THE ROLE OF TRANSPORTATION IN THE ECONOMY OF COMMUNIST CHINA 1950-62

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01141A001000010001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 58
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 31, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
N? 77
THE ROLE OF TRANSPORTATION
IN THE ECONOMY OF COMMUNIST CHINA
1950 - 62
CIA/RR 117
31 December 1957
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
SECRET
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE ROLE OF TRANSPORTATION IN THE ECONOMY OF COMMUNIST CHINA
1950-62
CIA/RR 117
(ORR Project 43.1601)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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FOREWORD
This report presents an analysis of the growth of the Chinese
Communist transportation system during 1950-56 and contains tentative
estimates and predictions for 1957-62.
It examines the transportation situation in the light of persistent
reports of congestion in transportation beginning as early as 1954
and evaluates these statements in terms of the current and projected
performance of the system. In view of the role that transportation
will play in Communist China during 1957-62, this report should be
useful to those in the intelligence community concerned not only with
transportation but also with general economic matters.
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CONTENTS
Summary
Page
1
I.
Introduction
3
II.
Railroads
9
A.
Pattern of Operations
9
B.
Investment
12
1. Construction of New Lines
17
2. Improvements in Existing Facilities
21
C.
Operating Efficiency
22
D.
Performance
24
III.
Highways
30
A.
Pattern of Operations
30
B.
Investment
,31
C.
Operating Efficiency
33
D.
Performance
34
IV.
Inland Waterways
34
A.
Pattern of Operations
34
B.
Investment
35
C.
Operating Efficiency
36
D.
Performance
37
V.
Coastal Shipping
38
A.
Pattern of Operations
38
B.
Investment
39
C.
Operating Efficiency
4o
D.
Performance
40
VI.
Civil Aviation
41
A. Pattern of Operations
41
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B. Investment
C. Operating Efficiency
D. Performance
Appendixes
Appendix A. Statistical Tables
Page
45
Tables
1. Communist China: Transportation Performance in Ton-
Kilometers, by Type of Carrier, Selected Years,
1950-62
2. Communist China: Transportation Performance in Tons
Originated, by Type of Carrier, Selected Years,
1950-62
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6
7
3. Communist China: Estimated Value of Completed Capital
Construction in Transportation and Posts and Tele-
communications, 1953-55 and 1956 Plan 14
4. Communist China: Railroad Construction, by Type of
Line, 1953-56, 1956, and 1957 Plan ..... . . . 16
5. Communist China: Indexes of Growth of Selected Eco-
nomic Sectors, 1951-56 26
6. Communist China: Estimated Performance of Rail Trans-
port, 1950-62 45
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7. Communist China: Estimated Performance of
Highway Transport, 1950-62
8. Communist China: Estimated Performance of
Inland Water Transport, 1950-62
9. Communist China: Estimated Performance of
Coastal Shipping, 1950-62
Illustrations
Figure 1. Communist China: Railroads and Selected
Roads, October 1957 (Map)
Figure 2. Communist China: Pattern of Growth of
Selected Economic Sectors, 1950-56
(Chart)
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Page
Following Page
Inside
Back Cover
26
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CIA/RR S-E-C-R-E-T
(ORR Project 43.1601)
THE ROLE OF TRANSPORTATION IN THE ECONOMY OF COMMUNIST CHINA*
1950-62
Summary
By 1953, at the start of the Chinese Communist First Five Year
Plan (1953-57), the transportation system of China was ready to em-
bark on an expansion program keyed to the demands of other sectors
of the growing economy. The transportation system of China was
operated at much less than capacity by the Chinese Nationalists, but
under the regime of the Communists it has been forced to perform at
close to capacity. Since 1950, all branches of the transport sector
have experienced high annual growth rates, but the railroads, with
their high percentage of the traffic load, have been primarily
responsible for the over-all success of the sector.
In 1956 the transportation system of Communist China** hauled
approximately 145 billion ton-kilometers (tkm) compared with only
42.2 billion in 1950. It is estimated that by 1962 the economy
will require approximately 244 billion tkm. The estimated distribu-
tion of freight traffic in Communist China, by type of transport, in
1950, 1956, and 1962 is as follows:
Percent of Total Freight Ton-Kilometers
Type of Carrier
1950
1956
1962
Railroads
93.2
82.8
79.5
Highways
0.9
2.4
2.7
Inland waterways
4.0
8.9
10.6
Coastal shipping
1.9
5.9
7.2
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent
the best judgment of ORR as of 15 August 1957.
** Limited to modern transport and excluding municipal transport,
wooden sailing vessels and junks, and other forms of native transport.
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Up to the present time the transport sector has supported rapid
advances in the economic growth of Communist China and, except for
local dislocations, has not appreciably inhibited the industrial
growth of the economy. A substantial rate of growth in the trans-
port sector will be required during the Second Five Year Plan
(1958-62), however, if planned economic growth in other sectors of
the economy is to be supported. This is particularly true of the
overburdened railroads, the only medium of transportation whose prog-
ress will significantly affect the attempts of China to increase its
economic potential through accelerated industrialization. Conscious
that increased railroad capability is essential to plans for increased
industrialization, the Chinese have been exerting much effort to
strengthen the railroad system. Although there have been reports of
an appreciable amount of congestion on certain parts of the railroad
system, particularly in 1956, it is estimated that investment will be
sufficient to enable transportation to keep pace with growing traffic
demands.
Transportation in Communist China made considerable progress in
operating efficiency during 1950-56. The efficiency of the railroad
system, for example, is indicated by the attainment of an estimated
4-day turnaround time in 1953. This figure, which colvares favorably.
with a 6.7-day turnaround time in the USSR for a somewhat longer
average haul, is a significant indication of Chinese ability to attain
high levels of performance. Although the technological innovations
necessary to overcome physical limitations in highway transport have
not been forthcoming to an appreciable degree, considerable effort has
been directed toward reducing inefficient hauling. The efficiency of
inland water fleet operations has been increased by improved organization
and by centralization of dispatch control and cargo allocation.
In all branches of the Chinese Communist transport sector, maximum
output has been squeezed from existing plant and equipment. It now
appears that Chinese transportation has reached a near-maximum oper-
ating efficiency within existing technology and facilities and that in
the near future large-scale expansion and renovation of existing plant
and equipment will have to be made, particularly of railroads. An
awareness that this situation exists is indicated by the fact that the
proportion of rail investment allocated for improvement of existing
lines was increased considerably in the 1957 Plan in spite of a cut in
total railroad investment. During the Second Five Year Plan an increased
proportion of rail investment will also be allocated for rehabilitation
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of existing lines, construction or restoration of double tracks,
development of additional yard facilities, and installation of com-
munications equipment.
The possibility of a traffic crisis in the transport sector of
Communist China similar to the one which occurred in the USSR in
the early 1930's seems remote at this time. Recently published in-
formation indicates that the Chinese are thoroughly cognizant of
the fact that the transportation system must be continuously improved
and expanded in order to cope with demands of other sectors of the
economy. Although this effort requires extensive allocations of re-
sources which in large measure must be generated by the Chinese
economy, it would be dangerous to assume that shortcomings in trans-
portation will be permitted to impair industrial growth, because the
power of the regime to allocate labor and capital resources on a
priority basis points to the contrary.
I. Introduction.
The most notable feature of the internal transportation system
of Communist China is the extent to which rail services currently
predominate. Their rise from a minor to a major role is not neces-
sarily a direct achievement of the Communist regime but is in line
with a long trend for which favorable geographical factors and
Japanese influence are also responsible. A few mountain barriers
and other natural obstacles do impede railroad construction to some
extent, but on the whole they have proved less serious for railroads
than for other carriers. Furthermore, the unique qualifications of
the railroads as instruments of mass transportation have helped to
assure their primacy. 1/*
Since the Communists gained control of the China mainland in 1949
the transport service has shown marked increases in performance, so
that by 1956 total traffic in terms of metric tons** originated was
more than 230 percent greater than in 1950. During 1953-55 the total
** Tonnages are given in metric tons throughout this report unless
otherwise indicated.
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volume of freight originated by modern transport increased by 112
million tons. In 1956 alone the increase was 91 million tons. In
some cases the magnitude of annual increases has been a result of
the depressed levels of production of the economy in 1949 and the
accompanying underutilization of transport capacity. In any event,
gains in transport performance have been impressive, particularly
in the railroad sector.
In terms of tons originated, the railroads' share of total
traffic rose sharply from slightly less than 50 percent of the
volume carried by all modern forms of internal transportation in
1937 2/ to 89 percent of total inland and coastal traffic in 1950
and then declined progressively to 66 percent in 1956 as highway
carriers began to gain a greater share of the total and water
carriers again became relatively more important. Although rail
traffic had increased by 147 percent in 1956 above the level of
1950 in terms of tons originated, highway traffic increased more
than 10 times, modern inland water traffic nearly 8 times, and
coastal shipping traffic 13 times. In 1956, modern motor carriers
originated 21 percent of total traffic, ranking second only to
railroads in this respect. Inland water traffic, although in-
creasing at a rate greater than rail tons originated, by 1956 had
reached a level only slightly more than half its prewar peak per-
formance, originating about 10 percent of total traffic.
The predominance of the railroads in the transportation system
of Communist China is even more striking when their performance is
viewed in terms of ton-kilometers. The railroads' share of total
traffic in this category was about 93 percent in 1950. This pro-
portion declined gradually thereafter but still remained between
82 and 83 percent in 1955 and 1956. In the period immediately be-
fore the Sino-Japanese war, modern inland water transport accounted
for roughly one-half of total ton-kilometer performance in China. 3/
At present, however, inland water transport comprises only about
10 percent of total ton-kilometer performance. Although it is grow-
ing rapidly, motor transport in Communist China is still an insig-
nificant carrier of freight in terms of ton-kilometers, accounting
for only 2 to 3 percent of the total in 1956. Probably the chief
curb to the growth of motor transport is the condition of the road
system, which, in spite of improvements, remains quite primitive.
Consequently, motor trucks have been used primarily in a feeder
type of operation handling traffic to and from railheads and ports
and therefore have a relatively short average length of haul of
50 kilometers (km) or less. Motor vehicles, however, are quite
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significant in the long-haul movement of goods in the western pro-
vinces, although even here length of haul may decrease as new rail
lines reach these areas. and begin full operation.
Throughout the period 1956-62, railroads are expected to con-
tinue carrying the predominant share of freight moving within Com-
munist China. In terms of tons originated the railroads' share
will decrease slightly to between 60 and 65 percent of the total.
In terms of ton-kilometers it will remain relatively constant at
about 80 percent of the total. The contribution of inland water
transport to the total will remain about 10 percent in terms of
both tons originated and ton-kilometers. Highway transport will
produce a slightly larger share of total tons originated (23 per-
cent in 1962) but will not improve significantly its relative ton-
kilometer position, which will remain at 2 to 3 percent of the
total. The transportation performance of Communist China, by type
of carrier, for selected years, 1950-62, is shown in Table 1* in
terms of ton-kilometers and in Table 2** in terms of tons originated.
During 1953-56 the Chinese Communist transportation system re-
ceived considerable assistance from other Sino-Soviet Bloc countries.
The Chinese have Imported both freight cars and trucks and, within
the last 3 years, have increased considerably their vessel purchase
program. The inventory of the Chinese civil air fleet is now made
up almost entirely of new aircraft manufactured in the USSR. The
Chinese have also been leaning heavily on the USSR for guidance in
planning and construction techniques, and much of their increased
capability in railroad construction can be ascribed to this tech-
nical aid. Chinese shipbuilding has also advanced rapidly, largely
as a result of significant material and technical aid from the USSR.
. Although the Chinese Communists have been carrying out an am-
bitious rail construction program to improve the existing system
and to service future planned demands, growth of rail capacity has
barely kept pace with requirements of the growing industrial economy.
Increased utilization of facilities and increases in freight car
inventory have largely overcome limitations because of rolling stock
availability, but traffic over several sections of line has recently
been approaching capacity, with the result that local congestion has
become a continuing problem. During 1957, some investment originally***
Table 1 follows on p. 6.
** Table 2 follows on p. 7.
*** Continued on p. 8.
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Table 1
Communist China: Transportation Performance in Ton-Kilometers, by Type of Carrier W
Selected Years, 1950-62
Year
Railroads
Highways
Inland Waterways 121
Coastal Shipping 2/
Total
Amount
(Billion Ton-
Kilometers)
Amount
(Billion Ton-
Kilometers)
Percent
of
Total
Amount
(Billion Ton-
Kilometers)
Percent
of
Total
Amount
(Billion Ton-
Kilometers)
Percent
of
Total
Amount
(Billion Ton-
Kilometers)
Percent
of
Total
1950
39.4
93.2
0.373
0.9
1.68
11..0
0.822
1.9
42.2
1951
51.5
89.3
0.503
0.9
2.66
4.6
3.01
5.2
57.7
1952
60.2
86.6
0.678
1.0
3.64
5.2
5.00
7.2
69.5
1953
78.1
87.2
1.18
1.3
5.63
6.3
4.65
5.2
89.5
1954
93.2
84.o
1.87
1.7
7.89
7.1
8.04
7.2
ill
1955
98.1
82.2
2.52
2.1
10.4
8.7
8.38
7.0
119
1956
120.4
82.8
3.50
2.4
12.9
8.9
8.60
5.9
145
1957
126.5 (Plan)
80.6
4.02 1/
2.6
15.8 s/
10.1
10.5 s/
6.7
157 s/
1960 s/
168
79.9
5.58
2.7
21.9
10.4
14.7
7.0
210
1962 s/
194
79.5
6.63
2.7
25.9
10.6
17.5
7.2
211.11.
a. Excluding air transport performance, which is negligible
ently from unrounded figures in Tables 6 through 9, Appendix
been rounded, in general, to three significant digits.
b. Modern water transport, excluding wooden sailing vessels
c. Estimated.
by comparison. Totals and percentages are derived independ-
A, and do not always agree with the above figures, which have
and junks.
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Table 2
Communist China: Transportation Performance in Tons Originated, by Type of Carrier 2/
Selected Years, 1950-62
Year
Railroads
Highways
Inland Waterways 121
Coastal Shipping 12/
Total
Volume
(Million Ton*
Originated)
Volume
(Million Tons
Originated)
Percent
of
Total
Volume
(Million Tons
Originated)
Percent
of
Total
Volume
(Million Tons
Originated)
Percent
of
Total
Volume
(Million Tons
Originated)
Percent
of
Total
1950
99.5
88.6
7.45
6.6
4.5o
4.o
0.828
0.7
112
1951
110.5
82.7
12.6
9.4
6.96
5.2
3.58
2.7
134
1952
132.1
78.6
20.7
12.3
9.41
5.6
5.76
3.4
168
1953
160.4
75.6
30.4
14.3
15.3
7.2
5.92
2.8
212
1954
192.6
72.3
43.5
16.3
20.5
7.7
9.91
3.7
267
1955
'93.4
69.0
50.1
17.9
26.3
9.4
10.4
3.7
280
1956
246.0
66.2
79.1
21.3
35.4
9.5
10.8
2.9
371
1957
256 (Plan)
63.9
91.1 s/
22.7
4o.6 2/
10.1
13.2 2/
3.3
401 c
1960 s/
351
63.5
127
23.0
56.0
10.2
18.4
3.3
552
1962 sj
416
63.5
151
23.0
66.3
10.1
21.8
3.3
655
a. Excluding air transport performance, which is negligible
ently from unrounded figures in Tables 6 through 9, Appendix
been rounded, in general, to three significant digits.
b. Modern water transport, excluding wooden sailing vessels
C. Estimated.
by comparison. Totals and percentages are derived independ-
A, and do not always agree with the above figures, which have
and junks.
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planned for new line construction will be reallocated for increasing
capacity of existing lines by such measures as double tracking, en-
larging yards, and the like. The tense transport situation does not
seem to be confined entirely to the railroads, as numerous references
to serious congestion on the Yangtze River have also been observed,
and truck transport is in chronic short supply. During the Second
Five Year Plan, all types of transport, including primitive carriers,
are to be improved in order to cope with increasing distribution re-
quirements.
Recently published information indicates that the Chinese Com-
munists are thoroughly cognizant of the fact that the transportation
system must be continuously improved and expanded in order to cope
with demands of other sectors of the economy. In the words of one
of their own writers, "the basic function of transport planning is
to ,assure that the needs of the national economy and-of the people
for freight and passenger transportation are fully met through the
most rational use of the various modes and means of transporta-
tion ... . One of the most important obligations in shaping the
plans for volume of freight transport gl'etric tons originateg is
to make certain that the plans accurately reflect the increasing
proportion between the total volume of traffic and the total na-
tional product during the period covered by the plans." It/ Once
transportation plans are prepared based on the economic needs of the
country, they are compared with the maximum capacity of the various
types of modern transport. Where government-operated transport fa-
cilities are unable to provide the required transportation, plans
are formulated to make use of the various private means of trans-
portation. 2/ What the Chinese are attempting to effect With their
planning mechanism is a balance between transport capacity and the
estimated amount of transportation needed so that the correct amount
of transportation can be determined with some assurance that it will
be realized. g
Because they are motivated by this philosophy, the Chinese Com-
munists must have considered carefully the capability of the trans-
portation system while formulating their 1962 Plan goals for the
manufacturing and extractive industries. No figures for planned
transportation performance for 1962 have been released as yet, nor
have any investment goals for transportation been divulged. However,
based on the goals of the Second Five Year Plan (1958-62) for new
rail line construction, it has been estimated that investment in rail-
roads during the Second Five Year Plan will be approximately double
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that of the First Five Year Plan (1953-57). If this turns out to be
the actual situation, it is estimated that growth in transportation
performance will be adequate during 1958-62 to support planned pro-
duction increases in other sectors of the economy. Estimates of
transportation performance appearing in Tables 1 and 2* are based on
this premise. The possibility still exists, of course, that the
underdeveloped nature of transportation in China and its resultant
inflexibility may in fact impede economic growth in some areas. Such
a judgment cannot be lightly made, however, considering that the
allocation of material and human resources is entirely controlled by
central planning.
II. Railroads.
A. Pattern of Operations.
Railroads in Communist China have borne the burden of in-
creasing economic activity, particularly in industrial areas. Man-
churia, with about 9 percent of the total area of China, originates
far more traffic per capita than the remainder of China. The Peking-
Tientsin area and the regions around Tsingtao (Ch'ing-tao), Shanghai,
Hankow (Han-k'ou), and Canton are also important, but as yet the rest
of China generates relatively little rail traffic.** 1/
Since the Chinese Communists gained complete control of China
in 1949 the railroads have been the most significant interior trans-
port connection in international trade. In 1955, well over 95 percent
of the total tonnage of international trade over interior routes crossed
the border by rail. Rail service is available between China and the
USSR, North Korea, Kowloon (Hong Kong), and North Vietnam. More
than 80 percent of all trade with the USSR was moved by rail. The
Trans-Mongolian Railroad, opened to traffic during January 1956, has
provided an appreciable increase in transport capacity supporting
Chinese foreign commerce through Siberia. It is estimated that in
1955 rail connections with the USSR handled nearly 5 million tons of
freight. About 90 percent of this was in trade with the USSR and the
remainder in trade with the European Satellites. .21/
The pattern of transportation between Communist China and North
Vietnam was changed in late 1955 by the completion and official opening
* Pp. 6 and 7, above.
** See the map, Figure 1, inside back cover.
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of the Hanoi - Nam Quan line linking the North Vietnam rail system
with that of China. This line became the principal transport route
for conveying the increasing volume of aid to North Vietnam, which
in 1955 amounted to about 60,000 tons. 12/ The Chinese are presently
working on the Pi-si-chai - Ho-ktou section of the Hanoi - K'un-ming line,
which when completed (probably in the fall of 1957) will facilitate
the export of Yunnan mineral resources through the ocean terminal at
Haiphong.
Within Communist China in the prerevolutionary period, nearly
half of the railroads were concentrated in the northeast. Conse-
quently, the northeast has a well-developed communications system.
This system facilitates the export to the rest of China and to the
world of coal, manufactures, and foodstuffs and the import of indus-
trial raw materials, complex capital goods, and some textiles. The
eastern section of the country possesses a network of railroad, high-
way, and inland water transport which facilitates the extensive inter-
regional trade of the area, with consumer goods and medium engineer-
ing products being exchanged for raw cotton, foodstuffs, and coal
from other parts of China. The transportation facilities of the cen-
tral and southern area are more diversified than those of other
regions, with a major trunk rail line running north and south and
the largest navigable waterway in China, the Yangtze River, running
east and west. Standing at the center of this transportation network'
is Wu-han, a transshipment point for waterborne cargoes from the
northeast and southwest and for rail cargoes from Peking and Canton.
Completion of the Yangtze River bridge at this point in late 1957
will increase Wu-han's importance as the main pivot of rail transport
between north and south China.
The southwestern part of the country, which experienced a
rapid rate of economic growth during World War II, has received little
emphasis in the Chinese Communist industrialization program during
the period of the First Five Year Plan. One reason for this has been
the need to develop first of all a modern transportation system. With
Ch'eng-tu in western Szechwan as the hub,. rail lines have been or will
be extended north to Pao-chi, southeast to Chungking, and south to
K'un-ming. Moreover, the construction of a second Yangtze River bridge
above Chungking and of the Szechwan-Kweichow Railroad will permit
through traffic to Fort Bayard (Chan-chiang) on the south China coast.
In the northwest, most of the investment to date has been devoted to
the development of transportation facilities and to the large-scale
prospecting of the abundant mineral resources of the region. Lan-chou,
in Kansu Province, traditionally a communications focus for Central
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Asia, is becoming in addition an important rail center, with rail
lines completed or in various stages of construction extending to
the east (to join the Lung-Hai Railroad), to the north (to the
planned new iron and steel combine at Pao-t'ou), to the northwest
(to Sinkiang and the USSR), and to the west (to the newly develop-
ing petroleum area in the Tsaidam Basin).
Domestic rail operations in Communist China consist largely
of the movement of a few bulk commodities from a relatively small
number of places of origin to a few principal destinations. Trans-
port of coal, the largest single item shipped, makes up about one-
third of total rail tons originated, whereas agricultural products
and construction materials each make up about 20 percent, and ores
and semiprocessed metals about 5 percent. As the level of the
economy rises, shipments of machinery, chemicals, and other manu-
factures are becoming of increasing importance. Petroleum is still
a relatively minor item in transit, but can be expected to increase
in volume as the oilfields in western China are further developed.
There has been a considerable advance by the Chinese Com-
munists in the manufacture of transportation equipment. Steam
locomotives have been produced of parts entirely manufactured with-
in China, 21/ and an increased efficiency of operation has been
achieved at locomotive and car shops. New techniques, such as
welding, have been introduced for construction of freight cars,
and quality control is being improved. Production of railroad
equipment has been concentrated at three main shops, at Chii-ch'i-
ha-erh, Ssu-fang (near Tsingtao), and Dairen (Ta-lien). The Chinese
have Imported rolling stock on a very limited scale, but domestic
production has reached a rate such that expansion of freight car
carrying capacity based on indigenous resources is possible for the
rail lines. 22/
Based on the relationship between traffic and operational
data as well as on marking analysis and Chinese Communist announce-
ments, it is estimated that at the end of 1954 the Chinese possessed
about 3,420 locomotives, 6,240 passenger cars, and 73,100 freight
cars. It is estimated that as of the end of 1955 these figures had
increased to 3,500 locomotives, 6,420 passenger cars, and 78,500
freight cars. The end-of-1957 park is planned to include approxi-
mately 3,700 locomotives, 7,960 passenger cars, and 90,800 freight
cars.
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In spite of these advances, there have been indications sir-16e
1954 that the Chinese Communist railroad system has not been improved
at the same rate as the increase in the traffic which it has been
obliged to carry. The fundamental limitation on sections of the
present system appears to be track capacity rather than the availability
of rolling stock. A net general transport shortage does not yet exist,
but local rail congestion and local inability to handle requirements
can be expected to continue. During 1956, references to congestion and
the lack of adequate transportation increased, and an official of the
central transport planning staff stressed the point that the volume
of freight transport requirements in 1956 would approach or exceed the
level originally planned for transport for 1957.112/ Most of the
recent trouble has been reported on sections of two key intersecting
rail lines: the north-south Peking-Hankow and the east-west Lung-Hai
Railroads. Additional investment in track and facilities on lines
with heavy traffic density such as these will be necessary during the
immediate future to insure that rail transport will continue to be
capable of supporting the planned expansion of the economy. Double
tracking of main lines, increasing the capacity of key rail junctions
and yards, and installation of automatic signaling systems on certain
main lines are reportedly to be emphasized in 1957 and during the
initial phases of the Second Five Year Plan.
B. Investment.
Since the end of 1949, When the Chinese Communists had only
21,700 km of operable rail lines, they have allocated a large part of
their available investment resources to the expansion of the railroad
system and to bolstering existing facilities. The First Five Year
Plan originally allocated a total of 5,670 million yuan* for invest-
ment in rail transport. This represented about 13 percent of new
capital investment for all purposes and 69 percent of the 8,210 million
yuan reserved for investment in all forms of transportation and com-
munications. Distribution of the 5,670 million yuan by the Ministry
of Railroads was planned as follows 12/:
* Yuan values in this report may be converted at the official rate
of 2.46 yuan to US $1.
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Investment
(Million Yuan)
Percent of
Total Rail
Investment
New lines
2,364
41.7
Improvement of existing lines
1,854
32.7
Increase in rolling stock park
1,219
21.5
Planning and design
233
4.1
Total
5,670
100.0
Table 3* shows the value of completed capital construction in
transportation and posts and telecommunications, 195355 and the 1956
Plan.
The estimated value of completed capital construction in rail-
roads as a percentage of yearly total basic construction expenditure,
1953-55 and 1956 Plan, was as follows 2?/:
Total Investment
Year (Million Yuan)
Rail Investment
(Million Yuan)
Rail Investment
as a Percent of
Total Investment
1953
6,506
724
11.1
1954
7,498
1,035
13.8
1955
9,360
1,354
14.5
1956 Plan
14,000
2,013
14.4
By way of comparison, during the same period, investment by the state
for highways, waterways, civil air transport, and posts and telecom-
munications as a percentage of yearly total basic construction expen-
diture was considerably less than that for railroads, as follows 21/:
Year
Percent
1953
6.4
1954
7.0
1955
5.8
* Table 3 follows on p. 14.
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Table 3
Estimated Value of Completed Capital Construction in Transportation
and Posts and Telecommunications 2/
1953-55 and 1956 Plan
Total Planned
1953
1954
1955
1956 Plan
Expenditures
Percent
Percent
Percent
Percent
1953-57
Expenditures
of 5-Year
Expenditures
of 5-Year
Expenditures
of 5-Year
Expenditures
of 5-Year
Sector
Yui)
(Million Yuan)
Goal
(Million Yuan)
Goal
(Million Yuan)
Goal
(Million Yuan)
Goal
Railroads
5,670
724
12.8
1,035
18.3
1,354
23.9
2,013
35.5
Other12/
2,540
418
16.5
523
20.6
546
21.5
811
31.9
Total
8,210
_
1142
13.9'
1,558
19.0
1,900
23.1
2,8214- 2/
34.4
a. lf"
b. Investment of both central and local governments in highways, waterways, civil air transport, and posts and telecommunications.
c. Assuming that railroads have the same proportion of total transport investment as in 1955.
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Although the First Five Year Plan allocated 41.7 percent of
total rail investment for the construction of new lines, the actual
portion going into this activity during 1953-55 reached 47.8 per-
cent. 22/ In March 1956 the Minister of Railroads, T'eng Tai-yuan,
stated that total investment for basic construction of railroads
during 1953-57 would be increased by 38.3 percent, from 5,670 million
yuan to 7,840 million yuan. 20/ He estimated that the original in-
vestment of 5,670 million yuan would be reached by 31 March 1957. 21/
In February 1957 it was announced that 60 percent of the 1957 in-
vestment in railroad construction would be assigned to improving the
freight-carrying capacity of older routes 22/ and to the procurement
of additional locomotives and freight cars. 22/ A later announcement
indicated that the proportion of investment allocated for improvement
of existing lines alone would be increased from 26.4 percent in
1956 2L/ to 35.8 percent in 1957. 22/ Because of the serious traffic
congestion existing on certain trunklines, the decision to put more
emphasis on improving the capacity of existing lines was not un-
expected. New line construction in turn is to be cut drastically
compared with previous years -- which means that the 38.3-percent
Increase in rail investment has also been revised downward. The ap-
parent cut in total investment is in line with the general move to
reduce 1957 spending as a result of material shortages which became
serious in late 1956. 2?./ Figures in Table 4* confirm the shift of
investment in 1957 from new line construction to double tracking of
existing lines and in addition point up the drastic cut in over-all
railroad construction. 21/
From proposals of the Second Five Year Plan presented at the
Eighth Party Congress in September 1956 it is apparent that capital
construction expenditure is planned to be about twice the size of
that laid out under the First Five Year Plan, or about 85 billion
yuan. Industrial capital construction is to constitute about 60 per-
cent of total expenditure. The proportion allocated for transporta-
tion in the Second Five Year Plan was not announced, but with respect
to rail investment a reasonable assumption can be based on the state-
ment that 8,000 to 9,000 km of new rail lines will be built. Because
this total is twice the length of track originally projected under
the First Five Year Plan, it is assumed that rail investment during
the 1958-62 plan period will be approximately double the planned ex-
penditure of the 1953-57 plan period. Thus rail investment will con-
tinue to be about 13 percent of total planned investment expenditure. 28/
* Table 4 follows on p. 16.
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Table 4
Communist China: Railroad Construction, by Type of Line
1953-56, 1956, and 1957 Plan
1953-56
2/
19562i
1957 (Plan) 12/
Percent
Percent
Percent
Type of Line
Kilometers
of Total
Kilometers
of Total
Kilometers
of Total
New
4,387
58.2
1,747
56.2
535
28.8
Restored
324
4.3
285
9.2
152
8.2
Double track
776
10.3
210
6.8
533
28.7
Industrial branch
2,045
27.2
866
27.9
64o
34.4
Total
7,532
3,108
1,860
a. 22/
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The allocation of total rail investment during the Second
Five Year Plan among new lines, improvement of existing lines, in-
crease in rolling stock park, and planning and design has not been
announced. The Minister of Railroads has indicated, however, that
57 percent of investment in railroads will go into improvement of
existing lines during 1958-62. 11/ If this is literally true, it
represents a sizable increase over the 32.7 percent allocated for
this purpose in the First Five Year Plan. However, in view of the
extensive plans for new line construction during 1958-62, it can
be assumed that the157.percent figure also includes the allotment
for increase in rolling stock park. Comparison should then be
made with the 54.2 percent originally allocated and the 50.5 per-
cent actually achieved 12/ in the First Five Year Plan for improve-
ment of existing lines and increase in the rolling stock park com-
bined. If the 57 percent figure includes the rolling stock alloca-
tion, then 43 percent of the total will remain for new line con-
struction and planning and design as against 45.8 percent originally
allotated and 49.5 percent actually achieved in the First Five Year
Plan. 11/
1. Construction of New Lines.
During the past 6 years the Chinese Communists have
carried on an impressive railroad construction program. The task
of building a railroad system to meet the -growing requirements of
the existing industrial sector and to service the areas into which
Chinese industry and mining are expanding is a monumental one, and
apparently improvements have hardly been sufficient to cope with
the increases in generated traffic. During 1950-55 the reported
length of railroads built was about 4,o0o km. 34/ Some 1,200 km
of railroads were restored and 1,100 km of double track were laid
or restored. 35During 1953-55, about 2,640 km of new railroads
_g/
were built. 3 Hence, of the 4,o84 km of new lines originally
scheduled to be built during the First Five Year Plan, about 65 per-
cent of the goal was completed by the end of 1955.
In March 1956 it was announced that the amount of track
to be laid on new railroads during 1953-57 was to be increased from
11-,o84 to 7,592 km. 11/ Early in December 1956 the Chinese Communists
reported that the First Five Year Plan for new trunk and branch rail-
road construction had been overfulfilled by 20 km, 13 months ahead
of schedule. 1.?1 This announcement referred to the original plan
figure. From 1953 to the end of November 1956 a total of 4,104 km
of new rail lines had been constructed. 12/
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Speaking at the Eighth Party Congress in September 1956,
Premier Chou En-lai reported that new and restored rail lines would
approximate 5,500 km during the First Five Year Plan;)22./ Even if
the assumption is made that this figure referred only to new lines,
it still was considerably less than the revised goal of 7,592 km
announced in March and seemed to indicate a considerable scaling
down of plans for new construction activity in 1956 and 1957. This
conclusion was borne out by the announcement in July 1957 that track-
laying on 1,747 km of new railroads had been completed in 1956, mak-
ing a total of 4,387 km for the first 4 years of the First Five Year
Plan. /11/ Although the 1,747 km figure represents more than a
percent increase increase above the 1955 figure of 1,220 km, it still is con-
siderably less than the original 1956 Plan figure of more than
2,000 km. A further indication that new line construction was not
proceeding according to the revised plan of March 1956 was the an-
nouncement that in 1957 it would approximate only 600 km. )11/
Simultaneously the announcement was made that more than 600 km of
lines would be double tracked during 1957.)12/ These 1957 Plan
figures were later reduced to 535 km of new line construction and
533 km of double tracking, as indicated in Table 4.* Completion of
295 km of new railroad track during the first 6 months of 1957 14/
indicates that these modest 1957 construction targets probably will
be fulfilled. Thus during the period of the First Five Year Plan,
new line construction will total slightly less than 5,000 km, in
contrast to the original plan figure of 4,o84 km and the March 1956
revised plan figure of 7,592 km.
The Second Five Year Plan target of 8,000 km of new rail-
roads 142/ represents a sizable increase above the anticipated per-
formance of 5,000 km during the First Five Year Plan. It probably
means that the Chinese Communists, expect to shift a sizable portion
of their resources back into new line construction in 1958 and beyond
if they manage to bring the present imbalance between the rate of in-
crease of transport capacity and transport volume into equilibrium
during 1957. The recent completion of aerial surveying of 2,000 km
and the initiation of aerial surveying of 3,000 km of new lines in
addition indicate an intention on the part of the Chinese to continue
large-scale activity in railroad construction, even though new line
construction will be kept to a minimum in 1957. The Second Five Year
Plan also calls for 2,000 km of lines to be reconstructed and raised
to the level of first-class lines, and from 500 to 1,200 km of lines
to be electrified. LY
* P. 16, above.
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A major part of the new railroad construction has been
concentrated in the western areas of Communist China, remote from
major centers of economic activity. Extension of the railroad system
into these areas hitherto inadequately served by modern transport
apparently is designed to enable the Chinese to exploit undeveloped
mineral resources; to establish an efficient transport service to
support planned industrial centers, power developments, and agri-
cultural stations; and, to a lesser extent, to provide for more ef-
fective political control over greater areas of population. Con-
struction of the Trans-Sinkiang line northwestward from Lan-chou,
by way of Yu-men and Urumchi, to connect with the Soviet system near
Aktogay, and the projected line into the Tsaidam Basin are prime
examples of this effort. It is estimated that the 2,400-km Trans-
Sinkiang line, which was nearly half completed by the end of 1956,
can be fully completed in 1959. Although plans call for tracklaying
on this line to reach only to the Kansu-Sinkiang border by the end
of 1957,)21/ it is possible that the tracks will be extended well
beyond this point before the end of the year.
By April 1955, tracklaying was completed on the Chinese
Communist section of the Trans-Mongolian line, which provided another
link with the USSR. This line represented a continuation of work on
an additional north-south trunkline which will run parallel to and
250 km west of the Peking-Hankow-Canton line. This line, which will
pass through Pao-t'ou, Lan-chou, Ch'eng-tu, Chungking, and K'un-ming,
will ultimately provide a Chinese inner belt line linking North
Vietnam and the USSR. It will be connected with lateral east-west
routes and will provide a flexibility of rail movement never before
available in China. Various sections of this line were completed or
approached completion in 1956. Tracklaying on the 668-km Pao-chi -
Chieng-tu Railroad, which links southwest China with northwest China
was announced as completed in the middle of July 1956, 111-f/ but because
of structural deficiencies which had to be corrected, this line was
not opened even for limited through traffic before October. Repair
of the Pi-sl-chai - Ho-k'ou portion of the Hanoi-Yunnan Railroad on
the North Vietnam border was started early in August 1956. ).22/ When
completed before the end of 1957, this portion will be linked to the
Hanoi - Lao Kay section, which was opened to traffic in mid-1956.
Reopening of the entire Haiphong - K'un-ming line will permit the im-
port of supplies and equipment for railroad construction northward
from the K'un-ming area toward Ipin 22/ and will provide an outlet
to the sea at Haiphong and to south China by rail by way of Hanoi
for raw materials produced in the Yunnan area. Another railroad is
under construction which will connect K'un-ming with the Burma
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border. 51/ This projected rail line has doubtful economic value
but will significantly increase Chinese logistic capability to the
Burma border. It will, moreover, strengthen Chinese control of
Yunnan Province and may facilitate the spread of Peiping's influence
in Southeast Asia. Other important lines which were completed before
1957 were the Li-t'ang - Fort Bayard line in south China and the
Ying-tlan - Amoy (Hsia-men) line in Fukien Province, both of which
greatly increased Communist military potential in the coastal area.
In addition to trunkline construction, forestry rail-
roads are being extended in the Greater Khingan Mountains of the
northeast, .22/ and numerous branch lines are being constructed to
service new or enlarged industrial and mining installations and to
exploit sources of construction materials.
The over-all quality of railroad construction has been
relatively good. Although defects have occurred, they can be attrib-
uted in most instances either to rugged terrain, accelerated con-
struction to meet completion goals, or a combination of the two fac-
tors.
The Chinese Communists are leaning on the USSR for guidance
in planning and construction techniques, and much of their increased
capability in railroad construction can be ascribed to this technical
aid. Basically, however, the gains made in railroad construction have
been largely a result of the intensity of labor involved. Hundreds
of thousands of corve'e and conscripted workers, plus 11 divisions of
the Peoples Liberation Army, have permitted the relatively Small
nucleus of skilled railroad construction workers to achieve the goals
established by the state.
The present outlook is for some further progress in 1957
and significant accomplishments during the Second Five Year Plan.
Lines scheduled in the latter period include the completion of the
inland north-south axis, the Trans-Sinkiang line, and numerous other
interconnecting and branch lines. It is also possible that the pro-
jected Golmo-Lhasa line currently under aerial survey may be started
during this period. Construction of this line would be through some
of the most rugged terrain to be found in China.
In order to meet the plan for 1958-62, problems of ma-
terials supply, skilled labor supply, and cost reduction will have
to be solved. Based on records of past performance and on the
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expectation of continued high-priority treatment of the sector, it
is estimated that these problems will engender only local and tempo-
rary dislocations in the program.
2. Improvements in Existing Facilities.
Much attention has also been directed toward strengthening
the existing railroad system of Communist China. Nearly one-third of
planned rail investment under the First Five Year Plan was allocated
for rehabilitation of existing lines, construction or restoration of
double tracks, development df additional yard facilities, and in-
stallation of communications equipment.
In terms of line rehabilitation and improvement the origi-
nal Five Year Plan allocated 1,854 million yuan for work involving
5,806 km of track, which would amount to an average cost of about
320,000 yuan per kilometer. No data are available to indicate how
this average figure would vary among projects for double tracking,
rebuilding lines, construction of sidings, and building of yards.
The original plan goal for double tracking of existing single-track
lines was 1,514 km, or about 26 percent of the total length to be
rehabilitated and improved. In the first quarter of 1956 this goal
for double tracking was revised upward by 22.8 percent to a figure
of 1,859 km. 21/ During the first 4 years of the First Five Year
Plan, however, only 776 km of double track were laid or rebuilt --
which explains in part some of the congestion problems which arose
in 1956.
In February 1957, Peiping announced that more than 600 km
of railroad lines would be double tracked during 1957, a figure that
was later reduced to 533 km. Railroad yards in Peking, Wuhan, and
12 other key locations are to be expanded. 2L/ The reconstruction
work will have the main objective of increasing the capacity of several
major trunklines in the area bounded by the Peking-Hankow line on
the east and by the Lung-Hai Railroad on the south and will include both
these lines. 22/ During the Second Five Year Plan, double tracking of
the entire Peking-Hankow Railroad is to take place. Peking esti-
mates that once these lines are double tracked, their capacity "may
be 1 to 1.5 times greater than that of a single-track line." Z./ In
1957 the Chengchow Railroad Administration plans to lay double tracks
on four rail lines in the vicinity of Chengchow. Once these projects
are completed, "the number of trains to be dispatched daily from both
ends of the Peking-Hankow Railroad will be increased from the present
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32 pairs to 41 pairs," and on the Lung-Hai Railroad the number "will
be increased from the present 26 pairs to 4o pairs." Ei These mea-
aures should do much to alleviate the localized congestion problems
which have occurred recently on the Chinese Communist railroads.
It is readily apparent that the Chinese Communists have
embarked on a major program of construction. It is noteworthy, more-
over, in view of the large commitments of capital resources necessary
to-implement such a program, that more than 20 percent of total rail
investment during the First Five Year Plan is being devoted to the
manufacture of rolling stock and motive power. During the first 4
years of the First Five Year Plan this investment was translated in-
to more than 500 locomotives, 27,000 freight cars, and 1,900 pas-
senger cars newly built or repaired. 2131 It is estimated that more
then 25,000 freight cars out of the 27,000 mentioned above and 335
locomotives out of the 500 mentioned above represent new production.
Since 1953, Chinese production of freight cars has been made up of
50-ton cars (except for a limited number of 30-ton refrigerator cars)
rather than the 30-ton cars formerly produced. This means that the
total freight-carrying capacity has increased substantially more than
the increases in number of cars would indicate.
In order for the railroad system to continue to grow con-
currently with the economy as a whole, relatively large investments
for improvement of the system's capacity, for extension of the system,
and for increases in the inventory of locomotives and freight cars
will have to be continued. The economy will have to generate a large
measure of the resources required for this expansion, and a failure
to do so will impair the growth of the over-all economy -- more par-
ticularly the growth of the modern industrial sector.
C. Operating Efficiency.
In their quest for increased traffic capacity, the Chinese
Communists have emphasized maximum utilization of available rolling
stock. Particular emphasis has been placed on decreasing freight
car turnaround time and increasing the load per car, which, indi-
vidually, affect operating efficiency and, combined, determine mini-
mum requirements for freieit cars at given traffic levels. Success
is apparent in both these areas. It is estimated that between 1950
and 1953 turnaround time was reduced from 4.7 to 4.o days.* 62/
* Turnaround time as a measure of rail efficiency is defined in the
US as the average time which elapses between one loading of a freight
car and its next loading. In spite of gootnote continued on p. 27
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Reductions in turnaround time are not likely to continue, however,
as new lines extended into remote areas will tend to offset gains
made elsewhere, especially if economic activity is thereby stimulated
to any great extent. 61/
By 1955 the average load per loaded car had reached 32.4
tons, an increase of 22 percent above the 1950 figure of 26.6 tons.
Recent announcements indicate that the net weight per carload is to
be increased to 34.7 tons by the end of 1957. Although the 32.4
figure may seem high, it is believed to approximate closely the actual
average load per loaded car. Chinese Communist success in this respect
may be attributed to the increasing relative proportion of new cars
of 40- and 50-ton capacity as well as to the considerable volume of
heavy loading freight which the railroads are currently moving. 64/
Any continued increases in net weight per car probably will result
from increases in the capacity of cars rather than from improved
methods of loading.
At the moment, major attention is being directed to increasing
the operational efficiency of locomotives through a campaign of in-
creasing gross freight train weights. It is planned to obtain an
average gross weight per freight train of 1,480 tons by the end of
the Five Year Plan. ..;.2/ The Ministry of Railroads has promoted com-
petition among various railroad bureaus and stations for moving
record-breaking trains, thus achieving an increase in train weight
on a given line. From all reports, considerable success is being
the existence of Chinese Communist definitions of turnaround time
which appear to be identical with the US definition, an exhaustive
analysis of Chinese literature bearing on the subject indicates that
the Chinese are referring to a loaded car turnover rate, which is a
lower figure than conventional turnaround time. The actual relation-
ship existing between loaded car haul (kilometrage) and empty car
haul (kilometrage) is believed to be about 3 to 1 -- that is, 25 per-
cent of total car movement in the complete turnaround cycle, includ-
ing both empty and loaded movement, is accounted for by the empty
move. Applying this relationship to the announced turnaround figures
for each year during 1953-57 yields a set of figures varying slightly
above or below 4 days. In view of the margins of error involved in
any calculation of turnaround time, it is felt that these figures
can best be expressed by being rounded to 4.0 days. For a complete
discussion of the derivation of the 4-day turnaround time figure,
see L2/.
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obtained in this campaign. The movement of heavier trains will per-
mit an increase in the tonnage moved on a line without requiring sub-
stantial increments of investment in line improvements other than
lengthening yard tracks and sidings and increasing the weight of
rails as needed.
The Chinese Communists also report that railroad communica-
tions and signaling equipment have been greatly improved during the
past 4 years. Automatic switches and other electric signaling equip-
ment were installed on a number of railroads in 1956.
Previously Chinese Communist rail operations were limited
largely by the availability of rolling stock. In view of the success
of campaigns to increase the average net load per car, to decrease
turnaround time, and to increase the freight car inventory by pro-
duction of additional units, limitations of traffic imposed by freight
car inventory are believed to have been largely overcome. However, as
a result of the continuing increase in traffic, limitations on further
growth in the number of trains are being imposed by available track
capacity in certain areas. In part, the campaign to move heavier trains
is an attempt to alleviate this situation, but even the Chinese them-
selves have recognized somewhat belatedly that the over-all effect of
the heavier train movement will not be adequate to solve the problem.
Additional continuing investments in track and track facilities appear
to be needed if the basic congestion problem is to be rectified.
D. Performance.
Since the Communists gained control over the China mainland
in 1949 the railroads have shown progressive gains in performance
consistent with the requirements of a growing economy. The large
annual increases in tons-originated traffic can be accounted for not
only by the depressed level of performance of the economy in 1949
but also by the ability of the Chinese Communists to obtain maximum
efficiency from existing equipment and facilities and to expand fa-
cilities where the need for rail service is greatest. This
achievement has resulted in part from the fact that the railroads,
now operating on a national scale, have apparently developed an
effective centralized, but flexible, administration which has per-
mitted intensive exploitation of the railroad system.
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There is a direct relationship between production data for
basic sectors of the Chinese Communist economy and transport per-
formance. This is especially true for the railroads, whose growth
has consistently paralleled increases in production of basic com-
modities. ?..g/ Table 5* contains indexes of the growth of selected
economic sectors in Communist China during 1950-56 and compares
them with indexes of rail freight performance in terms of both tons
originated and ton-kilometers. Each of the basic industries listed,
as well as gross national product (GNP), is a fairly representative
measure of the economic activity of a country. The table shows
that in Communist China the increases in these economic indicators
parallel the increases in both ton-kilometers and tons originated on
the railroads during the same period. This correlation reflects the
fact that the increased demand from production of goods and services
has both supported and made necessary the growth of rail transport
during the period of Communist control. ..21./ Figure 2** is a graphic
representation of the indexes in Table 5.
For the 5 years following 1949, when traffic was at a low
of 48,2 million tons originated because of the economic and political
disorganization following the civil war, the Chinese Communists an-
nounced annually sizable gains in tons originated. /2/ By 1954,
freight traffic was four times as great as in 1949. 22/ As of 1954,
however, when tons originated reached 192.6 million, 22/ there were
indications that the railroads were operating under an increasing
strain which might soon become acute for both the economic and the
military sectors of China. 73/
The best criterion for comparing increases in ton-kilometer
performance with increases in tons originated on the Chinese Communist
railroads is the average length of haul, which is obtained by divid-
ing ton-kilometers by tons originated. IL4/ Figures for the average
length of haul on Chinese railroads, as derived from official sta-
tistics for 1950-56, are as follows:
Table 5 follows on p. 26.
** Following p. 26.
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Table 5
Communist China: Indexes of Growth of Selected Economic Sectors
1951-56
1950 = 100
Year
Coal
Timber
Cement
Electric
Power
Ferrous
Mining
Industrial
Production 2/
Gross
National,
Product 12/
Rail
Freight Tons
Originated
Rail
Freight Ton-
Kilometers
1951
124
103
179
127
113
139
114
111
131
1952
156
108
207
160
145
185
132
133
153
1953
163
127
279
202
223
230
145
161
198
1954
195
140
329
242
300
269
155
193
237
1955
227
156
321
270
329
281
165
194
249
1956
263
164
457
336
461
337
179
247
306
a. Excluding individual handicraft industry.
b. At factor cost in 1955 prices.
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Year
Length of Haul
(Kilometers)
1950
396
1951
466
1952
455
1953
487
1954
484
1955
507
1956
489
The indicated increases in average length of haul are in
some measure attributable to the reorientation of internal Chinese
Communist traffic which followed the Communists' rise to power.
Because of the curtailment of international ocean trade and the
reduction of coastwise water movement, internal rail traffic has
been reoriented from an east-west to a north-south pattern. This
reorientation has had the effect of increasing long-haul traffic
density and thus the average length of haul. Another factor tend-
ing to increase the average length of haul has been the powerful
Chinese effort to develop the economy of China proper at a relatively
greater pace than that of Manchuria. There is clear evidence of
this movement in the relatively greater allocation of resources to
capital construction projects in China proper than to projects in
Manchuria. 75/
As noted above, the length of haul increased from 396 km in
1950 to between 455 and 487 km during 1951-54 and then reached a
high of 507 km in 1955. Although it fell to 489 km in 1956, the
1957 Plan goal indicates that it may again rise slightly to about
494 km in 1957. Because the kilometrage of railroad lines in Com-
munist China is increasing continuously, it would be logical to
expect a gradual increase in the average length of haul during the
Second Five Year Plan period. On the other hand, increased traffic
on existing lines, especially in north China, resulting from the
large investments being channeled into their improvement could largely
offset the influence of new line construction tending to increase
the average length of haul.
Given the expansion of the economy called for under the First
Five Year Plan, the growth in rail tons originated in 1955 was ex-
pected to be similar to that during 1950-54. The announced figure
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of 193.4 million tons originated in 1955 indicates, however, that
the latter did not advance as anticipated. In fact, the increase
in 1955 above the level of 1954 was less than 0.5 percent and can
be considered negligible. The increase in ton-kilometer perform-
ance of 5 percent, therefore, resulted almost entirely from the
increase in average length of haul. In May 1956 it was announced
that the ton-kilometers of freight to be moved on the railroads in
1956 would be 9.9 percent greater than in 1955 and that the tonnage
of freight to be moved would increase 13.8 percent above the level
of 1955, 2.Y indicating a significant reduction in the planned
average length of haul for 1956. Early in 1957, however, Peking
reported that the First Five Year Plan target for rail transport
had been fulfilled in 1956, 1 year ahead of schedule. 17/ In July
it was announced that during 1956 the Chinese Communist railroads
had attained a level of performance of about 120.4 billion tkm while
originating slightly more than 246.0 million tons of freight. 78/
The average length of haul was 189 km. The ton-kilometer figure
represents an increase of nearly 23 percent above the level of 1955
and 11.6 percent above the level of the 1956 Plan. The tons-originated
figure is about 27 percent above the level of 1955 and 11.8 percent
above the level of the 1956 Plan. Planned performance goals for 1957
call for a 5.1-percent increase in ton-kilometers, to 126.5 billion,
and a 4-percent increase in tons originated, to 256 million. 12/ The
planned increases for 1957 are relatively modest when compared with the
actual increases in 1956. If the plan goals are realized, the average
length of haul in 1957 will be 494 km, a 1-percent increase above the
level of 1956.
Although the increased performance figures for 1956 are Im-
pressive, they should be interpreted in the light of the much smaller
increases in 1955. Actually it is almost impossible to find a satis-
factory explanation for the varying increases between 1954, 1955, and
1956. It is difficult, for example, to reconcile the negligible in-
crease in rail freight tons originated in 1955 with the increases in
production in 1955 in the extractive and industrial sectors of the
economy. With the exception of cement, all important commodities
showed sizable production increases in 1955 above the level of 1954.
The decrease in production of cement, however, was not enough by it-
self to affect so drastically the increase in rail tons originated.
It is possible, however, that there was a proportional drop in haulage
of all types of construction materials because more than adequate
amounts were on hand at most building sites. Another factor in 1955
could have been the inability of local mines to furnish adequate coal
to newly developed centers of demand. If the latter were forced to
order from distant mines, longer turnaround time could have reduced
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the number of freight cars available for reloading. The Chinese Com-
munists themselves have said that the increases in 1956 in rail trans-
port performance were caused by the rapid progress of industrial pro-
duction and capital construction. The western section of the Lung-Hai
Railroad, for example, which carried an average of 10 freight trains
per day in 1953, carried 17 per day in 1956 f'12/ -- a 70-percent in-
crease. Several hundred thousand tons of goods needed for new con-
struction projects were shipped to northwest China each month on
this line, fl/ and petroleum began to move in an easterly direction
from the Yu-men oilfields to the Tefineries in the coastal areas.
In the country as a whole, rail freight shipments of coal, coke, iron
ore, steel, petroleum, petroleum products, construction materials,
timber, and machinery increased greatly. f2/ It is significant that
there was enough slack in the Chinese railroad system in 1956 for it
to handle the increased amounts of traffic in spite of the congestion
which developed in numerous rail centers throughout the country.
The Chinese realize now, however, that there is little slack left
and that they must expand existing facilities in order to keep up
with increased traffic demands. The year 1957 apparently will be a
year in which the Chinese pause in their new construction program
and give primary attention to immediate and pressing problems on
the established rail lines.
Rail transport performance goals for the Second Five Year Plan
have not yet been announced. Based on the Second Five Year Plan goals
for new rail line construction, however, it has been estimated that
investment in railroads during the Second Five Year Plan will be ap-
proximately double that of the First Five Year Plan. If this turns
out to be the actual situation, it is estimated that growth in rail
transport performance will be adequate during 1958-62 to support
planned production increases in other sectors of the economy. Esti-
mates of rail transport performance appearing in Table 6* are based
on this premise.
During 1957-62, rail tons originated will increase by almost
70 percent and ton-kilometers by about 60 percent above the level of
1956 if 1950-56 trends continue. This will mean a slight decrease in
the average length of haul of about 5 percent, resulting from the re-
latively heavier amounts of traffic moving over the expanded and re-
habilitated rail lines in the older established sections of the country.
Railroads will continue to carry the predominant share of freight moving
within Communist China during this period. The railroads' share of tons
* P. 45, below.
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originated will decrease slightly to between 60 and 65 percent of
the total, but rail ton-kilometers will remain relatively constant
at about 80 percent of the total. During the Second Five Year Plan
period, railroads and all other types of transport, including primi-
tive carriers, are to be improved in order to cope with increasing
distribution requirements.
III. Highways.
A. Pattern of Operations.
Except in the northeast, where several important highways
run parallel to rail lines and provide supplementary service, motor
vehicle transport in Communist China provides feeder service for
railroads and waterways and also performs short-distance, intercity
freight movements.. Motor transport has facilitated the growth of
commercial centers in rural areas not served directly by railroads
or waterways. New feeder roads which join many scattered farming
communities to the established transportation network enable the
marketing by vehicle of commodities that previously were dependent
on animal or coolie carriers. 83/ The demand for motor transport
has also been increased with the centralization of grain procure-
ment and distribution under state control. In spite of appreciable
increases in motor traffic, however, the amount of goods moved by
truck does not bulk large in the total overland transport of China --
of the tonnage hauled annually, animal and coolie transport probably
still haul as much as if not more than motor trucks.
A major emphasis has been placed on the extension of the high-
way network to the border areas where only primitive means of com-
munication formerly existed. Construction of roads in these areas
has assisted the economic and ciatural development of racial minority
districts and has tied them more closely to the central government. L321/
Roads provide the only means of direct transportation between Communist
China and Tibet and between Communist China and the neighboring coun-
tries of Laos, Burma, India, and the Soviet Central Asian republics.
Because of intense Chinese interest in Tibet as well as the Chinese
policy of strengthening border positions, motor transport has received
considerable expansion in these areas. A further stimulus to motor
transport has resulted from the increased tempo of construction under-
taken by the Chinese, especially in areas where rail service either does
not exist or where it remains relatively undeveloped. Truck transport
in the western oilfields has been of prime importance.
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Traffic congestion which affected the railroads in 1956 ex-
tended also into highway transport. Although the tieup was not so
vital, it seems to have been proportionally worse in trucking than
on the railroads. Blame was placed on the shortage of trucks; on
the practice of using drivers on two shifts only, which left trucks
idle part of each day; and on a low proportion of operable vehicles
because approximately 25 percent of all vehicles were under repair
at a given time. The tendency of rail congestion to back up into
highway transport was also recognized. .2./ The problem was further
compounded in the southwest and in Sinkiang, where petroleum prod-
ucts were in short supply, thus increasing the difficulty by im-
mobilizing trucks just when they were most needed. The remedies
proposed involved the production of mall trailers to increase the
capacity of each truck, the training of more drivers, and the in-
troduction of the three-shift system wherever possible. leg
B. Investment.
?
The Chinese Communists have placed considerable emphasis on
road rehabilitation and on new construction, which is accomplished
primarily by manual labor because only limited mechanical equipment
is available. The First Five Year Plan is estimated to have allocated
900 million yuan for highway construction, or about 10 percent of
the total investment of new capital in transportation and communica-
tions, fI/ but by far the greater part of the total kilometrage of
road building, mostly on secondary roads, is done by local govern-
ments.
The Chinese Communists have made considerable progress in
their highway construction program. The kilometrage open to traffic
was expanded from 104,000 km in 1950 88/ to 180,000 km by the latter
part of 1956. Statistics released by Peking on highway con-
struction are very difficult to assess because of the number of
classifications (there are six different classes of motor highways)
and a tendency to obscure the distinction between new construction and
rehabilitation of existing roads. EV However, it appears that the ,
Chinese will have constructed about 9,270 km of state-built trunk
motor roads by the end of 1957, a figure which they have announced
will exceed their First Five Year Plan goal by 88 percent. 21/ During
1957, new highway trunk lines totaling about 1,120 km will be built
and opened to traffic. An important highway along the western bor-
der of China between Sinkiang and Tibet will be completed, as well
as highways near the Vietnam border and ir Fukien and Shantung
Provinces. 22/
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Continued efforts to modernize Chinese Communist highway
transport seem probable. Plans continue to provide for the survey
and construction of new roads, mainly in industrial and mining
areas or in national minority regions. 93/ The Sikang-Tibet,
Tsinghai-Tibet, and K'un-ming - Ta-lo roads are examples of this
trend. The thorough reconditioning and expansion of the Fukien
network, providing a means of logistic support in the area opposite
Taiwan, has strategic as well as economic significance. The road
to Ta-lo on the Burmese border may prove particularly significant
along with the projected railroad if it facilitates Chinese eco-
nomic penetration of Burma. II/ Transportation facilities in Yunnan
Province, particularly in the southwest, have received increasing
attention since 1952-53. As a result, by early 1955 there were in
existence or under construction three principal through motor routes
from K'un-ming to the Burmese border, with a substantial number of
alternate branch roads in the border area. Most points along the
frontier south of the Burma road are now accessible by road from
China. At present, construction work is continuing on the Sikang-
Tibet highway, and the Tsinghai-Tibet road, which was completed and
opened to traffic in 1954, is undergoing reconstruction so as to
raise its standard. 251 When the entire network is completed in
this area some years hence, facilities will exist for considerably
more effective control of the whole Sikang-Tibet area. 5LY Peking
has plans to link up all county seats in the country by the end of
1962; so the pace of the highway construction program will probably
be stepped up considerably starting in 1958. 21/
In addition to increasing and modernizing the road network,
the Chinese Communists have also been investing heavily in their
motor vehicle park. Mainly as a result of large imports of vehicles
from the Soviet Bloc, the nonmilitary park increased to more than
70,000 units by the end of 1956. 2,./ The continued import of vehicles,
coupled with domestic manufacture beginning in 1956, is expected to
bring the total park to more than 150,000 units by the end of 1960. 22/
Indigenous production of 4-ton Soviet-designed ZIS-150 trucks was
,initiated in 1956 at the No. 1 Automobile Plant at Ch'ang-chun. It
is estimated that, in spite of present difficulties, this plant may
reach full production of 30,000 units per year by 1960. .100/ One
of the US nonrepatriate prisoners of war who left China recently has
indicated that the imported Soviet trucks are not as efficient as
those which the Chinese themselves are producing. The latter are
built from a basic Soviet design (ZIS-150) which has been modified
to provide an improved suspension and an engine better suited to the
Chinese climate. 101/
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C. Operating Efficiency.
The efficient utilization of highway transport in Communist
China is hampered on many roads by physical restrictions such as
low-capacity bridges, numerous ferries, and inadequate road con-
struction and maintenance. A report of road conditions in the
Hankow area (provided by the US prisoner of war mentioned above)
indicates, however, that the Chinese have achieved some measure
of efficiency in their roadbuilding operations. This prisoner of
war was employed as a truck driver in the late summer of 1956 and
on some occasions hauled loads as far as 200 km from Hankow. Al-
though the roads he traveled had a gravel surface, they were kept
in excellent repair, and he was able in many places to drive safely
at a speed of 80 km (50 miles) per hour. 102/
Lack of adequately trained personnel has also been a prob-
lem. The same US prisoner of war stated that in addition to his
regular monthly pay he received bonuses which were based on his
savings in the consumption of gasoline and oil and necessary re-
pairs on the truck assigned to him. Most of the Chinese in his
unit were such inefficient motor vehicle operators that, by driving
carefully and by providing for necessary maintenance on his truck,
he was able to perform more efficiently than his coworkers and thus
receive considerably higher bonuses. 103/ The need for more tech-
nically trained personnel was realized by the Chinese Communists as
early as 1952, but the building of adequate training facilities, for
the most part, is still in the planning phase. Technical advice pro-
vided in many cases by the USSR, however, overcomes this deficiency
to some extent. 104/
Although the technological innovations necessary to overcome
physical limitations in highway transport have not been forthcoming
to an appreciable degree, considerable effort has been directed toward
reducing inefficient hauling. Provincial transport companies were
established under central control of the gdvernment, and a rigid
system of traffic control was introduced to allocate trucking properly.
Administrative reorganization, coupled with the introduction of
heavier loading vehicles, has undoubtedly resulted in some improve-
ment, but commodity distribution is such that trucks are still required
to operate empty about half the time. 105/
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D. Performance.
In 1952 the Chinese Communists, as a result of limitations
imposed both by the sparse network of motorable roads and by truck
shortages, originated only 20.7 million tons of freight. 106/ Ton-
kilometer performance for the same year was reported to be slightly
more than 678 million. The average length of haul was thus about
33 km. By 1954 these figures had increased to 43.5 million tons
originated, 1.87 billion tkm, 107/ and an average length of haul
of 43 km. The First Five Year Plan goals of 67.5 million tons
originated and 3.21 billion tkm for 1957 108/ were fulfilled dur-
ing 1956, more than 1 year ahead of schedule. 109/ Actual per-
formance in 1956 amounted to 79.1 million tons originated, 3.5
billion tkm, and an average length of haul of 44 km. 110/ Between
1950 and 1956, motor transport experienced an increase of more
than tenfold in tons originated and more than ninefold in ton-kilo-
meters. This pronounced rate of growth resulted largely from the
increasing demand placed on motor transport services and from the
somewhat improved position of roads and of truck inventories during
these years. Based on past trends, highway tons originated could
increase more than 160 percent and ton-kilometers nearly 250 percent
during 1956-62. Lack of good motorable roads, however, and possible
shortages of motor fuel may prevent increases of this magnitude. It
is estimated that highway traffic in terms of both tons originated
and ton-kilometers will increase by no more than 90 percent during
this period. The average length of haul should remain fairly constant
midway between 4o and 50 km. In 1956, motor trucks produced only 2
percent of total ton-kilometers in China but originated about 21 per-
cent of total tonnage. It is estimated that by 1962 these figures
will increase only to about 3 percent and 23 percent, respectively.
Table 7* contains estimates of highway traffic performance.
IV. Inland Waterways.
A. Pattern of Operations.
The inland waterway system of Communist China is one of the
most extensive in the world. Approximately 100,000 km 111/ of inland
waterway routes are now open to navigation, although most are suitable
only for shallow-draft vessels. In general, inland water transport
in China fulfills its usual role of carrying bulk cargoes where speed
* P. 46, below.
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is not of major importance. The heaviest volumes of traffic are
carried on the Yangtze River system, the Pearl River in the south,
and the Sungari River system in the northeast. In spite of the
great length of such main routes as the Yangtze, inland water trans-
port is essentially local in nature; in 1956 the average length of
haul of the modern inland water transport sector (excluding native
craft) was only 364 km. The transportation of agricultural produce,
coal, and building materials is most important on the inland water-
ways, but, as the level of the economy rises, the movement of indus-
trial raw materials and produce is becoming relatively more important.
The inland waterways fleet has grown through domestic sal-
vage and new construction rather than through imports. Powered
vessels and barges have received special attention. The self-propelled
fleet, for the most part confined to the main arteries, is estimated
to total only about 750 vessels, 112/ ranging from passenger-cargo
vessels of 4,00o gross register tons (GRT*) to smaller tugs and
launches. The nonpowered fleet still consists of a large number of
small junks and native craft which, in the aggregate, have a freight
capacity of nearly 4 million tons. 113/ On major waterways, such as
the main stream of the Yangtze and the Sungari, tug-barge units are
replacing the junk to some extent, especially on long-haul routes.
On river inlets, canals, lakes, and tributary streams, however, the
shallow-draft junk is still supreme. More than 80 percent of the
junks of Communist China operate in the Yangtze basin, along the
Huai and Han Rivers, through the Poyang Lake and Tung-t'ing Lake
areas, and among the numerous canals. Throughout the Yangtze basin
and along the Pearl River system in south China the junk is the pri-
mary means of contact between market centers and the countryside.
The junk operates largely in support of the Chinese agricultural econ-
omy and is essential in the role of collecting grain and other agri-
cultural produce and in local distribution. In addition, junks have
been used in large numbers to move literally millions of tons of dirt
and fill in support of various construction programs, such as water
conservancy projects.
B. Investment.
Investment in inland waterways in Communist China has greatly
increased during the past few years, largely because of construction
* Gross register tonnage is a measure of the cubic capacity of the
cargo space of a ship expressed in tons at the rate of 1 long ton
per 100 cubic feet.
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of new self-propelled ships and barges. Before 1954, relatively
little investment went into new vessels, most of it going to sal-
vaging vessels and rehabilitating the existing fleet. Since 1954,
emphasis has been on new construction. Relative investment for
channel improvement and similar projects is small, but appropria-
tions for construction projects have increased several times yearly
and are especially important on the local level. The sum allocated
to the development of river transport in 1957 will be 2.6 times as
great as that allocated in 1953. 114/
C. Operating Efficiency.
Efficiency in river fleet operations in China has been in-
creased under the Communists by improved organization and by central-
ization of dispatch control and cargo allocation. Voyage time for
vessels operating on scheduled runs has been reduced, in some in-
stances from one-third to one-half. On the Yangtze, routing of barges
through the entire voyage, instead of transshipping the cargo several
times, has improved transit of bulk cargoes.
During the summer and early fall of 1956, however, ports
along the Yangtze handling freight to or from Szechwan Province
experienced volumes of passenger and freight traffic which they
were unable to handle. Other inland waterways seem not to have
been affected in the same degree. Failure to increase loading and
unloading facilities in the Yangtze ports as the traffic expanded
led to an increase in the length of time vessels spent in port and
created a shortage of vessels along the river. Delays on the part
of the limited number of vessels with sufficient horsepower to enable
them to navigate the difficult Yangtze gorges presented a special
problem. Slowdown of operations because of inclement weather, delays
in vessel repairs, and a lack of warehouse and lighter space also af-
fected the handling of freight. Concerted efforts toward ameliorating
the situation were put into effect, and some improvement was noted,
but undoubtedly conditions became worse again when cargoes from the
fall harvest were ready for shipment. Because traffic is increasing
faster than the capacity of facilities, transportation along the
Yangtze is likely to be a problem for some time unless greater efforts
are made to improve the efficiency of port loading and unloading fa-
cilities and to expand the river fleet. 115J
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D. Performance.
The increased emphasis on rail transport in Communist China
has reduced the relative importance of water transport, and river
traffic still has not reached pre-Communist levels. Inland water
operations have steadily improved under the Communists, however,
and inland water ton-kilometer performance (excluding traffic Car-
ried by junks) in 1956 was nearly eight times that of 1950. The
exclusion of traffic carried by junks minimizes the importance of
inland water traffic. . There is some doubt that the Chinese know
how much traffic is moved by junks. Statements about junk traffic,
although usually vague and inconsistent, suggest that junks account
for approximately three-fourths of total inland water ton-kilometer
performance. The statistics shown in Table 8,* based on Chinese
announcements, do not include junk traffic. It is estimated, how-
ever, that in 1955 junks possibly carried about 22 million tons of
traffic in support of the general economy and, depending on the
extent to which essentially local-haul traffic is also included,
could possibly have carried more than 100 million tons. 116/ Thus
inland water traffic in 1955 in terms of tons originated, including
junk traffic, may have been from 25 to 65 percent of the amount
carried by railroads.
With continuation of the present emphasis on water transport,
the achievement of further plans for development now under way should
bring continued increases in performance. It is estimated, there-
fore, that inland water transport will continue to hold the position
attained in 1955 and 1956, as a result of the recent strain on rail
transport, the new nationwide joint land-water shipping agreements 117/
which are currently being implemented, and recent statements about
the outlook concerning the development of highway transport. During
1956-62, inland water tons originated will increase by nearly 90 per-
cent and ton-kilometers by about 100 percent. Thus by 1962 it is
expected that inland water traffic will regain its prewar peak per-
formance, but, with the growing dependence on railroads, inland water
transport is likely never to regain its relative position among Chinese
freight carriers.
* P. 47, below.
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V. Coastal Shipping.
A. Pattern of Operations.
Operations of the Chinese Communist merchant fleet are gen-
erally confined to serving the domestic coastal trade. Recently
there has been an insignificant amount of commerce with North Viet-
nam. 118/ Chinese Nationalist interdiction of coastal shipping has
diminished and at present is effective only in the Taiwan Strait
area, especially around the port of Amoy. North of Taiwan the
Chinese Communists operate unobstructed trunk and feeder passenger
and freight routes servicing all coastal ports from Foochow (Fu-chou)
northward. The largest segment of the Chinese coastal fleet is con-
centrated in this area; shipments of coal and grains and other agri-
cultural products; petroleum products; and industrial goods comprise
the bulk of traffic. A smaller segment of the fleet operates out of
Canton in south China to Swatow (Shan-t'ou) and to ports in the
Liuchow Peninsula - Hainan Island area, providing local support for
military and economic activities.
The powered merchant fleet is considerably augmented by a
large number of coastal trading junks which handle the bulk of local
service operations, particularly on the coast south of Taiwan.
Presently, foreign-flag vessels(mainly of British registry) operate
on liner service between Hong Kong and Swatow and between Hong Kong
and various north China ports, and in 1956 some British vessels oper-
ated point-to-point along the China coast for extended periods with-
out touching a non-Bloc port. Soviet vessels occasionally engage in
Chinese domestic shipping from Shanghai north, particularly during
the winter months.
The Chinese Communists are completely dependent on foreign
registered vessels, both Bloc and Free World, to handle longer inter-
national trade. During 1956, non-Bloc tonnage accounted for 86 per-
cent of all arrivals in mainland China ports, an increase of 5 per-
cent above the previous year. The remainder were mainly Soviet- and
Polish-flag vessels. There is reason to suspect, however, that about
half of the 28 Polish ships on the Baltic-China run are effectively
controlled, if not owned, by the Chinese-Polish Shipbrokers Corpo-
ration (CHIPOLBROK).
Chinese shipbuilding has advanced rapidly, largely as a re-
sult of significant assistance of material and technical aid from
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the USSR. At the principal yards at Dairen and Shanghai, vessels
of larger and more complex types have been constructed. Medium-
size merchant vessels have been produced since 1954. The Chinese
Communists have announced that they plan to begin producing 10,000-
ton (probably deadweight tonnage*) freighters in 1958, 119/ in keep-
ing with the trend toward the building of larger and more complex
steel vessels.
Between 1950 and the end of 1956, with salvage efforts,
foreign purchases, and new construction, the Chinese Communist mer-
chant fleet increased from about 79 vessels of 175,000 GRT to about
117 vessels of 285,000 GRT. Within the last 3 years the Chinese
have stepped up their foreign purchase program and presently have,
or have had, orders for new vessels with Finland, Poland, East Germany,
and Hungary. It is estimated that by 1960 the Chinese could have a
coastal fleet of 350,000 to 400,000 GRT. This would still be less
than half the size of the merchant fleet of Nationalist China in 1949.
Communist China has few good harbors. Dairen, Tientsin -
Ta-ku/Hsin-kiang, Tsingtao, Shanghai, Swatow, Canton/Whampoa,
and Fort Bayard, which combined can discharge approximately 115,000
tons daily, possess about 65 to 70 percent of the total cargo-handling
capacity of Chinese ports. Ying-k'ou, Ch'in-huang-tao, Chefoo Cfen-t'ai
Ningpo (Yin-hsien), Wenchow (Yung-chia), Foochow, Amoy, Hai-k'ou, and
Yu-lin, all of relatively minor size, are Important terminals for do-
mestic coastal trade. Amoy and Foochow, opposite Taiwan, are currently
of singular importance as possible staging areas for an offshore
island offensive against the Chinese Nationalists. 120/
B. Investment.
Investment in the merchant marine service of Communist China
apparently has been devoted in large part to modernizing the existing
fleet and improving port facilities. Terminals of importance to for-
eign trade have received special attention, as indicated by construc-
tion of a new deepwater port at Ta-ku in north China 121/ and more
recently at Fort Bayard in south China. Work on the development of
Fort Bayard began in April 1955. 122/ In early December 1956 the an-
nouncement was made that the first stage of construction had been
* Deadweight tonnage is the carrying capacity of a ship in long
tons -- that is, the difference between the displacement light and
the displacement loaded.
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completed, giving the harbor a capacity of 1.6 million tons per
year. 123/ Construction of the harbor is continuing with the ulti-
mate goal of reaching a cargo-handling capacity of 4.6 million tons
per year. 124/ Efforts to reduce the dependence of Communist China
on foreign-flag shipping for overseas and domestic trade will involve
added expenditure for the purchase and construction of additional
vessels.
C. Operating Efficiency.
A comparison of the growth indexes for the merchant marine
inventory of Communist China and its performance shows that great
strides have been made in increasing the utilization of the coastal
fleet. Much of the progress was undoubtedly due to the growing de-
mand for shipping services, the increasing level of economic activity,
and the reduction of ocean freight charges. 125/ The Chinese continue
to emphasize efficiency as a primary goal and claim some success in
its attainment. Efforts have been directed toward a more efficient
use of labor by the mechanization of cargo handling at ocean terminals,
which shortens the time vessels must spend in port, and by closer
supervision of traffic operations. Installation of radar on vessels 126/
is a recent development which will expedite ship movements during
periods of limited visibility. Shipping developments in the last
half of 1956 undoubtedly will cause greater attention to be paid to
the problem of efficiency because cargoes offered during that period
were greater than the capacity of the fleet. .127/
D. Performance.
The available merchant fleet of Communist China apparently
was able to handle all shipping requirements before the last half
of 1956. Coastal shipping performance has grown steadily; ton-kilo-
meter performance in 1956 was more than 10 times the 1950 figure,
as shown in Table 9.* The growth of merchant shipping traffic since
1949, however, has been hAmpered by the extensive loss of merchant
shipping tonnage to the Nationalists and the radical shift in inter-
national trade routes from sea to rail through the northeast, which
accompanied the reorientation of Chinese foreign trade toward the
Soviet Bloc. 128/ During 1956-62, both coastal shipping tons originated
* P. 48, below.
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and ton-kilometers will increase by about 100 percent. In spite of
this increase, coastal shipping tons originated will remain at 3 per-
cent of total tons originated and ton-kilometers at 7 percent of the
total in 1962.
VI. Civil Aviation.
A. Pattern of Operations.
Air transport in Communist China as yet plays a very limited
role in freight movement, but it is important in the movement of high-
value, low-tonnage cargo and for the transportation of high-priority
personnel. The acquisition of new aircraft of greater capacity and
better performance and the adoption of international standards and
operating procedures undoubtedly will enhance the importance of civil
aviation in the economy of Communist China.
During 1955 and early 1956 the unduplicated basic civil air
network of Communist China increased more than 21 percent from the
1954 figure of 15,700 km.to more than 19,000 km. New routes were
opened from Canton to Hanoi in North Vietnam, 129/ from K'un-ming
to Rangoon in Burma, 130/ from Urumchi to Khotan, 131/ and from
Fort Bayard to Hai-k'ou on Hainan Island. 132/
The inventory of the Chinese civil air fleet has undergone
an almost complete changeover in type of aircraft. The US-built air-
craft which formed the nucleus of the inventory used on the domestic
network have been largely replaced by new aircraft of Soviet manu-
facture. The only US-built types which remain are the post-World
War II Convair 240, an occasional C-46, and a few C-47/DC-3's now
converted with Soviet engines to Ts-62's. All the other aircraft
of the expanded fleet are I1-12's, I1-14's, or Li-2's, types which
predominate in the Soviet civil air fleet: 133/
On 2 December 1956 the new Soviet twin-engine jet, Tu-104,
inaugurated scheduled service on the Moscow-Prague-Peking route. 134/
This jet aircraft, carrying 50 passengers in a luxury version and
70 for tourist service, makes the flight at an average flying time
of 800 km (500 miles) per hour, cutting the flight time approximately
in half. The additional capacity may be compared with the 14- to 18-
passenger aircraft used within Communist China.
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In the past it has been customary for the USSR to make avail-
able to each Satellite country sharing a route with it the same type
of equipment used by Aeroflot. Three Tu-104 transports have been
purchased by Czechoslovak Airlines. 135/ If Czechoslovakia and the
USSR both use the jet over the three-country route, it is likely
that the Chinese Communists also will receive the aircraft for their
use on the jointly flown portion of the route. 136/
B. Investment.
During the period of the First Five Year Plan, 101 million
yuan were to be invested in civil aviation in Communist China. The
increase of invested capital from 1950, the year of organization of
the Chinese civil airlines, in terms of index numbers is as follows:
if 1950 invested capital equals 100, then 1952 and 1955 invested
capital equal 206 and 519, respectively. 137/ No information is avail-
able on allotments for the period of the Second Five Year Plan. It
is probable, however, that new equipment from the USSR will be paid
for on a long-term basis, under an arrangement similar to that which
was made on the return of the Soviet interest in SKOGA* to the Chinese
as of 1 January 1955.
C. Operating Efficiency.
The operating efficiency of civil air transport in Communist
China is believed to have suffered at first by the conflict in ideol-
ogies between the US-trained managerial group which defected from
the Nationalists and the Soviet-influenced Peking organization.
Political reliability apparently was placed before technical training
as a requirement of responsibility, a Communist practice which in
many cases compounds inefficiency. 138/ The conflict may have been
resolved to some extent by the standardization on Soviet equipment
and the consequent training of Chinese Communist personnel in Soviet
operational procedures.
D. Performance.
Civil air transport in Communist China has never regained its
importance as either a domestic or an international carrier since its
peak performance in 1948. Under the Nationalists the routes flown
-
were five times the 1954 total. They consisted of an extensive
,* The Soviet-Chinese Joint Stock Company for Aviation, which provided
air service between Communist China and the USSR.
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domestic network and international routes to adjacent countries as
well as to the US. In 1956, however, the Communist network began
to expand, and the January 1957 announcement of plans spoke of
16,015 km of new domestic routes to be added. 139/ Projected inter-
national services between Communist China and India, Ceylon, Cambodia,
and Japan have been rumored. 140/ The total volume of air transport
during the first half of 1956 is reported to have increased 72.5 per-
cent above the level of the same period of 1955. 141/ During the
12 months ending 15 December 1956, air transport of passengers, mail,
and freight in terms of ton-kilometers was reported to be almost
4 percent above the 1957 target. 142/
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APPENDIX A
STATISTICAL TABLES
Table 6
Communist China: Estimated Performance
of Rail Transport
1950-62
Year
AmountVolume
(Billion
Ton-Kilometers)
(Million Metric
Tons Originated)
Average Length
of Haul /
(Kilometers) 21
1950
39.375 12/
99.519 12/
. 396
1951
51.500 2/
110.500 2/
466
1952
60.153 12/
132.064 12/
455
1953
78.0571.2/487
160.437 12/
1954
93.22312/
192.603 12/
484
1955
98.127 1/
193.396 2/
507
1956
120.350
246.050
489
1957
i/
126.500 Plan) 1/
i/
256.000 Plan) 1/
494
1958
141.637 5/
289.614 5/
489
1959
154.644 5/
319.454 5/
484
1960
167,673 5/
350.526 5/
478
1961
180.723 5/
382.830 Ei
472
1962
193.795 5/
416.366 5/
465
a. Calculated by dividing ton-kilometers by tons originated.
b. 143/
c. 144/
d. T/
e. 1 6/
f. 147/
g. Projection, 1958-62, based on a second-degree parabola
fitted to 1950-57 data. 148/
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Table 7
Communist China: Estimated Performance
of Highway Transport
1950-62
Year
Amount
(Billion
Ton-Kilometers)
Volume
(Million Metric
Tons Originated)
Average Length
of Haul
(Kilometers) 2/
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
0.373 LI
0.503 E/
0.678 1/
1.182 I/
1.867 1/
2.517 1/
3.500.?../
4.021 12/
4.542 h/
5.06312/
5.584 II/
6.10512/
6.626 ly
7.448 12/
12.575 1/
20.718 12/
30.393 12/
43.538 12/
50.068 ly
79.130 E/
91.077 12./
103.024 h/
114.971 Ey
126.918 ly
138.865 h/
150.812 Ey
50
4o 2/
33
39
43
50
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
a. Calculated by dividing ton-kilometers by tons origi-
nated.
b. 149/
c. Average annual increase of 34.8 percent.
d. Ton-kilometer figure divided by estimated average length
of haul of 4o km.
e. Estimated to be approximately midway between the 50-km
figure for 1950 and the 33-km figure for 1952.
f. 150/
g. 151/
h. Straight-line projection, 1956-62, based on the average
of the absolute increases between 1950 and 1956.
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Table 8
Communist China: Estimated Performance
of Inland Water Transport 2../
1950-62
Year
Amount
(Billion
Ton-Kilometers)
Volume
(Million Metric
Tons Originated)
Average Length
of Haul i
(Kilometers) 121
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1.677 E/
2.658 1/
3.638 L/
5.631 Li
7.891 2/
10.425 E./
12.900 I/
15.802 E./
17.820 1/
19.838 1/
21.856 1/
23.874 lj
25.892 1/
4.504_
6.956 I/
9.407 2/
15.338 Li
20.476 c/
26.322 f/
35,420 0
40.573 Li
45.72612/
50.879 .12/
56.032 LI/
61.185 h/
66.338 El/
372
382
387
367
385
396
364
389
390
390
390
390
390
a. Modern transport, excluding wooden sailing vessels and junks.
b. Calculated by dividing ton-kilometers by tons originated.
c. 152/
d. Straight-line projection, 1950-52.
e. 153/
f. 154/
g. The 1957 Plan for the ton-kilometer performance of inland
water and coastal shipping combined was announced to be 26.336
billion tkm. 155/ This figure was divided according to the 1956
breakdown: 60 percent to inland water and 40 percent to coastal
shipping.
h. Straight-line projection, 1956-62, based on the average of
the absolute increases between 1950 and 1956.
i. Straight-line projection, 1957-62, based on the average of
the absolute increases between 1950 and 1957.
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Table 9
Communist China: Estimated Performance
of Coastal Shipping 2/
1950-62
Year
Amount
(Billion
Ton-Kilometers)
Volume
(Million Metric
Tons Originated)
Average Length
of Haul
(Kilometers)
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
0.822 12/
3.012 1/
5.00012/
4.654 12/
8.o4o 12/
8.384 L/
8,600 1/
10.534 E/
11.921 1/
13.308 1/
14.695 1/
16.082 1/
17.469 1/
0.828 I2/
3.581 2/
5.765 12/
5.925 LI
9.907 12/
10.450 2/
10.850 1/
13.168 11/
14.9o1 II/
16.635 12/
18.369 1.2./
20.102 .12/
21.836 11./
993 2/
841 2/
867 2/
785 c/
812 2/
802 2/
793 c/
800 1/
800 1/
800 1/
800 1/
800 I/
800 i/
a. Modern transport, excluding wooden sailing vessels and junks.
b. 156/
c. Calculated by dividing ton-kilometers by tons originated.
d. Calculated from an announcement that in 1952 tons originated were
161 percent of the level of 1951 and ton-kilometers 166 percent of
the level of 1951. 157/
e. 158/
f. 159/
g. The 1957 Plan for the ton-kilometer performance of inland water
and coastal shipping combined was announced to be 26.336 billion
tkm. 160/ This figure was divided according to the 1956 breakdown:
60 percent to inland water and 40 percent to coastal shipping.
h. Calculated by dividing ton-kilometers by average length of haul.
i. The years 1953-56 reveal a tendency for the average length of
haul to level off at about 800 km. In the absence of additional in-
formation, it is assumed that this pattern will prevail until the
situation in the Taiwan Strait region is settled.
j. Straight-line projection, 1957-62, based on the average of the
absolute increases between 1950 and 1957.
-48-
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