additional billion traffic-
kilometers performed, 98 million rubles were invested, and it is ex-
pected that during the Seven Year Plan 192 million rubles will need
to be spent to generate each additional billion traffic-kilometers.
.2. Motor .Transport
The available financial data for motor vehicle transport
have not been sufficient to enable a satisfactory estimate of.capital
investment to be made. It is possible, however, by taking into con-
sideration the low-level of highway construction and inventory in-
creases, to state that investment in motor vehicle transport has, been
kept to a minimum. The low volume of highway construction has been.
especially significant,
Data in the Seven Year Plan do indicate, however, that in-
vestment in motor vehicle transport probably will increase faster than
that in other modes of transport except petroleum pipelines. Plans
for highway construction and inventory expansion suggest that invest-
ments during 1959-65 are to increase by nearly 200 percent in compari-
son with the previous 7-year period. The corresponding percentages
for railroad and inland water transport are 88 and 30, respectively.
Even if expected increases occur, Soviet investment in motor vehicle
transport during the entire 7-year period is not likely to approach US
investment for any single year of the period.
3. Inland Water Transport
Capital investment in inland water transport has been mod-
est and insufficient throughout the postwar period. Partly as a re-
sult of inadequate investment, traffic plans have not always been ful-
filled, operating costs have not been lowered as planned, and modern-
ization of the fleet has taken place very slowly.
Three billion rubles were allocated for investment in in-
land water transport during the Fourth Five Year Plan. Of this amount,
it is estimated that less than 2 billion rubles actually were spent.
Investments began to increase during 1951-55 and averaged about 1.7 bil-
lion rubles per year between 1950 and 1958. 21/ Data in the Seven Year
Plan indicate that average annual investments are to increase to about
2.2 billion rubles, or 30 percent more than the average during the pre-
vious 7-year period. .51/ By-comparison, railroad investments,are.to
increase by nearly 88 percent.' At the same time, inland water freight
traffic is scheduled to increase by more. than 60 percent, whereas rail-
road freight traffic is to increase by 4o to 45 percent.
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Planned investment may not be entirely adequate. It is
probable that the traffic plan will be fulfilled but that planned de-
creases in operating costS and increases in labor productivity will be
difficult to achieve without greater investment in modernization of
plant and network.
Pipelines
Investment in petroleum pipelines has been low until very
recently, as the figures for network expansion indicate. On the basis
of construction completions and costs, it is estimated that about 2 bil-
liOn rubles were spent for pipeline construction during 1951-55.*
Tho considerable emphasis being placed on development of pe-
troleum pipeline transport is reflected in the planned investment of
12 billion rubles reported for 1959-65. 2.a/
* Investment for petroleum pipeline construction. is contained in in-
vestment allocations to the oil and .gas industry and is not a part of
transport and communications investments.
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APPENDIX A
STATISTICAL TABLES
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Table 1
Ton-Kilometer Performance by Inland Transport in the USSR and the US
by Mode of Transport 2/
1950, 1955-59, and 1965 Plan
Carrier
Billion Ton-Kilometers
Percent of Total
1950
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1965
Plan
1950
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1965
Plan
USSR
Railroads 12/
602.3
970.9
1,079.1
1,212.8
1,302.0
1,429.5
1,850
87.o
85.9
86.3
86.3
84.9
84.6
78.0
Motor vehicles 12/
20.1
42.5
48.5
61.7
76.8
87.6
146
2.9
3.8
3.9
4.4
5.0
5.2
6.2
Inland water fleet y
46.2
67.7
70.5
76.4
85.5
93.6
140
6.7
6.o
5.6
5.4
5.6
5.5
5.9
Ships in coastal and
intercoastal traffic 2/
18.8
33.4
33.0
27.8
35.1
38.0
50
2.7
3.0
2.6
2.0-
2.3
2.2
2.1
Petroleum pipelines y
4.9
14.7
20.5
26.6
33.8
41.6
185
0.7
1.3
1.6
1.9
2.2
2.5
7.8
-Total
692.3
1,129.2
1,251.6
l,105.3
1,533.2
1,690.3
2,371
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
US
Railroads 1/
917.5
955.7
988.4
941.3
839.1
45.6
39.8
39.3
38.2
36.6
Motor vehicles 2/
325.0
421.0
463.0
470.0
474.0
16.2
17.6
18.5
19.0
20.7
Inland water fleet 1/
238.5
316.1
321.2
338.4
276.0
11.9
13.2
12.8
13.7
12.1
Ships in coastal and
intercoastal traffic
340.2
406.8
400.6
391.8
391.8
16.9
17.0
16.0
15.9
17.1
Petroleum pipelines h
188.6
296.7
335.7
325.2
308.5
9.4
12.4
13.4
13.2
13.5
Total
2,009.8
2,396.3
2,508.9
2,466.7
2,289.4
3,100 1/
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
a. Excluding air freight transport, which is not significant in terms of ton-kilometers.
b.212/. The figure for inland waterways does not include traffic on the landlocked Caspian Sea, which is included in coastal shipping.
c. Computed from total maritime traffic] lutilizing a Soviet statement that the share of foreign trade traffic in the total is arwl
expected to increase from 67 percent in 1958 to 79 percent in 1956 and utilizing similar information for other years 2:11 50X1
d. Revenue traffic for Class I, Class II, and electric railroads and nonrevenue traffic for Class I railroads. Li]]/ This total figure has been
ascertained to be the US figure most comparable with Soviet data...5.2/
f. 1/. Including the Great Lakes.
g. The figure for 1950 was estimatedd ] and the figure for 1955-57 by the Interstate Commerce Commission. L1/ The figure for 1958 was
estimated to have been the same as that for 1957.
la. Q2/
i. Estimated on the basis of the 3-percent average annual rate of growth achieved during 1951-57.
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Table 2
Passenger-Kilometer Performance by Inland Transport
in the USSR and the US, by Mode of Transport Li./
Selected Years, 1950-58, and 1965 Plan
Billion Passenger-Kilometers
Percent of Total
1965
1965
Carrier
1950
1953
1955
1957
1958
Plan
102_
1221
1955
122L
1221_
1221?._
Plea
USSR
Railroad b/
88.0
118.3
141,4
142.4-
'153.4 -
158.4
190
69.2
66.2
65.8
63.8
61.0
57.6
40.5
Automobile E./
1.7
3.7
5.9
6.8
7.9
8.9
17.3
1.3
2.1
2.7
3.0
3.1
3.2
3.7
Intercity bus d/
1.4
2.6
5.5
7.2
9.7
12.3
61.5
1.1
1.5
2.6
3.2
3.9
4.5
13.1
Urban 2/
31.1
46.9 s/
54.0
58.8
70.5
82.3
145.6
24.4
26.3
25.1
26.3
28.0
29.9
31.1
Air g/
1.2
2.2
2.9
3.3
4.8
. 7.8
46.5
2.9
1.2
1.4
1.5
1.9
2.8
9.9
Water 13/
3.9
4.8
5.1
4.9
5.2
5.4
7.9
3.1
. 2.7
2.4
2.2
2.1
2.0
1.7
Total
127.3
178.5 ?
214.8
992_,.
251.5
276.1
468.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
US
Railroad 11
51.2
51.0
45.9
45.3
41.7
3.7
3.2
2.6
2.5
2.2
Automobile
1,168.0
1,400.0
1,569.0
1,632.0
1,704.0
85.1
86.8
88.1
88.3
89.4
Intercity bus I
71.0
83.5
87.1
88.7
78.9
5.2
5.2
4.9
4.8
- 4.1
Urban 1/
69.0
55.6
46.1
43.8
41.6
5.0
3.4
2.6
2.4
2.2
Air al/
12.9
22.4
31.9
36.4
40.8
1.0
1.4
1.8
2.0
Water 2/
_2.1
Total ?
1,372.1
1,612.5
846.2
1,907.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
USSR as a Percent
of US
Railroad -
171.9
231.4
308.1
314.3
367.9
Automobile
0.1
0.3
0.4
0.4
0.5
intercity bus
2.0
3.1
6.3
8.1
12.3
Urban
45.1
84.4
117.1
134.2
169.5
Air
9.3
9.8
9.1
9.1
11.8
Total.
9.3
11.1
12.1
12.1
13.2
a. All figures are rounded to the nearest 100 million passenger-kilometers.
e. Including urban buses, streetcars, trolley buses, and subways. Figures are estimated from the number of passengers.
f. This figure is for 054.
h.
of passengers and the estimated average length of haul. 713/
J. Estimated by the Bureau of Public Roads I
B. Estimated from Department of Commerce data. 81/
1. Estimated from Department of Commerce data. TO/
a. gv. Including revenue passenger-kilometers only.
n. Annual passenger traffic on US waterways has not exceeded 1 billion passenger-kilometers.
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Table 3
Passengers Carried by Inland Transport in the USSR, by Mode of Transport 21
Selected Years, 1950-58, and 1965 Plan
Carrier
1950
1955
1958
1965
Plan
1950
1955
1958
1965
Plan
Intercity
Railroad
Bus 4/
Air 2/
Water f./
Total intercity
Local and Urban
Railroad 2/
Bus 5/
Streetcar g/
Trolleybus g/
Subway g/
Taxi h/
Water 1/
Total local and urban
Grand total
Million Passengers )2/
Percent of Total Intercity Traffic
209
52
1
11
273
955
1,001
5,186
947
629
160
46
8,924
249
188
3
19
459
1,392
4,294
6,415
1,850
945
600
70
15,566
251
445
8
27
/21
1,583
7,932
8,129
2,778
1,852
1,148
87
23,509
300
2,203
49
38
2,590
76.6
19.0
o.4
4.0
100.0
54.2 34.3
41.0 60.9
0.7 1.1
4.1 3.7
100.0 100.0
11.6
85.0
1.9
1.5
100.0
I,950
22,570
7,026
4,259
2,548
2,365
119
40,837
Percent of Total Local and Urban Traffic
10.7
11.2
58.1
10.6
7.1
1.8
0.5
100.0
8.9
27.6
41.2
11.9
6.1
3.9
0.4
100.0
6.7
33.7
34.6
11.8
7.9
4.9
o.4
100.0
4.8
55.3
17.2
10.4
6.2
5.8
0.3
100.0
2,12T
16 025
ai2.1.1-2
4..3i'2i
1951-55 1956-58 1959-65
Average Annual Rates of Growth 1/
Intercity
11.0
16.8
19.8
Local and urban
11.8
14.7
8.2
Total
11.7
14.8
8.7
a. Excluding passengers carried by automobiles other than taxis. Taxis, however, account for approximately one-half of the passenger-kilometers performed by auto-
mobiles.
b. All figures are rounded to the nearest million passengers
f. The total numbs
city traffic).
of maritime passengers plus 15 percent of the numbers
inland water passengers (which is estimated to be the proportion of the latter in inter-
h. Figures for 1950-58 are estimated from taxi-kilometers 91/ and for 1965 from total automobile travel.
i. These figures represent 85 percent of the total number of inland water passengers.
j. Average annual rates of growth are computed at the compound rate for the stated period, including the terminal years.
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Table 4
Indexes of Performance of Inland Transport and Other Economic Indicators
in the USSR and the US
Selected Years, 1938-65
Economic Indicators
1938 1950 1955 1956 1957 1958 1965
USSR
Index of inland freight transport (1950 = 100) 2./
Index of inland freight transport (1958 = 100)
Index of industrial production (1950 = 100) .-2/
Index of industrial production (1958 = 100)
Index of gross national product (GNP) (1950 = 100) d/
Index of GNP (1958 = 100)
Ton-kilometers performed per 1955 US $1,000 of GNP
Index of ton-kilometers performed per metric ton of basic
production (1950 = 100) 2/
Ton-kilometers performed per metric ton of basic production 2/
Index of ton-kilometers Performed per metric ton of basic
production (1938 . 100) 2/ 1/
100
US
100
100
100
6,351
100
1,020
119
163
166
139
7,478
116
1,182
138
181
183
151
7,585
115,
1,176
137
203
197
160
8,076
123
1,251
146
221
100
212
100
174
100
8,069
123
1,258
146
342
155
180
261
150
8,319
Index of inland freight transport (1950 = 100) a/
Index of inland freight transport (1958 = 100) ?
Index of industrial production (1950 = 100) 2/
Index of GNP (1950 = 100) 1/
Index of GNP (1958 . 100)
Ton-kilometers performed per 1955 us $1,000 of GNP
Index of ton-kilometers performed per metric ton of basic
production (1950 . 100) 2/
Ton-kilometers performed per metric ton of basic production 2/
Index of ton-kilometers performed per metric ton of basic
production (1938 = 100) 2/ 1/
100
100
100
100
6,241
100
1,456
129
119
129
124
6,021
112
1,633
145
125
134
126
6,195
113
1,647
146
123
135
128
5,973
112
1,638
146
114
100
125
125
100
5,659
115
1,678
149
149
131
171
137
2/
a. Calculated from data in Table 1, p. 52, above.
b. 100/
c. 101/ ....-
d. 102/
e. For tons of basic production the 24 most important ores, fuels, agricultural products, and chemicals were used. 103/
f. 104/
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Table 5
Railroad Network in the USSR
1950, 195859, and 1965 Plan
Route-Kilometers as of the End of Each Year
Year
Total a/
Electrified
Diesel Operated
Double Tracked
Automatic Block
Centralized
Traffic Control
1950
116,900 Y
3,042 y
3,43212/
26,900 2/
12,300 1/
197 1/
,1958
122,80012/
9,500 12/
11,100 y
33,700 2/
22,700 !./
2,400 1/
1959
124,000 e
11,600 11/
14,300 11/
34,386 .1../
24,200 11/
2,900 I/
1965 Plan
131,800II/
30,000 ,11/
70,000 y
41,70011/
40,700-42,700
1/
12,500 n2/
a. The operational network of the Ministry of Railroad Transportation only, excluding industrial
spurs and sidings and the lines in "temporary" operation (recently constructed but not yet up to
operational standards).
b. _05/
c. During 1951-55, 4,700 km were built. The length in 1955 was 6,600 km less than the 1960 Plan, and
30 percent of the planned route of about 127,200 km was to be double tracked in the 1960 Plan. 106/
d.
e.
1957.
107/
In 1956, 8..76 km were added and in 1957 514 km 108/. In 1958, 157 km more were laid than in
109/
f.
110/
g.
111/
h.
112/
i.
113/
j.
114/
k.
115/ ?
1.
116/
m.
117/
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ce?
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Table 6
Estimated Inventory of Railroad Freight Cars in the USSR
Selected Years; 1945-59, and.1965 Plan
Year
:Inventory as of the
Beginning of Each. Year.
Total Capacity 12/
Percent
Thousand
Units 2/
Index
(1945 = 100)
Million
Metric Tons
Index
(19)-i-5 = 100)-
Two-Axle Cars E./
Automatic
Brakes 1/
Automatic
Couplings 1/ --'
1945
609.1
100
15.8'
100
73.0
71.1
41.5
1952
802.8
132
26.3
166
53.0
79.1
61.5
1958
875.9
144
39.9
253?
30.0
96.3
100.0
1959
889.0
146
42.5
269
27.0
100.0
100.0
1965 Plan
969.7
159
56.2
356
14.0
100.0
100.0
a. These estimates are based on recent Soviet experience, published by a Soviet railroad expert and others,
showing that the working inventory represents 75 to 85 percent of the total inventory. 118/ The working
inventory was derived from daily carloadings and turnaround time The margin of
error on total inventory is plus or minus 5 percent.
b. The total inventory times the average-capacity per physical unit. 119/
c. 120/. Interpolations have been made where necessary.
d. 121/.
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Table 7
Estimated Inventory of Mainline Locomotives in the USSR
Selected Years, 1946-65
Units
Beginning of Year
Total Mainline
Steam 2/
Diesel12/
Electric
1946
_25,682
25,300
151
23112/
1951
31,468
30,500
498
470 2/
1952
32,179
31,022
574
583
1959
35,979
31,680
2,277
2,022
1965
26,343
9,149 .c11
8,752
8,442 2/
a7-7 Figures on retirements of steam loco-
motives are estimated to be about 2 percent per year through 1958. Exports beginning
in 1959 (principally to Communist China) are considered to be part of steam loco-
motive retirements. About 75 percent of the estimate of mainline steam locomotives
produced by the European Satellites (except East Germany) are estimated to have been
exported to the USSR. No steam locomotives were produced or imported after 1956.
b. 123/. These figures are for total production and imports. Retirements are esti-
mated to be negligible. The 1959-65 increment is estimated from the average annual
rate of increase necessary to attain the planned production rate for 1965.
c. 124/. Total production during 1946-50 is added to the 1946 inventory. Imports
and retirements are estimated to be negligible. Production data for 1956-58 are pub-
lished in several Soviet newspapers and journals.
d. It is assumed that the acquisition of an estimated total.of_12,845 electric and
diesel electric and diesel locomotives will eliminate the need for about 22,500 steam
locomotives, many of which will be good mainline units and may be exported to Com-
munist China.
e. The 1959-65 increment is estimated from the average annual rate of increase
necessary to attain the planned production rate for 1965. The total includes esti-
mated imports of AC types of locomotives known to be on order from France and West
Germany for use on the Trans-Siberian Railroad.
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S -E -C -R -E -T
Table 8
Railroad Labor Force Productivity, and Earnings in the USSR and the US L.a./
1950-58 and 1965 Plan
USSR?'
us b/
Productivity
Adjusted
(Thousand
Adjusted
Productivity jJ
Average
Productivity
Average
Traffic-
Railroad
(Thousand
Annual
(Thousand
Annual
Total
Operating
Kilometers
Labor Force E./
Traffic-
Earnings
Total
Traffic
Earnings
Employees
Employees
per Operating
Index
(Thousand
Kilometers
Index
(Current
Index
Employees
Kilometers
Index
(Current
Index
Year
(Thousand)
(Thousand)
Employee)
(1950 =
100)
Employees)
per Employee)
(1950 =
100)
Rubles)
(1950 =
100)
(Thousand)
per Employee)
(1950 =
100)
US $)
(1950 =
100)
1950
3,014
1,712
403
100
2,013
343
100
.
8,640
loo
1,221
745
100
3,785
4,182
100
1951
3,088
1,765
44o
109
2,063
376
no
9,045
105
1,276
784
105
4,352
110
1952
3,233
1,866
455
113
2,160
393
115
9,152
106
1,227
776
104
115
1953
3,326
1,901
482
120
2,222
412
120
9,128
106
1,206
775
104
4,415
4,560
117
1954
3,421
1,968
501
124
2,285
432
126
9,319
108
1,065
797
107
4,719
120
1955
3,400
1,980
562
139
2,271
490
143
9,319
108
1,058
904
121
125
1956
3,414
1,980
617
153
2,281
536
156
9,422
109
1,042
950
128
5,107
135
1957
3,439 1/
1,995 2/
685 2/
170
2,297
595
173
9,530 5/
110
986 gi
997 E/
134
5,434 gj
144
1958
3,443 (1/
1,997 2/
731 2/
181
2,300
635
185
9,735 I/
113
841 E/
1,043 gi
140
5,860 9/
155
1965 Plan
3,587 1/
2,081 LI/
980 1/
243
2,396
851
248
10,710 5/
124
757 jj
1,296 1/
174
, 7,608 I/
201
b. All data for the USSR are for the Ministry of Transportation (MPS) and for the US for Class I railroads.
5()38:1
c. Adjusted for Comparability with the labor force in the US. Employees of the MIS believed to be engaged in functions not performed by US railroads were eliminated: 66.8 percent of total employ-
ment of the MFS is believed to be comparable with the railroad labor force in the US in the matter of productivity.
d. Operational employees are estimated to constitute about 58 percent of total employment of the MIS, based on the relationship in 1950-56.
e. 126/
f. Present Soviet intentions 127/ indicate continued gradual wage increases and decreased hours. Earnings after 1956 are therefore estimated to increase at the 1950-56 rate.
g. 128/
h. Derived from statements of planned traffic and productivity.
i. Actual performance is estimated to reach the minimum of the planned range.
j. Estimated on the assumption that present trends in traffic, productivity, and earnings will continue. Significant changes in government transport policy now under review could have considerable
effect on the validity of these estimates, probably in the direction of increased traffic and employment rather than on productivity or average earnings.
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0-J1-t.-fl-L-a.
Table 9
Volume and Selected Characteristics of Motor Freight Traffic in the USSR
Selected Years, 1950-59, and 1965 Plan
1950
1953
1955
1958
1959
1965 Plan
Performance by all motor vehicles 2/
(billion ton-kilometers)
Performance by common carrier motor vehicles 12/
(billion ton-kilometers)
Common carrier performance as a percent of total
Tons originated by all motor vehicles 1/
20.1
0.93
4.6
31.4
2.52
8.o
42.5
9.26
21.8
76.8
18.39
23.9
87.6
21
24.0
146
64
(million metric tons)
1,859.2
3,002.7
3,730.0
6,474.4
7,361.3
10,500
Tons originated by common carrier motor vehicles
(million metric tons)
46.4
127.4
452.1
1,145.6
1,302
N.A.
Common carrier tons originated as a percent of total
2.5
4.2
12.1
17.7
17.7
Average length of haul for all motor freight/
-(kilometers)
10.8
10.4
11.4
11.9
11.9
14
Average length of haul for noncommon carrier freight
(kilometers)
10.6
10.0
10.1
11.0
11.0
N.A.
Average length of haul for common carrier freight g/
(kilometers)
20.0
19.8
20.5
16.1
16.1
N. A.
50X1
the
figure for 1965 50X1
has been computed from the percent reported.
c. .133/
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Table 10
Length of the Highway Network in the USSR and the US
Selected Years, 1950,59, and 1965 Flan
Year
USSR 2/
(Thousand Kilometers)
US 12/
(Thousand Kilometers)
USSR
as a Percent of US
Total
Improved 2/
Paved1/
Total
Improved 2/
Paved
Total
Improved
Improved
Paved
177.3
2,776.0
6.4
2.0
1953
194.2
30.3
3,063.0
1,101.0
6.3
2.8
1955
206.8
41.1
3,211.04
1,196.0
6.
3. 4
1956
214.5
47.1
3,264.0
1,257.0
6.6
3.7
1957
225.7
52.0
N.A,
N.A.
1958
235.9
58.5
N.A.
N.A.
1959
246.0 2/
65.0 2/
N A.
N.A.
1965 Plan
N.A.
158.5 V
N.A.
N.A.
. 142/
c. Totals are for surfaced roads only. In each country, there are at present more than 1 mil-
lion km of nonsurfaced roads.
d. Surfaced with a water-resistant binding material.
e. The 1958 total plus estimated additions in 1959.
f. It is estimated that there will have been constructed or reconstructed about 100,000 km of
roads which fall into this category. A total of 70,000 km of all-weather roads will be con-
structed in the USSR, 145 and 16,000 km of roadways will be reconstructed to higher standards
in the RSFSR alone. 14
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Table 11
Estimated Inventory of Motor Vehicles in the USSR 2/
Selected Years, 1950-59, and 1965 Plan
Type of Vehicle
Thousand Vehicles
Percent of Total
1950 1955
1958
1965
1959 Plan
1950
1955
1958
1959
1965
Plan
Truck12/
1,172 2,126
2,815
3,100 4,200
90.3
82.9
81.9
81.5
77.6
Automobile
111 396
555
630 1,000
8.6
15.5
16.2
16.6
18.5
Bus
14 42
65
74 209
1.1
1.6
1.9
1.9
3.9
Total
1,297 2 564
3,435
3,80)4 5,)409
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Index (1950
= 100)
100 198
265
293 417
1951-55
1956-58
1959-65
Average annual rate of
growth 2/ 14.6
10.2 6.7
a. Estimates are for the end of each year and are based on official production figures, with allow-
ances for net exports and retirement. Estimates include military vehicles, which accounted for about
18 percent of the total at the end of 1957.
b. Including jeeps.
c. Average annual rates of growth are computed at the compound rate for the stated period, including
the terminal years.
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S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 12
Mainline Petroleum Pipeline Transport in the USSR
1950-59 and 1960 and 1965 Plans
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960 Original Plan
1960 Revised Plan
1965 Plan
Length of Line
As of the End
of Each Year 2/
(Thousand Kilometers)
5.4
6.0
6.2
7.1
8.1
10.4
11.6
13.2
14.4
16.7
24.9 12/
20.9 Eli
43.0d
Traffic 2/
Million
Tons Originated
15.3
18.4
23.2
29.4
39.7
51.7
65.3
80.9
94.7
111.3
126.4 12/
126.4 2/
170.0 121
Billion
Ton-Kilometers
4.9
5.5
6.4
7.6
10.2
14.7
20.5
26.6
33.8
41.6
83.0 2/
65.0 1/
185.0 1/
Average Distance Pumped
(Kilometers)
320
299
276
259
257
284
314
329
357
374
657
514
1,100 1/
Traffic Density
(Million Ton-Kilometers
per Kilometer of Line)
0.9
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.3
1.4
1.8
2.0
2.3
2.5
3.3
3.1
4.3
b.
C.
d.
e.
f.
g?
h.
1.
3.
150/
151/
152/
There is no evidence that the plan for tons originated was altered.
153/
154/
155
15 /. The performance plan may very well be revised downward if the original construction plan is not fulfilled.
The average distance pumped will not reach the plan figure if the ton-kilometers plan is not fulfilled.
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S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 13
CommOdity Composition. of Railroad Traffic in the USSR in Ton-Kilometers
1950-58
Commodity
1950 2/
1951 12/
1952 12/
1953 2/ 1954 2/ 1955
2/
1956 2/
1957 2/
1958 2/
Billion Ton-Kilometers
Coal and coke
178.2
188
201
211.5 234.7
266.7
303.2
336.4
348.9
Wood, excluding firewood
72.2
84
94
98.5 100.1
119.9
124.1
151.9
178.4
Firewood
4.5
5
5
4.3 4.6
5.2
5.0
5.9
6.8
Petroleum :
52.0
60
68
76.9 84.5
101.6
112.4
131.2
154.0
' Ferrous metals, including scrap
47.5
57
65
67.5 69.7
75.7
80.2
83.8
90.6
Ore
27.8
33
39
42.3 40.5
45.0
49.2
58.1
59.9
,,.Mineral construction materials
46.7
53
64
68.2 68.4
82.1
90.0
100.0
113.9
Grain and flour
30.9
37
37
? 45.1 53.1
55.1
80.1
95._6
80.8
-Other
142.5
160
166
183.7 201.2
219.6
234.9
249.9
268.7
Total
602.3
677.3
741.3
798.0 856.8
970.9
1,079.1
1,212.8
1 302 o
Percent of Total,
Coal and coke
29
28
27
27 27
27
28
27
26
Wood, excluding firewood
12
12
13
12 12
12
12
13
14
Firewood
. I
1
1 -
1 1
1
- 1
Negl.-
1--
Petroleum
9
9
9
9 lo
10
lo
11
12
Ferrous metals, including scrap
8
8
9
8 8
8
7
- 7
7
Ore
5
5-
5"
5 5
5
5
5
5
Mineral construction materials
8
8
9
9 8
8
8
8
9
Grain and flour
' 5
'5
5
6 6
6
- 7
8
6
Other
23
24
22
23 23
23
22
21
20
Total
100
100
100
100 100
100
100
100
100
a. 157/
b.
15/
c. 159/
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Table 14
Commodity Composition of Railroad Traffic in the USSR in Tons Originated
1950-58 and 1965 Plan
Commodity
1950 El 1951 1)/
1952 I/ 1953 2/
1954 2/ 1955 2/
Million Tons Originated
1956 a/ 1957 2/
1958 9/ 1965 Plan
Coal and coke 266.1 283 304 322.1 349.3 389.0 422.4 454.1 478.8 N.A.
Coal,'excluding coke (457.4 d/) 552 e/
Wood, excluding firewood .72.4 77 82 82.6 84.3 . 94.1 96.0 110.6 ..121.5' 158 1./
Firewood 18.9 17 ' 17 16.2 16.0 16.4 15.3 16.7 18.1 N.A.
Petroleum 43.2 48 55 , 62.3 69.9 77.6 86.5 99.0 112.5 210 e/
Ferrousi metala,-including scrap 43.3 50 57 ? 61.3- 64.6 71.8. 77.2 81.8 88.3 N.A.
Ferrous metals, excluding scrap (66.8 g/) 110 e/
Ore 48.4 56 66 72.4 75,3 83.8 89.8 100.1 108.1 203 ./
IMineral construction materials 157.5 169 - 194 207.9 209.8 245.6 263.0 282.2 324.2 500 "e/
Grain and flour 38.8 43 . 44 47.5 53.2 58.o 67.8 71.9 71:5 N.A.
Other 145.7 166 , 178 195.1 209.0 230.7 253.0 271.3 293,9 N.A,
, .._
Total
834.3 909,2 997:0 1,067.4 1,131.14 1,267.0 1,371.0 1,487.7 1,616.9 2,372 e/
Percent of Total
Coal and coke 32 31, ' 30 30 '31 31 . 31 31 30 N.A.
Coal, excluding coke (28) ? 23
Wood, excluding firewood 9 8' 8 8 ? 7' 7 7 7 8 7
.Firewood . - , 2 2 2 2 1 1 ? 1 1 1 N.A.
Petroleum. 5 5 6 6. 6 . 6 6 7 7 - 9
Ferrous metals, including scrap 5 6 6' - 6- 6 6 6 5 5 N.A.
Ferrous metals, excluding scrap (4) 5
Ore -6 6 - 7 , - 7 ? 7 7 7 . 7 ' '9
Mineral construction materials19 19 19 19 . 19 19_ 19 19 20 21
Grain and flour 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 4 N.A.
Other . ., 17 . 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 N.A.
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
b. 161/
d. Derived by subtracting coke shipments of 21.4-million metric tons 163/ .from the total for coal and coke
e. 165/
f. 30 percent above the level of 1958. 166/
g. 167/
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Table 15
Average Length of Haul per Metric Ton of Railroad Freight
in the USSR, by Principal Commodity
1950-58
Kilometers
Commodity
1950 2/
1951 b/
1952 b/
1953 2/
1954 b/
1955 a/
1956 a/
1957 a/
1958 a/
Coal and coke
670
665
661
657
672
686
718
741
729
Wood4 excluding firewood
998
1,084
1,148
1,193
1,187
1,274
1,293
1,373
1,469
Firewood
241
263
273
266
290
314
329
352
374
Petroleum
1,205
1,253
1,231
1,235
1,210
1,309
1,298
1,326
1,369
Ferrous metals, including scrap1,095
1;138
1,147
1;101
1,078
1,055
1,039
1,025
1,026
Ore
,574
587
588
585
538
537
548
580
554
Mineral construction materials
296
314
329
328
326
334
342
354
352
Grain and flour
795
_873
-829
949
997
950
1,182
1,329
1,129
Other
978
964
933
942
963
952
928
921
914
All freight
722
745
744
748
757
766
787
815
805
a. 168/
b. -1741W
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Table 16
Railroad Freight Traffic in the USSR, by Economic Region 2/
1940, 1950, and 1955
Tons Originated Tons Terminated
Economic Region
1940
1950
1955
1940
1950
1955
Million
Metric Tons
Percent
of Total
Million
Metric Tons
Percent
of Total
Million
Metric Tons
Percent
of Total
Million
Metric Tons
Percent
of Total
Million
Metric Tons
Percent
of Total
Million
Metric Tons
Percent
of Total
Ia North
11.2
1.9
24.9
3.0
39.4
3.1
7.2
1.2
12.6
1.5
21.4
1.7
Ib Northwest
33.1
5.6
29.8
3.6
43.5
3.4
45.1
7.7
38.7
4.6
59.8
4.7
ha Baltic
17.4
2.1
20.7
1.6
17.4
2.1
39.0
3.1
lib Belorussia
15.0
2.5
17.7
2.1
18.6
1.5
20.0
3.4
17.1
2.1
27.8
2.2
III South
201.1
33.9
231.1
27.7
351.6
27.8
167.4
28.4
203.5
24.4
318.0
25.0
IV Southeast
37.9
6.4
49.9
6.0
70.5
5.6
26.9
4.6
38.8
4.6
53.0
4.2
V Transcaucasus
14.3
2.4
17.2
2.1
29.2
2.3
16.0
2.7
21.8
2.6
33.7
2.6
VI Volga
20.8
3.5
30.5
3.7
57.2
4.5
21.9
3.7
38.9
4.7
57.7
4.5
VII Central
95.8
16.2
131.7
15.8
180.6
14:3
132.3
22.5
171.6
20.6
242.1
19.0
Total for the
western regions
429.2
72;4
550.1
65.9
811.4
64.1
436.8
74.2
560.4
67.2
852.4
66.9
VIII Urals
56.0
9.4
114.9
13.8
185.2
14.6
57.3
9.7
124.2
14.9
184.5
14.5
IX West Siberia
39.5
6.7
65.3
7.8
103.4
8.2
27.6
4.7
50.5
6.1
80.8
6.3
Xa Kazakhstan
15.5
2.6
35.2 .
4.2
58.0
4.6
12.2
2.1
28.0
3.4
50.3
3.9
Xb Central Asia
12.9
2.2
17.7
2.1
25.8
- 2.0
13.8
2.3
20,9
2.5
31.3
2.5
XI East Siberia
18.0
3,0
28.3
3.4
49.6
3.9
15.5
2.6
23.8
2.9
38.9
3.1
XII Far East
21.6
3.6
23.0:
2.8
32.3
2.6
25.5
4.3
26.3
3.2
35.9
2.8
Total for the
eastern regions,
163.5
27.6
284.4
34.1
454.3
35.9
151.9
25.8
273.8
32.8
421.6
33.1
Total
592.7
100.0
834.5
100.0
1,265.6
100.0
588.7
100.0
834.1
100.0
1,2714.0
100.0
a. 170/. Totals in this table differ slightly from those given in Table 17, p. 68, below,
Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals sho..50X1
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Table 17
Tons Originated by Inland Transport in the .USSR, by Mode of Transport.
Selected Years, 1950-59, and 1965 Plan
Carrier
Million Metric Tons Percent of Increase
50X1
50X1
bUA"I
ow\ i
50X1
1950
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1965 Plan 1950-58
1958-65
,
Railroad ./'
. .
Motor vehicle 1/
Inland water fleet c/.
Ships in coastal and ..
intercoastal traffic d/
Petroleum pipeline
Total
Railroad
Motor vehicle
Inland water fleet
Ships in coastal and
intercoastal traffic d/
Petroleum pipeline
Total
834.3
1,859.2
91.8
25.0
15.3
2,825.6
1,267.0 1,371.0 1,487.7 1,616.9 1,763.8 2,372 93.8
3,730.0 4,200.9 5,216.4 6,474.4 7,361.3 10,500 248.2
139.5 147.1 159.2 178.3 192.2 268 94.2
42.9 45.9 48:4 49.4 49.7 69 97.6
51.7 65.3 80.9 94.7 111.3 170 519.0
5,231.1 5,830.2 6,992.6 8,11.13.7 9,478.3 13,379 197.8
46.7
62.2
50.3
39.7
79.5
59.0
Percent of Total
29-5
65.9
3.2
0.9.
0.5
100.0
24.2 23.5 21.3 19.2 18.6 17.7
71.3 72.1 74.5 77.0 77.7 78.5
. 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.0
.0.8 0.8 0.7. 0.6 0.5 0.5
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.3
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a. Figures
for 1965 from Table 14; p.-65,'above
of
C.
The figure for 1965 was planned to be about 50 percent above the revel of 1958. 177/
d. Estimated.
the 1965 Plan figure is 70.5 percent above the level
1958. 179/ The amount of coastal
and intercoastal
traffic in relationship to total maritime traffic was estimated
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Table 18
Distribution of Total River Cargoes
in the USSR, by River Basin
1955
River Basin a/
Tons Originated
(Million Metric Tons) ?
Percent of Total
Cargoes, by Type
Percent of Total
Basin Cargo
USSR b/
Total
139.1 .2/
100.0
100.0
Petroleum
14.4
100.0
10.4
Dry cargo
68.5
100.0
49.2
Rafted timber
56.2
100.0
4o.4
Central Basin d/
Total
82.8
59.5
100.0
Petroleum
13.0
90.3
15.7
Dry cargo
41.1
60.0
49.6
Rafted timber .
28.7
.51.1
34.7
Northwestern Basin d/
Total
14.2
10.2
100.0
, Petroleum
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
Dry cargo
7.5
10.9
52.8
Rafted timber
6.7
11.9
47.2
Northern Basin d/
Total
'17.1
12.3
100.0
Petroleum
0.1
0.7
0.6
Dry cargo
4.1
6.0
24.0
Rafted timber
12.9
23.0
75.4
Eastern Basin d/
Total
18.0
100.0
Petroleum
.25.0
1.3
9.0
5.2
Dry cargo
15.8
, 23.1
63.2
Rafted timber
7.9
14.0
31.6
a. Major waterways located in individual basins are as follows:
(1) Central Basin: the Volga, Kama, Belaya, Moscow, and Oka Rivers and the Moscow-Volga and
Volga-Don Canals.
(2) Northwestern Basin: the Neva, Svir', and Sheksna Rivers and the Ladoga, Mariinskiy, and
Stalin Canals.
(3) Northern Basin: :the Severnaya Dvina, Pechora, Sukhona, and Vychegda Rivers.
(4) Eastern Basin: the Ob', Irtysh, Yenisey, Angara, Lena, and Mur Rivers.
b. 181/
c. This figure differs from that given in Table 17, p. 68; above
This figure is being retained because of the breakdown 17 .type of cargo.
d. Percentages were derived from a table and were applied to official totals.
?
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Table 19
Performance of River Transport in the USSR
Selected Years, 1945-58, and 1965 Plan
1945 21*
1950 21
1955 2/
1958 b/
1965 Plan c/
Petroleum
Billion ton-kilometers
6.3
12.0
14.3
15.3
23.0
Million metric tons -
5.5
11.9
14.4
16.2
24.5
Average length of haul (kilometers)
1,145.5
1,008.4
993.1
944.4
938.8
Percent of total cargo
15.0
13.0
10.4
9.1
9.2
Timber in rafts
Billion ton-kilometers
5.1
17.2
23.9
30.0
30.0
Million metric tons
15.9
42.4
56.2
68.4
78.5
Average length of haul (kilometers)
320.8
405.7
425.3
438.6
382.2
Percent of total cargo
43.4
46.3
40.4
38.4
29.3
Dry cargo
Billion ton- kilometers
7.2
16.7
29.2
40.2
87.0
Million metric tons
15.2
37.2
68.5
93.7
164.5
Average length of haul (kilometers)
473.7
448.9
426.3
429.0
528.9
Percent of total cargo
41.5
40.7
49.2
52.6
61.5
Total freight performance
Billion ton-kilometers
18.6
45.9
67.4
85.5 d/
140.0 e/
Million metric tons
36.6
91.5
139.1
178.3 TV
267.5 e/
Average length of haul (kilometers)
508.2
501.6
484.5
479.5
523.4
Percent of total cargo
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Footnotes for Table 19 follow on p. 71.
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Table 19
Performance of River Transport in the USSR
Selected Years, 1945-58, and 1965 Plan
(Continued)
1945 2/
Total passenger performance
1950 2/ 1955 2/
195812/ 1965 Plan Si
Billion passenger-kilometers
2.3
2.7
3.6
4.o 1/
5.5
Million passengers
38.5
53.6
82.4
102.2 d/
140
Average length of trip (kilometers)
59.7
50.4
43.7
39.1
39.3
a. 183/. Data for total ton-kilometers and metric tons originated in this table differ slightly from those shown in
Tables 1 and 17 (pp. 52 and 68, respectively, above) because of a difference in coverage. These data were published before
the Ministry of the River Fleet, RSFSR, took over some transport organizations not included in common carrier river trans-
port before 1957. The later data are not used here, because a breakdown is not available.
b. 184/. for all figures except total freight and passenger traffic (for which see footnote d). Indi-
vidual breakdowns are based on percentage increases above the level of 1955 and have been adjusted to figures for total
freight traffic (see footnote d), which are absolutes.
c. 185/.? for all figures except freight traffic (for which see footnote e). Individual breakdowns are
based on percentage increases above the level of 1958 on which absolute figures have not been published, except as in
footnote e. The figures have been adjusted to correspond with increases scheduled for total freight traffic (see foot-
note e).
d. 186/
e. 1447/
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Table 20
Average Freight Car Performance of Railroads in the USSR 2/
1950-58 and 1965 Flan
Year
Average Freight Car Trip
Average
Turnaround
Time (Days)
Average
Kilometers
Per Day
Kilometers
Percent
Empty
Loaded
Empty
Total
1950
801
296
1,097
27.0
7.49
146.4
1951
826
308
1,134
27.2
7.13
159.0
1952
818
317
1,135
27.9
6.87
165.2
1953
825
316
1,141
27.7
6.64
171.8
1954
838
320
1,158
27.6
6.68
173.3
1955
844
328
1,172
28.0
6.23
188.2
1956
868
338
1,206
28.0
6.31
191.2
1957
896
366
1,262
29.0
6.12
206.4
1958
893
369
1,262
29.2
5.83
216.6
1965 Plan
5.33
a. 188/
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Table 21
Average Freight Train Performance of Railroads in the USSR a/
1950-58 and 1965 Plan
Year
Gross Ton-Kilometers
per Freight Train-Hour
Average Weight
(Metric Tons)
Average Speed
(Kilometers per Hour)
Excluding
Stops
Including
Stops
Gross
Net
1950
28,740
1,430
815
33.8
20.1
1951
32,520
1,14.78
839
34.5
22.0
1952
35,1440
1,521
859
34.9
23.3
1953
37,110
1,579
894
35.0
23.5
1954
38,010
1,660
936
35.2
22.9
1955
43,420
1,758
1,002
37.1
24.7
1956
11.5,14.10
1,831
1,052
37.6
24.8-
1957
48,130
1,880
1,100
37.8
25.6
1958
52,220
1,963
N.A.
N.A.
26.6
1965 Plan
1+00
2,400
N.A.
N.A.
31.0
a. 189/
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Table 22
Profits, Revenues, and Costs of Railroad Operations
in the USSR
1940, 1950-58, and 1959 and 1965 Plans
(1) (2) (3) (4). (5) (6) (7) (8)
Gross Operating Gross Operating Total
Profit- Operating Profit Revenue Operating Revenue Operating Cost Operating Cost Total
(Million, per Traffic-Kilometer 12/ (Million per Traffic-Kilometer c/ (Million per Traffic-Kilometer Traffic-Kilometers d/
Year Current Rubles) Operating Ratio 5/ (Current Kopecks) Current Rubles) (Current Kopecks)- Current Rubles) (Current Kopecks) (Billion) -
1940 5,147 e/ 72.5 1.002 18,692 f/ 3.644 13,545 g/ 2.642 11/ 513.0
1950 6,342 i/ 85.2
1951 8,708 i/ 81.3
1952 7,678 i/ 83.8
1953 9,496 i/ 81.2
1954 11,918 it 78.2
1955 14,374 I/ 75.2
1956 14,346 I/ 75.9
1957 16,813 T./ 74.1
1958 19,121 I./ 71.9
1959 Plan 21,919 i/ 69.4
1965 Plan 41,963 i/ 56.2
0.935 42,711 1/
1.124 46,625 .,1/
0.906 47,316 LI/
1.035 50,423 .1/
1.209 54,761 A/
1.292 58,065 A/
1.174 59,603 f/
1.231 64,849?!
1.309 68,030 //
1.435 71,730 r/
2.057 95,819 t/
6.187
6.010
5.575
5.503
5.554
5.220
4.879
4.747
4.658
4.697
36,369 A/
37,917 j/
39,638
40,927 A/
42,843 ra
43,691 1/
45,257 m/
48,036 E/
4E3,909 E/
49,811 m/
4.697 h/ 53,856 m/
5.252 II/
4.886 h/
4.669 1-1/
4.468 12/
4.345 1;/
3.928 E/
3.705 n/
3.516 o/
3.349
3.262 s/
690:3
775.8
848.7
916.3
985.9
1,112.3
1,221.5
1,366.2
1,460.4
1,527.0
2.640 v/ 2,040
a. Column (6) divided by Column (4).
b. Column (7) subtracted from Column (5).
c. Column (4) divided by Column (8) unless otherwise indicated.
d. See Tables 1 and 2, pi). 52 and 53, respectively, above, except for 1940, 1951, 1952, and 1954]
e. 191/
f. Column (1) plus Column (6).
g. Column (1) divided by profitability]
h. Column (6) divided by Column (8). The figure for 1940 also is given as 2.616 and the figure for 1955 as 3.932. 193/ Derived figures, which are not sufficiently different to affect
the time series, have been used to maintain internal consistency.
i. Column (6) subtracted from Column (4).
i. 194/
k. 195/
1. Column (6) multiplied by profitability
m. Column (7) multiplied by Column (8).
n' 152/
o. 1.9-8/. A figure of 3.480, which_is for the first 9 months of operations only, has erroneously been carried in the more official sources. 192/
p. This figure is 83.5 percent of total profits 83.5 percent is estimated to be the portion of total profits derived fro. operations. On the basis of pre-
vious established relationships between total profits and operating profits.
q. 201/
r. 202/. An increase of 3.7 billion rubles is planned.
a. 203/. A decrease of 2.6 percent is planned.
t. Column (5) multiplied by Column (8).
u. In order to obtain estimates of profits and revenues, unit revenue for 1965 is assumed to be the sage as for 1959.
v. 204/. carries out. the figure to three places beyond the decimal point (2.612), which does not seem warranted considering the ranges given in other related control
data7--
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Table 23
Average Revenue Rates for Selected Commodities
as a Percent of Unit Costs of Railroad Freight Traffic in the USSR
Selected Years, 1949-56
Percent
Commodity
1949 2/
1950 2/
1952 2/
1955 ID/
1956 2/
Coal
105
96
91
99
115
Coke
95
92
82
LA.
88
Iron ore
94
91
92
98
103
Earth, sand, and clay
94
76
82
N.A.
88
Mineral fertilizer
105
92
65
N.A.
65
Ferrous metals
94
96
95
N.A.
120
Grain
117
123
110
N.A.
111
Cotton
92
119
124
105
120
Sugar
300
263
230
218
243
Shoes
286
N.A.
N.A.
230
N.A.
Textiles
385
N.A.
N.A.
257
N.A.
a.
b.
c.
206/
207/
208/
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Table 24
Profits, Revenues, and Costs of Railroad Passenger Operations
in the USSR a/
1940, 1950-58, and 1965 Plan
Year
(i)
'Gross Operating
Profit 12/
(Million
Current Rubles)
(2)
Operating Ratio 2/
(3)
Operating Profit
per Passenger-
Kilometer d/
(Current Kopecks)
(4)
Gross Operating
Revenue 2/
Current Rubles)
(5)
Operating Revenue
per Passenger-
Kilometer 1/
(Current Kopecks)
(6) (7)
Total Operating Cost
Operating Cost .5/ -per Passenger- '
(Million Kilometer h/
Current Rubles) (Current Kopecks)
(8)
Total
Passenger-
Kilometers 1/
(Billion)
1940
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1965 Plan
2,674
3,174
3,365
3,749
3,576
3,086
3,801
3,749
4,467
5,216
9,895
52.0
69.1
68.8
67.4
70.5
74.8
71.0
71.6
69.3
67.4
53.7
2.729
3.60710,265
3.416
3.491
3.023
2.390
2.688
2.633
2.912
3.293
5.208
5 ,570
a
12,264
13,104
1.341F2
15,976
21,386
5.684
11.665
10.933
10.704
10.258
9.500
9.267
9.286
9.480
10.086
11.256
2,896
7,091
7,4o4
7,747
8,559
9,178
9,303
9,474
10,075
10,760
11,491
2.955
8.058
7.517
7.213
7.235
7.109
6.579
6.653
6.568
6.793
6.048
98.0
88.0
98.5
107.4
118.3
129.1
ltt:14
153.4
158.4
190
a. Revenues and costs of baggage and mail service are included in revenues and costs of passenger service, but there is no allowance for these items
in total passenger-kilometers. The resulting inflation is not sufficient to alter the time series.
b. Column (6) subtracted from Column (4).
c. Column (6) divided by Column (4), -
d. Column (1) divided by Column (8).
e. Column (1) plus Column (6).
f. Column (4) divided by Column (8).
g. Column (7) multiplied by Column (8).
h. Column (6) divided by Column (8).
i. See Table 2, p. 53, above, except for 1940, 1951, 1952, and 1954
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Table 25
Profits, Revenues, And Costs of Railroad Freight Operations
in the USSR
1940, 1950-58, and 1965 Plan
Year
(1)
Gross Operating
Profit a/
(Million
Current Rubles)
(2)
Operating Ratio b
(3)
Operating Profit
per Ton-Kilometer c/
(Current Kopecks)?
(4)
Gross Operating
Revenue d/
(Million
Current Rubles)
(5)
Operating Revenue
per Ton-Kilometer e/
(Current Kopecks)?
(6)
Total
Operating Cost f/
(Million ?
Current Rubles)
(7)
Operating Cost
per Ton-Kilometer c/
(Current Kopecks)?
(8)
Total
Ton-Kilometers 5/
(Billion)
1940
2,473
81.2
0.596
13,122
3.162
10,649
2.566
415.0
1950
3,168
90.2
0.526
32,446
5.387
29,278
4.861
602.3
1951
5,344
85.1
0.789
35,856
5.294
30,512
4.5o5
677.3
1952
3,929
89.0
0.530
35,820
4.832
31,891
4.302
741.3
1953
5,921
84.5
0.742
38,288
4.798
32,367
4.056
798.0
1954
8,833
79.2
1.031
42,497
4.960
33,664
3.929
856.8
1955
10,573
76.5
1.089
44,962
4.631
34,389
3.542
970.9
1956
10,597
77.2
0.982
46,380
4.298
35,783
3.316
1,079.1
1957
12,346
75.5
1.018
50,307
4.148 h/
37,961
3.130 i/
1,212.8
1958
13,905
73.3
1.068
52,054
3.998 .]/
38,149
2.930 k/
1,302.0
1965 Plan
31,598
57.3
1.708
73,963
3.998 1/
42,365
2.290 mi
1,850
a.ColumactedfromColumn4).
b. Column (6) divided by Column (4).
c. Column divided by Column (8).
d. Column 5 multiplied by Column (8).
e. Source 210/ unless otherwise indicated.
f. Column 7 multiplied by Column (8).
g. See Table 1, p. 52, above, except for 1940, 1951, 1952, and 19511.
h. 212/ '
i. Source 213/
j. Estimated decrease
k. Estimated decrease
1. In order to obtain
m. Estimated decrease
of 0.15 kopeck based on the actual decrease per traffic kilometer.
of 0.2 kopeck based on the actual decrease per traffic kilometer.
estimates of profits and revenues, the unit revenue for 1965 is assumed to be the same as for 1959.
of 0.64 kopeck based on the planned decrease per traffic kilometer.
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Table 26
Profits and Budget Transactions of the Ministry of Railroad Transportation
of the USSR
1950-59 and 1965 Plan
Million Current Rubles
Year
(1)
(2)
Profits
(3)
(4)
Payments
, to the State Budget
Gross Operating 2/
Other b/
Total
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1965 Plan
6,342
8,708
7,678
9,496
11,918
14,374
14,346
16,813
19,121
21,562
41,494
1,277 c/
1,533 c/
1,882 -a/
1,069 Cl
1,047 'a/
2,305 Cl
1,442 Z./
3,387 IV
3,779 h/
3,938 h/
7,322 m/
7,619 d/
10,241 d/
9,560 7,17
10,565 d/
12,965 'a/
16,679-d/
15,788 .J.../
20,200 ay
22,900 ay
25,5001/
48,816 a/
. N.A.
6,365 f/
6,276 7/
10,841 7/10,478
12,285 7/
15,722 7/
15,4002V
17,200 .1/
19,000 ..j/
N.A.
N.A.
(5) (6)
Budget Transactions
Appropriations
from the State Budget Net Surplus or Deficit
N.A. -6,200 e/
6,924 f/ -2,559 7/
8,428 7/ -2,152 0
7/ +363 7y

10,191 7/ +2,o94 0
9,384 7/ +6,338 T/
8,500 78./ +6,900 /
+9,000 1/
';',,:gg IV/
+9,800 i/
N.A. - +12,2001/
N.A. +22,000 n/
a. See Table 22, p. 74, above.
b. Other profits refer to profits resulting from enterprises
such as stations and maintenance organizations.
C. 214/
d. Column (1) plus Column (2).
e. 215/
f. TZ/.
g.
h. Column (1) subtracted from Column (3).
i. 219/
j. 220/. The figure for 1958 is a plan figure.
k. Column (6) subtracted from Column (4).
1. 221/
m. Based on a continuation of the present relationship
n. I Ithere will be a net surplus
yields a figure of 22 billion for 1965.
of the Ministry of Railroad Transportation that are not directly engaged in transport,
between Columns (1) and (3).
of 121 billion rubles during 1959-65. A straight-line increase resulting in this total
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Table 27
Profits, Revenues, and Costs of Inland Water Transport Qperations
in the USSR a/
1950-59 and 1963 Plan
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
?
Year
Gross Operating
Profit or Deficit
(Million
Current Rubles)
Operating Ratio b/
Gross Operating
Revenue
(Million
Current Rubles)
Operating Revenue
per Traffic-Kilometer
(Current Kopecks)
Total
Operating Cost Cl
(Million
Current Rubles)
Operating Cost
per Traffic-Kilometer
(Current Kopecks)
Operating Cost
per Traffic-Kilometer
as a Percent
of Railroad
Operating Cost,
per Traffic-Kilometer d/
Total
Traffic-Kilometers
(Billion)
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1965 Plan
-63 f/
Deficit _j/
Deficit
Deficit 1/
+5 f/
+143 7/
N.A.
+136 0/
+114
N.A.
N.A.
103.2
99.7
94.8 2/
N.A.
95.1
1,944 g/
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
2,59i/
2,742i/
N.A.
2,7)491/
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
4.o h/
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
3.87 m/
3.86 Ei
N.A.
3.44 m/
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
2,007
2,160
2,213
2,451
2,544
2,599
2,513
2,613
2,619
2,970
3,507
4.13 1/
3.97 I/
3.64 k/
3.94 V
3.861/
3.66 71
3.)l1/
3.28 1/
3.15 I/
3.04 E/
2.41 s/
78.6
81.3
78.0
88.2
88.8
93.2
92.0
93.3
94.1
93.2
91.3
48.6
54.4
60.8
62.2
65.9
71.0
73.7
79.9
89,5
97.7
145.5
e/
-
a. Including common carriers only.
b. Column (5) divided by Column (3).
c. Column (6) multiplied by Column (8).
d. Column (6) divided by Column (7) in Table 22, p. 74, above'.
f. Column (3) minus Column (5).
g. Column (4) multiplied by Column (8).
h. 225/
j. The magnitude of the deficits for these years is unknown.
k. Column (7) multiplied by Column (7) in Table 22,
1. Column (1) plus Column (5).
m. Column (3) divided by Column (8).
n. 227/
o.
p. 229/. Cost in 1958 decreased by 14 percent from 1955. The figure for 1957 is interpolated.
q. 230/. Estimated from data for the first 9 months of operations.
r. 231/. Plan figure.
s. 232/. Plan figure.
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Table 28
Estimated State Budget and Nonbudget Allocations for Transport and Communications
in the USSR a/
1950-51, 1956-57, 1952-55 Plan, and 1958-59 Plan
Year
, State Budget Allocations
Nonbudget Allocations
Total Allocations
Billion
Current
Rubles
Percent of Total
Allocated to the
National Economy
Billion
Current
Rubles
Percent of Total
Allocated to the
National Economy
Billion
Current
Rubles
Percent of Total
Allocated to the
National Economy
,1950
1551
1952 Plan'.
1953 Plan
1954 Plan
.1955 Plan
1956
1957
1958 Plan
1959 Plan
15.7 b/
11.9 c/
14.3 .zy
17.4 TV
21.5 -01./
19.5
21.6b/
18.8 13/
14.4 IT,/
20.8 7/
9-9
6.7
8.0
9.6
10.1
8.4
8.8
7-3
5.6
6.7
17.5 c/
20.2 -/
19.7 -/
20.0 c/
17.3 -C/
17.5 c/
18.8
N.A.
17.8 e/
27.2 7/
43.o
23.3
22.7
20.4
15.6
14.6
17.1
N.A.
11.4
15.5
33.2
32.1
34.0
37.4
38.8
37.0
4o.4
N.A.
32.2
48.o
16.7
12.1
12.8
13.4
12.0
10.5
11.4
N.A.
7.8
9-9
a. Communications have generally taken from 3 to 5 percent of the total allocated to transport and
-communications;
b.
233/
c.
d.
235/
-2-7/
e.
f.
237/
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Table 29
Estimated Capital Investment
In the National Economy, Transport and Communications, and Railroad Transport
in. the USSR, by Plan Period a/
? First Five
Year Plan b/
(1928-32)-
Second Five
Year Plan b/
(1933-37)-
Third Five
Year Plan b/
(193842)-
Fourth Five
Year Plan b
(1946-50)-
Fifth Five
Year Plan b/
(1951-55)
1956-57 I.)/
1952-58 2/
Seven Year
Plan Cl
(1959Z5)
Capital investment in the national
economy (Billion Current Rubles)
Capital investment in the transport and
communications Sector (Billion Current
Rubles)
Percent invested in the transport and
'communications sector
Capital investment in railroad transport.
(Billion Current Rubles)
Percent of total investment invested in
pailroad transport
Percent of transport and communications
investment invested in railroad transport
64.9 d/
12.1 d/
18.6 d/
8.2 e/
12.7g/
. 67.8
147.6 d/
31.8 d/
21.5 d/
21.4 e/
145 g/
67.3
145.3 d/
29.6 d/
20.4 d/
20.6 e/
14.2 z/
69.6
338.7 d/
48.1 d/
14.2 d/
35.2 e/
10.4 E/
73.2
654.4 d/
66.0 d/
10.1 ci/
49.1 e/
7.5 g/
74.4 h/
396.2 d/
358 d/
9.0 a/
22.0 1/
5.6
61.5 h/
997.0
108.1
10.8
60.0
6.0
55.5 h/
1,955
211.5
10.8
112.5
5.8
53.2 h/
a. Communications have generally taken from 3 to 5 percent of the total allocated to transport and communications.
b. Including both centralized and noncentralized investment.
c. 238/. Including centralized investment only.
d. 2'RQ/ ?
e. Data for 1951-55 differ from data in Table 30, p. 82, below. The reason for this difference is
not evident
.f. See Table 31, p. 83, below.
g. 241/
h. The inconsistenCy between the percentages for 1951-57 and 1952-58 results from the latter figure not including noncentralized investment, which
is relatively high for railroad transport.
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Table 30
Capital Inputs of Railroad Transport in the USSR
1950-59 and 1965 Plan
Year
(1)
Total
Retained Profits
(Billion
Current Rubles)
(2)
Total
Appropriation
from the State
a/ Budget b/
(Billion
Current Rubles)
(3)
New Financial
Inputs c/
(Billion
Current Rubles)
(4)
Depreciation
Charges d/
(Billion
Current Rubles)
(5)
Total
Available Capital e/
(Billion
Current Rubles)
(6) (7)
Estimated
Capital Investment Percent of Investment
(Billion in the National
Current Rubles) Economy
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1965 Plan
3.9
3.3
-o.3
0.7
1.0
o.4
3.0
3.9
N.A.
N.A.
8.9
8.4
10.5
10.2
9.4
8.5
8.2
9.2
N.A.
N.A.
13.8
12.8
11.7
10.2
10.9
10.4
8.9
11.2
13.1
13.3 ?j/
26.8
5.1
5.0
6.o
6.5
6.9
7.4
8.1
8.8
9.3
N.A.
13.9
18.9
17.8
17.7
16.7
17.8
17.8
, 17.0
20.0
22.4
N.A.
40.7
12.2 f/
11.5
11.4 _g/
10.8 z/
11.5 EV
11.5 _EV
10.9 0
11.1 IV
12.81/
26..3 f/
N.A.
Average
7.5
5.8
5.8
6.3
6.0
N.A.
a. Column subtracted from Column (3) in Table 26, p. 76, above.
b. See Table 26.
c. Column (1) plus Column (2) except for 1950, which is Column (3) in Table 26 plus Column (6) in Table 26.
d. See Table 32, p. 84, below.
e. -Column '(3) plus Column (4).
f. Estimated on the basis of the relationship between total available capital and capital investment established in footnote
g. 242/. A total of 56.7 billion rubles was invested in railroad transport during 1951-55, or 64.6 percent of the total
this period. Therefore, 64.6 percent of the available capital for each year was used to derive these estimates
gY
available
below.
capital for
1.
j. Net surplus subtracted from total profits. See Table 26.
k. 245/
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Table 31
Estimated Capital Investment in Transport in the USSR and the US a/
1951-59
USSR
US
Year
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
Transport
Investment
(Billion
Current Rubles)
Transport
Investment
as a Percent
of National
Investment
Investment
in Railroad
Transport b/
(Billion
Current Rubles)
Railroad
Investment
as a Percent
of Transport
Investment
Railroad
Investment
as a Percent
of National
Investment
Transport
Investment c/
(Billion
Current US $)
Transport
Investment
as a Percent
of National
Investment
Investment
in Railroad
Transport d/
(Billion
Current US $)
Railroad
Investment
as a Percent
of Transport
Investment
Railroad
Investment
as a Percent
of National
Investment
14.0 e/
15.5 -J/
17.7 e/
18.0 f/
19.0 T/
21.5 11/
22.5 g/
19.8 h/
23.3 7-1/
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
11.5
11.4
13.4
12.6
9.7 i/
10.0 i/
11.5
11.4
10.8
11.5
11.5
10.9
11.1
12.8
14.0
82.1
73.5
61.0
63.9
60.5
50.7
54.2
72.7
67.0
Average
7.5
5.8
5.8
6.3
6.0
5.2
5.3
5.8
6.2
6.5
7.8
8.4
8.2
9.4
18.7
18.2
18.6
20.2
20.3
19.5
19.7
22.4
24.9
1.5
1.4
1.3
0.9
0.9
1.2
1.4
0.8
0.9
28.8
26.4
22.4
14.5
13.8
15.4
16.7
9.8
9.6
5.3
4.8
4.2
2.8
2.9
3.1
3.3
2.1
2.2
a. Data for the USSR include investment in communications, which have generally taken from 3 to 5 percent of investment in the transport and communica-
tions sector. Data for the USSR also exclude investment in air transport and petroleum pipeline transport for all years and exclude republic investment
in motor vehicle and inland water transport for 1958 and 1959. Data for the US exclude government investment in inland waterways, port facilities, ship
construction, and air facility development. Data for both countries exclude farm-owned trucking.
b.. See Table 30, p. 82, above.
c. 246/. The US estimates consist of US business expenditures on new plant and equipment for rail and nonrail transport plus investment in highways by
federal, state, and local governments.
d. 247/
e. 778/
f.
g. 250/
h. 251/
i. The percentages probably remained at previous levels (sea footnote a).
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Estimated Fixed Assets)
Table 32
Depreciation Charges, Output, and Capital-Output Ratios
for Railroads in the USSR
1950-58 and 1965 Plan
(1)
(2)
(3) (4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
. Year
Book Value
of Fixed Assets a/
(Billion
Current Rubles)
Depreciation Chargeb
Traffic-Kilometers
Performed
per July 1955 Ruble
Of Fixed Assets e/
Output 0
(Billion July
1955 Rubles)
Capital-Output
Ratios g/
.Billion
Current Rubles b/
.Fixed Assets d/
Percent of Total, (Billion July
pperating Costs 2/ 1955 Rubles)
1950
78
5.1
14.0
92.9 h/
7.4
36.0
2.6
1951
77
5.0
13.2
96.81/
8.o
40.5
2.4
1952
92
6.o
15.1
100.971
8.4
44.3
2.3
1953
loo
6.5
15.8
105.1
8.7
47.8
2.2
1954
106
6.9
16.2
?I/
109.7 it
9.0
51.5
2.1
1955
114
7.4
17.0
118.7 k/
9.4
58.1
2.0
1956
125
8.1
17.9
130.0 7./
9.5
63.8
2.0
1957
135
8.8
18.3
141.2 11
9.7
71.3
2.0
1958
143
9.3
19.1
149.2 71
9.8
76.2
2.0
1965 Plan
214
-13.9
25.8
223.11/
9.2
106.5
2.1
a. Column (2) divided by an amortization rate of 6.5 percent.
b. Column (6) in Table 22, P. 74, above, multiplied by Column (3).
e.
f.
Column (8) in Table 22 divided by Column (4).
Column (7) in Table 22 multiplied by Column (8) in Table 227.
Revenue per traffic-kilometer for 1955 r
g. Column (4) divided by Column (6).
h. 257/
i. Interpolation based on an average annual
j. 258/. A coefficient of utilization of 8
k. 259/
1. Derived by applying percentage increases
rate of growth of 4.2 percent between 1950 and 1954.
traffic-kilometers per ruble of fixed assets at 1954. prices
in Column (1).
- 814-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Ls
estimated.
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S-Er-C-R-E-T
APPENDIX B
METHODOLOGY
Official Soviet transport statistics that have been published were
accepted as the basis for all estimates, aggregations, and comparisons
in this report. Adjustments, as duly noted on appropriate tables,
were made where necessary to effect maximum possible comparability.
Where published data were not available, estimates were based on past
and present trends.
Detailed techniques for estimating aggregates such as performance,
inventory, investment, and the labor force are given in their respec-
tive sections of this report.
-85-
S- E- C-R- E- T
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50X1
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R
Next 9 Page(s) In Document Denied
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110 180 170
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USSR
PRINCIPAL INLAND WATERWAYS, 1956
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St?tule sfiles
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25521 8-56
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SECRET
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