THE OPERATING EFFICIENCY OF THE SOVIET MARITIME CARGO FLEET 1950-58 AND PLANS FOR 1959-65

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 1, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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CONFIDENTIAL
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
N? 3
THE OPERATING EFFICIENCY
OF THE SOVIET MARITIME CARGO FLEET
1950-58 AND PLANS FOR 1959-65
CIA/RR 59-24
June 1959
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
CONFIDENTIAL
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE OPERATING EFFICIENCY OF THE SOVIET MARITIME CARGO FLEET
1950-58 AND PLANS FOR 1959-65
CIA/RR 59-24
, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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FOREWORD
This report deals with the efforts made by the USSR to raise the
operating efficiency of its maritime cargo fleet, with the problems
involved in the task, and with the progress which has been made and
which remains to be made in raising this efficiency. The operating
efficiency of the fleet is important because it indicates the return,
measured in ton-miles of cargo turnover, which the USSR is receiving
for the resources and capital invested in its fleet and ports and be-
cause it influences the amount of foreign exchange which the USSR
spends for the 'chartering of foreign vessels. '
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CONTENTS
Summary
Page
I. Introduction
2
II. Efforts to Raise Operating Efficiency
3
A. Improvement of the Fleet
3
1. Addition of Modern Vessels
3
2. Modernization of Existing Vessels
7
B. Port Facilities and Methods of Handling cargo
7
C. Traffic Management
10
D. Ship Repair
12
E. Size and Composition of Crews
13
III. Growth of Cargo-Carrying Capacity, Performance, and
Operating Efficiency, 1951-58 and Plans. for 1959-65 .
13
IV. An Explanation of the Planned Decrease in the Rate of
Growth of Productivity of Cargo-Carrying Capacity,
1959-65 ?
.20
Appendixes
Appendix A. 'Statistical Tables
23
Appendix B. Methodology
27
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Tables
1. Soviet Indexes of Levels of Simple and Complex Mecha-
nization of Cargo Handling in the Seaports under the
Soviet Ministry of the Maritime Fleet, 1950-58 and
1965 Plan
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Page
2. Cost of Shipments in the Soviet Maritime Cargo Fleet,
1950-58 and 1965 Plan 15
3. Productivity of Cargo-Carrying Capacity in the Soviet
Maritime Cargo Fleet, 1950-58 16
U. Coefficient of Utilization of Cargo-Carrying Capacity
of the Soviet Maritime Cargo Fleet, 1950-57 17
5. Labor Productivity in the Soviet Maritime Cargo Fleet,
1950-56
6. Average Annual Rates of Change in Important Indexes
of Cargo-Carrying Capacity, Cargo Turnover, and
Operating Efficiency in the Soviet Maritime Cargo
Fleet, 1951-58 and 1959-65 Plan
7. Derivation of the Productivity of Cargo-Carrying
Capacity of the Soviet Maritime Cargo Fleet, 1950-57
1950-57
8. Derivation of the Coefficient of Utilization of the
Cargo-Carrying Capacity of the Soviet Maritime
Cargo Fleet, 1950-57
Chart
18
19
25
Indexes of Operating Efficiency in the Soviet Maritime
Cargo Fleet and Influencing Factors 14
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THE OPERATING EFFICIENCY OF THE SOVIET MARITIME CARGO FLEET*
1950-58 AND PLANS FOR 1959-65
Summary
The first detailed plan figures for the growth of Soviet maritime
transportation during the Seven Year Plan (1959-65) were released on
18 December 1958. These figures covered the performance of the Soviet
maritime cargo fleet in ton-miles,** increases in the cargo-carrying
capacities of both the tanker and the dry cargo segments of the
fleet,*** and three of the most important indexes**** of fleet oper-
ating efficiency. In the cases of fleet performance and fleet oper-
ating efficiency, the planned annual rates of growth are generally
lower than the actual rates during the 8 years, 1951-58, which com-
prised the Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55) and the first 3 years of the
original Sixth Five Year Plan (1956-60). The average annual rate of
growth for fleet cargo-carrying capacity in the Seven Year Plan is
greater, however, than the average annual rate of growth during
1951-58.
The fact that there is no planned increase in the rate of growth
of fleet performance corresponding to the planned increase in the rate
of growth of fleet cargo-carrying capacity can be accounted for to a
considerable extent by planned decreases in the rates of growth of two
Important indexes of fleet operating efficiency productivity of
cargo-carrying capacity and cost of shipments. A study of Soviet ef-
forts to raise the operating efficiency of the fleet through 1958
gives the impression that the rates of growth of these indexes of op-
erating efficiency should be expected to rise during the Seven Year
Plan. The main reason for this belief is that the vessels which are
planned to be added to the fleet in considerable numbers during that
* The estimates and conclusions in this report represent the best
judgment of this Office as of 15 April 1959.
** Although Soviet performance figures for inland transport are nor-
mally reported in terms of ton-kilometers, similar maritime data usu-
ally appear as ton-miles. A ton-mile is the Movement of 1 metric ton
of cargo the distance of 1 nautical mile.
*** Comprising all of the tankers and dry cargo vessels subordinate to
the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet (Ministerstvo Morskogo Flota), in-
cluding those of the Caspian Roadstead, Caspian, and Danube Steamship
Companies and excluding those of the Central Asiatic Steamship Company
and those not employed in the shipment of cargoes. The tanker segment
and the dry cargo segment of the fleet are hereafter referred to as the
tanker fleet and the dry cargo fleet, respectively.
**** The term index as used in this report refers to indicators of
operating efficiency.
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period will include a high proportion which are modern in design and
which are highly efficient in their operation. Thus) from the point
of view of fleet composition, the operating efficiency of the fleet
should for a time experience an accelerated growth.
Although fleet composition as well as port adequacy is important,
there are other factors which also influence the operating efficiency
of the fleet. Most important is ready availability of cargo. As
Soviet shipping activities are expanding, particularly in foreign
trade, this factor is causing the USSR problems for which there are
no easy solutions. One such problem is obtaining return cargoes on
trade routes where there is a heavier flow of traffic in one direction
than in the other. The movement of POL from the Black Sea to Western
Europe is the best example. A large.proportion of the Soviet tankers
in this trade return to Soviet ports in ballast. Because the prepon-
deranee of exports over imports in Soviet seaborne foreign trade is
increasing) similar situations are developing in the movement of dry
cargoes as well.
The tapering off in the rates of growth of the two indexes of op-
erating efficiency -- productivity of cargo-carrying capacity and cost
of shipments -- therefore may be explained by the fact that the USSR
has reached a point in the expansion of its shipping activities beyond
which it will encounter increasing difficulty in finding return cargoes
for its vessels on certain trade routes. The resultant increases in
voyages in ballast and in underloading will cause a decline in fleet
utilization which in turn will restrict the growth of operating effi-
ciency. As the new plan data indicate, however, the prospect of dimin-
ishing growth in important aspects of operating efficiency has not de-
terred the USSR from planning accelerated expansion of its maritime
fleet and services.
I. Introduction.
During the period from the end of World War II through 1958 the
greatest single obstacle to increasing the operating efficiency of the
Soviet maritime cargo fleet was the composition of the fleet. Many of
the vessels were overage, slow, undersized, and lacking in modern labor-
saving devices. At the beginning of 1958, nearly one-third of the ves-
sels still operated on solid fuel. With few exceptions the vessels
added to the fleet from the end of the war through 1958, although new,
were not modern in design. As a result, their contributions to in-
creases in operating efficiency were limited. They were characteris-
tically both smaller and slower than equivalent vessels added to Free
World maritime fleets during the Same period.
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Another explanation of the low level and slow growth of the oper-
ating efficiency of the Soviet maritime cargo fleet is that methods
and equipment in such activities as cargo handling and ship handling
in seaports, ship repairs, and traffic management were not entirely
up to date. For this reason, Soviet efforts to raise the operating
efficiency of the maritime cargo fleet extend to these activities as
well as to improvement of the fleet itself.
The efforts and plans of the USSR to overcome these obstacles and
to raise the operating efficiency of its maritime cargo fleet are dis-
cussed in II, below. If carried to fulfillment, this program should
eliminate many of the obstacles to the growth bf fleet operating effi-
ciency which existed during the period froth the end of World War II
through 1958. Section III, however, which compares the actual growth
of .fleet operating efficiency, performance, and cargo-carrying capac-
ity during the Fifth and Sixth Five Year Plans (1951-58) with the
planned growth of the same factors during the Seven Year Plan (1959-65),
indicates that the USSR anticipates no accelerated growth in the two
most important indexes of fleet. operating efficiency as a result of the
removal of these'obstacles. An explanation of this apparent paradox is
provided in IV, below.
II. Efforts to Raise Operating Efficiency.
The complex of factors that influences the operating efficiency of
the Soviet maritime cargo fleet includes a small number, such as the
weather and geography, which the USSR can do very little to control and
a large number which the USSR can do much to control, assuming a will-
ingness to make the necessary allocations of manpower and resources.
' Most Soviet efforts to control the latter factors are included in the
following five fields: . (1) improvement of the fleet, (2) port facili-
ties and port activity, (3) traffic management, (4) ship repair, and
(5) regulation of the size and composition of crews.
A. Improvement of the Fleet.
1. Addition of Modern Vessels.
The degree of improvement of a fleet brought about by the
addition of new vessels depends on the characteristics of the vessels
being added. Some of the most important characteristics are the fol-
lowing: speed, cargo-carrying capacity, rate of fuel consumption, de-
gree of mechanization of cargo handling aboard ship, and type of fuel.
burned. Each of these characteristics affects one or more aspects of
fleet operating efficiency. Thus the more modern the new vessels are
In. terms of these characteristics, the more favorably they will affect
efficiency.
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From World War II to the end of 1958 the USSR had diffi-
culty in supplying its maritime cargo fleet with vessels the operating
characteristics.and equipment of which were modern by Free'World
standards. This statement is particularly true with regard to the
tanker fleet. As of 31 December 1958, there was only one tanker in
the fleet which could be considered modern in terms of either speed or
cargo-carrying capacity -- the Apsheron, a tanker delivered to the
USSR by Denmark in 1952. This tanker has a speed of 14.5 knots and a
cargo-carrying capacity of nearly 13,000 metric tons* and can be con-
sidered modern only in terms of speed.
The Kazbek-class tankers which have been added to the fleet
in considerable numbers since 1951 and which account for the bulk of
the tonnage in the fleet were outmoded from the day they went into con-
struction. They are considered to be general-purpose tankers because
(unlike supertankers, the drafts of which limit the number of trade
routes that the vessels can serve on) they are able to serve on all
major trade routes. These Kazbek-class tankers have maximum speeds of
13.3 knots and cargo-carrying capacities of 11,000 tons, although the
general-purpose tankers which were added to most Free World fleets dur-
ing the same period carry up to 18,000 tons at speeds up to 16
knots. 1/**
Under the pressure of a severe shortage of tanker tonnage,
the USSR was forced by Free World controls on strategic exports to
build its own tankers. Although other factors may have entered, the
Soviet decision to concentrate construction on the outmoded Kazbek-
class model undoubtedly was influenced to a considerable extent by the
lack of a powerplant suitable for a larger and faster tanker. The
USSR did not have the capability to produce modern diesels larger than
the2,000-horsepower models used in the Kazbek-class, foreign manufac-
turers of diesels had too many orders from other sources to be able to
meet Soviet needs, and Soviet turbine-producing facilities were en-
tirely absorbed in meeting other needs.
As of December 1958 the USSR was planning the addition of
two new classes of modern tankers to the fleet. One class was planned
to consist of steam-turbine tankers designed to carry up to 27,000 tons
of cargo at speeds up to 17.7 knots. The size of these vessels would
put them almost into the supertanker category, which one authority de-
fines as tankers with cargo-carrying capacities of 30,000 tons and
more. 2/ Like the supertankers, their activity would be confined to
trade routes connecting ports with depths of at least 35 feet. (Their
draft loaded is planned to be 33.7 feet.) In addition to the advantages
which these planned new tankers would have over those of the Kazbek
class in terms of size and speed) their cargo-handling equipment Would
be better. The discharge pumps on these tankers would be able to empty
* Tonnages are given in metric tons throughout this report.
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a full cargo of 27,000 tons in little more than 16 hours. The pumps on
the Kazbek-class tankers require 20 hours to empty a full cargo of
11,000 tons. For this reason, the introduction of these new steam-
turbine tanker 6 should help to decrease the time spent in port by the
tanker fleet. The USSR expects the Cost per ton-mile to be 27 percent
lower on these tankers than on those of the Kazbek class and expects
the labor productivity to be 27 percent higliaTT The first tanker
of this planned class was launched during the second half of 1958: The
tankers of the Second class, still in the planning stage at the end of
1958, were designed to carry cargoes of 17,000 tons at speeds of 17.0
knots and apparently are intended to supersede the Kazbek-class tankers
in their general-purpose role. With these characteristics and with
drafts of 29.4 feet, which would enable them to enter most of the major
seaports of the world, the tankers of the second class will, if built,
compare favorably with recent general-purpose tankers built in the Free
World. The cost of their operation is planned to be 25 percent lower
than that of the Kazbek-class tankers.
The Soviet tanker fleet has a great advantage over the dry
cargo fleet in that it requires no shift from solid to liquid fuel. All
of the new tankers acquired by the USSR since World War II have been
diesel or diesel-electric propelled. Among the tankers in use during
1958, only one was a coal burner.
In the dry cargo fleet, as in the tanker fleet, the two most
important effects of the addition of new vessels are the increases in
average speed and in size. The introduction of vessels which are modern
In terms of both speed and size into the Soviet maritime dry cargo fleet
began in 1952. Through 1955, however, deliveries remained on a small
scale and consisted entirely of imported vessels. The modern dry cargo
vessels delivered during 1952-55 included 2 Finnish-built Arkhangel'sk-
class vessels with speeds of 17.4 knots and cargo-carrying capacities of
7,200 tons and 3 Dutch-built Lend-class vessels with speeds of 14.2 knots
and cargo-carrying capacities of 7,600 tons.
Deliveries of vessels of both of these classes continued-into
the period of the Original Sixth Five Year Plan. Deliveries of the
Arkhangel'sk-class vessels, which through 1958 were the most modern dry
cargo vessels in the fleet In terms of size and speed, are planned to
continue through 1960. 2/ It appears, however, that the Lena-class
vessels delivered in 1957 were the last of their class. An improved ver-
sion of these vessels designed with ice-breaking features for use along
the Northern Sea Route reportedly is planned for construction in Soviet
shipyards.
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The only other class of modern dry cargo vessels with cargo-
'carrying capacities greater than 4,000 tons imported during the first
2 years of the Sixth Five Year Plan was a series of French-built steam-
turbine vessels with cargo-carrying capacities of 6,200 tons and speeds
of 14.6 knots. Six were delivered, but it is not certain that the
USSR will order more.
The first modern dry cargo vessels with cargo-carrying ca-
pacities greater than 4,000 tons to be built in the USSR appeared dur-
ing 1956. They were the diesel-electric GES-class vessels with cargo-
carrying capacities of 6,500 tons and speeds of 16.0 knots. Six of
these vessels were delivered during 1956 and 1957, but it is uncertain
whether or not the USSR intends to produce more.
The USSR apparently intends to continue purchases from Fin-
land and the European Satellites of certain classes of smaller and
slower dry cargo vessels with cargo-carrying capacities of less than.
4,000 tons. Planned deliveries for 1958-60, however, include four
'classes of vessels which are modern in terms of both speed and site, as
follows: (a) a collier built in East Germany with a cargo-carrying ca-
pacity of 6,300 tons and a speed of 14.5 knots; (b) the revised Lena-
class icebreaker-cargo vessels with.a cargo-carrying capacity of 7,500
tons and a speed of 15.0 knots; (c) a large Soviet-built, turbine-
propelled dry cargo vessel with a cargo-carrying capacity of 13,000
tons and a speed of 18.6 knots; and (d) a large Polish-built, diesel-
propelled dry cargo vessel with a cargo-carrying capacity of 10,000 tons
and a speed of 16.8 knots. g The steam-turbine vessels appear to be
intended to become the mainstays.of the Soviet dry cargo fleet on the
longer trade routes. The USSR apparently intends to mass-produce them,
for at least three were under construction at the end of 1958 without
there having been any trials .of a prototype.
The mechanically operated metal hatch covers on these new
steam-turbine vessels, on one series of East German-built dry cargo ves-
sels, and on the large Polish-built diesel dry cargo vessels are the
only known instances of mechanization of cargo handling aboard the new
vessels being added to the Soviet dry cargo fleet. The only fleet data
available on this subject show that 4.5 percent of the Black Sea Steam-
ship Company's dry cargo vessels were equipped with mechanical hatch
covers in 1955. V In an article published in August 1958, a deputy
minister of the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet complained that the in-
stallation of mechanical hatch covers was proceeding at an inadmissibly
slow rate. IV
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2. Mddernization of Existing Vessels.
The Soviet program for the modernization.of existing ves-
sels includes a.variety of measures affecting operating efficiency, in-
cluding the conversion of vessels-from coal to fuel oil, the installa-
tion of modern radar, and the automation of boiler-combustion regulation
and boiler fuel supply.
Although there is only one vessel in the Soviet tanker fleet
which burns coal, more than one-third of the cargo-carrying capacity of
the dry cargo fleet as of 31 December 1957 burned coal. Because coal-
fired boilers require more men to operate them and tend to limit oper-
ating speeds) the USSR undertook a program during the Fifth Five Year
Plan period to convert coal-burning vessels to oil burners. At the same
time, plans were made to discontinue deliveries of dry cargo vessels
with coal-fired boilers. This conversion program is scheduled to con-
tinue beyond 1960, and although there are no published Soviet indexes of
progress init, there-is good evidence in the Soviet press'and radio
that the program is continuing. The USSR planned to convert a total of
314 vessels to liquid fuel during 1956-58.
The use of navigational radar on shipboard is important
from the point of view of both safety and operating efficiency. A ves-
sel equipped with this kind of radar can maintain a higher rate of
speed under conditions of poor visibility than a vessel not so equipped.
As of 1 January 1957, 80 percent of the vessels in the maritime fleet
were equipped with navigational radar. If plans were realized) 100 per-
cent were so equipped as of 31 December 1958. The USSR, however, will
still have the problem of replacing many obsolete radar sets.
The USSR has announced another program to increase labor
productivity in boiler operation. This is the automation of boiler-
combustion regulation and boiler fuel supply on existing steamships.
As of 31 December 1958, however, neither progress indexes nor refer-
ences to specific Installations had been published by the USSR.
B. Port Facilities and Methods of Handling Cargo.
? The improvement of port facilities and of methods of hand-
ling cargo in the Soviet ports used by the maritime fleet influences
the operating efficiency of the fleet through its effect both on the
total time Which a vessel spends in port and on the proportion of that
time which is devoted to productive activities such as cargo handling -
and bunkering. In the interest of efficiency, it is desirable to re-
duce the total time spent in port and to increase the proportion of
that time spent productively.
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The total time which each vessel spends in port is largely a
function of two factors. The first factor is the number of vessels
that a given port can berth at one time. One-third of the unproduc-
tive time in port is the result of vessels having to wait for berthing
space. 2/ The amount of berthing space in Soviet ports thus affects
the proportion of productive time in port. The second factor is the
speed with which a vessel is handled once it has been berthed, the
speed depending on the extent to which modern equipment and methods of
handling cargo are available on the vessel and in the ports.
Thus the development of port facilities involves both increas-
ing berthing space and introducing modern equipment and methods of
handling cargo. Through 1958 the USSR was actively engaged in making
both improvements. In respect to increasing berthing space, there is
no index of progress available. A comparison of space added during the
Fifth Five Year Plan with that planned to be added during the Seven
Year Plan, however, provides an indication of the increased pace at
which the USSR was planning to extend berthing space in its ports at
the end of 1958. During the Fifth Five Year Plan, 4,900 linear meters
of berthing space were added, consisting of both new piers and piers
reconstructed after World War II. The Seven Year Plan provides for
the addition of 15,500 linear meters. 12/
Among the statistical indexes which the USSR uses in its opera-
tions are two that reflect the addition of modern cargo-handling equip-
ment by the ports. The first is the coefficient of simple mechaniza-
tion, which expresses the percentage of total cargo handled in Soviet
ports that is handled by processes involving mechanical devices, such
as cranes or conveyers, at one or more stages of the operation. The
second is the coefficient of complex mechanization, which expresses the
percentage of total cargo handled that is handled by processes involv-
ing mechanical devices at all stages of the operation except for such
activities as the attaching and detaching of crane hooks. 11/ The
trends of these indexes through 1958 and their planned levels for 1965
are shown in Table 1.* These indexes reflect Soviet acquisition of in-
creasing numbers of floating and shipside cranes, conveyers, forklift
trucks, specialized devices for the handling of bulk cargoes such as
grain and coal, and other up-to-date cargo-handling equipment. Much
equipment of this kind, however, remains to be added.
The methods of handling cargo which the USSR is introducing
appear to be equally up to date. The two most significant new intro- .
ductions are "container" and "packet" shipments. These methods,
which are especially important in the handling of piece goods and tim-
ber, have been mechanized only to a slight degree,, but they represent
steps in the direction of increased mechanization.
* Table 1 follows on p. 9.
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Table 1
Soviet Indexes of Levels of Simple and Complex Mechanization
of Cargo Handling in the Seaports
under the Soviet Ministry of the Maritime Fleet 2/
1950-58 and 1965 Plan
Percent of Total Cargo Handled
Year
Simple Mechanization
Complex Mechanization
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1965 Plan
90.7 12/
92.3J
93.6 hi
94.6 12/
95.3 12/
95.812/
96.9 12/
N.A.
96.2 1/
N.A.
Si,
24 .
Si
2/
3C5 12/
40.5 g
47.9 2/
48.5 si
56.9 I/
75.0 B/
a. Throughout this report, data are provided for 1950 be-
cause the changes in the various indexes involved are meas-
ured from 1950 to 1958 even though they occurred during
1951-58. Likewise the changes which are planned to Occur
during 1959-65 are measured from 1958 to 1965.
c. There is no indication that this index was maintained
before 1954.
d. lee.
f. 1,6/
g.
In the container shipment method, piece cargoes are packed into
containers, which are specially constructed weatherproof boxes with
cargo-carrying capacities of from 2.5 to 4.0 tons. The main effect of
these containers on fleet operations is a reduction of the time which
vessels must spend in port. The use of these containers also leads to
reduced operating costs in port and conceivably could lead to reduced
fees in Soviet ports. The containers generally used by the Soviet
maritime fleet are the same ones used by the Soviet railroads and
river fleet, so that the transfer from carrier to carrier of cargoes
shipped by this method is greatly expedited. 'Little is known of the
extent to which this method is employed beyond the fact that its
use as recently as 1955 was limited to specified ports on the Caspian
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and Black Seas and that in 1958 there were complaints that it had not
been introduced on the important route in the Soviet Far East from
Vladivostok to Petropavlovsk. 11/ There is no indication that Soviet
experiments have gone as far as US experiments with this method, and
there is no indication of use of the related "roll on - roll off"
method, wherein semitrailers are used instead of containers.* In the
US, existing vessels have been modified and new vessels designed espe-
cially to carry containers. There is no indication, at least in the
Soviet maritime fleet, that the USSR intends to modify or design any
vessels for shipment by the container method. For the time being the
USSR appears to be content to use existing vessels as they are. The
situation is similar with regard to the containers themselves. A
majority of the containers in use by the Soviet maritime fleet are
types which the railroads have been using for at least 10 years.
The packet shipment method has the same advantage for fleet
operation as the container shipment method -- that is, to reduce the
time which a vessel has to spend in port. The packet shipment method
is used in the handling of both piece cargoes and timber cargoes where
the logs are of standsrd lengths. It consists of fastening the logs or
piede goods to forklift pallets with straps to form packets of uniform
dimensions. In 1956 the cargo handled by this method amounted to 3 per
cent of the total:cargo handled in Soviet maritime ports. Under the
original Sixth Five Year Plan this figure was planned to be increased to
13 percent by 1960 and was to include all cargoes suitable for handling
by this method by that year. 197
C. Traffic Management.
Two important tasks which confront the USSR in the field of
maritime traffic management are the coordination of the arrivals of
vessels in port with the arrivals of their intended cargoes and the
solicitation of cargoes. Proper coordination of vessel and cargo
arrivals is required to insure the maximum utilization of vessels, to
prevent port congestion, and to reduce unproductive time in port. So-
licitation of cargoes also insures the maximum utilization of vessels,
as it reduces the number of voyages by vessels in ballast or with par-
tial loads. Thus Soviet efforts in the field of traffic management
should affect two Important aspects of operating efficiency, the uti-
lization and the productivity of cargo-carrying capacity.
In the field of traffic management the three most significant
Soviet efforts to raise the operating efficiency of the maritime fleet
* The USSR has shown no interest in this method in its maritime op-
erations, possibly because in US experiments it has proved to be prof-
itable only on short hauls. lY
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are the expansion of scheduled line operation, the implementation of
the economic reorganization decrees of 1957 which set up regional eco-
nomic councils, and the expansion of shipments between forei40:-.Torts.
The introduction of scheduled line operation consists of the-Assign-
ment of a number of vessels to a given trade route in coastal, inter-
coastal, or foreign trade and their operation on that route according
to schedule. Scheduled lines in 1957 included the petroleum line
from the Black Sea to the Soviet Far East, a general cargo line from
the Black Sea to India, and a coal and manganese line between Poti
and Zhdanov on the Black Sea. The advantages which the USSR claims
for this method include the following: fewer voyages in ballast, a
reduction in the amount of unproductive time in port, greater operat-
ing speeds as a result of increased familiarization of the crews with
the routes, reduced loading and unloading time in port as a result of
increased familiarity of the crew with the specialized cargo (when it
is specialized, as in the case of ore and coal on the Poti-Zhdanov
line), and increased familiarity of the dock workers with the ships
assigned to the line. 22/ The percentages of the total cargo volume
of the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet carried by vessels in scheduled
line operations during 1954-57 were as follows:
Year Percent of Total
1954 19.8 21/
1955 .48.2 ggi
1956 47.0 241/
1957 47.3 a_./
Although the operating efficiency of many vessels has been im-
proved by placing them in scheduled line operation, the USSR is. still
faced with the problem of keeping vessels on schedule. One device
used by the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet to encourage adherence to
schedule is a system of penalties and bonuses. The bonuses are paid
to steamship companies and shippers when vessels are loaded or un-
loaded ahead of schedule. The penalties are levied against the steam-
ship companies when the vessels are late and against the shippers when
the vessels have to wait beyond their scheduled departure times for
deliveries of cargo.
The regional economic councils established by the economic re-
organization in 1957 should contribute to the solution of Soviet prob-
lems in the field of maritime traffic management. These councils are
intended to bring together representatives of the transportation and
industrial enterprises of the various economic regions, thereby per-
mitting a higher degree of coordination in their activities. For
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example, this coordination should help to alleviate the problem of get-
ting vessel arrivals to coincide with cargo deliveries to the ports by
the shippers. As of the end of 1958 the economic reorganization had
not been functioning sufficiently long for any conclusive evaluation
of its effect on Soviet activities in the field of maritime traffic
management.
The expansion of shipments between foreign ports is intended to
increase the utilization and productivity of cargo-carrying capacity by
reducing the number of voyages in ballast or with partial loads. It con-
sists largely of obtaining cargoes for Soviet vessels which otherwise
would have to return either in ballast or with partial loads from the
delivery of Soviet exports abroad or from the delivery of POL from the
Black Sea to the Soviet Far East. Two examples of shipments between for-
eign ports are the movement of Indian and Chinese Communist iron ore to
Rumania and Bulgaria in Soviet dry cargo vessels returning from the de-
livery of exports to India and Indonesia and the movement of soybeans
from Communist China to West Germany in Soviet tankers returning from the
delivery of POL to the Soviet Far East. Regardless of what share of the
cargo available for shipment between foreign ports the USSR is able to
obtain for its vessels, its success in increasing the utilization of ves-
sels serving on trade routes where traffic is heavier in one direction
than the other will always be limited ultimately by the availability of
cargo.
D. Ship Repair.
The main objective of Soviet efforts in the field of ship repair
is the reduction of the time which vessels of the Soviet maritime fleet
have to spend in repair. Almost all of the time out of operation is
spent either in repair or waiting for repair. Excessive time in repair
affects efficiency by raising the cost of shipments.
There are no indexes available of the extent to which the USSR
is using the latest methods and equipment for ship repair or of the ex-
tent to which the USSR intends to ?expand its ship-repair enterprises.
However, judging from the complaints in Morskoy fiat, the journal of
the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet, there is considerable room for im-
provement. g5" The methods by which the USSR is currently attempting to
reduce the time which vessels spend in repair include the standardization
of parts to facilitate the introduction of assembly line methods into
ship-repair. activity, the specialization of ship-repair enterprises in
the manufacture of particular spare parts and components, and the encour-
agement of greater participation by 'ships' crews in repair activity.
Repair time is also being reduced as a result of the expansion
of the fleet with new, modern vessels. The newness of these vessels
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reduces the necessity for repairs, and the fact that most of them are
series-built, incorporating standardized parts, reduces the time re-
quired for repairs when needed. The USSR expects to keep in operation
from 80 to 85 percent of the time the new types of vessels which it
plans to add during the Seven Year Plan. 2?/ In 1955, the most recent
year for which data are available, the average tanker was in operation
65 percent of the time, and the average dry cargo vessel was in opera-
tion 70 percent of the time. 21/
E. Size and Composition of Crews.
The ratio of crew members to cargo-carrying capacity in the
USSR is a function partly of fleet composition and partly of existing
regulations pertaining to the size and composition of ships' crews.
During the Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55) this ratio increased slightly,
in spite of the fact that improvements in fleet composition should have
caused it to drop. The difficulty lay in the ship-crew regulations then
in effect. In the cases of many classes of vessels, steamship companies
were required to fill job positions which technological advancements or
procedural changes had made unnecessary. Thus many vessels were over-
manned. During 1957, in response to agitation for revision of the
standard tables of organization of ships' crews, two unnecessary posi-
tions were eliminated by order of the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet.
Other changes at that time authorized the "mixing of professions," a
practice which had already become widespread in the Soviet river fleet.
Under this practice the number of men required to operate a given vessel
is reduced by training a crewman to perform tasks in one or more addi-
tional professions or specialties. Thus an oiler might be trained to
fill in as a deckhand when needed.
labor productivity in the fleet of the Black Sea Steamship
Company could be raised almost 5 percent by elimination of unnecessary
job positions aboard ship.
III. Growth of Cargo-Carrying Capacity, Performance, and Operating
Efficiency, 1951-58 and Plans for 1959-65.
In Soviet maritime shipping the chief measure of fleet capacity is
cargo-carrying capacity, expressed in metric tons, and the chief measure
of fleet performance is .cargo turnover in ton-miles. The relationship
between these two measures at any given time is a function of the op-
erating efficiency of the fleet, particularly as manifested in the in-
dex of the productivity of cargo-carrying capacity, which is the number
of ton-miles performed by a given amount of cargo-carrying capacity
during a given period of time.
Productivity of cargo-carrying capacity is one of four important
Soviet indexes of fleet operating efficiency which are available. The
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50X1
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other three are as follows: (1) cost of shipments, which measures the
expenditure in kopeks for each ton-mile performed by the fleet 12/;
(2) labor productivity, which is the number of ton-miles performed for
each worker employed directly in the transportation process during a
given period of time 11/; and (3) the coefficient of utilization of
cargo-carrying'capacity, which expresses the percentage ratio of ton-
miles actually performed to tonnage-miles. (Tonnage-miles represent
the ton-miles which would be performed if all vessels were loaded to full
cargo-carrying capacity while they were under way.) 22/ Each of these
indexes is influenced by one or more of the following: fleet composition,
the adequacy of ports in handling vessels and cargoes, regulations re-
garding the size and composition of ships' crews, the adequacy of ship-
repair activities, the adequacy of traffic-management activities, and the
various factors other than traffic management which influence the avail-
ability of cargoes. This influence may be direct or indirect, through
the effect on a given index of one or more of the other indexes. The
accompanying chart shows how these indexes are influenced by one another
and by the factors cited above.
Cast of Shipments
Adequacy
*.tt
cri:f2.;
Labor
Productivity
Crew Size Net
Regulations CampoMan
Productivity
OCwip-Carrying
Capacity
Adequacy
al Pero
Coefficler."7;\
.of Utilization
of Cargo-Carrying
Capacity
A
enrol
...teamtoy
of Cargo
27538 5.59
Indexes of operating elle ency In the Soviet M rtima Cargo Fleet and Influenci g factors .
From this chart it can be seen that the cost of shipments is the most
comprehensive index of operating efficiency because-it is influenced
by all of the other indexes and by all of the factors influencing them.
Unfortunately its value is reduced by the fact that it sometimes re-
flects more than the operating efficiency of the fleet. Changes in
the prices of the various elements of cost, such as wages, fuel, and.
amortization, as well as changes in the relative shares of these ele-
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ments in the whole, can cause the index to change also. Table 2
shows this index for 1950-58 and its planned level for 1965.
Table 2
Cost of Shipments
in the Soviet Maritime Cargo Fleet
1950-58 and 1965 Plan.
Year
Cost per
Ton-Mile
(Kopeks)
Change from
Previous Year
(Percent)
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1965 Plan
6.93 2/
N.A.
N.A.
6.30 12/
6.25 2/
5.50 2/
4.95 2/
N.A.
4.53 di
3.44 2/
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
-0..8
-12.0
-10.0
-4.3 si
-4.3 Ei
a. Di d. 35/
b. 211/ e. .1?/
c. An average figure based on
the change from 1956 to 1958.
Because the cost of shipments tends to reflect the influence of
factors other than efficiency, productivity of cargo-carrying capacity
is probably the best over-ail index of efficiency available. It is ob-
tained by dividing the ton-miles performed by the fleet by the total
tonnage-days in operation of the vessels of the fleet. Tonnage-days
in operation are obtained by multiplying the cargo-carrying capacity
of each ship by the number of days it was in operation during the time
period in question. This index is influenced by the coefficient of
utilization of cargo-carrying capacity and all of the factors which
affect that index, by fleet composition, and by adequacy of ports.
Productivity of cargo-carrying capacity in turn exerts considerable
influence on both the cost of shipments and labor productivity.
Table 3* shows this index for 1950-57. No plan figures for 1965 aile
available, because no figures for 1958 are available from which to
calculate them.
* Table 3 follows on p. 16.
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Table 3
Productivity of Cargo-Carrying Capacity
in the Soviet Maritime Cargo Fleet
1950-58
Tanker Fleet
Dry Cargo Fleet Combined Fleet
Year
' Productivity
(Ton-Miles per
Tonnage-Day
in Operation)
Change from
Previous Year
(Percent)
Productivity
(Ton-Miles per
Tonnage-Day
in Operation)
Change from
Previous Year
(Percent)
Productivity
(Ton-Miles per
Tonnage-Day.
in Operation)
Change from
Previous Year
(Percent)
1950
68.6
N.A.
44.0
N.A.
49.3
N.A.
1951
73.4
7.0
46.2
5.0
52.5
6.5
1952
74.3
1.2
47.0
1.7
52.9
0.8
1953
72.5
-2.4
49.1
4.5
54.2
2.5
1954
80.2
10.6
52.9
7.7
59.3
9.4
1955
'98.1
22.3
52.0
-1.7
62.2
4.9
1956
105.1
7.1
54.2
4.2
67.1
7.9
1957
103.0 y
-2.0
58.0 b/
.-,
7.0
71.9 y
7.2
1958
N.A.
N.A.
61.9w
6.7
N.A.
N.A.
a. See Table 7, p. 2k, below, for data for 1950-57.
b. Plan data only.
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The next index in importance is the coefficient of utilization of
cargo-carrying capacity. This index is important because of its in-
fluence on all of the other indeies. Its value as an over-all index
of efficiency is limited because it is influenced only by the adequacy
of traffic management activities and by the various other factors which
influence the availability of cargo. Table 4 shows this index for
1950-57. No plan figures for 1965 are now available.
Table 4
Coefficient of Utilization of Cargo-Carrying Capacity
of the Soviet Maritime Cargo Fleet 2/
1950-57
Percent
Year Tanker Fleet Dry Cargo Fleet Combined Fleet
1950
51.3
58.9
56.5
1951
52.6
57.8
56.1
1952
53.9
56.9
55.9
1953
52.6
57.7
56.1
1954
55.9
6o.6
59.0
1955
59.7
58.o
58.5
1956
61.9
60.5
61.o
1957 LI
56.1
6o.4
58.4
a. See Table 8, p. 25, below.
b. Plan data only.
Labor productivity is probably the least important of the four in-
dexes discussed. It influences only one of the other indexes -- the
cost of shipments, 25 percent of which represented labor costs in
1955. 21/ In addition, labor productivity is to a large extent only
another expression of productivity of cargo-carrying capacity, which
exerts considerable influence on it. Labor productivity, however,
also expresses the influence of fleet composition and of regulations
regarding the size and composition of ships' crews on the number of
men required to operate a given amount of cargo-carrying capacity in
the fleet. Thus it is possible that the growth of this index during
any given period of time could be greater or less than the growth of
productivity of cargo-carrying capacity because of changes in the
conditions determining the number of men required to operate a given
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amount of cargo-carrying capacity. Table 5 shows this index for
1950-56. Only relative growth figures are available, for later years.
? Table 5
Labor Productivity in the Soviet Maritime Cargo Fleet 2/
1950-56
Year
Thousand Ton-Miles
per Man-Year
Change from
Previous Year
(Percent)
1950
873.1
N.A.
1951
811.6
-7.0
1952
836.4
3.1
1953
847.7
1.4
1954
930.3
9.7
1955
1,043.1
12.1
1956
1,165.6
11.7
a. 12/
The planned average annual rates of growth of labor productivity
and a number of other factors are available for the Seven Year Plan
(1959-65). A comparison of these planned rates with the actual aver-
age annual rates of growth for the same indexes during the preceding
8-year period (1951-58) reveals some significant contrasts. These
two sets of rates are presented in Table 6.* The coefficient of uti-
lization of cargo-carrying capacity is omitted for two reasons: the
rate of growth of a coefficient cannot be.measured in the same way as'
the rates of growth of the other factors, and even if it could be
measured in this way, no Seven Year Plan figures have been released
for this particular coefficient.
In spite of the considerable increase in the rate of growth of
cargo-carrying capacity, no increase is planned in the rate of growth
of cargo turnover. The decreased rate of growth of operating effi-
ciency that is reflected in both productivity of cargo-carrying
capacity and cost of shipments is consistent with this situation. The
slight rise in the rate of growth of labor productivity can be ex-
plained by the fact that it is influenced by factors other than the
productivity of cargo-carrying capacity. Because of their greater
size and greater use of labor-saving devices, the new vessels planned
* Table 6 follows on p. 19.
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Table 6
Average Annual Rates of Change in Important Indexes
of Cargo-Carrying Capacity, Cargo Turnover, and Operating Efficiency
in the Soviet Maritime Cargo Fleet
1951-58 and 1959-65 Plan
Average Annual Rate of Change. (Percent)
Indexes of Operating Efficiency
Productivity of
Cargo-Carrying
Capacity
Cargo-Carrying Cargo Tanker Dry Cargo Cost of Tabor
Years Capacity Turnover Fleet FleetS Shipments Productivity
1951-58
1959-65
Plan
5.6W
10.4 g/
, 13.0W
. 12.1W
6.o 2/
2.61/
4.4
3.81/
-5.2W
-3.9J
5.5W
a. The cargo-carrying capacity of the Soviet maritime fleet increased 64
percent during 1951-55 1221 and another 15.6 percent during 1956-58, 42/ or
an over-all increase during 1951-58 of 54.9 percent. Using the compound in-
terest formula, the average annual rate of growth during 1951-58 was calcu-
lated to have been 546 percent.
b. The cargo turnover of the maritime cargo fleet in 1950 was 21.4 billion
ton-miles L.1.2/ and in 1957, 50.0 billion ton-miles. 11/ In 1958 it increased
13.6 percent, to 56.8 billion ton-miles. it4/ There was a total increase dur-
ing 1951-58 of 165.4 percent, or an average annual rate of growth of 13.0 per-
cent.
c. The average annual rate of growth for 1951-57 was projected for 1958 be-
cause there are no productivity figures available for the tanker fleet for
that year. The increase for 1951-57 was 50.0 percent (see Table 3, p. 16,
above), or an average annual rate of growth of 6.percent.
d. Productivity in the dry cargo fleet increased 40.7 percent during 1951-58
(see Table 3, p. 16, above), or an average annual rate of growth of 4.4 per-
cent.
e. The cost of shipments dropped 35 percent during 1951-58 (see Table 2,
p. 15, above), or an average annual rate of change of -5.2 Witeent.
f. Because no labor productivity figures are available for 1957-58, the
average annual rate of growth for 1951-56 was projected for those years. The
increase-for 1951-56 was 33.5. percent (see Table 5, p..18, above), or an
average annual rate of growth of 4.9 percent.
g. The planned increase in cargo-carrying capacity for this period is nearly
100 percent, or an average annual rate of growth of 10.4 percent. 451
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Table 6
Average Annual Rates of Change in Important Indexes
of Cargo-Carrying Capacity, Cargo Turnover, and Operating Efficiency
in the Soviet Maritime Cargo Fleet
1951-58 and 1959-65 Plan
(Continued)
h. The planned increase in cargo turnover is 122 percent, or an average
annual rate of growth of 12.1 percent. )I?/
i. The planned increases in productivity of cargo-carrying capacity in the
tanker and dry cargo fleets are 20 and 30 percent, respectively, or average
annual rates of growth of 2.6 and 3.8 percent, respectively.)11/
j. The planned decrease is 24 percent, or an average annual rate of change
of -3.9 percent. Afj
k. The planned increase is 45 percent, or an average annual rate of growth
of 5.5 percent. 122/
for addition to the fleet during the Seven Year Plan will reduce the
number of men required to operate a given amount of cargo-carrying
capacity. If the USSR continues to bring its regulations regarding
the size and composition of ships' crews up' to date, this activity
should have similar results.
Because the behavior of the index of the cost of shipments can be
explained largely by the influence exerted on it by the index of the
productivity of cargo-carrying capacity, the behavior of the latter
index should be examined more closely in attempting to explain the
planned reduction in the rate of growth of cargo turnover at a time
when the rate of growth of cargo-carrying capacity is increasing.
Another reason for examining this index is to explain the reduction
in the rate of growth of productivity at a time when the large num-
bers of large modern dry cargo vessels and tankers planned for addi-
tion to the fleet should be expected to raise productivity of cargo-
carrying capacity. In IV, below, the factors influencing the pro-
ducitivity of cargo-carrying capacity are examined with the inten-
tion of explaining the unusual behavior of this index.
IV. An Explanation of the Planned Decrease in the Rate of Growth of
Productivity of Cargo-Carrying Capacity, 1959-65.
The most direct way to determine the reason for the planned de-
crease in the rate of growth of productivity of cargo-carrying ca-
pacity in the USSR is to examine systematically the factors of which?
it is a function. The following factors affect productivity directly:
fleet compostion, adequacy of ports, utilization of cargo-carrying
capacity, and adequacy of traffic management. Productivity is affected
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indirectly by the factors which affect utilization of cargo-carrying
capacity -- including the coefficients of voyages in ballast and
loading -- and various other factors -- including Soviet activities in
the field of traffic management -- which influence the availability
of cargo.
In the case of both fleet composition and port adequacy, all in-
dications are that the rate of growth of productivity.should increase.
During the Seven Year Plan period, large numbers of truly modern ships
are to be added to the fleet for the first time, and port capacity is
to be raised considerably, both by the expansion of facilities and by
improvements in equipment and methods.
Although no figures have been announced for the changes which are
planned to occur during the Seven Year Plan period in the coefficient
of utilization of cargo-carrying Capacity, there is considerable evi-
dence that it is planned to drop and that in this planned decrease
lies the explanation for the decrease in the rate of growth of pro-
ductivity of cargo-carrying capacity.
There is actually evidence that such a drop was foreseen by the
USSR at the time plan figures for 1957 were released. Although little
change was planned in the utilization of the dry cargo fleet for that
year, the coefficient of utilization for the tanker fleet was planned
to drop from 61.9 to 56.1 percent.
To understand the circumstances which might lead to such a drop
in the utilization of cargo-carrying capacity, it is necessary to con-
sider two lesser indexes which influence it. These are the coeffi-
cient of voyages in ballast, which expresses the ratio between the
number of voyages made without cargo and the number of voyages made
with cargo, and the coefficient of loading, which expresses the ratio
between the tonnage of cargo. actually carried on the voyages made with
cargo and the tonnage of cargo which would have been carried if all
the ships involved had been loaded to full cargo-carrying capacity.
The level of these indexes depends largely on the ability of the USSR
to find return cargoes for its vessels. The declines planned in 1957
in both the productivity of cargo-carrying capacitY and the coefficient
of utilization for the tanker segment of the fleet reflect the antiCi-
pation of increasing difficulty in the procuring of return cargoes for
Soviet tankers. The reason for this trend is to be found in the pro-
gram of the USSR to increase its seaborne foreign trade and the role
of its tankers and dry cargo vessels in the movement of such trade.
The first year in which there was a significant rise in Soviet POL
shipments in foreign trade was 1956. The bulk of the increase con-
sisted of exports from the Black Sea area in Soviet tankers. The rise
in these exports during 1955-58 is shown in the following tabulation:
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Year Thousand Metric Tons 22/
Change from
Previous Year
(Percent)
1955
155
N.A.
1956
1,029
564
1957
3,327
223
1958
5,342
61
Because of the preponderance of export shipments and because
tankers are normally capable of carrying only liquid cargoes and a
limited number of bulk dry cargoes such as soybeans and grain, many
of the Soviet tankers which delivered these exports had to return to
the USSR in ballast. Some of the tankers returning from deliveries
to Western Europe were able to load crude Mil in Albania for the
last legs of their return voyages, but the majority were required to
remain in ballast for the entire distance.
Such problems existed in milder form long before the present
trade offensive began. Numerous coastal and intercoastal trade routes
exist, involving only Soviet ports, on whieh there are considerable
numbers of voyages in ballast or with undercapacity loadings. This
statement is borne out by the fact that neither the coefficient of
utilization for the tanker fleet nor that for the dry cargo fleet has
ever exceeded 62 percent during the postwar period.
The increase in the volume of foreign trade cargoes carried by
Soviet vessels is planned to continue during 1959-65, although at a
slower rate than during 1956-57. Shipments of POL in foreign trade
are to increase by 150 percent and shipments of dry cargoes by 220
percent. .51/ Because the rate of growth for export cargoes will be
so much greater than that for import cargoes,* however, the number of
voyages in ballast also is expected to rise. This factor more than
any other should explain the anticipated drop in the utilization of
cargo-carrying capacity in the Soviet maritime cargo fleet during
1959-65. Apparently the USSR has accepted the fact that this drop
will occur in spite of its efforts to improve traffic management.
* Under the original,Sixth Five Year Plan the volume of import car-
goes carried by Soviet vessels was planned to rise by only 18 percent
during 1956-60.
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APPENDIX A
STATISTICAL TABLES .
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Table 7
Derivation of the Productivity
of Cargo-Carrying Capacity of the Soviet Maritime Cargo Fleet
1950-57
(1) (2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
Year
Tanker Fleet
Dry Cargo Fleet
Productivity
(Ton-Miles Turnover
per Tbninage-pay (Billion
in Operation) Ton-Miles)
Ship Time b/
(Million
Tonnage-Days
in Operation)
Combined Fleet
Productivity
(Ton-Miles
per Tonnage-Day
in Operation)
Turnover
(Billion
Ton-Miles)
Ship Time 2/
(Million
Tonnage-Days
in Operation)
Productivity 2/
(Ton-Miles
per Tonnage-Day
in Operation)
Turnover 2/
(Billion
Ton-Miles)
Ship Time 2/
(Million
Tonnage-Days
in Operation)
1950
68.6 1/
6.4 g/
93.3
44.0 I/
15.05/
340?9
49.3
21.4
434.2
1951
73.4 1/
95.4
4672 I/
14.7 2/
318.2
52.5
21.7
413.6
1952
74.3 f/,
7.2W
96.9
47.0 I/
16.6W
353.2
52?9
23.8
450.1
1953
72.5 1/
103.4
49.1 1/
18.3 g/
372.7
54.2
25.8
476.1
1954
8&2J
9.6W
119.7
52.9-//
20.85/
393.2
59.3
30.4
512.9
1955
. 9&l.!/
12.9 g/
131.5
52.0 //
214.15/
463?5
62.2
37.0
595.0
1956,
105.1 12/
17.6.g/
167.5
54.2 Y
26.6 5/
490.8
67.1
44.2
658.3
1957
103.0W
22.0 1/
213.6
58.0 y
27.6 1/
475.9
71.9
49.6
689.5
a.
b.
C.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
Column 2 divided by column 1.
Column 5 divided by column 4.
Column 8 divided by column 9.
Sum of columns 2 and 5.
Sum of columns 3 and 6.
22/
53/
5 /
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Table 8 ,
Derivation of the Coefficient of Utilization
, of the Cargo-Carrying Capacity of the Soviet Maritime Cargo Fleet'
1950-57
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Tanker Fleet
Dry Cargo Fleet
Combined Fleet
Turnover a/
Coefficient of
Ship Movement bi
TUrnover 2/
Coefficient of
Ship Movement d/
Turnover 2/
Coifficient of
Ship Movement
(Billion
Utilization
(Billion
(Billion
Utilization
(Billion
(Billion
Utilization fi
(Billion
Year
Ton-Miles)
(Percent)
Tonnage-Miles)
Ton-Miles)
(Percent)
Tonnage-Miles)
Ton-Miles)
(Percent)
Tonnage-Miles)
1950
6.4
51.3 y
12.5
15.0
58.9 11/
25.4
21.4
56.5
37.9
1951
7.0
52.6 II/
13.3
14.7
57.8 12/
25.4
21.7
56.1
38.7
1952.
7.2
53-9 II/
13.4
16.6
56.9 y
29.2
23.8
55.9
42.6
1953
7.5
52.6 12/
14.3
18.3
57.7 12./
31.7
25.8
56.1
46.o
1954
9.6
55.9 12/
17.2
20.8
6o.6 LI/
34.3
30.4
59.0
51.5
1955
12.9
597W
21.6
24.1
58.0W
41.6
37.0
58.5
63.2
1956
17.6
61.9 I/
28.4
26.6
60.5 1/
44.0
44.2
61.0
72.4
1957
22.0
56.1 1/
39.2
27.6
6o.4 hi
45.7
49.6
58.4 1/
84.9
g/
a. From column 2, Table 7, p. 24, above.
b. Column I divided by column 2.
c. From column 5, Table 7, p. 24, above.
d. Column 4 divided by column 5.
e. Sum of columns 1 and 4.
f. Column 7 divided by column 9.
g. Sum of columns 3 and 6.
i.h. I6j
27./ ?
j. Plan data only.
k. IEJS
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APPENDIX B
METHODOLOGY
This report is based almost entirely on Soviet material dealing
with the operation of the Soviet maritime cargo fleet. This material
was first surveyed to identify the indexes which the USSR uses to
measure the operations of the fleet. It was then determined that
four of these indexes could be considered to be indexes of operating
efficiency. Each index expressed a ratio between cargo turnover in
ton-miles, which are considered to be the main units of production in
Soviet maritime shipping, and one of the following: operating cost,
cargo-carrying capacity, and the size of the labor force. Soviet
handbooks and glossaries in the field of maritime shipping and in the
related field of river shipping were consulted to establish precise
definitions and formulas for each of the indexes. After further
study of Soviet shipping journals for information on the nature and
extent of Soviet efforts to improve these indexes, the relationships
between these efforts and the various indexes were analyzed to deter-
mine the factors influencing each of the indexes.
Using similar material, as much information as possible was assembled
for the creation of timeseries for the various indexes. The time series
for two of the indexes for the entire fleet had to be derived from sep-
arate data on the dry cargo fleet and the tanker fleet. Fortunately, the
weighting factors necessary for the derivation were available.
In order to obtain average annual rates of change for fleet capacity,
performance, and operating efficiency for purposes of comparison, the
actual over-all percentage increases during 1951-58 and the planned over-
all percentage increases for the indexes involved were used to derive the
average annual rates during the -same periods by the compound interest
formula.
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