HOUSING IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES 1949-58

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 100
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 29, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 17, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
N? 3
HOUSING IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES
1949 - 58
CIA/RR 147
17 September 1958
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
HOUSING IN THE EUROPEAN SAlhLLITES
1949-58
CIA/RR 147
(ORR PrOject 38.1741)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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FOREWORD
This report describes developments and problems in housing in all
the European Satellites except Albania during 1949-58. The report de-
scribes both the general pattern of housing developments in the Satel-
lites as a'whole and the special characteristics of the problem in
each country. The report on each country contains the following:
(1) a survey of housing in the period before World War II, during the
war, and in the reconstruction period; (2) an analysis of plans and
achievements in housing from the beginning of the first long-term
plan to 1956, the opening year of the present Five Year Plan*; (3) an
examination of the current housing problem; (4) an analysis of the
effect of the housing problem on political stability and economic de-
velopment; (5) an analysis of the housing program for the current Five
Year Plan and of housing developments during 1956-57; and (6) an esti-
mate of prospects for housing. In an introductory chapter, housing
developments in the Satellites as a whole are discussed, and compari-
sons are made of housing among the individual Satellites. Definitions
of terms for quantitative measurement of housing (for example, dwell-
ings); for reporting dwellings added (for example, reconstruction
repairs); and for determining the sponsor of construction (for example,
nonstate) vary among the European Satellites. At times a definition
used by a Satellite in its statistical reporting is not known and ,
must be approximated. The definitions used in this report are those
which are most applicable to the general practice of the Satellites,
and variations in definitions in individual Satellites are noted only
when significant.
The numerical data contained in thiS report represent the best
estimates available but are subject to further refinement.
* The treatment of Bulgaria is somewhat different because the Second
Five Year Plan of Bulgaria lasted from 1953 to 1957.
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CONTENTS
Page
Sumnary and Conclusions' 1
I. Introduction 5
II. Poland 11
A. General 11
B. Prewar, War, and Reconstruction Periods ,11
C. Six Year Plan (1950-55) 13
1. 'Urban Housing 13
a. Introduction 13
b. Results 14
16
2. Rural Housing
D. 1956-58 17
1, Urban Housing 17
a. Nature of the Housing Problem 17
b. Warsaw 19
2.. Rural Housing 20
E. Effect of the Housing Problem on Political Stability
and Economic Development 20
1. Political Stability
2. Economic Development
F. Five Year Plan (1956-60)
1. Urban Housing
a. Plans
b. Results, 1956-57
2. Rural Housing
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20
21
22
2
22
24
25
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Page
G.
Prospects
28
III.
Czechoslovakia
29
A.
General
29
B.
Prewar, War, and Reconstruction Periods
29
C.
1949-55
31
1. Introduction
31
2. First Five Year Plan (1949-53)
32
3. 1954-55
33
4. Results
33
D.
1956-58
35
1. Nature of the Housing Problem
35
2. Regional Variations
38
3. Prague
39
E. Effect of the Housing Problem on Political Stability
and Economic Development
39
1. Political Stability
39
2. Economic Development
4o
F.
Second Five Year Plan (1956-60)
1. Plans
2. Results, 1956-57
?
141
G.
Prospects
IV.
Hungary
43
A.
General
43
B.
Prewar, War, and Reconstruction Periods
43
C.
1949-55
45
1. Introduction
45
2. First Five Year Plan (1950-54)
45
3. 1955
47
4. Results
48
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D.
1956-58
1. Urban Housing
a. Nature of the Housing Problem
b. Budapest
c. Other Urban Centers
2. Rural Housing
Page
50
50
50
51
51
52
E.
Effect of the Housing Problem on Political Stability
and Economic Development
52
1. Political Stability
52
2. Economic Development
53
F.
1956-60
53
1. Original Plans
53
2. Results, 1956-57
54
G.
Prospects
55
V.
East Germany
57
A.
General
57
B.
Prewar, War, and Reconstruction Periods
57
C.
First Five Year Plan (1951-55)
58
D.
1956-5Q
61
E;
Effect of the Housing Problem on Political Stability
and Economic Development
62
1. Political Stability
62
2. Economic Development
62
F.
Second Five Year Plan (1956-60)
63
1: Plans
63
2. Results, 1956-57
63
G.
Prospects
64
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VI.
Bulgaria
A. General
B. Prewar, War, and Reconstruction Periods
C. 1949=57
Page
65
65
65
66
1. First Five Year Plan (1949-52)
66
2. Second Five Year Plan (1953-57)
68
3. Results
70
D.
1958
71
1. Urban Housing
71
a. Nature of the Housing Problem
71
b. Sofia
72
2. Rural Housing
72
E.
Effect of the Housing Problem on Political Stability
and Economic Development
72
1. Political Stability
72
2. Economic Development
73
F.
Prospects
73
VII.
Rumania
75
A.
General
75
B.
Prewar, War, and Reconstruction Periods
76
C.
First Five Year Plan (1951-55)
76
1. Urban Housing
76
2. Rural Housing
79
3. Results
79
D.
1956-58
8o
1. Urban Housing
80
2. Rural Housing
Bi
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E. Effect of the Housing Problem on Political Stability
' and Economic Development 81
1. Political Stability 81
2. Economic Development 81
F. Second Five Year Plan (1956-60) 82
82
2. Results, 1956-57 82
83
1. Plans
G. Prospects
Appendixes
Appendix A. Methodology
STAT
85
Tables
1. Average Number of Persons per Dwelling Roam in the Urban
Areas of Poland, January 1939, February 1946, January
1950, January 1956, and January 1958 18
0
Construction of Dwelling Rooms in Poland, 1950-57 26
Relation Between Dwelling Rooms and Population in Urban
27
Areas in Poland, 1950-57
4. Average Number of Persons per Dwelling and per Dwelling
Boom in Czechoslovakia, 1937, January 1949, March 1950,
January 1956, and January 1958 30
5. 'Construction of Dwellings in Czechoslovakia, 1948-57 . . 34
6. Relation Between Dwellings and Population in Czecho-
slovakia, 1949-57 36
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Page
Average Number of Persons per Dwelling and per
Dwelling Room in Hungary, 1940, January 1949,
and January 1956 44
8. Construction of Dwellings in Hungary, 1950-57 47
9. Relation Between Dwellings and Population in
Hungary, 1950-55 49
10. Construction of Dwellings in East Germany,
1950-57 60
11. Construction of Dwelling Space in Bulgaria,
1949-57 67
12. Construction of Living Space in Urban Areas of
Rumania, 1951-57 78
Charts
Following Page
Figure 1. European Satellites and USSR: Average
Living Space per Person in Urban Areas,
January 1958 2
Figure 2. Poland: Urban Dwelling Rooms Made Avail-
able, as Percentages of Need, 1950-57 . 16
Figure 3. Czechoslovakia: Dwellings Made Available,
as Percentages of Need, 1949-57 . . . . 36
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(ORR Project 38.171)
HOUSING IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES*
1949-58
Summary and Conclusions
Poor housing in the European Satellites** will be the most last-
ing evidence of the damage to consumer welfare caused by Communist
emphasis on rapid industrial growth. Because of large increases in
urban population, the housing needs of urban areas in the Satellites
have been especially pressing throughout the period after World
War II. Nevertheless, with the continuing emphasis on the expansion
of heavy industry, urban housing has been neglected throughout the
Satellites. As a result, urban housing has deteriorated sharply-in
Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania since the launching of the
first long-term economic plan.*** In Czechoslovakia, although the
deterioration of urban housing has been slight, there has been a
strong popular demand for improved housing. In East Germany, hous-
ing has improved slightly since the launching of the first long-
term plan but still is very poor compared with the prewar level of
housing of the area.
In all the European Satellites except Czechoslovakia, not only
does existing urban housing not provide minimum standards sought by
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent
the best judgment of ORB as of 1 June 1958.
** Data on Albania are not considered in this report.
*** The first long-term plans in the European Satellites were as
follows:
Satellite First Long-Term Plan
Poland Six Year Plan (1950-55)
Czechoslovakia Five Year Plan (1949-53)
Hungary Five Year Plan (1950-54)
East Germany Five Year Plan (195155)
Bulgaria Five Year Plan (1949-52),
completed in 4 years
Rumania Five Year Plan (1951-55)
There was in Czechoslovakia a 2-year interplan period during 1954 and
1955 and in Hungary a 1-year interplan period during 1955. There was
in Bulgaria a Second Five Year Plan during 1953-57.
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?
the population, but it does not provide even the minimum average amount
of living space* per person required to maintain health, as shown in
the accompanying chart, Figure 1.** In addition, a lack of privacy in
dwellings*** and the very poor quality of many of the dwellings in use
aggravate the housing problem of the urban population.
Substandard urban housing is a key economic factor causing popular
antagonism throughout the European Satellites toward the Communist
governments and their policies of industrial expansion at the expense
of consumer welfare. Poor housing also adversely affects economic de-
velopment by contributing to such labor problems as low productivity
and excessive turnover of workers.
Housing in rural areas in the European Satellites is as bad as or
worse than housing in urban areas. The housing standards of the rural
population, however, generally are much lower than those of their ur-
ban countrymen. Dissatisfaction with rural housing does exist, espe-
cially in Poland, but, in general, housing is not a major source of
discontent in the villages.****
By 1956, the beginning of a new Five Year Plan in all the Euro-
pean Satellites except Bulgaria, the Communist governments had become
seriously concerned about the political and economic consequences of
neglect of housing. The new plans promised greatly increased atten-
tion to housing. Prospects for urban housing during 1956-60,t
* The term living space as used in the European Satellites gener-
ally comprises the floorspace of main dwelling rooms -- that is, living
rooms, bedrooms, and dining rooms. Rooms used for utility purposes,
such as bathrooms and closets, are not included. Rooms used as kitch-
ens generally are counted only when the rooms also are used for general
living or sleeping purposes.
** Following p. 2.
*** The term dwelling as used in the European Satellites generally
includes rooms or suites of rooms which are used for habitation by
private households and which have separate access to a street or a
common space within a building -- that is, a hallway. In the cities
and larger towns of the Satellites, most dwellings are located in
multidwelling buildings. In some of the smaller towns and in the
villages, buildings of a single dwelling predominate.
**** In each of the European Satellites, almost all the rural pop-
ulation lives in villages in contrast with the rural population in
the US, which primarily lives on individual farms.
t Unless otherwise indicated, the periods for which data are given
throughout this report are from 1 January of the first year in a series
through 31 December of the last year in a series. For example, 1956-60
means from 1 January 1956 through 31 December 1960.
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11.5
European Satellites and USSR
January 1958
(In square meters)
Minimum Health Standard ??
Figure 1
8.1
8.0
6.8
5.0
(9 square meters per person)
4.8
5.0
Czechoslovakia East Germa y Hungary Poland Bulgaria Rumania USSR
*For methodology see Appendix A.
As estimated by European hygienists and as adopted in the housing codes of Bulgaria ond the USSR.
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nevertheless, are for no appreciable improvement in East Germany and
Czechoslovakia and for even further deterioration in Hungary, Poland, ,
and Rumania. Urban housing in Bulgaria probably will improve somewhat
by 1960 but will remain wholly inadequate.
The failure of the European Satellites to plan any significant im-
provement of housing for the near future illustrates the limitations
of their economic strength in relation to the magnitude of the housing
problem. In each country, only a major reduction in industrial expan-
sion would release adequate resources for improvement of housing. None
of the Satellites has indicated any willingness to undertake such a
course, and consequently the housing problem will continue to plague the
Satellites for a very long period.
A major factor prolonging the housing problem in the European Satel-
lites is the rapid rate of deterioration of urban dwellings caused in
large measure by neglect of repairs and maintenance of dwellings. The
deterioration problem is cumulative and will continue to get worse be-
cause the Satellites seem unwilling or unable to cope with the problem
adequately.
1/4
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I. Introduction.
As an aftermath of World War II, major housing problems existed
both in Western Europe and in the European Satellites. In recent years
the countries of Western Europe, however, have been overcoming their
deficiencies in housing through expanded programs of construction and
repair. In contrast, housing in the European Satellites either has ?
deteriorated considerably or has remained substandard. The outlook
for housing in Western Europe, moreover, is for continued progress.
For the Satellites the outlook is for continued deterioration of hous-
ing in several of the countries and for long-term continuation of '
urgent housing problems in all the countries. Throughout this report
the greatest emphasis is given to housing in urban areas, for in the
expanding cities and towns of the European Satellites discontent with
housing has been most widespread and the effect of poor housing on
economic development has been greatest.
All the Communist governments in the European Satellites inherited
major housing problems. With the exception of East Germany, housing
deficiendies existed even before World War II. The destruction of
dwellings during the war and the curtailment of normal construction
and repair of dwellings aggravated existing shortages throughout the
Satellites and created an acute shortage in East Germany.
At the start of the first long-term economic plans the Communist
governments of all the European Satellites probably recognized that an
'urgent need for a greatly increased number of urban dwellings would
arise during the period of the plans. Shortages of dwellings in cities
and towns already were considerable. Large increases in urban popula-
tion were expected during the plans (with the possible exception of
East Germany) as a result of high birthrates, rapid industrial expansion,
and overpopulation of rural areas. Existing dwellings, moreover, were
deteriorating at a rapid rate because of old age and neglect of essen-
tial repairs. Under the plans, nevertheless, the housing needs of the
population were considered of secondary importance, as were all other
consumer needs, and the highest priority in the use of economic resources
was given to the expansion of heavy industry. In each Satellite the
government probably decided that the perpetuation of depressed housing
in urban areas and even the deterioration of existing housing was neces-
sary for rapid industrial growth. In effect, the Satellites embarked
on the course followed by the USSR throughout most of its history.
It is believed that the urban housing programs under the first
long-term plans were considered to be minimum programs in terms of
basic needs of key economic areas and essential propaganda needs. In
most instances, nevertheless, even these minimum programs were under-
fulfilled. The over-all construction programs of most of the countries
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were too ambitious in view of the available economic resources. When
the more important construction projects (from the Communist point of
view) fell behind schedule, labor and materials originally scheduled
for construction of urban dwellings were diverted to construction of .
factories, warehouses, and office buildings. Planned programs for the
repair and maintenance of urban dwellings were inadequate and consist-
ently were underfulfilled.
As a result of the inadequacy of construction and repair of dwell-
ings since the launching of the first long-term plans) urban housing
has deteriorated sharply in.Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania.
In all four countries, not only did overcrowding increase, but the
quality of available dwellings declined. The deterioration in housing
in Czechoslovakia since the beginning of its First Five Year Plan has
been relatively slight. Discontent with housing in Czechoslovakia)
however, has increased because the standard of housing demanded by the
urban population has risen. In East Germany, housing has improved
slightly since the start of the East German First Five Year Plan, pri-
marily because of large population losses resulting from emigration to
the West. Housing in East Germany, however, remains very poor in com-
parison with housing before World War II in the same area.
Throughout the European-Satellites, poor housing in urban areas is
among the worst problems of daily living for the population. Although
urban housing generally had been poor in the Satellites, in the postwar
period, despite Communist promises, housing for the urban population
has become even worse. Except in Czechoslovakia, existing housing does
not meet even the minimum standards sought by urban residents. Over-
crowding in the Satellites is general and for large segments of the
population intolerable. In the 19th century, European hygienists esti-
mated that the minimUm amount of living space per person consistent
with the maintenance ofproper health was 9 square meters (sq. in). In
the 20th century, several European countries, including the USSR and
Bulgaria, adopted the minimum of 9 sqm in their housing codes. 1/*.
In 1958, in all the Satellites except Czechoslovakia the average amount
of living space per person in urban areas is less than the widely
accepted minimum (see Figure 1**).
Overcrowding is not the only problem of housing that people of the
European Satellites must endure. Lack of privacy in dwellings is very
widespread. . In some countries, most urban families must share dwellings
with one or more families, and many families even must share a single
dwelling rbom with outsiders., The quality of many of the dwellings in
use in the cities and towns of urban areas is appalling. Because of
** Following p. 2; above.
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the shortage of dwellings thousands of dangerously deteriorated dwell-
ings have been kept in use, and dwellings in various stages of disrepair
are very widespread in the Satellites.
Housing in the urban areas of Czechoslovakia is clearly superior to
housing in the urban areas of the other European Satellites. The aver-
age amount of living space per person in urban areas in Czechoslovakia
In 1958 is about 11.5 sq m.* Housing in Czechoslovakia also is superior
in terms of privacy in dwellings and of the quality of dwellings. The
Czechoslovaks, nevertheless, complain that the dwellings available are
much too small and out of date to meet their needs.
East Germany and Hungary rank clearly below Czechoslovakia but
above the other European Satellites in terms of current housing. The
average amount of living space per urban resident in East Germany is
about 8.1 sq in and in Hungary about 8.0 sq m.
The average amount of living space per urban resident in Poland is
less than 7.0 sq m. The problems of lack of privacy in dwellings and
of dangerously substandard dwellings are substantially greater in Po-
land than in Hungary or in East Germany.
The worst urban housing is in Bulgaria and Rumania. The average
amount of living space per person in urban areas in Bulgaria is about
5.0 sq in and in Rumania even less. In both countries the sharing of
dwellings by several families is almost universal, and the use of dwell-
ings of very poor quality is widespread.
Substandard urban housing is one major factor contributing to popu-
lar discontent with the Communist governments of the European Satellites
and with their policies of rapid industrial expansion at the expense
of consumer welfare. Poor housing in itself, however, is not likely to
disturb the status quo in the Satellites.
Discontent with housing is very widespread among young people. Be-
cause of the shortage of dwellings, large numbers of young couples in
the European Satellites are compelled to delay their marriages, marry and
live in separate places, or marry and live with relatives in already over-
crowded dwellings. Discontent also is general among, doctors, lawyers,
engineers, and other professionals, who remember the. quality of housing
* The figure for living space per person for urban areas in each
country is an estimate. The estimates were made for January 1958.
For methodology, see Appendix A. The numerical data in the text of
this report are rounded to no more than three significant digits.
All ratios, averages, and totals used in the text and in the tables
are derived from unrounded data whenever available.
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which their class enjoyed in prewar days and contrast it with the
housing that they must tolerate today.
Discontent with housing is related as much to the standards of
housing expected by the population as to the absolute level of hous-
ing in a country. The degree of authoritarian control over the popu-
lation and the submissiveness of the population to this control may be
additional factors which determine the acuteness of discontent with
housing.
It is believed that discontent with urban housing is greatest in
Poland, East Germany, and Hungary. Discontent is believed to be most
acute in Poland where the existing level of housing falls far below
even the modest expectations for housing of the population. The Poles,
moreover, are free to voice their discontent. The decline in housing
since prewar days has been sharpest in East Germany, and the East Ger-
man population has the model of superior housing in West Germany. Many
of the people most discontented with the low levels of living in East
Germany, however, already have taken advantage of the "escape valve" to
the West. The Hungarians have found housing deteriorating despite their
strong desires for improved housing and generally have been able to
voice their discontent.
It is believed that there is less discontent with housing in Czecho-
slovakia than in Poland, East Germany, and Hungary. The Czechoslovaks,
with the best housing in the European Satellites, do demand better hous-
ing than is available. The minimum housing standards of the people,
however, generally are met, and there is a tradition among the popula-
tion of submissiveness to authority.
Although very poor housing is' general in Rumania and Bulgaria, it
is believed that there is not so much discontent as in Poland, East
Germany, and Hungary, because in both Bulgaria and Rumania the urban
population is accustomed to very low levels of housing, largely is
inured to economic hardship, and is submissive to authoritarian con-
trols. Moreover, a large portion of the urban population recently
was removed from rural areas where housing was extremely poor.
The inadequacy of housing also is a major factor contributing to
the labor problems which impede economic progress in the European Sat-
ellites. HouSing problems reduce productivity of workers and increase
turnover of workers, especially in expanding industrial and mining
centers. Shortages of dwellings also aggravate problems of unemploy-
ment and immobility of labor. In the Satellites it is not only un-
skilled workers in industries of secondary importance to the economy
who are affected by the housing problem but also engineers, technicians,
and foremen in essential industries.
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Housing in rural areas in the European Satellites generally is as
bad as or worse than housing in urban areas. The housing'standards of
the rural population, however, are lower than those of their urban
countrymen. Under Communist rule, construction of dwellings in the
villages has been left primarily to the peasants, but the availa-
bility of first-class materials for construction and repair of dwell-
ings in villages has been limited strictly. The size of the rural
population in all the Satellites, however, has decreased or remained
relatively stable, and the peasants generally have been more success-
ful in maintaining their previous levels of housing than have the urban
populations) which have had to depend primarily on state-sponsored con-
struction. Discontent with rural housing does exist, especially in
Poland, in which even rural housing has declined sharply under Communist
rule. In most of the Satellites, however, housing is not a major cause
of discontent in the villages.
It is believed that the Communist governments of the European Sat-
ellites always had recognized the harmful effect of neglect of housing.
The neglect had continued because of the single-minded concentration
on industrialization. However, by 1956, the beginning of new 5-year
plans in all of the Satellites except Bulgaria; the Communist govern-
ments had become seriously concerned about the political and economic
consequences of continued neglect of housing. The new plans, conse-
quantly, promised greatly increased attention to housing. Prospects
for 1956-60, nevertheless, are for no appreciable improvement in hous-
ing in East Germany and Czechoslovakia and for further deterioration
of housing in Hungary, Poland, and Rumania. Urban housing in Bulgaria
probably will improve somewhat by 1960 but will remain wholly inade-
quate.*
The failure of the European Satellites to plan any appreciable
improvement in urban housing by 1960 illustrates the limitations of
their economic strength in the face of the dimensions of housing prob-
lems. Whatever other concessions the Communist governments may choose to
make in the line of consumer welfare, housing problems will continue
to plague the Satellites for a very long period. More than with other
facets of consumer welfare, an expansion of construction of dwellings
would drain essential materials and skilled labor from industrial
projects. Because of past neglect of housing, only a major reduction
of plans for further industrial expansion would release sufficient
resources for more than a token improvement, and none of the Satel-
lites has indicated any willingness to undertake such a course. Poor
housing in the European Satellites will be the most lasting evidence of
the damage to consumer welfare caused by Communist emphasis on rapid
industrial growth.
* For a discussion of the prospects in each country, see subsections
F and G of II through VII, below.
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A-major factor which will prolong the housing problem in the Euro-
pean Satellites is the rapid rate of deterioration of urban dwellings.
A large proportion of the urban dwellings in the Satellites is old and
poor in construction; and, consequently, the rate of loss through
deterioration naturally would be high. Years of neglect of essential
repairs and of maintenance of dwellings has aggravated the-problem .
of decay.
Under Communist rule, rents of dWellings have been maintained by
law far below the level of return needed for upkeep and replacement
of existing dwellings. The Communists have favored low rents as a
means of fostering low wages. Although the governments have assumed
the burden of supplying additional funds for the repair of dwellings,
they have preferred to publicize construction of new dwellings rather
than to invest in repair and upkeep of existing dwellings. As a re-
sult, funds for repairs always have been inadequate. Of the funds
allotted for repairs, moreover, much money has been diverted to other
purposes.
For 1956-60, increased attention to repair of dwellings has been
promised in all the European Satellites. Because the problem of de-
cay is cumulative, it is believed that deterioration of dwellings will
become an even greater problem by 1960 in most Satellites.
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II. Poland.
A. General.
The housing problem in Poland in 195a is believed to be the
most critical in the European Satellites in terms of the number of
people acutely diScontented with their housing and the seriousness
of the effect of inadequate housing on economic development. Accord-
ing to Polish officials, the deplorable housing in both urban and
rural areas constitutes "the most painful and grievous problem" in
the daily lives of the Polish people. Overcrowding in Polish dwellings
is general and severe; privacy in dwellings, especially in urban areas,
is practically nonexistent; and the quality of dwellings is very poor.
Housing in Poland always has been poor. Widespread destruc-
tion during World War II aggravated a housing problem that was already
serious. Losses of population during the war and immediate postwar
periods and efforts at reconstruction during 1945-49 served to offset
wartime losses of dwellings. During the Six Year Plan (1950-55), how-
ever, the housing needs of the population, similar to other consumer
needs, were subordinated to the needs for development of heavy industry.
Consequently, housing in Poland deteriorated markedly.
By 1956, government officials had come to recognize the acute-
ness of the housing problem in Poland in terms of its effect on eco-
nomic development and political stability. An improvement of housing
was made "a basic task" of the Five Year Plan (1956-60). Despite in-
creased expenditures for construction and repair of dwellings, further
deterioration of urban housing in Poland is unavoidable.
B. Prewar, War, and Reconstruction Periods.
The Communist government of Poland inherited a serious hous-
ing problem, which resulted primarily from the very poor housing that
existed in Central Poland* before World War II and the widespread war-
time destruction of dwellings throughout the territory of postwar
Poland. Housing in Central Poland in the prewar period ranked among
the worst in Europe. The average number of persons per dwelling room
(kitchens included) in urban areas during the 1930's was approximately
two. Extreme overcrowding was general among working class families.
In addition, the quality of Polish housing, in terms of construction
and availability of utilities, was very poor. Housing in the
* The term Central Poland as used in this report designates that part
of postwar Poland which was part of prewar Poland.
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Incorporated Territories* during the prewar period was far superior
to that in Central Poland. The average number of persons per dwelling
room in the urban areas of the Incorporated Territories in 1939 was
only 1.3. For all of present-day Poland the average in 1939 is esti-
mated to have been 1.67 (see Table 1**). Housing in the rural areas of
both Central Poland and the Incorporated Territories was inferior to
housing in the respective urban areas both in the quantity and in the
quality of available dwellings. 21
During World War II, almost 4o percent of the prewar urban
dwelling rooms of the present territories of Poland were destroyed
completely or rendered uninhabitable as a result of severe damage.
In all, more than 2.8 million of 7.25 million prewar urban dwelling
rooms were lost. The destruction was greatest in the Incorporated
Territories, in which 60 percent of prewar urban dwelling rooms were
lost, and in the city of Warsaw, in which 56 percent of the prewar
rooms were lost. Losses of dwelling rooms in rural areas as a re-
sult of military action, althougn not as great as urban losses, also
were considerable. 2/
Poland also suffered heavy losses of population during the
war and immediate postwar periods. Consequently, despite the heavy
losses of dwelling rooms the average number of persons per room in
Poland in 1946, according to the census of that year, was 1.7 (see
Table 1**), or approximately the same as in 1939. The national
average of persons per dwelling room, however, in no way indicated
the extreme nature of the housing crisis in Poland immediately after
the war, for the regional distribution of rooms did not match the
distribution of population. In the towns and cities of the Incor-
porated Territories, housing was much worse than before the war but
was not serious by Polish standards. In Warsaw and the other major
urban centers of Central Poland, in contrast, the shortage of dwell-
ing rooms was extreme. Overcrowding was greater than before World
War II, and tens of thousands of families were forced by the shortage
of dwelling rooms to live in makeshift and bombed-out quarters which
were totally unfit for human habitation. 1Y
Attention to construction and repair of dwellings in Poland dur-
ing 1945-49 apparently alleviated the housing emergency. For the 5-year
period of reconstruction the Poles claim that 810,000 urban dwelling
rooms were made available, primarily through reconstruction repairs. 2/
* The term Incorporated Territories as used in this report desig-
nates that part of postwar Poland which was annexed from Germany in
1945. The former free city of Danzig also is considered part of the
Incorporated Territories.
** p. 18, below.
*** The term reconstruction repairs as used in this report refers to
the process by which dwellings whidh were previously uninhabitable are
made habitable thrcugh major repairs.
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C. Six Year Plan (1950-55).
1. Urban Housing.
a. Introduction.
The major concern in housing of the Polish government
during the Six Year Plan (1950-55) was urban housing, for it was in
the cities, towns, and workers' settlements of Poland that the indus-
trial development planned for the period was to take place. Despite
the progress in housing made during the period of reconstruction, the
housing problem in the urban areas of Poland in 1950, the opening
year of the Six Year Plan, still was serious. There were indications,
moreover, that the problem would become worse during the plan unless
there was a massive program of construction and repair of dwellings.
By January 1950, according to official data, the
average number of persons per urban dwelling room* had dropped to
1.57 (see Table 1**). As in 1946, however, the distribution of
dwellings and of population did not always coincide. In the
Incorporated Territories the average number of persons per urban
dwelling room was 1.3. In some towns, already abandoned by the for-
mer German residents and not yet repopulated by Poles, there were
more dwelling rooms than residents. In Central Poland, however, the
average number of persons per urban dwelling room was more than 1.7
for the area as a whole and 2 or more in several of the major cities,
including Warsaw. The above figures represent only average densities
of room occupation, and numerous families in Central Poland lived
five or more per dwelling room. In addition, as in 1946, tens of
thousands of families lived in very substandard dwellings, including
garages, cellars, attics, shacks, caves) and decayed and even bombed-
out buildings. g According to the estimates of Polish housing authori-
ties, in 1950, 500,000 urban families, about 15 percent of the total
number of urban families, were without adequate dwellings. I/ Such
an estimate would place the urban housing shortages in 1950 at approxi-
mately 1 million dwelling rooms.
Polish planners were aware that the urban population
would increase greatly during the Six Year Plan. The birthrate of
postwar Poland was one of the highest in Europe. In addition, the
rapid industrial expansion planned for the period would impel hundreds
* The term dwelling room as used in Poland includes all enclosed
areas of 6 sq m or more of floorspace (including kitchens).
** P. 18, below.
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of thousands of peasants to abandon the overpopulated countryside and
to migrate to expanding towns and cities. It was clear in 1950 that
such increases in population would place a tremendous strain on the
already inadequate urban housing.
In estimating urban housing needs for the Six Year
Plan, Polish planners had to consider not only existing shortages and
the press of new population but also probable losses in dwellings as
a result of deterioration. Polish dwellings were generally old and,
in Central Poland, of poor construction. During World War II, neces-
sary repairs and maintenance of dwellings had been neglected, and
&image to dwellings from military action had been very widespread..
During the period of reconstruction, energies had been concentrated
on making available as many additional dwellings as possible, and
once again essential repairs were neglected. As a result of age,
poor quality, and long-term neglect of dwellings, tens of thousands
of dwellings could be expected either to collapse completely or decay
beyond repair during the plan period.
b. Results.
The housing program in Poland for urban areas under
the Six Year Plan called for state construction of 724,000 dwelling
rooms and nonstate construction* of 62,000 dwelling rooms. 8/ The
combined total of 786,000 dwelling rooms planned was unquestionably
too small merely to Maintain the prevailing inadequate housing
standards of 1950. Even if all of the rooms planned were to be ap-
plied to meet the needs of new urban residents at an averagd of 1.57
persons per dWelling room (the 1950 average), a population increase
of only 1,230)000 would have been accommodated, compared with an actual
increase of 2.2 million in urban population during the plan The in-
adequacy of the urban housing program adopted for the Six Year Plan
reflects the very low priority assigned under the plan to housing.
During the plan, there was to be a major expansion of the Polish con-
struction industry. The construction needs of industry, however, were
made paramount, and the proportion of the'economic resources of Poland
devoted to housing was to ne restricted, for the most part, to the
minimum necessary to meet the most pressing needs of areas of planned
industrial expansion. 9/
* Unless otherwise indicated, the term onstate construction as used
in this report refers to construction both by private individuals and
by cooperatives composed of private individuals, either with or with-
out state financial assistance. Construction by cooperatives which
are organized by the state as parts of institutions run by the state --
for example, trade unions -- generally is treated as state construction.
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According to official Polish reports a total of 818,000
urban dwelling rooms were constructed during the Six Year Plan, 4 per-
cent more than the number planned for the period. Of the total re-
ported, however, 113,000 so-called dwelling rooms consisted of space
in worker and student barracks, calculated at 1 room per 100 cubic
meters (cu m) of space. The actual nuMber of family dwelling rooms
provided was 705,000. Of the latter total, 52,600 resulted from re-
construction repairs.
The state construction sector provided 761,000 urban
dwelling rooms during 1950-5575 percent more than the number planned.
The nonstate sector provided 57,000 urban dwelling rooms during the
period, 92 percent of the number planned.* Because state plans for
urban construction were eZceeded each year during 1950-53, the total
urban housing goals for those years also were exceeded. During 1954-55,'
however, state plans were seriously underfulfilled, and the total
urban housing goals for those years were not attained. Total urban
construction increased from 123,000 dwelling rooms in 1950 to 166,000
rooms in 1955 (see Table 2**). For 1955, 190,000 dwelling rooms had
been planned. It is believed that the new course*** policy, launched
in the European Satellites in 1953, had no significant effect on con-
struction of dwellings in Poland.
Difgiculties in state construction during 1954-55
resulted from inadequate supplies of construction materials, shortages
of skilled labor, low productivity by workers,, and organizational and
planning deficiencies. Nonstate construction Was hampered seriously
by the lack of government cooperation which prevailed throughout most
of the plan and the consequent difficulty in obtaining adequate con-
struction materials. In 1955, when the government began to encourage
nonstate construction in urban areas, 18,100 dwelling rooms were con-
structed, many more than had been planned for the Year. 12/
Although the program for urban housing for 1950-55 was
exceeded slightly, the number of dwelling rooms turned over to the pop-
ulatiOn during the period was grossly inadequate compared with actual
? needs in urban housing. During 1950-55, 818,000 urban dwelling rooms
?were gained through construction and reconstruction repairs. It is
* Included under nonstate construdtion are 7,800 dwelling rooms
constructed by nonstate builders with state financial assistance.
In some Polish sources these rooms are included under state construc-
tion.
** P. 26, below.
*** The term new course as used in this report refers to the changes.
In policy launched in the Satellites after the death of Stalin in
1953, one purported purpose of which was to improve consumer welfare.
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estimated that during the same period approximately 200,000 dwelling
rooms were lost as a result of deterioration and destruction.* The
net gain in urban rooms, therefore, was approximately 618,000.. The
urban population increased during the period by 2.2 million. 12/
Consequently, only 1 dwelling room was made available for every
3.6 additional residents, compared with the 1950 standard for the
population of 1 room for every 1.57 residents. As shown in the ac-
companying chart, Figure 2,** and in Table 31*** at the 1950 stand-
ard, only 44 percent of the increase In population would ,have been
accommodated by the net gain in dwelling rooms. In addition to the
marked increase in overcrowding, the number of families living in sub-
standard dwellings greatly increased during the period. The program
for housing repair undertaken during the period was completely in-
adequate, and because of the severe housing shortage hundreds of
thousands of dangerously deteriorated rooms were continued in use. Di
2. Rural Housing.
Although more than one-half the Polish population lives
In rural areas,**** the problems ok rural housing were almost com-
pletely neglected by the Polish government during the Six Year Plan,
under which no program for state or private construction of rural
dwellings was published. The government policy of neglect reflects
the secondary position assigned to agricultural development under the
Six Year Plan. Actually, housing in rural areas in 1950, in respect
to both overcrowding and the prevalence of substandard dwellings, was
far worse than housing in urban areas: In the rural areas of Poland
the average number of persons per dwelling room in 1950 was approxi-
mately 2, and the average for Central Poland probably was 'consider-
ably higher than. 2. The rate of deterioration of the old, poorly con-
structed, and long-neglected rural dwellings was very high. 1.51
For the most part, the peasants were left to meet their
housing needs by their own means. Government allocation of resources,
however, severely restricted the supplies of construction materials
delivered to rural areas. Construction by peasants during the entire
6-year period consequently totaled only 263,000 dwelling rooms. The
state restricted its construction activity to state farms, on which
It constructed 118,000 rooms. Housing in rural areas deteriorated
considerably during the period. Housing authorities estimated the
* This estimate is based on source 111.
** Following p. 16.
*** P. 27, below.
**** Of the over-all Polish population, in January 1950, 64 percent
resided in rural areas and in January 1956, 56 percent. By Polish
usage, all areas not included under cities, towns, and workers' settle-
ments are considered rural. 111
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Figure 2
POLAND
URBAN DWELLING ROOMS MADE AVAILABLE
As Percentages of Need)
1950-57
100%
Deficit of
dwelling rooms
Dwelling. rooms
made available
56%
783,000
36%
163,000
51%
947,000
64%
296,000
49%
913,000
44%
618,000
1950-55
1956-57 1950-57 .?
(a) Net gain in urban dwelling rooms, as percentages of rooms needed to house
increases in population, at the 1950 average of 1.57 persons per room.
(11) Totals ore derived from unrounded data and may not agree with the sum
of the rounded components.
26838 7-58
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needs for replacement of decayed rural dwellings at 150,000 dwelling
rooms per year, or 900,000 for the period, compared with a total of
only 381,000 rooms constructed. Because of the inadequacy of the
construction program, only dwellings which collapsed completely were
actually retired from use. Nevertheless, the number of dwelling
rooms lost may have exceeded the number of rooms constructed, whereas
the number of rooms in deteriorated condition increased sharply.
The lack of construction materials for even minor repairs further
aggravated the housing problem in rural areas.
D. 1956-58.?
1. Urban Housing.
a. Nature of the Housing Problem.
Polish officials admit that urban housing problems
became more serious as a result of the inadequacies of the housing
program during the Six Year Plan. The official expression of the
extent of the decline in housing is the rise in the official index
of persons per dwelling room from 1.57 in January 1950 to 1.74 in
January 1956. 127 During the same period the average number of per-
sons per urban room increased from 1.3 to 1.5 in the Incorporated
Territories and from 1.7 to 1.9 in Central Poland, as shown in
Table 1.*
Official Polish statistics on housing, even if ac-
curate, do not begin to express the severity of the housing problem
from the point of view of the urban population. The general standard
of room occupancy desired by urban dwellers in Poland is believed to
be two persons or less per sleeping room.** The number of sleeping
rooms in Poland is considerably lower than the total number of dwell-
ing rooms because kitchens and other rooms too small for beds and
kitchens shared by more than one family are counted as dwelling rooms
by housing authorities. It iS estimated that if only sleeping rooms
were counted, the average number of persons per room in the urban
areas of Poland would be more than 2 and Warsaw and in the other
major urban centers of Central Poland close to 2.5. XXX
Overcrowding in Polish dwellings is nearly universal.
The typical urban dwelling in Poland consists of 2 or 3 dwelling rooms.
In most instances, one family occupies each sleeping room in the dwell-
ing, and kitchens and bathrooms, when present, are shared. In many
Table 1 follows on p. 18.
4HE. Based on source
1HHE Based on source 1
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Table 1
Average Number of Persons per Dwelling Room 2/
in the Urban Areas b/ of Poland
January 1939, February 1946, January 1950, January 1956,
and January 1958
Date
Central Poland S/
Incorporated,
Territories E/
Postwar Poland 1/
January 1939
2.0
1.3
1.67
February 1946
1.8
1.4
1.69
January 1950
1.7
1.3
1.57
January 1956
1.9
1.5
1.74
January 1958
1.9
1.6
1.79
a. The term dwelling room as used in this table includes all'enclosed
areas of 6 sq in or more of floor space (including kitchens).
b. Based on official data on housing and population. According to
official usage, the term urban includes cities; towns; and, after
World War II, workers' settlements. For methodology, see Appendix A.
c. The term Central Poland as used in this table designates that part
of postwar Poland which was part of prewar Poland. The term Incorpo-
rated Territories designates that part of postwar Poland which was
annexed from Germany in 1945. The former free city of Danzig also is
considered part of the Incorporated Territories.
d. These data have been. carried out to three digits to indicate more
clearly changes in the average density of it.00m occupation.
cases the number of occupants in each sleeping room is limited only
by the number of persons in each family, and reports of five and
more persons to a single dwelling room are commonplace in Poland. 22/
Almost no information is available on the average amount of living
space per urban resident in Poland. It is estimated, however, that
the average is approximately 7 sq in of living space (floorspace of
sleeping rooms) per person.*
PrivacY in urban housing is practically nonexistent
in Poland, inasmuch as sharing a dwelling with strangers is the rule
for most urban families. According to Polish estimates, the number
of households in urban areas exceeds the number of dwellings by 4o per-
cent. Even sharing a sleeping room with strangers is not uncommon.
* Based on source 21/.
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Moreover, hundreds of thousands of workers are forced by the shortage
of dwellings to live in workers' barracks separated from their families.
Thousands of young married couples never have lived together, because
of the unavailability of living quarters which they could share, and
divorced people often are forced to continue sharing the same room be-
cause of the impossibility of securing alternate quarters. 22/
As oppressive to the Pole; as overcrowding and lack
of privacy id the widespread necessity to use dwellings which even
the government recognizes as dangerous to the health and safety of
the occupants. A decade after the end of World War II, tens of
thousands of families are still living in patched-together shelters
in bombed-out buildings and in caves, hovels, huts, attics, and
cellars,. Of even greater importance, hundreds of thousands of fami-
lies are living in dangerously deteriorated dwellings, and the num-
ber of such families increases every year. The repair programs
undertaken since 1950 have taken care of only a fraction of the
dwellings needing capital repairs to avert major decay. Of the
decayed dwellings, few are taken out of use until they actually col-
lapse. Disrepair of dwellings is universal throughout Poland. Even
in dwellings constructed during the postwar period, roofs leak, stair-
ways sag, doors and windows do not work properly, and sanitary facili-
ties are out of order. DJ
The exact extent of the urban housing problem in
Poland is difficult to measure. It is estimated, however, that as
many as 30 percent of the 13 million urban residents in 1958 live
under conditions which represent severe hardship in their daily
lives in terms of extreme overcrowding, dangerously substandard dwell-
ings, and involuntary separation from family.*
b. Warsaw.
The housing problem in Warsaw is one of the worst in
all Poland, although some improvement was reported during 1956-57. In
December 1957 the official average number of persons per dwelling room
in Warsaw was 1.9, compared with 2.1 in January 1956. The conversion
to dwelling purposes of a large number of rooms formerly used as offices
has contributed to the improvement of housing. Housing, nevertheless,
remains critical, especially for the very large proportion of the
population which resides in dwellings constructed before World Wax II.
The average number of persons per sleeping room for all Warsaw in
1957 probably was close to 2.5, and the average for persons residing
in prewar housing probably was greater than 2.5. The housing shortage
is so severe In Warsaw that even high ranking bureaucrats are affected.
Based on source 24/.
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It is not uncommon for a privileged official and his family to live
3 or 4 to a sleeping room. No improvement has been registered in
the problem of decay of dwellings. 22/ Despite the progress reported
for 1956-57, it is unlikely that any substantial improvement in over-
all housing in Warsaw will result during the next few years.
2. Rural Housing.
Few official statistics are available on housing in the
rural areas of Poland. It is known, nevertheless, that housing is
even worse in rural areas than in urban areas. In 1950 the average
number of persons per rural dwelling room was close to.2 and by
1956 greater than 2. The rural shortage of dwellings is greatest in
Central Poland. In the province of Kielce, for example, approxi-
mately 4o percent of all the dwellings in rural areas consist of only
1 dwelling room, for which the average number of occupants is 4.3.
The quality of rural dwellings, which was very poor in 1950, dete-
riorated considerably during the Six Year Plan. By 1956, hundreds
of thousands of rural families occupied dwellings which were in a
state of ruin. gY Less publicity has been given by the Polish
government to the housing plight of the rural population than to
that of the urban population. Even though the housing standards
of the rural population are not so high as those of the urban popu-
lation, the existence of dissatisfaction and irritation over housing
nevertheless is very widespread in the Polish countryside.
E. Effect of the Housing Problem on Political Stability
and Economic Development.
1. Political Stability.
The housing problem is a major economic factor arousing
the antagonism of the Polish population, both urban and rural, against
the Communist government. For most Polish families the struggle to
maintain a minimum level of subsistence is extremely burdensome. Con-
sequently, once a family obtains housing facilities which afford the
minimum conditions of safety and health, the housing problem becomes
just one of many oppressive economic problems of everyday living.
However, for the hundreds of thousands of Poles to whom housing is
the major problem of living, housing may be the primary spur to anti-
Communist attitudes. Dissatisfaction with housing generally is most
acute among engineers, architects, doctors, lawyers, and other pro-
fessionals who constantly.contrast their present inadequate dwellings
with dwellings of their class before World War II. Discontent also is
very widespread among newly married couples who find it very difficult
to secure adequate housing. 21/
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The Communist policy of allocating available dwellings
almost exclusively to high government and Party officials, Stakhanovite
workers, police and military officers, and others favored by the regime
has especially provoked bitterness among those Poles who do not rate
preferential treatment. Since 1956, there has been some modification
of the official policy on allocations, and it has become more often
possible for the ordinary citizen in desperate housing straits to be
allocated a dwelling. Bitterness against the government policy on
allocations, however, has remained. Since the breakdown of authori-
tarian governmental controls in 1956, disturbances and even riots
have resulted when Poles without official authorization have Occupied
vacant dwellings and have resisted the efforts of authorities to
evict them. 2Li/
Besides provoking a general antiregime attitude, poor
housing conditions also cause opposition to specific governmental
policies which only indirectly are related to housing. For example,
there is a distinct resentment among many Poles against the govern-
mental policy of unlimited repatriation of Poles from the USSR and
from the West, for repatriates often are given top priority in the
assignment of available dwellings. In addition, one factor involved
In the anti-Semitism which has been rampant in Poland, despite govern-
ment efforts to curtail it, is the desire of Poles to secure the
dwellings of Jews who may be forced to leave the country. g2/
2. Economic Development.
Since 1956, Polish officials have expressed concern over
the effect of the housing problem on Polish industrial and agricultural
development. Depressing and unhealthy housing adversely affects the
productivity of the individual worker. The lack of adequate housing
In an area adversely affects the output of a factory or even of an en-
tire industry. In Poland it is not only the unskilled laborers in in-
dustries of secondary importance to the national economy who are poorly
housed but also engineers, foremen, and highly skilled operators in
key industries. The vital coal-mining industry, key to the future eco-
nomic development of Poland, for example, has been considerably af-
fected by housing problems. The shortage of dWellings in mining areas,
in the face of a large expansion in the size of the mining labor force,
has forced large numbers of mine workers of all categories to live in
overcrowded and unpleasant barracks. Still other workers are-forced
to commute to the mines from distant towns and villages. Almost one-
half of the mining force in 1957 was housed inadequately, according to
mining authorities. The housing problem is a key factor contributing
to the labor shortages and to the excessive turnover and low produc-
tivity of workers which afflict the industry. A solution of the hous-
ing problem is considered essential to the solution of labor problems,
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but little in the way of improvement of housing in mining areas is
expected during the next few years. 20/ Paradoxically, the construc-
tion industry itself has been hampered by the housing problem. Par-
ticularly in the new socialist towns of Nowa Huta and Nowe Tychy,
construction schedules have bogged down as a result of low productivity
and excessive turnover of workers, both resulting in large measure
from housing problems. 11/
Housing problems also aggravate the problem of distribu-
tion of labor in Poland. During 1956-58, unemployment in the major
cities of Poland increased considerably, although there were many
Polish towns which had their economic development stifled by shortages
of workers that were directly related to shortages of dwellings. 12/
Housing problems also affect adversely the availability and produc-
tivity of agricultural workers. Inadequate rural housing has been
cited by Polish officials as a major factor in the excessive exodus
of peasants from the countryside to the city since 1950. As a result,
shortages of workers now exist in some rural communities, especially
in the Incorporated Territories. Agricultural officials have called
for an improvement of rural housing as a factor necessary for the ful-
fillment of plans for increased agricultural production during the
Five Year Plan (1956-60). 11/
Poor individual health in Poland has resulted in lower
productivity of workers. Polish officials have cited overcrowded
and unsanitary dwellings as contributing to the poor health prevail-
ing among peasants, laborers, students, and even nurses. An explicit
relationship has been made by Polish authorities between poor housing
and the continued high incidence of tuberculosis in Poland. ILI
F. Five Year Plan (1956-60).
1. Urban Housing.
a. Plans.
By 1956, Polish officials admitted that urban housing
had become critical. An improvement in urban housing consequently
was made a basic task of the Five Year Plan (1956-60). The housing
program proposed for 1956-60 called for construction of 1.2 million
dwelling rooms in urban areas, compared with the 694,000 rooms actually
provided during the 5-year period 1951-55. In addition, considerable
increases in expenditures for repairs and maintenance of dwellings were
promised for the new plan.
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The government of Wladyslaw Gomulka, which came into
power in October 1956, promised that special attentipn would be devoted
to a "radical improvement" in Polish housing. Gomulka himself has
stated that increased urban housing is the most "urgent necessity" of
Polish life. 161 The Gomulka government, however, has not raised the
goal for construction of urban dwelling rooms under the Five Year Plan.
It is believed that the housing program for 1956-60
will not prevent a further decline in urban housing in Poland. Most
Polish officials predict that the program will lead to a slight im-
provement in urban housing by 1960 or at least will prevent a further
decline in housing. 21/ Such predictions apparently consider only
the quantitative level of housing. The 1956-60 housing program may
preserve the average number of persons per urban dwelling room at the
January 1956 level of 1.74* but only by continuing in use hundreds of
thousands of dwelling rooms which will deteriorate beyond repair during
the period. Several Polish housing officials have insisted that con-
struction of 2.5 million dwelling rooms during 1956-60 is essential to
maintain the level of housing of 1956. Such officials consider the
need to replace rooms which decay beyond repair as well as rooms
which are actually retired from use.La/ The planned total of only
1.2 million dwelling rooms will not prevent a very sharp increase in
the number of urban residents living with housing which represents
great hardship in their daily lives.
The key to the continuing problem of urban housing
in Poland.. is the rapid rate of deterioratinn of dwellings. Repairs
and maintenance of urban dwellings generally have been neglected in
Poland since 1939. During 1950-55, according to Polish housing
authorities, only a fraction of the amount needed was spend on re-
pairs of dwellings. a../ By 1956, hundreds of thousands of dwelling
rooms had deteriorated beyond the point of repair (except by re-
construction repairs) and still were occupied only because of the
shortage of dwellings. IT/ During 1956-60, according to some Polish
housing officials, the number of such dwelling rooms will increase at
a rate faster than the number of new rooms added. Whole neighborhoods
in Lodz, Gdynia, and other cities are crumbling because of age and
* Of the 1.2 million urban dwelling rooms planned for 1956-60,
200,000 will be needed, according to housing authorities, to replace
rooms lost through destruction or complete collapse. 1E1/ The remain-
ing 1 million rooms could house the increase in urban population dur-
ing'1956-60 (estimated on the basis of source 22/ as approximately
1,750,000) at 1.74 persons per room. A larger loss of dwelling rooms,
a larger increase in population, or, an underfulfillment of the con-
struction plan -- and all of these events are possible -- would raise
the 1956 average number of persons per dwelling room.
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neglect. ILI/ Proposed repair programs, even if fulfilled, will not
be adequate to arrest the deterioration. w Moreover, repair pro-
grams in the European Satellites usually are not fulfilled.
Partly as a measure to combat the problem of dete-
rioration of dwellings and partly to assure the fulfillment of the
construction program of the Five Year Plan, the Polish government
has reversed its traditional policy toward nonstate construction in
urban areas from one of discouragement, or at best tolerance, to one
of encouragement. According to the original version of the housing
program for 1956-60, 200,000 dwelling rooms were to result from non-
state construction, mostly through a system of state financial assist-
ance.115/ During 1951-55, only 46,000 dwelling rooms had resulted
from nonstate construction.* The Gomulka government has increased
even further the role of private and cooperative construction in
Poland. In 1957 the goal for nonstate construction for the Five Year
Plan was raised to 310,000 dwelling rooms, or more than 25 percent of
the total number of rooms planned for the period. )i-g In addition,
provisions for the sale of state-controlled dwellings to private in-
dividuals or to cooperatives have been approved by the government in
order to relieve the state of the burden of maintenance and repair of
the dwellings transferred. In 1958 the government proposed a
future revision of the rent system as an incentive to increased non-
state construction of new dwellings and improved maintenance of
existing dwellings. Ei Housing officials, however, expect no sub-
stantial relief of the housing problem in the near future through
increased use of nonstate resources. 4
b. Results, 1956-57.
For 1956, the opening year of the Polish Five Year
Plan, there were promised 177,000 urban dwelling rooms, only a slight
increase in comparison with the 166,000 actually provided in 1955.
Although "extreme attention" was pledged for the launching of the
new 5-year housing program, the 1956 housing plan was underfulfilled.
According to official reports, 165,000 dwelling rooms were provided
in 1956 (see Table 2**), 50/ 7 percent less than were planned for the
year and 1,000 less than were provided in 1955. It is believed, more-
over, that the reported total of dwelling rooms for 1956 included about
9,000 rooms gained through conversion of offices and military build-
ings to residential use. .51/ Previously, only rooms gained through
new construction or reconstruction repairs were reported.
* Including 7,800 nonstate dwelling rooms constructed with state
financial aid.
** P. 26, below.
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The worst bottleneck in Polish construction of dwell-
ings in 1956, as in the past, was the shortage of construction ma-
terials. Shortages of skilled laborers, low productivity of workers,
and poor planning and administration also were key factors involved
in the failure of the plan for urban construction. 52/
For 1957, there were planned 197,00Q urban dwell-
ing rooms, including approximately 17,000 rooms which were close to
completion at the end of 1956. 22/ According to official reports,
211,000 urban dwelling rooms were provided in 1957 (see Table 2*),
7 percent more than were promised for the year, 2)1/ and it is prob-
able that once again rooms gained through conversion were counted
in the total reported.
Despite the increase in the number of urban dwell-
ing rooms provided, from 307,000 during 1954-55 to 376,000 during
1956-57, the net gain in rooms did not meet the needs of the new
population (see Figure 2** and Table 3***), and the quantitative in-
dex of housing has continued to decline. According to official re-
ports the average number of persons per urban dwelling room rose
from 1.74 in January 1956 to 1.79 in January 1958 (see Table 1****). 55/
The increase in overcrowding was accompanied by a-further decline in
the quality of available housing.
2. Rural Housing.
No program for rural housing in Poland for the Five Year
?
Plan has been published. Polish officials, however, in their recent
statements on economic problems, have been paying greater attention
to the housing needs of rural areas. As in the past, construction
of dwellings in the rural areas during 1956-60 is to be left pri-
marily to the private initiative of the peasants. The government,
for its part, has promised much greater supplies of construction
materials and increased financial assistance. 5.6j Polish housing
authorities have estimated that during 1956-60 270,000 dwelling
rooms a year will be needed to meet the most pressing housing needs
In rural areas. Merely to replace the rooms which are completely
destroyed or which fall into a state of serious dilapidation would
-require 150,000 dwelling rooms each year. 51/
During 1956, there were many reports of a continued seri-
ous shortage of construction materials in rural areas. According to
Table 2 follows on p. 26.
Following p. 16, above.
Table 3 follows on p. 27.
P. 18, above.
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Table 2
Construction of Dwelling Rooms pi in Poland 12/
1950-57
Thousand Dwelling Rooms
Year
/
Urban 2.1
'
Rural Si
Total
1950
123.2
55.6
178.8
1951
112.6
63.3
175.9
1952
129.9
44.4
174.3
1953
144.9
63.5
208.4
1954
141.2
68.1
209.3
1955
165.9
86.2
252.1
1956 2/
164.8 2/
98.7
263.5
1957 g../
210.8 f/
135.4
346.2
a. The term dwelling room as used in this
table includes all enclosed areas of 6 or more
sq m of floorspace (including kitchens).
b. Source e.", unless otherwise indicated.
This table includes dwelling rooms gained
through reconstruction repairs and space in
worker and student barracks converted at I
"room" per 100 Cu in of space.
c. According to official usage, the term urban
is used for construction in cities; towns; and,
in the postwar period; workers' settlements.
The term ruralis used for construction in all
other areas.
d. 5
e. The official figure is believed to include
approximately.9,000 dwelling rooms gained
through conversion of offices and military build-
ings to dwellings (based on source
f. Probably includes dwelling rooms gained
through conversion.
official reports, nevertheless, 98,700 rural dwelling rooms were com-
pleted during the year, 12,500 more than in 1955 (see Table 2). Li
Throughout 1957, reports by both Polish officials and Western observers
indicated a greatly accelerated pace of construction of rural dwell-
ings. L/ According to preliminary estimates by Polish officials,
135,000 rural dwelling rooms were completed in 1957, 37 percent more
than in 1956. LI/
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Table 3
Relation Between Dwelling Rooms 2/ and Population
in Urban Areas bi in Poland
1950-57
Measures of Dwelling Rooms and Population
1950-55
1956-57
1950-57 Ei
Increase in urban population (thousand persons)
Dwelling rooms needed to house increase in
population at 1950 average of 1.57 persons
per dwelling room I/ (thousand rooms)
Gross gain in urban dwelling rooms A/
(thousand rooms) .
Dwelling rooms lost (thousand rooms)
Net gain in dwelling rooms (thousand rooms)
2,200 Li/
1,400
818
200 h/
618
720
459
376
8o 1/
296
2,920
1,860
1,193
280
913
.Net gain in urban dwelling rooms, aa percent-
ages of rooms needed to house increase in
population at 1950 average (percent) 44 ' 64 49
a. The term dwelling room as used in this table includes all enclosed areas of .
-6 sq m or more of floorspace (including kitchens).
b. Cities, towns, and workers' settlements.
c. Totals are derived from unroUnded data and may not agree with the sum of
their rounded components.
a. fy
e.
657
f.
g. 7. Gross gain is ?a result of new construction and reconstruction repairs.
These figures include space in workers' and students' barracks converted at 1.
"room" per 100 cu m of space.. Figures for 1956-57 probably include rooms gained
through conversion of office and military buildings to dwellings.
h. zv. This loss is a result of destruction and deterioration and includes.
only rooms retired from use.
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G. Prospects.
Prospects for Polish housing are bleak. A critical housing
problem will continue to plague the people, the government, and the
economy of Poland for decades. Housing in urban areas will continue
to deteriorate for years to come. Approximately 211,000 urban dwell-
ing rooms were constructed in 1957. For 1960, 332,000 urban rooms
are planned. In contrast, 500,000 urban rooms a year are needed,
according to some housing authorities, merely to meet current popu-
lation and replacement needs. Such a level of construction is not
contemplated until 1963-64. 12/ The inability of the Polish govern-
ment to prevent further deterioration of urban housing, despite fre-
quent pronouncements about the vital importance of improving housing,
reflects both the magnitude of the housing problem and the very weak
condition of the Polish economy,
If the emphasis on increasing rural construction revealed in
1957 is maintained, it is possible that by 1960 the number of dwell-
ing rooms constructed each year in rural areas will be sufficient to
meet current needs for replacement and for new population and there-
by to avert a further decline of housing. The rapid expansion of
urban housing planned for 1959-60, however, may cut down the resources
available for the further expansion of rural construction. In any
case, it will not be possible, for a very long period, to undo the
damage to rural housing of years of neglect.
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III. Czechoslovakia.
A. General.
: The general level of housing in Czechoslovakia in 1958 is
considerably higher than the level prevailing in any of the other
European Satellites. Nevertheless, Czechoslovakia has a housing
problem which depresses the standard of living of the population
and impedes the economic development of the country. The housing
problem results partly from the high standard of housing demanded
by the population. Very overcrowded and substandard housing does
exist in Czechoslovakia but not nearly to the extent that it does
in Poland. For the most part the complaints of the Czechoslovaks
about housing are about dwellings which are too small and too old
to provide the comforts demanded by the occupants and not about?
dwellings which affect the health and safety of the occupants.
To the Czechoslovaks, nevertheless, demanding as they do a
higher standard of living than their neighbors in the European
Satellites, the housing problem is very real. Especially in Prague
and in rapidly expanding industrial and mining centers, people com-
plain vehemently of undesirable housing. The government has ac-
knowledged the legitimacy of popular grievances about housing and
has admitted that something must be done to improve the situation.
As yet, however, the government has not undertaken a housing pro-
gram which would eliminate the conditions about which the Population
.complains. During 1949-55, housing throughout the ccuntry actually
deteriorated because of Communist emphasis on rapid industrial ex-
pansion and neglect of the housing needs of the population. The
program for construction of dwellings proposed for 1956-60 probably
will prevent any further decline of housing but will provide prac-
tically no relief of existing housing problems.
B. Prewar, War, and Reconstruction Periods.
Housing in Czechoslovakia before World War II, although not
up to the standards of the industrialized nations of Western Europe,
was superior to housing prevailing in the countries of Eastern Europe.
In 1937 the average number of persons per dwelling throughout Czecho-
slovakia was approximately 4.1, /1/ and the average number of persons
per dwelltimg room, about 1.7 to 1.8,* as shown in Table 4.** Although
* Based on source 12/. .The term dwelling room as used in Czecho-
slovakia comprises main rooms of more than 4 sq m of floorspace and
kitchens of more than 12 sq m of floorspace.
** Table 4 follows on p. 30.
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Table 4
Average Number of Persons per Dwelling and per Dwelling Room
in Czechoslovakia 2/
1937, January 1949, March 1950, January 1956, and January 1958
Persons
? Date Per Dwelling Per Dwelling Room 12/
1937
4.1
1.7 to 1.8
January 1949
3.44
1.55
March 1950
3.42
1.54
January 1956
3.47
1.57
January 1958
3.43
1.56
a. For methodology, see Appendix A, p. 87, below.
b. The term dwelling room as used in Czechoslovakia comprises
main rooms of more than 4 sq m of floorspace and kitchens of
more than 12 sq m of floorspace.
housing was poorest in the rural areas of Slovakia, the major housing
problem of the country, in the view of government officials, existed
in the urban centers of Bohemia and Moravia. The working class lived
under very crowded conditions in Prague and in other industrial cen-
ters. Dwellings in working class districts in Czechoslovakia probably
were not so crowded, however, as dwellings in similar districts in
Poland. Moreover, the quality of urban dwellings in Czechoslovakia,
in respect to both construction and existence of utilities, was superior
to that of Poland.
As in all the European Satellites, residential construction
in Czechoslovakia was curtailed seriously throughout World War II, and
necessary maintenance and repair of dwellings were neglected. Wartime
destruction of Czechoslovak dwellings, however, was relatively light
because little military action took place on Czechoslovak territory.
Only 3 to 4 percent of prewar dwellings were lost as a result of mili-
tary action. Losses of population immediately after the war, result-
ing primarilY from the emigration of the ethnic German population from
the Sudetenland, far outweighed losses of dwellings. As a rtsult,
housing in Czechoslovakia, in quantitative terms, was more favorable
in 1946 than in 1939. Empty houses in the Sudetenland, however, did
not compensate for the postwar shortages of dwellings which existed
elsewhere in Czechoslovakia. 11/
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The magnitude of the housing problem in Czechoslovakia in the
early postwar period is indicated by the top priority within the con-
struction sector of the economy assigned by the pre-Communist regime
to construction of dwellings. According to the draft of the Two Year
Plan (1947-48), a total of 125,000 dwellings were to be gained through
construction and reconstruction repairs. Housing construction during
1947-48 fell far short of the planned goal primarily because of the
chaotic condition of the construction industry and the political un-
certainties of the period. In 1947, 28,700 dwellings were completed
and in 1948 21,700, for a 2-year total Of only 50,400 dwellings. It
is not known whether or not the latter totals include dwellings re-
sulting during the period from unauthorized construction activity. 111/
C. 1949-55.
1. Introduction.
Housing in Czechoslovakia in 1949-50, the opening years
of the First Five Year Plan (1949-53), was superior to housing in
any other European Satellite at the commencement of its first long-
term plan. Nevertheless, in terms of the housing standards demanded
by the population, a major housing problem existed in Czechoslovakia.
In March 1950, according to the census of that date,
throughout Czechoslovakia the average number of persons per dwelling
was 3.42 and per dwelling room 1.54 (see Table 4*). There was a
marked regional variation in the quantitative level of housing. In
the Czech regions of Bohemia and Moravia, in which 72 percent of the
total population resided, the average number of persons per dwelling
was 3.2 and per dwelling room 1.4. 11/ Even within Bohemia and Moravia
there were marked differences in housing. There was still an over-
abundance of dwellings in the Sudetenland and a shortage of dwellings
in Prague and in most other major urban centers.
In Slovakia in 1950 the average number of persons per
dwelling was 4.2 and per dwelling room 2.0, 1?/ with both averages
being considerably higher than the averages for the Czech regions.
In addition, the general quality of available dwellings in respect
* P. 30, above. It is estimated that in January 1949 the average
number'of persons per dwelling throughout Czechoslovakia was 3.44.
The decline in the average from January 1949 to March 1950 resulted
from thepopulation's remaining about the same during the period
while the number of dwellings increased by about 30,000. 12/ Czecho-
slovak sources usually cite the March 1950 census figures in discus-
sing housing at the beginning of the First Five Year Plan. In/
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to construction and presence of utilities was considerably poorer
in Slovakia than in the Czech regions. However, the Slovaks, pre-
dominantly a rural people, did not demand the same high standards
of housing as did the urban Czechs.
2. First Five Year Plan (1949-53).
The housing problem in Czechoslovakia at the start of the
First Five Year Plan (1949-53) was just as pressing as it had been
at the start of the Two Year Plan (1947-)48). In contrast with the
pre-Communist government, which had given top priority within the
construction sector of the economy to construction of dwellings, the
Communist government gave top priority to industrial construction.
For 1949-53, state construction and reconstruction repairs were to
provide 9.7 million sq m of dwelling room space, or only approxi-
mately 130,000 dwellings. 79/ The Communist housing program primarily
was meant to provide for the minimum housing needs of key industrial
and mining areas whereas the housing needs of the country as a whole
were neglected. No plan for nonstate construction of dwellings dur-
ing the First Five Year Plan was published, and apparently little
nonstate construction was expected.
During 1949-50, state construction provided 48,700 dwell-
ings. In April 1951 the First Five Year Plan was redrafted with a
sharp upward revision of industrial goals. At the same time the state
construction program for the 3 years 1951-53 was revised upward to
133,000 dwellings,Ei01 apparently to meet the increasing housing needs
of areas of planned accelerated industrialization. The revised total
for the First Five Year Plan, consequently, was to be approximately
182,000 dwellings. As one means of achieving the increased goal,
Czechoslovak planners probably intended to reduce the average size of
the dwellings to be constructed during 1951-53 below the average size
originally planned for the period.
The 1951-53 goal for state construction of dwellings was
underfUlfilled inasmuch as only 82,300 dwellings of the 133,000 planned
actually were provided. Because the entire construction sector of the
economy encountered difficulties in fulfilling revised targets, re-
sources originally intended for construction of dwellings were diverted
to projects of nonresidential construction.
During the entire First Five Year Plan the state provided
131,000 dwellings, only slightly more than the number called for in
the original housing program. In terms of dwelling room space -- the
terms in which the housing program originally was expressed -- state
construction fell far short of the original goal for the plan. Of
the 9.7 million sq m of dwelling space called for by the plan, only
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6.05 million were provided by the state, an underfulfillment of 38
percent. al/ During 1949-53, nonstate construction, which generally
was discouraged by the state, provided 47,400 dwellings. State and
nonstate construction and reconstruction repairs combined therefore
provided 178,000 dwellings (see Table 5*).
3. 1954-55.
As part of the new course originated in the Soviet Bloc
in 1953, the. Czechoslovak government promised a more vigorous hous-
ing effort for the interplan period 1954-55. The state construction
goal for 1954-55 was set at 88,000 dwellings, ag/ compared with the
60,000 dwellings actually gained through state efforts during
1952-53. Once again, state plans were underfulfilled considerably.
In 1954, 27,800 dwellings were provided, as shown in Table 5,* and
in 1955 35,600, resulting in a 2-year total of only 63,400 dwellings.
.During 1954-55 the government changed its policy toward nonstate
construction from one of restriction and indifference to one of en-
couragement. Consequently, 31,500 nonstate dwellings were constructed
in 1954-55, one-third of the total number of dwellings constructed
in Czechoslovakia during the 2 years.
4. Results.
Daring the 7-year period 1949-55, state construction and
reconstruction repairs in Czechoslovakia provided 194,000 dwellings,**
and nonstate construction provided 78,900 dwellings for a total of
273,000 dwellings. An attempt was made, for purposes of propaganda,
to provide a token amount of new state-constructed dwellings in most
larger towns. Most state-constructed dwellings during the period,
however, were provided in key industrial'and mining centers. Particu-
lar emphasis was given to the Ostrava coal and steel area of Moravia
and to newly developed industrial centers in Slovakia. The average
size of state-constructed dwellings decreased steadily during the
period from 57.0 sq m of dwelling room space in 1949 to 35.4 sq m in
1955. In addition, toward the end of the period, rooms in.workers'
dormitories were counted as part of the total of dwellings con-
structed. aV
Government officials admit that the volume of construc-
tion of dwellings in Czechoslovakia during 1949-55 was not sufficient
to cover the minimum needs of the country and that, consequently,
* Table 5 follows on p. 34.
**. During 1949-55, 8.3 million sq
provided by state construction and
than the original goal for 1949-53
m of dwelling room space were
reconstruction repairs, less
alone. al/
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Table 5
Construction of Dwellings in Czechoslovakia a/
1948-57
Thousand Dwellings
1
I
Year
State Sector
Nonstate Sector 2/
Total 2/
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957 2/
11.9
19,6
29.1
22.3
30.4
29.7
27.8
35.6
33.3
31.5
9.8
9,5
9.1
8.6
9.9 slj
10.3 I./
13.4 27
18.1 a/
22.3 1/
31.5
21.7
29.1
38.2
30.9
4o.2 Lai
41.2 a/
53.7 LI/
55.6 2../
63.0
a. Source _51, unless otherwise indicated. This table includes
dwellings gained through reconstruction repairs.
Ii. The term nonstate as used in this table includes private con-
struction with and without state financial aid.
c. Totals are derived from unrounded data and may not agree with
the sum of their rounded components.
d. Source 2/ includes, under its column for Nonstate Sector for
1956, 8,100 dwellings constructed in previous years but not re-
ported until 1956. In this, table the dwellings have been sub-
tracted from the number reported for 1956 in this source and have
been added to the numbers reported for the previous 4 years as fol-
lows: 1955, 3,100; 1954, 3,000; 1953, 1,000; and 1952, 1,000.
These changes affect the column for total for 1952-56.
e. 87/
housing deteriorated. During 1949-55, 273,000 dwellings were added,
but it is estimated that the number of dwellings lost as a result
of demolition was 48,000,* and the net gain therefore was 225,000
dwellings. During 1949-55 the population of Czechoslovakia increased
* Based on source 2/. According to Czechoslovak housing officials
the number of dwellings gained by the conversion of buildings to.
residential uses was about the same as the number of dwellings lost
through conversion of dwellings to nonresidential uses and through
other means (not including demolition). Dwellings added through the
subdivision of existing dwellings are not counted as dwellings
gained, because they do not add to the total dwelling room space of
the country.
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by 822,000. L82/ At the 1950 average of 3.42 persons per dwelling,
the net gain in dwellings would have housed only 94 percent of the
increase in population. More importantly, in a country in which most
families desire separate dwellings, the increase in dwellings fell
far behind the increase in family units. During 1949-55 the net in-
crease in households totaled approximately 350,000.* 5S1 The net
gain in dwellings consequently was only 64 percent of the net gain
in households, as shown in the accompanying chart, Figure 3,** and
Table 6.*** In addition, the general quality of dwellings in use
in Czechoslovakia declined during the period. As a result of the
Inadequacy of the program for construction, a large number of dilapi-
dated dwellings, which by Czechoslovak standards should have been
abandoned, were continued in use. Because of the increased shortage
of dwellings, moreover, the number of persons compelled to live in
workers' barracks, in attics and cellars, in abandoned stores, and
in other makeshift and substandard quarters increased. 51/
D. 1956-58.
1. Nature of the Housing Problem.
According to government officials, the decline in housing
in Czechoslovakia during 1949-55 was the "weakest link" in efforts of
the government to raise the standard of living. .In additicn, the
existing shortage of dwellings has been described by government of-
ficials as one of the key problems affecting the economic progress
of Czechoslovakia. The housing problem in Czechoslovakia in 1956-58
is by no Means so harmful in its effect on the population and on the
economy as it is in Poland. Nevertheless, by their own housing
standards, which are considerably higher than Polish standards, the
Czechoslovaks do have a major housing problem.
The population of Czechoslovakia on 1 January 1956 was
13,200,000. The number of dwellings, adcording to.estimates by
Czechoslovak officials, was 3.8 million and the number of dwelling
rooms 8.4 million. The average number of persons per dwelling conse-
quently was 3.47, a slight increase in comparison with 1950. The
average number of persons per dwelling room was 1.57 (see Table 4****),
also a slight increase in comparison with 1950. The average amount
of living space (floorspace of dwelling rooms) per person was 11.2 sq m,
a slight decrease since 1950. The number of families without separate
Most new households result from new marriages.
Following p. 36.
Table 6 follows on p. 36.
P. 30, above.
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Table 6
Relation Between Dwellings and Population in Czechoslovakia
1949-57
Measures of Dwellings and Population 1949-55 1956-57 1949-57
Increase in population a/ (thousand persons) 822 248 1,070
Dwellings needed to house increase in popula-
tion at 1950 average of 3.42 persons per
dwelling h/ (thousand -dwellings)
Gross gain in dwellings h/ (thousand dwellings)
Dwellings lost di (thousand dwellings)
Net gain in dwellings (thousand dwellings)
Net gain in dwellings, as percentages of dwell-
240
273
48
225
73
119
15
104
313
392
63
329
ings needed to house increase in population at
1950 average (percent) 94 143 105
Net gain in households _ei (thousand households) 350 110 46o
Net gain in dwellings, as percentages of net
gain in households (percent) 64 94 71
a.. 2a/
b. 24/
c. 9 /. Including dwellings gained through new construction and reconstruction
repairs only. (See Table 5, footnote d, p. 3)4, above.)
d. Based on source 95/. This loss is a result of demolition only. (See
Table 5, footnote d, p. 3)4, above.)
e. 2L61. Most new households result from new marriages.
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100%
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
DWELLINGS MADE AVAILABLE
As Percentages of Need*
1949-57
36%
125,000
64%
225,000
6% ?6,000
94%
104,000
29%
131,000
Figure 3
Deficit of
dwellings
71% Dwellings
329,000 made available
1949-55
1956-57 1949-57
Percentages ore derived from unfounded data.
*Net gain in dwellings, as percentages of net increase in households.
26839 7.58
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dwellings in 1956 had increased considerably in comparison with 1950
but probably was still less than 10 percent of the total number of
families living in private households. 21/
The general level of housing prevailing in Czechoslovakia
In 1956-58 is considerably superior to the general level of housing
prevailing throughout the rest of the European Satellites. In
Czechoslovakia, almost all families are able to obtain separate
dwellings, whereas elsewhere in the Soviet Bloc the sharing of dwell-
ings by more than one family is very widespread. The average amount
of living space per person in Czechoslovakia is 11.2 sq m whereas
in no other Satellite is the average higher than 8.1 sq m. In con-
sideration of the quality of construction, the maintenance of repairs,
and the availability of utilities, housing in Czechoslovakia also is
generally superior to housing elsewhere in the Satellites. The
people of Czechoslovakia, however, tend to compare their living con-
ditions with conditions in Western Europe and not in the Soviet Bloc.
In comparison with the highly industrialized countries of Western
Europe, housing in Czechoslovakia is substandard.
There are instances of marked overcrowding in Czechoslo-
vakia, especially in Prague and in expanding industrial and mining
centers. Many families, moreover, occupy very substandard dwellings,
such as attics and basements, abandoned stores, and dilapidated build-
ings. For the most part, however, complaints about housing in Czecho-
slovakia involve the discomfort of the occupants and not great hard-
ship. Nevertheless, the standards of housing of the Czechoslovak
population are very high, and dissatisfaction with housing is very
widespread.
The major source of dissatisfaction with housing in
Czechoslovakia is the small size of most dwellings. About 25 percent
of all dwellings contain only 1 dwelling room and another 41 percent
only 2 dwelling rooms. By Czechoslovak standards, as expressed by
housing officials, there should be 1 dwelling room in a dwelling for
every occupant 15 years of age or older and 1 dwelling room for every
2 occupants under 15 years of age. 2:LE/ It is estimated that by such
standards less than 30 percent of all households in Czechoslovakia
are of a size which can be accommodated by the 1-.and 2-dwelling
room units which make up 66 percent of the total number of dwellings.*
Consequently, a very large number of families, especially in urban
areas,' are forced to live under conditions which are very cramped by
the standards of the occupants. It does not appease an irate Czecho-
slovak family to know that the housing about which it complains would
be considered very satisfactory elsewhere in the Satellites.
* Based on source 52/.
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Another major source of dissatisfaction with housing in
Czechoslovakia is the poor quality and old age of the dwellings
available. In the words of one harassed housing official, everyone
in Czechoslovakia wants a modern, fully equipped apartment. In con-
trast, most Czechoslovak dwellings are old fashioned and without ade-
quate facilities from the point of view of the occupants. 100/
2. Regional Variations.
There still is a marked regional variation in the level
of housing in Czechoslovakia between Slovakia and Bohemia and Moravia.
AlthoUgh adequate statistical data on regional developments in hous-
ing since 1950 are not available, it is probable that regional dif-
ferences in housing have been narrowed somewhat in recent years. The
Communist regime has emphasized both the industrial development of
Slovakia and the improvement of the standard of living. As a conse-
quence, the priorities for construction of dwellings for both urban
and rural areas in Slovakia have been higher in general than the pri-
orities for Bohemia and Moravia. During 1948-57, 44 percent of all
dwellings constructed in Czechoslovakia were located in Slovakia,
although Slovakia contained only about 28 percent of the total popu-
lation. Reports for 1958 indicate a continued greater relative scale
of construction of dwellings in Slovakia than in Bohemia and
Moravia. 101/ It is probable that the increased urbanization of
Slovakia since 1949 also has tended to raise the standards of housing
demanded by the population. Consequently, discontent with housing in
Slovakia, at least in urban areas, may be greater today than it has
been in the past, in spite of the greater attention given by the re-
gime to housing in Slovakia than to housing in Czechoslovakia as a
whole.
Within the CzeCh lands of Bohemia and Moravia, there still
are sectional variations in housing. The Sudetenland still enjoys a
surplus of housing whereas the rapidly expanded urban communities of
the Ostrava coal-mining and industrial area are subject to large-scale
shortages of dwellings.
Little is known specifically about urban-rural differences
in housing in Czechoslovakia. It is believed, however, that housing
is better in urban than in rural areas. It is probable, nevertheless,
that the rural population is more content with prevailing housing than
is the urban population inasmuch as rural housing standards are lower
and the size of the rural population has remained fairly stable since
1949 in contrast with the large increases in population in key urban
centers.
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3. Prague.
The general level of housing in Prague is considerably
higher than that in the capital of any other European Satellite.
Nevertheless, by the standards of housing demanded by the population
and accepted as reasonable by the government, Prague suffers from a
housing problem of very great dimensions. In March 1956 in Prague
the average number of persons per dwelling was 2.9 and per dwelling
room 1.3 (in both instances about 20 percent lower than the averages
for all of Czechoslovakia). Also in March 1956, 11,000 people
(1.1 percent of the population of the city) lived in "emergency" or
nonresidential buildings. Of more importance, 36 percent of the
330,000 dwellings of the city were considered by housing officials
to be overcrowded in terms of the number of occupants per dwelling
room. 102/
Housing in Prague has deteriorated steadily under Com-
munist rule. Despite a continually expanding shortage of dwellings
in the capital, the government has restricted the level of construc-
tion of dwellings, preferring instead to concentrate efforts in con-
stcuction in the rapidly expanding industrial centers of Slovakia
and the Ostrava coal and steel area. 121/ During 1945-55 an annual
average of only 1,300 dwellings were constructed in Prague whereas
about 500 dwellings a year were lost as a result of destruction or
deterioration. A large number of additional dwellings weregained
through the subdivision of large dwellings, but such changes did not
add to the total living space of the city. 104/ In July 1957, there
were registered in Prague approximately 60,000 officially approved
requests for dwellings. The number of such requests increases by
about 8,000 a year. The average annual number of dwellings planned
for construction in Prague during 1956-60 is only 4,200. 102 Con-
sequently, no relief of the shortage of dwellings in Prague can be
expected in the near future.
E. Effect of the Housing Problem on Political Stability
and Economic Development.
1. Political Stability.
Popular dissatisfaction with housing is very widespread
in Czechoslovakia, especially in the key industrial, mining, and
administrative centers. The Communist government, with its policy
of stressing rapid industrial expansion at the expense of consumer
welfare, generally is held responsible by the population for the
housing problem. Young couples with growing families are among the
people most discontented with their present dwellings. On the other
hand, older families occupying dwellings which are considered adequate
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are constantly fearful that they may be forced by the government to
give up some of their dwelling space or move to a less desirable
dwelling. From time to time, older people have even been forced to
evacuate overcrowded cities and move to less congested areas to
alleviate the urban shortage of dwellings. The government policy of
favoring members of the Party; officials of the government, police,
and military; and Stakhanovite workers in the allocation of avail-
able dwellings, especially choice dWellings, has been an important
factor in provoking antiregime sentiment among individuals who are
not so favored. Since 1956, government policy on allocations has
been modified somewhat. It is still almost essential to have politi-
cal or monetary influence in order to get a desirable dwelling.
Despite the widespread animosity toward the government because of
housing, it is unlikely, given the general disposition of the Czecho-
slovak population, that the housing problem seriously threatens the
stability of the regime.
2. Economic Development.
A shortage of dwellings in key industrial and mining
areas frequently has been listed by government officials as a major,
factor impeding the economic development of Czechoslovakia. Insuf-
ficient dwellings and the poor quality of existing dwellings have
been associated particularly with difficult problems of the labor
force in the coal-mining and industrial enterprises of the Ostrava
area of northwest Moravia. The recruitment and stabilization of an
adequate labor force in the area depend to a very large extent on
ending the critical shortage of dwellings. Despite concentration in
the Ostrava area of a large share of the new dwellings planned for
Czechoslovakia during 1956-60, poor housing is expected to continue
to impede the development of the area for some time to come. 106/
The urban housing problem in Czechoslovakia is one factor
adversely affecting productivity of workers. Many workers, for
example, have to commute to factories from distant villages over un-
dependable public transportation systems. In contrast'with the situa-
tion in Poland, however, housing in Czechoslovakia is not at such
a low level as to impair the physical and mental alertness of a
large portion of the labor force. The general level of housing in
Czechoslovakia, for example, is not so dangerously low as to affect
the level of health of the population, especially in view of the rela-
tively high standards of sanitation and medicine which prevail in
the country.
Government officials have demonstrated concern over the
possible effects of the housing problem on the birthrate of Czecho-
slovakia and thereby on the economy of this labor-short country.
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According to housing officials the continued shortage of dwellings
in Czechoslovakia tends to delay marriages, and the small size of
dwellings tends to restrict the size of families, especially in
Bohemia and Moravia. 107/
F. Second Five Year Plan (1956-60).
1. Plans.
After admitting that the number of dwellings added dur-
ing 1949-55 had not met the minimum housing needs of the country,
government officials in Czechoslovakia promised that exceptional
attention would be paid to housing during the Second Five Year Plan
(1956-60). The original draft of the housing program for 1956-60
called for construction of 300,000 dwellings, compared with an
actual construction total during the 5-year period 1951-55 of 206,000
dwellings. Under the original program, nonstate construction was to
be deemphasized during 1956-60, with only 50,000 private dwellings
called for, compared with an actual nonstate total during 1951-55 of
60,000 dwellings. 108/ In October 1957 the goal for construction of
dwellings for 1956-60 was revised upward to 330,000 dwellings, and
official policy on nonstate construction was reversed. The target
for nonstate construction was raised to 120,000 dwellings, and the
goal for state construction was cut back from 250,000 to 210,000
dwellings. 109/ The increased emphasis on nonstate construction
probably arises from government recognition of the inadequacies of
state construction in view of the magnitude of the existing housing
problem.
2. Results, 1956-57.
For 1956, the opening year of the Czechoslovak Second
Five Year Plan, the state construction goal originally was set at
approximately 39,000 dwellings.* In March 1956, apparently as a
result of the poor performance of the construction industry during
the first quarter of the year, the state plan was lowered to 35,600
dwellings, or to approximately the level of achievement of 1955. 111/
Even the revised plan was underfulfilled, because only 33,300 state-
constructed dwellings were completed in 1956. Nonstate construction,
however, more than made up for the deficiencies of the state sector
by providing 22,300 dwellings compared with only 15,000 dwellings
originally expected for the year. In all, 55,600 dwellings were com-
pleted during 1956 112/ Compared with 53,700 dwellings in 1955 (see
'Table 5**).
* Based on source 110/.
** P. 34, above.
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For 1957, state construction was to provide 38,000 dwell-
ings and nonstate construction 25,000 dwellings for a total for the
year of 63,000 dwellings. Approximately 63,000 dwellings were com-
pleted in 1957, but once again state plans for construction were under-
fulfilled whereas the nonstate sector provided more.dwellings than
were expected. The state sector and the nonstate sector each provided
about 31,500 dwellings during the year. 113/ Difficulties in state
construction, as in the past, arose from shortages of skilled laborers,
high rates of absenteeism, shortages of key construction materials,
and poor planning and management. 114/
The increase in construction during 1956-57, accompanied
by a decline in the rate of increase in population, resulted in a
slight quantitative improvement in housing in Czechoslovakia. For
January 1958 the average number of persons per dwelling is estimated
at 3.43 and the average number of persons per dwelling room at 1.56
(see Table 4*). The net gain in number of dwellings during 1956-57
nearly matched the net gain in households (see Figure 3** and Table 6***).
G. Prospects.
The urgent problems of housing in Czechoslovakia will con-
tinue for some years to come. The revised housing program for
1956-60, if fulfilled, will meet the minimum current housing needs
of Czechoslovakia and will prevent any further deterioration of
housing. The program, however, will provide practically no relief
for existing inadequacies. Czechoslovakia housing authorities esti-
mate the minimum housing need of the country, taking account only of
the expected increase in number of households and the retirement of
the most severely deteriorated dwellings, at 62,000 dwellings a year.
The revised housing plan calls for construction of 66,000 dwellings a
year. Any appreciable headway against existing housing problems would
require construction of at least 90,000 dwellings a year, a level of
construction which will not be attempted in Czechoslovakia, according
to housing authorities, until 1963. 115/ The Czechoslovak government
explains its inability to relieve the housing distress of the popula-
tion during the Second Five Year Plan by pointing to the limited capa-
bilities of the construction industry and to the continued favoring of
heavy industry in the allocation of construction resources 116/
* P. 30, above.
** Following p. 36, above.
*** P. 36, above.
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IV. Hungary.
A. General.
Housing in Hungary in 1958 is superior to that in Poland but
considerably inferior to that in Czechoslovakia. The standards of
housing considered acceptable by the Hungarian population more nearly
approximate those of the Czechoslovaks than those of the Poles.
Consequently, a great number of Hungarians, especially in urban areas,
are very dissatisfied with ,their housing.
Under Communist rule, rapid industrial expansion has been ,
stressed in Hungary, and housing, like all other facets of consumer
welfare, has been neglected. During 1950-55, housing in Hungary
deteriorated considerably, as even the relatively small goals for
construction of dwellings were underfulfilled. By 1956, government
officials admitted that the housing problem in Hungary was acute
and realized that substandard housing was one important factor con-
tributing to widespread popular dissatisfaction with Communist rule.
Moreover, officials had come to recognize that the inadequacy of
housing in key areas, especially in coal-mining centers, was impeding
the economic development of the country. Consequently, a sharp in-
crease in construction of dwellings was promised for the Second Five
Year Plan (1956-60), compared with achievements during 1950-55. Al-
though no improvement in over-all housing was expected, it was hoped
that the new program would at least prevent further deterioration of
housing.
The regime of Janos Kadar, which came into power as a result
of the Hungarian uprising of October 1956, has stated that housing
represents Hungary's most urgent problem. The proportion of capital
investment in Hungary to be devoted to housing during 1957-60 has been
increased in comparison with the proportion originally proposed for the
period. A reassessment of the economic potential of Hungary, however,
apparently has led to a sharp curtailment of the over-all investment
program. Consequently, the number of dwellings planned for 1956-60
actually has been decreased from 200,000 to 184,000. It is probable
that housing in Hungary will continue to deteriorate at least until
1961 and that the Communist regime will continue to be plagued by a
major housing problem for a considerable period.
B. Prewar, War, and Reconstruction Periods.
Housing in Hungary before World War II was superior to housing
in Poland but was poor compared with that in Czechoslovakia at the
time. It is estimated that in 1940 in Hungary the average number of
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persons per dwelling was approximately 3.9 and per dwelling room* ap-
proximately 2.7, as shown in Table 7. 117/ Housing, in terms of
the quantity and quality of dwellings available, was poorest in rural
areas. From the point of view of public officials, however, the
major problem of housing in Hungary existed in the larger urban
centers and particularly in Budapest. Overcrowded dwellings of very
poor quality were almost universal in working class districts.
Table 7
Average Number of Persons per Dwelling
and per Dwelling Room L/ in Hungary b/
1940, January 1949, and January 195T
Persons
Date Per Dwelling Per Dwelling Room
1940
3.9
2.7
January 1949
3.72
2.64
January 1956
3.84
2.8
a. The term dwelling room as used in this
table comprises main rooms and all kitchens
regularly used for sleeping purposes.
b. For methodology, see Appendix A, p.88,
below.
Losses of dwellings in Hungary as a result of military action
during World War II were concentrated primarily in Budapest, which
suffered great damage during the Soviet siege of the city in 1944.
Out of a total of 300,000 dwellings in Budapest, 13,600 were destroyed
completely during the war, and 66,000 were rendered wholly or partly
uninhabitable. Throughout Hungary, moreover, normal construction and
repair of dwellings were interrupted by the war. By 1949, however,
reconstruction repairs and new construction had compensated for war-
time losses, and the housing situation, in quantitative terms, had
improved slightly compared with the prewar period. Housing probably
had improved most in rural areas as a result of the small extent of
wartime losses and of considerable construction activity by peasants
during 1946-49. 118/
* The term dwelling room as used in Hungary comprises main rooms and
-sal kitchens regularly used for sleeping purposes.
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C. 1949-55.
1. Introduction.
In 1949, the year preceding the launching of the First
Five Year Plan (1950-54), there were in Hungary 2,480,000 dwellings,
3,490,000 dwelling rooms) and 9,205,000 people. The average number
of persons per dwelling was 3.72 and per dwelling room 2.64 (see
Table 7*). Housing in quantitative terms in Greater Budapest, in
all other urban centers, and in rural areas was as follows** 119/:
Percent Persons Persons
of Total per per
Area Population Dwelling Dwelling Room
treater Budapest
17
3.4
2.0
Other urban centers
20
3.5
2.5
Rural areas
63
3.9
3.0
In 1949 the problem of urban overcrowding, especially
in Budapest, was as pressing as it had been before World War II.
Moreover, most dwellings in urban areas were very old and in need
of considerable repair. Large increases in urban population could
be expected during the First Five Year Plan as a result of the planned
rapid industrial expansion. Such increases in population would in-
crease greatly the burden on the already inadequate urban housing
unless relieved by a large-scale program for construction of dwellings.
In terms of the quantity and quality of dwellings avail-
able, housing in rural areas in 1949 was much worse than in the cities
and towns. The housing standards of the peasants, however, were far
lower than those of the urban population. Moreover, the size of the
rural population was not expected to increase to any great extent dur-
ing 1950-54. Nevertheless, considerable construction in rural areas
during the First Five Year Plan would be needed merely to replace the
dwellings which would be lost as a result of destruction and decay.
2. First Five Year Plan (1950-54).
The original versional the housing program for the First
Five Year Plan of Hungary (1950-54) called for construction of 180,000
new dwellings. In 1951 the housing goal was increased to 220,000 new
* P. 44, above.
** The term Greater Budapest as used in this report includes Budapest
and suburbs, the term other urban centers includes autonomous cities
and county towns, and the term rural areas includes the remainder of
the country.
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dwellings. In both instances, half of the dwellings were to be con-
structed in urban areas and half in rural areas, 120/ Presumably,
most of the dwellings in urban areas were to be constructed by the
state and most of those in rural areas by the peasants themselves.
The state program for construction of dwellings was drawn up almost
exclusively in terms of the requirements for an increased number of
workers in key industries rather than in terms of the general welfare
of the population. Considering the emphasis placed on industrial ex-
pansion under the Five Year Plan and the consequent requirements for
large-scale programs for nonresidential,construction, it is believed
that both the original and the revised housing goals represented what
government officials considered to be the minimum housing needs of
the nation. Hungarian officials in 1955 labeled the housing goals
set for 1950-54 as "relatively low." 221/
Even the relatively low housing goals for the First Five
Year Plan, however, were underfulfilled considerably. Hungarian
officials admit that resources originally allocated for housing pro-
jects were diverted to construction of factories, warehouses, and
office buildings. 122/ In 1950, 24,700 dwellings were constructed
(see Table 8*). Three-fourths of the total were provided by nonstate
builders. During 1951-53; only 17,000 to 18,000 dwellings a year
were constructed. State construction of dwellings increased slightly,
but nonstate construction decreased sharply as nonstate builders
(primarily peasants) were unable to obtain necessary construction
materials.
The advent of the new course in 1953 led to pledges of
a more vigorous housing effort through increased state construction
and through state financial assistance for nonstate construction.
For 1954, 40,000 dwellings were promised, 123/ compared with only
16,800 dwellings provided in 1953. Only 27,200 dwellings actually
were provided in 1954, a substantial increase in comparison with 1953
but only 68 percent of the number planned for the year. Most of the
increase in construction of dwellings during 1954 was provided by
nonstate builders.
According to official reports, during the Five Year Plan
there were provided 103,000 dwellings, only 47 percent of the revised
goal. Of the total, only 40,000 dwellings (39 percent) resulted from
state activity. It/ Moreover, it is estimated that 21,000 dwellings
did not result from new construction but from reconstruction repairs,
additions to existing buildings, and other means.** Even dwellings
gained through subdivision of larger dwellings and through remodeling
* P. 47, below.
** Based on source 125/.
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of existing dwellings, neither of which adds to existing living space,
were counted as dwellings provided. In terms of new construction
alone, during the Five Year Plan, there were completed about 82,000
dwellings, only 37 percent of the revised goal.
3. 1955.
During 1955, an interplan year, 31,500 dwellings were
provided in Hungary, including 26,100 through new construction. lgy
No plan for housing for 1955 is available. It is probable, never-
theless, that once again more dwellings were planned than actually'
were constructed. In 1955, 17,900 dwellings, 57 percent of the num-
ber provided, resulted from nonstate construction, including con-
struction with state financial assistance (see Table 8).
Table 8
Construction of Dwellings in Hungary LL/
1950-57
Thousand Dwellings 12/
Year
State Sector
Nonstate Sector 2/
Total
1950
5.8
18.9
24.7
1951
6.3
11.4
17.7
1952
7.4
9.3
16.7
1953
9.2
7.6
16.8
1954
11.3
15.9
27.2
1955
13.6
17.9
31.5
1956II/
7.4
18.1
25.5
1957 2/
22.8
25.2
48.?
a. Based on source 127/, unless otherwise indi-
cated.
b. Including dwellings gained through new con-
struction, reconstruction repairs, additions to
existing buildings, subdivision of existing
dwellings, and renovation and remodeling of
existing dwellings.
c. The term nonstate as used in this table in-
cludes private construction with and without
state financial aid.
d. 128/
112./. Believed to include dwellings gained
through conversion of offices to dwellings.
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4. Results.
The number of dwellings gained in Hungary through new con-
struction and through other means during 1950-55 was not sufficient
to maintain the already depressed levels of housing prevailing in
1949. During 1950-55 the population of Hungary increased by 572,000. 130/
To provide dwellings for such an increase in population at the 1949
level of 3.72 persons per dwelling would have required 154,000 dwell-
ings. During 1950-55, 135;000 dwellings were provided, but it is esti-
mated that during the period 60,000 dwellings were lost as a result of
deterioration and of destruction from flood, fire, and earthquake.*
The net increase in dwellings, consequently, was approximately 75,000,
less than one-half of the number needed to maintain the quantitative
level of housing of 1949. During 1950-55, moreover, it is estimated
that the net increase in households in Hungary was approximately
300,000.** The net increase in dwellings, therefore, was only 25 per-
cent of the net increase in households, as shown in Table 9.***
It is estimated that by January 1956 the average number
of persons per dwelling for all of Hungary had increased to 3.84,
an increase of 3 percent since 1949. The average number of persons
per dwelling room in January 1956 is estimated as 2.8, an increase
of about 6 percent in comparison with 1949 (see Table 7****). The num-
ber of persons per dwelling room increased more sharply than the num-
ber of persons per dwelling because the average size of dwellings
decreased during 1949-55.
The decline in housing during 1950-55 was most marked in
urban areas. Most of the increase in population during the period
was registered in urban districts, whereas. a large portion of the
increase in dwellings was registered in rural areas. It is estimated
that by January 1956 the average number of persons per dwelling in
Greater Budapest had risen to more than 3.6. For all other urban
centers the average had risen to about 3.8. The average for rural
areas, in contrast, had remained at about the 1949 level of 3.9.t
Based on source 131/.
** Based on source 132/. Most new households result from new
marriages.
xxx Table 9 follows on p. 49.
**** P. 44 above.
t These estimates are based on source 133/. Direct comparisons
between the averages of 1956 and those of 1949 cannot be made for
the three divisions of Hungary, because of changes during the period
in the definitions of the areas included in Greater Budapest, other
urban areas, and rural areas.
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Table 9
Relation Between Dwellings and Population in Hungary
1950-55
Measures of Dwellings and Population 1950-55
Increase in population a/ (thousand persons) 572
Dwellings needed to house increase in popu-
lation at 1949 average of 3.72 persons per
dwelling 12/ (thousand dwellings) 154
Gross gain in dwellings s/ (thousand dwellings) 135
Dwellings lostII/ (thousand dwellings) 60
Net gain in dwellings (thousand dwellings) 75
Net gain in dwellings, as a percentage of dwell-
ings needed to house increase in population at
1949 average (percent) 49
Net gain in households !/ (thousand couples) 300
Net gain in dwellings, as a percentage of net
gain in households (percent) 25
a. 134/
b. 135/
c. i7/. Including dwellings gained through new construction, re-
construction repairs, additions to existing buildings, subdivision
of existing dwellings, and renovation and remodeling of existing
dwellings.
d. Based on source 137/. Including dwellings lost through de-
terioration and through destruction by fire, flood, and earthquake.
e. 138/. Most new households result from new marriages.
The increase in overcrowding during 1950-55 was accom-
panied by a decrease in the quality of dwellings available. As a
result of the inadequacy of the program for repair and maintenance
of existing dwellings during the period and of the low level of
construction of new dwellings, the number of families living in
decayed and substandard dwellings increased sharply, especially in
urban areas. 139/
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D. 1956-58.
1. Urban Housing.
a. Nature of the Housing Problem.
Housing in Hungary in 1956-58 still is worse in rural
than in urban areas. From the point of view of the Communist regime,
however, the housing problem in Hungary remains predominantly an
urban one. It is in Budapest and in the principal mining and indus-
trial towns that popular dissatisfaction with housing and the adverse
effect of housing on economic development are greatest.
Overcrowding in the cities and towns of Hungary, by
the standards of the population, is almost universal. It is believed
that the quantitative standard of housing desired by the urban popu-
lation, which in 1956 constituted about 4o percent of the total popu-
lation, calls for no more than 2 persons per dwelling room.* In
contrast, the average number of persons per dwelling room throughout
Greater Budapest in January 1956, according to official reports, was
more than 2.3. 141/ It is estimated that in all other cities and
towns the average was 2.7.** The average amount of living space
(floorspace of dwelling rooms) per urban resident in Hungary in 1958
is estimated at 8.0 sq m,*** compared with more than 11 sq M per
person in Czechoslovakia.
In addition to the problem of overcrowding, the urban
population of Hungary suffers from lack of privacy in housing. As
in Czechoslovakia, most urban families in Hungary desire separate
dwellings. In Hungary, however, although the average size of urban
dwellings is only 1.5 dwelling rooms, it is estimated that 20 to 25
percent of all urban families must share dwellings with other fami-
lies.**** Moreover, thousands of married workers are forced by the
shortage of dwellings in certain industrial and mining centers to
live in workers' barracks, separated from their families. Thousands
of young married couples are living apart because of the unavaila-
bility of suitable living quarters. 145/
In addition to the burden of overcrowding and lack of
privacy in housing, the urban population of Hungary suffers from the
very poor quality of dwellings. Hungarian officials admit that the
majority of dwellings are overage and are without adequate utilities
Based on source
Based on source 142/.
Based on source 143/.
Based on source 144/.
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and sanitary facilities, according to the standards of the population.
'Neglect of repair and maintenance since 1941 has led to a critical
problem of decay of dwellings. By official admission, there has been
. a sharp increase since 1949 in the number of dwellings which have de-
cayed beyond the point of safety but which are still in use. It is
estimated that in January 1956 about 30 percent of all urban dwell-
ings were in need of extensive repairs in order to meet minimum hous-
ing standards.* The number of families forced by the shortage of
dwellings to live in abandoned stores, in unsanitary cellars and
attics, and in huts and hovels also has increased sharply in recent
years. 147/ In summary, the housing problem in Hungary, both in
terms of the actual conditions which prevail and in terms of the
percentage of the population dissatisfied with housing, is best
characterized as more acute than the housing problem in Czechoslo-
vakia but not as great as the one in Poland.
b. Budapest.
In March 1956, municipal officials labeled housing
in Greater Budapest (in which about 20 percent of the total popula-
tion of Hungary resides) as the most serious problem and worry of
the city. Housing in Budapest has deteriorated considerably since
1949 and is worse than housing that prevailed before World War II.
In 1956 the average number of persons per dwelling room in Budapest
was greater than 2.3, compared with less than 2.1 in 1949 (within
1956 boundaries). During 1950-55, only 25,500 dwellings were con-
structed in Budapest, whereas, according to estimates by housing
officials, a minimum of 120,000 dwellings were needed during the
period to replace losses in dwellings and to provide for demographic
changes. The quality of dwellings in Budapest has been decreasing.
From January 1949 to July 1954 the number of stores and other make-
shift buildings used as dwellings increased by 14,000. The prevalence
of disrepair of dwellings and the accompanying annoyances and dangers
are almost universal in Budapest. 148/
c. Other Urban Centers.
Housing in the other cities and towns of Hungary has
declined even more rapidly than in Budapest. In Miskolc, the second
largest city of Hungary, the average number of persons per dwelling
Increased from 3.7 in 1949 to 4.2 in 1954. 149/ In the provincial
* Based on source 146/. In 1954, according to Hungarian officials,
145,000 of a total of 496,000 dwellings in Budapest were in need of
"full repair." It is believed that the situation in all other urban
centers was about the same as in Budapest and that no substantial
improvement in the repair problem took place between 1954 and 1956.
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city of Kaposvar only 560 dwellings were added during 1949-55, where-
as the population increased by 12,000. As a result, the average num-
ber of occupants per dwelling jumped during the period from 3.4 to
4.4. 150/ In Debrecen, a city of 120,000 residents, 6,000 families
in January 1957 were lodged in cellars and other unhealthy quarters. 151/
2. Rural Housing. ,
In 1956 the average number of persons per rural dwelling
in Hungary was 3.9, the same as in 1949. In general, little publicity
has been given by the government to the housing problem in rural
areas. A press report of February 1957, however, indicated that com-
plaints about housing are widespread in the villages. In terms of
the standards of the peasants, the shortage of dwellings is not
nearly so pressing in the villages as in the towns and cities. Large
numbers of rural houses, however, are in,a state of disrepair because
of neglect (if state owned) or the unavailability of construction
materials (if privately owned). 152/
to
E. Effect of the Housing Problem on Political Stability
and Economic Development.
1. Political Stability.
The housing problem in Hungary causes discomfort and
irritation in the daily lives of a very large percentage of the
population, especially in the major cities and towns. Grievances
about housing, in both urban and rural areas, are a key economic fac-
tor in the very widespread popular antagonism to the Communist regime
and its policy of rapid industrialization at the expense of consumer
welfare. The repeated failure of the state to fulfill plans for con-
struction of dwellings and the admission that housing in the country
has deteriorated under the Communist regime have damaged the prestige
of the regime. Dissatisfaction over housing is probably sharpest
among young people, who are starting families and who find it almost
Impossible to find adequate and private housing, and among the intel-
ligentsia, who feel that the inadequate housing which the regime
allots them is unsuitable to their work and station. .153/
As in the other European Satellites, the discriminatory
policy of allocations of dwellings by the Hungarian government,
which favors members of the Communist Party, police and army offi-
cials, and Stakhanovites, has provoked antiregime feelings among
the individuals living under poor housing conditions who do not rate
special treatment. After the uprising of October 1956, Hungarians
completely ignored the allocations machinery of the state and "il-
legally" occupied 10,000 partly constructed or recently evacuated
dwellings in Budapest alone. 154/
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2. Economic Development.
The low level of housing of the urban population is one
key economic factor adversely affecting the productivity of the
Hungarian labor force.. The productivity of workers living in bar-
racks, in which conditions generally are very poor, or commuting to
factories and mines from distant villages and towns especially is
affected. The vital coal-mining industry has been hardest hit by
the housing problem. Because of shortages of dwellings in the min-
ing areas, one-third of all coal miners are forced to live in
workers' barracks and another one-third must commute to work over
long distances. The productivity of both groups of miners is dimin-
ished. Moreover, in large measure as a result of poor housing, turn-
over of workers in the coal-mining enterprises is excessive, and
shortages of labor are a chronic problem. Hungarian officials admit
that the solution of the housing problem in mining areas is essential
to the development of a permanent and highly productive force of coal
miners. 155/ As in the other European Satellites, the construction
industry itself, especially in Stalinvaros and other "new socialist
towns," has suffered from excessive turnover and low productivity of
workers, partly because of housing problems. 156/
F. 1956-60,
1. Original Plans.
By 1956, the opening year of the Second Five Year Plan
(1956-60), Hungarian officials had come to recognize the political
and economic necessity of increased attention to the housing problem.
For the Second Five Year Plan, 200,000 dwellings were promised, an
average of 40,000 dwellings per year, compared with an actual yearly
average of 22,000 during 1950-55. One-half of the dwellings were to
be constructed by the state and one-half by nonstate builders under
an expanded program of state financial assistance. In recognition
of the great need for dwellings in Budapest, 60,000 dwellings were
to be constructed there, compared with only 25,500 actually constructed
during the 6-year period 1950-55. Special attention also was promised
for hbusing needs in mining areas. To complete the housing program,
a considerably expanded effort for repair and maintenance of dwell-
ings was promised. 12/
Hungarian officials recognized that the fulfillment of ?
the program for construction and repair during 1956-60 would not
result in any improvement in housing. At least 100,000 dwellings
per year would be needed to meet adequately demographic and replace-
ment needs and to make headWay against existing shortages. 158/ It
was hoped, however, that the housing program would prevent further
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major deterioration of housing. Hungarian officials openly admitted
that to attempt to do more, given the limited economic resources of
the country, would jeopardize other programs considered essential to
the future development of Hungary. The solution of the housing
problem would have to await future 5-year plans. 159/
2. Results, 1956-57.
The housing program for Hungary for 1956 required con-
struction of 4o,000 dwellings, including 16,300 through state con-
struction. The uprising in Hungary in October disrupted construc-
tion. Even before the uprising, however, the construction program
for the year had fallen behind schedule. According to official data,
not released until late in 1957, 25,500 dwellings were provided in
1956, including only 7,400 dwellings by the state (see Table 8*). 160/
It is believed that the official figure includes a large number of
dwellings which did not result from new construction. It is possible
that the reported total may include dwellings damaged during the up-
rising and repaired before the end of the year.
Hungarian officials report that as a result of the fighting
in Budapest in October and November 1956 2,200 dwellings were destroyed
completely, 5,000 dwellings were damaged severely, and 15,000 addi-
tional dwellings received more than minor damage. la/ Reports from
Western observers in Budapest during the uprising, however, indicate
that the number of dwellings destroyed or severely dPmeged was sig-
nificantly higher than the official figures reveal. 162/ Damages
outside of Budapest were negligible. In general, population losses
as a result of the uprising mitigated the effect of losses of dwell-
ings.
Promised for 1957 was the completion of 41,000 dwellings,
including a large number nearly completed in 1956. The state was
to provide 20,000 dwellings, nearly all of which were to be 1-room
efficiency apartments. Official reports for 1957 claim that 48,000
dwellings were "handed over to the people," including 22,800 dwell-
ings provided by the state. 13/ It is believed that a large portion
of the dwellings "handed over resulted from reconstruction repairs,
renovation and remodeling of existing units, and conversion (in many
cases, reconversion) of offices to dwellings.** As promised by the
government, miners received 10,000 dwellings during 1957.
?
Hungarian reports indicate that 73,500 dwellings were
"handed over" to the population during 1956-57, compared with 58,700
* P. 47, above.
** Based on source 164/.
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during 1954-55. It is believed that the net gain in dwellings dur-
ing 1956-57 was only one-half or less of the reported gross gain.
Losses of. dwellings through deterioration and destruction, includ-
ing the 1956 uprising, were very high during the period. Moreover,
a large number of the dwellings "handed over" during 1956-57 prob-
ably were already a part of the housing stock at the beginning of
1956.
For all of Hungary, some quantitative improvement in
housing did result during 1956-57 because the .population decreased
through emigration. It is believed that the average number of per-
sons per dwelling still is approximately 3.8.* The nationwide gain
in the quantitative level of housing was largely offset by the con-
tinued decrease in the quality of available dwellings. Reports from
urban centers during 1957 reveal a continuation of the problems of
overcrowding and dilapidation of dwellings. li6./ A large-scale pro-
gram of repairs and renovation of dwellings was undertaken in Budapest
during 1957. Moreover, most of the offices converted to dwellings in
1957 were located in Budapest. The population of the city, however,
increased sharply during 1957, and it is believed that housing in
January 1958 was no better than in January 1956. 1472
G. Prospects.
Housing in Hungary will continue to decline at least until
1961, and the housing problem will remain critical for many years to
come. The Kadar government has desoribed housing as the most urgent
problem of Hungary. 168/ The postrevolutionary "hard look" at the
economic capabilities of Hungary, nevertheless, has led to a cutback
in housing plans for 1956-60. Hungary has instituted a Three Year
Plan for 1958-60 under which 110,000 dwellings are to be constructed. 169/
Including dwellings "handed over" during 1956-57, less than 184,000
dwellings now are planned for 1956-60) compared with the original goal
for the period of 200,000 dwellings. The percentage of total Hungarian
investments to be devoted to housing during 1957-60 has been increased
in comparison with the percentage originAlly planned for the period.
The size of the total investment program, however, apparently has been
sharply decreased.
* Based on source la/.
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V. East Germany.
A. General.
Very little official statistical information is available on
housing in East Germany. Helpful, although incomplete, unofficial
data on housing in 1946 and in 1950, however, are available. Conse-
quently, reasonable estimates on developments in housing throughout
the postwar period can be made.
Housing in the present area of East Germany during the period
before World War II was among the best in Europe, being substantially
superior to housing in any of the other future European Satellites.
East German housing, however, deteriorated markedly as a result of
heavy wartime destruction of dwellings and large increases in popu-
lation immediately after the war. Through neglect of the housing
problem, housing deteriorated even further during 1946-50. Some
slight improvement in housing took place during the First Five Year
Plan of East Germany (1951-55) primarily through losses in popula-
tion rather than through any substantial effort by the government
In construction of dwellings. In 1958, housing in East Germany still
Is very poor by the prewar standards of the area and is substantially
inferior to housing in West Germany or Czechoslovakia. The sub-
standard housing of the population of East Germany is one of the
major economic factors provoking popular dissatisfaction and under-
mining the productivity of workers. The Communist government is
aware of the adverse effects of inadequate housing but apparently
accepts a perpetuation of depressed conditions as one necessary cost
for rapid expansion of industry. The housing program for the Second
Five Year Plan (1956-60) calls for expanded construction of dwellings,
compared with the First Five Year Plan. There is little prospect,
however, for any appreciable improvement in housing by 1960.
B. Prewar, War, and Reconstruction Periods.
In 1939 in the present area of East Germany,* almost all
families occupied separate dwellings. The average number of persons
per dwelling room was only 0.8, and the average amount of living
space per person was 15.6 sq m.** The quality of housing, in terms
* Available data for 1939 and 1946 do not include East Berlin. It
Is believed that data on East Berlin, if available, would not alter
substantially the figures for the rest of the territory of East Germany.
** No definitions of the terms living space and dwelling room are
available. Kitchehs probably are considered as dwelling rooms but
probably are not included in living space.
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of workmanship and of availability of utilities, was superior to that
of housing in the other future European Satellites. Housing in the
urban areas of the future territory of East Germany was generally
superior to housing in rural areas.
Housing in the territory of East Germany deteriorated markedly
as a result of World War II. Losses of dwellings caused by military
action were heavy. In addition, immediately after the war the popu-
lation of the area increased as a result of a heavy influx of refugees
from the German provinces annexed by Poland and from the Sudetenland
of Czechoslovakia. By 1946 the number of family units in the area
greatly exceeded the number of dwellings. Almost 10 percent of the
entire population was forced to live in emergency barracks and other
emergency structures. The average number of persons per dwelling
room had doubled to 1.6, and the average amount of living space per
person had been cut by almost one-half to approximately 8 sq m.
Finally, as a result of war damages, neglect of necessary repairs
and maintenance, and the introduction of many hastily and poorly con-
structed dwellings, the quality of occupied dwellings in the area
had declined considerably since 1939. 170/
During the period of reconstruction, 1946-50, almost nothing
was done to relieve the housing distress of the population, and hous-
ing actually deteriorated further. During this period the population
of the area decreased by about 100,000 as a result of emigration. 171/
The size of the housing stock, however, decreased at a more rapid rate
than did the size of the population. More living space was lost as a
result of natural destruction; collapse through deterioration; and,
especially, conversion to nonresidential uses than was gained through
new construction and reconstruction repairs. The liquidation of
emergency housing camps and the transfer of the former occupants to
permanent types of dwellings further intensified the problem of over-
crowding. 172/
C. First Five Year Plan (1951-55).
In 1951, the opening year of the First Five Year Plan of East
Germany (1951-55), housing was very poor by prewar German standards.
By January 1951 the average amount of living space per person had de-
clined to about 7.3 sq m.* 173/ It is estimated that the average num-
ber of persons per dwelling room had climbed to about 1.8.** Shared
* Including East Berlin.
** This estimate is based on source 174/. Source 175/ reports the re-
sults of a 1950 housing census for East Germany, excluding East Berlin.
The 4.5 million dwellings indicated by this source as existing in 1950
is inconsistent with all other information on East German housing and
is not accepted in this report.
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tenancies were the rule rather than the exception, and many families
of 4 and 5 and more were forced to live in a single dwelling room.
Thousands of dilapidated and collapsing buildings, which before World
War II would have been abandoned as unsafe and unsanitary, were still
occupied because of the shortage of dwellings. lig A massive long-
term construction program would have had to be undertaken if an end
to the housing crisis was to be obtained and if prewar standards were
to be restored:
In drafting the housing program for the First Five Year Plan,
the government of East Germany made no attempt to improve the general
level of housing of the population. In contrast, the government prob-
ably decided that the perpetuation of the prevailing poor housing was.
one necessary cost for the planned rapid development of heavy industry.
The housing program as drafted was designed to do little more than to
meet the minimum propaganda and economic requirements of the regime.
For the Five Year Plan, construction of 240,000 dwellings,
constituting 10.1 million sq m of living space, was promised. 177/
Even this minimum program was not fulfilled, because only 208,000
dwellings, constituting approximately 9.1 million sq m of living
space, were provided. The latter total included dwellings gained
through reconstruction repairs and through additions of dwellings to
existing buildings as well as through new construction. 178/ The
state construction sector provided about 95,000 dwellings, about 46 per-
cent of the total. The government also contributed financial assistance
to some of the nonstate builders. 1/2/
State and nonstate efforts resulted in making available
61,000 dwellings in 1951 and 48,000 in 1952, as shown in Table 10.*
The large early gains resulted from concentration on the less costly
projects of restoring and enlarging existing buildings. During
1953-55, in contrast, an average of only 33,000 dwellings a year was
gained. ?Bo/ Apparently, the new course had no effect on construction
of dwellings in East Germany. State-constructed dwellings were con-
centrated near key industrial and mining enterprises, especially near
the Wismut uranium mines in Saxony and Thuringia. Construction of rural
dwellings received the lowest priority during the period. 181/
The actual increase in number of dwellings in East Germany dur-
ing 1951-55 was considerably less than the 208,000 dwellings reported
as gained because of the large number of dwellings lost as a result
of destruction, deterioration, and conversion to nonresidential uses.
Official East German sources indicate that at least 30,000 dwellings
per year became "uninhabitable" because of deterioration alone during
* Table 10 follows on p. 60.
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Table 10
Construction of Dwellings in East Germany 2/
1950-57
Thousand Dwellings
Year
State Sector
Nonstate Sector1.1 Total 2/
1950
31.0
1951
61.0
1952
47.6
1953
32.3
1954
30.1
4.7
34.7 (34.7)/
1955
19.8
13.0
32.8 (30.1)
1956
18.7
14.1
32.8 (30.4)
1957 2/
38.4
22.7
61.1 f/ (50)
?a. Source 182/, unless otherwise indicated. This table in-
cludes dwellings gained through new construction, recon-
? struction repair, and additions to existing buildings.
b. The term nonstate as used in this table includes private
? and cooperative construction with and without state finan-
cial aid.
c. Totals are derived from unrounded data and may not agree
with the sum of their rounded components.
d. Figures in parentheses include new construction only.
e. 183/
f. Probably includes dwellings gained through conversion
.of nonresidential buildings.
1951-55. 184/ Many of these dwellings, however, were not evacuated
because of the critical shortage of dwellings. Whatever the actual
extent of losses of dwellings during the period, a quantitative im-
provement in housing resulted because the population of East Germany
decreased by 530,000. 185/ The quantitative gain, however, largely
was offset by a further decrease in the quality of housing. The num-
ber of dangerously deteriorated buildings which still were occupied
Increased during the period. Moreover, the general quality of all
residential buildings decreased during the period as essential re-
pairs and maintenance were neglected. Finally, many of the dwellings
constructed during the period consisted of workers' barracks and
cabins of very, poor quality. 186/
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D. 1956-58.
Whatever the extent of housing gains in East Germany during
1951-55, the level of housing in 1956-58 still is very depressed by
standards in Germany before World War II. The population of East
Germany in January 1958 is estimated at 17.4 million* and the total
amount of living space at 141 million sq m.** Consequently, the
average amount of living space per person was about 8.1 sq m, only
about one-half the 1939 average. XXX The average number of persons
per dwelling room in 1958 is estimated at 1.7, approximately 2 times
the 1939 average.****
The people of East Germany still suffer from a lack of hous-
ing privacy to a degree unknown before World War II. A very large
percentage of families in East Germany must share dwellings with
other families. Reports of families of 4 and 5 living in a single
dwelling room are common. The quality of dwellings in East GerMany
remains well below the standards to which the population was accus-
tomed in prewar days. Tens of thousands of families live in dangerously
decayed buildings, while hundreds of thousands of families live in
buildings which rapidly are decaying as a result of old age and ne-
glect of essential repairs ahd maintenance. 121/
It is believed that almost all the population of East Germany
is living under conditions of housing which the population recognizes
to be substandard. Moreover, a very large portion of the population
is living under conditions of housing considered extremely substandard.
Housing in East Germany is markedly inferior to housing both in Czecho-
slovakia and in West Germany, the latter having suffered much heavier
losses of dwellings during World War II than did East Germany and having
been subject to large increases in population. 192/
No information is available on urban-rural variations in hous-
ing in East Germany in 1956-58. It is believed, nevertheless, that,
similar to prewar days, urban housing still is generally superior to
rural housing. Almost no information is available on housing in East
Berlin. It is probable, however, that despite construction of "Stalin
Allee" for propaganda purposes, housing in East Berlin is far below
prewar national standards.
* Based on source
** Based on source / and the assumption that the net gain in
living space during 1951-57 was about one-half the gross gain.
*** Official data on housing are available for Wismar, a city of
55,000. The average amount of living space per person in 1957 was
8.5 sq m. 189/
**** Based on source 190/.
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E. Effect of the Housing Problem on Political Stability
and Economic Development.
1. Political Stability.
The almost universally substandard houSing of the East
German population is one key economic factor provoking anti-Communist
feelings in East Germany. Before the uprising in East Berlin in June
1953, almost no mention of the housing problem was made by officials
of East Germany. Since 1953, and especially since 1956, officials
publicly have recognized the existence of a housing problem. Almost
nothing, however, has been reported on the actual extent and severity
of the problem. 193/ It is believed that most East Germans rank sub-
standard housing second only to shortages of food as the most depress-
ing economic factor in their daily lives and that the Communist govern-
ment is criticized severely by the population for failure to improve
housing since the end of the war. East Germans are especially aware
of the sharp contrast between the poor effort at construction of dwell-
ings in East Germany and the remarkable achievements in construction
in West Germany in recent years.* In July 1956 a program for acceler-
ated construction of dwellings for East Germany was announced,** partly
as a response to popular dissatisfaction over housing.
2. Economic Development.
Little specific information on the relationship of hous-
ing to economic problems is available for East Germany. The low
level of housing is believed to be one key factor in the low level
of productivity of workers. The shortage of dwellings probably is
very extreme in rapidly expanding econpmic areas, such as Stalinstadt
and the uranium mining areas of Saxony and Thuringia. 195/ These
areas probably have suffered from labor problems, partly as a result
of inadequate housing. Insofar as poor housing is a factor in the
emigration of young, active workers from East Germany, housing con-
tributes to the depletion of the supply of labor in an economy al-
ready suffering from a tight labor market.
* In 1956, West Germany completed 561,000 dwellings compared with
only 33,000 by East Germany. On a per r:apita basis, West Germany
completed more than 6 times as many dwellings in 1956 as did East
Germany. 194/
** See F, below.
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F. Second Five Year Plan (1956:60).
1. Plans.
The original housing program for the Second Five Year
Plan of East Germany (1956-60) called for the construction of
260,000 dwellings. 196/ In July 1956, in a much publicized announce-
ment, the construction goal for 1956-60 was indreased to 360,000
dwellings. 121/ In October 1957, however, the goal was decreased
to 340,000 dwellings, including 25,000 dwellings to be obtained.
through reconstruction repairs, through additions to existing dwell-"
ings, and through conversions of dwellings from nonresidential uses.
It has been made clear, moreover, that the average size of the dwell-
ings to be constructed during 1956-60 is to be restricted to 38 sq m
of living space, compared with an average of 48 sq m for the dwellings
constructed in 1955. 198/
2. Results, 1956-57.
The 1956 lousing plan for East Germany called for construc-
tion of 42,100 dwellings. Even this goal, which was small considering
the magnitude of the revised plans for 1956-60, was underfulfilled.
There were completed in 1956 only 30,400 dwellings, 72 percent of the
goal for the year. An additional 2,400 dwellings were gained through
reconstruction repairs (see Table 10*). Housing authorities admit
that as many dwellings were lost through decay in 1956 as were gained
through construction. 122/ Failures in construction in 1956 were most
serious in rural areas. As in the past, East German officials blamed
the underfUlfillment of the construction goal on poor planning and on
shortages of skilled labor and construction materials. 200/
For 1957, East Germany proposed the completion of 55,000
new dwellings, including several thousand which were nearly completed
in 1956. 201/ Provisional reports indicate that once again the plan
for new construction was not fulfilled. Only 50,000 dwellings were
constructed in 1957 (see Table 10*). Additionally, 11,000 dwellings
were "gained" through conversion of nonresidential buildings, through
reconstruction repairs, and probably through renovation of decayed but
still occupied dwellings. 202/
It is possible that the downward revision kn October 1957
of the housing program for 1956-60 resulted from pessimistic views of
the probable accomplishments in 1957. The chances of East German
completion of the 340,000 dwellings currently promised for 1956-60
are at best doubtful. 203/
* P. 60, above.
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G. Prospects.
Prospects for housing in East Germany are for long-term con-
tinuation of very depressed conditions, with their adverse effect on
individual welfare, political stability, and economic development.
No substantial improvement in housing can be expected by 1960. Some
quantitative improvement in housing, however, will result even if
the 1956-60 construction program is not fulfilled, because the popu-
lation of East Germany should continue to decrease. As in the past,
however, the quantitative gains in housing will be in part offset by
further decreases in quality. There is no indication that East Ger-
many has undertaken a repair program for 1956-60 of sufficient magni-
tude to combat the problem of the ever-increasing decay of dwellings.
By 1960, according to official pronouncements, East Germany expects
to complete 100,000 dwellings a year. 204/ Only if that level of
construction actually is achieved and then maintained for a long
period, will any substantial progress in housing result.
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VI. Bulgaria.
A. General.
An analysis of housing in Bulgaria is hampered by the vague-
ness and inconsistency of official data. Although the general trends
in housing since World War II can be traced, the actual extent of
changes in housing under Communist rule and the actual level of cur-
rent housing are difficult to estimate. Almost no official informa-
tion is available on the effect of housing on individual welfare and
national development.
Housing in prewar Bulgaria was very poor, especially in rural
areas and in working class districts in urban areas. The cities and
towns of prewar Bulgaria, however, were relatively uncongested, and
over-all urban housing was far superior to rural housing. The size
of the urban population has increased rapidly during the postwar
period. Until 1955, however, the Communist government, in its drive
toward industrial development, almost completely ignored the housing
needs of urban areas. Consequently, urban housing deteriorated con-
siderably. Since 1955 the government has increased state construc-
tion and encouraged private construction in urban areas, and housing
has improved slightly. The level of urban housing, nevertheless,
still is very depressed even by Bulgarian standards and constitutes
one of the major problems of the country. Rural housing, in contrast,
has improved slightly during the postwar period. In quantitative
terms, housing in the villages is now better than housing in the
towns and cities. Housing of the vast majority of rural families
still is very poor, but because the level of housing demanded by the
peasants is low, there is no serious housing problem in the villages.
B. Prewar, War, and Reconstruction Periods.
Housing in Bulgaria before World War II was among the worst
in Europe, reflecting the poor and underdeveloped economy of the
country. The nationwide average of persons per dwelling room in
1939 was more than 2.* In rural areas, in which about three-fourths
Of the population lived, the average was 2.4, and the quality of
housing was extremely poor. There was relatively little congestion
in urban areas, in which the average number of persons per dwelling
room was less than 1.5. In Sofia the average was less than 1.4.
* Kitchens probably were included as dwelling rooms. No information
is available on persons per dwelling or on square meters of living
space per person, the two measures on which information is available
for the postwar period. For the same period, no information is
available on the average number of persons per dwelling room.
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Housing in working class districts, however, was very poor in terms
of overcrowding and quality of dwellings. 205/
About 12,000 dwellings in Sofia were destroyed or damaged
during World War II as a result of military action, 206/ but wartime
destruction of housing outside Sofia was minimal. Normal activities
of construction and repair, however, were interrupted throughout the
country during the war. Construction and repair activities also were
very limited during the reconstruction period of 1946-48.
C. 1949-57.
1. First Five Year Plan (1949-52).
During the First Five Year Plan of Bulgaria (begun in
1949 and announced as completed in 4 years in 1952) urban housing
deteriorated considerably) whereas housing in rural areas improved
slightly. By 1949, housing in urban areas already had deteriorated.
below prewar levels of housing. The population of urban areas al-
ready had begun to increase rapidly, mainly as a result of the migra-
tion of large numbers of peasants to the towns and cities. The larg-
est expansion of population had taken place in Sofia, in part as a
result of the concentration there of an enlarged bureaucracy. Villas
confiscated from the old ruling class were taken over as offices or
dwellings by the new ruling class. Many apartment buildings similarly
were confiscated. Most new urban residents, however, were crowded
into the working class and lower middle class districts. 207/
It is estimated that by 1949 the average number of per-
sons per dwelling in all urban areas was slightly more than 4* and
per dwelling room close to 2. All signs indicated that the swell
of population in urban areas would increase in tempo during the Five
Year Plan, as a result of the planned industrial expansion and of the
existence in rural areas of widespread underemployment. Unless hous-
ing facilities were provided for the new urban residents, a major
housing problem was inevitable.
Rural housing in 1949 probably was about the same as be-
fore the war. Overcrowding might have decreased slightly as a result
of the movement of peasants to urban areas, but the quality of rural
dwellings still was extremely poor. The major problem of rural hous-
ing during the Five Year Plan was to be the replacement of the most
dilapidated and substandard units.
* Based on source 208/.
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No plan for construction of dwellings for the First Five
Year Plan of Bulgaria is available. According to the latest official
data (released in 1957), 3,510,000 sq in of dwelling space* were con-
structed during 1949-52 with the peak year for this period being 1950,
as shown in Table U. State construction accounted-for 836,000 sq m
and nonstate construction** for 2,680,000 sq in. State and private
construction combined thus provided about 60,000 dwellings during
1949-52. 210/
Table 11
Construction of Dwelling Space LI" in Bulgaria 12/
1949-57
Thousand Square Meters
Year
State Sector
Nonstate Sector
Total Si
1949
93
806
899
1950
281
859
1,14o
1951
214
527
741
1952
248
484
732
1953
299
545
843
1954
377
733
a,109
1955
64o
1,151
1,791
1956
435
1,259
1,695
1957
100 I/
2,190 2/
2,290
a. The term dwelling space as used in this table
comprises floorspace of main rooms; kitchens; and,
probably, private entrance halls and bathrooms. In
some sources the term living accommodation is used.
b. Source 211/, unless otherwise indicated.
c. Totals are derived from unrounded data and may
not agree with the sum of their rounded components.
d. Based on source 212/.
e. 213/
* The term dwelling space as used in Bulgaria comprises floorspace
of main rooms; kitchens; and, probably, private entrance halls and
bathrooms. In some sources the term living accommodation is used.
** Private construction in Bulgaria is reported to the state in terms
of dwellings and then is converted into dwelling space by housing of-
ficials. 209/ It is believed that Bulgarian officials exaggerate the
average size of private dwellings when converting them to dwelling
space for purposes of official reports on housing and thereby exag-
gerate the over-all amount of construction of dwelling space in
Bulgaria.
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No breakdown of the latest official data on housing be-
tween urban and rural construction is available. Earlier official
reports indicated that state urban construction during 1949-52 had
provided about 9,300 dwellings and nonstate construction 9,200 addi-
tional urban dwellings, giving a total of 18,500 dwellings for urban
areas. 2214/ The number of dwellings constructed was only a fraction
of the number needed to prevent further deterioration of urban hous-
ing. It is estimated that during 1949-52 the urban population in-
creased by 350,000.* To accommodate such an increase in population
at the 1949 standard of slightly more than 4 persons per dwelling
would have required the construction of at least 80,000 dwellings,
or more than 4 times the number of dwellings actually constructed.
Moreover, many dwellings were lost during the period as a result of
destruction, deterioration, and conversion to nonresidential uses.
The inadequacy of urban construction of dwellings during the First
Five Year Plan illustrates the extent to which considerations of con-
sumer welfare were subordinated' to considerations of industrial expan-
sion during the period.
According to official reports, construction by peasants in
rural areas during 1949-52 provided 41,000 dwellings. 216/ State con-
struction may have provided a small number of additional dwellings on
state farms. As a:result of the effort in construction, housing in
rural areas improved slightly during the period. The number of dwell-
ings lost during the period as a result of deterioration probably was
nearly as high as the number of dwellings constructed.** The size of
the rural population, however, decreased Consequently, there was some
quantitative gain in housing. Not all rural dwellings constructed
during the period were 2-story brick buildings, as official propaganda
would indicate. Because of the national shortage of brick, cement, and
timber, most of the dwellings probably were constructed of materials of
secondary importance, such as scrap lumber, clay, and mud. Neverthe-
less, the general quality of the newly constructed dwellings probably
was superior to the general quality of the dwellings replaced. 217/
2. Second Five Year Plan (1953-57).
For the Second Five Year Plan (1953-57) the Bulgarian
government promised a great expansion in construction of dwellings. 22f/
According to official reports, during 1953-56, the first 4 years of
the new Plan, 5,440,000 sq in of dwelling space were constructed in
Bulgaria, compared with 3,510,000 during the 4-year period, 1949-52,
* Based on source 215/.
** It is possible that many of the rural dwellings reported as new
construction actually resulted from renovation of decayed but still
occupied dwellings.
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an increase of 55 percent (see Table 11*). State construction dur-
ing 1953-56 totaled 1,750,000 sq m of dwelling space, more than 2
times the amount of state construction during 1949-52. Nonstate con-
struction during 1953-56 totaled 3,690,000 sq m, compared with
2,680,000 sq m during 1949-52, an increase of 38 percent.**
According to official reports, nonstate construction in
1957 provided 31,800 dwellings containing 2,190,000 sq m of dwelling
space, a very substantial increase over 1956. 220/ State construction
in contrast fell sharply in 1957 to, it is estimated, 100,000 sq m,*4.*
less than one-half of the state plan for the year. Total construction
of dwellings in 1957 consequently provided approximately 2,290,000 sq in
of dwelling space, an increase of one-third in comparison with 1956
(see Table 11*). For the entire Second Five Year Plan, state construc-
tion provided 1.8 million sq in of dwelling space and nonstate construc-
tion 5.9 million sq in for a combined total of about 7.7 million sq m.****
Very little information on the urban-rural breakdown for
construction of dwellings during 1953-57 is available. It is probable,
however, that compared with 1949-52 the annual rate of urban construc-
tion increased considerably, whereas the annual rate of rural construc-
tion increased only slightly.
The annual rate of construction of urban dwellings in-
creased only slightly during 1953-54, compared with 1949-52. The rate
of increase in urban population remained high, and, consequently, a
further decline in urban housing resulted. During 1955-57, large in-
creases in construction of urban dwellings, combined with a decrease
In the rate of increase of urban population, served to halt the trend
toward deterioration and resulted in a slight improvement in urban
housing. State urban construction, according to official reports,
produced more dwellings in 1955 alone than during the entire period of
* P. 67, above.
** Official reports on nonstate construction in terms of dwellings
strongly indicate that the reported increase in nonstate construction
(and therefore in total construction) in terms of dwelling space dur-
ing 1953-56 may be exaggerated. One report indicates that nonstate
construction actually decreased from about 50,000 dwellings during
1949-52 to 48,000 dwellings during 1953-56. 219/
*** Based on source 221/.
**** A Bulgarian report on plan fulfillment 22g/ states that a total
of 8.2 million sq m of housing was constructed during 1953-57. Such
a'total probably represents an attempt to exaggerate the level of
construction by adding types of construction which previously were
not considered as dwelling space.
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1949-52. 223/ Nonstate urban construction began to increase in 1954
as a result of a government policy, as part of the new course, of
liberal construction loans to private nonstate builders. 224/ Dur-
ing 1956-57, state construction was deemphasized, and still greater
emphasis was placed on nonstate urban construction. 322/
Nonstate rural construction decreased from about 41,000
dwellings during 1949-52 to 36,200 dwellings during 1953-56. 226/
Greatly increased nonstate rural construction during 1957, however,
probably raised the average annual rate of construction for the
Second Five Year Plan to slightly above the level of the First Five
Year Plan. 227/ State rural construction, moreover, may have in-
creased during the more recent period. Losses in rural dwellings
as a result of deterioration probably continued to cancel a major
portion of gains in dwellings. During 1953-57, moreover, the size of
the rural population began to increase. 228/ Consequently, little
if any quantitative improvement in rural housing took place during
the Second Five Year Plan.
3. Results.
For the 9-year period 1949-57, Bulgarian officials report
the construction of more than 11 million sq m of dwelling space. The
net gain in dwelling space during the period was considerably less
than the reported total construction. In rural areas, losses of dwell-
ings were probably almost as extensive as gains in dwellings. Losses
of dwellings in urban areas, as a result of destruction from floods,
demolitions for planning purposes, deterioration, and conversion to
nonresidential uses also were considerable. 229/ It is believed that
the net gain in dwelling space throughout Bulgaria during 1949-57 did
not meet the needs of new population and that nationwide housing
deteriorated somewhat. The housing problem in Bulgaria definitely
became more critical during the period. Although some improvement
in rural housing probably was registered, the improvement was very
slight in relation to the over-all depressed condition of peasant
housing and did not have any significant effect on the morale or eco-
nomic productivity of the peasant class. In urban areas, in contrast,
housing deteriorated considerably. It is believed that the net in-
crease in urban dwellings during the period was substantially less
than one-half the number needed to provide for the increase in urban
population at the 1949 level of housing.* A decline in the quality
of dwellings during the period, as a result of the neglect of essen-
tial repairs, served further to aggravate the housing problem. The
decline in housing in urban areas did significantly affect the morale
and economic productivity of the urban worker. By 1956-57, Bulgarian
officials began to admit publicly that housing problems in urban areas
had become critical. 231/
* Based on source 230/.
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D. 1958.
1. Urban Housing.
a. Nature of the Housing Problem.
Housing in the urban areas of Bulgaria in 1958 is
depressed seriously, by national standards. Although comparisons are
difficult because of the noncomparability of available data on housing
for each country, urban housing in Bulgaria is probably worse than in
Poland.
The vast majority of urban residents in Bulgaria (one-
third of the total population in 1958) live under conditions of ex-
tremely poor housing. In marked contrast with prewar days, over-
crowding of dwellings now is greater in urban areas of Bulgaria than
in rural areas. The generally accepted minimum standard of housing
in Bulgaria, adhered to by both prewar and Communist authorities,
is 9 sq m of "clear living space" per person (the floorspace of main
rooms only). g,32/ In December 1954, according to an estimate by
Bulgarian housing authorities, the average amount of "clear living
space" per person in urban areas was only 4.6 sq m. al/ It is esti-
mated that by January 1958 the average may have increased to 5.0 sq m
per person.* For the most part, only members of the privileged class
occupy as many as 9 sq m of "clear living space." The majority of
urban dwellers occupy only one-half or less of the amount of "clear
living space" considered to be the minimum for purposes of health.
In contrast with a prewar average of less than 1.5 persons per urban
dwelling room, the average number of persons per urban dwelling room
(kitchens included) in Bulgaria in 1958 is believed to be 2 or more.
? In addition to the physical discomforts of over-
crowding, almost all urban families in Bulgaria must suffer the
annoyance of sharing a dwelling with strangers. In 1958 the basic
dwelling accommodation for the urban family in Bulgaria is 1 or
possibly 2 rooms in a multiroom dwelling. Prewar urban residents
have been forced to turn over much of their dwelling space to
strangers from the villages. Tensions and conflicts between tenants
of different backgrounds are endemic in Bulgaria. 235/ Even in newly
constructed state housing, 2 or more families often share a dwelling
originally designed for 1 family. 21?./
Housing for the urban population in Bulgaria is made
even mOre unpleasant by the very poor quality of available dwellings.
The quality of dwellings has deteriorated under Communist rule as a
* Based on source 3112/.
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result of the shoddy construction of new dwellings by the state and
of the neglect of essential repairs of existing dwellings. 237/ The
rate of decay of dwellings in urban areas is accelerated by the oc-
cupancy of residential buildings by 2 and 3 times the number of resi-
dents for which the buildings were designed.
b. Sofia.
The failure of the program for urban construction of
dwellings in Bulgaria is illustrated by developments in Sofia. By
Eastern European standards, there was relatively little overcrowd-
ing in Sofia before World War II, but housing has deteriorated con-
siderably during the postwar period. The population of Sofia has
increased by more than 200,000 since 1946 to 730,000 in 1957. Not
until 1957, however, after a decade of concentration on the construc-
tion of factories, warehouses, and office buildings, was more than a
token program for construction of dwellings actually launched. Dur-
ing the 7-year period 1950-56, only about 16,000 dwellings were com-
pleted. For 1957, 7,000 dwellings were planned. 238/ The shortage
of dwellings in Sofia has led to a government policy of restricting
immigration of "nonessential persons" into the city and even of ex-
pelling from the city, from time to time, persons classified as
economically "nonproductive." 239/
2. Rural Housing.
Two-thirds of the population of Bulgaria reside in rural
areas. Although slight improvements in rural housing probably have
taken place since 1949, the vast majority of families in rural areas
continue to live under conditions of very poor housing, compared with
levels of housing in the rural areas of Hungary or Czechoslovakia.
According to estimates by Bulgarian housing authorities, the average
peasant in 1958 occupied about 7 sq m of "clear living space," 240/
compared with about 5 sq m for the average urban dweller. The general
quality of rural dwellings probably remains below the quality of
dwellings in urban areas. The peasants of Bulgaria generally are
accustomed to and accept very low levels of housing. From the point
of view of the government, consequently, there is no serious problem
of housing in the villages.
E. Effect of the Housing Problem on Political Stability
and Economic Development.
1. Political Stability.
The housing problem in Bulgaria, insofar as it affects
political stability, basically concerns urban areas. The portion of
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the Bulgarian urban population which is dissatisfied with its housing
probably is very large. Information is lacking, however, as to just
how acute the dissatisfaction actually is. It is known that the
remnants of the prewar bourgeoisie, who were accustomed to adequate
housing and who now must accept the lowest housing priority in a
country with an acute housing shortage, are very bitter about hous-
ing. 241/ Bulgarian workers have expressed dissatisfaction over the
generous allotment of dwellings to the numerous Russian officials
resident in Bulgaria. Dissatisfaction also has been expressed over
the allotment of apartments to Party leaders and bureaucrats in
buildings constructed with factory funds supposedly for factory
workers. 242/ It is unlikely that popular dissatisfaction concern-
ing housing has any serious effect on political stability in Bulgaria
because of the strict controls over the population which the regime
has been able to maintain.
2. Economic Development.
Almost no information is available on the relationship
between the urban housing problem in Bulgaria and poor economic per-
formance. It is believed that in Bulgaria, as in the other European
Satellites, however, poor housing adversely affects the productivity
of the labor force. The inadequacy of housing in key centers of in-
dustry and mining adversely affects the progress of a plant or an
enterprise. Overcrowded and substandard dwellings are a major factor
depressing the level of health of the population in Bulgaria and
thereby retarding productivity of workers. The increase in construc-
tion of urban dwellings since 1955 probably is an indication that
the Bulgarian government has recognized that poor dwellings do inter-
fere with economic progress.
F. Prospects.
Bulgaria will be faced with a major urban housing problem for
years to come. The housing program proposed for the Third Five Year
Plan (1958-62) indicates that the government will continue to stress
increased construction of urban dwellings. EL/ Although it is prob-
able that a gradual improvement in urban housing conditions will con-
tinue to take place, it will take years of strenuous effort in con-
struction to undo the damage of the 1949-54 period of unrestrained
emphasis on industrial development and consequent neglect of housing.
In rural areas the peasants probably will continue to meet their low-
level housing needs.
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One development begun in Bulgaria in 1956 which probably will
be continued in the future is the curtailment of state construction
in urban areas and the expansion of nonstate construction with state
financial assistance. Of the 7,000 dwellings planned for completion
in Sofia in 1957, only 1,500 were being constructed by state enter-
prises. 244/
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VII. Rumania.
A. General.
Even less statistical information on housing is available
for Rumania than for Bulgaria. An analysis of housing in Rumania
is handicapped by the lack of any official or unofficial estimate
of the size of the housing stock. The general direction of develop-
ments in housing in Rumania since World War II, however, is known.
Estimates of the current situation, moreover, can be made by using
statistical data available for Bulgaria.
Housing in the rural areas of Rumania before World War II.
was very poor and probably was on a par with rural housing in Bulgaria.
During the postwar period, housing in the rural areas of Rumania has
improved somewhat. Although the level of housing in the villages
still is very poor compared with rural housing in Hungary or Czecho-
slovakia, the housing standards of the Rumanian peasantry are low,
and there is relatively little discontent over housing in the villages.
From the point of view of the Communist government, consequently,
there is no serious housing problem in rural areas.
Housing in the cities and towns of Rumania was very poor in
.prewar days but probably was superior to housing in rural areas.
Under Communist rule, housing of the urban population -- 31 percent
of the total population in 1956 -- has deteriorated considerably.
The government has neglected housing in urban areas even though the
size of the urban population has been increasing at a rapid rate
throughout the postwar period. .Current urban housing in Rumania is
believed to be the worst of all the European Satellites, and the
urban housing problem is one of the major problems of the country.
The Rumanian government admits that housing in urban areas is inade-
quate. There are indications, moreover, that the government recog-
nizes the adverse effect of poor housing on economic progress and
political stability. The government, nevertheless, consistently has
accepted deterioration of urban housing as a necessary price to be
paid for industrial expansion.
Stimulated by events in Hungary and Poland, the Rumanian
government late in a956 did promise an accelerated program for con-
struction of urban dwellings. It is unlikely, however, that in
the next few years there can be attained a level of construction suf-
ficient to avert further serious deterioration of housing in the cities
and towns of Rumania. Rumania will be faced with a critical urban
housing problem for a very long period.
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B. Prewar, War, and Reconstruction Periods.
Very little data on prewar housing in Rumania are available.
As in Bulgaria, housing in the rural areas of prewar Rumania was
characterized by great overcrowding and by dwellings of very poor
quality. Housing of the urban population of Rumania probably was
superior both quantitatively and qualitatively to housing of the
rural population. Housing in urban working class districts, however,
was very poor and probably was inferior to housing in similar dis-
tricts in Bulgaria.
Losses of dwellings in Rumania as a result of military action
during World War II were concentrated primarily in Bucharest, in
which 7,500 houses were destroyed or damaged severely. Several other
towns suffered significant war damage. The Rumanian capital also suf-
fered housing losses as a result of an earthquake in 1940. Through-
out the country normal activities of construction and repair were inter-
rupted by the war, thereby aggravating existing shortages of dwellings.
Housing activity during the reconstruction period of 1946-50 also was
below normal prewar levels and the shortage of dwellings increased
further. Large migrations from the villages to the towns and cities
took place during 1946-50, thereby overtaxing the already inadequate
supply of dwellings in urban areas. EL52
C. First Five Year Plan (1951-55).
1. Urban Housing.
By 1951, the opening year of the Rumanian First Five Year
Plan (1951-55), urban housing in Rumania already was appreciably worse
than it had been in the prewar period. Serious shortages of dwellings
were reported in Bucharest and in other expanding population centers.
The postwar legal "minimum" standard of urban housing in Rumania,
supposedly based on considerations of health and sanitation, is 8 sq in
of living space* per person. 246/ By 1951 the actual average amount
of living space per resident probably was already less than 8 sq m,
and the average number of persons per room probably was 2 or more.
The First Five Year Plan) with its emphasis.on industrial expansion)
necessarily would impel a larger-than-ever migration of peasants to
growing centers of industry, mining, and administration.
* The term living space as used in Rumania comprises the floorspace
of main rooms and internal halls, excluding kitchens and bathrooms.
In some sources, it is referred to as "inhabitable space." The Rumanian
definition of living space is similar to) although not identical with,
the Bulgarian definition of clear living space.
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Despite the indications that a critical problem of urban
housing would develop during the First Five Year Plan unless the state
sponsored a huge housing Program, the Communist government chose to
ignore the housing problem in order to concentrate on industrial ex-
pansion. The state housing program for 1951-55 called for construc-
tion of 2.8 million sq m of "housing area,"* 247/ only a fraction of
the minimum housing needs for the period.
According to an official report published in 1957, state
and state-aided construction** during 1951-55 totaled 2,610,000 sq in
of "housing area," 93 percent of the amount planned for the period.
Of this total, however, only 1,510,000 sq in (58 percent) represented
living space.*** State and state-aided construction thus provided
approximately 50,400 dwellings.**** Almost all these dwellings were
located in urban areas. Several thousand dwellings, however, were lo-
cated on state farms. In addition, 26,700 urban dwellings emcompassing
800,000 sq m of living space were provided by private constructiont
during the period. 248/ In all, therefore, about 75,000 dwellings
consisting of 2,250,000 sq m of living space were constructed in
urban areas during 1951-55.
The combined total of state, state-aided, and private urban
construction increased from 302,000 sq m of living space in 1951. to
577,000 sq m in 1954 and 666,000 sq in in 1955, as shown in Table 12.tt
Much of the increase in urban construction during 1954-55 resulted
from the expansion, as part of the new course, of state-aided
* The term housing area as used in Rumania comprises the floor-
space of all rooms, closets, corridors, and laundry areas.
** The term state-aided construction as used in Rumania includes
nonstate construction with state financial assistance.
*** The percentage of "housing area" devoted to living space in
the sector of state construction decreased from 67 percent in 1951
to 49 percent in 1955. Considering the acuteness of the shortage
of living space in Rumania, such a decrease appears unrealistic.
It is possible that in an effort to exaggerate the actual level of
construction the government included under "housing area" in the
later years of the plan types of construction not originally so con-
sidered. If in fact the regime did pad its figures for "housing
area," the figures for living space would be more reliable as an
indicator of the resources devoted to housing. ,Most references in
the present report will be in terms of living space.
**** According to official Rumanian usage, 30 sq m of living space
equals 1 dwelling unit.
t The term private construction includes nonstate construction
without state financial assistance.
tt Table 12 follows on p. 78.
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Table 12
Construction of Living Space 2/ in Urban Areas of Rumania h/
1951-57
Thousand Square Meters
Year
State
Sector
State-Aided
Sector E/
State and
State-Aided,
Sectors 1/
Private
Sector 1/
Total f/
1951
172
130
302
1952
166
2
120
289
1953
316
11
150
477
1954
282
96
200
577
1955
332
134
200
666
1956
288
149
200 1/
637
1957W
331
200
531
a. The term living space as used in this table comprises the
floorspace of main rooms and internal halls, excluding kitchens and
bathrooms. In some sources the term inhabitable space is used in-
stead, of the term living space. According to official Rumanian
usage, 30 sq in of living space equals 1 dwelling.
b. Source 249/, unless otherwise indicated.
1 c. The term state-aided as used in this table includes nonstate
construction with state financial aid.
d. The data for 1957 are available only as a total for state and
state-aided construction.
e. The term private as used in this table includes nonstate con-
struction without state financial aid.
f. Including living space of several thousand state and state-
aided dwellings constructed in rIgal areas. Totals are derived
from unrounded data and may not agree with the sum of their rounded
components.
g. Based on source 250/.
h. Based on source 251/.
construction. The increase of total urban construction, although im-
pressive in terms of percentage, was insignificant in relation to
the real need for urban dwellings.
Most of the new state and state-aided dwellings during
1951-55 were located in Bucharest and in centers of coal, petroleum,
and steel production. A substantial proportion of state construction
consisted of workers' barracks and dormitories. The quality of many
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of the dwellings constructed by the state has been criticized as very
poor by both .official and unofficial sources. 252/
As a result of the inadequacy of new construction during
1951-55, urban housing declined sharply. During this period the ur-
ban population increased, it is estimated, by at least 1 million
persons.* A considerable number of dwellings were lost during the
period as a result of destruction, deterioration, and conversion to
nonresidential purposes., Nevertheless, even if all reported urban
construction is considered as net gain, only 2.2 sq m of "living
space" were provided for each new resident. At the official stand-
ard of 8 sq m of "living space" per person, only 280,000 of the 1
million or more new residents would have been accommodated. During
1951-55, moreover, the quality of urban housing declined as a result
of the neglect of essential repairs of old dwellings and of the poor
workmanship in new state-constructed dwellings. 254/
2. Rural Housing.
Housing in the rural areas of Rumania in 1951 was prob-
ably essentially the same as it had been before World War II. Dur-
ing 1951-55, according to officfal reports, private construction
provided 174,000 dwellings in rural areas. Several thousand addi-
tional dwellings were constructed on state farms by the state or
through state aid. Most of the newly constructed rural dwellings
were utilized to replace dwellings lost as a result of destruction
or deterioration.** It is believed, nevertheless, that the size
of the housing stock of the villages probably did increase slightly
during the period, whereas the population of the villages declined
slightly. Consequently, a quantitative improvement in rural housing
was registered. Any improvement in the over-all quality of rural
dwellings during the period was at best very slight because most of
the new dwellings were of very poor construction. 25_2/ The peasants
In Rumania, nevertheless, were much more successful in meeting their
housing needs than the state was in satisfying the housing needs of the
urban population.
3. Results.
Despite the slight gains in rural areas, housing in
Rumania probably declined during the First Five Year Plan. The
problem of housing in Rumania, moreover, was intensified greatly
during the period. As in Bulgaria, slight changes one way or another
* Based on source
** It is possible that many of the rural dwellings reported as new
construction actually resulted from renovation of decayed but still
occupied dwellings.
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in rural housing do not alter the general economic and political
situation in the villages. In contrast, a sharp decline in urban
housing such as occurred in Rumania during 1951-55 does affect
significantly the economic and political situation in the towns and
cities. By 1955, Rumanian officials had come to admit that the level
of construction of urban dwellings during the First Five Year Plan
had been inadequate and that the problem of housing in urban areas
had become serious. 256/
D. 1956-58.
1. Urban Housing.
Urban housing in Rumania in 1956-58 is far below the pre-
war level of housing in that country and is believed to be worse than
urban housing in any other European Satellite. Even for a popUla-
tion which is accustomed to very poor housing, the present level of
housing constitutes the outstanding problem of daily living in the
cities and towns of Rumania. Moreover, the situation gets worse
every year, and there is almost no hope for any improvement in the
near future.
No official or unofficial estimate of the size of the
housing stock in Rumania is available. Urban housing in 1946, how-
ever, was probably worse than urban housing in Bulgaria at the ;time
as a result of greater prewar urban congestion in Rumania and heavier
wartime losses. The decline in urban housing during the postwar
period, moreover, has been sharper in Rumania than in Bulgaria. Dur-
ing 1955-57, for example, urban housing in Bulgaria began to improVe
whereas housing in Rumania continued to deteriorate at a rapid rate.
The average amount of living space per urban resident in 1958, conse-
quently, is believed to be even smaller in Rumania than in Bulgaria
and is estimated at less than 5 sq m.
For the urban Workers of Rumania the official standard of
8 sq in of living space per person is in effect a maximum standard
rather than a minimum. Except for the top ranks of the privileged
class, almost everyone lives two or more per dwelling room (kitchens
Included). In most instances, entire families live in a single room
of a multiroom dwelling. Privacy in dwellings in Rumania is almost
unknown, and almost all families must contend with the constant irri-
tations arising from sharing dwellings with Other families. The
quality of urban dwellings has declined sharply in the postwar period.
Because of the shortage of dwellings, thousands of families must con-
tinue to occupy badly decayed dwellings and unsanitary basements and
attics. Urban dwellings are decaying rapidly because of the neglect
of essential repairs and maintenance. The pressure of excess resi-
dents in a flat hastens its deterioration. 257/
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2. Rural Housing.
More than two-thirds of the population of Rumania live
in rural areas. In 1956-58 the. average peasant in Rumania probably
had more living space than the average urban resident. Over-all
rural housing condition S probably are slightly better today than
they were before the war. Although the quality of dwellings still
is very poor by the standards of peasants in Hungary or Czecho-
slovakia, it meets the over-all level of housing aspired to by the
Rumanian peasants. Some peasants do complain about the lack of .
first class materials for construction and repairs. In general,
however, housing does not seem to be a major problem of village
life.
E. Effect of the Housing Problem on Political Stability
and Economic Development.
1. Political Stability.
The deplorable housing of the urban population probably
is one of the major economic Sources of antiregime attitudes in
Rumania. Complaints about overcrowded and substandard dwellings,
about favoritism and corruption in the allocation of dwellings,
and about neglect of repairs are universal. 258/ Dissatisfaction
is most general among the remnants of the prewar bourgeoisie, who
enjoyed adequate housing before the war and who now must accept.
the lowest housing priority. 259/ The government admits that the
housing complaints of the population are justified and apparently
recognizes the importance of the housing problem as a source of
popular discontent. A depressed and continually declining level of
housing, nevertheless, is accepted by the government as a necessary
cost of the drive for industrial expansion. In times of tension,
as after the uprisings in Hungary and Poland in 1956, the government
has promised an accelerated program of construction of dwellings. 260/
Any serious effort to alleviate the housing shortage, however, would
curtail severely plans for industrial development, a step to which
the Communist regime has never yet committed itself.
2. Economic Development.
In Rumania, depressed urban housing seriously impedes
economic development. Inadequate housing is one key factor in the
problems of low productivity by workers, excessive turnover of labor,
and inadequate mobility of labor, all of which sap the strength of
the Rumanian economy. Low productivity by workers is related to the
very poor status of health of workers in Rumania. -Poor housing con-
tributes Importantly to the prevalence of both physical and psychologi-
cal illnesses in Rumania. The government has recognized the importance
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of housing to economic development and has concentrated new state
dwellings almost exclusively in key economic areas to attract neces-
sary manpower and to increase productivity per worker. Even in these
areas, however, the construction effort has been inadequate and hous-
ing remains a problem. 261/
F. Second Five Year Plan (1956-60).
1.. Plans.
The program for state and state-aided housing for the
Second Five Year Plan of Rumania (1956-60) calls for construction of
2.5 million sq m of living space, compared with the 1,510,000 sq in
actually constructed during the First Five Year Plan.* 262/ The
housing program, even if accomplished, will not prevent further major
deterioration of urban housing. At the current inadequate rate of
5 sq m of living space per person, 500,000 people would be accommodated
by the proposed program. At the official standard of 8 sq m, only
310,000 people would be accommodated. In contrast, it is estimated
that the urban population of Rumania will increase during the period
by about 1 million.** Losses of urban dwellings during the period,
moreover, will be heavy because of past and present neglect of re-
pairs and upkeep of dwellings. Private construction, which con-
tributed about one-third of the total urban construction during 1953-55,
will compensate for only a portion of the difference between planned
state and state-aided construction for 1956-60 and actual urban need.
In rural areas during 1956-60 it is likely that the peasants
will continue to satisfy their basic housing needs through private con-
struction based on the use of local materials. As in the past the
state will construct a small number of dwellings on state farms.
2. Results, 1956-57.
During 1956, state and state-aided urban construction pro-
vided less living space than in 1955, despite the expansion in con-
struction of dwellings promised for the Second Five Year Plan. In
,* It is not clear from official Rumanian reports whether the 1956-60
housing program refers to "housing area" or "living space." However,
UN housing reports, which usually are based on consultation with
Rumanian officials, refer to the program in terms of "living space."
Moreover, an expansion of construction of dwellings during 1956-60,
which would be indicated only if the program were in terms of "living
space," would be consistent with housing developments in Rumania and
elsewhere in the European Satellites.
** Based on source 263/.
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1956, 437,000 sq m of living space were provided, compared with
466,000 sq m in 1955. Private urban construction during 1956 pro-
vided, in addition, 200,000 sq m of living spaee, giving an urban
total for the year of 637,000 sq in (see Table 12*). Consequently,
approximately 21,000 urban dwellings were gained in 1956. It is
believed that private rural construction during 1956 remained at
approximately the 1955 level of 34,000 dwellings. 264/
For 1957, in reaction to events in Hungary and Poland in
1956, the Rumanian government pledged a greatly accelerated effort
to provide better housing in urban areas, along with other conces-
sions to the consumer at the expense of industrial development. 265/
Despite government promises, official reports indicate that less
living space was gained in 1957 than in 1956. State and state-aided
construction provided an estimated 331,000 sq m of living space,**
24 percent less than in 1956. . If private urban construction con-
tinued at the same rate as it did during 1954-56, a total of only
531,000 sq m of urban living space would have been completed in 1957
(see Table 12*).
G. Prospects.
Prospects for housing in Rumania are for a long-term continua-
tion of critical conditions in urban areas. Any realistic program
for the alleviation of the housing problem in the cities and towns of
Rumania would require a complete recasting of present economic plans.
Merely to arrest the trend toward continual deterioration of urban
housing would require an annual construction output of two times the
1955-56 level. It is unlikely that Rumania will reach and maintain
such a level of construction during the next few years. Urban con-
ditions, consequently, will continue to decline sharply throughout the
Second Five Year Plan.
* P. 78, above.
** Based on source 266/.
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APPENDIX A
METHODOLOGY
1. Figure 1.
The statistics reported for the average amount of living space
in urban areas in 1958 in the European Satellites and in the USSR
have been derived from data of considerably varied.completeness and
reliability. The absolute value of the statistics, consequently,
should not be giVen great weight. It is believed, however, that the
statistics do represent reliably the relationship among the countries
as to per capita amounts of living space in urban areas.
a. Czechoslovakia.
The estimate for Czechoslovakia is based on official data in
source 267/. The national figure has been adjusted upward from
11.2 sq m to 11.5 sq m on the assumption that there is more living
space per person in urban than in rural areas. The assumption is
based on source 268/.
b. East Germany. ,
The estimate for East Germany is based on the UN estimate for
1950, source 269/, and the assumption that the net gain in living
space during 1951-57 was about one-half of the gross gain.
c. Hungary.
The estimate for Hungary is based on the census figure for
December 1954, source 212/, and on the assumption that there was a. ,
slight increase in the average amount of living space per person
from December 1954 to January 1958.
d. Poland.
The estimate for Poland is based on an estimate by Polish
housing officials, source 271/. The Polish estimate is adjusted
downward on the assumption that many rooms considered as main rooms
in Poland would not be so considered in the other European Satellites.
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e. Bulgaria.
The estimate for Bulgaria is based on an official estimate
for December 1954, source 272/, and on the assumption of some in-
crease in the average amount of living space per person since the
Bulgarian estimate was made.
f. Rumania.
The estimate for Rumania is based on the assumption that the
average amount of living space per person in the urban areas of
Rumania is less than that in Bulgaria.*
g. USSR.
The estimate for the USSR is based on source 273/.
2. Table 1.
a. 1939.
The number of dwelling rooMs for Central Poland, for the Incor-
porated Territories, and for postwar Poland are taken from source 274/.
An estimate of the size of the urban population in each case was de-
rived from source 275/ and is based on the assumption that from 1931
to 1939 the percentage of the total population in urban areas increased
slightly in Central Poland and remained the same in the Incorporated
Territories.
b. 1946.
The number of dwelling rooms is taken from source 22?_/. An
estimate of the size of the urban population was derived from source 277/.
The portion of the population not designated as either urban or rural
has been apportioned according to the urban-rural ratio for the rest
of the population.
c. 1950.
The average number of persons per urban dwelling room for all
postwar Poland is taken from source 278/. The averages for Central
Poland and for the Incorporated Territories have been derived from
source 279/.
?* See VII, above.
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d. 1956.
The average number of persons per urban dwelling room for
all postwar Poland is taken from source 280/. The averages for
Central Poland and for the Incorporated Territories have been de-
rived from source 281/.
e. 1958.
The average number of persons per dwelling room for .all post-
war Poland is taken from source 282/. The averages for Central
Poland and for the Incorporated Territories are estimated from the
1956 averages for each area.
3. Table 4.
a. 1937.
The average number of persons per dwelling for Czechoslovakia
Is taken from source 3D./. The average number of persons per dwell-
ing room is derived from an estimate of an average of 2.3 to 2.4
dwelling rooms per dwelling. This estimate is based on source 284/
and on the assumption that the average size of dwellings, in terms
of rooms, was larger in 1937 than in 1950.
b. January 1949.
The population on 1 January 1949 is taken from source 285/.
The net increase in the nuMber of dwellings from 1 January 1949 to
I March 1950 is estimated from source 286/. The average number of
persons per dwelling room is derived from an estimate of 2.2 dwell-
ing rooms per dwelling, as given for March 1950 in source 287/.
c. March 1950.
These statistics are based on official census data adjusted
to include the entire population and not just the portion of the
population residing in dwellings. 288/
d. January 1956.
These statistics are based on official data given in
source EL12/.
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e. January 1958.
The population on 1 January 1958 is taken from source
The net increase in dwellings from 1 January 1956 to 1 January 1958
is estimated from source 221/. Dwellings gained through subdivision
of larger dwellings are included. The net increase in dwelling
rooms from 1 January 1956 to 1 January 1958 is estimated from
source 292/. ?
4. Table?.
a. 1940.
These estimates are based on data for dwellings and dwelling
rooms in Hungary in source 293/ and data on population in source
b. 1949.
. These estimates are derived from census data in source
c. 1956.
:The average ?number of persons per dwelling was estimated
from 1949 census data on nilmber of dwellings, from data on the pop-
ulation in 1956 in source _296/, and from an estimate of net gain in
dwellings during 1949-55 (90,000 dwellings) based on source 297/.
The same figure is derived by using a Hungarian estimate of persons
per dwelling in July 1954, 298/ 1956 population data, and an estimate
of net gain in dwellings from July 1954 to .January 1956 -(30,000 dwell-
ing) based on source
The average .number of persons per dwelling room is estimated
on the basis of the average for Greater Budapest) 300/ an estimate
of the average for all other urban areas based on source 301/, and
the assumption that the average for rural areas was the SaM2 as in
1949. 302/
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