MILITARY ASSISTANCE BY THE SOVIET BLOC TO THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD

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• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 29, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
N?
MILITARY ASSISTANCE BY THE SOVIET BLOC
TO THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
OF THE FREE WORLD
CIA/RR 59-5
January 1959
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
MILITARY ASSISTANCE BY THE SOVIET BLOC
TO THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD
CIA/RR 59-5
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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CONTENTS
Page
Summary 1
I. Introduction 2
II. Nature of the Arms Agreements 3
III. Values and Terms of the Arms Agreements 4
A. Egypt' 4
B. Syria 5
C. Indonesia 5
D. Afghanistan 6
E. Yemen 6
F. Iraq 6
IV. Soviet Bloc Military Technicians 6
A. Assembly and Maintenance 7
B. Training of Military Personnel 9
C. Advisory Personnel 10
V. Military Training in the Soviet Bloc 10
VI. Military Installations 14
A. Egypt 14
B. Syria 15
C. Afghanistan 17
D. Yemen 17
VII. Economic Consequences of the Arms Agreements 18
A. Foreign Trade 18
B. Economic Development 21
VIII. Conclusions 22
Appendixes
Appendix A. Statistical Tables
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Tables
Page
1. Soviet Bloc Military Agreements with Under-
developed Countries of the Free World,
1955-58 5
2. Military Technicians of the Soviet Bloc
Utilized by Recipient Countries, 1955-58 . . . 7
3. Military Personnel Trained in the Soviet
Bloc, 1955-58 12
4. Foreign Trade of Egypt and Syria, 1954, 1956,
and 1957 19
5. Export of Egyptian and Syrian Cotton to the
Sino-Soviet Bloc 19
6. Foreign Exchange Reserves of Egypt and Syria,
1954-58 20
7. Egyptian Trade Balances in Clearing Accounts
with the Soviet Bloc, 1957 21
8. Financial Aspects of Arms Sales by the Soviet
'Bloc to the Underdeveloped Countries of the
Free World 25
9. Military Trainees in the Soviet Bloc, 1955-58 28
10. Foreign Trade of Egypt, 1954, 1956, and 1957 29
U. Foreign Trade of Syria, 1954, 1956, and 1957 31
12. Estimated Selected Arms Received from the
Soviet Bloc, 1955-58 32
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Illustrations
Figure 1. Egypt: Soviet-Built Jet Fighters at
an Air Force Base (PhotograPh) . . . 8
Figure 2. Egypt: Training on Soviet-Built J3-3
Heavy Tanks (Photograph) 9
Figure 3. Syria: Training in the Use of Heavy
Artillery (Photograph) 11
Figure 4. Syria: Training in Soviet-Built T-34
Tanks (Photograph) 11
Figure 5. Syria: Example of Modernization at Hama
Airfield (Photograph) 16
Figure 6. Syria: Naval Base Under Construction
with the Assistance of the Soviet Bloc
(Photograph) 16
Figure 7. Egypt: Activity of the Soviet Bloc in
the Development of Military Installa-
tions (Map)
Figure 8. Syria: Activity of the Soviet Bloc in
the Development of Military Installa-
tions (Map)
Figure 9. Afghanistan: Activity of the Soviet
Bloc in the Development of Airfields
(Map)
Figure 10. Yemen: Activity of the Soviet Bloc in
the Development of Airfields (Map) .
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MILITARY ASSISTANCE BY THE SOVIET BLOC
TO THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD*
Summary
Since mid-1955, six underdeveloped countries of the Free World
have signed agreements with the Soviet Bloc for the acquisition of
arms through credits valued at a minimum of $910 million.** The
credits extended under these agreements are being utilized to equip
completely with Bloc arms the armed forces of recipient countries.
In conjunction with the purchase of Bloc arms, Bloc advisers are
assisting these countries in reorganizing their military establish-
ments and are engaged in teaching military science to indigenous
military personnel. The USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland have been
the principal contractors under the agreements concluded with these
countries. The United Arab Republic accounts for about 55 percent
of the value of such credit agreements concluded with the Bloc. The
agreements provide for payment, usually through export of domestic
commodities, over periods ranging from 4 to 10 years.
Large numbers of Soviet Bloc technicians are exported simultane-
ously to assemble equipment and to train indigenous personnel in its
use and maintenance. In addition, Bloc technicians are utilized for
training personnel in military tactics and operations and as advisory
personnel for staff and line units. It is estimated that about 1,200
Bloc military technicians have been utilized by the countries receiv-
ing Bloc arms.
Since mid-1955, more than 1,600 nationals from countries receiv-
ing arms from the Soviet Bloc have undergone military training in
the Bloc. Courses of instruction included many phases of ground,
air, and naval training and were undertaken primarily in the USSR,
Poland, and Czechoslovakia.
In addition to providing arms, training, and the services of
military technicians, the Soviet Bloc also has been active in help-
ing these countries to modernize established military installations
and to construct new facilities. The Syrian airfield network is
undergoing an extensive modernization with Bloc assistance. Egypt
* The estimates and conclusions in this report represent the best
judgment of this Office as of 1 January 1959.
** Al]. dollar values in this report are in terms of current US dollars.
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also has utilized Bloc assistance in modernizing a number of major
airfields and in expanding its naval facilities. Yemen and Afghan-
istan are receiving substantial Bloc assistance in building domestic
airfield networks.
The conclusion of military aid agreements has affected directly
the trade patterns of recipient countries. Between 1954 and 1957
the trade of Syria with the Soviet Bloc rose from 2 to 13 percent of
total Syrian trade. During the same period the trade of Egypt with
the Bloc increased from 10 to 36 percent of total trade. Approxi-
mately 10 to 15 percent of total Egyptian exports are being utilized
to pay for arms purchased from the Bloc. The trade of Yemen, Indo-
nesia, and Iraq can be expected to undergo similar changes. The
already large percentage of Afghanistan's trade with the Bloc is
expected to increase even further.
The burden of large defense expenditures has affected adversely
the economic development plans of recipient countries. The loss in
foreign exchange from the shift of large portions of exports to Soviet
Bloc markets has restricted the level of trade with the West and has
compelled the underdeveloped countries to seek additional economic
assistance from the Bloc.
I. Introduction.
Exploiting local conflicts and supporting nationalist movements
which are basically anti-Western, the USSR has succeeded in achiev-
ing a position of influence in regions vital to Western interests.
The present turmoil in the Middle East is the culmination of 3 years
of Soviet-supported nationalist ferment in order to destroy Western
influence in this strategic area.
In the Middle East, particularly in Egypt and Syria, the conse-
quences of large-scale arms purchases from the Soviet Bloc have been
the most dramatic. Latent forces developing since the end of World
War II were provided explosive outlet by a series of events that oc-
curred in 1955. A destructive raid by Israeli forces in the Gaza
Strip early in 1955 and the adherence of Iraq -- Egypt's arch rival
in the Arab world -- to the Baghdad Pact undoubtedly impressed upon
Nasser that Egypt could never become a leader in the Arab world with-
out military strength.
The coincident decision of the USSR to provide active economic
and political support to nationalist movements in former colonial
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areas presented a source from which such strength might be developed.
This decision became evident in 1955 as the Sino-Soviet Bloc economic
offensive gained momentum amidst the illusion of good will created
by the Geneva Summit Conference. While the Conference was in session,
an Egyptian government representative approached the USSR with a re-
quest for the very arms which the West recently had denied Egypt. A
credit agreement for Egyptian purchase of arms from Czechoslovakia --
in which Czechoslovakia probably served as the medium through which
Soviet arms could be transmitted -- was negotiated quickly.
In Syria, where anti-Western nationalism had reached a fierce
Intensity, the opportunity to obtain large supplies of arms to de-
fend itself against hostile neighbors, particularly Israel, was
seized quickly. Within months after the Egyptian agreement, Syria
also signed an arms agreement with Czechoslovakia.
In Yemen, Afghanistan, and Indonesia, the USSR was able to ex-
ploit local, rather than regional, situations. Yemen's.conflict
with the UK over Aden, Afghanistan's border conflict with Pakistan,
and Indonesia's internal strife and territorial conflict with the
Netherlands presented prime opportunities for further Soviet ex-
ploitation. In each instance the Soviet Bloc was quick to come
forward with offers designed to cultivate local chauvinism and to
Increase antipathy toward the West..
II. Nature of the Arms Agreements.
The arms agreements discussed in this report are those inter-
governmental accords in which a Soviet Bloc country has agreed to
provide on credit military goods and services up to a specified
aggregate value. Presumably such agreements, which are in effect
a line of credit for acquiring military assistance, outline the
general categories of goods and services to be purchased, leaving
the determination of specific quantities within each category to
subsequent contract negotiations by military purchasing commissions.
The services of Soviet Bloc military technicians to assemble
the arms probably are included in the aggregate value specified in
the basic agreement. The recipient country, however, apparently
concludes separate contracts for other Bloc technicians and must,
in addition, provide the daily costs of the technician during his
tour of duty in that country. The costs of training the nationals
of recipient countries in the Bloc and of construction of military
installations to utilize Bloc equipment also are not included in
the basic agreement.
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III. Values and Terms of the Arms Agreements.
Six underdeveloped countries of the Free World -- Egypt, Syria,
Indonesia, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Iraq -- have signed credit agree-
ments to purchase arms from the Soviet Bloc valued at a minimum of
$910 million.* (See Appendix A.) Except for the Indonesian agree-
ment, in which Poland is extensively involved, Czechoslovakia and
the USSR have provided the bulk of the arms. (See Table 1.**)
A. Egypt.
Egypt has accounted for approximately $365 million, or about
40 percent of the value of military assistance agreements concluded
with the Soviet Bloc. This estimate includes only those agreements
signed with Czechoslovakia in 1955 and the USSR in 1958. Because an
additional agreement may have been concluded in 1957, the actual
figure may be considerably higher. in Decem-
ber 1956 the Egyptian government discussed with Soviet Marshal Zhukov
the replacement of arms lost during the previous month's hostilities
with the UK, France, and Israel. 2/*** In mid-1957 the Egyptians re-
ceived from the USSR, among other things, 20 MIG-17 (Fresco) fighters
and 12 I1-14 (Crate) transport planes. 2/ How these aircraft were
financed is not known.
In the agreement with Czechoslovakia in 1955 the Egyptians
were required to make a 20-percent downpayment. The balance was
payable in 4 annual installments at 2-percent interest through the
Egyptian-Czechoslovak bilateral payment account. Egyptian exports,
primarily cotton and rice, were to be the means of payment. Letters
of credit presumably were to be opened in favor of Soviet Bloc trad-
ing organizations, and these, when utilized, were to be credited
against debts due the Bloc for arms purchases. It is possible that
the visits of high-level Egyptian officials to Moscow during the past
2 years may have resulted in some revision of the original agreement,
probably easing the terms for Egypt.
* The total value of the credit specified in a given arms agree-
ment reflects solely the selling prices to the underdeveloped coun-
try and bears no necessary relation to costs of production or prices
of arms in either the US or the Bloc.
** Table 1 foflows on D.
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Table 1
Soviet Bloc Military Agreements with Underdeveloped Countries
of the Free World
1955-58
Million US $
USSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Total
Egypt
115
250
365
Syria
100
45
145
Indonesia
8
50
120
178
Afghanistan
25
10
35
Yemen
20
20
Iraq
168
168
Total
416
375
120
911
B. Syria.
Since early 1956 the Soviet Bloc has provided Syria with
credits totaling about $145 million to be utilized for the purchase
of arms. As in the case of Egypt, the first agreements were signed
with Czechoslovakia and subsequent agreements with the USSR, the
latter accounting for about $100 million.
The Czechoslovak agreement in 1956 provided for a 20-percent
downpayment, the balance to be repaid over a 4-year period. As a
result of domestic financial difficulties, Syria was unable to meet
its first installment in 1957. Czechoslovakia agreed to postpone
the payment
The Soviet-Syrian agreement in November 1956 specified a
prior payment of one-third the value of the credit extended for arms
purchases in cash, with the balance to be repaid in 10 annual in-
stallments at 2-percent interest. As in the case of Egypt, the
Syrian installments will be met through the bilateral payments ac-
count, primarily through exports of Syrian cotton.
C. Indonesia.
Indonesia purchased approximately $8 million worth of mili-
tary vehicles from the USSR in 1957 but did not conclude a major
credit agreement for the purchase of arms until early 1958. Credit
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agreements providing for about $170 million of military assistance
have been signed with Poland and Czechoslovakia. An initial pay-
ment of at least 5 percent was required in the Polish agreement, Li
and, presumably, a similar downpayment was stipulated in the agree-
ment with Czechoslovakia. The balance is to be repaid in 10 annual
installments at 2-percent interest. There is no indication that
Indonesia will be permitted to pay for arms purchases with commodi-
ties. The allocation by the Indonesian cabinet in December 1957
of $250 million for arms purchases 2/ seems to indicate that annual
payments will be made in convertible currency.
D. Afghanistan.
The USSR and Czechoslovakia have provided Afghanistan with
credits of $25 million and $7 million, respectively, to be utilized
for the procurement of arms. The agreement with the USSR, signed in
1956, permits payment to be made in Afghan commodities in 8 annual
installments at 2-percent interest, with the first payment due in
1957.
The agreements signed with Czechoslovakia consist of a $3-
million cash transaction in 1955 and a $7-million agreement in 1956
which specified terms similar to the Soviet agreement. The first
payment on the 1956 agreement, however, is not due until 1959.
E. Yemen.
Before 1958, Czechoslovakia agreed to provide Yemen with arms
on credit to a value of about $20 million. Annual payments apparently
are to be made over a period of 15 years, presumably in Yemeni com-
modities. While there are indications that Yemen may have concluded
another sizable agreement with Czechoslovakia late in June 1958,
details are lacking.
F. Iraq.
In November 1958 the USSR agreed to extend a line of credit
to Iraq for the procurement of arms. The value of the agreement is
reported to be $168 million.
IV. Soviet Bloc Military Technicians.
Soviet Bloc military technicians in the underdeveloped countries
receiving Bloc arms are utilized for three major functions, as
follows:
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1. Assembling and maintaining military equipment;
2. Training military personnel in tactics and in
the operation of equipment; and
3. Advising personnel in staff and line units.
It is estimated that about 1,200 Bloc military technicians have
been utilized by the countries receiving arms from the Bloc (see
Table 2). ?/ It is believed that the cost of the services of tech-
nicians required to assemble and maintain equipment is included in
the total value of the arms credits but not the cost of technicians
performing training and advisory functions.
Table 2
Military Technicians of the Soviet Bloc
Utilized by Recipient Countries
1955-58
Egypt
USSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Total
490
150
64o
Syria
180
75
10
265
Indonesia
120
30
150
Afghanistan
65
65
Yemen
60
15
75
Total
915
270
10
1,195
A. Assembly and Maintenance.
During the period of initial arms deliveries the immediate
need is for Soviet Bloc technicians to assemble the equipment and
to train indigenous personnel in its use and maintenance. Late in
October 1955, more than 40 Soviet and Czechoslovak technicians ar-
rived in Egypt to assemble the transport and fighter planes Egypt
received from the Bloc.
These
technicians also were used to train Egyptian personnel in the re-
pair and maintenance of the aircraft.
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Contrary to the situation in Egypt, there was no immediate
influx of large numbers of Soviet Bloc technicians into Syria, partly
as a result of the slower rate of deliveries and partly as a result
of the necessity of having the aircraft destined for Syria shipped
to Egypt because of inadequate facilities in Syria. 11/ The hostili-
ties in the Middle East in November 1956 delayed some deliveries of
equipment as well as the arrival of Bloc technicians.
Indonesia's arms agreements have resulted in the arrival of
about 100 Soviet Bloc pilots and technicians to assemble and test
the planes obtained by Indonesia. 21/
As new agreements are concluded, technicians usually are
required to assemble and maintain subsequent arrivals of equipment.
Although most of these technicians do not remain longer than is
necessary to fulfill their functions, some are required to remain
for extended periods of time to service the more intricate equipment.
Soviet Bloc technicians were still assembling aircraft in Egypt and
Syria toward the end of 1957, and a mission of Soviet engineers had
to return to Egypt to repair damages to submarines resulting from
improper operation by Egyptian naval personnel.ill/ Figure 1 (below)
and Figure 2 (p. 9, below) are examples of equipment in which the Bloc
has conducted training courses in Egypt.
Figure 1. Egypt: Soviet-Built Jet Fighters at
an Air Force Base
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Figure 2. Egypt: Training on Soviet-Built JS-3
Heavy Tanks
B. Training of Military Personnel.
Training of indigenous personnel has become a major function
of Soviet Bloc technicians. Late in 1956 a-mission of Soviet officers
planned to establish a comprehensive military training program in
Egypt. 12/ Soviet military technicians have set up a number of tech-
nical schools in Alexandria for training Egyptian naval personnel.
A group of Soviet officers also are assisting the Egyptian air force
In selecting pilots for preliminary training in Egypt before their
advanced training in the USSR. la/ Courses have been established
for the utilization of the entire range of armaments from rifles to
aircraft with Soviet, Polish, and Czechoslovak technicians employed
as instructors. 11/
Late in 1956 a large group of Soviet technicians was requested
by the Syrian government to undertake an integrated program to train
Syrian military personnel in the use and maintenance of all Bloc mili-
tary equipment. 1?/ Polish technicians are training Syrians in the
use and maintenance of minr equipment obtained from Poland, 12/ and
about 15 Soviet officers are serving at a new military staff college
at Qatana, Syria, where military tactics and organization are being
taught. 22/ Soviet training manuals have been translated into Arabic
and are being used at the staff college. 21/ Figures 3 and 4 (p. 11,
below) are examples of the types of equipment utilized in training
programs in Syria.
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In Afghanistan, Soviet officers at the Mazar-1-Sharif' air-
field have been training Afghan air force personnel in jet fighter
operation, photo interpretation, meteorology, and the use and main-
tenance of communication equipment. 22/ One group of Soviet officers
is conducting 6-month courses at the Kabul Military School, and
another group is instructing at a tank school in Herat. 22/
Since late in 1956, Soviet and Czechoslovak officers have
been training Yemeni personnel in the use and maintenance of tanks,
artillery, and aircraft. 21.1/
C. Advisory Personnel.
Soviet Bloc advisory personnel, particularly Soviet officers,
have permeated the military eStablishments of Egypt and Syria. Soviet
naval advisers are attached to elements of the Egyptian navy, Soviet
and Czechoslovak officers are organized into special advisory groups
and attached to divisional and army group headquarters, 22/ Soviet
staff advisers have drawn up defensive and offensive battle plans,
and Egypt has agreed to adopt Tables of Organization and Equipment
drawn up by Soviet advisers. 2?/
In Syria, Soviet officers, at the request of the Syrian
government, arrived early in 1957 to undertake a reorganization of
the Syrian army. 21/ A large group of Soviet officers arrived in
Syria in mid-1957 and were assigned to advisory posts at staff and
field headquarters.
The extent to which reorganization of the armies of the United
Arab Republic (UAR) has been effected is difficult to determine, but
it would appear reasonable to expect some reorganization along Soviet
lines if efficient utilization of Soviet Bloc arms and equipment is
anticipated.
V. Military Training in the Soviet Bloc.
More than 1,600 nationals of the underdeveloped countries receiv-
ing arms from the Soviet Bloc have undergone military training in the
Bloc since mid-1955 (see Table 3*). Courses of instruction have in-
cluded many phases of ground, air, and naval training and were under-
taken primarily in Poland and in the USSR and Czechoslovakia. It is
probable that the cost of this training is in addition to the total
value of the arms agreements.
* Table 3 follows on p. 12.
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Figure 3. Syria: Training in the Use of Heavy
Artillery
Figure 4. Syria: Training in Soviet-Built T-34
Tanks
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Table 3
Military Personnel Trained in the Soviet Bloc
1955-58
USSR
Czecho-
slovakia
Poland
East
Germany
Bulgaria
Total
Egypt
347
310
46o
20
1,137
Syria
295
25
65
3
25
413
Indonesia
50
50
Afghanistan
50
50
Total
692
1_82
.212
3
45
1,650
Poland has provided training facilities for about one-third of the
personnel trained and has been the site for almost all naval training
undertaken. Courses have been provided in the operation and mainten-
ance of destroyers, submarines, motor torpedo boats, minesweepers,
and coastal artillery. 32V In addition, some pilot training has been
provided and perhaps some training in armor and artillery. _31./
Czechoslovakia has been a major site for flight training and has
provided courses in flight instruction and operations tactics for
fighter and bomber pilots. 32./ Czechoslovakia also has been a major
training site for antiaircraft and field artillery operation and
maintenance. 13/
The USSR is providing a considerable amount of training in land
armaments and aircraft but did not become a major location for mili-
tary training until 1957. This factor probably is a result of the
early reluctance of the USSR to be associated directly with the ex-
tension of military aid to countries of the Free World. The Egyptian
and Syrian arms credits in 1955 and 1956 were negotiated through
Czechoslovakia. Since late in 1956, however, the USSR has undertaken
direct negotiations in arranging for arms deliveries.
Egypt and Syria have provided the bulk of all military trainees
to the Soviet Bloc. It was not until December 1957 that Afghanistan
sent 50 trainees to the USSR. Early in 1958, Indonesia sent approxi-
mately 50 trainees to Czechoslovakia. There may be as many as 30
Indonesian pilots in Egypt being trained by Soviet instructors. Yemen
has not sent any military trainees to the Bloc, but there are a num-
ber of Yemeni students attending Egyptian military schools. _LI/
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The training which followed shortly after extension of Soviet
Bloc arms credits was generally for short periods, usually less than
6 months, and probably was caused by the urgent need for military
personnel to help utilize the large influx of Bloc equipment. In
Czechoslovakia, for example, the duration of courses in antiaircraft
and field artillery was from 3 to 6 weeks. The number of students
varied between 5 and 25. A representative course in operation and
maintenance of 85-mm (millimeter) antiaircraft artillery for Egyptian
officers consisted of 22 to 25 students and included instruction in
the following 15/:
1. 85-mm antiaircraft artillery operation;
2. 85-mm antiaircraft artillery ammunition with
time fuses;
3. Theory of ballistics and antiaircraft artil-
lery fire;
4. General overhaul of 85-mm antiaircraft artillery
guns;
5. Measuring instrument for 85-mm antiaircraft
artillery guns -- theory, practice, and repair.
During 1957 the USSR began to provide training for periods of a
year and longer. Staff and line officers through the rank of general
are being trained in the USSR for command assignments. Large numbers
of Egyptian officers are being trained to implethent the reorganiza-
tion of the Egyptian army in order to utilize Soviet Bloc equipment more
effectively. .1?/ The Egyptian government reportedly has decided to
send all key officers for varying periods of training in the USSR. Ei
High-ranking Syrian officers are being selected to undertake 4-year
training programs at the Staff College of Frunze -- the senior Soviet
military college located in Moscow. .TY Fifty Afghan officers have
gone to the USSR for up to 3 years of training. 35./
Historically, the military groups have been the major source of
authority in many underdeveloped countries. In the Middle East the
earliest indication of Western influence was evident in the organiza-
tion of the military. Training of indigenous military leaders and
contact with Western technical superiority strongly affected the course
of political development in these areas. The effect of present Soviet
Bloc training on future military leaders may be expected to influence
profoundly the political orientation of these countries. The proba-
bility of ideological indoctrination is obvious, and the "demonstra-
tion effect" of the scientific and technological advances of the USSR
also is certain to influence the thinking of these trainees. These
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developments will be particularly true in Egypt and Syria, where the
military is by far the dominant group.
VI. Military Installations.
In addition to providing arms) training, and the services of
military technicians, the Soviet Bloc also has been active in help-
ing the underdeveloped countries to modernize existing military in-
stallations and to construct new facilities. The cost of this assist-
ance usually is in addition to the cost of the arms credits, and,
judging from evidence at hand, involves additional credits.
Soviet Bloc assistance in modernizing military installations has
been confined primarily to air and naval installations and in most
instances probably has entailed the use of Bloc technicians in super-
visory capacities rather than to the award of contracts to construct
an entire project.
Available reports often fail to make clear the size of a particu-
lar construction project or the extent of modernization involved. In
some instances, modernization of an airfield may be a major under-
taking. In others, it may be simply the installation of radio facili-
ties or the resurfacing of a runway. The construction of an airfield
may relate only to the construction of an additional landing strip or
the construction of additional facilities. It is unlikely that very
many of the airfields are being renovated or modernized to the extent
that would permit them to support sustained jet fighter and bomber
operations.
A. Egypt.
Although the Egyptian government has undertaken most of the
construction work for its own military installations, it has utilized
Soviet Bloc technicians, and probably Bloc guidance, to a considerable
extent.
In mid-1956 the USSR offered to assist Egypt in modernizing
5 airfields to accommodate jet aircraft. L42/ Soviet Bloc technicians
have been engaged in the construction of an airfield in the Qalyub-
Benha area north of Cairo L41/ and reportedly supervised construction
work at the Dekheila Airfield./12/ Soviet and Czechoslovak tech-
nicians were employed extensively in repairing damage at Almaza and
other airfields after the hostilities in November 1956. lijj
Soviet technicians also have been engaged in the construction
of naval facilities in Egypt. In mid-1956 the USSR offered to develop
Port Said and Alexandria into modern naval bases. I& A Soviet naval
mission reportedly arrived in Cairo in September 1957 to discuss the
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establishment of submarine bases on the Mediterranean and Red Seas.112/
Sites considered to be possible locations for submarine and naval
bases were in the vicinities of Port Said, Mersa Matruh, Hurghada,
and Safaga. 14?/ In Alexandria, Soviet naval engineers probably were
employed in the construction of a naval arsenal and surveyed the
harbor area for further developments. h1/ Soviet engineers assisted
in the expansion of facilities at Adabiya L.@./ and probably have been
employed in construction of Abu Qir since early 1957. 112/
Figure 7* shows the locations of military installations in
Egypt being developed with the assistance of the Soviet Bloc.
B. Syria.
Since mid-1956, Syria has been engaged in a program designed to
modernize and expand its basic facilities to accommodate the arms pur-
chased from the Soviet Bloc. Bloc technicians and Bloc guidance have
been utilized in accomplishing this program. Shortly after the con-
clusion of the first Syrian-Czechoslovak arms accord early in 1956,
it was agreed that, pending the modernization and conversion of cer-
tain Syrian airfields, MIG fighters supplied by Czechoslovakia would
be maintained in Egypt. 22/ In mid-1956, Czechoslovak technicians
reportedly were preparing to survey the possibility of converting
certain existing airfields into bases for jet aircraft. 21/
There are indications that subsequent to the conclusion of
the Syrian-Soviet military aid agreement of NoveMber 1956 the USSR
agreed to assist Syria in the construction of 3 new airfields and
the modernization of 4 others. 22/ Subsequent reports indicated that
the USSR was prepared to modernize the airfields at Damascus, Homs,
Qamichliye, Deir-Ez-Zor, and Nayrab (Aleppo) and to construct new air-
fields at Risafe, Beggs, and Palmyra. 2.31 In mid-1957 it was reported
that about 8o Soviet and Czechoslovak technicians were engaged in
construction work on Syrian military airfields. 212/
The Syrians now possess 4 major airfields located at Dumayr,
Hama, Mezze (Damascus), and Nayrab. The construction of the major
runway for the airfield at Dumayr by a Bulgarian firm, at a cost of
about $1.4 million, was supervised by 10 Bulgarian engineers and
technicians.
At Hama, as many as 60 Soviet, CzechosloVak, and Bulgarian
technicians may have been employed in the construction work at the
airfield, 21/ which is now the main training base for Syrian pilots.
Soviet and Czechoslovak officers are supervising the training of
Syrian pilots at Hama. 2W
* Following p. 16.
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Soviet Bloc assistance also has been reported in connection
with actual or planned construction at other important locations such
as Palmyra, Risafe, Qusayr, and Qamichliye. 22/
Figure 5 shows the type of airfield modernization being under-
taken in Syria.
Figure 5. Syria: Example of Modernization at Hama
Airfield
Syria has developed a small naval base about 10 miles north
of Latakia. A Yugoslav firm constructed the breakwater and dock in-
stallations, and the Bulgarians are constructing the military facili-
ties and installations surrounding the port area. Figure 6 shows
a Syrian naval base being developed with the assistance of the Soviet
Bloc.
Figure 6. Syria: Naval Base Under Construction
with the Assistance of the Soviet Bloc
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50X1
Figure 7
2. 0 34
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