GROWTH OF TRANSPORTATION IN THE USSR 1948-56 AND PROSPECTS THROUGH 1961

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 75
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 25, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 25, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE rift15bRT
IsT? 159
GROWTH OF TRANSPORTATION IN THE USSR
1948 - 56 AND PROSPECTS THROUGH 1961
CIA/RR 89
25 February 1957
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6 ,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
GROWTH OF TRANSPORTATION IN THE USSR
1948-56 AND PROSPECTS THROUGH 1961
CIA/RR 89
(ORR Project 43.760)
CENTRAL INTELTIOENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
FOREWORD
The purpose of this report is to analyze and evaluate the perform-
ance of various branches of the transport sector of the Soviet economy
from 1948 to 1956 and to investigate some of the forces which have been
responsible for the annual and long-term rates of growth. A yardstick
was developed for measuring the levels of efficiency attained by the
various carriers, and a preliminary exploration of the relationships
existing between industrial output and freight ton-kilometers was under-
taken. Finslly, an investigation was made into the volume of investment
and the effectiveness with which transport capital has been utilized.
During the first half of 1956 the USSR released more transport
statistics than at any time since before World War II. Absolute values,
which so far have withstood checks for consistency, have continued to
be announced almost daily, and it is no longer necessary to depend on
vague percentage announcements for many of the performance and operating
estimates. This report is being published during a transitional period
in Soviet policy; consequently, many of the estimates contained in it
may be refined as more data are released. This situation is particu-
larly true in the field of investment; where data are limited in quan-
tity and subject to misinterpretation.
?
This report has been coordinated within ORE but not with other IAC
agencies.
-ui-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
CONTENTS
Page
Summary and Conclusions
I. Introduction
II. Transport Network
1
3
5
A.
Railroads
6
B.
Highways
10
C.
Inland Waterways
12
D.
Maritime Service
13
E.
Civil Aviation
15
III.
Performance
17
A.
Freight Traffic
24
1. Railroads
24
2. Highways
25
3. Inland Waterways
27
4. Maritime Service
28
5. Civil Aviation
30
B.
Regional Distribution of Freight Traffic
31
C.
Passenger Traffic
32
1. Railroads
32
2. Highways
34
3. Inland Waterways
34
4. Maritime Service
35
5. Civil Aviation
35
IV.
Levels of Operating Efficiency and Labor Productivity
36
A.
Operating Efficiency
36
1. Railroads
37
2. Highways
40
-v -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
Page
3. Inland Waterways
41
U. Maritime Service
44
5. civil Aviation
46
B. Employment and Labor Productivity
47
V. Demand for Transport Services
50
A. Total National Requirements
50
B. Per Capita Volume of Transport
57
VI. Transport Investment and Capital-Output Ratios
59
A. Sources of Transport Investment and Working Capital
59
B. Capital Investment
61
C. Trends in Fixed Assets
62
D. Capital-Output Ratios
63
Appendixes
Appendix A. Methodology
71
Tables
1. Estimated Distribution of Freight Traffic in the USSR,
by Type of Carrier, 1950, 1955, and 1961 2
2. Rail Construction Scheduled for the Sixth Five Year Plan
in the USSR, 1956-60 9
3. Estimated Ton-Kilometer Performance of Transport in the USSR,
by Type of Carrier, 1948-61 18
- vi -
S-E-C-R-E-T
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
4. Estimated Passenger-Kilometer Performance of Transport
in the USSR, by Type of Carrier, 194861
Page
21
5. Ton-Kilometer Performance of Transport in the US, by Type
of Carrier, 1948-55 23
6. Estimated Distribution of Tons-Originated and Ton-Kilo-
meters of Rail Freight Traffic in the USSR, by Commodity,
1955 26
7. Estimated Distribution of Tons-Originated of Maritime
Freight Traffic in the USSR, by Commodity, 1950 . . ? ? 29
8. Estimated Distribution of Ton-Kilometers on Railroads and
Inland Waterways in the USSR, by Region, 1954 33
9. Selected Measures of Operating Efficiency for Railroads
in the USSR, Selected Years, 1939-55 39
10. Estimated Performance of Motor Trucks in the USSR, Selected
Years, 1939-55
141
11. Estimated Performance of Inland Waterways in the USSR,
Selected Years, 1940-55 43
12. Estimated Index of Performance of the Maritime Service
in the USSR, Selected Years, 1940-55 45
13. Estimated Number of Employees in the Transport Sector
in the USSR, 1948-55 48
14. Index of Growth Patterns of Employment, Traffic, and Labor
Productivity in the Transport Sector in the USSR,
1948-55 48
15. Labor Productivity of Railroads in the USSR, Selected Years,
1928-55
S-E-C-R-E-T
49
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
16. Indexes of Industrial Production and of
Aggregate Freight Ton-Kilometers in the USSR,
1928-40, 1948-55, and 1960
17. Estimated Rate of Growth of Freight Traffic
and of Length of Rail Freight Haul in the USSR,
1949-55
18. Estimated Per Capita Volume of Freight and
Passenger Transport in the USSR, by Type of
Carrier, 1950, 1955, and 1961
19. Estimated Budget and Nonbudget Allocations for
Transport and Communications in the USSR,
1948-56
20. Estimated Outlays for Capital Investment in
Transport and Communications in the USSR,
1948-56
21. Estimated Fixed Assets, Investment, Output, and
Capital-Output Ratios for Railroads in the
USSR, 1924-40 and 1945-55
Illustrations
Page
55
58
6o
62
64
Following Page
Figure 1. USSR: New Lands Transportation System,
1956 (Map) 6
Figure 2. USSR: Railroad Systems, 1956 (Map) . . .
Inside
Back Cover
Figure 3. USSR: Principal Road Network)
1955 (map) 10
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
Following Page
Figure 4. USSR: Principal Inland Waterways,
1956 (Map) 12
Figure 5. USSR: Scheduled Civil Air Routes, Inside
Winter 1954-55 (Nap) Back Cover
Figure 6. USSR: Indexes of Industrial Production
and Aggregate Freight Ton-Kilometers,
1928-40, 1948-55i and 1960 (Chart) . . . 52
Figure 7. USSR: Fixed Assets and Output of
Railroads, 1924-40 and 1945-52 (Chart) . 66
Figure 8. USSR: Capital-Output Ratio of Railroads,
1924-40 and 1945-52 (Chart) 68
Figure 9. USSR: Annual Investment and Output
of Railroads, 1924-40 and 1945-55
(Chart) 68
S-E-C-R-E-T
I .
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
CIA/RR89
(ORB Project 43.760)
GROWTH OF TRANSPORTATION IN THE USSR
1948-56 AND PROSPECTS THROUGH 1961*
Summery and Conclusions
By 1948 the transportation system of the USSR had recovered from
the devastation of World War II and was ready to embark upon an expan-
sion program consistent with the needs of the growing economy. Since
1948, most branches of the transport sector have experienced high annual
growth rates; however, the railroads, with their high percentage of the
traffic load, are primarily responsible for the over-all success of the
sector.
The physical expansion of the transport network, although not static
by any means, is not receiving the emphasis given to factors which
directly influence the volume of the transport product. A greater
concentration of effort and expenditure is currently being placed upon
better maintenance of existing facilities and upon efforts to improve
operating efficiency. Planned programs for physical expansion of the
network are generally confined to the "new lands" (northern Kazakhstan
and adjacent areas) and other outlying or marginal areas.
In 1955 the transportation system of the USSR hauled approximately
1,184 billion ton-kilometers (tkm) (excluding pipelines), compared
with only 550 billion tkm in 1948. Total passenger-kilometers jumped
from 82 billion in 1948 to more than 170 billion in 1955. By 1961 it
is estimated that the economy will require approximately 1,897 billion
tkm and 305 billion passenger-kilometers. The estimated distribution of
freight traffic in the USSR, by type of carrier, in 1950, 1955, and 1961
is shown in Table 1.**
The transport sector has supported rapid advances in Soviet economic
growth and, except for temporary dislocations, has not inhibited the
industrial and agricultural growth of the economy. The transport plan
and statements by transport officials indicate, however, that planned
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent the
best judgment of ORB as of 15 November 1956.
** Table 1 follows on p. 2.
S-E-C-R-E-T
?
I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
economic growth in all sectors of the economy during the Sixth Five
Year Plan (1956-60) will require a substantial rate of growth in the
transport sector. Although there has been some talk of strain and
bottlenecks in recent years) it is estimated that planned investments
will be sufficient to enable transport to keep pace with growing traffic
demands.
Table 1
Estimated Distribution of Freight Traffic in the USSR
by Type of Carrier ani
1950, 1955, d 1961
Percent of Total Freight Ton-Kilometers
Type of Carrier
1950
1955
1961
Railroads
Highways
Inland waterways
Maritime service 12/
Other 2/
Total
85.2
2.8
6.4
5.5
0.1
100.0
84.9
3.5
5.7
5.8
0.1
100.0
80.1
4.8
6.9
8.1
0.1
100.0
a. Excluding pipelines and animal and human
carriage.
b. Including Caspian Sea, domestic, and inter-
national traffic in Soviet-flag vessels.
c. Including civil aviation and the statistical
errors caused by rounding the percentages for
the four principal carriers.
Soviet transport made great progress in operating efficiency in
1948-56. The railroads, for example, almost doubled their gross ton-
kilometers per freight-train hour during that time. In terms of ton-
kilometer performance per unit of transport capacity, maritime shipping
increased about 67 percent in 1948-56) and highway transport increased
about 21 percent. Inland waterways during the same period recorded
a substantial loss. In the field of labor productivity the index for
total transport increased from a base of 100 in 1948 to 165 in 1955.
- 2 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
In all branches of the Soviet transport sector, investment inputs
have been maintained at a low level by squeezing the maximum output from
existing plant and equipment, with minimum additions to both. It now
appears that Soviet transport has reached a near-maximum operating effi-
ciency within existing technology and that in the near future large-
scale additions to plant and equipment will have to be made, particu-
larly to railroads. An analysis of the Sixth Five Year Plan indicates
that transport officials are aware of this situation. The Plan provides
for large-scale capital equipment inputs in the form of diesel and elec-
tric motive power, extensive double tracking and electrification, and an
increase in automatic block signaling and centralized traffic control,
all of which will greatly increase the traffic capacity of the rail
lines. Comparable investments are planned for the other carriers.
The possibility of a traffic crisis in the transport sector like
that of the early 1930's seems remote. The Sixth Five Year Plan appears
to provide for adequate additional traffic capacity. Any substantial
decrease in the relative role of the transport sector also seems remote.
Soviet objectives would, however, be furthered if a reduction in the
amount of transportation per unit of industrial and agricultural output
could be effected. In spite of these objectives, the USSR has failed
to reduce transportation's share of total Soviet investment -- princi-
pally because of a failure to reduce the average length of haul.
I. Introduction.
Major factors which have shaped the transport policy of the USSR
include the following: (1) A large part of the USSR is relatively
flat plain offering few serious obstacles to the building of railroads.
(2) Most inland waterways are frozen and unusable from 3 to 9 months
of the year, and many of the navigable rivers flow through sparsely
populated areas or into the Arctic Zone, which is frozen for the greater
part of the year. Railroads, on the other hand, can be built where
needed and can be operated in most climates. (3) Because the bulk of
intercity traffic is carried by railroads, there has been little need
for paved highways other than those of local importance. (4) The bulk
of the population and resources is located inland; hence coastal mari-
time traffic is of minor significance except in the Far North and the
Soviet Far East. Air transport operations, although an insignificant
- 3 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
part of total transport, are important because they can speed key per-
sonnel and high-priority cargo to areas where no other form of transport
is available.
The uneven distribution of population and resources has created a
transport pattern that can be worked out at least expense by large-
volume land transport capable of performing fast, efficient carriage
throughout the year. The railroads can therefore be expected to per-
form the greater share of transport services in the USSR, which is one
of the leading railroad powers of the world. Stalin said in 1935:
"The USSR as a country would be impossible without first-class rail-
road transport to bind its numerous oblasts and regions into one unified
whole. In this lies the great significance of railroad transportation
to the USSR." 1/* The Soviet railroad system provides dependable and
economical communications between the industrial areas and the sources
of raw materials in the country; the rail lines are currently penetrat-
ing new regions and are making available new and greater resources.
The primary function of motor transport is the movement of freight
to and from rail stations and water depots. It also carries a consider-
able volume of local freight traffic, mostly intracity and short-haul
carriage for the industrial and agricultural ministries. Some long-haul
traffic is carried by motor vehicles, but generally such movements are
confined to remote areas which are served by no other means of transport.
The USSR also has an enormous network of inland waterways, surpass-
ing the railroads in length by some 11,000 route-kilometers. The great-
est hindrance to water transport is that navigation is interrupted for
several months each year by freezing. Furthermore, it is limited to
the natural flow of rivers and the natural distribution of lakes and
inland seas. Some of these drawbacks have been corrected, however, by
the construction of many canals and canalized routes, noteworthy among
which are the Volga-Don Canal, the Moscow-Volga Canal, and the Mariinskiy
Canal system. These and other projects have given the European USSR a
well-unified water system, linking the White, Baltic, Black, Caspian,
and Azov Seas. In spite of ambitious plans for the eastern part of the
USSR, little has actually been done to improve inland water transport
in that area.
S-E-C-R-E-T
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 :
CIA-R DP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
III. Performance.
In 1955 the transport sector of the Soviet economy produced approx-
imately 1,184 billion tion of freight haulage (excluding pipelines) and
about 170 billion passenger-kilometers (including urban transit). The
corresponding volumes for 1948 were about 550 billion tkm and about 82
billion passenger-kilometers. If pipeline movements and auxiliary traf-
fic such as rail, highway, and water transport supply movements (company
freight) are disregarded, these amounts can be said to represent the to-
tal national requirements for transport. The estimated ton-kilometer per-
formance of transport in the USSR) by typo of carrier, in 1948-61 is shown
in Table 3* and the estimated passenger-kilometer performance of transport
in the USSR, by type of carrier, in 1948-61 is shown in Table 4.**
To the extent that US experience affords an appropriate standard, the
relative volume of Soviet transport cannot be considered large. The ton-
kilometer performance of transport in the US) by type of carrier, in 1948-55
is shown in Table 5.*** The USSR has been able to run its economy with
relatively less transport than has been required by the US at similar
stages of economic development. At the same time, Soviet planners have
generally regarded the amount of transport services demanded by the
economy as excessive. Recently, however, Party leaders have recognized
the need for a well-coordinated transportation system, consistent with
the needs of the growing Soviet economy. Kaganovich stated at the XXth
Party Congress that "The growth of the national economy of our country,
the increased mighty development of heavy industry, the carrying out of
important measures adopted by the Party and the government for the raising
of agriculture, the increase in the production of consumer goods, and the
entire upsurge in socialist economy are indissolubly connected with and
depend to a considerable extent on a new upsurge in transport."lig ****
* Table 3 follows on p. 18.
** Table 4 follows on p. 21.
*** Table 5 follows on p. 23. Caution should be used in comparing
Tables 3, 4, and 5 for the following reasons: US statistics exclude
Maritime Service. Pipelines in the US account for 16 percent of total
freight ton-kilometers in 1954, but pipelines in the USSR account for
only 1.2 percent of the total. US highway statistics exclude intracity
traffic, but Soviet statistics include both intercity and intracity
traffic. Private haulage and travel, which are virtually nonexistent
in the USSR, are increasing in the US.
**** Continued on p. 23.
-17-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 :
CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 3
Estimated Ton-KilterPerfcmmance of Transport in the uszEt
by Type of Carrier
1948-61
Billion Ton-Klloneters
Year
Railroads 2/
Tariff Operating Highways 2/ Inland Waterways .5./ Maritime Service A/ Civil Aviation 2/ Total 11
19413
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960 (Plan)
1961
'.502/
525,2/
6022/
677 at
7'l?8/
195w'
8572/
971 It)/
1,050 Et/
1,130 Et/
1 210
'.82/
5419/
6129/
685 2/
7479/
8272/
8875,/
0,005 ES
1,092 ii/
1,164 11/
1,246 rs/
1,329 a/
1,415 f//
1,514 ft/
13.69/
17.41/
20.19/
22.52/
27.02/
32.09/
37.59/
42.52/
50.0 9/
58.09/
67.09/
76.02/
85.0,2/
93.0 2/
34.1 1/
41.2 2/
55.99/
51.0w
57.o "I
58.99/
62.4 tti
67.4 22/
78.0 EW
89.0 Ed
100.0 al
110.5 28/
121.3 gg/
132.0 gg/
34.59/
37.39/
39.79/
40.4 2/
54.09/
58.09/
56.6 2/
68.9 2/
83.3 W
98.3 a/
113.0 IS
128.0 W
142.9 lb/
157.5 22/
0.0529/
0.065 1/
0.1592/
0.390E/
0 222
550
637
718
799
875
566
1,044
3.0.84
1,294
1,43.0
1,527
1,644
1,765
1.897
. _
r/
0.2542/
0.285 E/
0.254 2/
0.353 11/
0.412 II/
0.570 iA/
0.529 il/.
0.588 Ai/
0.647 Ili
Et/
1,290 &
1,374 II/
1,470 22/
a. Tariff ton-kilometers represent tone-originated multiplied by the average distance which freight would move if it vent by the shortest
route. This factor is used in computing the freight rate. Operating ton-kllometers are the product of toes-originated multiplied by the
average distance actually traveled by freight. These figures are believed to exclude a significant part of the ton-kilometers moved by
the railroads for their own consumption (such as fuel, ballast, and the like) and also exclude freight hauled on lines not operated by the
Ministry of Transportation (such as lines operated by the Ministries of the Timber Industry, the Coal Industry, Ferrous Metallurgy, and
Nonferrous Metallurgy)
b. These figures are believed to include traffic handled by all udnistries.
c. Including activities of the former Ministry of the Maritime and River Fleet sal the present Ministry of the River Fleet.
d. Including Caspian Sea traffic.
e. These figures cover the scheduled operations of Aeroflot, the civil carrier of the Main Administration of the Civil Air Fleet, but do
not include Polar Aviation, regional carriers, or special services. Ton-kilometer estimates cover both air freight and air mail.
f. These totals, which are rounded, include operating ton-kilometers for railroads, not tariff ton-kilometers.
i:
J. 2/
m. This figure is estimated on the basis of a Soviet statement that ton-kilometer performance in 1959 was 15 percent above that of
1940. Ton-kilometer performance in 1940 was estimated I Ito be 35.9 bt113.00 the.
o. Highway ton-kilometer performance for 1950 through 1961 is based on statements 1 las follows:
The first I Igives the results of the Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55), states that during the period of this Plan the
number of freight ton-kilometers moved by "all-purpose" rotor transport increased 10 times and that in 1955 "all-purpose" highway transport
made up 22 percent of the total freight moved by highway 2?/ compared with 5 percent in 1950.
- 18 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
50X1
soxl
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 3
Estimated Ton-Kilometer Performance of Transport in the USSR
by Type of Carrier
19103-61
(Continued)
Ithe Sixth Five Year Plan (1956-60) provided that "automobile transport is to double approximately the
freight turnover in 19bo as tampered to 1955" and is to increase "transport for general use, raise its freight turnover to 40 billion ton-
kilometers ... or by 11.3 times as tempered to 1955." 51/ The terms all-purpose end general use are used synonymously. The raethoi used to
estireate the /Wt. =AOC! of total highway transport in 1950 and 1955 Is as follows:
General use in 1560 -- ho billion t (4.3 tins 1955)
40.0
General use in 1955 -- . 9.3 billion it
General use in 1950 -- 211 . 0.93 billion tko
Total in 1950 -- 121 x 100 . 18.6 billion tko
5
Total In 1955 x 100 . 42.3 billion it
22
The third l gives an absolute figure of 42.5 billion tkm for 1955. 51/ Assuming that this figure is correct,
Total in 1960 -- 42.5 x 2 . 85 billion Um
The estimates for other years between 1950 and 1959 and for 1561 are graphic projections.
p.2/
q. Absolute figures for 1950, 1954, and 15551 Ton-kiloccter performance for 1951 has not been announced by the
UETM1. Anouncements for other years state that ton-kilometer performance for 1952 was 109 percent of that in 19511 1953, 109 percent of
1952; 1954, 118 percent of 1953; and 1955, 122 percent of 1954. De interpolating these percentage* for the year* before 1955, on estimate
of 40.36 billion Um was obtained for 1951. 11/
s. An increase of 12 percent above the level of 1950. 13/
t. 612/
v. LE/
v. An Increase of 191 percent above the level of 1940, which was 433 Una.
y.x. sg
a. n/ This figure is based on an increase in tariff ton-kilarreters of 142 percent in 1954 above the level of 1950. On the basis of
Soviet indications that there was considerable circuitous healing in 1954, however, It is estbrated that the excess of operating ton-
kilometers above tariff tan-lillaseters was 3.5 percent In 1954, ea:pared with approximately 2 percent in 1950?
as. Ton-kilometer performance rose 6 percent above that of 1953. 71/ This atatement is supported by a Soviet press statement that the
1954 cargo turnover was 36.7 percent above the level of 1950. r/
bb.
cc. gs figure is based on a 3.5-percent excess of operating above tariff tonakilometers.
as. Figures for 1956-59 and 1961 are graphic projections based on past performance and the 1560 Plan.
ff. This figure is based on a 3-percent excess of operating ton-kilometers above tariff ton-kilometers. There is every indication that
the LBO is concerned about the percentage spread between tariff ard operating ton-kilcoeters. It is believed that during the Sixth rive
Year Plan some progress will be made toward decreasing the spread Cram the currently estimated 3.5 percent to 3 percent.
- 19 -
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
50X1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 3
Estimated Ton-Kilometer Performance of Transport in the UESR.
by Type of Carrier
1948-61
(Continued)
gig. This figure is based on the Sixth Five Year Plan, which provides for an increase of about eo percent in 1960 above the level of 1955.
Figures for the intervening years and 1961 are gzaphic projections based on Plan forecasts and past performance. 7.2/
hh. This figure is based on a "cargo turnover Lin 1962/ of apprmitnately 2.1 times" the level of 1955. Figures for the intervening years
and 1961 are graphic projections based on past trends and the 1960 Plan. 7.?/
11. The Sixth Five Year Plan provides for a 100-percent increase in freight ton-kilometers in 1960 above the, level of 1955. rd Figures
for the intervening years aid 1961 are graphic projections.
jj. The Sixth Five Year Plan gives ton-kilometer performance in 1960 as approximately 1,374 billion, an increase of 42 percent above the
level of 1955.
- 20 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-EC-R-E-T
Table 4
Estimated Passenger-Kilometer Perfonnuice of Transport in the TEM
by Tine of Carrier
1948-61
Billion Passenger-Kilometers
Year
Railroads W
Highways W
Inland Waterways W
Maritime Service V
Civil Aviation W
Total
1948
75.09/
3.4 8/
2.39/
1.101/
0.55
82.35
1949
81.3 j/
4.3 a/
2.59/
1.151/
0.68
90.13
1950
88.0W
5.2g/,
2.79/
1.20
1.03
98.28
1951
98.59/
6.7 9/
2.99/
1.25W
1.3/49
110.84
1952
107.49/
9.0 2/
3.19/
1.309/
1.80
122.60
1953
115.03/
12.09/
332/
1.359/
2.11
133.76
1954
129.1 1/
14.19/
3.52/
1.40 2/
2.41
150.51
1955
141.149/
20.9 EL
3.69/
1.50 2/
2.72
170.12
1956
158.0 3/
30.0 3/
3.7 2/
1.55 V
3.50
196.75
1957
169.09/
38.09/
3.8p/
1.60 3/
4.50
216.90
1958
180.09/
56.09/
3.92/
1.653/
6.co
237.55
1959
191.09/
55.09/
14.09/
1.703/
8.00
259.70
1960
205.0 2/
62.79/
5.19/
1.753/
10.34
283.89
1961
215.o!/
71.0 2/
4.29/
1.803/
12.60
304.60
a. Including all paying passengers in local, suburban, and long-distance rail movement.
b. These figures are believed to include all highway passenger movements performed by all mirdstrien, but exclude
private automobiles.
c. Including activities of the former Ministry of the Maritime and River Fleet and the present Ministry of the River
Fleet.
d. Including Caspian Sea traffic.
e. These figures cover the scheduled operation of Aeroflot, the civil carrier of the Main Administration Of the
Civil Air Fleet and do not include Polar Aviation, regional carriers, or special services. These estimates are
eased on data The projection to 1961 is based on the girth Five Year Plan. 10/
f. No announcement of either the Plea or PLui fulfillment has ever been made for 1P43. The estimate of 75 billion
passerger-A110motero is rade arbitrarily on the basis of pre-1948 performance.
g. This estimate in based on prewar and postwar performance. IV
h. This estimate in based on a straight-line trend from the passenger-kllameter performance of 1.66 billion reported
for 1945 to the Plan figure of 2.7 billion fOr 1950. Egt
1. Iltie estimate is based on the assumption that performance was not quite at the pnnmo. level. In 1939, passenger-
kilometer performance was Boo million. The highest prewar performance, in 1932, was 1 billion passenger-kilo-
meters. ?3./
J? 83/4
:I. Figures for 1950 and 1954
tent with these date.
n. 88
P. M/
q. 21/ This figure representsanineecteof
r. Figures for 1954 and 1955
trends and from ftegoentary data concerning fUt
times the 1955 figure. 23/
a'
Figures for the intervening years are estimates which are congas-
22 rcent above the level of 1950.
The estimates for other years were projected graphically fran pest
ure expectations for motor transport. The estimate for 1960 is three
- 21 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
50X1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 4
Estimated Passenger-Kilcceter Performance of Transport in the USSR
by Type of Carrier
194R-61
(Continued)
t. This figure represents an increase of 47 percent above the level of 1950. g
u. This figure represents an increase of 61 percent above the level of 1950.
v.271
v. This figure is a projection based on pest trends; no Plan announcements have been made. There were comparable
increases (61 percent) in freight and passenger traffic during the period of the Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55).
Because freight is to increase 42 percent in the Sixth Five Year Plan (1955-60), an increase of 42 percent is also
assumed for passenger-kilometers.
x. This figure is estimated on the assumption of alight increases in performance because of more emphasis on vacation
trips, vorker rewards in the form of Black Sea and Caspian Sea excursions, and similar civilian traffic. Such traffic
accounts for a large part -- perhaps the greater part -- of seaborne passenger transport in the lima.
- 22 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 5
Ton-Kilometer Performance of Transport in the US by Type of Carrier
1948-55
Billion Ton-Kilometers
Domestic
Commer-
cial Ai-
Year Railroads hi Inland Waterways a/ Highways 41 lines 2/ Total
1948
931
236
166
0.203
1,333.2
1949
769
203
182
0.240
1,154.2
1950
859
238
248
0.290
1,345.3
1951
944
266
266
0.303
1,476.3
1952
898
246
269
0.336
1,413.3
1953
884
295
317
0.366
1,496.4
1954
802
254
313
0.394
1,369.4
1955
905
292
357
0.592
1,554.6
a. No entry is made for Maritime Service, because these statistics are
not available. Inland Waterways excludes all intercoastal movements and
all coastwise movements outside the intracoastal canal system.
b. 218/
d. 100/
e. 101/. The figure for 1955 is a preliminary estimate.
An analysis of the Sixth Five Year Plan and a projection of the past
relationship between industrial output and freight traffic indicate that
the USSR will demand approximately 1,897 billion tkm (excluding pipe.-
lines) of freight traffic in 1961. Passenger traffic at the end of
1961 will approach 305 billion passenger-kilometers, counting all means
of passenger transport.
- 23 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
A. Freight Traffic.
1. Railroads.
The volume of rail freight turnover in the USSR, measured .
in operating ton-kilometers, grew from 468 billion tkm in 1948 to approx-
imately 1,005 billion in 1955, or an increase of about 114 percent (see
Table 3*). During the! period 1948-55 the Soviet railroads' share of
total traffic remained rather constant at about 85 percent of total ton-
kilometer movements, thus reflecting a failure on the part of Soviet
transport officials to' shift a greater share of the transport burden to
other carriers.
Although direct comparisons of railroads in the USSR with
those in the US must be made with some caution because of the increasing
volume of traffic handled by the other US carriers, it is noteworthy that
the US Class I railroads produced only 802 billion tkm in 1954 compared
with 931 billion in 1948 (see Table 5**). The US railroads, therefore,
have been recording substantial losses in ton-kilometers since 1948, but
Soviet rail performance has more than doubled during the 1948-55 period.
This is not a reflection of a reduction in total transport performance
in the US but rather of its distribution among the various carriers.
Accordingly, the US railroads have shown a decline in their share of
total traffic; in 1954 they moved 49.5 percent of the total ton-kilo-
meters compared with 64.4 percent in 1948. 122/
A review of the planned development for railroads indicates
that the Soviet economy will require the production of approximately
1,415 billion operating tkm (1,374 billion tariff tkm) of rail traffic
in 1960, the last year of the Sixth Five Year Plan. By the end of 1961,
rail traffic probably will reach about 1,514 billion operating tkm (see
Table 3*). Such increases mean that the Soviet rail system will be
hauling 42 percent more traffic in 1960 than in 1955. An increase in
performance of this magnitude might seem to be optimistic planning;
however, in view of the 64-percent increase achieved in the Fifth Five
Year Plan, it would appear reasonable to expect the railroads to accom-
plish the planned goal by 1960. If the total industrial output of the
USSR is to increase by about 65 percent during the forthcoming plan
period, the railroads can do no less than the planned 1,415 billion
* P. 18, above.
** P. 23, above.
-24-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
operating tkm (1)374 billion tariff tkm) in 1960. An expansion of this
magnitude) however) would seem to depend upon large capital outlays
during the period. In order to cope better with such increases, the
Plan provides for the widespread use of diesel and electric traction)
so that by 1960 such motive power will account for 40 to 45 percent of
the total freight performance compared with 14 percent in 1955. 103/
Furthermore, large-capacity cars, more automatic block signaling, some
centralized traffic control, and an increase in the system's route
kilametrage -- all of which are provided for in the Plan -- should
greatly increase the traffic capacity of the railroads.
Soviet rail operations consist largely of the movement of
a few bulk commodities. The estimated distribution of tons-originated
and ton-kilometers of rail freight traffic in the USSR, by commodity,
in 1955 is shown in Table 6.* Coal, the largest single item shipped,
comprises about 31 percent of total tons-originated, although its
relative share of ton-kilometers (27 percent) is somewhat lower be-
cause of an average length of haul of approximately 686 km compared
with an average, of 766 km for all commodities. 104/ The locational
factors tending to raise the average distance over which coal is shipped
do not appear to be changing; consequently, coal is expected to continue
to account for no less than 25 percent of total rail ton-kilometers
through 1961. Trends for most commodities since the 1930's indicate
that the percentages given in Table 6 should remain fairly constant
through 1961.
. 2. Highways.
Considerable achievements have been made in Soviet motor
transport during the postwar years. During 1948-56, performance rose
at an average annual rate of approximately 17 perdent-(see Table 3**).
This relatively constant growth rate can be attributed mainly to the
increase in truck inventory, because the road net has not been improved
significantly and utilization of equipment has remained rather constant.
During the period of the Sixth Five Year Plan the USSR in-
tends to double the volume of highway transport, which will bring per-
formance to approximately 85 billion tkm in 1960. This increase is
comparable to growth rates of recent years -- during the Fifth Five
Year Plan, actual performance was estimated to have increased about
* Table 6 follows on p. 26.
** P. 18, above.
- 25 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
111 percent. Of particular interest is the fact that the Plan provides
for the share of highways in total traffic to increase from 3.6 percent
in 1955 to 4.8 percent in 1960. The increase in the share of motor
traffic should produce a corresponding reduction in the share of rail
traffic.
Table 6
Estimated Distribution of Tons-Originated and Ton-Kilometers
of Rail Freight Traffic in the USSR, by Commodity 2/
1955
Percent
Commodity
Tons-Originated
Ton-Kilometers
Coal
31
27
Petroleum
6
10
Ores
7
5
Ferrous metals
6
8
Timber
7
12
Firewood
1
1
Grain
5
6
Mineral construction materials
19
8
All others
18
23
Total
100
100
The Sixth Five Year Plan provides that motor vehicle produc-
tion by 1960 will be at an annual rate of 650,000 units, or 146 percent
of the 1955 rate. Much consideration will also be given to the produc-
tion and use of large tonnage trailers and more efficient motor vehicle
engines. Of equal importance is the plan to place about 50 percent of
the highway haulage under general or central pools, thus eliminating
much of the activity now being aaministered by the agricultural, extrac-
tive, and industrial ministries. All of these innovations, aimed at
increasing vehicle and highway utilization, will be major factors in
increasing the role of motor transport in the Soviet economy.
-26-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
3. Inland Waterways.
In 1955, inland water transport performance in the USSR in
terms of ton-kilometers was about 47 percent above the 1950 level (see
Table 3*). Tons-originated during these years grew at a slightly lesser
rate because of progressively increasing average lengths of haul. 12W
In spite of these steady improvements in the postwar era, inland water
traffic has consistently fallen short of performance plans. These trends
are significant because inland water freight traffic did not substan-
tially exceed the pre-Revolutionary level until about 1948. As early as
1913 the waterways handled about 29 billion tie. 12// By contrast, the
railroads in 1954 were producing some 13 times as many ton-kilometers of
freight traffic as in 1913. 12?/ Continued emphasis, however, on inland
water transport should bring performance close to the level forecast by
the Sixth Five Year Plan for 1960, when it is estimated that about 121.3
billion tkm of inland water freight traffic will be required to support
the Soviet economy. This upward trend is expected to continue through
1961, when performance should reach 132 billion tkm. An important fac-
tor in raising the performance to the 1960 Plan goal will be the increase
in fleet capacity planned for the waterways. The opening up of new river
ports, the deepening of many channels, and an increase in labor produc-
tivity by 35 percent in 1960 above the level of 1955 should also con-
tribute toward increasing the ton-kilometer performance.
As stated above, rail freight traffic is dominated by coal.
By contrast, inland water freight traffic is composed largely of two
basic commodities, timber and petroleum. In 1950, of the total waterway
movements planned, timber accounted for 45 percent, petroleum 27 percent,
and all other traffic only 28 percent. 122/ As measured in tons-orig-
inated, timber has consistently made up well over half the total tonnage,
but the distance it is carried on the average is below that for petrol-
eum and other freight- 112/ Its position, therefore, in total ton-kilo-
meters is somewhat smaller than 50 percent.
The average composition of traffic is expected to remain
rather constant throughout the 1955-61 period, although in certain areas
there may be relative shifts in the commodity makeup of traffic. In the
Volga-Don area, for example, there could be a diversion of more coal
traffic to the water carriers. The emphasis on the new lands in Central
* P. 18, above.
-27-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
Asia will no doubt increase the volume of grain traffic on rivers in
that area. Any buildup of economic strength in the Far East) moreover,
will increase the volume of shipping on the Amur River system.
it. Maritime Service.
Maritime traffic during the Soviet era in the USSR, like.
that of the inland waterways, has grown relatively slowly compared with
the railroads. There have been impressive gains from time to time) but
the total traffic moved remains a minor portion of the total. Expan-
sion, however, has been considerable during the recovery period follow-
ing World War II. Traffic during 1955 amounted to 68.9 billion tkm,
representing an increase of 74 percent over 1950 (see Table 3*). Part
of this significant increase, which is 12.3 billion tkm above the level
of 1954) results from the USSR's having placed in service 115,000 dwt of
tankers during the year. 111/ These new vessels for the most part were
placed in the long-haul Black Sea - Far East petroleum trade and conse-
quently contributed materially to increased ton-kilometer performance
in 1955.
Even though vast areas in the Polar regions and the Far East
depend almost entirely upon ocean shipping for economic and military
support, the Caspian Sea traffic, which is composed largely of petroleum,
has accounted for virtually one-third of all maritime ton-kilometer move-
ments. Recently) however, there appears to have been a shift in the
distribution of traffic among seas contiguous to the USSR, with the share
of the Far East increasing. Kaganovich reported in 1954 that some 26
percent of all maritime freight shipments took place in the Far Eastern
basin'. 112/
Petroleum accounts for approximately 65 percent of total
maritime traffic) but only 6 percent of total rail traffic. The esti-
mated distribution of tons-originated of maritime freight traffic in
the USSR, by commodity, in 1950 is shown in Table 7.**
Performance by the maritime fleet in 1960 is planned to in-
crease 2.1 times above the level of 1955. Projections to 1961 indicate
approximately 157.5 billion tkm for that year. The fleet, however, must
receive the capital investment planned during the Sixth Five Year Plan
period in order to realize Plan fulfillment in 1960. During the
* P. 18, above.
** Table 7 follows on p. 29.
-28-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 :
CIA-R DP79 R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
forthcoming Five Year Plan, the fleet is to receive an increase of 1.14
million dwt of dry-cargo capacity and an increase of 460,000 dwt of tank-
er tonnage, thus increasing present fleet tonnage by approximately 35
percent.
Table 7
Estimated Distribution of Tons-Originated
of Maritime Freight Traffic in the USSR
by Commodity 2/
1950
Percent
Commodity
Tons-Originated
Petroleum
65.0
Timber
5.6
Coal
4.9
Ores
4.7
Mineral building materials
2.3
Iron and steel
0.9
All others
16.6
Total
100.0
At the XXth Party Congress, Kaganovich pointed out some of
the deficiencies of water transport, as follows:
The relative proportion of shipment by cheaper kinds
of transport, such as water ... remains too law. Partip-
ularly unsatisfactory use is being made ... of the so-
called small rivers. In spite of radical reconstruction
... our waterways are still being used in an extremely
inadequate manner. It cannot be tolerated that tens of
millions of tons of freight ... are carried by rail par-
allel to the ... rivers. Great possibilities for re-
ducing excessively distant shipment of freight by rail to
the Far East will be effected by greater use of the Arctic
waterway and by increased transport of freight by long-
distance coastal traffic from Black Seaports. 114/
- 29 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 :
CIA-R DP79 R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
Thus it appears that the water carriers will be under more pressure in
the future to meet Plan goals than in the past.
5. Civil Aviation.
Data on the postwar volume of air freight traffic in the
USSR are scarce and conflicting and give rise to widely divergent esti-
mates, depending on the assumptions employed. Estimates of air freight
ton-kilometers are subject to a wide range of error. The volume of
freight moved by air transport is negligible relative to other carriers
(see Table 1*), however, and the discrepancies thus are not significant
in a comprehensive index of all freight transport media.
an 85-percent gain
was registered in air freight traffic for_1955 above the level of 1950
(see Table 3**). Although the estimated 294 million tkm moved in 1955
represent substantial progress in recent years, the relative gains are
not appreciable because of the small initial base. The substantial
increases achieved can be attributed, however, in large degree to new
route acquisitions. Aeroflot has taken over the Magadan area as well
as additional routes in the Arctic which were formerly flown by Polar
Aviation. 1252 Increases in the number of flights on many routes and
interchange agreements with several foreign carriers have also contrib-
uted toward significantly increasing ton-kilometer performance.
Air transport in the USSR has been of primary importance in
speeding key personnel and high-priority cargo to areas in which no other
form of transport is available. There is no doubt, however, that the
strategic importance of air power has reinforced economic considerations
in fostering the postwar rise of air transport. The limiting factor of
expansion has been Aeroflot's dependence on obsolete two-engine trans-
port aircraft.
The Sixth Five Year Plan provides for doubling the civil air
ton-kilometer performance in 1960 compared with 1955. Any increase of
this magnitude is dependent, first, upon the receipt of modern transport
aircraft, and, second, upon the successful introduction of such aircraft
into regular commercial service over domestic and international routes.
* P. 2, above.
** P. 18, above.
- 30 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
In addition, the ton-kilometer estimates for the period 1956-61 depend
upon the progressive absorption by Aeroflot of Polar Aviation and
regional routes.
Introduction of the TU-104 into regular commercial service
over the civil air routes was inaugurated in 1956. The use of this
aircraft with its increased speed (800 km per hour) and its capacity'
of 50 to 70 passengers would greatly augment the potential of Aeroflot,
hitherto limited to 2-engine, 18- to 21-passenger aircraft. llg
Additional high-performance aircraft -- a 4-engine jet, the TU-114,
and a 4-engine turboprop) the IL-18 -- probably will be in operation
by 1961.
B. Regional Distribution of Freight Traffic.
The Moscow (Region VII*) and Leningrad (Region I) areas generate
the greater portion of the freight traffic of the USSR. The eastern
Ukraine (Region III) is a substantial exporter of primary commodities
and fabricated goods to other regions of the USSR. The Urals (Region
VII) and the Kuzbas (Region IX) are not yet equal in industrial growth
to the old eastern Ukrainian industrial complex. There has been a
significantly higher rate of growth in this second industrial base,
however, than in the Ukraine.
The Volga basin (Region VI), which tended to lag during the
1930's) has been the scene of especially rapid industrial growth during
and since World War II. Consequently) whereas the freight traffic of
this area used to consist primarily of through traffic to or from Cen-
tral Asia (Region Xb) and Kazakhstan (Region Xa) and the southern Urals)
such traffic is now combined with a large volume of local freight traffic.
In East Siberia (Region XI) there appears to be less evidence of
rapid industrial development. On the other hand) since the late 1940's
an increasing volume of trade with Communist China moves overland on the
Trans-Siberian Railroad.
* The term region in this report refers to the economic regions
- 31 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
The estimated distribution of ton-kilometers on railroads and
inland waterways in the USSR by region, in 1954 is shown in Table 8.*
hthese percentages probably did
not change appreciably during 1955. Current data will not permit a
breakdown of the maritime and highway traffic.
C. Passenger Traffic.:)
. Railroads.
Rail passenger traffic is of considerable economic impor-
tance in the USSR because of the great extent of Soviet territory and
the virtual absence of private automobile traffic. Its significance as
a transport activity in comparison with freight traffic, however, is
secondary. Restrictions on the freedom of individual movement, more-
over, have seriously affected the absolute volume of Soviet rail pass-
enger traffic.
Since 1948 there has been a steady growth in passenger-
kilometers performed by the railroads -- the 1940 level of 95.4 billion
passenger-kilometers was reached again in 195], when 98.5 billion tkm
were performed (see Table 4**). 11// Passenger-kilometers in 1955 had
reached a level only 48 percent higher than in 1940; however, freight-
kilometers during the same period showed a 142-percent gain. The gap
between the rates of growth of passenger and freight operations. probably
,will be narrowed during 1956-61 because personal travel is expected to
increase as a result of continued economic development, an expanding
population, further urbanization) and relaxation of controls on personal
movement.
The statistics given on rail passenger traffic (see Table 4)
include both so-called long-distance passenger movements and commuting
(intercity and urban, including Moscow subway) traffic Because of the
method of reporting, it appears impossible to isolate urban passenger
movements from the total with any degree of accuracy.
however, urban movements inflate the total
passenger-kilometer figure for any given year no more than 25 to 30
percent because of the short length of the average urban passenger
trip. 1.12/ The Sixth Five Year Plan announced no statistics for rail
passenger traffic.
* Table 8 follows on p. 33.
** P. 21, above.
-32-
S-E-C-R-E-T
50X1
50X1
QUA I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 8
Estimated Distribution of Ton-Kilometers on Railroads and Inland Waterways
in the USSR, by Region 2/
1954
Percent
Region
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII
/ (North (Kazakhstan
Transport and (South- (Trans- (West and (East (Far
i
Sector Northwest) 22211 1?sal _22E11_ Cat (Volga) (Central) 1112allil Siberia), Central Asia) Lisa' EEIEL1 Total
e
Railroads
5
1
25
5
3
6
19
10
8
9
5
4
100
Inland
waterways
20
3
6
3
Negligible
17
27
7
6
.
3
4
4
100
a. 319/
- 33 -
S -E -C -R -E -T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
2. Highways.
Available data concerning the volume of highway passenger
traffic in the USSR are in-most instances divided into three categor-
ies -- urban, suburban, and intercity. Reported statistics overlap in
most cases, and total passenger-kilometer figures cannot be derived from
them with any degree of accuracy. Except for 1950, 1954, and 1955, the
estimates recorded in Table 4* are not very reliable for individual
years) because they are based entirely upon a straight line projection,
although they do reflect the Soviet planned rate of growth and appear
to be in the proper magnitude.
Bus service is becoming increasingly available throughout
the USSR. Intercity bus service has shown an appreciable rate of growth)
especially in the Soviet Far East) during recent years. Highway passen-
ger transport has not been substantial, because of the lack of automobiles
for private travel. It is anticipated that private Soviet citizens will
not be able to own automobiles for some years to come; thus a constant
expansion of the public means of passenger transport by highway will be
necessary.
The Sixth Five Year Plan) however, provides for a threefold
increase in the movement of passengers by automobile in 1960 above the
level of 1955. This increase obviously refers to passenger transport
by "for hire" vehicles such as taxicabs and does not include private
automobile traffic. During the same period, passenger-kilometers by
motor bus are to increase 3.5 times above the level of 1955. Such plans
imply that the passenger vehicle and bus inventory will greatly increase
in size and utilization. Judging from past performance records, it
appears likely that passenger traffic will fall short of its projected
goal for 1960.
3. Inland Waterways.
Inland waterways play a minor role in the field of passenger
transport in the USSR (see Table 4*). The coverage of passenger trans-
port for inland water, like that of the other carriers, is considerably
less extensive than that for freight traffic. Absolute values are
reported for 1950, 1954, and 1955, but Plan announcements are virtually
the only sources for the other years.
* P. 21, above.
-34-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
During the First Five Year Plan the waterways accounted for
about 5.3 percent of total passenger-kilometers) but by 1938 their share
of the total had fallen to 2.5 percent. 120/ It is estimated that inland
waterway traffic in 1950-56 increased about 33 percent and rail traffic
about 61 percent -- thus the waterways' share of the total has continued
to decline. 121/
new passenger launches, ferries) 50X1
and similar craft are being added to the inland water fleet, but it is
believed that such additions will have little) if any) influence upon
elevating the relative role of the water carriers in passenger transport.
Because water transport is inherently slow, it has generally been em-
ployed in local short-haul ferry service and for pleasure cruises; very
little long-haul traffic has been reported. It is estimated that the
passenger traffic trend through 1961 will be toward a leveling off in
water transport, with the greater percentage increases going to highway
and air transport. Performance for 1961 is estimated to be 4.2 billion
passenger-kilometers)..an estimated increase of only 17 percent in the
6-year period preceding (see Table 4*).
4. Maritime Service.
The performance of the Soviet merchant fleet in 1955 is
estimated to be 1.5 billion passenger-kilometers, less than 1 percent
of total passenger-kilometers for all means of transport (see Table 4*).
Although maritime passenger transport performance increased by approxi-
mately 36 percent in 1955 above the level of 1948, it probably will in-
crease by only 20 percent in 1961 above the level of 1955 (see Table 4*).
The small increase appears plausible because of the nature of domestic
maritime passenger traffic in the USSR, which generally is limited to
regions not served by other modes of transport and to short-haul service
or pleasure cruises on Soviet-controlled seas.
5. Civil Aviation.
Civil aviation passenger traffic increased fivefold between
1948 and 1955, principally because of the expansion of operations to
Communist China and the addition of routes in the Far Eastern USSR. The
movement of priority traffic in both passengers and property has always
been emphasized in the USSR, and property traffic has been relatively
* P. 21) above.
-35-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
more important than in Western airline operations. 1.22/ Recently, how-
ever, there has been a trend to a more conventional type of air opera-
tion which gives greater consideration to passenger traffic.
Several factors have hindered the growth of the volume of
passengers carried by air. The USSR has relied on the DC-3 type of
twin-engine aircraft, which is capable of carrying only 14 to 21 passen-
gers. la/ As a consequence, the cost of air passenger traffic is con-
siderably higher than the other passenger services. Also, air passenger
traffic 'is rigidly controlled in the USSR, and a system of priorities
limits passenger travel to members of the bureaucracy and various civil
Military missions. lgj
'Passenger-kilometer estimates for 1948-61 are given in
Table 4.* The Sixth Five Year Plan stated that the volume of air pas-
senger transport in 1960 will be roughly 3.8 times the 1955 volume. An
increase of this magnitude, like that planned for air freight, is depend-
ent.upon Plan fulfillment for the production and delivery to Aeroflot of
fast, efficient, high-capacity aircraft. Receipt of the TU-104 by Aero-
flot will vastly increase passenger traffic potential over all Soviet
civil air routes. The increased capacity of 50 to 70 passengers, to-
gether with the high speed of the Aircraft, probably will facilitate the
accomplishment of the Plan. By 1961 a 4-engine turboprop, the IL-18, and
a 4-engine jet, the TU-114, probably will be in operation and will give
additional impetus to the growth of passenger traffic volume.
IV. Levels of Operatin% Efficiency and Labor Productivity.
A. Operating EffiCiency.
There are indications that the general level of operating effi-
ciency in the transport sector of the Soviet economy has not risen
significantly since the end of 1954. The railroads were able to increase
their operating efficiency in 1955, as in other recent years. Highways
showed a small increase, but inland water transport registered a net
loss in efficiency measured in annual ton-kilometer performance per
unit of transport equipment. The extensive efforts of transport offi-
cials to raise levels of efficiency through the optimum use of trans-
port facilities and equipment are indicative of the pressures under
which the transport system is operating in order to meet requirements.
* P. 21, above.
-36-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
This is particularly true of the railroads, yhose burden is to be
relieved by increasing the proportionate share of the other forms of
transport.
1. Railroads.
Soviet railroads have recorded significant annual rates of
growth in operating efficiency compared with the US in _recent years.
This achievement) carried out with a much smaller total of route-kilo-
meters, motive power, and freight cars, means that locomotives and
freight cars are kept on the line more continuously than in the US. At
the same time) however, ton-kilometer productivity of trains measured
in gross ton-kilometers per freight-train hour is substantially below
US levels because of the slower speeds and lighter loads of Soviet trains.
In the US the use of fast, heavy freight trains is-.a means ,
of economizing on the labor cost of train crews, and the use of advarivxd
modern maintenance equipment is a means of econbmizing on labor crews.
US practice is thus relatively labor swing and capital using. Ih the
USSR, although skilled labor has been in short supply, capital equip-
ment has been even scarcer. Consequently, Soviet railroads have had to
make intensive use of roadways, motive power) and freight cars while
at the same time employing relatively large quantities of labor. The
trend in recent years in the USSR, however, has been toward the intro-
duction of increasing quantities of modern equipment. .
Selected measures of operating efficiency for railroads in
the USSR in selected years, 1939-55, are shown in Table 9.* The trends
shown here are consistent with a rational allocation of the Soviet means
of production. It will be noted, for example, that although the average
length of haul in the USSR jumped from 722 km in 1950 to 766 km in 1955,
freight car turnaround time showed a rather sharp drop from 7.5 days in
1950 to 6.2 days in 1955, thus indicating a substantial increase in car
utilization. The average length of haul of 696 km for the US in 1955
compares favorably with that of the USSR; however, because of the
intensive utilization of equipment in the USSR compared with the US,
turnaround time in the USSR is only about one-third of the 13.3-day
* Table 9 follows on p. 39.
-37-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
figure for the US in 1954.* 125/ The current trend in turnaround time
in the USSR, however, is expected to continue to level off as more modern
efficient rolling stock is made available.
Both average freight train speeds and average train weights
on Soviet railroads have risen sharply during the past few years. In
gross ton-kilometers per freight-train hour, however, Soviet performance
in the past few years has generally been about one-half the US level,
although the annual rate of growth in gross ton-kilometers per freight-
train hour of the USSR in 1954 more than doubled that of the US during
the past 5 years. This change has been introduced primarily by discon-
tinuing the manufacture of 2-axle cars and placing emphasis on higher
capacity 4-axle cars, with a resultant increase in the general level of
operating efficiency.
The Sixth Five Year Plan includes a number of improvements
which will result in increased efficiency, as follows: double tracking
many lines which are currently single track; installing automatic block
signaling on double-track lines and centralized traffic control on many
single-track lines; constructing additional mechanized hump classifica-
tion yards; installing radio communications on the line and in yards;
electrifying lines formerly operated with steam locomotives, particularly
on double-track lines; introducing diesel locomotives on lines previously
operated with steam locomotives; and increasing the number of four-axle
cars, all equipped with automatic couplers and air brakes. 12E The
effect of these improvements is to speed train movements and to increase
the tonnage hauled per train and the tonnage loaded per car. When com-
bined, these improvements will no doubt continue to push gross ton-kilo-
meters per freight-train hour upward at a fairly constant annual rate of
growth through 1961.
In summary, it may be expected that the operating efficiency
of Soviet railroads compared with US railroads will continue to improve
as it has in the past. With additional inputs, an already effective
* It should be stressed that these turnaround figures are not entirely
comparable, because the US includes reserve cars in its operating park
and the USSR excludes them. Furthermore, the USSR appears to drop a
car temporarily from the operating park when it is under demurrage, but
the US does not. Hence when turnaround time is calculated by dividing
operating car park by average daily carloadings? the Soviet figure is
lower than it would be if the US method of calculating operating park
were utilized. The difference may be as high as 30 percent.
-38-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 9
Selected Measures of Operating Efficiency for Railroads in the USSR
Selected Years, 1939-55
Average Operating
Freight Car Length of
Turnaround Freight Haul
Years Time (Days) (Kilometers)
1939 7.25 12/
1945 10.92 12/
1948 8.68 12/
1950 7.5 1./
1954 6.7 s./
1955 6.2 A/
708 4/
794 2/
729 2/
722 2/
757 12/
766 hi
Average Freight
Train Weight
(Metric Tons)
Gross Net
1,296w 711 4/
1,247 4/ 698 4/
1,340 4/ 758 4/
1,427 2/ 813 2/
1,6402! 951 2/
1,753 4/ 1,020 1/
Average Freight
Train Speed
Including Stops
(Kilometers per Hour)
19.3 2/
17.2 2/
17.3 2/
20.1 2/
22.9 1/
24.7 1/
Gross Ton-
Kilometers per
Freight-Train
Hour EV
25,013
21,448
23,182
28,683
37,556
43,299
a. Gross train weight multiplied by train speed.
formance per freight-train hour for US railroads:
640310; and 1954, 78,150. 222/
do D2/
" 1J11/
12/
i.
go
1.3i/
The following are the gross ton-kilometers of per-
19390 35,571; 1945, 53,583; 1948, 57,869; 1950,
-39-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
system should be expected to evolve into a more modern system charac-
terized by labor-saving, capital-using equipment which will compare
more favorably with the rail system of the US.
2. Highways.
The efficient utilization of highway transport in the USSR
is hampered to a large extent by the lack of a network of all-weather
modern roads throughout the country. Motor transport has continued in
its role as an intracity carrier and as a short-haul tributary carrier
for rail and water transport; this is indicated by its average length
of haul) which has remained rather constant at about 11 km. 131/ The
average load per loaded truck also has remained static at approximately
2.2 tons, and the coefficient of use* of the central park has shown
little variation from the 62 percent shown in 1953. Truck pools belong-
ing to the various industrial and agricultural ministries have been
especiAlly inefficient, with a coefficient of use of about 47 percent
in recent years. 1
Motor truck utilization in terms of annual ton-kilometers
per vehicle unit for 1955 was about 124 percent of 1948, but the annual
increases have been relatively small since 1953) primarily because of
a change in operational practices. It has been normal Soviet policy
to assign the available truck park according to specific industrial or
agricultural demands. Trucks used by the Ministry of Agriculture, for
example, may be shifted to support construction or some other economic
activity during the agricultural off seasons. As additions are made to
the inventory it becomes less necessary to shift the park. Unit utili-
zation is therefore lowered, because many vehicles are idle during the
off season. The estimated performance of motor trucks in the USSR in
selected years, 1939-55, is shown in Table 10.**
There are indications that the general use of motor trans-
port is rapidly being brought under central control, leaving less in
the hands of the industrial and agricultural ministries. The Sixth
Five Year Plan provides for a radical improvement in the use of auto-
mobile pools) which is planned to increase the productivity of trucks
in 1960 by 36 percent above the level of 1955. 1112/ A more favorable
level of productivity will depend upon the success achieved in pro-
moting centralized control of highway transport. If a significant
volume of the motor transport now conducted independently by the vari-
ous industrial and agricultural ministries can be concentrated in
The ratio of the number of days worked to the number of business
days in a year.
** Table 10 follows on p. 41.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
centralized motor pools, greater utilization will result. Furthermore,
the Plan specifically provided for the production and delivery of more
and larger trucks and trailers and emphasized the expansion of paved
highways. Such improvements will increase both speed and pay load and
will greatly improve the current level of operating efficiency.
Table 10
Estimated Performance of Motor Trucks in the USSR
Selected Years, 1939-55
Performance per Truck
Index
Year
Truck Inventory
Ton-Kilometers Eti
(1939 =
100)
1939
771,600 12/
11,500
100
1945
1,011,800 12/
4,300
38
1948
828,800 12/
15,952
139
1950
1,260,000 2/
14,800
129
1953
1,770,400 2/
18,100
157
1954
1,946,500 2/
19,265
168
1955
2,137,500 2/
19,883
173
a. These figures are calculated from estimates of ton-
kilometer data given in Table 3 (p. 18, above), except
for 1939 and 1945
b. 142/
c. These estimates are based upon annual production,
military allocation, and rate of retirement. The esti-
mates of vehicle production are based upon analyses of
individual plant production, graphic projections of
planned increases, and chassis serial number data.
Retirement rates
are
calculated at 5 percent per year.
50X1
50X1
3. Inland Waterways.
The failure of inland water transport in the USSR to raise the
level of operating efficiency is considered to be serious by Soviet plan-
ners, in view of the potential capacity of the system. It is estimated
that river transport in 1954 could have originated 30 million tons of
cargo more than the 128.2 million tons actually handled. 144/ If the
S-E-C-R-E-T
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
surplus tonnage capacity available in 1954 had been fully utilized in
the same traffic pattern, ton-kilometer performance would have amounted
to 75 billion tkm, or about 20 percent more than the estimated actual
ton-kilometer performance of 62.4 billion. The available surplus capa-
city in 1955 probably was in the same proportion to ton-kilometer per-
formance as that in 19540 so that utilization of the maximum capacity
available in 1955 would have resulted in about 81 billion tkm instead
of the 67.4 billion estimated for 1955. This would have been a sizable
contribution toward diverting from the railroads traffic which could
move more economicslly by water.
Efforts to raise the efficiency of inland water transport
in the USSR are hampered by three inherent difficulties, as follows:
(a) the reluctance of many shippers to use such a slow form of trans-
port, (b) the seasonal nature of cargo availability, and (c) the lack
of a continuous shipping season. Although there has been some improve-
ment in overcoming these obstacles, there is still much dissatisfaction
with the level of efficiency. Soviet planners are constantly emphasiz-
ing the need for more efficient operations threugh a reduction of demur-
rage time in ports, a reduction of cargo-handling cost, and a reduction
in the accident rate. 1112/
Although inland water officials claim marked improvements in
many areas of efficiency, evidence indicates that the aver-all level of
efficiency has declined. The estimated performance of inland waterways
in the USSR in selected years, 1940-551 is shown in Table 11.* This
analysis indicates that ton-kilometer performance per deadweight ton of
available carrying capacity has declined substantially since 1950. The
increase in ton-kilometer performance has been accomplished through
additional tonnage and not through increased operating efficiency.
Additions to the fleet of 70 percent in deadweight tons resulted in a
ton-kilometer performance increase in 1955 of only 47 percent above the
level of 1950.
The Sixth Five Year Plan provides for a substantial increase
in the efficiency of the river fleet. Labor productivity is scheduled
to increase 35 percent; productivity of dry cargo tugs; 30 percent; per-
formance of self-propelled cargo ships, 36 percent; and non-self-propelled
ships, 33 percent above the level of 1955. 1M/ The addition of many
* Table 11 follows on p. 43.
-42-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 11
Estimated Performance of Inland Waterways in the USSR
Selected Years, 1940-55
Freight Ton-Kilometer
Performance
(Billion Ton-Kilometers)
Cargo Fleet
(Million Dead-
Year weight Tons) Total
Excluding
Rafted Timber
Cargo Performance
Thousand Ton-Kilo-
meters per Dead-
weight Ton of Barge
Capacity Available
Excluding
Total Rafted Timber
' Index
(1940 74 100)
Excluding
Total Rafted Timber
19401
8.1W
35.9 hi
24.2
4.4
3.0
100
100
1945
3.8/
18.2 1/
13.2
4.8
3.5
109
117
1950
45.9 12/
24.9
6.5
3.5
148
117
1954
10.8 s/
62.4 y
34.3
5.8
3.2
132
107
1955
12.0 2/
67.4 12
37.9
5.6
3.2
127
107
-43-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
higher speed vessels and the mechanization of port operations will be
instrumental in achieving these optimistic goals. Judging from past
trends, however, the goals probably will be unfulfilled by 1960.
4. Maritime Service.
The Soviet merchant fleet historically has been character-
ized by a low level of operating efficiency. Vessels are poorly main-
tained/ cargoes are handled inefficiently and badly stowed/ and the
productivity of ships' crews is generally below European standards.
In spite of all efforts by Soviet planners, these conditions still pre-
vailed to a serious degree through 1955.
There have been some improvements in recent years. The
plan to increase freight turnover in 1955 by 55 to 60 percent above
the level of 1950 was exceeded by a wide margin. It is estimated that
ton-kilometer performance in 1955 exceeded the 1950 performance by
approximately 74 percent (see Table 3*). Dry cargo vessels were to
increase their cargo-carrying performance (in terms of tons hauled per
ton of freight-carrying capacity) by 19 percent in 1955 above that of
1950) and tankers were to increase their performance by 21 percent
above that of 1950. 151/ Although precise data on all aspects of per-
formance are not available) it appears that all these targets were over-
fulfilled) thus reflecting substantial progress toward raising the level
of operating efficiency.
Operating conditions in the maritime fleet are far from sat-
isfactory, especially in regard to idle time in port. Although current
over-all data for 1955 operations are fragmentary, the extent of idle time
in port in 1954 is known to have been serious, particularly in the Far
East. 152/ In a 9-month period) nonproductive time spent by Soviet
ships in port accounted for 27 percent of all port time. There is
little reason to believe that this percentage dropped substantially
in 1955.
The estimated index of performance of the maritime service
of the USSR in selected years, 1940-55, is shown in Table 12.** This
index) which is in terms of ton-kilometer performance per deadweight
* P. 18/ above.
** Table 12 follows on p. 45.
-44-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
ton of shipping available, indicates a substantial gain in efficiency
during the period of the Fifth Five Year Plan, especially in 1954 and
1955, although 1955 was slightly lower than 1954.
Table 12
Estimated Index of Performance of the Maritime Service
in the USSR W
Selected Years, .19140-55
(In Terms of Ton-Kilometer Performance
Per Deadweight Ton of Shipping Available)
1940 = 100
Year
Dry Cargo
Petroleum Tankers
1940
100
100
1950
175
97
1954
210
113
1955
206
137
a. 21,31
There are indications that continued emphasis will be placed
upon improvement in operating efficiency in 1956-61. It is planned to
increase the productivity of the dry cargo fleet by 34 percent and that
of tankers by at least 25 percent in 1960 above that in 1955. 25_11/
Although these increases appear high, there is much unused fleet capac-
ity, principally because of excessive idle port time.
It is believed that the level of operating efficiency in
the maritime fleet for the next 5 years will be raised principally by
the addition of new modern vessels. Tankers which will be much more
efficient than those now in the fleet are reported to be in the design
stage -- ships of 20,000 to 25,000 dwt, 155/ which is about double the
tonnage of tankers now in serial production. New designs for dry cargo
vessels will also help to increase efficiency. Furthermore, the Plan
has provided for a program whereby 65 percent of all cargo handling in
ports will be mechanized by 1960. Such a program would vastly raise
efficiency by decreasing port time and thus reducing vessel turnaround
time, which in turn will increase vessel utilization.
-45-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
5. Civil Aviation.
The present level of utilization of aircraft of Aeroflot,
the Soviet civil air carrier,
Western air carriers.
Aeroflot's utilization approximates US domestic airline
experience with twin-engine aircraft. 15S Applying the Soviet formula)
it is estimated that available Li-2's and IL-12's had to fly daily 5.5
hours and 5.2 hours, respectively, in order to meet the 1954-55 winter
schedules. This is to be compared with about 6 hours per day for major
trunk lines operating twin-engine aircraft (DC-3's) in the US. 151/
is slightly lower than that of large
Operating efficiency is affected by several factors which
are considered adverse by Western standards, including a lack of uniform
proficiency among operating personnel and a lack of proper maintenance
of aircraft. The continued dependence on two-engine aircraft such as
the Li-2 and the IL-12 is a major obstacle to increasing air transport
performance. The slow speed and low payload of these aircraft would
make it impossible for Aeroflot to compete with modern commercial air
operations of the West in terms of present operational equipment.
The current pattern of development of Aeroflot probably will
lead toward some aver-all improvement in its level of operating effi-
ciency. It probably will continue to share in the technological advances,
administrative improvements, and educational progress of Soviet mili-
tary aviation. Improvements in airfield lighting, navigational aids,
and pilot training probably will result in more all-weather and night
flying. Further development of the current route network is indicated
by the improvement of civil air facilities and by the addition of new
routes. It is also to be expected that by 1961 at least one type of
modern high-performance transport aircraft will be operational on long-
range domestic and international routes. The TU-104 was put into
scheduled domestic service during 1956. 158/ The TU-114, a 4-engine
jet, and the IL-18, a turboprop capable of carrying 70 passengers,
are under development; the latter, which is in prototype, is said to
be ready for use.
In conclusion, future improvements in the level of efficiency
will depend largely upon the availability of aircraft capable of a greater
payload and upon the standardization of operating practices in accordance
with generally accepted standards of international commercial air transport.
-46-
S-E-C-R-E-T
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
B. Employment and Labor Productivity.
The plan for transport labor in the USSR deals with the ques-
tion of labor productivity and the level of employment required to sus-
tain the prescribed volume of traffic. The labor plan, therefore, is
closely linked with the plan for traffic, the aim being to increase the
productive capacity or efficiency of labor so that the =lather of work-
ers increases at a rate less than that of the increase in traffic. The
estimated number of employees in the transport sector in the USSR in
1948-55 is shown in Table 13.* A comparison of the growth patterns of
employment, traffic, and labor productivity in the transport sector in
the USSR in 1948-55 is shown in Table 14.**
The rate of growth in labor productivity for total transport
in the US in the same period is somewhat above that in the USSR. The
relatively high annual rate of growth of labor productivity estimated
for total Soviet transport is to be expected, especially in view of the
emphasis placed upon labor-saving capital equipment inputs into the
Soviet system in recent years. In 1955 there was an 11-percent gain
above the level of 1954 but only a 4-percent gain for 1954 above the
level of 1953, clearly indicating that the USSR is relying on tech-
nology more and more.
Rail labor productivity has shown a constant annual rate of
growth in the USSR. An analysis of labor productivity for US railroads
indicates a current level of about 952,000 cumulated tkm*** per oper-
ating employee, which is 70 percent above the Soviet level. Further
analysis discloses, however, that the current annual rate of growth in
rail cumulated ton-kilometers in the USSR is considerably above that in
the US. The labor productivity of railroads in the USSR in selected
years) 1928-55, is shown in Table 15. xxxx Rail labor productivity since
1948 has increased 78 percent, but labor productivity for total trans-
port has increased only 65 percent.
Although skilled labor has been in short supply for some 20 years
in the USSR, the supply of capital equipment has been even scarcer.
This situation has been especially pronounced in the transport sector,
where an investment program large enough to enable the railroads to
Table 13 follows on p. 48.
Table 14 follows on p. 48.
Freight ton-kilometers plus passenger-kilometers.
Table 15 follows on p. 49.
S -E -C -R -E -T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Table 13
Estimated Number of Employees in the Transport Sector in the USSR 2/
1948-55
Thousand Employees
Transport Sector
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
Railroads
1,636
1,681
1,712
1,760
1,842
1,915
1,968
1,980
All others
2,265
2,327
2,370
2,567
2,710
2,861
3,012
3,067
Total
3,901
14,008
4 082
4,327
14,552
14,776
14,980
5,0147
a. 159/
Table 14
Index of Growth Patterns of Employment,
Traffic, and Labor Productivity
in the Transport Sector in the USSR 2/
1948-55
1948
= 100
1948
1949
1221
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955,
Employment
100
103
107
111
117
122
128
129
Traffic
(cumulated ton-kilometers)
100
115
129
151
158
174
189
214
Labor productivity
100
112
123
130
135
142
148
165
a, Employment data are from Table 13; traffic volume data are from Tables 3 and
4 (pp. 18 and 21, respectively; above).
- 48 -
S-E-C-R -E -T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 15
Labor Productivity of Railroads in the USSR 2/
Selected Years, 1928-55
Year
Thousand Cumulated Ton-Kilometers bJ
per Operating Employee
1928
137
1938
367
1940
364
1945
275
1948
315
1950
403
1954
501
1955
561
b. Freight ton-kilometers plus passenger-kilo-
meters.
keep pace with traffic demands would have been too large to be approved
by the Soviet leaders. Consequently, the hard-pressed transport offi-
cials have been driven to make intensive use of their routes, facili-
ties, and equipment while employing relatively large quantities of labor
compared with the US. The observed characteristics of Soviet transport
operations are therefore consistent with what could be expected under
rational allocation of resources. With additional inputs of capital
equipment) the labor productivity index will no doubt approach a posi-
tion which will compare more favorably with that of the US.
The planned increase in labor productivity for transport in 1960
appears to be consistent with the planned capital investment for the sec-
tor. During the Sixth Five Year Plan, railroads are to increase their
level of labor productivity by 34 percent, inland waterways by 35 percent,
and the maritime service by 40 percent. 1?1/ Actual performance attain-
ed between 1950 and 1955 for total transport is estimated to be 34 per-
cent (see Table 14*). During the next 5 years, any increases in labor
* P. 48, above.
-49-
S-E-C-R-E-T
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
productivity of the magnitude outlined in the plan are dependent, how-
ever, upon the plan fulfillment in other parts of the transport sector.
The increase in rail labor productivity, for example) is predicated
upon many planned technological innovations) such as an increase in
the production and delivery of more and better electric and diesel-
electric locomotives; an increase in average car capacity; and the
improvement of many other technical phases of the industry) such as
double tracking, automatic block signaling, and centralized traffic
control which will permit higher train densities. Ikg/ The increase
for the water carriers is to be achieved through the addition of more
powerful and modern vessels, mechanized loading and unloading facili-
ties) and a general reduction in turnaround time.
Although the announced plan for 1960 said nothing about the
planned increase in labor productivity for highway and air transport,
the same general optimism is implied in the plan for traffic perfor-
mance. The labor productivity of motor vehicles will no doubt increase
significantly by 1960 through the use of larger and faster units opera-
ting over more and better surfaced highways. IL/ Air transport will
show a comparable increase through the introduction of faster) higher
capacity aircraft. Given these inputs) it is highly likely that labor
productivity will reach its planned goal.
V. Demand for Transport Services.
A. Total National Requirements.
The tonnage index
six basic raw materials:
cement.
had been available, it is
improved by the inclusion
of production includes
coal, petroleum, steel, timber, grain, and
If data
probable that these forecasts could have been
of such items as ores mineral construction
-50-
S-E-C-R-E-T
50X1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
materials (other than cement), consumer Roods, and aaricultural commod-
ities other than grain.
These studies show that Soviet coal production, for example,
has been closely associated with coal and coke rail ton-kilometers in
a well-defined and stable relationship from 1923 through 1951 in such
a way that a straight line will predict actual observations with an
average error of plus or minus 4 percent. 102 For the other four
indicators traffic proved to be somewhat less stable
and more complex. Generally, however, there is a strong tendency to
raise the amount of transport associated with given additional output
for each selected commodity. This relationship is to be expected
because, as the production of raw materials is expanded) it becomes
necessary to draw upon progressively lower grade materials or upon
material located at greater distances from the principal markets.
find a significant correla-
tion between aggregate freight traffic and total industrial output.
The degree of parallelism in trends of industrial output and
aggregate freight ton-kilometers is brought out clearly through the
use of a scatter diagram. The Hodgeman industrial production index
is used as a reliable indicator for over-all industrial output for the
prewar series, and the ORB industrial production index is used as the
most reliable for the 1948-55 period. 2..?g These indexes of industrial
production and aggregate freight ton-kilometers for 1928-40, 1948-55,
and 1960 are shown in Table 16.* The accompanying chart (Figure 6**),
which shows these relationships for the two periods, has been produced
by linking the two series and plotting them with aggregate ton-kilo-
meters of freight carried by all carriers.
If regression lines are fitted to the series (one for the over-
all period 1928-54 and one each for the 1928-40 and the 1948-55 series),
it is apparent that there is a close correlation between production and
ton-kilometers. It is also apparent, however, that the 1948-55 trend
lies only slightly below the 1928-40 line, which is quite close to the
1928-55 long-run trend. This would seem to indicate that Soviet
* Table 16 follows on p. 52.
** Following p. 52.
- 51 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
bUX1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
industrial production is now associated with slightly lower levels of
freight ton-kilometers than was the case in 1928-40. Nevertheless,
the postwar trend is not very different from the 1928-40 trend.
Table 16
Indexes of Industrial Production
and of Aggregate Freight Ton-Kilometers in the USSR
1928-40, 1948-55, and 1960
1928 = 100
Year
Index of Industrial
Production
(X)
Index of Aggregate
Freight Ton-Kilometers
(Y)
1928
100
100
1929
120
120
1930
139
145
1931
164
167
1932
172
183
1933
192
188
1934
229
226
1935
295
280
1936
344
343
1937
371
367
1938
388
378
1939
407
393
1940
430
410
1948
450
466
1949
535
539
1950
612
604
1951
706
675
1952
787
732
1953
846
814
1954
927
880
1955
1,026
998
1960
1,693
1,546
-52-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
50X1
Figure 6
Aggregate Freight
Ton-Kilometers
1800
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
USSR
INDEXES OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
AND AGGREGATE FREIGHT TON-KILOMETERS
1928-40, 1948-55, and 1960
1928=100
/
/
,:
,,/loco
/
/
/
/
/
/
A.
1955
?
1954
19
?1952
19SO
.e.
0'
1951
1928-54 Rob
ionship
1940
1928-40 Rob ionship

1948-55 Rela
ionship
1939
1935 I
3973:94?
1932
193319341936
1 19.1
1929
1918
/447/
A
..
e
200
25732 1-57
400
600
800 1000
Industrial Production
1200
1400
1600
1800
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 :
CIA-R DP79 R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
In view of the difficulties of long-range prediction, such
studies are not considered to be bases for output-traffic ratio esti-
mates, but rather attempts to show where present trends, if continued,
would lead. Some weight, however, must be given to such analysis,
because all studies have shown an unusually close relationship in
recent years between aggregate freight ton-kilometers and industrial
output in the USSR, and the closeness of this relationship is explain-
able.
The implied growth rates of transport calculated. by this tech-
nique appear high for a sustained period in terms of Western experience.
When these results are combined, however, with past Soviet achievement;
with the Kaganovich forecasts of 8 May 1954, and with the Sixth Five
Year Plan, transport performance through 1960 may be estimated with
some degree of confidence to be approaching, if not reaching, the level
suggested by the output-traffic ratios. snx1
an abatement 50X1
of freight traffic growth during the early years of the Sixth Five Year
Plan, it is now clear that such an abatement is not probable in the
near future, because Kaganovich's predictions and the Sixth Five Year
Plan combine with the 1948-55 record to indicate a continued rise in
freight traffic along with the growth in industrial output. Kaganovich
stated in his speech of May 1954:
If the railroads are already working under a strain at the
moment, then in view of the prospects for a large increase
in the coming years, and especially in view of its geography,
this strain may turn, if serious measures are not taken, into
a failure to meet the economy's shipping needs. It is neces-
sary to anticipate this. It is necessary to foresee that
railroad freight shipments will grow by 1960 rbyLT no less
than 50 to 6o percent :above 1953.7. Transport must handle
a growth in heavy industrial freight combined with contin-
uously growing agricultural and consumer-goods freight. 1?7/
Kaganovich's prediction of a high growth rate in Soviet trans-
port was further expanded in a forecast that on the railroads in 1960
coal traffic would increase no less than 60 percent; petroleum by 70
percent; iron, steel, and ores by 6o percent; cement by 100 percent;
and consumer goods shipments by at least 300 percent above the level
of 1953.
-53-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 :
CIA-R DP79 R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E -C -R -E -T
Although Kaganovich definitely referred to rail traffic when
predicting growth rates for the three basic commodities and consumer
goods, it is clear that Soviet planning has been altered since May 1954.
Consumer goods traffic by rail in 1960 was predicted to be three times
the 1953 volume. Such a demand for transport of consumer goods hardly
seems feasible now in view of the 60-percent increase forecast for light
industry during 1955-60.
The calculations underlying the traffic forecasts through 1961
(as presented in Table 3*) are based on the Sixth Five Year Plan; how-
ever, the total traffic volume envisaged by Kaganovich is only slightly
below the plan forecast. These forecasts increase the volume of total
traffic planned for 1961 at an average annual rate of growth of approx-
imately 8 percent. This growth rate is significant in the light of
trends in the average length of rail haul_and the expected growth in
the volume of freight carried by water and highways relative to the
railroads. The estimated rate of growth of freight traffic and length
of rail freight haul in the USSR in 1949-55 are shown in Table 17.**
(See also Table 1.***) Increases in rail ton-kilometers are calculated
to grow at an average annual rate of 7 percent through 1961. Clearly,
such trends indicate that a declining share of the total traffic is
planned for the railroads.
Kaganovich pointed out in his address of May 1954 that great
success had been accomplished in keeping the average length of haul
from being higher than it is, although Soviet authorities preferred
a downward trend. He later stated in his speech to the XXth Party
Congress: "It is necessary to utilize more extensively ... to
develop individual areas in a complex manner, to intensify the pro-
cessing of goods on the spot which) parallel with improved planning
of transport and marketing) will make possible the elimination of
irrational kinds of transport like two-way transport, repetitive trans-
port, excessively long-distance transport) and so forth. This is an
important and serious task of the Sixth Five Year Plan." It appears
evident) therefore, that the railroads have had little &lobes& in
reducing this operating factor to the level desired by the planning
officials. It is significant that the average length of haul has
shown annual increases each year since 1949, when it was reported as
712 km. In 1953 it was 752 km and then rose to an estimated 757 km
* P. 18) above.
** Table 17 follows on p. 55.
*** P. 2, above.
-54-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 17
Estimated Rate of Growth of Freight Traffic
and of Length of Rail Freight Haul
in the USSR
1949-55
Percentage Increase of Ton-Kilometers
Above Preceding Year
Average Length
of Rail
Year
Railroads
Highways
Inland
Waterways
Maritime
Service
Total
Freight Haul
(Kilometers)
1949
15.6
27.9
20.8
8.1
15.8
712
1950
13.1
15.5
11.4
6.4
12.7
722
1951
11.9
11.9
11.11
1.8
11.2
746
1952
9.0
20.0
11.8
8.9
9.5
749
1953
10.7
18.5
3.3
9.1
10.4
752
1954
7.2
17.2
5.9
17.9
8.1
757
1955
13.3
13.3
8.0
21.7
13.4
766
a. Calculations are based on data in Table 3, p. 18, above.
-55-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
in 1954. In 1955, still unable to arrest the climb, it was reported
to be 766 km. The war period of 1942-45 is the only one in Soviet
history in which this important factor of railroad operations has
exceeded its present length. During that time) however) a large part
of the territory which has historically generated much of the short-
haul traffic was overrun by the Germans, thus invalidating any direct
comparisons between the two periods.
It appears evident that the length of haul cannot be reduced
greatly) if at all, because (1) any transfer of short-haul traffic to
the highways would result in an increase in the average length of rail
movement, and (2) lateral growth (development of the outlying marginal
areas) at a rapid rate will also tend to raise this index. Both of
these programs were given an added impetus by the Sixth Five Year
Plan -- that is, by the completion of the new lands program and by
the emphasis upon the development of eastern Siberia. Both of these
programs are inconsistent with the plans for reducing the average length
of haul.
Prospects for growth in freight traffic moved by carriers other
than railroads depend on the performance of each type of carrier indi-
vidually, although it is emphasized that even as a group the role of
the nonrail carriers is a minor one compared with that of the railroads.
Kaganovich told transport officials that water shipments (inland water
and maritime combined) would have to increase their 1953 performance
2-1/2 to 3 times by 1960. He challenged the water carriers to try to
achieve by 1960 a performance figure that is at least 18 to 20 percent
of the sum of rail and water traffic. The lower goals set in the Sixth
Five Year Plan demonstrate that this figure was too optimistic -- inland
waterways in 1960 are to increase performance 80 percent above that of
1955, and maritime traffic is to increase its performance approximately
2.1 times above that of 1955. Such plans, if fulfilled, will increase
water transport's share of total traffic to 15 percent in 1960 from
an estimated 11.5 percent in 1955.
Kaganovich said nothing about highway and air prospects, but
the Five Year Plan reflects the same optimism that is evident in the
rail and water targets. Both highway and air carriers are to double
the 1955 performance in 1960.
In conclusion, it is significant that the growth rates which
emerge from the Kaganovich forecasts of May 1954 and from the Sixth
Five Year Plan announced in January 1956 have the same order of
-56-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
magnitude as those predicted by a 1948-55 transport-output analysis.
The uniformity exhibited by the various freight traffic estimates is
perhaps sufficient to emphasize the reliability which may be attached
to the estimates through 1961. If the Soviet economy is to increase
industrial production during the Sixth Five Year Plan by approximately
65 percent) the transport sector of the economy will have to accomplish
the planned increase of at least 50 percent above the level of 1955.
Some relief) however, is expected by increasing pipeline haulage to
about 83 billion tkm, which is six times the level of 1955. Reductions
in the average length of haul for all carriers are contemplated) but
success is doubtful for the reasons stated above. It therefore appears
that during the Sixth Five Year Plan transport will fulfill -- probably
overfulfill.-- the task set forth in the plan.
B. Per Capita Volume of Transport.
Per capita analysis gives a yardstick for appraising the magni-
tude of Soviet transport performance. The estimated per capita volume
of freight and passenger transport in the USSR) by type of carrier, in
1950, 1955, and 1961 is shown in Table 18.* Calculations in this table)
based on ton-kilometer performance data given in Table r* show that
the Soviet national product in 1955 entailed a haulage of goods of about
5,940 tkm per person, based on an estimated population of 198.5 million
in 1955. The corresponding total for the US was 8,580 tkm, based on a
population of 162 million persons.***
Although examination of passenger traffic shows somewhat simi-
lar disparities between the USSR and the US, such differences may be
more apparent than real because they are based on conventional statis-
tical comparisons of commercial traffic. Allowances for US private
travel -- which is negligible in the USSR -- cannot be accurately
measured) thus invalidating conventional comparison between the two.
Statistics reported by the US common carriers show that the US per cap-
ita volume of passenger traffic currently amounts to about 500 passen-
ger-kilometers. If the statistics for private automobile travel) which
are estimated.by the Interstate Commerce Commission to account for
92 percent of US travel) are included, then the US performed 6,170
* Table 18 follows on p. 58.
** P. 18) above.
*** See Table 5, footnote a (p. 23, above)) for ton-kilometer perfor-
mance not included in the per capita consumption in the US.
-57-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
passenger-kilometers per capita in 1954. .1E/ Calculations in Table
18) based on passenger-kilometer estimates in Table 4)* show the per
capita demand fOr passenger transport in the USSR.
Table 18
Estimated Per Capita Volume of Freight and Passenger Transport
in the USSR, by Type of Carrier
1950, 1955, and 1961
Ton-Kilometers per Person
Type of Carrier
1950 _Ell
1955 12/,
1961 2/
Railroads
3,355,0
5,063.0
6,879.0
Highways
?llo.o
189.0
423.0
Inland waterways
252.0
340.0
600.o
Maritime service
218.0
347.0
716.0
Civil aviation
0.8
1.5
2.9
Total
3,935.8
5,940.5
8,2620.9
Passenger-Kilometers per Person
Railroads
482
712
977
Highways
29
105
323
Inland waterways
15
18
19
Maritime service
7
8
8
Civil aviation
7
14
57
Total
1,384
1,384
a. Based on
Tables 3 and
b. Based on
Tables 3 and
c. Based on
Tables 3 and
* P. 21, above.
midyear population of 182.4 million, and data in
4, pp. 18 and 21) respectively, above.
midyear population of 198.5 million and data in
4.
midyear population of 220.1 million and data in
4.
-58-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 :
CIA-R DP79 R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
VI. Transport Investment and Capital-Output Ratios.
In all branches of the Soviet transport sector, investment inputs
in the past have been maintained at a minimum by squeezing the maximum
output from the existing plant and equipment, with minimum additions to
both. It appears that this reluctance to increase the absolute volume
of capital inputs has had some effect upon the growth and performance
of the sector. An analysis of the Sixth Five Year Plan and the XXth
Party Congress speeches clearly indicates that Soviet policymakers are
now aware of the economic pitfalls which can result from minimizing
transport investment. Large volumes of funds will have to be directed
to transport. at the expense of other sectors of the Soviet economy.
A burden on Soviet capital resources in the next several years probably
will be the development of a modern highway system, which is so far
virtually nonexistent. To some extent the expansion of the road net
is an alternative to increasing the capacity of the rail system, but
in many respects the two are complementary rather than competitive.
Mich investment especially will be needed to expand the net of secondary
roads if they are to cope with the demands placed upon them by an expand-
ing agricultural program. The opening of more outlying areas and the
burden imposed on transport by the ambitious production goals of the
Sixth Five Year Plan should give impetus to investment in transport dur-
ing the next 5 years.
A. Sources of Transport Investment and Working Capital.
The flow of funds into the transport sector, both for fixed and
working capital expenditures, is from two sources in the USSR -- budget
allocations from the Soviet state budget and retained profits from the
transport sector itself. The estimated budget and nonbudget allocations
for transport and communications ih the USSR in 1948-56 are shown in
Table 19.*
The share of transport in total budget allocations since World
War II appears to have remained rather constant, claiming about 9 to 10
percent each year except for 1951 and 1952, when it was given 6.7
* Table 19 follows on p. 6o.
-59-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 :
CIA-R DP79 R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 19
Estimated Budget and Nonbudget Allocations
for Transport and Communications in the USSR
1948-56
LL/
Year
State Budget Allocations
Nonbudget Allocations
Total Allocations
Billion
Current Rubles
Percent
of Total
Billion
Current Rubles
Percent
of Total
Billion
Current Rubles
Percent
of Total
1948
14.3 2/
9.9
2.2 2/
14.3
16.5
10.2
1949
14.7 2/
9.6
6.y2/
17.9
21.4
11.2
1950
15.0 2/
9.1
17.5 2/
43.0
32.5
18.3
1951
11.9 2/
6.7
20.2 2/
23.3
32.1
11.8
1952
14.3 2/
8.0
19.7 LI
22.7
34.0
12.8
1953
17.4 Li
9.0
20.0 2/
20.4
37.4
12.8
1954
21.5 2/
10.0
17.3 1/
15.6
38.8
10.0
1955
23.0 2/
10.5
17.5 2/
14.6
40.5
12.1
1956
21.8 f/
9.2
18.8 f/
17.1
40.6
11.7
a. Communications have generally taken 3 to 5 percent of the total allocated to trans-
port and communications.
b.
1?2/
e' 112/
d. 1
e' 12/
-6o-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
percent and 8 percent, respectively.* 1/V Budget outlays for trans-
port in 1955 were estimated at 23 billion rubles, an increase of 61 per-
cent above the 1948 expenditure of 14.3 billion rubles.
When nonbudget expenditures -- that is, appropriated outlays
financed by the sector itself -- are added to the state budget alloca-
tions, it is apparent that transport and communications have consist-
ently claimed approximately 12 percent of total expenditures. In one
year, 1950, their share jumped to a high of 18.3 percent, but this prob-
ably was an effort to offset 1948 and 1949, when the sector was allo-
cated only 10.2 and 11.2 percent, respectively, of total expenditures
of the national economy.
B. Capital Investment.
Total allocations to investments in fixed capital and expansion
of working capital in the USSR are outlined in the state budget, which
gives the amounts that will come from the budget and the amounts that
will come from transport's internal funds. In recent years this break-
down of allocations for transport has not been published; however, the
total state budget allocations amounted to 120 percent of the total
capital investment for 1955. In 1956, budget allocations were only
300 million rubles more than total planned capital investment. That
portion of the investment program which is not financed by the state
budget is covered from transport's internal funds, derived principally
from amortization deductions and profits set aside for investment pur-
poses.
Investments in transport and communications have been about
12 percent of total state investments during recent years. 1/2/ The
plan for 1956 provided for slight increases, however, both absolutely
and as a percent of total investments. 1/Y These increases probably
are the result of greater demands for transport services in the new
lands and of underfulfillment of investment goals of the Fifth Five
Year Plan.
* These percentages are for both transport and communications because,
beginning with the 1938 Plan, the Soviet budget has combined the two.
Generally, the share of communications has been only about 3 to 5 per-
cent of the total allocation for the sector.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
The estimated outlays for capital investment in transport and
communications in the USSR in 1948-56 are shown in Table 20. The amount
for rail investment has been isolated from the total and is also shown
in the table. The difference between total investment and rail invest-
ment went to all other forms of transport plus communications. Although
the percent of the total claimed by railroads has fluctuated greatly
during the period) their share dropped from 82 percent in 1948 to 63
percent in 1955, thus indicating the emphasis which is currently given
to increasing the role of the other carriers.
Table 20
Estimated Outlays for Capital Investment
in Transport and Communications in the USSR 2/
1948-56
Billion Current Rubles
Year
Total Transport Investment Rail Investment
1948
7.9
6.5
1949
10.5
8.3
1950
15.8
9.9
1951
16.3
11.0
1952
15.5
9.7
1953
17.7
11.1
1954
18.6
11.6
1955
19.5
11.9
1956
21.5
N.A.
a. EV. Communications have generally taken 3 to 5
percent of total capital investment for transport and
communications.
C. Trends in Fixed Assets.
The position of fixed assets (capital stock) of Soviet trans-
port as related to the total assets of the economy does not seem to
have changed radically during the postwar years compared with the
decade preceding the war. In 1924 the transport plant and equipment
accounted for 19.5 percent of the total assets of the economy, and
railroads alone accounted for 17.3 percent. 1.7L3/ The share of trans-
port fell somewhat during the next 4 years, but in 1928 it was still
-62-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
17.7 percent of the total) with railroads claiming 15.4 percent of the
total. By 1933 the railroads' share had increased only 0.3 percent.
At the beginning of the Third Five Year Plan in 1938 the value of all
rail property had increased to one-sixth of the country's fixed capital
stock. 1/2/
Evidence indicates that postwar trends have maintained the same
general pattern as those for the prewar period. T.S. Khachaturov stated
that in 1942 transport accounted for 20 percent of the country's fixed as-
sets and that railroads alone made up about 15 percent of the total. 212/
In 1955, Gudok the trade publication of the railroad industry) reported
that rail fixed assets were one-sixth of the total for the country. la./
The estimated fixed assets as well as investment) output, and
capital-output ratios for railroads in the USSR in 1924-40 and 1945-55
are shown in Table 21.*
D. Capital-Output Ratios.
The effectiveness with which Soviet transport capital has been
used May be investigated by combining data on the total value of the
transport plant and equipment (assets) and data on the output of the
system (value of the transport product). If a precise annual series
could be built up, increments in fixed assets could be brought into
direct correspondence with data on annual investment. Unfortunately,
Soviet asset and investment statistics for total transport are full of
obscurities) and the available data cannot be used with full confidence.
Some data are available on railroad assets and investment, however) and
these can be employed with some confidence. Thus the analysis in this
report must necessarily be confined solely to the railroad branch of
the transport sector.
The series of data in Table 21 indicate that during 1924-27
fixed assets remained fairly constant while output doubled. It is
evident that the system was operating below capacity in 1924. From
1927 through 1939) assets doubled, but output more than quadrupled.
The industrialization period clearly brought with it a sharp rise in
* Table 21 follows on p. 64.
-63-
S-E-C-R-E-T
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 21
Estimated Fixed Assets, Investment, Output, and Capital-Output Ratios
for Railroads in the USSR Al
1924.40 and 1945-55
Year
(1)
Fixed Assets hi
(Billion 1933
Rubles)
(2)
Investment el
(Billion 1933
Rubles)
(3).
Cumulated Ton-
Kilometers Al
(Billion Ton-
Kilometers
(4)
Output Al
(Billion 1934
Rubles
(5)
Capital-Output
Ratio
(1) + (4)
1924
11.1
LA.
49
0.9
12.3
1925
11.0
0.30
66
1.2
9.2
1926
11.1
0.54
92
1.7
6.5
I.
1927
11.2
0.93
104
2.0
5.6
1928
11.5
0.97
118
2.2
5'.2
1929
11.9
1.21
145
2.7
4.4
1930
12.5
1.54
186
3.5
3.6
1931
13.3
2.20
214
4.0
3.3
1932
14.2
2.40
253
4.8
3.0
1933
15.5
2.11
245
4.6
3.1
1934
16.6
2.48
277
5.2
3.2
1935
17.4
4.34
326
6.1
2.9
1936
18.8
3.90
401
7.5
2.5
1937
20.4
4.26
446
8.4
2.4
1938
21.3
4.65
462
8.7
2.5
1939
22.1
4.95
486
9.1
2.4
1940
26.9
5.55
513
9.6
2.8
1945
25.8
4.5o
414
7.8
3.3
1946
27.8
5.00
465
8.7
3.2
1947
32.7
5.20
473
8.9
3.7
1948
34.5
5.75
543
10.2
3.4
1949
36.1
5.50
622
11.7
3.1
1950
40.2
7.80
700
13.2
3.0
1951
43.0
9.40
783
14.7
2.9
1952
46.0
8.90
854
16.1
2.9
1953
LA.
10.00
942
17.7
N.A.
1954
14.4.
10.70
1,016
19.1
N.A.
1955
44.4.
11.00
1,146
21.5
N.A.
1 1
b. 1133i
1 I See Table 20 (p. 62, above) for 1948-55.
d. Freight ton-kilometers plus passenger-kilometers. Figures for 1954 and 1955 were calculated
from Tables 3 and 4 (pp. 18 and 21, respectively, above).
- 64 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
50X1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
the intensity with which plant and equipment were employed. The cap-
ital-output trend in the postwar period shows a close relationship to
that in the prewar series.
The changing relationships among the series can be made more
apparent through the use of a scatter diagram relating output to fixed
assets. The accompanying chart (Figure 7*) presents data drawn from
Table 21. The output attained during 1924-27 gave way to a smoothly
declining productivity of capital during 1928-39. Except for 3 years
1933, 1934, and 1935 -- the observations lie close to a hypothetical
curve convex toward the X-axis. During these years, even though the
railroads were receiving additions to their capital plant and equipment,
operating difficulties prevented them from producing the large incre-
ments in transport service which were required by the economy. After
the 1935 reorganization under Kaganovich, capital productivity immedi-
ately sprang back to the long-run trend.
In 1945-47 the annual relationships between fixed assets and
output clearly show that postwar reconversion and the effects of wartime
disorganization hampered the effectiveness of the railroads' performance.
In 1948-49 the recovery process generated rapid gains, and the 1950-52
relationship is similar to that in the prewar period.
In the opening years of forced industrialization (1928-32),
assets rose from 11.5 billion to 14.2 billion rubles at 1933 prices, for
an increment of 2.7 billion. Using cumulated ton-kilometers as a measure
of output, the 1932 level was 135 billion cumulated tkm above that of
1928. An increase of 100 billion cumulated tkm in output was associ-
ated, therefore, with an asset increment of 2 billion rubles. In
1936-39, assets rose by 3.3 billion rubles, while output increased by
85 billion cumulated tkm. In this period the additional assets asso-
ciated with 100 billion cumulated tkm of output rose to 3.9 billion
rubles compared with 2 for the earlier period. There was, therefore,
almost a doubling in the amount of capital necessary to obtain a given
increment in output.
During the rapid postwar recovery period (1947-49) an increment
of 3.4 billion rubles in assets was associated with 149 billion cumu-
lated tkm of output. In this period an increase of 100 billion cumu-
lated tkm of output was associated with an asset increment of 2.3
billion rubles, not very different from the situation in 1928-32.
* Following p. 66.
-65-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
Growth between 1949 and 1952, on the other hand) involved a 9.9-billion-
ruble addition to assets and a 232-billion cumulated tkm output. An
increase of 100 billion cumulated thin in this period was associated,
therefore, with an asset increment of 4.3 billion rubles. Hence this
recent period shows a close likeness to 1936-39, when the asset incre-
ment was 3.9 for each 100 billion cumulated tkm. The crude evidence
seems to indicate, therefore, that Soviet railroads in the early 1950's
faced approximately the same capital-output relationship that they
faced in the late 1930's.
Such a comparison with output in physical terms has limited
applications; consequently, an analysis utilizing money valuations for
output should be undertaken. The value Of transport output is not
easily determined, but analysis of unit revenue per cumulated ton-kilo-
meters shows that 1.88 kopeks, estimated for the value of the service in
1934, is a fairly representative measure of the gross value of railroad
output during the prewar years. iL/ Output during the postwar series
is valued at the composite unit revenue of 1934 in order to obtain a
comparable series for both periods. The 1934 value also allows for a
1-year timelag between output and investment, which was given in 1933
prices.
Multiplying the cumulated ton-kilometers of output in each pre-
war period by 1.88 kopeks produces gross value increments of 2.6 billion
rubles for 1928-32 and 1.6 billion rubles for 1936-39. These increments
were associated with increments in assets which amounted to 2.7 and 3.3
billion rubles, respectively. Dividing the asset increments by the out-
put values gives incremental capital-output ratios of 1.04 for 1928-32
and 2.06 for 1936-39. Thus the prewar trend calculated from the physical
data is confirmed by these value Comparisons.
For the postwar years an increment of 3.4 billion rubles in
assets for 1947-49 is associated with an increment of 2.8 billion rubles
in output) producing an incremental capital-output ratio of 1.21, which
is quite close to that of 1928-32. Growth between 1949 and 1952) on
the other hand) involved a 9.9-billion-ruble addition to assets and a
4.4-billion-ruble increment in output values. The incremental capital-
output ratio for this period, therefore, was 2.25, not far different from
the values estimated for 1936-39. Once again the evidence, as calcu-
lated by the physical data, is confirmed by the value comparison.
Approximately twice as much additional capital was required for addi-
tions to output in 1936-39 and 1949-52 as was required during 1928-32
and 1947-49.
-66-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Cumulated Ton-Kilometers
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
Figure 7 50X1
USSR
FIXED ASSETS AND OUTPUT OF RAILROADS
1924-40 AND 1945-52
1932
?
1949
1951 ?
1950
1938.
193-4
1936.
1939 ?
?
1940?
1946
.
19.45
?
? 1947
948
1932.
1931.
1935
? 1934
1933
?
1930 ?
?92, 929
1927
1926
25..
1924
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Fixed Assets of Railroads
(Billion Rubles-I933 Prices)
35
40
OM711 1R7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
45
50
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
Another aspect of the underlying forces can be shown by an anal-
ysis of average capital-output ratios -- that is, of trends in the rela-
tionship between assets available in a given year and the output which
they produced during that year. Employing the annual asset series at
1933 prices and converting the physical output series to 1934 values
leads to the capital-output ratios presented in column 5 of Table 21*
and graphically shown in the accompanying chart (Figure 8**).
Once again it is clearly evident that the trend is toward inten-
sive use of rail plant and equipment. The average productivity in 1927
was more than twice that in 1924. The downward trend continued unabated
through 1932 but was reversed somewhat in 1933 and 1934. Thereafter the
ratio decreased slightly and toward the close of the decade seemed estab-
lished at a level only one-half that of 1928. It is also evident that
the average capital-output ratio continued its decline through the post-
war years. Starting from a level of 3.3 in 1945, it fell to 2.9 in 1952,
a level again which is not very different, although slightly higher,
than that of the late 1930's.
One other analysis may be made to show the relationship between
the functions of capital and output. Using the annual capital investment
data and the production data in Table 21, another chart (Figure 9**)
was constructed which indicates the general trend from 1924 through
1955, minus the war years. It is evident that in 1930-35 rail invest-
ment increments were associated with more modest additions to output
than in 1925-30. The year 1935 showed slow progress, although invest-
ments were increased substantially. The year 1936, however, showed
significant additions to output even though investment that year was
cut back. Reference to the postwar series shows that the general
relationship between investment and output appears to have been main-
tained except for 1950-51, when increments in investment were greatly
increased. The next year) 1952, was involved in investment cutbacks
which seemed to average the trend back to the hypothetical 1949-55
curve) concave toward the X-axis.
All of the foregoing calculations clearly indicate that an alter-
ation in the ratio reflects nothing more than the results of changes in
output and in the related flow of capital. Even so, the behavior of the
average capital-output ratio warrants some attention, for the pattern of
* P. 64, above.
** Following p. 68.
-67-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
its trend is suggestive of a number of underlying factors. Table 21*
shows that the ratio in 1924 was 12.3, meaning that for every ruble's
worth of annual output there were 12.3 rubles of accumulated invest-
ment in road, facilities, and equipment. The ratio fell rapidly to
3 in 1932, then rose to 3.2 in 1934 and again descended to a low of
2.4 in 1939. The postwar series assumed the same general trend, with
a high of 3.7 in 1947. Some implications of this trend in connection
with the volume of capital follow.
An outstanding characteristic of the railroad industry is the
indivisibility of many of its units of capital investment. In order to
provide for any service at all between two given points, a minimum
investment is required in grading lines, laying tracks) and installing
structures and equipment. The capacity of this minimum may exceed many
times the actual demands of business during a road's early period of
operation. Furthermore, once the initial huge investment is made in
the building of a road, capacity may be extended manyfold through rela-
tively small additional investments.
The indivisibility of capital alone cannot explain the average
capital-output ratio trend shown on the charts. Two other factors have
had a strong influence upon the declining efficiency of capital in the
Soviet railroad industry.
First, there was the transport crisis of the early 1930's which
was caused by the forced industrialization drive. This brought about a
situation in which the railroads were unable to cope with the heavy in-
crease in traffic, necessitating substantial inputs of capital beginning
in 1935. It is clear, too, that the rail system lagged in effectiveness
during the immediate postwar years mainly because of the lack of invest-
ments during the war and the disorganization associated with the reestab-
lishment of an effective system to prewar levels.
Coupled with these changes was a succession of technological
innovations to increase the work capacity of cars, locomotives, track,
and facilities. Such changes are substantial but are not always re-
flected in prices, although their net effect is to lower the capital-
output ratio. It is doubtful, however, that many such forces were
actually at work in the Soviet rail industry. Railroading in the USSR
to date has been overwhelmingly based on steam traction, outdated sig-
naling, and relatively weak roadbeds compared with that in the US.
There is every indication, however, that the USSR is beginning to
* P. 64, above.
-68-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
USSR
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
CAPITAL-OUTPUT RATIO OF RAILROADS
1924-40 AND 1945-52
Figure 8
Assets at 1933 Prices
Output at p934 Prices
1924
I I I I
'26
'28
1930 '32
34 '36 '38 1940 1945'46
'48
25734 1-57
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
1
1950 1952
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
USSR
ANNUAL INVESTMENT AND OUTPUT OF RAILROADS
1924-40 AND 1945-55
Cumulated Ton-Kilometers
(Billions)
2
1
8
6
4
2
Figure 9
50X1
Investment
(Billion Rubles-i933 Prices)
222 2 2 0 0 0
0 co o0
v 0
cm
?
?
i
,.
i
if T
I .
hi
't
F-
-

+4
t-rt?
f
T
-1 r-i
t ? r
"
; .-
!-V1
, 4-?,--
..
.1.t.t .1.
- 4.- ,? -
-:-. t :.
? - 7-
410
. -
ill!:
.-t -T-4
- .. T. f
?
:4.1.:
- . I.+
. t.; I-
? i.44i.
; -4 '1-
1. ft; -
..I41:i:
f -LI ti?
- f I- -
if! -in
1 PI
1. .. ? i
?
4 4
:
- ?_
.

,
. , .
;rt., ri7. .2
t
tr.-
1
:::4114
1=1;#
--a
-.ittP.
t
:+- til: ii..
.
.4..?
1::140.-,
.?
'Fli
t:4T-t
?
r? y
f4:144...tee.
t
4-4f.-bi
tfiz--;
t
? ?
"
-
a
... .?
---
.. I.
tii
q
_
. -
.
-4--
,
-;--:? - r,.- 1,.
rf
t-
,
I -
.. .
.
1-?
/ , r ?
,..,1 .: ,
.117.? -?:i14. E? ,
-1.-11
-
4tri 7'
- th?-?
-7-71:-.
?iii.
TON-KILOMETERS,.,..
ittr4
7 If.11
?
t':
- . : ,
?, _
.1-i.ii. :--t-? t., , 11
'
T
? ?
'
1?
,
.
?:. .i
.. .
/ 1 4
;I? i 4 I- r -I
. 4 ' r .
. ... -
t
i' '
.
-.'
?
-Pr
:
It
:
?
.....-12:-.--?.
?
4 ;
INVESTMENT''4
:' * ' 4'. 1-4-?
I
-i- ,
1-Z4-4411
It .4- -r-r--1-1-
, ? -14-1,-
P ?
1
P . -I-
? it?a
.
? , _1
.
----- ?ft--
...__
E.!
I :---
..,
rt
-
---.--,"'-tf- 1 '-
1
i -1
--
.I
44 ?:
1;4
444'
ti:--t-?
ii=
14-
ins
--
rif

TT '
-'-i
i
fyiit.
-
: 414 t t -- .
...._.

P:411. lit
...LE.
1 'ffst.1-
- ? -
3:4
f
Till.
t- -4
i -
t.
-.1- . tr:
r /.-.1
73, H.
ti
:',
inttt.r.S.
/&
94-1 :2
- --:
taSE
-
---4f
:122-7't .1-1:. t'
-'::2-
. .4-:
44! t
_tiot
r
1 -+:;
? 1: :441
? It; th:44: ;7-17r; I._
11 -t. -t44F... -F-1.4-.
4 .._.P
1.?1
1 1
?I.1 ? I _r " ! .- 1
1
-I-.14-
t "I:
:- t. I 19-+T-1 d?-fr
1 ? 4 '.I .. I !,
1
.11
4- [
T-1-1
-4- I ?
1924
25735 1-57
1930
1935
1940 1945
1950
20
10
8
6
4
2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
1955
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
revolutionize its motive power, following the US change to electrifica-
tion -- it expects to produce its last steam locomotive in 1957. 187/
Similarly, important innovations in signaling, communications, and other
aspects of railroading offer the prospect of radical improvement. Al-
though these developments will require large absolute investments, it
seems likely that a given stock of rail assets in the future will be
associated with a larger volume of output than would have been possible
using the old technology.
-69-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
APPENDIX A
METHODOLOGY
The methodology employed for estimating transport performance in
the USSR was to accept the absolute values announced by the USSR for
some base year) generally a prewar year, and add to these the announced
percentage increase. Where data were not available for any given year)
estimates were derived based upon past and present trends. For some
branches of the transport sector, absolute values were given for 1960)
and the intervening years, 1956-59, were graphically projected, using
past performance and the Sixth Five Year Plan as a basis.
Investment and asset data have been taken directly from Soviet
announcements which have generally been quoted in current absolute
values.
The techniques for estimating the levels of operating efficiency,
labor productivity, and the demand for transport services are given in
some detail in their respective sections of this report.
-71-
S-E-C-R-E-T
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
. I
lie
40 Next 10 Page(s) In Document Denied
e
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6
SECRET
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800040002-6