THE FERROUS METALLURGICAL INDUSTRY OF THE USSR

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• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 28, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
N? 86
THE FERROUS METALLURGICAL INDUSTRY
OF THE USSR
CIA/RR 88
28 January 1957
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
1
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SECRET
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title Is, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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ECONOMIC INTEL!' IGENCE REPORT.
THE FERROUS METALLURGICAL INDUSTRY OF THE USSR
CIA/RR 88
(ORR Project 23.604)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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Summary
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CONTENTS
Page
3-
I. Introduction 5
A. Scope 5
B. Significance 5
C. History and Development 6
1. Early Five Year Plans and World War II (1928-45) . 6
2. Fourth Five Year Plan (1946-50) 7.
3. Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55) 8
II.
D. Sixth Five Year Plan (1956-60)
Organization
10
17
A. Council of Ministers
17
B. Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy
17
C. Main Administrations
18
D. Enterprises
18
III.
Planning and Control
19
A. Plan Formulation
19
B. Tekhpromfinplan
20
C. Control
21
IV.
Production of Iron and Steel
23
A. Steel Plant
'
23
B. Distribution of Facilities
24
C. Pig Iron and Scrap
25
1. Pig Iron
25
2. Scrap
30
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D.
E.
F.
G.
Crude Steel
Finished Steel
Alloy Steel
Other Iron and Steel Products
Page.
30
35
41
44
1.
Wire and Other Manufactured Products
44
2.
Consumer Goods
44
3.
Gray and Malleable Iron Castings
45
V.
Production of Raw and Alloying Materials
47
A.
Basic Raw Materials
47
1.
Coking Coal and Coke
47
2.
Iron Ore
51
3.
Manganese Ore
63
B.
Alloying Materials
69
1.
General
69
2.
Chromite
70
3.
Tungsten
72
4.
Molybdenum
76
5.
Vanadium
80
6.
Nickel
81
7.
Cobalt
85
8.
Ferroalloys
87
VI.
Trade
95
A.
General
95
B.
Raw Materials
101
1.
Iron Ore
101
2.
Manganese Ore
101
3.
Coke and Scrap
102
4.
Chromite
102
5.
Nickel, Tungsten, and Molybdenum
102
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Page
C. Ferrous Metals 102
1. Pig Iron
2. Finished Steel
VII. State Reserves
VIII. Inputs
IX. Technology
A. General
B. Preparation of Iron Ore
C. Preparation of Coke and Coking Coal
D. Blast Furnace
E. Steelmaking
F. Alloy Steel
G. Rolling Mill and Finishing Line
X. Costs
A. Cost Accounting and Analysis
B. Cost Structure
C. Cost-Price Relationship
XI. Prices
A. System
B. Policy
C. Trends
D. Ruble/Dollar Price Ratios
XII. Investment
XIII. Employment, Labor Productivity, and Wages
A. Labor Force
B. Labor Proddctivity
C. Wages
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109
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125
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XIV. DistribUtion and Consumption
A. Distribution
B. Consumption
XV. Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Intentions
Page
141
141
143
145
A. Capabilities 145
B. Vulnerabilities 145
C. Intentions 145
Appendix A. Statistical Tables
Appendixes
Appendix B. Methodology
147
163
Tables
1. Estimated Production of Crude Steel in the Sino-Soviet Bloc,
1955
6
2. Increases in Capacity and Production in the Ferrous Metal-
lurgical Industry of the USSR Called For by the Sixth Five
Year Plan (1956-60) 12
3. Distribution of Production of Coke,
and Finished Steel in the USSR, by
It. Estimated Production of Pig Iron in
1930-40, and 1945-60
5. Production of Pig Iron in the USSR,
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Pig Iron, Crude Steel,
Economic Region, 1955
the USSR, 1913, 1928,
by Type, 1955
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6. Index of Utilization for Blast Furnaces in the USSR, 1940)
1945, and 1950-56 29
7. Estimated Production of Crude Steel in the USSR, 1913, 1928)
1930-39, and 1945-60 31
8. Production of Crude Steel in the USSR and the US, by Process)
1955 32
9. Use of Ferrous Metallics in the USSR) by Steelmaking Process)
1955 33
10. Index of Utilization for Open Hearth FUrnaces in the USSR)
1937, 1940, and 1950-56 34
11. Estimated Production of Finished Steel in the USSR, 1913)
1928, 1930-40) and 1945-60 35
12. Ratio of Production of Quality Finished Steel to Total Fin-
ished Steel in the USSR) 1930-47 and 1950-55 37
13. Production of Finished Steel in the USSR, by Major Types,
1955 . 38
14. Production of Hot and Cold Rolled Sheet and Strip, Electrical
Sheet) and Tinplate in the USSR) 1955 39
15. Estimated Production of High-Temperature Coke in the USSR,
1913, 1922, 1928-40, and 1945-60 50
16. Estimated Production of Selected Coke-Chemical Byproducts
in the USSR) 1955 . 51
17. Estimated Production of Commercial-Grade Iron Ore in the USSR,
1938-60 53
18. Estimated Production of Commercial-Grade Iron Ore in the USSR,
by Economic Region, 1940, 1950, and 1955 54
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Page
19. Estimated Production of Manganese Ore in the USSR, by Produc-
ing Area, 1940 and 1945-55 68
20. Estimated Production and Exports of Chromite by the USSR,
1937-55 71
21. Estimated Production of Tungsten in the USSR, 1938-55 . ? ? 74
22. Apparent Supply of Tungsten in the USSR. and in the US,
1955' 75
23. Estimated Supply of Molybdenum in the USSR, 1940
and 1942-55 79
24. Estimated Production of Vanadium in the USSR, 1946
and 1951-55 Si
25. Estimated Production of Nickel in the USSR, 1945-55
and 1960 83
26. Estimated Reserves and Production of Cobalt in the USSR,
by Economic Region, 1955 86
27. Estimated Production of Electric Furnace Ferroalloys in the
USSR, 1931-55 89
28. Estimated Production of Blast Furnace and Electric Furnace
Ferroalloys in the USSR, by Type, 1955 90
29. Soviet Foreign Trade in Ferrous Metallurgical Raw Materials,
1950-55 96
30. Soviet Foreign Trade in Ferrous Metals; 1950-55 98
31. Components of Cost in the Ferrous Metallurgical Industry
of the USSR, Selected Years, 1930-55
120
32. Approximate Relationship of Components of Cost in the Steel
Industries of the US and the USSR, 1951 121
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33. Components of Cost in tpe Ferrous Metallurgical Industry
of the USSR, by Producing Unit, 1954 122
34. Weighted Ruble/Dollar Ratios in Sectors of the Ferrous Metal-
lurgical Industry of the USSR, by Standard Industrial Classi-
fication Number, 1950 and 1955 130
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
110.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
Estimated Labor Force in the Ferrous Metallurgical Industry
of the USSR, 1955
Production and Employment at the Magnitogorsk Steel Plant
in the USSR, by Department, 1955
Production and Consumption of Finished Steel in the USSR,
by Geographic Area, 1940, 1951, and 1953
133
136
142
Distribution of Coke, Pig Iron, Crude Steel, and Finished
Steel in the USSR, by Republic, 1955 147
Wholesale Prices and Ruble/Dollar Ratios for the Ferrous Metal-
lurgical-Industry of the USSR, Selected Years, 1948-55 . . 148
Selected Input Requirements for the Coke and Coke
Industry (SIC No. 2932) in the USSR, 1955
Selected Input Requirements for the Blast Furnace
(SIC No. 3311) in the USSR, 1955
Selected Input Requirements for the Steel Works and Rolling
Mill Industry (SIC No. 3312) in the USSR, 1955
Byproducts
Industry
Selected Input Requirements for the Steel Casting Industry
(SIC No. 3323) in the USSR, 1955
Selected Input Requirements for the Iron Casting Industry
(SIC Nos. 3321 and 3322) in the USSR, 1955
Estimated Production of Electric Furnace Ferroalloys in the
USSR, Selected.Years, 1931-55
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Illustrations
Figure 1. USSR: The Ferrous Metallurgical Industry from
Raw Materials to Finished Products (Chart) . . .
Figure 2. Comparison of World Production of Crude Steel, 1955
(Chart)
Figure 3. No./1 Blast Furnace of the Cherepovets
Plant, 1955 (Photograph)
Metallurgical
Figure 4. USSR: Administrative Structure of the
Ministry of
Ferrous Metallurgy, 1955 (Chart)
Figure 5. Blast Furnaces of the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical
Combine, 1955 (Photograph)
Figure 6. A 150-Ton Furnace in the Open Hearth Shop of the
Sumgait Tube Plant, 1955 (Photograph)
Figure 7. A 66-Inch Continuous Hot Sheet Mill in the Rolling
MI11 Division of the Zaporozh'ye Steel Plant,
1955 (Photograph)
Figure 8. USSR: Principal Iron Ore
1955 (lAap)
, /
Figure 9. USSR: Principal Alloy Ore
Plants, 1955 (Map)
Following Page
6
6
10
28
32
36
and Coking Coal Deposits, Inside
Back Corer
Deposits and Ferroalloy
Figure 10. Blast Furnace Control Room
Metallurgical Plant, 1955
of the Dneprodzerzhinsk
(Photograph)
Figure 11. Oxygen Installation Under Construction at the
Nizhniy Tagil Metallurgical Plant, 1955
(Photograph)
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Back Cover
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Figure 12. A 300-mm Bar Mill in the Rolling Mill Division
of the Chelyabinsk Metallurgical Plant (Bakal),
1955 (Photograph)
Following Page
n6
Figure 13. USSR: Coke, Iron, and Steel Plants and Sales Ware- Inside
houses, 1955 (Map) Back Cover
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CIA/RR 88 S-E-C-R-E-T
(ORB Project 23.604)
TEE FERROUS METALLURGICAL INDUSTRY OF THE USSR*
?9219EI
The ferrous metallurgical industry of the USSR is the second largest
in the world. In 1955 the Soviet industry produced 45.3 million metric
tons** of crude steel, 17 percent oftotal world production and equal to
43 percent of US production. Of total production of crude steel in the
Sino-Soviet Bloc in 1955, 62.5 million tons, the USSR produced 72.5 per-
cent. The ferrous metallurgical industries of the European Satellites
and Communist China are dependent on the USSR for supplies of raw ma-
terials and equipment. In 1955 the USSR provided about 51 percent of
the iron ore required by the European Satellites and most of the more
complex equipment for the ferrous metallurgicarindustries of the Satel-
lites and Communist China.
The production capacity of the Soviet ferrous metallurgical industry
has increased steadily during the postwar period, and Plan goals have
been fulfilled consistently. Production of crude steel increased from
12.3 million tons in 1945 to 45.3 million tons in 1955, and during the
period of the Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55)1 production of crude steel
increased at an average annual rate of 3.6 million tons.
Steel is produced in every economic region of the USSR, but the
location of the major Soviet iron and steel complexes is determined by
the availability of the three bulk raw materials -- iron ore, coking
coal, and limestone. More than 75 percent of the Soviet ferrous metal-
lurgical industry is concentrated in the Ukraine (Region III) and the
Urals (Region VIII). These areas are distant from the principal indus-
trial centers of the European USSR, and in 1955 the average haul of
ferrous metals to the consuming industries was 1,055 kilometers, an in-
crease of 9 percent above the average haul in 1940.
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent
the best judgment of ORE as of 1 August 1956.
** Tonnages throughout this report are given in metric tons.
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The Soviet steel industry is supported by indigenous sources of raw
materials which, in general) are adequate both for the present require-
ments of the industry and for long-term growth. Soviet resources of
iron ore, coking coal, limestone) and most alloying materials are among
the largest in the world. Supplies of nickel, molybdenum, and cobalt
apparently are adequate for normal peacetime consumption) but they
might become critically short in a wartime economy -- particularly
cobalt. Domestic reserves of tungsten are relatively small, but they
are adequately supplemented by imports from Communist China.
Since 1950 the USSR has been a net exporter of all ferrous metal-
lurgical raw materials and products except tungsten and molybdenum. In
1955, Soviet exports of manganese amounted to 17 percent of domestic
production; of iron ore, 12 percent; of chromite, 12 percent; of nickel,
11 percent; of pig iron) 2,5 percent; and of finished steel) 2 percent.
Although a greater part of Soviet exports of ferrous metallurgical
materials and products have gone to other countries of the Sino-Soviet
Bloc) substantial amounts have gone into Free World markets. In 1955,
Soviet exports to non-Bloc countries included 537)000 tons of manganese,
88/000 tons of chromite, 120;000 tons of scrap iron) 665,000 tons of pig
Iron, and: 326,000 tons of finished steel. Soviet plans call for in-
creasing exports of ferrous metallurgical commodities to the Free World,
particularly to the underdeveloped nations. The USSR has undertaken to
supply to India) for example, 1 million tons of finished steel over the
3-year period ending in 1958.
The pattern of consumption of iron and steel in the USSR is not
revealed by the Soviet government, undoubtedly because the pattern
would provide information on the production of military equipment.
It is apparent) however, that in terms of gross national product (GNP)
the relative consumption of Steel in the USSR is greater than in the
US. In 1955 the Soviet GNP was equal to 36 percent of the US GNP,
Soviet consumption of steel) however) was equal to 46 percent of US
consumption. A general indication of the pattern of steel consumption
in the USSR is Implicit in the fact that in 1955 the Soviet economy
channeled 56 percent of total production of steel into heavy industry.
In the US, only 31 percent of total production was consumed by heavy
Industry in 1955.
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In the ferrous metallurgical industry of the USSR) technology is
equal) generally, to that of Western nations, including the US. The
application of Soviet technology, however, has varied among different
sectors of the industry. Advanced technology has been applied to the
preparation of raw materials, to blast furnace and open hearth furnace
processes, and to the military applications of high-temperature alloys,
but the application of new technology to rolling mina and finishing
lines has begun only recently.
Because the manufacture and construction of metallurgical equipment
in the USSR has not kept pace with the demand, there has been consid-
erable selectivity in the allocation of modern equipment among the
plants in the industry. The highest priority has been accorded to in-
vestment in technological improvements and new equipment, in the prepa-
ration of raw materials) and in the ironmaking and steelmaking depart-
ments of major plants such as the Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk combines.
These facilities are as efficient and productive as the best units in
the US, and they serve as models for other Soviet steel plants.
The data available on capital investment in the ferrous metallur-
gical industry of the USSR are scant. It is known) however, that the
Fourth Five Year Plan (1946-50) called for an investment of 27 billion
rubles) and it is estimated that about 23 billion rubles actually were
invested. Total investment in the industry during the Fifth Five Year
Plan probably was about 41 billion rubles, and the Sixth Five Year Plan
(1956-60) calls for an investment of about 80 billion rubles -- 13 per-
cent of the planned capital investment in all Soviet industry and 20
percent of the planned investment in heavy industry.
Until 1949) .prices of finished steel products in the Soviet ferrous
metallurgical industry were considerably below actual cost) and the indus-
try was heavily subsidized. In 1949, major increases in steel prices
eliminated the need for subsidization of the industry as a whole) although
some plants continue to operate at planned losses. Since that time the
price trend has been downward, indicative of a policy of relating prices
to costs of production.
About 645)000 persons were employed in the Soviet ferrous metallur-
gical industry in 1955. Of this total) about 411)000 were employed in
iron and steel works, about 71,000 in iron ore mining, between 40,000
and 70,000 in various levels of administrative work) and the remainder
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in other segments of the industry. In the Soviet iron and steel indus-
try, labor productivity is considerably lower than it is in the US in-
dustry. In 1955, US annual production per worker was 163 tons of crude
steel, and annual Soviet production per worker was only 88 tons. The
level of labor productivity depends to a considerable extent on the
levels of technology that have been introduced in the various segments
of the industry. In those plants that employ the latest technological
developments, for example, labor productivity is much higher than the
industry average and is closely comparable with that in the US indus-
try.
Prospects for the long-term development of the ferrous metallurgical
Industry of the USSR appear to be excellent. Soviet reserves of the
major raw materials for the industry are adequate, and those few alloy-
ing mat-irials of which there are not large indigenous reserves can be
imported from Communist China. The quality of the finished product is
satisfactory. The production of the industry meets domestic requirements
and provides exports for competition in world markets.
To insure continued expansion of the industry, however, the USSR
must make large capital investments in the development of raw materials,
in the modernization of existing plants, and in the manufacture and con-
struction of new equipment and new plant facilities. The provisions of
the Sixth Five Year Plan indicate the clear intent of the Soviet govern-
ment to make the necessary investment. The Plan calls for an increase in
production of crude steel from 45.3 million tons in 1955 to 68.3 million
tons in 1960, an average annual, rate of increase of 4.6 million tons.
These planned increases are commensurate with objectives in other sectors
of Soviet heavy industry and appear to be designed to support the planned
peacetime growth of the national economy.
The Soviet production goals for crude steel and finished steel probably
will be reached, but it is likely that some specific aspects of the Plan are
beyond the capability of the USSR. Although capital investment in the indus-
try certainly will increase substantially, it probably will fall short of
the goal. As a consequence, the goals for the replacement of obsolete equip-
ment and for increased labor productivity will not be reached. The directives
of the Sixth Five Year Plan, however, appear to provide for excess capacity to
assure the fulfillment of production goals even though all of the component
objectives are not met.
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I. Introduction.
A. Scope.
This report surveys the ferrous metallurgical industry of the
USSR and its contribution to the Soviet economy and to that of the Sino-
Soviet Bloc. To provide a basis for an assessment of the capabilities
of the industry, the report is not limited to operations under the
Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy. Production of some commodities dis-
cussed in the report is under the control of other ministries. To
present a broad view of the resources base as well as of significant
economic and technological aspects of the industry itself, the report
covers the major raw materials used in making iron and steel and the
reserves and production of the principal alloying metals consumed by
the industry. '
? The important units of the Soviet ferrous metallurgical indus-
try are shown in the accompanying chart, Figuit 1.* Among these the
basic unit is the steel plant. The most economical form of the steel
plant is the? integrated plant) combining-at one location the production
of coke, pig iron, and crude and finished steel. This report, however)
follows the, general practice of using the term steel plant to denote any
facility which produces steel, whether or not the facility is an integrated
plant.
B. Significance.
The ferrous metallurgical industry of the USSR is the second
largest in the world. In 1955, Soviet production of crude steel amounted
to 17 percent of world production, and on 1 January 1956 crude .steel ca-
pacity in the USSR was equal to about 41 percent of US capacity. The
relation of production of crude steel in the USSR to that in other areas
of the world is shown in the accompanying chart, Figure 2.* 1/**
Soviet production of crude steel in 1955 was equal to the com-
bined production of West Germany, the UK, Belgium) and Sweden. Total
.Sino-Soviet Bloc production, 72.5 percent of which was produced in the
USSR, was equal to 34 percent of total NATO production. 2/ Estimated
production of crude steel in the Sino-Soviet Bloc in 1955 is shown in
!Table 1.***
* Following p. 6.
*** Table 1 follows on p. 6.
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Table 1
Estimated Production of Crude Steel in the Sino-Soviet Bloc 2/
1955
Country
Production
(Million Metric Tons) Percent of Total
USSR
45.3
72.5
CzechosloVakia
4.5
7.2
Poland
4.4
7.0
East Germany
2.7
4.3
Hungary
1.6
2.6
Rumania
0.8
1.3
Bulgaria
0.1
0.2
Communist China
2.9
4.6
North Korea
0.2
0.3
Total
62.5
100.0
The maintenance and enlargement of the heavy industrial and de-
fense base in the USSR is vitally dependent on the metallurgical industry.
During the Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55) a continually growing demand
for steel in the consuming sectors of heavy industry, construction, trans-
portation, and defense resulted in a crude steel growth pattern of about
3.6 million tons annually. The directives of the Sixth Five Year Plan
(1956-60) require an average annual growth rate-of 4.6 million tons of
crude steel.
C. History and Development.
1. Early Five Year Plans and World War II (1928-45).
At the beginning of the First Five Year Plan (1928-32)) the
Soviet ferrous metallurgical industry, because of the disastrous effects
of the revolution, had just attained the 1913 production level of 4.3
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COKING COAL MINING
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COAL
PREPARATION
REFRACTORIES
COKE
PLANT
BY PRODUCTS
Napthalene
Ammontum Sulphate
Pyridine
Benzol
Toluol
Xylol
Tar
Others
METALLURGICAL COKE
COKE OVEN GAS
USSR
THE FERROUS METALLURGICAL INDUSTRY
FROM RAW MATERIALS TO FINISHED PRODUCTS
(Simplified Schematic)
IRON
FOUNDRIES
SCRAP
FOUNDRY
PIG IRON
_ BLAST FURNACE
GAS
BENEFICIATION
AGGLOMERATION
BLAST
FURNACE
REFRACTORIES--v?
IRON ORE MINING
SINTERING
CONCENTRATION
?
,PLANT
LIMESTONE QUARRYING
MANGANESE ORE MINING-4--CONCENTRATION
ALLOY ORE MINING-
Chrome
Vanadium
Wolfram (Tungsten)
Molybdenum
Cobalt
Nickel
CONCENTRATION
25641 12-56
CONCENTRATION
RAW MATERIALS
COKE
REFRACTORIES
BESSEMER
PIG IRON
SCRAP
1 REFRACTORIES-0?
BASIC
PIG IRON
BESSEMER
AND
OXYGEN
CONVERTOR
PLANT
1 BLAST FURNACE
FERROALLOYS
Ferromanganese
Ferrosilicon
Speigeleisen
?Id
ALLOY
REFRACTORIES FERRO . PLANT
ORE
SMELTER
ELECTRIC FURNACE
FERROALLOYS
Ferrochrome
Ferrotungsten
Ferrovanadium
Ferromolybdenum
Ferromanganese
IRON MAKING
COBALT
NICKEL
OPEN -
HEARTH
FURNACE
PLANT
SCRAP --IN--.
REFRACTORIES-0--
ELECTRIC
FURNACE
PLANT
GRAY IRON CASTINGS
MALLEABLE IRON CASTINGS
? STEEL CASTINGS ?I.
?I SEMI-
BLOOMS
STRIPPER ?4-- INGOTS FINISHING , BILLETS ?
'
MILLS I SLABS
*11
DUPLEXING COMBINATIONS USED IN THE USSR .
CONVERTER
OPEN HEARTH
OPEN HEARTH
ELECTRIC
STEEL MAKING
* At any stage past this point semi-finished and
finished steel may be sold outside thb industry.
SCRAP FROM
4-- ALL PROCESSING
FOR REMELTING
RAILS ?
?RAIL ACCESSORIES-0
STRUCTURAL SHAPES 0
BARS
-FIGURE 1
WIRE PRODUCTS
(METIZ)
?WIRE ROD--0----
?PIPE AND TUBE--?
WHEELS
PLATE
-0
SHEET TIN PLATE
GALVANIZED SHEET AND STRIP--??
COLD ROLLED SHEET AND STRIP?,
STRIP ELECTRICAL SHEET
FORGINGS
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?
CONSUMER GOODS
(SHIRPOTREB)
?
SEMI-FINISHED AND FINISHED PRODUCTS
?
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COMPARISON OF WORLD PRODUCTION
OF CRUDE STEEL, 1955
WORLD TOTAL
268 MILLION METRIC TONS
C\
7
1-
FIGURE 50X1
7
0
7
OTHER
FREE
WORLD
996
ler BLOC 2396 ,
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million tons of crude steel. The ambitious First Five Year Plan goal
of 10.3 million tons of crude steel was fulfilled by only 57 percent
(5.9 million tons), a failure caused largely by Soviet operational and
technical incompetence. V
In spite of this early failure the groundwork had been
laid -- with much US equipment and technical assistance -- for the
progress made during the Second Five Year Plan (1933-37). Completion
of the initial stages of the Magnitogorsk, Kuznetsk, and other com-
bines during this period enabled production of crude steel in 1937 to
reach 17.7 million tons, a 4-percent overfulfillment of the 17-million-
ton goal. ?/
The Third Five Year Plan (1938-42) started auspiciously
with a forecast for a 1942 production of crude steel of 28 million
tons. The effects of the purges, however, were so disruptive that
by the end of 1940, on the eve of German invasion, the production of
crude steel had risen only 3 percent above the 1937 level.
At' the onset of the German advance in June 1941 a tremen-
dous effort was made to evacuate eslential equipment. By 1942 the USSR
had lost, primarily in the Ukraine, 75 percent of its coking coal ca-
pacity, more than 60 percent of its iron ore, 68 percent of its pig
iron, and 65 percent of its steel capacity. Production of crude Steel
dropped from 18.3 million tons in 1940 to 6.5 million tons in 1942. By
drastic restrictions in the allocation of steel, by a considerable ef-
fort to construct steel plants in the Urals) and by importing 2.5
million tons of finished steel and thousands of tons of war material
from the US, the USSR managed to maintain a supply of steel sufficient
to conduct the war. ?/
2. Fourth Five Year Plan (1946-50).
The principal task of the Soviet ferrous metallurgical
industry during the Fourth Five Year Plan (1946-50) was to complete
restoration of wartime damage and achieve a considerable increase
above 1940 production levels. Goals for 1950 called for the produc-
tion of 25.4 million tons of crude steel, 17.8 million tons of fin-
ished steel, 19.5 million tons of pig iron, 40 million tons of com-
mercial-grade iron ore, and 30 million tons of coke. In February 1946,
Stalin stated that by about 1960 the USSR should have a capacity for
the annual production of 50 million tons of pig iron and 6o million
tons of crude steel. 2/ '
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By 19480 reconstruction had advanced to a point where produc-
tion of crude steel exceeded the 1940 level, and in 1949 production of
pig iron reached the 1940 level. Most of the plants in the Ukraine were
rebuilt with as much modernization introduced as the pressing demand for
immediate production would permit. Seizure of metallurgical equipment
as reparations, particularly in East Germany and Manchuria, aided the
task of reconstruction. The steel industries of the Ukraine and of the
badly damaged Leningrad area were completely restored by the end of the
Plan period. 12/
Goals for crude and finished steel were exceeded by the end
of the Plan period. Production of 27.3 million tons of crude steel, an
overfulfillment of 1.9 million tons, was largely the result of utiliza-
tion of abundant war scrap. The underfulfilIment of production goals
for both comMercial-grade iron ore and pig iron was slight. The failure
In construction of new plants was more pronounced, however, for of the
six new plants planned, only the Kazakh and Uzbek works produced any
steel by 1950. 11/
3. Fifth'Five Year Plan (1951-55).
? To insure an advance of 70 percent in the growth of indus-
trial production during the Fifth Five Year Plan '(1951-55) the goals
for pig iron and crude steel were set at 34 million and 44.3 million
tons, respectively. Stalin's 1960 goal of 50 million tons of pig iron
and 6o million tons of crude steel was restated. 1E/
The Plan directed that, because of the relatively low in-
vestment requiredlexpansion of existing steel plants was to be the
most important source of increased production. Emphasis on expansion
of plants already in operation was a change from the policy of con-
structing new facilities -- a policy stressed in all previous Five
Year Plans. Although the new policy was not an abandonment of the
theory of "regional self-sufficiency," the Plan statement was tacit
admission of the high costs and extensive delays encountered in the
construction of new plants. The Plan included the completion of plants
started during the Fourth Five Year Plan at Novo-Troitsk? Sumgait,
Rustavi, and Cherepovets. la/
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During the Fifth Five Year Plan, great emphasis was to be
placed on improving efficiency of operation. Increased operating ef-
ficiency at existing plants was to provide about one-third of the
planned increases in production. The automatization of equipment and
the production of alloy and special steels from electric furnaces was
to increase. Many types of finished steel new in the USSR -- such as
wide-flanged beams, Z-beams, and railroad car channels -- were to be
added. Sharp increases were scheduled for plate, light sections,
wire, and stainless steel sheet.
By the end of the Fifth Five Year Plan, many achievements
and a few notable failures had been recorded by the Soviet ferrous
metallurgical industry. The production plans for crude steel and fin-
ished steel were overfulfilled by 1 million and 1.3 million tons)
respectively) but production of several types of finished steel --
light sections, wire rod, cold rolled sheet, and metal articles --
were under Plan. The production of plate in 1955 was 88 percent
greater than in 1950; small sections were 100 percent greater; wire,
2.1 times more; electrical sheet, 2.3 times; stainless steel, 2.9
times; and stainless steel sheet) 2.8 times greater than in 1950.
Production of pig iron fell short of Plan goals by 2 percent, but the
supply of scrap apparently was adequate to overcome this deficiency
and also to provide for an overfulfillment of the plans for crude
steel. 12/
Planned goals for investment and capital construction, for
labor productivity, and for increasing blast furnace efficiensy were
not met. Blast furnace efficiency, scheduled for a 30-percent increase,
registered only a 22-percent increase. The most startling failures
probably were the 26-million-ton undeifulfillment in opening new iron
ore mining capacity and the failure to construct rolling mills of 4.8
million tons of capadity (estimated to be a shortfall of 25 to 35 per-
cent). ly
During the period of the Fifth Five Year Plan, construc-
tion continued at the new Novo-Troitsk, Chetepovets, Rustavi) Temir-Tau,
Begovat, and Sumgait iron and steel works and at the Baglai and MOSCOW
coke plants. The new No. 1 blast furnace of the Cherepovets plant)
completed in 1955, is shown in Figure 3.* Major construction projects,
* Following p. 10.
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adding new units of capacity at existing plants) were under way at the
Magnitogorsk, Chelyabinsk Bakal, Azovstal', Krivoy Rog, Dneprodzerzhinsk,
Voroshilovsk, Zaporozh'ye? and Novo-Lipetsk metallurgical plants.
D. Sixth Five Year Plan (1956-60).
The ambitious directives of the Sixth Five Year Plan (1956-60)
announced in January 1956 called for a 23-million-ton (51-percent) lm-
crease in production of crude steel to a level of 68.3 million tons by
1960 (the Fifth Five Year Plan increase in production of crude steel
was 18 million tons) 66 percent). Although the expansion of the US
steel industry by 1960 will be influenced by diverse economic and po-
litical factors, estimates indicate a probable increase of 20 million .
tons (17 percent) -- from 116 million tons to 136 million tons. By
1 January 1961, therefore, Soviet steel capacity will equal 52 percent
of US capacity, compared with 41 percent on 1 January 1956.*
The Soviet Plan directives also call for a 1960 production of
114.3 million tons of commercial-grade iron ore) 64.6 million tons of
coke, 53 million tons of pig iron, and 52.7 million tons of finished
steel, increases of 59, 48, 59, and 52 percent, respectively.** 17/
Soviet blast furnace productivity will be greatly improved by
the construction of 58 new sinter lines (39 were built between 1950 and
1955). The production goal of 73 million tons of sinter will provide
the industry with a sinter-to-pig-iron ratio of 1.38 to 1 in 1960 and
will result in significant increases in the production of existing blast
furnaces. Another factor which will contribute to higher blast furnace
production is the trend to larger furnaces. The Sixth Five Year Plan
calls for the completion of a 2)000-cubic-meter furnace with a 32.2-
foot hearth diameter (the largest furnace in the US at present is 1,810
cubic meters with a hearth diameter of 30.3 feet). Many large open
hearth and electric furnace units are also comtemplated.
* The Soviet steel industry is assumed to be operating at capacity.
Estimated crude steel capacity as of 1 January 1956, for example, is
obtained by totaling production in 1955 and in 1956 and dividing by 2.
** The production increases specified by the Plan directives were
applied to estimated 1955 production to obtain Sixth Five Year Plan
goals. In the case of finished steel) 1955 production was underesti-
mated, and only a 49-percent increase now will be required to achieve
the original goal.
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4.1.?-:-.Hr *1114- ?.? 1-? .a0 ?
???? ? ff?ton. ' via;zi
a :I.e.' kik I ? -
; a
,
24380 a 12.56
Figure 3. No. 1 Blast Furnace of the Cherepovets Metallurgical Plant, 1955.
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Another noteworthy goal is the planned erection at steel plants
of 18 oxygen stations (2 were built during the Fifth Five Year Plan
period) with capacities ranging from 10,000 to 30,000 cubic meters per
hour. As a result, about 40 percent, of the production of crude steel,
including all converter steel, will be smelted with oxygen-enriched
blast. Soviet metallurgical capabilities will continue to improve
during the Sixth Five Year Plan period with the expansion of contin-
uous tasting in plants at Gorikiy, Sverdlovsk, Stalino, Voroshilovsk,
Taganrog) Kramatorsk, and other sitee; vacuum melting and casting; and
the erection of more electrolytic tin lines, which will effect an econ-
omy.in the use of tin. 12/
The commissioning of a number of new continuous hot and cold
sheet and strip mills will permit a significant increase in the highly
deficient flat-rolled product category; sheet is to increase 85 percent,
including a 2.2-fold increase in production of thin sheet and a four-
fold increase in production of cold rolled sheet. During the next
several Five Year Plan periods the USSR hopes to bring the production
of flat-rolled products up to 4o or 45 percent of the total production
of finished steel, as is the case in the US. Because flat-rolled prod-
ucts are predominantly used in consumer applications, the rise in
production of sheet and strip steel indicates a contemplated increase
In the production 'of consumer durable goods. 20/
To obtain the production increases called for by the Sixth
Five Year Plan, the Plan directives specify the amount of construction
of new capacity, to be undertaken and the minimum increase in production
to be achieved through the more efficient organization of production
and use of existing capacity. These directives as they apply to iron
ore, pig iron, and crude and finished steel provide for increases in
capacity substantially greater than the added production called for
by the Plan. Increases in capacity and production in the ferrous
metallurgical industzir of the USSR called for by the Sixth Five Year
Plan are shown in Table 2.*.
A major part of the apparent excess capacity probably is des-
ignated. for the retirement or replacement of obsolete facilities.
This assumptiOn is substantiated by Soviet journals stressing the
uneconomic aspects of maintaining high-cost, obsolete units in opera-
tion and referring to the inability of the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy
* Table 2 follows on p. 12.
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Table 2
Increases in Capacity and Production
- in the Ferrous Metallurgical Industry of the USSR
Called For by the Sixth Five Year Plan (1956-60)r2/
Million Metric Tons
Source of Increase
Commercial-
Grade Iron Ore
Pig
Iron
Crude
Steel
Finished
Steel
Capacity
? From increased efficiency
N.A.
6.9
10.8
7.0
From new construction .
68.5 12/
16.8
15.8
16.3
Total
N.A.
23.7
26.6
23.3
Production
42.4
19.7
23.0
17.4
Apparent excess capacity
N.A.
4.o
3.6
2,2
b. This is the approximate amount of commercial-grade ore that
would be Mined from the 91 million tons of raw ore mining capacity
to be developed during the Sixth Five Year Plan period. Because
1.23 tons of raw ore were required to produce 1 ton of commercial-
grade ore in 1955 and it is expectedlthat 1.44 tons will be re-
quired in 1960, the 68.5 million tons of commercial-grade ore
would require 91 million tons of raw ore mining capacity.
to effect their replacement. The underfulfillment of the Fifth Five .
Year Plan in the creation of new iron ore mining and rolling mill ca-
pacity by 26 million and 4.8 million tons, respectively, concurrently
with the overfulfilIment of production, goals strongly suggests serious
shortcomings in retirement and modernization programs. 22/
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Another factor bearing on the apparent excess capacity is the
probability that an attempt is being made to create some reserve ca-
pacity to enable the industry to meet goals and to operate with greater
flexibility. In the iron ore mining industry the creation of reserve
capacity by 1960 is not possible, according to the Soviet Minister of
Ferrous Metallurgy, in spite of huge planned increases in capacity.
This situation undoubtedly is a reflection of the shortcomings en-
countered during the Fifth Five Year Plan period in opening new ca-
pacity. LI/
The planning of an apparent excess capacity affords the indus-
try several important opportunities. If planned increases in efficiency
materialize and if construction schedules are met, the industry will be
In position to meet production goalS and at the same time to replace
obsolete units and create some reserve capacity. Underfulfillment of
plans for expanding capacity, although it would prevent the successful
achievement of retirement and reserve aims, would not bar the possibi-
lity of meeting production goals. A shortfall 61 nearly 15 percent in
the planned expansion of crude steel capacity could occur without en-
dangering the production goal. In view of past failures to meet con-
struction goals, this margin may be more apparent than real. Continued
deferment of the installation of modern facilities must eventually be
paid for in high costs and low labor productivity.
Investment for capital construction in the industry during the
Sixth Five Year Plan period will be almost twice that expended on Soviet
ferrous metallurgy during the Fifth Five Year Plan period. The consid-
erable quantity of increased production planned to be obtained by
improved utilization of existing facilities -- 35 percent for pig iron
and 47 percent for crude steel -- materially reduces the investment
that would be required if the expansion were to be accomplished wholly
by the construction of new facilities. Fulfillment of the Plan, how-
ever, will require record outlays. The added production from increased
efficiency will be obtained through mechanization and automation and by
the provision of oxygen plants, high-capacity turboblowers, more power
facilities, and other ancillary improvements. In addition, 16.8 million
tons of pig iron and 15.8 million tons of crude steel capacity must be
constructed, some in sparsely populated areas requiring housing and
utility and transportation facilities as well as production units. New
mines must be opened, and heavy investment must be made in beneficia-
tion plants.211/
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The greatest investment will take place in Siberia and Kazakh-
stan,- where in the. course of the next 10 or 15 years production facili-
ties are to be established capable of producing 15 million to 20 million
tons of pig iron annually. The creation of a new metallurgical base in
the eastern USSR will bring about a realignment of producing units and
their raw material supplies. The Urals-Kuznetsk complex, based on the
exchange of Kuznetsk coking coals and Magnitogorsk iron ore, will be
supplanted by the Southern Urals - Karaganda.? Kuznetsk complex. In
addition, three new complexes -- the Northern Urals - Pechora, the
Kuznetsk-Yeniseysk, and the Aldan-Amur. -- will be created. 22/
The old Urals-Kuznetsk complex has been modified to include
recent developments in Kazakhstan and is now termed the Southern Urals -
Karaganda - Kuznetsk complex. The tremendous reserves of iron ore lo-
cated at Kustanay, coupled with the now proved feasibility of coking
Karaganda coals, more than adequately compensates for the declining
quality of the ore mined at Magnitogorsk and lessens the dependence
of the Southern Urals coke plants on long-haul Kuznetsk coals. The
fully integrated Karaganda works now under construction at Temir-Taul
near Karaganda, will be the second largest plant in the USSR when com-
pleted. The first .2 blast furnaces are to provide 1.35 million tons of
pig iron annually by 1960 and will operate on Karaganda coal and local
Atasuskiy iron ores. The Magnitogorsk, Chelyabinsk Bakal, and Kuznetsk
combines -- currently the key steel producers in the complex -- are
undertaking major expansion programs that will be largely finished by
1960, as will be the smaller but important Novo-Troitsk plant. Further.
development .of the Karaganda works and the initiation of construction
of a major integrated steel plant near the Kustanay deposits will con-
tinue during the 1961-65 period, maintaining and increasing the impor-
tance of the Southern Urals - Karaganda - Kuznetsk complex in the national
economy. 24./
The formation of a Northern Urals - Pechora complex is predicated
on the further development of Pechora Basin coking coals and the comple-
tion of a rail line from the northern Urals to the Pechora area. Both
tasks probably will be completed late in the Sixth Five Year Plan-period,
making the Northern Urals - Pechora complex a real economic asset in
freeing the northern Urals, which is deficient in coking coals, from
dependence on long-haul Kuznetsk coal. 21/
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The development of ferrous metallurgy in the area.of Siberia
which lies between the Kuznetsk Basin (Kuzbas) and Lake Baykal will
give rise to a new combination of plants and raw materials termed the
Kuznetsk-Yeniseysk complex. Within the framework of this complexi
three major integrated steel plants will be started during the Sixth
Five Year Plan period. The first of these, on which planning is most
advanced, is the West Siberian plant, to be located in the Altay dis-
trict. Production from what will be the world's largest blast furnace
is scheduled to begin in 1959-60. The plant's raw material base will
be similar to that of the present Kuznetsk combine and will include
the Currently developing iron bre deposits .of the Abakan-Minusinsk
region and probably those at Korshunovsk in the Angara-Ilimsk district.
Although some construction may start during the 1956-60 period on the
other two steel plants to be located in East Siberia, one in Krasnoyarskiy
Kray and one in Irkutskaya Oblast, the greatest development of these facili-
ties will occur during the 1960's? concurrently with full exploitation
of the Angara-Ilimsk (Korshunovsk) and Lower Angara irdh ore. deposits.
Farther to the east, in the Transbaykal area, the discovery of
.large deposits' of iron ore near Aldan and of coking coal near Chul'man,
both in the southern Yakutskaya ASSISI presage the establishment of an'
Aldan-Amur metallurgical complex. With another iron ore deposit along 4
the Argun' River in Chitinskaya Oblast and with the prospective develop-
ment of cheap hydroelectric power near the confluence of the Zeya and
Amur Rivers, the Transbaykalarea is rich in the resources necessary to
support a steel industry. The opening of the Aldan-Amur complex probably
will permit the long-delayed integration of the steel plant at Komsomol'sk
and could eliminate the apparent dependence of East Siberia and the Soviet
Far East on pig iron from Manchuria. 22/
The abundance of reserves of raw materials; the experience gained
by the USSR during'preceding.Five Year Plans in expanding ferrous metallurgy;
and the margins of safety built into the Sixth Five Year Plan in respect
to total production of iron ore; pig iron, and crude and finished steel
(see Table 2*) seem to assure the fulfillment of the production goals of
the metallurgical industry. The Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy has con-
sistently failed in the past, however, to complete modernization and new
construction programs as scheduled. These failures have been ascribed
by the Ministry to its lack of control of the production of metallurgical
equipment and the construction of new projects, which are administered
* , P. 12, above.
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by the Ministry of Heavy Machine Building and the Ministry of the Con-
struction of Metallurgical and Chemical Industry Enterprises) respec-
tively. The magnitude of the current construction program and the
commitments of the USSR to provide capital equipment for the European
Satellites, Communist China, and India make it probable that the new
construction and modernization goals of the Sixth Five Year Plan will
not be met on schedule. 22/
The Sixth Five Year Plan provides for a 51-percent increase
in production of crude steel; the expected increase in the US during
the same period is only 17 percent. In terms of tonnage) however,
Soviet expansion will exceed that of the US by only 3.1 million tons
for the 5-year period. During and after the XX Party Congress') Bulganin?
Khrushchev, and other speakers emphasized the Soviet intention to exceed
the US production of steel and other items on a per capita basis during
the next several Five Year Plans. Considering the 1955 populations of
the US and the USSR (165 million and 200 million, respectively) the
Soviet steel industry would require a production of 127 million tons,
2.8 times it present production) to equal the US 1955 per capita
production. If the Soviet intentions are serious, therefore, the rate
of growth of the Soviet steel industry in absolute tonnage must be
materially increased, principally in the expensive sector of new con-
struction.
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II. Organization.
A. Council of Ministers.
Administrative organization in the USSR is divided into three
major levels: the Council of Ministers; the various ministries, and
their main administrations, and the individual enterprises. The Council,
which includes the various ministers in charge of major sectors of the
Soviet government, exercises over-all supervision of, leadership of; and
coordination among the several branches of the economy. In the Council
the iron and steel industry is represented by Deputy Chairman Ivan F.
Tevosyan, formerly Minister of Ferrous Metallurgy, and by Aleksandr G. .
Sheremet'yev, the present Minister. 31/
B. Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy.
Before 1939 the Soviet iron and steel industry was controlled by
the Commissariat for Heavy Industry. In that year the Presidium-of the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR established the All-Union Peoples Commissariat
for Ferrous Metallurgy. 2/ In 1948 the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy
and the Ministry of Nonferrous Metallurgy (both changed from Commissariats
in 1946) were merged to form the Ministry of the Metallurgical Industry,
which was divided into the MinistrieS of Ferrous and Nonferrous Metal-
lurgy in December?1950. In March 1953 the two ministries were recom-
bined, but in February 1954 they once more became individual ministries.
In addition, the Supreme Soviet in 1954 created the Republic Ministry
of Ferrous Metallurgy of the Ukrainian SSR. Although the Ukrainian
Ministry presently controls about 40 percent of the iron and steel indus-
try of the USSR, it is still subordinate to the union-republic Ministry
in'Moscow for important policy decisions. 13/
Tevosyan has remained the dominant personality throughout all
ministerial shifts. When Tevosyan became a Deputy Minister of the Council
of Ministers in 1953, he was succeeded by Anatoliy N. Kuz'min who held the
post until his death in November 1954. Kuzsmin was succeeded by Sheremet'yev.
The Ukrainian Ministry is directed by Sergei I. Tishchenko. 311/
The Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy controls the production of all
iron and manganese ores, high-temperature coke, ferroalloys, and pig iron,
but only about 05 percent of the production of crude and finished steel.
The remaining 15 percent of the steel is produced in plants of the Minis-
tries of Heavy Machine Building, Transport Machine Building) Petroleum
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Industry, Shipbuilding, and Defense and in those of various republic
ministries of local industry. The mining of nickel, cobalt, and several
other ores used extensively in steelmaking is under the direction of the
Ministry of Nonferrous Metallurgy. 12/
The Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy receives major assistance in
the field of research and development from the Academy of Sciences and
its various affiliates and from many metallurgical institutes. Ivan P.
Bardin, a Vice President of the Academy of Sciences and Director of the
Central Scientific Research Institute of Ferrous Metallurgy, whose
pronouncements often reveal the principal problems confronting the
development of metallurgy in the USSR, is regarded as the outstanding
spokesman for the industry outside the Ministry. 2?,/
C. Main Administrations.
The Subordinate administrative apparatus of the Ministry of
Ferrous Metallurgy consists primarily of two types of main adminis-
trations: production-territorial units, which control producing ,
enterprises in particular districts or enterprises producing certain
types of goods; and auxiliary and administrative units which supervise
certain functional operations such as transport, personnel, and,fin-
ance; and as such serve, in a staff capacity to the production-territorial
administrations. For counsel and advice on broad matters of policy the
Minister has recourse to the Collegium, which is composed of 6 to 12
of the mostable people in the Ministry. The techniCal council of the
Ministry studies the applicability of new scientific and technical .
innovations. The administrative structure of the Ministry of Ferrous
Metallurgy is shown in the accompanying chart, Figure 4.* 11/
D. Enterprises.
At the base of the administrative pyramid of the Soviet ferrous
metallurgical industry are the:various producing units, or enterprises.
Each enterprise is a legal entity. "operating on the basis of economic
accountability" (khozraschet) with limited administrative control in the
hands of the director. The enterprise has its own working capital and
fixed assets and can make contracts, sue, and be sued. The primary
objective of the enterprise is to operate in conformity with the state
plan and to fulfill the prescribed production goals as efficiently and
economically as possible.
* Following p. 18.
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USSR
ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF THE MINISTRY
OF FERROUS METALLURGY, MS *
UKRAINE MINISTRY
OF
FERROUS METALLURGY
MINISTER
S. I. T1shchenko. 1955
DEPUTY MINISTERS
L Ye. Lukleh, 1954
BarChtiltov. 1954
Ivanov. 1954
ORE MINING
UROLATRUDA
SavIllakly. 1955
COKE
UXOLAVICOILS
V. E D1denko. 1955
MAIN PRODUCTION
Boyko, 1955
MINIS I LH
A. 0. Sheremet'yev, 1956
DEPUTY MINISTERS
F. A. Merkulov, 1955
A. 8, Vlsbnevekly, 1951
V. Bychkov. loss
F. A. Petruaba, 1955
V. B. KhlebnIkov, 1955
Ye. Damparldze. 1953
S. M. Meleshldn, 1953
0. G. volnev. 1959
P. Korobov,1952
Yegorov, 1951
AUXIUARY DIRECTORATES
H METAL SALES
OLAVMETALLOSBYT
Vaellenko. 1054
SCRAP
GLAVTORMET
Mamontov. 19M
HPRODUCTION SUPPLY
GLAVSNAR
Erldman, 1950
d WORKERS SUPPLY
OLAVURS
POWER
GLAVENERGO
1 CAPITAL
,?
CONSTRUCTION
OUICS
TRAINING
OUUZ
TRANSPORTATION
GLAVTRANSUPR
CHIEF MECHANIC
LABOR AND WAGES
GEOLOGICAL
PROSPECTING
GLAVOIX)LOGITA
ZhIlyakov, 1050
* I?nrs ghee." Ar nell memo Wks&
lad knew, eat. let Dank.,
25643 12-56
PRODUCTION DIRECTORATES
MAIN PRODUCTION
GLATMETPROM
R,Belan, 1954
URALS METALLURGY
GLAVURALMET
TartarIntaev. 1950
SPECIAL STEELS
GLASTETSSTAL?
Sokolov, 1954
PIPE AND TUBE
OLAVTRUBOSTAL?
N. A. TIlthonov. 1954
1
ORE MINING
OLAVRUDA
COKE
OLAVICOKS
A. K. Shelkov. 1955
FERROALLOYS
GLAVFERROSPLAY
REFRACTORIES
GLAVOONEUPOR
Dep. Balbesheveklv.1052
TIMBER
OLAVLMMET
DobIlln. 1054
i
METAL ARTICLES
OLAVMETIZ
METALLURGICAL
EQUIPMENT
GLAVMASHMET
NO
MINERALS
GLAVNERUD
yemeryanov. 1050
FIGURE 4
COLLEOIUM
TECHNICAL COUNCIL
P. Horde!. 1051
CENTRAL SCIENTIFIC
RESEARCH INSTITUTE
remicim
I. P. Pardln, 1955
CENTRAL INFORMATION
INSTITUTE
ADMINISTRATIVE
DIRECTORATES
STATE PLANNING
INSTITUTES
METALLURGICAL
PLANTS
01PROMES
I. A. KrIvonosm, 1955
ORE MINING
01PRORUDA
STEEL PLANTS
01PROSTALP
STEEL PROJECTS
STA!: PROYEKT
METAL ARTICLES
01PROMETIZ
TECHNOLOGY
Deputy Bunln, 1950
PUBLICATIONS
METALLUROIZDAT
ACCOUNTING
FINANCE
PERSONNEL
HOUSING
LEGAL
LIAISON
FOREIGN
POLICE-MINE
INSPECMON
CONSUMER GOODS
ARCHIVES
ARBITRATION
METALLURGICAL
TRADE UNION
Yeranov.1954
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III. Planning and Control.
A. Plan Formulation.
Planning for the ferrous metallurgical industry of the USSR
is developed for several time periods. At least in theory, there
are at all times monthly, quarterly, annual, or Five Year Plans.
Five Year Plans are prepared in the form of general directives;
annual plans, which serve as the operational program of the enter-
prise, are drawn up in great detail. 22/
Formulation of the annual plan begins at the enterprise
level. The proposed plan, sent by the enterprise through its main
administration to the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy, includes a
production plan, a labor plan, a plan of the cost of production, a
capital Investment plan, a plan showing consumption norms of raw?
materials and equipment, and a plan for the introduction of new
technological features. 110/
The Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy consolidates and prepares
the annual plan and then forwards it to the Council of Ministers by
15 August of each year, at the same time sending a copy to the State
Economic Commission (Gosekonomkomissiya). Gosekonomkomissiya must
approve the plan by 1 October. Financial aspects of the annual plan
are gone over by the Ministry of Finance, which must give its approval
by 10 October. Lill
Either the Council of Ministers or Gosekonomkomissiya may
alter the goals sent up in the Ministry's annual plan, as happened
during the formulation of the 1955 and 1956 plans. The magnitude
of the 1955 upward adjustment is unknown. In spite of the greater
production ordered, however, the steel industry succeeded in over-
fulfilling the annual plan by 570,000 tons of crude steel and 200,000
tons of finished steel. Over the Ministry's strong objections the
government also raised goals in the 1956 annual plan for crude and
finished steel by 1.3 million and 1.7 million tons, respectively.
These changes in the annual plan were made in the summer of
1955, when the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) was formulating
the Sixth Five Year Plan goals and Gosekonomkomissiya was examining
the Ministry's 1956 annual plan. The Ministry's relatively moderate
6-percent increase of 2.6 million tons of crude steel (3.9 million
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tons less the known increase of 1.3 million tons),* proposed and for-
warded to the Council of Ministers before 15 August, would have met
the 1960 goal of 60 million tons of crude steel set by Stalin in
1946. In July 1955, Premier Bulganin specifically reemphasized the
60-million-ton goal. Sometime during the third quarter of 1955 the
government and Gosplan decided to place additional emphasis on
ferrous metallurgy, as subsequently revealed by the directives of
the Sixth Five Year Plan. The result of this decision was to
request the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy to raise the 1956 goal
for crude steel from about 2.6 million to 3.9 million tons, an
increase of 50 percent. 1_12/
B. Tekhpromfinplan.
After returning through the administrative hierarchy from
the Council of Ministers, the approved plan with its basic direc-
tives is received at the enterprise. In accordance with the
directives) each enterprise draws up in detail a Technical-Indus-
trial-Financial Plan (Tekhnicheskiy-Promyshlennyy-Finansovyy Plan --
Tekhpromfinplan) which must then be approved by the chief directorate
of the enterprise by the first of the new plan year.** 45/
The basic elements of the Tekhpromfinplan are (1) the pro-
duction plan showing the type of product and its value; (2) the
plant utilization plan outlining the operation of equipment and
various monetary funds; (3) the plan for labor and wages showing
the expected increase in labor productivity; (4) the plan for the
supply of materials, fuel, energy, replaceable equipment, and
instruments; (5) the cost plan) including charges for amortization,
administration, and marketing; and (6) the financial plan stating
the proposed income and expenditures of funds. Daily, weekly,
monthly) and quarterly operating plans are set up based on the goals
of the annual Tekhpromfinplan. 12.6.7
* This figure is predicated on an 8.5-percent annual increase in
production of crude steel required to meet the 1960 goal of 68.3
million tons.
** In actual practice the method of planning does not operate with-
out difficulty. For example) in 1953 the important Serp i Molot
Plant in Moscow did not receive approval for its Tekhpromfinplan
until November, 10 months late. 12?/
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? C. Control.
In fulfilling the directives of the Tekhpromfinplan the
enterprise is under the supervision of its awn chief directorate
and the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy. In addition the State
Bank (Gosbank), through its local branches, exercises financial
control by holding the settlement account of the enterprise where
all of the monetary transactions of the enterprise are recorded
In detail. Because the enterprise is forced to operate with
minimum working capital, inadequate for coping with emergencies,
Gosbank has an additional element of control in its power to
grant short-term credit.ill/
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IV. Production of Iron and Steel.
A. Steel Plant.
In this report, as in general usage, the term steel plant de-
notes a facility that makes or Tolls steel. Because of the savings
that may be made by combining in one plant conversion of raw materials
into coke, pig iron, Crude steel, and finished steel products, the
most economical unit is the integrated plant. An important reason for
the striking contrast in efficiency* between the average Soviet plants
and the average plant in the US is the relatively low proportion of
the total production of Soviet steel that is made in integrated units.
In 1955, only 60 percent of Soviet steel came from integrated plants,
compared with 92 percent in the US. The degree of integration in the
USSR, however, will rise considerably during the next 10 years as a
result of the large number of integrated plants currently under con-
struction or planned. lig/
Although Magnitogorsk is one of the three largest steel plants
in the world)** the Soviet steel industry is composed to a considerable
extent of small and relatively uneconomical plants. No determination
can be made of the precise optimum for steel plant capacity under all
conditions) but 1 million tons is the approximate minimum required to
derive the maximum benefit from highly productive blast furnaces, open
hearth furnaces, and blooming and rolling mills. In the USSR, 11 plants)
each with a capacity of 1 million tons or more, account for 50 percent
of the production of crude steel; in the US) 82 percent of total annual
production is produced in 46 plants of this size. All of the new in-
tegrated plants in the USSR are planned for capacities in excess of 1
million tons. The further development of the oxygen converter and of
continuous casting processes, however, may substantially reduce the min-
imum capacity now required to achieve optimum economy with conventional
modern equipment.Ii2/
* See IX, A) p. 109.
** With a 1955 production of crude steel of 5.8 million tons, Magnito-
gorsk would rank second, just ahead of the Sparrow's Point Plant of the
Bethlehem Steel Company (5.6 million metric tons in 1955) and behind .the
Gary Works of the US Steel Corporation (6.5 million metric tons in 1955).
All three mills are scheduled for further expansion.
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B. Distribution of Facilities.
Markets as well as raw materials exert a strong influence in
determining the location of iron and steel plants. Because 4 tons of
raw materials are required to produce 1 ton of finished steel, however,
gathering costs are the controlling factor, and they dictate a loca-
tion as close as possible to sources of iron ore and coking coal, the
major bulk materials. Thus the Ukraine) possessing abundant reserves
of both iron ore and coking coal, accounts for one-half of the pig
iron and one-third of the steel produced in the USSR. The Urals area,
rich in iron ore but depending on the Kuznetsk Basin for coking coal,
accounts for an additional one-third of the pig iron and steel. The
remaining production is widely distributed, the principal producers
being the Kuznetsk metallurgical combine in West Siberia (Region IX),
which accounts for 6 percent of the crude steel, and the plants of the
Central Region (Region VII), which are based largely on scrap generated
by the manufacturing industries of the region and produce 6.1 percent
of total Soviet crude steel. 0
The regional distribution of production of coke, pig iron,
crude steel, and finished steel in the USSR, by economic region, in
1955 is shown in Table 3.*
The Kuznetsk combine in Stalinsk provides an example of the
heavy transportation costs resulting from a plant location remote from
major consuming industries. The only integrated plant east of the
Urals, Stalinsk was constructed on the theory that savings in trans-
portation would be achieved by crosshauling coal from the Kuznetsk
Basin (Kuzbas) and iron ore from Magnitogorsk. Much of the finished
steel produced at Stalinsk, however, is shipped west, some as far as
Leningrad, because the vast territory to the east is at such a low
stage of industrialization that it cannot consume the production of
the plant. 51/
* Table 3 follows on p. 25.
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Table 3
Distribution of Production of Coke, '
Pig Iron) Crude Steel, and Finished Steel in the USSR
by Economic Region a/
1955
Percent of Total
Economic Region
Coke
Pig Iron
Crude Steel
Finished
Steel
I (Northwest)
0.1
0.3
2.3
2.0
II
(West)
0
0
0.3
0.4
III
(south)
52.8
49.8
37.4
38.6
Iv
(Southeast)
0
0
2.2
2.0
V
(Transcaucasus)
1.3
1.3
2.1
1.6
VI
(Volga)
0
0
3.7
3.4
VII
(Central)
2.4
7.1
6.1
5.4
VIII
(Urals)
27.6
35.1
36.0
34.4
IX
(West Siberia)
10.7
6.4
7.3
7.0
X
(Kazakhstan and
Central Asia)
0
o
1.0
1.1
XI
(East Siberia)
0.3
0
0.9
0.8
XII
(Far East)
0.1
0
0.7
0.7
Unallocated
0
Negligible
2.6
Total
,100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
a. 2/. For the distribution of production of coke, pig iron,
and crude and finished steel in the USSR by Soviet republic in
19550 see Appendix A, Table 38) p. 147, below.
C. Pig Iron and Scrap.
1. Pig Iron.
The USSR is the world's second largest producer of pig
iron. Soviet production in 1955 was 33.3 million tons, equal to 47
percent of that of the US) and on 1 January 1956 Soviet production
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capacity was equal to 45 percent of that of the US. To meet the 1960
Plan goal, an average annual growth rate of 3.9 million tons will be
required) a rate which is substantially greater than the rate of 2.8
million tons achieved during the Fifth Five Year Plan period. Esti-
mated production of pig iron in the USSR in 1913, 1928, 1930-40, and
1945-60 is shown in Table 4. 21/
Table 4
Estimated Production of Pig Iron in the USSR 21
1913, 1928, 1930-40) and 1945-60
Million Metric Tons
Year
Production Year
Production
1913
4.2
1946
9.9
1928
3.3
1947
11.2
1930
5.0
1948
13.7
1931
4.9
1949
16.4
1932
6.2
1950
19.2
1933
7.1
1951
21.9
1934
10.4
1952
25.1
1935
12.5
1953
27.4
1936
1937
14.4
14.5
1954
1955
30.0
33.3 12/
1938
14.7
1956
36.6
1939
14.5
1957
40.2
1940
14.9
1958
44.1
1945
8.8
1959
48.4
1960 (Plan)
53.0
a. 2_/. Production figures include blast fur-
nace ferroalloys.
b.
Of the 33.3
million tons of pig iron produced in 1955) be-
tween 98 and 99 percent was produced at coke-
operated furnaces, and the remainder in char-
coal blast furnaces.
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In the USSR, pig iron is classified as basic (open hearth),
converter, foundry, or natural alloy pig or as a type of blast furnace
ferroalloy. Production of pig iron in the USSR, by type, in 1955 is
shown in Table 5.
Table 5 .
Production of Pig Iron in the USSR, by Type
1955
Million Metric Tons
Type
Quantity
Basic (open hearth)
25.990
Foundry
4.570
Converter
1.840
Natural alloy
0.165
Spiegeleisen
0.425
Ferromanganese
0.165
Ferrosilicon '
0.145
Total
33.300
The principal type of natural alloy pig iron is a chrome-
nickel pig (0.5 to 1.4 percent chrome and 0.7 to 1.4 percent nickel)
smelted from Yelizavetinskiy ores. In 1955, 'production of a natural
alloy chrome-nickel pig iron from Khalilovo ores began in the new blast
furnace at Novo-Troitsk in the southern Urals. Blast furnace ferro-
alloys consist of ferromanganese (70 to 75 percent manganese), ferro-
silicon (9 to 13 percent silicon), and spiegeleisen (10 to 25 percent
manganese). Although several blast furnaces in the Ukraine are operat-
ing exclusively on these products, the usual practice in the USSR is to
produce ferroalloys just before a furnace is taken out of operation for
relining. 2?../
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? During 1955, 'Soviet blast furnaces required 62 million to
63 million tons of iron ore (averaging 54 percent iron) and 31 million
to 32 million tons of coke.. Supplies of limestone for use as a fluxing
agent are available in many localities, but requirements are much higher
In the Ukraine because of the high-sulfur Donets coke and the siliceous
Krivoy Rog ores. Low-grade manganese ores are often added to Soviet
blast furnaces to aid in the elimination of sulfur and to obtain basic
pig iron with an average 2-percent manganese content. About 5 percent
of the metallic burden of Soviet furnaces consists of scrap, mill scale,.
and open hearth slag. 2//
A study of operating achievements of Soviet and US blast
furnaces suggests that the production rates of some large, modern Soviet
furnaces are superior to the best US furnaces of comparable size. The
blast furnaces at Magnitogorsk produce about 2,000 tons of pig iron
daily, which is about 10 percent more than the best US furnace produces.
The outstanding performance of the Magnitogorsk furnaces is a result of
the high degree of raw material preparation combined with the application
.of advanced technological features. The cost of the product, however,
may be higher than the US cost. The blast furnace division of the Magnito-
gorsk metallurgical combine is shown in Figure 5.* Average furnace produc-
tivity rates in the Soviet blast furnace industry, which are substantially
below the Magnitogorsk rate, probably compare favorably with the average
US rate. 21
An approximate measure of the increased productivity achieved
by Soviet furnacemen is afforded by the blast furnace coefficient, or
index of utilization. An index of 0.80 signifies that 0.80 cubic meters
of blast furnace volume were utilized for the production of 1 ton of pig
Iron in 24 hours. An index of utilization for blast furnaces in the
USSR in 1940, 1945, and 1950-56 is shown in Table 6.**
Planned gains in Soviet production of pig iron from increased
operating efficiency were not met in 1953; 1954, and 1955 -- presumably
as a result of the delays encountered in the construction of new raw
Following p. 28.
** Table 6 follows on p. 29.
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Figure 5. Blast Furnaces of the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine, 1955.
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Table 6
Index of Utilization for Blast Furnaces in the USSR W
1940, 1945, ahd.1950-56
Cubic Meters per Ton of Pig Iron per 24 Bow's
Year
Index Year
Index
194o
1.19
1952
0.88
1945
1.15
1953 '
o.86
1950
0.98
1954
0.83
1951
0.93
1955
0.80
1956 (Plan)
0.76
a. 59/.
There are other indexes of utiliza-
tion. In the US, productivity is measured by
the tons of pig iron per square foot of hearth
per 24 hours, which makes comparison with So-
viet furnaces difficult.
material preparation plants required to prepare a furnace charge
of higher quality. ?.0/
The use of pig iron as a source of ferrous metallics is
relatively more important in the USSR than in nations which indus-
trialized earlier arid have supplies of scrap in the form of obsolete
structures and machines. The ratio of production of pig iron to
production of crude steel has always been higher in the USSR (0.82 in
1940 and 0.72 in 1953) than in the US (0.68 in 1940 and 0.66 in 1953)
or in the UK (0.63 in 1940 and o.64 in 1953). The ratio in the USSR
reached a low of 0.70 in 1950 because of the availability of mar-
created scrap and a consequent emphasis on the construction of scrap-
operated plants in the 1946-50 period. During 1952 and 1953 the So-
viet supply of ferrous metallics became so restricted that it was
necessary to construct a large number of new blast furnace installa-
tions. By 1955 the ratio had risen to 0.74, and according to the
Sixth Five Year Plan it will rise to 0.78 in 1960. _61/
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2. Scrap.
Soviet practice in the use of scrap as against pig iron
in steelmaking furnaces varies from the exclusive use of pig iron
to an all-scrap charge) depending on the relative cost and availability
of the two materials. In the absence of suitable sources of coking
coal and iron ore for the production of pig iron, an adequate scrap
supply can serve as a raw material base for the establishment of a
metallurgical industry, as is the case in the areas around Leningrad,
Moscow, Stalingrad, Gor'kiy, and Komsomorsk in the Soviet Far East.
Until 1940 the practice in the USSR was to use 40 percent
or less scrap in the steelmaking charge. The enormous supply of war
scrap available between 1945 and 1950 led to investment in steel plants
(largely dependent on scrap. Beginning in 1951), when war scrap supplies
approached exhaustion, this policy produced a serious shortage of
ferrous metallics.
Scrap drives of all sorts, including house-to-house collec-
tions, augmented the tonnage flowing to the steel mills. Reports of
Interruption in steelmaking operations and decreased production in some
plants indicate that the supply of scrap was in a critical state. The
construction of new blast furnace capacity, designed to alleviate the
critical shortage of scrap, fell behind schedule, and, as a result,
the demand for scrap remained high.
Intense scrap collection efforts, however, enabled the
ferrous metallurgical industry to meet planned production goals for
crude steel in 1955) even though the supply of ferrous metallics re-
mained tight.
D. Crude Steel.
The USSR is the second largest producer of crude steel in the
world. In 1955) Soviet production was 45.3 million tons, equal to 43
percent of US production) and capacity on 1 January 1956 was equal to
about 41 percent of US capacity. To meet the 1960 Plan goal) an aver-
age annual growth rate of 4.6 million tons will be required, a rate
substantially greater than the rate of 3.6 million tons achieved during
the Fifth Five Year Plan. Estimated production of crude steel in the
USSR in 1913, 1928, 1930-39) and 1945-60 is shown in Table 7.* gi/
* Table 7 follows on p. 31.
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Table 7
Estimated Production of Crude Steel in the USSR 2/
1913, 1928, 1930-39, and 1945-60
Million Metric Tons
Year Production Year
Production
1913
4.3
.
1946
13.3
1928
4.3
1947
14.5
1930
5.8
1948
18.6
1931
5.6
1949
23,3
1932
5.9
1950
27.3
1933
6.9
1951
31.4
1934
9.7
1952
34.5
1935
12.6
1953
38.1
1936
16.4
1954
41.4
1937
17.7
1955
45.3.
1938
18.1
1956
49.2
1939
17.6
1957
53.3
1940
18.3
1958
57.9
1945
12.3
1959
62.8
1960 (Plan)
68.3
a.
Crude steel is steel for ingots and
_2/.
castings.
The Soviet steel industry has about 158 plants producing crude
steel. In 1955 these plants had 532 open hearth furnaces (the US had
924), 206 electric furnaces (the US had 259), and 48 Bessemer conver-
ters (the US had 33).
Production of crude steel in the USSR and the US, by process,
in 1955 is shown in Table 8.*
* Table 8 follows on p. 32.
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Table 8
Production of Crude Steel in the USSR and the US, by Process 2./
1955
USSR
USSR (Percent of
Process (Million Metric Tons) Total)
Open hearth
Electric hi
Bessemer hi
Total
40.3
3.2
1.8
89
7
14
45.3 100
US
(Percent of
Total)
88
8
14
100
b. Crude steel produced by a duplex process, either a com-
bination of a Bessemer converter and an open hearth furnace
or of open hearth and electric furnaces, is shown a's-open
hearth steel.
Virtually all open hearth steel is produced in basic* furnaces
similar to the 150-ton Sumgait units shown in Figure 6.** Several acid
open hearth furnaces are in operation at Uralmash and at other machine
building plants. Production of converter steel is limited to Bessemer
converters (acid refractory lining), but a Thomas converter (basic re-
fractory lining) may be in a stage of reconstruction at Kerch'. There
are two duplex processes currently in use and one planned for operation
during the Sixth Five Year Plan period. The most important is the acid
converter - basic open hearth process used in the Ukraine at Yenakiyevo,
Dnepropetrovsk, Dneprodzerzhinsk, Makeyevka, and Stalino and in the Urals
at Chusovoy. The other process, the basic open hearth - acid electric,
* The term basic refers to acidity or basicity of refractory lining,
which has been predetermined by available raw materials and the type of
steel to be produced.
** Following p. 32.
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11? 11
24380c 12-56
Figure 6. A 150-Ton Furnace in the Open Hearth Shop of the Sumgait Tube Plant, 1955.
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Is used at the Bolshevik and Kirov plants in Leningrad, and also at
Zaporozh'ye. Under consideration for adoption during the new Plan
period is the Bessemer converter - basic electric furnace process. 0/
The use of ferrous metallics in the USSR, by steelmaking
process, in 1955 is shown in Table 9.
Table 9
Use of Ferrous Metallics in the USSR
by Steelmaking Process
1955
Percent of Total
Process Pig Iron .?EDIE Iron Ore
12/
.Open hearth
56
40
4
Electric
3
94
3
Bessemer
90
6
it
b. Given in terms of metallic content.
An approximate measure of the increase in productivity of So-
viet open hearth furnaces over a period of years is afforded by the
open hearth coefficient, or index of utilization. A coefficient of
6.19 signifies that 6.19 tont of steel were produced from each square
meter of hearth area in a 24-hour period. An index of utilization
for open hearth furnaces in the USSR in 1937, 1940, and 1950-56 is
shown in Table 10.*
* Table 10 follows on p. 34.
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Table 10
Index of Utilization for Open Hearth Furnaces in the USSR Lit/
1937, 1940, wad 1950-56
Metric Tons per Square Meter of Hearth per 24 Hours
Year
Index Year
Index
1937
4.35
1952
6.19
1940
4.37
1953
6.50
1950
5.81
1954
6.69
1951
6.10
1955
6.95
1956 (Plan)
7.44
A comparison of the Soviet index of utilization with results
achieved by US open hearth furnaces indicates that during 1954 Soviet fur-
naces were 10 percent more productive in terms of production per unit of
hearth area.* Data on a few of the best Soviet plants suggest a produc-
tivity rate 10 percent higher than that of the best US plants.
The superior productivity of the Soviet furnaces probably is the
result of a combination of practices, not all of which are necessarily
economical from the US point of view. Soviet metallurgists charge a
higher percentage of hot metal in most of the larger plants, use oxygen
more extensively, employ more basic refractories in furnaces, and, on
the average, have larger furnaces. Although all these factors tend to
raise productivity per unit of hearth area, cost considerations also ?
are involved. Soviet high hot-metal practice results from a scarcity
of scrap, which is available in the US at prices which make it economical
to use in greater quantities.
* The US index is derived from the 1954 average of all plants of a
major US producer of steel. 11/
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E. Finished Steel.
Finished steel, the end product of the ferrous metallurgical in-
dustry, includes the total production of rolled, drawn, forged, and cast
products. In total production of these items the USSR ranks second in
the world and is the largest producer of rails, rail accessories, and
railroad car wheels. To meet the 1960 Plan goal, an annual growth rate
of 3.5 million tons will be required, a rate substantially greater than
the rate of 2.8 million tons achieved during the Fifth'Five Year Plan
period. Estimated production of finished steel in the USSR in 1913,
1928, 1930-40, and 1945-60 is shown in Table 11.
Table 11
Estimated Production of Finished Steel in the USSR
1913, 1928, 1930-40) and 1945-60
Million Metric Tons
Year
Production Year
Production
1913
3.6
1946
9.6
1928
3.4
1947
11.1
1930
4.6
1948
.14.2
1931
4.3
1949
18.0
1932
4.4
1950
20.9
1933
5.1
1951
24.0
1934
7.0
1952
26.8
1935
9.4
1953
29.4
1936
12.5
1954
32.1
1937
13:0
1955 .
35.3
1938
13.3
1956
38.3
1939
1957
41.5
1940
.12.7
13.1
1958
45.0
1945
8.5
1959
48.7
1960 (Plan)
52.7
a. Recent evidence, as yet inconclusive,
indicates that production of steel castings may
not be included in production of finished steel.
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Finished steel is produced in all regions of the USSR and is
closely related to production of crude steel, as shown by the 1955
regional production in Table 3.* The relation of production to con-
sumption varies from region to region. The two largest producing
areas, the Ukraine and Urals, consume only 6o to 75 percent of their
production whereas consumption in the Moscow-Leningrad area is 6
times greater than production. 751
Finished steel is produced in about 188 enterprises in the USSR.
Of this number, 78 produce only steel castings and are, for the most
part, captive foundries subordinate to Other ministries. Approximately
20 plants are small sheet mills which do not produce their own steel
but obtain sheet bar and slabs from other plants. For the production
of semifinished steel the Soviet steel industry has 44 blooming and
slabbing mills and 38 billet mills. The industry also has 9 rail-
structural mills) 5 wheel mills, 97 bar mills, 23 rod mills, 63 tube
mills) 43 plate mills, and more than 180 hot and cold strip and sheet
mills, of which only a few are of the highly productive continuous
type shown in Figure 7.** The type of finished product produced at
each plant in 1955 and the plant location is shown in the Supplement
to this report, Table 1.
The continuing development of the economy of the USSR is re-
flected in the shifting pattern of grades and types of finished steel
produced. In the USSR, finished steel is categorized as "ordinary"
or "quality" steel.*** Quality steels are those with closely controlled
chemical compositions and mechanical properties. Carbon steels may be
considered quality steels when specifications require special processing
and control, and all alloy steel is of a quality grade. 7/
During early Five Year Plans, when the USSR was engaged primarily
in construction activities, the proportion of ordinary grades of steel
was high. Under the influence of armament requirements during World War
II the product mix departed radically from the normal peacetime pattern.
* P. 25, above.
** Following p. 36.
*** The Soviet categories are not comparable with the US categories of
carbon, alloy, and stainless. Although the US alloy and stainless
categories are found completely within the Soviet "quality" category,
US carbon grades may be found in both the Soviet "ordinary" and "quality"
categories.
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"Pr
410 -
;et: Lt.-- = .ns *i
111111.S1:4111 ii6;??-14" ...0" At Yr' t riar
ti
Figure 7. A 66-Inch Continuous Hot Sheet Mill in the Rolling Mill Division of the Zaporozh'ye Steel Plant, 1955.
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At the height of the war) quality steel accounted for 6o percent of the
production, compared with 20 percent in 1940. The planned production of
quality steel in 1950 amounted to 19.3 percent of the total) but actual
production was 25.8 percent of the total. The greater amount of quality
steel actually produced probably reflects the demand fok Soviet war ma-
teriel during the Korean War. The ratio of production of quality fin-
ished steel to total finished steel in the USSR in 1930-47 and 1950-55
is shown in Table 12. 17/
Table 12
Ratio of Production of Quality Finished Steel
to Total Finished Steel in the USSR hi
1930-47 and 1950-55
Year
Percent Year
Percent
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1941
(Plan)
(Actual)
5.0
10.1
15.4
18.1
18.5
17.7
20.0
19.3
20.3
23.2
24.3
24.8
30.0
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1950
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
(Plan)
(Actual)
50.0
62.2
55.0
48.o
22.0
21.0
19.3
25.8
30.0 hi
27.0 h/
20.0 h/
20.0 h/
20.0 12/
a. /hi
b. The figure is estimated.
Because the Soviet category of quality steel is too general to
be revealing without further breakdown) examination of the product mix
for finished steel provides the best indicator of economic and military
Intentions. Under mobilization for war, production of castings and
forgings increases significantly, and production of other types of
products) sueh as rails, decreases. Apparently this occurred during
the Korean conflict.
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Until 1955, when the USSR announced the actual production of
rails, rail accessories, wheels, and pipe and tube, there had been no
information available on actual production by type of finished steel
since 1938. Annual percentage increases have been announced occasionally
for rails and pipe but for none of the other types comprising the product
'mix. Estimates of production in 1955 by type of finished steel, other
than figures officially announced) are derived from inspection of the
general directives of the Fourth) Fifth, and Sixth Five Year Plans and
are believed to be accurate within a range of error of plus or minus 15
percent. Production of finished steel in the USSR) by major types) in
1955 is shown in Table 13. 7
Table 13
Production of Finished Steel in the USSR, by Major Types
1955
Product
Part of Total
(Percent)
Amount
(Million Metric Tons)
Rails
5.7
2.025
Rail accessories
1.4
0.505
Wheels
1.1
0.405
Pipe and tube
9.7
3.400
Heavy sections
12.5
4.410
Light sections
27.3
9.650
Wire rod
6.1
2.145
Sheet
13.4
4.710
Strip
2.1
0.755
Plate
11.3
3.985
Forgings
1.8
o.64o
Blooms and billets
2.6
0.900
'Steel castings
5.0
1.770 12/
Total
100.0
35.300
a. il0/. See footnote a to Table 11, p. 35, above.
b. The 1960 goal for production of steel castings is 4
million tons.
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Changes in the relative importance of the various types of fin-
ished steel composing the product mix were slight during the Fifth Five
Year Plan period. Rails) rail accessories) and car wheels decreased
slightly in importance) and pipe, wire rod, sheet, strip, and plate in-
creased. In the Sixth Five Year Plan period, a greater share of the
product mix will be composed of pipe, light sections) wire rod) sheet)
and strip. In the future the USSR intends to put greater emphasis on
production of the flat-rolled products, sheet and strip, and eventually
to raise the share of those products to 4o or 45 percent of the product
mix. At present) 16 percent of the Soviet product mix is sheet and strip
(in the US it is 43 percent). p!li
Production of hot and cold rolled sheet and strip) electrical
sheet, and tinplate in the USSR in 1955 is shown in Table 14.
Table 14
Production of Hot and Cold Rolled Sheet and Strip)
Electrical Sheet, and Tinplate in the USSR 2/
1955
Product
Million Metric Tons
Production 12/
HOt rolled sheet
3.060
Cold rolled sheet
1.053
Electrical sheet
0.286
Tinplate
0.226
Hot rolled strip
0.566
Cold rolled strip
0.180
b. There is some loss of metal entailed in manu-
facturing the products listed in Table 14 from the
sheet and strip categories shown in Table 13)
p. 38, above.
The theory employed by Soviet steelmakers with respect to the
quality of production is one of "make it good etough for the job and
no better)" a theory which, in some cases, is counter to US practice,
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where more than the requisite quality is often specified. There is evi-
dence that some Soviet products are rolled to obsolete specifications
which do not fulfill present-day requirements satisfactorily. As an
outstanding example, the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy has failed to
organize the production of wide-flange structural shapes, which are
superior to standard structural sections in weight-to-strength ratios
and which in the US have replaced completely the standard section in
certain applications. .41.3./
The supply of finished steel in a planned economy should be
large enough to enable all sectors of the economy to fulfill their
annual plans. In theory the adequacy of finished steel supplies is
guaranteed by government approval of the annual economy-wide material
balance plan, which gives the distribution of steel to the various
ministries and provides for the amount to be set aside for emergencies
and state reserves. In spite of this careful planning and the overful-
fillment of the Fifth Five Year Plan goal for finished steel by.1.3
million tons, there have been consistent indications of steel short-
ages.
The shortage of steel in the USSR was indicated generally by
the remarks made in an October 1954 speech by F.S. Petrusha) a Deputy
Minister of Ferrous Metallurgy, who stated that "the metallurgical
Industry is far from supplying fully the requirements of the national
economy." Petrusha's statement is bolstered by the many critical
editorials and persistent demands published in Soviet newspapers and
trade journals urging the "economizing" of steel in all applications.
A more specific indication of the status of the steel supply is a
decree ordering the extensive use of reinforced concrete as a sub-
stitute for steel in construction work. L5/
The primary cause of shortages in the Soviet supply of steel
is the rapid growth of the steel consuming industries. Although the
steel industry has achieved remarkable increases in production, it
has not kept pace with the growth of its principal consumers -- the
construction) machine building, and metal processing industries.
Deficiencies in supply have been further aggravated by failures in
1953, 1954) and 1955 to fulfill the goal for some types of finished
steel, even though the over-all goal was met; in 1954, heavy and light
sections were under plan by 155,000 tons, wire by 85,000 tons, and
wheels by 25,000 tons.
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The effect of shortages in. the supply of steel during 1955 is
difficult to assess. It is probable that heavy industry and defense,
with their high priorities) suffered little, but the light and consumer
industries and the export market may have suffered considerably.
The annual increment of 3.5 million tons of finished steel re-
quired to meet the Sixth Five Year Plan goal of 52.7 million tons is
consistent with the 4.6-mi1lion-ton annual increase planned for crude
steel. The Plan also provides for an 82-percent increase in production
I
of rolling mill equipment) compared with a 52-percent increase in
production of finished steel. Whether or not the greater increase in
production of rolling mill equipment will be sufficient to offset the
tremendous underfulfiLlment (production was about 25 percent under Plan)
of production of rolling mill equipment during the Fifth Five Year
Plan period is. questionable. a7_/ In addition to providing the necessary
facilities for Soviet steel plants, the metallurgical equipment plants
must meet commitments for the European Satellites, Communist China)
India) and possibly other Free World countries. Although rolling mill
capacity probably will be available to meet the 1960 goal for finished
steel) there may be some underfulfillment in providing equipment for
replacement and modernization. ig.181
F. Alloy Steel.*
The production of rolled alloy steel in the USSR during the
period of the Fifth Five Year Plan amounted to 8.7 million tons, 2;2/
5.9 percent of total Soviet production of rolled steel. The comparable
figure in the US for the same period was 28.9 million tons) 7.7 percent
of total US production of rolled steel. Although the USSR produced 39
percent as much rolled steel as did the US during the Plan period) So-
viet production of alloy steel was equal to only 30 percent of that of
the US. 90e approximate equality of US and Soviet defense expendi-
tures, 1 2E7/ Th
when related to the great superiority of the US in tonnage
of alloy steel produced, suggests that much of Soviet production of
alloy steel is channeled into defense industries at the expense of
* Alloy steel is steel in which one or more elements have been blended
to give it special properties that cannot be obtained in carbon steel.
Alloy steel falls into the Soviet quality category) defined on p. 36,
above.
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general industrial usage. This conclusion has been confirmed by ex-
amination of Soviet industrial machinery and equipment, which contain
carbon steel in numerous parts which in the US would be made of alloy
steel.
As it is in the US, produCtion of alloy steel in the USSR is
widespread geographically; about one-fourth of all Soviet steel plants
produce some type of alloy steel. Probably the most important indivi-
dual plant, although not the largest, is the Electrostal' metallurgical
plant near Moscow, where new types of alloy steel are first put into
production.
Soviet production of alloy steel by grade or by type is not
published) and there is little information on the use of specific
alloys in particular applications. In Soviet scientific literature,
however, there is considerable discussion of the characteristics and
properties of both experimental and standard alloys. Government
specifications (GOST's) and some prices are available.
GOST specifications have been issued for substantially all those
grades of alloy steel that are in general use in the US, and Soviet tech-
nical literature contains abundant evidence that the USSR is familiar
with US production, processing, heat treating, and finishing techniques.
The distribution of production between full- and low-alloy, stainless,
heat-resistant) and tool steels, however, is not known.
Much research has been done in the USSR on the substitution of
the more plentiful alloying elements for those in short supply and on
the reduction of the over-all alloy content. Chrome, manganese, and
silicon are used wherever possible to conserve relatively scarce and
high-cost nickel, molybdenum, and cobalt for essential industrial and
defense-related uses. S
The USSR produces essentially the same types of stainless
steel as does the US -- generally, however) with a somewhat higher
carbon content. The use of straight chrome and austenitic types
substituting manganese for most of the nickel appears to be encouraged
over the use of the popular 18-percent chrome) 8-percent nickel types.
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Although precipitation-hardening stainless steel, which is becoming in-
creasingly important in the US for industrial use and aircraft and guided
missile applications, has been discussed in Soviet literature, there is
no evidence of its production. 2V
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Soviet specifications for magnet steel include aluminum-nickel,
nickel-iron, Alnico, and chrome-cobalt-molybdenum compositions. The
USSR is fully aware of modern technology in the field of cobalt-bearing
magnetic steel and oxidic ceramic materials. The increasing application
of the Alnico type of magnets in a variety of Soviet communications and
electronic equipment indicates a growing competence in their production. 22/
In the field of high temperature the USSR successfully produced
cobalt- and nickel-base alloys of the Nimonic-80 type soon after World
War II. Soviet metallurgists, moreover, reduced the quantity of scarce
alloys such as cobalt in some alloy compositions but retained necessary
performance characteristics. 2f,./ Although the USSR is known to have
conducted extensive research on the development of chromium-based high-
temperature alloys, there has been no indication that the efforts have
been successful. 97/
References in the Sixth Five Year Plan to expanding production
of high-purity metals and a technical article on furnace construction
suggest that the USSR has mastered the principles of the recently devel-
oped consumable electrode vacuum melting furnace. 8
Published directives of the Sixth Five Year Plan are uninforma-
tive regarding total future production of alloy steels. The data dis-
closed are limited to percentage increases for certain special categories.
Capacity for producing stainless steel and heat-resistant alloys is to
increase 3.2 times; that for heat-resistant alloys alone, more than 6
times. Production of transformer steel is planned to increase 2.1 times;
dynamo steel, 97 percent; and low-alloy steel, 17 times. These are
Impressive increases, when compared with the 52-percent expansion in
total production of rolled steel prescribed in the Plan or with probable
growth rates in the US. No mention is made of the standard grades of
engineering steel that constitute 65 to 70 percent of alloy steel shipments
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In the US, and it is possible that the planned increase in the total
production of alloy steel in the USSR may be more in line with the
52-percent increase planned for total production of rolled steel. 22/
Some tentative conclusions can be drawn from the Sixth Five
Year Plan. The increases in production of transformer and dynamo
steels are not inconsistent with planned expansion in the production
and consumption of electric power; those for stainless steel and heat-
resistant alloys suggest a major development of applications in as
turbines and atomic energy, both military and civilian, and increasing
requirements of the power generating, petroleum, and chemical industries
for corrosion- and heat-resistant materials. The spectacular 17-fold
increase provided for low-alloy steel, which in the US accounts for
approximately 10 percent of total production of alloy steel, probably
is calculated on a considerably lower base than that used in the US.
The principal usage of this category of alloy steel in the US is in
the automotive, rail transportation, and machinery and industrial equip-
ment industries. It is possible that the USSR plans to use low-alloy
steel in engineering applications for which full-alloy steel is specified
in US practice.
G. Other Iron and Steel Products.
1. Wire and Other Manufactured Products.
The Soviet steel industry like most steel industries of the
world has facilities for the processing of finished steel into manufactured
metal products (metiz); such production is controlled by the Main Adminis-
tration of Metal Products (Glavmetiz). Processing is largely confined to
the manufacture of carbon, alloy, and stainless wire; barbed wire; steel
cable; welding rod; and nails, but other products such as rail accessories
(splice bar and tie plate) also are manufactured. More than one-half of
the Soviet production of wire rod is consumed by the steel industry itself
in the manufacture of these products. 100/
2. Consumer Goods.
In addition to the normal complement of products found in
the usual steel plant, an unusual quantity of consumer goods is produced
in Soviet plants. During 1954, for example, the Ministry of Ferrous
Metallurgy accounted for the manufacture of 25 percent of total Soviet
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production of beds) which were to be produced largely from defective
and sbrap pipe and tube. The Magnitogorsk combine and the Chelyabinsk
pipe and tube mill each have a capacity of 300)000 beds per year. Be-
tween 1946 and 1953 the Elektrostal' metallurgical plant near Moscow
produced more than 10 million knives) forks) and spoons. Most Soviet
steel plants are committed by plan to the production of household
articles) such as pots and pans, stamped from scrap metal. 101/
3. Gray and Malleable Iron Castings.
Most medium And large Soviet plants, regardless of their
product) have one or more foundries for the production of gray or
malleable iron castings. A small proportion of the Soviet iron foundry
capacity is located in steel plants; where the production iS consuMed
in the Manufacture of molds) rolls, and casting plates for use within
the steel plants. Foundries range in size from the large facilities
at machine building plants, such as Uralmash and Kramatorsk) with annual
capacities of about 200,000 tons of iron castings down to little 1-cupola
furnace operations with an annual production of less than 1,000 tons.
Many foundries, such as those found in automobile or tractor plants, are
highly specialized, and others produce a wide variety of castings. The
1955 production of gray iron and malleable iron castings is estimated
to have' been 6,436,000 and 558,000 tons, respectively. The 1960 goals
for production of gray and malleable iron castings are 13,350,000 and
650,000 tons) respectively. 122/
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V. Production of Raw and Alloying Materials.
A. Basic Raw Materials.
1. Coking Coal and Coke.
The USSR is the world's second largest producer of coke for
metallurgical use. The 1955 Soviet production of 43.6 million tons re-
presented about 16 percent of the world total, and within the Sino-So-
viet Bloc the USSR accounted for 68 percent of the total Bloc production
of 64.2 million tons. The 55.1 million tons of coking coal mined in the
USSR during 1954 amounted to 16 percent of all production of Soviet coal
mines. In spite of the large production of coke the supply of metallur-
gical grades available for use in blast furnaces is barely adequate. 103/
a. Coking Coal.
The expansion of ferrous metallurgy in the USSR has re-
sulted in rapidly growing demands for coking coal, and its production
is given a high prIority by Soviet planners. In contrast to the direc-
tives of the Fifth Five Year Plan, which stated that the production of
coking coal was to increase not less than 50 percent, the directives of
the Sixth Five Year Plan call for an increase of about 85 percent. Be-
cause the production of coke is to be increased only 48 percent during
the Sixth Five Year Plan period, the scheduled rise in production of
coking coal reflects the declining quality of the coal.* In 1955, 1.5
tons of coking coal, as mined, were required per ton of coke produced,
and in 1960 the requirement will rise to 1.8 tons. 12.11/
The principal coking coal basins in the USSR are the
Donets Basin (Donbas), the Kuznetsk Basin (Kuzbas), the Karaganda
Basin) and the Kizel Basin.** The Donbas provides 6o percent and the
Kuzbas 30 percent of all Soviet coking coals, and although reserves
are adequate for centuries it is probable that mining capacities in
these basins will limit production to levels slightly above current
ones. The largest expansion is going on at the Karaganda field, which
eventually is to supplant the Kuzbas as a major source of coking coal
for the Urals. 105/
* Exports, possible new uses, and sharp expansion in other present
uses are not considered to be significant.
** See the map, Figure 8, inside back cover.
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Extensive reserves of coking coal near Vorkuta in the
Pechora Basin are being developed. At present they supply the new
Cherepovets blast furnace S near Leningrad and in the future will supply
plants in the northern Urals. During 1954 the fields at Tkvarcheli and
Tkibuli in the Georgian SSR started to produce for the blast furnaces
at Rustavi. The development and further exploration of the large re-
serves near Aldan in southern Yakutskaya ASSR will be pushed during
the next 10 to 15 years. In addition) coals with coking characteris-
tics are known to exist in deposits or basins at Noril'sk) Irkutsk,
Bukachacha, Bureya, Suchan, and on Sakhalin Island. 106/
Coking coals of the Donbas and the Kizel Basin are
?
coked locally, but all of the coking coals of the Karaganda Basin are
coked in the Urals. Between 62 and 63 percent of the coking coals of
the Kuzbas are coked in the Urals) the remainder at Stalinsk and
Kemerovo. Transportation costs represent about one-third of the cost
of the coking coals of the Karaganda Basin delivered to the Urals and
about one-half of those of the Kuzbas, which must be hauled 2,000
kilometers. The long rail hauls required for one-quarter of Soviet
coking coals constitute the major potential vulnerability of the
coking coal industry. 107/
The quality of coking coals probably is the chief
limiting factor in the coking coal base of the USSR. Both the ability
of a coal to coke and the quality of the coke are determined by the
chemical and physical properties of the coal. The widespread lack of
coals with optimum Chemical and physical properties requires the blend-
ing of several types having somewhat inferior properties. These can be
blended, however, only if their properties are complementary. Coals
with complementary properties are produced in the Kuzbas and the Donbas)
and the problem of blending is an intrabasin one. Because only small
quantities of poor coking coals are available in the Urals, however,
this area depends on the Kuzbas and the Karaganda Basin for the better
grades. 108/
More than 95 percent of the coking coal mined in 1954
was mechanically cleaned. In spite of the increases in impurities in
coking coal as mined) the USSR generally has succeeded, through heavy
Investment in coal cleaning plants, in obtaining a cleaned product with
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an ash and sulfur content* slightly lower than that of the coal cleaned
before 1940. The ash content of all cleaned Soviet coking coal decreased
from 10.8 percent in 1940 to 10.2 percent in 1955, and the sulfur content
decreased from 1.4 to 1.2 percent. 129/
b. Coke.**
The USSR is the world's second largest producer of coke.
On 1 January 1956 the Soviet capacity was equal to.69 percent of that
of the US. To meet the Plan goal for 1960, an average annual growth
rate of 4.2 million tons will be required, a rate which is substantially
greater than the rate of 3.2 million tons achieved during the Fifth Five
Year Plan period. Estimated production of high-temperature coke in the
USSR in 1913) 1922, 1928-40, and 1945-60 is shown in Table 15.*** 112/
The 1955 regional distribution of coke production is
shown in Table 3.**** Production of coke is closely associated with
production of pig iron in blast furnaces) and coke plants) with their
attendant byproduct facilities, usually are combined with or located
close to integrated steel plants.
More than 90 percent of all coking coal consumed in
the USSR is used to make high-temperature coke for the ferrous metal-
lurgical industry.' The remainder is used in chemical plants, in
nonferrous metallurgy, and for transport. Because of the great con?.
sumption of high-temperature coke in ferrous metallurgy, it is some-
times referred to as "metallurgical coke." Soviet coals coked at
temperatures lower than 900? centigrade are called medium- and low-
temperature cokes and also may be referred to as semicoke) gas coke)
brown-coal coke) and char.
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* For a discussion of the effects of ash and sulfur content, see
p. 112, below.
** The term coke refers to high-temperature coke produced in byproduct
slot-type ovens at temperatures above 900? centigrade and to any high-tem-
perature coke that may be produced in beehive ovens.
*** Table 15 follows on p. 50.
**** P. 25) above.
I. Coke used in smelting pig iron in the USSR must be in lumps 40
millimeters in diameter or greater, but some pieces as small as 25
millimeters are tolerated in small blast furnaces.
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Table 15
Estimated Production of High-Temperature Coke in the USSR LI/
1913) 1922, 1928-40) and 1945L60
Million Metric Tons
Year Production
Year Production
1913
4.4
1946
13.5
1922
0.2
1947
15.3
1928
4.2
1948
18.7
1929
5.9
1949
22.2
1930
6.2
1950
27.7
1931
6.8
1951
30.4
1932
8.4
1952
33.5
1933
10.2
1953
36.6
1934
14.2
1954
40.3
1935
16.8
1955
43.6
1936
19.9
1956
47.2
1937
20.0
1957
51.1
1938
20.3
1958
55.3
1939
20.7
1959
59.8
1940
21.1
1960
64.6
1945
12.0
a. 111/
In the USSR the byproducts of coking are the primary
sources of the major aromatic chemicals -- benzoll toluol, and, to a
lesser extent, phenol. Other byproducts of importance are ammonia
(90 percent of which is converted to ammonium sulfate for fertilizer),
xylo10 cresol, and naphthalene. The estimated production of selected
coke-chemical byproducts in the USSR in 1955 is shown in Table 16.*
* Table 16 follows on p. 51.
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Table 16
Estimated Production of Selected Coke-Chemical Byproducts
in the 'USSR 2/
1955
Byproduct
Yield per Ton of Coke
(Kilograms)
Production
(Thousand Metric Tons)
Benzol
7.75
?.338
To
1.93
84.1
Phenol
_ 0.309
13.5
Xylol
o.67
29:2
Cresol
o.429
18.7
Ammonia hi
4.o
174
Naphthalene
2.32
101
" LE/
b. Ninety percent of the ammonia is converted into ammonium
sulfate at the byproduct plant.:
After the valuable byproducts are stripped out, the
remaining coke gas is widely distributed as a fuel in the steel plant
and for municipal use. In the Ukraine, a number of important cities
are linked by a network of coke-gas pipelines. 112/
2. Iroa Ore.
a.. General.
The USSR is second only to the US as the world's leading
producer of iron ore. Because of the increasing reliance of the US on
imports and the role of the USSR as an exporter to the European Satellites,
Soviet production of iron ore may exceed that of the US by 1960.
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Production of iron ore in the USSR has risen steadily
since the end of World War II to an all-time high in 1955 of an esti-
mated 71.9 million tons of commercial-grade ore.* 22W To attain this
rate of production, an all-out effort was required of the iron mining
industry during both the Fourth and Fifth Five Year Plan periods.
The outstanding achievement of the Fourth Five Year Plan period was
the complete rehabilitation and extensive renovation of the mines in
the Krivoy Rog Basin.
Although it was officialy announced that the produc-
tion goal for iron ore set by the Fifth Five Year Plan had been attained)
criticism was later directed at the Ministry of the Construction of
Metallurgical and Chemical Industry Enterprises for having failed to
fulfill by 26 million tons the Plan goal for putting new gross produc-
tivr capacity. into operation. 115/ Because this amount is more than
one-half of the increase in rate of gross production claimed for the
period) much of the capacity not constructed must have been intended
to replace obsolete or depleted installations. Thus the production
goal probably was achieved by sacrificing quality and utilizing exist-
ing facilities more intensively than was originally planned. Numerous
reports of ore of inferior quality being received at metallurgical
plants, both in the USSR and the European Satellites, tend to confirm
this conclusion.
Estimated production of commercial-grade iron ore in
the USSR in 1938-60 is shown in Table 17.**
Estimated production of commercial-grade iron ore in
the USSR, by economic region) in 1940, 1950) and 1955 is shown in
Table 18.***
The principal areas in the USSR that produce iron ore
are in the southern Ukraine and the Ural Mountains. These areas ac-
counted for 94 percent of total Soviet production in 1940, 85 percent
* Commercial ore is iron ore as received at the steel plant.
Usually concentrating and some sintering has been done at the mine.
** Table 17 follows on p. 53.
*** Table 18 follows on p. 54.
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Table 17
Estimated Production of Commercial-Grade Iron Ore
. in the USSR
1938-60
Million Metric Tons
Year
Production
Year
Production
1938
26.5 2/
1950
39.7 s/
1939
28.0 2/
1951
4o.o A/
1940
29.9 Li/
1952
52.0 a/
1941
22.7 2/
1953
58.0 A/
1942
1954
64.3 2/
1943
9.7 !II
1955
71.9 2/
1944
12.0 2/
1956
78.8 11
1945
16.6 ELI
1957
86.6 A/
1946
20.3 2/
1958
95.0 A/
1947
24.4 Li/
1959
lo4.1 A/
1948
29.2 a/
1960
(Plan)
114.3f/
1949
35.0 21
a. 116/
b. 117/
d. This figure is interpolated.
e. 119/
f. 212/
in 1950, and about 87 percent in 1955. West Sib
peen USSR, and the Transcaucasus, in that order
for most of the remainder in 1955. In spite of
production, these latter deposits are important
iron and steel plants.
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eria, the central Euro-
of importance, accounted
their relatively small
sources of ore for local
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Table 18
Estimated Production of Commercial-Grade Iron Ore
In the USSR, by Economic Region
1940) 1950) and 1955
Percent of Total
Economic Region
1940 2/
1950 ..E1/
1955
III
(South)
67.5
52.0
56.2 .12/
VIII
(Urals)
27.0
33.4
30.5 2/
IX
West Siberia)
1.7
6.5
6.1 1/
VII
(Central)(Tula and Lipetsk)
3.8
2.5
7.2 2/
Others
0
5.6
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
a. 121/
b. 122/
c. 14/
d. 12 /
e. This figure is total production minus production of
Regions III, VIII, and IX.
The Sixth Five Year Plan directs that Soviet produc-
tion of iron ore be raised 59 percent by 1960, an increase estimated
at 42.4 million tons of commercial-grade ore. 121/ To aid in achieve-
ing this goal, important new mines are to begin producing in the
Kursk-Belgorod district of the central European USSR, at the Kustanay
and Atasuskiy deposits in Kazakhstan, at Gora Kachkanar in the Urals,
and at the Abakan and Korshunovsk deposits in East Siberia.
The Abakan mine will be the largest in the Kuznetsk metal-
lurgical combine, and it is planned that the mine will release the combine
completely-from its dependence on Magnitogorsk iron ore. The Kustanay
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deposits, near the confluence of the Ayat' and Tbbol Rivers, are being
developed as an important source of iron ore for Magnitogorsk, Chelyabinsk)
and other metallurgical centers in the southern Urals. The Sokolovskiy-
Sarbaisk ore concentration combine, currently the largest construction
project of the iron ore industry, will process Kustanay ore. This combine
is to have a capacity of 10 million tons of crude ore per year and 5.6
million tons of concentrates by 1960. 12.6_/ The Atasuskiy deposits are
being developed to provide ore for the Karaganda metallurgical combine.
Development and survey work is also in progress at the Korshunovsk depos-
it in Irkutskaya Oblast and at an undesignated iron ore deposit in
southern Yakutskaya ASSR to provide local ore bases for proposed new
metallurgical centers to be constructed in Siberia within the next 10
to 15 years.
In addition to the stress placed on increasing produc-
tion of iron ore during 1956-60, great emphasis is attached to improving
the quality of the ore before it is charged into the furnaces. This
results) in part, from the declining iron content and increasing pro-
portion of fines in run-of-mine iron ores and, in part, from an apprecia-
tion of the increased efficiency in blast furnace operation obtainable
by introducing advanced techniques in preparation of ores.
The declining iron content of the available ores is
Indicated by the Soviet statement that by 1960 it will be necessary
to mine 1.44 tons of crude iron ore to obtain 1 ton of ore of commer-
cial grade, compared with 1.23 tons of crude ore in 1955 and 1.08 tons
in 1940. 127/ The increasing percentage of fines is an even greater
problem, however. On the average) 4o percent of the iron ore mined in
the USSR is less than 10 millimeters in size) and in some mines in the
Krivoy Rog area and at Kerch' fines represent as much as 80 or 100 per-
cent of the ore mined. lay
To reduce excessive losses and other difficulties in
handling and smelting ore fines, the USSR is agglomerating ore on a
rapidly expanding scale. Production of ore agglomerate increased from
about 6.4 million tons in 1950 to approximately 33.2 million tons in
1955. ag2/ The Sixth Five Year Plan sets a 1960 production goal of
73 million tons of ore agglomerate, nearly two-thirds of the estimated
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production of commercial-grade ore in that year. 130/ Although born of
necessity, the increasing use of ore agglomerate as a furnace charge in
the USSR is resulting in additional positive benefits, such as increased
furnace productivity and a lower rate of coke consumption. Similar
measures are being taken by the US steel industry, although not on as
broad a scale as that contemplated in the USSR.
Probably the most important problem in the Sixth Five
Year Plan period, as it affects the iron mining industry, is the attain-
ment of the goal for construction of new productive capacity for iron ore.
Originally set at 84 million tons in the Sixth Five Year Plan, the goal
was raised to 91 million tons when the shortfall in the Fifth Five Year
Plan was announced. 131/ The Fifth Five Year Plan goal) estimated at 67
million tons of new productive capacity for iron ore, was underfulfilled
by approximately 26 million tons, and the failure was attributed to
weaknesses in planning and management. !/ Such weaknesses were pre-
sumably still present in February 1956, when the Soviet press criticized
the implementation of programs for development at Kustanay and various
iron ore deposits in the Urals and for construction at ore processing
installations in the Ukraine. 133/ Continued delays in these projects,
it was pointed out, would jeopardize further development of metal produc-
tion at the Magnitogorsk combine and at other steel plants in the Urals
and the Ukraine.
b. Reserves.
The iron ore resources of the USSR are among the greatest
In the world. According to the 1938 survey, issued by the Union Geolog-
ical Fund of the USSR, Soviet reserves of workable iron ores amounted
to about 10.9 billion tons with an average iron content of 45 percent.
Of this total, approximately 4.5 billion tons were classified as "proven"
reserves. In addition, Soviet reserves of iron quartzites (similar to
the taconites of the Mesabi Range in the US) were estimated at 256.7
billion tons, of which 11.6 billion tons were classified as "proven"
reserves.
'Because of extensive programs of geological exploration
and surveying and technological improvements in ore extraction and utili-
zation since World War II, the "proven" iron ore reserves of the USSR
now probably surpass the estimates made in 1938, in spite of a greatly
increased rate of exploitation in the intervening years. Theoretically,
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"proven" reserves of workable iron ore in the USSR could support the
1955 Soviet production rate for pig iron of 33.3 million tons for about
6o years, and the 1960 goal for pig iron production of 53 million tons
could be maintained for about 38 years. DIV
In spite of intensive exploration, it is likely that
very few new deposits actually have been located. Soviet claims of a
new discovery frequently refer to a rediscovery or a more detailed
investigation of a deposit already charted before World War II. Thus
accretions to the total Soviet ore reserves appear to have been primarily
the result of extending known ore bodies and transferring ores from one
reserve category to another. Furthermore, the average quality of the
iron ores has declined steadily, in both chemical composition and physical
structure. It now appears that Soviet geologists in former years tended
to overestimate the quality of ore reserves, particularly the more impor-
tant deposits such as those in Krivoy Rog and Magnitogorsk. The expand-
ing use of low-grade iron ores in the USSR is evidence of the declining
quality of Soviet iron ore resources.
The most highly utilized iron ore deposits in the USSR
are those in the Krivoy Rog Basin in the Ukrainian SSR. These deposits)
estimated to contain 1.7 billion to 2.4 billion tons of 50 percent iron
content or better, are the largest deposits of high-grade ore now being
worked and will remain so for many years. 135/ In addition to their
high iron content) Krivoy Rog ores are desirable for their low silica)
low phosphorus, and low sulfur content. Recent reports indicate) however,
a rising average content of these impurities. The friability of the ores,
moreover, is a distinct hindrance to their utilization and has caused in-
creasing difficulties to the Ukrainian steel industry and to European
Satellite consumers.
The largest iron ore deposit in the USSR is at Kerch')
in the eastern, part of the Crimean peninsula. Total reserves are be-
lieved to exceed 2.7 billion tons. 13_6/ The average iron content ranges
from 30 to 40 percent, the composition of the ore is complex) and the
ore is diffidult to utilize; but the favorable occurrence and geographic
location of the Kerch' deposit Make it potentially one of the most
economical to mine of all iron ore deposits in the USSR.
Deposits of iron ore in the central European USSR, lo-
cated near Kursk, Belgorod, Tula) and Lipetsk) are important because of
their close proximity to blast furnaces at Tide and Lipetsk. The Kursk
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magnetic anomaly is located near many of the metallurgical centers of
the Ukraine. The Kursk deposit consists of 336.7 million tons of high-
grade iron ore, plus tremendous reserves of low-grade iron quartzites. 137/
In spite of these favorable factors, complicated hydrogeological condi-
tions and an intricate chemical composition have hampered large-scale
exploitation of these ores up to the present time.
About 200 known iron ore deposits are in the Urals. In
1938 the total probable reserves were given as more than 2.4 billion
tons, of which 1.17 billion tons were classified as "proven" reserves.
These deposits are characterized by the exceptional purity of some of the
ores, primarily the Bakal ores, and by the alloying admixtures of other
ores at Vysokaya) Blagodat', Khalilovo) and Titanogorsk. The largest con-
centrations of iron ore are in the Bogoslovsk, Tagilo-Kushva, Alapayevsk,
Bakal, Magnitogorsk, Beloretsk, and Khalilovo areas.
Certain other iron ore deposits in the USSR are important
because they support local steel industries. They are the Dashkesan depo-
sits in the Transcaucasus, the Gornaya Shoriya deposits south of Stalinsk
in West Siberia, the Yena-Kovdora and Olenogorsk deposits of the Kola
Peninsula, the Balyaginskiy deposit in East Siberia, and the Nikolayevsk
deposit in the Soviet Far East. Other deposits are important because they
are scheduled to supplement existing sources of supply or to serve as ore
--bases for future planned metallurgical centers. Among these are deposits
at Kustanay and Atasuskiy in Kazakhstan) the Abakan-Minusinsk deposit,
the Angara.;Ilimsk (Korshunovsk) deposit, the Argun' River deposit, the
Lower Angara deposit, and an undesignated deposit -- possibly the
Batomsk deposit near Aldan in the Yakutskaya ASSR in East Siberia.
The Kustanay deposits, after almost 10 years of geophysical
and geological prospecting) are now being developed for large-scale open-
pit mining. These deposits, claimed to possess reserves equal in magnitude
to the Krivoy Rog Basin and containing ore averaging 45 percent iron content,
but high in silica, will be a major source of ore for metallurgical plants
in Kazakhstan and the southern Urals, including Magnitogorsk. 139/
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c. Principal Producing Areas.
Except during World War II and the rehabilitation period
that followed, Krivoy Rog has long been the largest iron ore producer in
the USSR, and plans indicate that it will remain so for many years. These
mines accounted for about 47 percent of the iron ore produced in the USSR
in 1950) and for approXimately 45 percent in 1955. 140/ After World War
II, 34 mines were restored and modernized, and efforts were made to mech-
anize development and mining operations. There are now approximately 40
mines in the area with a combined annual production of about 32 million
tons of commercial-grade iron ore. 1111/ In addition to supplying the
metallurgical industry in the Ukraine, these mines are the source of
almost all the iron ore exported to the European Satellites. lyv
The declining physical quality of Krivoy Rog iron ores
and the mine-to-mine variations in their chemical composition and particle
site made it increasingly difficult to obtain a product of constant quality.
Agglomerating facilities have been constructed at Krivoy Rog and at most
of the Ukrainian metallurgical plants supplied by these mines to process
the fines, which average about 50 percent of all ore mined in the area.
Existing agglomerating capacity, however, is inadequate. Many of the 58
new agglomerating lines to be put into operation in the USSR in 1956-60
probably are designated for the Krivoy Rog area.
The expanded Soviet requirements for iron ore and the in-
'creasing depth of formations containing higher grade ores have led to the
exploitation of poorer (less than 46 percent iron) but more accessible
iron ores in the Krivoy Rog Basin. The large deposits of iron quartzites)
frequently located at the surface, also are being exploited extensively
and are to be used on a much larger scale. Construction of the new Southern
Enriching Combine (UGOK), designed to process the quartzites (30 to 40 per-
cent iron) to yield a finished self-fluxing concentrate averaging 58 to 6o
percent iron, was started at Krivoy Rog in early 1952. Although the combine
was one of the most important projects in the Soviet iron mining industry
at that time, construction lagged consistently. It was not until September
1955 that the first plant of the combine was put into operation. A second
plant, possibly another unit of the combine) reportedly is under construc-
tion and is scheduled to begin operating in 1957. 144/
gra
The deposits at Kerch' are said to be the most economically
exploitable iron ore deposits in the USSR. For this reason, considerable
effort has been made to expand production at Kerch'. In spite of the
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favorable characteristics (geological occurrence) geographic location)
and the like) of the Kerch' ores) their complex chemical composition
(high phosphorus content and the presence of arsenic and vanadium) has
for years retarded a more extensive development. The high phosphorus
content (averaging 1.2 to 1.3 percent) has been a primary deterrent to
greater utilization in the USSR and in the European Satellites, where
production of Thomas steel is small. Production of iron ore in the
Kerch' district in 1950 was about 2 million tons, and it increased
during the Fifth Five Year Plan period to about 7 million to 8 million
tons in 1955. 145/ Plans call for an ultimate capacity of at least 10
million tons per year. 146/ The principal consumer of Kerch' iron ore)
after agglomeration at the Kamysh-Burun concentrating plant, has been
the Azovstal' plant in Zhdanov, where utilization probably is accom-
plished by blending with low-phosphorus ores. Recent information indi-
cates that East Germany and Poland are now receiving ore from Kerch'.
Iron ore in the Central Region (Region VII) of the
USSR) although it accounted for only 2.5 percent of total Soviet produc-
tion in 1950, is important because of its geographic location. 147/ The
mining centers are around three towns -- Tula, Lipetsk, and Kursk. The
Kursk district is currently the most important and also offers great
potentialities for future development and expansion. The tremendous re-
serves of low-grade iron quartzites and the large reserves of rich ore
in the Kursk magnetic anomaly (KMA) have long attracted Soviet interest.
Large-scale exploitation of the ores has been slow, however) because of
technical difficulties. Before the German invasion, only minor quantities
of ore were extracted -- mainly for experimental purposes. In 1945 a
special trust (Kmastroy) was created to develop and exploit the KMA.
For 10 years, considerable effort and increasingly large budget appropria-
tions have been directed toward the development of an economical method
of exploiting both the iron ore and the iron quartzites. Among the plans
for the area was the development of a mine with an initial annual produc-
tion capacity of 500,000 tons of iron quartzites. 148/ Actual accomplish-
ments during 1946-55 are unknown. The continued interest in the project
Is indicated, however, by plans to construct, during 1956-60, additional
new mines in the Kursk-Belgorod area.
The mines at Tula and Lipetsk are small and have been in
operation for a number of years. The ores require concentration, and, in
view of the declining quality and quantity of the reserves) little expan-
sion in production is expected.
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Exploitation of the Olenogorsk and Yena-Kovdora iron
ore deposits began in 1955 to provide the iron ore base for the new
Cherepovets metallurgical plant. All of the ore mined, which contains
33 to 35 percent iron, requires concentration. -Efforts to utilize at
the Cherepovets plant the titaniferous magnetite ores of the Karel'-
skaya ASSR deposits have thus far been unsuccessful.
Production at the Dashkesan deposits started in 1948.
Plans called for the annual mining of 2 million tons of iron ore, to
be shipped to metallurgical plants at Rustavi and Sumgait. 11.12/ Two
mines -- one open-pit and one underground -- produce low-quality ores
(34 percent iron) that require concentration. Both mines are believed
to be operating at near capacity to meet the requirements of the two
new blast furnaces at Rustavi.
The iron ore industry of the Urals, which accounted for
33.4 percent of Soviet production in 1950 and about 30.5 percent in 1955,
Is more diversified and, in some respects, more complex than is the iron
ore industry of the Ukraine. 150/ In contrast to the fairly concentrated
operations of the Ukraine, production of iron ore in the Urals is scattered
from Ivdele in the northern Urals to Khalilovo in the south. The largest
producing areas in the region are at Magnitogorsk) Nizhniy Tagil) Kushva,
and Bakal.
For years Magnitogorsk was the principal source of high-
quality Urals iron ore, and after the loss of the Ukraine in World War II
it was the largest producer in the USSR. Near the end of World War II,
it was discovered that, contrary to former beliefs, scarcely one-fourth
of the remaining ores at Magnitogorsk were of first quality. The remain-
ing three-fourths had an increasing sulfur content and a decreasing iron
content, necessitating extensive processing. In 1946 the Soviet press
stated that the high-grade ores at Magnitogorsk might not last for more
than 15 years. 151/ It now appears, however, that increased utilization
of the lower grade deposits by means of extensive beneficiation may extend
this period substantially. In 1954, Magnitogorsk reportedly mined about
20 million tons of ore to obtain 10.8 million tons of commercial-grade ore,
roughly one-half of the total estimated production of commercial-grade iron
ore in the Urals. 152/ Efforts are being made to relieve Magnitogorsk from
supplying ore to the metallurgical centers of the southern Urals and to the
Kuznetsk metallurgical combine at Stalinsk about 2,000 kilometers to the east
by developing alternate sources of supply for these plants. These objectives
ultimately will be realized when the Kustanay and Abakan deposits have reached
full production.
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An unusual aspect of the iron ore industry in the Urals
is the polymetallic nature of some of the ores exploited. The ore ex-
tracted at Vysokaya Gora near Nizhniy Tagil contains 50 to 55 percent iron
and enough chalcopyrite (1.5 percent copper) to permit the extraction of
copper as a byproduct, but whether or not this is being done is not known.
The Blagodat' Gora mine east of Kushva annually produces at least 1.5 mil-
lion tons of iron ore, which is Processed to yield a byproduct containing
titanium. 153/ Ore from the? Bulandikha mine, largest in the Bakal district,
contains 40 to 45 percent iron (which is concentrated to 54 percent iron)
and enough manganese to reduce or eliminate the customary manganese charge
in the blast furnace. Bakal district ores, because of their low sulfur
and phosphorus content, are considered to be the best iron ores in the
Urals.
Nearly all of the iron ore mined in the Urals must undergo
beneficiation in one form or another. This has been necessary since World
War II, and it is certain to become an increasingly important phase of
mining operations in future years. While the transition of the older Urals
iron mines from open-pit to underground operations to maintain production
of high-grade ore has progressed, rapidly increasing requirements for iron
ore have made it necessary to exploit poorer ores near or at the surface.
The Kachkanar ore concentrating combine (in Sverdlovskaya Oblast) -- to be
constructed during 1956-60 -- is destined to handle such ores. Furthermore,
the occurrence of the high-grade ores obtained from deep mines is such that
their extraction involves contamination with gangue material, necessitating
treatment for these ores as well.
Production of iron ore in West Siberia is concentrated in
the Gornaya Shoriya district. Production) believed to have increased from
about 2.8 million tons in 1950 to 4.6 million tons in 1955, is consumed
entirely by the Kuznetsk metallurgical combine at Stalinsk. Ore Ore from
the Tashtagol mine) largest in the region) contains an average of 50 percent
iron and is the only Gornaya Shoriya iron ore which does not require benefi-
ciation. Other producing mines in the district are the Sheregesh mine and
the Shalym mine, the ores of both of which are processed at the Mundybash
agglomeration plant.
Under development since the end of World War II, the
Abakan deposit east of Stalinsk is intended to replace Magnitogorsk as
a source of part of the iron ore requirements of the Kuznetsk combine.
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Construction of the Abagursk agglomeration plant, to process Abakan ores,
began in 1946. The first section was scheduled to begin production in
1948. The most retarded construction project of the Soviet iron mining
industry, neither the mine nor the agglomerating plant were in operation
at the end of 1955 although production was then scheduled to begin in
mid-1956. 155/ Delayed construction of a rail line from Stalinsk to
Abakan, originally scheduled for completion in 1950 but not in operation
until 19550 probably contributed to the slow development of Abakan.
Aside from Abakan) the Balyaginskiy mine, 25 kilometers
northwest of Petrovsk-Zabaykalsk) is the only mine in East Siberia known
to be in operation. The mine supplies a small quantity of iron ore to
the steel plant at Petrovsk. Development of an iron mine at Korshunovsk)
in the Angara-Ilimsk deposit) is scheduled during 1956-60, as is the
prospecting and further surveying of an undesignated iron bre deposit
(possibly Batomsk) in Yakutskaya ASSR.
In the Far East the development of iron ore deposits
in the Malyy Khingan district to provide a sufficient ore base for an
Integrated operation at the Amurstal' steel plant at Komsomol'sk has
never proved feasible. Ore for this purpose possibly may be obtained
from deposits now being prospected in southern Yakutskaya ASSR. Small
quantities of iron ore, for direct charging into the open hearth fur-
naces at Amurstal', are now being obtained from a small deposit at
Nikolayevsk.
3. Manganese Ore.
a. General.
. Among the major steel producing countries of the world
the USSR is the only one that is self-sufficient in manganese. The USSR
is not only the world's largest producer of manganese but is also -- be-
cause of ironmaking practices arising primarily from the nature of its
iron ore and Coking coal -- the largest consumer and a substantial ex-
porter. Possession of one-third of the world's known manganese reserves
assures an adequate Soviet supply for at least a century.
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Ninety percent of Soviet reserves and production of
manganese are concentrated in two areas. One major producer, Nikopol')
supplies the Ukrainian steel industry; which produces 48 percent of the
Soviet production of pig iron. The other area, Chiatura, in the Georgian
SSR, supplies the major portion of high-grade ore for production of ferro-
manganese and supplies ores to manganese-deficient areas in the USSR
and for export. Although manganese production goals for the USSR as a
whole were not announced, the Georgian SSR Sixth Five Year Plan calls
for a 50-percent increase in production.
As the steel industry of the USSR was expanded toward
the east) emphasis was directed toward the discovery of local sources
of high-grade manganese to eliminate the long haul from Chiatura.
Thus the Fourth) Fifth, and Sixth Five Year Plans have included such
exhortations as "In the eastern areas of the country, to increase by
every means the search for new deposits of ... manganese ores for the
production of ferromanganese metal." Recently, Kazakh SSR has claimed
sufficient reserves of high-grade manganese to support production of
ferromanganese) probably at the projected ferroalloy plant at Pavia-
dar. 156/ The 50-percent increase in 1960 planned production at Chiatura)
which is only slightly lower than planned increases in the production of
pig iron and steel, and the continuing search for new manganese deposits
in the east indicate, however, that Chiatura will continue for some time
to be the major supplier for the industry east of the Ukraine.
b. Reserves.
Total Soviet reserves of manganese ore are estimated to
be 816 million tons out of a Sino-Soviet Bloc total of 872 million tons.
Approximately one-third of these reserves are "proven."
Chiatura. The Chiatura manganese mines are located near
the viLlage of Chiatura on the southern slope of the Caucasus Mountains
in the Georgian SSR. The manganese ore bed is 1,250 to 1)900 feet above
the bottom of a Valley in an area of canyon-like valleys. The deposits
cover an area of 130 square kilometers. 157/
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Published 1938 estimates were 146 million tons of "proven"
reserves and 63 million tons of "probable and possible" reserves.
Present unofficial estimates are 150 million tons of "proven" reserves
and 30 million tons of "probable and possible" reserves..
The manganese ores consist of pyrolusite, psilomelane?
manganite? wad, and carbonates. The carbonate ores, discovered since
1938, have only recently been used in production of ferromanganese.
The quantity of these ores is unknown and is excluded in the estimates
of reserves. 159/ The raw ore, containing 25 to 47 percent manganese,
concentrates to as high as 55 percent. 112/ High silica and phosphorus
present a problem in some grades, but Chiatura ores are generally among
the best in the world.
The long-wall retreating method* of mining is used in
the underground mines. 111/ In spite of the rugged terrain, open-pit
mining has increased. In 1950, after 3 years of stripping overburden,
the first open-pit mine was started, and others have since come into
production. The ratio of open-pit to underground mining is not known. 112/
Complete mechanization of the manganese mines was a goal
of the Fifth Five Year Plan. Drilling, ore breaking, and mine transport
have been completely mechanized, but approximately one-half of the ore
is still loaded manually. 113/
The introduction of modern concentrating equipment has
increased the production of high-grade concentrates and has Made it
possible to produce a 30- to 33-percent manganese concentrate from
tailings. 164./ It is probable that by consolidating operations the num-
ber of concentrating plants has been reduced from the 17 existing in ,
1937. One large new plant was recently placed in operation, and two
more are under construction. 112/
Completion of the Chiatura-Zestafoni wide-gauge railroad
in September 1956 is expected to eliminate a long-standing problem. Pre-
viously, ore shipments destined for points beyond Shorapani had to be
transferred at that rail junction from narrow- to wide-gauge cars. The
elimination of this bottleneck had been planned since 1949. 111/
* Haulage roads and airways are first driven to the boundary of the
ore bed, and then the bed is mined, in a single face without pillars,
back toward the shaft.
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Nikopol'. The Nikopol' manganese deposits cover an area
of approximately 275 square kilometers on the east side of the Dnieper
River and are divided into two distinct fields, one northwest and the
other northeast of the town of Nikopol'. 167/ The Nikopol' deposits are
the largest in the world, on the basis of both raw ore and metallic con-
tent, and contain 65 percent of Soviet manganese reserves. Total reserves
in 1938 were estimated at 522 million tons, of which 78 million tons were
"proven." 121 As a result of geological surveys made during the period
of the Fourth Five Year Plan, "proven" reserves are now estimated at 139
million tons and "probable and possible" reserves at 370 million tons.
A complete survey of the deposits has never been published. 16
Nikopol' ore consists of pyrolusite with an admixture of
psilomelane and bog manganese. It contains a larger amount of gangue
and phosphorus than does Chiatura ore, but it is less friable. Manganese
.content is relative low, 28 to 33 percent, and silica content is high,
42 percent. All of the ore is washed. 112/
Concentrates contain from 4o to 50 percent manganese
with a ratio of manganese to iron higher than 10. The better grades
of concentrates are used for production of ferromanganese at the
Zaporozh'ye ferroalloy plant, sometimes blended with Chiatura ore.
Nikopol' manganese Mines were completely reconstructed
after World War II. Reconstruction plans celled for complete mechaniza-
tion of cutting, loading, and hauling and provided that by 1956 one-half
of the production was to be from open-pit mines. In 1955, however, the
Nikopol' mines were severely criticized for low labor productivity, for
delays in introducing new equipment, and for not developing open-pit
mines faster. 1/1/ Press reports indicate some progress in remedying
these defects.
By 1948 the four concentrating plants in operation
before the war were repaired, and plans were made for the building of
new concentrating plants at some of the larger mime:. 112/ Two new
plants, including electromagnetic separators, are known to have been
completed.
Eastern Areas. Exploration has revealed more than 200
manganese deposits in the Urals) Central Asia, Siberia, and the Soviet
Far East. With few exceptions, these deposits are small and of low grade
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and are exploited principally to supply local blast furnaces. Emphasis
on the discovery of additional sources of manganese in the East has been
stressed in every Five Year Plan since World War II. Except for the an-
nouncement by Kazakh SSR that plans have been made to produce ferroman-
ganese from local ores, there has been no evidence that the search has
been successful.
c. Production.
Estimated production of manganese ore in the USSR, by
producing area, in 1940 and 1945-55 is shown in Table 19.*
The principal areas of production of manganese in the
USSR, currently estimated to supply about one-half of world production,
have changed little since World War II. Although Chiatura contains
only one-quarter of the reserves, it produces nearly 60 percent of the
total -- probably because of the higher quality of its deposits. Niko-
pa]), with two-thirds of the reserves of the USSR, accounts for less
than one-third of its production.
Postwar planning in the USSR called for a sharp in-
crease in production of manganese to meet the needs of the steadily
expanding iron and steel industry. Reconstruction was accomplished
In a relatively short period, considering the extent of wartime dam-
age, and by 1949 production had' equaled its prewar peak of about 3
million tons. 1/3/ Production in 1955 was 61 percent greater than
in 1950. 174/
Production in the Urals; Central Asia, and Siberia
was greatly stimulated by the German invasion and is gradually in-
creasing, but not in proportion to the increases at Chiatura and
Nikopol' or to the expansion of production of pig iron and steel.
Ores of ferromanganese grade produced in the Urals, Central Asia, and
Siberia total approximately 200,000 tons, less than one-half the re-
quirements of local steel plants. 175/ Deficiencies are covered by
shipping high-grade concentrates from Chiatura or ferromanganese from
southern ferroalloy plants. 11Y
* Table 19 follows on p. 68.
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Table 19
Estimated Production of Manganese Ore in the USSR, by Producing Area
1940 and 1945-55
Nikopol'
Chiatura Eastern Areas
Total
Year (Thousand Metric Tons) (Percent of Total) (Thousand Metric Tons) (Percent of Total) (Thousand Metric Tons) (Percent of Total) (Thousand Metric Tons)
1940 850W 33 1,560W Ea I5o 2/ 6 2,560
1945 32o 2/ 22 3?W8 56 33X/ 22 1,480
1946 48o 2/ 27 950W 52 380w 21
1947 550 ?1/ 26 1,10012/ 53 430 21 Ilg
1948 620 1/ 27 1,200W 52 4130 21 2,300
1949 880W 29 1,700W 55 500 16 3,080
1950 975 2/ 28 1,950 2/ 56 550 16
31
1951 1,260 E/ 30 2,350 2/ 57 55o 13 1:1176O
1952 1,260 2/ 30 2,42o 2/ 57 550 13 4,230
1953 1,40o yi 31 2,5240W 56 Lao 13 4,54o
1954 1,46o 3/ 30 2,84o y/ 58 600 12 4,900
1955 1,67o 2/ 30 3,160 2R/ 56 770 14 5,600 E12/
a. 177/. All tonnage figures are given in terms of 35 percent (or more) n. 145/
manganese content.
b. 178/ p. 192/
C. 179/ q. 191/
d. 180/ r. 192/
123/
f. Agg/ t. Production is assumed to have remained at the 1952 level.
g.
Ige u' 12L1/
v. 1 5
i. Production data for the eastern areas from 1946 through 1955 are estimated.
j. This figure is interpolated. x.
k. 185/ y.
m. 1
z.
bb.
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d. Consumption.
Approximately 90 percent of the manganese consumed in
the USSR is used by the iron and steel industry. The remainder is used
In manufacuturing chemicals, glass, dry batteries, nonferrous alloys,
and miscellaneous products. The unusually high rate of consumption by
ferrous metallurgy* arises from the practice of charging substantial
quantities into the blast furnace to supplement the characteristically
low-manganese Soviet iron ores and to aid in eliminating the relatively
high sulfur content of coke, particularly that of Donbas origin. This
practice, which does not require ore of metallurgical grade, is esti-
mated to account for 80 percent of the consumption of manganese ores
and concentrates by the iron and steel industry (70 percent on a metal-
lic basis).
Additions of manganese for deoxidization and desulfur-
ization in the steelmaking furnace are in line with normal practice in
other countries. The use of manganese as an alloying additive in sub-
stitution for less abundant materials is encouraged, and there is evi-
dence of the production of electrolytic manganese metal for low-carbon
manganese steel.
Particularly after the USSR terminated exports of man-
ganese ore to the US in 1949, Soviet production appeared to be consid-
erably in excess of requirements for domestic consumption and exports,
and a stockpile of 4 million to 5 million tons may have been accumulated.
In 1955, however, exports of about 937,000 tons probably absorbed any
surplus production in that year.
B. Alloying Materials.
1. General.**
The USSR is unique among industrialized nations in being
substantially self-sufficient in all of the principal alloying metals.
Soviet reserves of chromite are among-the largest in the world, and
the production of nickel, tungsten, molybdenum, and vanadium are --
* In the USSR, 25 kilograms of metallic manganese are used per ton of
steel produced; in the US, 6 kilograms per ton are used.
** See the map, Figure 9, inside back cover.
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or soon will be -- at least adequate for current industrial requirements.
Only in the supply of oobalt is there a shortage sufficient to cause an
extensive Substitution of less satisfactory materials.
Self-sufficiency has not been achieved, however, at low cost.
Although the reserves of chromite are economically exploitable and some
nickel ores compare favorably with those of the great Canadian deposits,
a considerable part of the nickel produced in the USSR and most of the
other alloying metals are extradted from lean, complex ores, frequently
in remote regions under adverse climatic conditions. The high internal
prices of these materials -- relative to the costs of other materials
used by the steel industry -- reflect the high costs of production.
2. Chromite.
a. Reserves.
The USSR claims to have the world's largest reserves of
chromite.* Although no official estimates of reserves have been released
since 1939) there is considerable evidence that reserves are more than
adequate Thr the foreseeable future. 2S2/
The Donskoye deposits in Kazakh SSR contain by far the
largest known reserves. Thirty occurrences within a radius of 40 kilo-
meters have been reported. Most Donskoye ore is of metallurgical grade,
requires little or no concentration, contains up to 60 percent chromic
oxide (Cr203), and has a low silica content and a chrome-to-iron ratio
as high as 4 to 1. The ore is, however, quite friable; the fines range
up to 4o percent of production. ED/
In the Urals there are chromite deposits estimated at
16 million tons in 1939, but less than 1 million tons are of metallur-
gical grade. Reserves In the Saranovskiy deposit are estimated at 14
million tons. These ores are of refractory grade, ranging from 20 to
42 percent Cr203 with relatively high ferrous oxide (FeO) and aluminum
oxide (A1203) content. 204/ Relatively small reserves, apparently of
chemical grade, have been reported in the Lake Sevan area of the
Armenian SSR.
* Chromite reserves of the Union of. South Africa, probably the largest
in the Free World, are estimated at 100 million to 150 million tons.
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I. Production.
Production of chromate in the USSR began in the second
half of the nineteenth century, when minihg began on a small scale in
the Urals. Operations were confined to the deposits in the Urals until
1938, when development of Donskoye began. The Donskoye deposits approxi-
mately doubled total production during the following 5 years. 205/ After
the modernization of the Donskoye mines An 19451 production -- stimulated
by exports -- continued to increase, and in 1949 it reached a peak of
910,000 tons. Although exports were drastically reduced in 1949, produc-
tion was not cut back immediately, and a substantial stockpile of chrome
ore probably was accumulated. ?CS Since 1951, production appears to
have been held at levels approximating requirements for consumption and
for small but increasing exports. Soviet production of chromite now
comprises about 20 percent of total world production. Estimated produc-
tion and exports of chromite by the USSR in 1937-55 is shown in Table
20. 207/
Table 20
Estimated Production and Exports of Chromite by the USSR
1937-55
Thousand Metric Tons
Year
Production ?
Exports
Urals 2/
Donskoye W
Total
1937
1938
1939
3.940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
217 2/
220
245
24o
240
238
240
240
200
200
195
552/
70
W
114
125
138
167
183
o
20 g
80 2/
1201/
120
120
200
200
250
340 I/
480W
5253/
840 2/
770 1.2/
456 Ii/
450
600
600
600
217
240
325L/
360
360
358W
440 j/
.440
450
540
675
580
910
856
570
575
738
767
783 2/
Negligible
o
o
29W
o
27!!
90 W
101 h/
150 Is/
2L99/
365!/
106 1/
69
10
14
28
76
95
a. Production figures for the Urals are given in terms of 35 percent Cr203.
b. Production figures for Donskoye are given in terms of 48 percent Cr203.
c.2S b. M./ m. 218/ r' ?IV
d. fa, i? D.A/ n' all/ n' MY
e. 210/ 1. Mi o. 2a:// t. El/
f. 2_2J3. k. 2S P' Eali u. a/
v. a
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All of the metallurgical-grade chromite mined in the
USSR comes from the Donskoye deposits. ?E9/ In 1948 there were three
open-pit mines in the area. 230/ Most of the ore for domestic consump-
tion is shipped on the Kandagach-Orsk rail line to the Aktyubinsk ferro-
alloy plant, which produces 80 to 90 percent Of the Soviet requirements
for ferrochrome.
The Saranovskiy deposits, in Sverdlovskaya Oblast in
the Urals, are the principal source of chromite of refractory grade.
Principal consumers are the large magnesite refractory plant at Chelya-
binsk 22g/ and the Ordzhonikidze plant at Chasov Yar in the Ukraine. al/
Another user will be a chrome-magnesite refractory plant being built at
Zaporozh'ye.
Chemical-grade chrome ore is produced at Pervourallsk
in Sverdlovskaya Oblast for consumption in the nearby Krompik chemical
plant, g1.51 and in the Lake Seven area of the Armenian SSR to supply the
requirements of the Yerevan bichromate plant. g2?./ Metallurgical-grade
chrome ore, if it is low in silica, is also suitable for chemical use,
and some Donskoye ore appears to be consumed for this purpose at a '
chromite plant at Dzhambul in Kazakh SSR.
3. Tungsten. .
a. Reserves.*
There are no authoritative data on which to base a
quantitative estimate of resources of tungsten in the USSR. The latest
official figure, 13,700 tons, was published in 1933. U13./ That amount,
however, is only one-fourth of the quantity of tungsten estimated to
have been produced since 1933. Because more than two-thirds of current
production is obtained from deposits known in the 1930's, it is likely
that no major new9discoveries have been made and that the increased
production has come from the extension of ore bodies previously known.
On the basis of this assumption, fairly firm conclusions
can be drawn concerning the characteristics of the ores being exploited.
In general, the ores are low-grade and complex, and the tungbten is
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associated with molybdenum, manganese, gold, tin, and other minerals.
These complex ores require extractive metallurgy involving costly
processes for the recovery of the contained minerals. Of about 40 or
50 known tungsten deposits, only a few have been capable of sustaining
production for an extended period of time.
b. Production.
Production of tungsten in the USSR began in 1916,
when a total of 39 tons of concentrates was produced, but it did
not achieve importance until the Dzhida mines and concentrating
plant in East Siberia were put into operation in 1935. 239/ Produc-
tion was further increased in 1940 by the opening of the Tyrny-Auz
deposits in the Caucasus and a concentratiniplant at Chita in the
Transbaykal. 240/ These operations and mines and plants at Chorukh-
Dayron, Akchatau, and numerous smaller mines widely distributed in
the Urals, Central Asia, and the eastern USSR are the present sources
of production. At most installations, tungsten concentrates are
produced as coproducts or byproducts, along with molybdenum, tin, gold,
and other nonferrous metal concentrates.
The USSR has released no information on the production
of tungsten since the Fourth Five Year Plan, which set a goal of 7,500
tons for 1950. There is considerable indirect evidence that production
In 1950 probably was no larger than 4,500 tons and that the planned 1950
level of production may not have been attained until 1955. Estimated
production of tungsten in the USSR in 1938-55 is shown in Table 21.*
* Table 21 follows on p. 74.
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Table 21
Estimated Production of Tungsten in the USSR
1938-55
Metric Tons
Year
Production Year
Production
1938
1939
500 .E1/
N.A.
1947
1948
21640 II/
3,260 a/
1940
800 2/
1949
3,880 a/
1941
1,700 2/
1950
4,5oo 2/
1942
N.A.
1951
5,100 a/
1943
1)470 h/
1952
5,700 a/
1944
N.A.
1953
6,00 1/
1945
1,700 2/
1954
6,900 a/
1946
1,900 h/
1955
7,500
a. ?Li/. Production figures are given in
terms of 6o percent tungstite (w03).
b. 2t2/
d. This figure was interpolated.
e. 244/
The Sixth Five Year Plan calls for a 1960 production of
tungsten concentrates 57 percent above that of 1955, indicating that
planned production in 1960 may be on the. order of 11,000 to 12)000
tons. 245/
Tungsten and molybdenum concentrates -- about three-
fourths of the total are tungsten concentrates -- are produced at
Tyrny-Auz) the largest producer of tungsten in the USSR. 246/ The
mine, a subsurface operation in mountainous country, produced 350 tons
of tungsten concentrates in 1941) just before it was destroyed by the
Germans. 247/ Production in 1955 is estimated to have been about 5,000
tons of tungsten concentrates, two-thirds of the estimated total Soviet
production.
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The status of the Dzhida tungsten combine is unknown.
The Dzhida deposits were discovered in 1931, and until the end of
World War II they accounted for more than 6o percent of all tungsten
produced in the USSR.21?Y During the war years, reserves of ore
reportedly were heavily depleted by intensified production.
The success of the USSR in recovering tungsten, tin,
molybdenum, and other metals from complex ores indicates an advanced
state of technology in extractive metallurgy. Specific reference has
been made to the hydrometallurgical treatment of ores and to the use
'of autoclaves* to increase product yields.
c. Supply and Consumption.
In the USSR, as in the US, the estimated supply of
tungsten in 1955 apparently was greatly in excess of current consump-
tion requirements. The apparent supply of tungsten in the USSR and .
In the US in 1955 is shown in Table 22.
Table 22
Apparent Supply of Tungsten in the USSR
and in the US 91
1955
Thousand Pounds
Supply
USSR
US
Production
7,840
15,670
12/
Imports
21,855
2/
20,735
12/
Total
29,695
36,405
a. All data are given in terms of
contained tungsten.
b. This figure is a US Bureau of
Mines estimate.
Autoclaves are used for a leaching process involving a combination of
heat and pressure in a controlled atmosphere.
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Of the 36.4 million pounds of tungsten available to the
US in 1955, only 8.96 million pounds were reported as consumed. The re-
mainder, approximately 78 percent of the available supply, was consigned
principally to the national stockpile.
The amount of tungsten consumed in the USSR is not known.
If Soviet usage of tungsten were the same as US usage) in terms of the
relative production of steel,* Soviet consumption in 1955 would have been
only 3.8 million pounds. The USSR is known) however, to encourage the
substitution of tungsten for molybdenum wherever that can be done) and
consumption of tungsten in relation to production of steel probably is
greater in the USSR than in the US. Because the Soviet military hard-
goods program is believed to be at least equal in magnitUde to that of
the US the use of tungsten in applications with military implications
(high-temperature alloys, hard alloys, EVAP cores) may equal or exceed
US consumption for these purposes. In view of the lower over-all indus-
trial production of the USSR, however, it is not probable that total con-
sumption of tungsten exceeded that of the US. On this basis) domestic
production in 1955 would have approximated requirements, and substantially
all of the tungsten imported from Communist China would have been available
for stockpiling.
The US supply of tungsten has been greatly increased in
recent years by expansion programs initiated during the Korean crisis.
As a result, stockpile objectives have been attained, and drastic cutbacks
In procurement are scheduled. Soviet supplies may have reached a compar-
able level since the Communization of China, and the policy of continued
expansion of the production of tungsten in both the USSR and Communist
China is difficult to reconcile with the apparent facts unless the USSR
has developed uses that the US has not.
4. Molybdenum.
a. Reserves.
Molybdenum occurs in the USSR in relatively small, widely
distributed deposits, frequently in combination with copper and tungsten.
Although the molybdenum content of the ores is generally low, averaging
not more than 0.5 percent, the recovery of other metals makes economically
feasible the ekploitation of molybdenum ores.
* 0.085 pound of tungsten per ton of steel.
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The extent of Soviet reserves of molybdenum has not
been disclosed, but a 1947 Soviet announcement stated that reserves
would meet requirements for many decades. EEI During the Fifth Five
Year Plan, prospected reserves of molybdenum were increased 69 per-
cent, and the Sixth Five Year Plan calls for an extension of 65 to
70 percent. 251/
The most important single source of molybdenum is the
copper-molybdenum deposit at Vostochno Kounradskiy in Kazakh SSR, direct-
ly east of the main Kounradskiy copper mine. The ore, which is mined
principally for its molybdenum) contains 0.8 percent molybdenite (0.48
percent molybdenum). This deposit is one of the two largest in the
USSR. 252/ The other is the tungsten-molybdenum deposit at Tyrny-Auz)
where recoverable molybdenum reserves were estimated at 2)500 tons in
1940 and reportedly have been extended since that time. au/
About 66,000 tons of molybdenum can be ascribed to
low-grade copper deposits located at Kounradskiy and Boschekul' in
Kazakh SSR and Pirdoudan and Agarak in the Armenian SSR. 254/
Boschekul' is the only deposit currently not in production.
b. Production.
Before World War II, production of molybdenum in the
USSR was negligible. Following the solution of problems of extractive
metallurgy presented by polymetallic ores, significant production began
In 1939-40 with the development of the Tyrny-Auz tungsten-molybdenum
deposit. Extraction of molybdenum from the Kounradskiy copper mine
began shortly thereafter. By 1942 the deposit at Vostochno Kounradskiy
and numerous small mines, notably in East Siberia) Mere in production.
Thus, in spite of the destruction of Tyrny-Auz by the Germans in 1942,
wartime demands resulted in increasing annual production, from 350 tons
in 1940 to a wartime peak of 1)500 tons in 1944. 2
Intense efforts to increase national production continued
In the postwar era. Technological improvements were made) and Tyrny-Auz
was restored. Tyrny-Auz recently installed autoclaves'-- evidence of
continued technological improvements in metal extraction on a par with
the newest methods developed in the Free World. 25/ The two Armenian
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copper deposits, Agarak and Pirdoudan, were developed during the Fourth
Five Year Plan. 257/ The amount of molybdenum recovered from these de-
posits is still small. 258/ The estimated supply of molybdenum in the
USSR in 1940 and 1942-55 is shown in Table 23.*
The .increased rate of production attained during 1945-50
was not sustained during the Fifth Five Year Plan. The decrease in produc-
tion from 1950 to 1955 was offset in part by imports from Communist China.
The diversion of approximately one-half of the Chinese Communist produc-
tion to the European Satellites, beginning in 1952, indicates an improved
supply in the USSR.
The production rate of molybdenum is to double during
the Sixth Five Year Plan period. 259/ In addition to a possible ex-
pansion of the capacity of the Chelyabinsk ferroalloy plant) the
principal producer of ferromolybdenum for the steel industry, the Plan
calls for the production of ferromolybdenum at the new plant to be
constructed at Pavlodar in Kazakh SSR 260/ and at a plant for the
extraction of molybdenum, probably as a powder) in Krasnoyarskiy
Kray. 261/
What little is known of the quality of the molybdenum-
containing ores exploited in the USSR indicates that average costs are
relatively high. This indication appears to be supported by the in-
ternal ruble price for ferromolybdenum. In 1950 the ruble price was
approximately 33 times the US dollar price. 262/ In 1950 the ruble/
dollar ratio was 9 for ferrochrome, 11 for finished steel) and 37 for
nickel.
c. Consumption.
In terms of the production of steel in the USSR and
the US the supply of molybdenum available for consumption (production
plus imports less exports) in the USSR in 1955 was equivalent to about
two-thirds of US consumption per ton of steel produced in that year.
In addition) the US placed a substantial quantity in the strategic
stockpiles, and it is probable that Soviet consumption was further
reduced for the same purpose. The twofold increase in molybdenum
availability incorporated in the Sixth Five Year Plan is therefore
consistent with the present relatively low supply and with the
* Table 23 follows on p. 79.
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Table 23
Estimated Supply of Molybdenum in the USSR LI"
1940 and 1942-55
Metric Tons
Year
Production 12/
Imports 2/
Apparent Supply
1940
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
350
650
1,155
1,500
1,450 1/
1,125 I/
150
2/350
1,830
1,810
740
N.A.
500
3)000
2,985
3,310
2,190
1,125
1947
2,175
N.A.
2,175
1948
2,550
N.A. -
2)550
1949
2)800
V.A.
2)800
3.950
3,045
125
3,170
1951
3,345
515
3,860
1952
3,645
280
3,925
1953
3,945
290
4,235
1954
4,245
290
40535
1955
4,400 2/
300
4,700
a. It is assumed that all reported molybdenum con-
centrates contain 65 percent molybdenite (the molyb-
denum content of molybdeniteds 60 percent).
b...263
.d. The decrease in production during 1945 and 1946
could be explained by the transfer of scarce metal-
lurgical equipment and specialists from areas which
were developed during the war to Tyrny-Auz.in the
Transcaucasus as part of the restoration program.
e. 265/. The'estimate is based on a statement
that Kazakh SSR produced 22 percent of Soviet
molybdenum.
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magnitude of Soviet expansion goals in the electric power, chemical)
petroleum, and armaments industries -- all of which are large con-
sumers of molybdenum steel. The provision of facilities in Krasnoyarskiy
Kray for the extraction of high-purity molybdenum indicates an increased
Soviet interest in the use of this metal in gas turbines and other high-
temperature applications and in electronics.
5. Vanadium.
The USSR has extensive reserves of polymetallic ores,
principally titanomagnetites, containing traces of vanadium. In
aggregate these ores contain sufficient vanadium for any foreseeable
demand. The deposits are found principally in four areas: the
Kola Peninsula, the Kerch' Peninsula. the Urals and Kazakh SSR.
The first Soviet attempt to extract vanadium from the iron
ores in the Kerch' Peninsula took place in 1932 at the Kerch' metallur-
gical works. Calcium Vanadate, a catalyst, was obtained from blast
furnace slag after the slag was crushed) calcined, and leached. 266/
Other, experiments in utilizing the polymetallic vanadium-bearing ores
of the Kola and Kerch' Peninsulas were partially successful, and con-
struction of a plant at Chusovoy in the Urals was planned to make
ferrovanadium for the Chusovoy steel plant, a large producer of
vanadium steels. In 1935-36 a process for extracting vanadium from
Ural titanomagnetites was started on a production basis. Currently
this plant is the main source of vanadium in the USSR. 267/ In addi-
tion, it is likely that uranium mining in Kazakh SSR yields vanadium
as a byproduct. The Kola and Kerch' vanadium-bearing iron ores
may continue as a source of vanadium through utilization in natural
alloy pig iron. Estimated production of vanadium in the USSR in
1946 and 1951-55 is shown in Table 24.*
It is possible that there is an important deposit of vana-
dium ore in Kazakh SSR. References to such a deposit have appeared
since 1944) and in 1955 it was claimed that in the Kara-Tau Mountains,
* Table 24 follows on p. 81.
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Table 24
Estimated Production of Vanadium in the USSR
1946 and 1951-55
Metric Tons
Year
Production 21/
1946
425
1951
535
1952
645
1953
675
1954
700
1955
725
a. Tonnage figures are given in terms of
metallic equivalent of ferrovanadium.(40
percent vanadium content). For methodol-
ogy, see Appendix B.
Kazakh SSR had the largest reserves of vanadium in the world. 268/
Such a deposit would support the production of ferrovanadium in the
new ferroalloy plant to be built at Pavlodar during the Sixth Five
Year Plan period. 2L62/ In this event the costly processing at
Chusovoy probably would be discontinued.
6. Nickel.
- a. General.
The USSR hasthe world's second largest nickel indus-
try. Soviet production is about one-fourth that of Canada, the largest
producer. Since 1948, Soviet production has been sufficient to meet
essential consumption and stockpiling requirements and to provide some
exports --'usually involving nickel-containing equipment in return.
Soviet production of nickel in 1955, when related to steel production,
was about equal to US consumption per ton of steel produced.
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The increased production from 29,000 tons in 1950 to
44,000 tons in 1955 called for in the Fifth Five Year Plan was ful-
filled only to the extent of 40,000 tons. The Sixth Five Year Plan
goal of 65,000 tons by 1960 appears, however, to be within Soviet
capabilities, in view of expansion projects under way. This objective
Is related to a 17-fold planned increase in the production of low-alloy
steel and a 3.2-fold increase in production of stainless and heat-re-
sistant alloys. Because it is unlikely that there will be a substantial
increase in the availability of nickel to the US, the achievement of the
Soviet aims may result in a production of nickel alloys in the USSR
considerably higher than that in the US, in relation to the production
of steel in the two countries.
The USSR also proposes to build during the Sixth Five
Year Plan period a plant for the Production of carbonyl nickel (Mond
process) in Krasnoyarskiy Kray. 270/ This plant probably will use
nickel matte from Noril'sk. The Mond process produces pure nickel,
and it is significant that this kind of nickel has applications in the
atomic energy industry. 271/
b. Reserves.
At the beginning of the Fifth Five Year Plan, prospected
reserves of nickel in the USSR were estimated at 900,000 tons. 272/ By
1955, prospected reserves had been increased 94 percent, which brought the
total to 1.75 million tons. 272/ The Sixth Five Year Plan calls for a
third increase in prospected reserves which would make total reserves
2.3 million tons in 1960. 274/ This figure is equal to approximately
one-half of Canada's current reserves. At the projected 1960 rate of
consumption, 65,000 tons, the Soviet reserves would last 35 years.
Most of the projected exploration for new reserves will be undertaken
In the Pechenga and Noril'sk areas, known to have deposits which have
never been fully explored. The USSR is preparing a new nickel deposit
near Nikel', the location of the Pechenga nickel combine. g12/
The principal nickel deposits of the USSR are located
at Pechenga and Monchegorsk on the Kola Peninsula; at Rezh, Revda, and
Verkhniy Ufaley in the central Urals; at Orsk, Aydrlinskiy, and Novo-
Troitsk in the southern Urals; at Noril'sk in East Siberia; and at
Kimpersayskiy and Buranovo Shelekta in Kazakh SSR.
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c. Production.
The production of refined nickel in the USSR dates from
1934, when the nickel refinery at Verkhniy Ufaley in the central Urals
began operations. During the Middle and late 1930's the Soviet govern-
ment intensified its efforts to expand the nickel industry in an attempt
to keep pace with the growing demand for nickel brought about by the
armament program and the increase in production of alloy steel. . By 1939)
integrated nickel combines had been put into operation at Orsk in the
southern Urals and at Monchegorsk on the Kola Peninsula. In 1938 a third
combine was started at Noril'sk in East Siberia, and in 1942 it was put
into partial operation. Production of nickel expanded almost tenfold
betWeen 1934 and 1940 -- from 860 tons to 8)500 .tons. Estimated production
of nickel in the USSR in 1945-55 and 1960 is shown in Table 25.
Table 25
Estimated Production of Nickel in the USSR
1945-55 and 1960
Metric Tons
Year
Production Year
Production
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
15)200 s/
16,200 b./
21,000 s/
23,600 1/
26,400 1/
29,000 2/
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1960
31)000 A/
33,000 A/
35,000 1/
- 37,000 1/
40,000 f/
65,000 0/
a. 276/
b. 277/
c.
d. This figure is interpolated.
e. 279/
f. ?UT/
g? 2_2/
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None of the three nickel combines started during the
1930's had been fully completed at the outbreak of World War II. Much
of the equipment from the Monchegorsk combine was evacuated to Orsk,
which became the chief center of production of refined nickel during
the war years.
In the postwar period the Monchegorsk combine and the
Orsk refinery were rehabilitated and enlarged beyond their prewar ca-
pacities, and additional capacity was built at Noril'sk. In 1950 a
.double-track rail line was completed from Noril'sk to Dudinka on the
Yenisey River) which can be reached 3 months out of the year by ocean-
going vessels by the northern sea route. A rail line from Noril'sk
to the industrial regions of the USSR by way of Dudinka) Igarka) and
Vorkuta is now nearing completion.
Acquisition of the Pechenga mine and smelter from
Finland in 1944 made an important contribution to the Soviet nickel
Industry. Construction of the Pechenga smelter was started by a
subsidiary of the International Nickel Company in 1935 and completed
under Finnish-German occupation. Operated by the Germans during
World War II, the Pechenga smelter had an annual capacity of 10,000
tons of nickel matte. The USSR completed restoration of the Pechenga
smelter, and it is believed to have been operating-at its full original
capacity by 1951. In 1951 a Finnish company completed reconstruction
of the power plant at Yaniskoski) which serves the Pechenga smelter.
A second power plant) being built 'at Rajakoski by the same company,
is scheduled for completion in late 1956. Recent reports indicate
that in the near future this company will begin work on a third power
plant for the USSR at Kolttakengyas, near the Russian-Norwegian border.
The completion of these power plants) all with approximately the same
capacity, will represent a threefold increase in the electric power
supply of the Pechenga area) and because there are no other large power
consumers in this area the expansion indicates that a sizable expansion
of nickel production is contemplated -- including, perhaps, the addition
of an electrolytic refinery. At present, nickel matte from the Pechenga
smelter is sent to Monchegorsk for refining
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7. Cobalt.
Before World War II, consumption of cobalt in the USSR was
minor and was supplied almost entirely from imports. During and imme-
diately after the war the growth in the use of cobalt in sintered car- .
bides, in permanent magnets for telecommunications and radar, and in
high-temperature applications assotiated with gas turbines and jet
engines prompted extensive exploration for cobalt-bearing ores.
The greater part of the 50,000-ton Soviet reserve of cobalt
occurs in combination with nickel ores. These ores are chiefly on the
Kola Peninsula, near the lower Yenisey River at Noril'sk, in the Urals)
and in Kazakh SSR.
In the USSR) cobalt also occurs with ores containing iron)
manganese, copper, and other elements. These ores, which account for
approximately 25 percent of the supply, are found principally in the
Urals) the Transcaucasus, and the Soviet Far East. Other complex poly-
metallic ores) mostly in Altayskiy Kray and in the Transbaykal area,
present extractive difficulties and are not being exploited. Estimated
reserves and production of cobalt in the USSR, by economic region) in
1955 are shown in Table 26.*
Because cobalt occurs principally as a constituent in
nickel ores and nickel-copper ores, the production of cobalt is admin-
istered in the USSR by the Main Administration of Nickel and Cobalt of
the Ministry of Nonferrous Metallurgy. Cobalt produced in the nickel
combines at Monchegorsk, Orsk, Ufaley, and Noril'sk is recovered in
local refineries. Cobalt-containing matte from the Pechenga smelter
probably is refined at Orsk or Monchegorsk. Because of the decline
In reserves of nickel in the Verkhniy Ufaley area, it is probable that
cobalt concentrates From Other sources -- principally Dashkesan in the
Transcaucasus and Seymchan in the Far East, -- are treated in the
Verkhniy Ufaley refinery.
The first commercial production of cobalt in the USSR took
place at the South Ural Nickel Combine, at Orsk, in 1947. Production
has grown steadily, and now the USSR is the second largest producer of
cobalt in the world. Estimated 1955 production was 1,220 tons) 10 per-
cent of Free World production and equivalent to approximately one-third
of US consumption in that year.
* Table 26 follows on p. 86.
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Table 26
Estimated Reserves'and Production of Cobalt in the USSR
by Economic Region
1955
Metric Tons
Economic Region
Reserves 2/
Production
(North and Northwest)
(Transcaucasus)
8,000
N.A.
200 12/
12021
VIII
(Urals)
13,000
585 I)
X
(Kazakhstan and
Central Asia)
7,500
120 2/
XI
(East Siberia
13,500
120 I/
XII
Far East)
N.A.
75 e
Total
1.220
a. Reserves are stated in terms of cobalt content of
the ores as determined by the composition of the ores
and the estimated recovery rates.
b. 282/
c. 283
d. 2 /
e. gP2/
f. 2pg. 2 7/
?
Cobalt is the only alloying material probably in short
supply in peacetime in the USSR. The more essential uses of cobalt
are closely associated with military applications, and perhaps for
this reason no direct references are made to cobalt in official an-
nouncements. Soviet expenditures for military purposes are estimated
to be approximately equal to those of the US, and a supply of cobalt
amounting to only one-third of US consumption (not including quantities
consigned to the US stockpile) would be adequate only for uses of the
highest priority.
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There is considerable additional evidence that the Soviet
supply of cobalt is below desired levels. The occasional references
to cobalt in the technical literature usually are made in connection
with the development of substitutes. Sintered tungsten carbide cores
in Soviet HVAP shells recovered in Korea used nickel instead of cobalt
as a binder, a substitution which reduces the effectiveness of the
missile. Soviet researchers are now working toward the development of
chrome-based, high-temperature alloys and ceramic tool bits, partly
for the purpose of reducing cobalt requirements.
The 1950 price of cobalt in the USSR is a further indica-
tion of scarcity. The ruble price is 103 times the US dollar price,
compared with a ruble/dollar ratio of 37 for nickel and an average
ruble/dollar ratio of 11 for finished steel products.
The high price of cobalt in the USSR serves both to dis-
courage nonessential use and to offset the high cost of indigenous
production. The ores exploited generally are below Free World com-
mercial standards. Concentrates produced in the remote Bol'shoy
Canyon region near Seymchan are flown to Magadan and shipped west
for refining.
Substitution by the European Satellites, particularly
East Germany, of inferior materials for cobalt, and the devious and
costly attempts of the Satellites to relieve their chronic shortage
by covert importations from the West, clearly indicate that Soviet
shipments to the Satellites are severely restricted.
8. Ferroalloys.
a. General.
The ferroalloys produced in prerevolutionary Russia
were ferromanganese) spiegeleisen, and low-grade ferrosilicon (silvery
pig) produced in the blast furnaces of Ukrainian steel plants. The
First Five Year Plan recognized the need for electric furnace ferro-
alloys, especially for special and quality steels. The first planned
production started in 1931 at the Chelyabinsk ferroalloy plant, and
the Zestafoni and Zaporozh'ye ferroalloy plants were operating in 1932.
Except for the World War II years, no ferroalloys have been imported
by the USSR since 1935.
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Expansion of ferroalloy plant capacity was emphasized
in the Third Five Year Plan) which was called the "Five Year Plan for
Special Steels)" and since 1942) production has kept pace with the
demands of the Soviet iron and steel industry) both in volume and
variety of types. The USSR now exports relatively small quantities
of ferroalloys to the other nations of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, primarily
on a spot basis.
b. Production.
More than 95 percent of Soviet production of ferroalloys con-
sists of ferromanganese (including.spiegeleisen), ferrochromium) and ferro-
silicon. Some standard-grade ferromanganese (70 to 75 percent manganese),
all spiegeleisen (10 to 25 percent manganese); and all low-grade ferrosil-
icon (10 to 17 percent silicon) are produced in blast furnaces. These
products account for approximately 735,000 tons) two-thirds of total produc-
tion of ferroalloys. Capacity is virtually unlimited in that conventional
blast furnaces are used; it is Soviet practiCe to operate blast furnaces
on ferroalloys) when desired, usually near the end of a furnace campaign.
All of the five major electric furnace ferroalloy plants
are served by hydroelectric power. In addition) Zestafoni and Zaporozh'ye
are near the world's largest deposits of manganese, at Chiatura and Niko-
poi', respectively. Aktyubinsk is 80 kilometers from the large metallur-
gical-grade chromite deposits at Donskoye) and the Chelyabinsk and
Stalinsk plants are adjacent to steelmaking consumers of ferroalloys.
The operation of some of these plants (Zaporozhlye especially) is subject
to seasonal variations in the water supply.
Production of electric furnace ferroalloys in 1955 is
estimated at 421)000 tons, one-third of the total Soviet production of
ferroalloys. Estimated production of electric furnace ferroalloys in
the USSR in 1931-55 is shown in Table 27.* Estimated production of
blast furnace and electric furnace ferroalloys in the USSR by time
in 1955 is shown in Table 28.**
* Table 27 follows on p. 89.
** Table 28 follows on p. 90.
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Table 27
Estimated Production of Electric Furnace Ferroalloys
in the USSR 2/
1931-55
Metric Tons
Year
Production Year
Production
1931
4,600
1943
225,000
1932
15,000
1944
225,000
1933
21,000
1945
225,000
1934
67,000
1946
258,000
1935
94,000
1947
275,000
1936
125,000
1948
290,000
1937
172,000
1949
305,000
1938
190,000
1950
315,000
1939
210,000
1951
.330,000
1940
225,000
1952
345,000
1941
200,000
1953
360,000
1942
200,000
1954
380,000
1955
421,000
a. For methodology, see Appendix B.
c. Ferromanganese.
Almost 'all of the production of ferromanganese in
the USSR is divided about equally between Zaporozh'ye and Zestafoni.
Zaporozh'ye, which obtains most of its supply of ore from Nikopol',
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Table 28
Estimated Production of Blast Furnace and Electric Furnace Ferroalloys
In the USSR) by Type it/
1955
Metric Tons
Blast
Furnace
Electric
Furnace
Total
Ferromanganese
Spiegeleisen (10 to 25 percent man-
ganese)
.
425,000
750)000
Standard (70 to 75 percent manganese)
165,000
Electrothermic (76 to 80 percent man-
ganese)
16o,000
Ferrochrome
120,000
120,000
Ferrosilicon
245)000
Silvery pig (10 to 17 percent sil-
icon)
.145,000
Electrothermic (45, 75, and 90 per-
cent silicon)
100,000
Ferromolybdenum (55 percent molybdenum)
FerrOvanadium (40 percent vanadium)
Other
9,000 12/
1,800 12/
.30,000 s/
9,000
1,800
30)000
Total 735,000
421,000
1,156,000
a. For methodology, see Appendix B.
b. The estimate is based on all of the supply of molybdenum and vana-
dium being used to produce ferroalloys.
c. The estimate is based on US analogy and includes ferroph6sphorus,
ferroboron, ferroniobium) ferrotungsten, and ferrotitanium.
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70 kilometers distant, is also conveniently located near consumers in
the Ukraine, which provides 35 percent of Soviet production of steel.
Ferromanganese is produced only when power from the Dnieper hydroelec-
tric plant is plentiful. A 40-percent increase in the production of
all ferroalloys at Zaporozh'ye is called for during the Sixth Five
Year Plan period. 288/
Ferromanganese is produced at Zestafoni from Chiatura
ore, which comes a distance of approximately 15 kilometers. Power is
supplied by a nearby hydroelectric plant on the Rion River. Capacity
at.Zestafoni recently has been increased to provide additional ferro-
manganese to replace some of the manganese ore formerly shipped to the
Urals and, presumably, smelted there in blast furnaces. The Sixth Five
Year Plan specifies a 155-percent increase in the production of all
ferroalloys. 2219/
d. Ferrochrome.
Production of electric furnace ferrochrome in 1955 is
estimated at 120,000 tons, 80 to 90 percent of which was produced at
the Aktyubinsk ferroalloy plant. Production, which started there in
1945, is based on the extensive high-grade chromite deposits at Donskoye,
80 kilometers south of Aktyubinsk. 290/
Most of the remaining supply of ferrochrome in the USSR
is made in the Chelyabinsk ferroalloy plant. Production here was orig-
inally based on local ores, but in recent years these have been replaced
by Donskoye ores. Products from the new plant at Pavlodar will include
ferrochrome and probably will provide for most of the increased require-
ments of this ferroalloy. 221/
e. Ferrosilicon.
Unlike that of other ferroalloys, the production of
electric furnace ferrosilicon is almost evenly divided among the five
major ferroalloy plants. The dispersed production ,of ferrosilicon
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results from the widespread occurrence of silicon-bearing minerals and
the universal use of ferrosilicon in the steelmaking process. Produc-
tion of electric furnace ferrosilicbn in 1955 is estimated at 100,000
tons and of blast furnace ferrosilicon at 145,000 tons. g92/
Although the Sixth Five Year Plan does not-specify an
Increase in the production of ferrosilicon) additional supplies un-
doubtedly will be required for the general expansion in steelmaking
and for the 2.1-fold increase called for in the production of trans-
former sheets. These requirements probably will be provided for in the
general expansion planned for production of ferroalloys.
f. Other Ferroalloys.
Ferrotungsten and ferromolybdenum were first produced
in 1932 and 1935, respectively) at Chelyabinsk) which is still believed
to be the major producer. Although there have been references to the
production of these ferroalloys at Zestafoni and Zaporozhiyel production
is believed to be irregular at best.
Since 1936) ferrovanadium has been produced by the
aluminothermic process at the Chusovoy ferroalloy plant in the Urals.
Nearby Kushva titanomagnetite ores are processed at,the.Gornoblagodat-
skaya concentrating plant and the Chusovoy steel plant by a complex and
costly process. The production of ferrovanadium at Chusovoy probably
will be discontinued on the advent of the new plant at Pavlodar in
Kazakh SSR, which will manufacture that ferroalloy from deposits of
indigenous ores whieh are claimed to constitute the largest vanadium
reserves in the world. 293/
Ferrotitanium is produced at the Klyuchevsk ferroalloy
plant by the aluminothermic method. 29Ii./ The Ural titanomagnetites
serve as raw material for this plant and for the Chusovoy ferroalloy
plant. 295/
It is estimated that an additional 550,000 tons) a
total of 1.75 million tons) of ferroalloys will be needed by 1960 to
support the increased production of carbon and alloy steel called for
by the Sixth Five Year Plan. It is intended to achieve this additional
production by the construction of new plants, by the expansion and
improvement of existing facilities, and by changes in technological
practices.
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Two new electric furnace plants are called for -- one
at an unspecified location in the Ukraine. and one at Pavlodar in Kazakh
SSR. 296/ Expansion plans for existing plants are not disclosed beyond
the provision that 250 million rubles are to be spent for "rebuilding
and reequipping" Zestafoni. 1E/ In addition, pressure on electric fur-
nace capacity will be relieved by using oxygen to produce in the blast
furnace some types of ferroalloys now being made in electric furnaces.
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VI. Trade.
A. General.
The USSR is a net exporter of iron arid steel and of almost
all of the metallic raw and alloying materials that are used in their
production and for which trade data are available. The only exceptions
are tungsten and molybdenum ores and concentrates, production of which
is supplemented by imports from Communist China.
Exports of the ferrous metallurgical industry's products have
increased substantially since 1950, and except for shipment of fin-
ished steel, these exports reflect growing proportions of the industry's
production. Although net exports of finished steel have more than
doubled since 1950) they continue to represent only about 2 percent of
Soviet production. Considerably larger proportions of the raw materials
produced in the USSR are exported. In 1955 the USSR exported the
equivalent of 17 percent of the manganese produced in that year, 12
percent of the iron ore and chromite, and 11 percent of the nickel.
Soviet foreign trade in ferrous metallurgical raw materials in 1950-
55 is shown in Table 29.* Soviet foreign trade in ferrous metals in
1950-55 is shown in Table 30.**
Soviet trade in steelmaking and alloying materials reflects a
pattern of commitments to the European Satellites, a desire -- sup-
ported by abundant reserves of some ores -- to earn foreign exchange,
and a need to supplement domestic supplies of some ores. Iron ore,
by far the largest item of export in both tonnage and value) is ex-
ported solely to the Satellites and amounts to more than one-half
of the apparent consumption of these iron-deficient countries. Ex-
ports of coke also support the Satellite steel industries.
Soviet exports of manganese continue to offset European Satel-
lite shortages and are appearing in increasing quantities in Free
World trade agreements. Soviet chromite is exported almost exclusively
to the Free World. _Satellite imports of chromite come from Albania)
apparently by agreement.***
* Table 29 follows on p. 96.
** Table 30 follows on p. 98.
*** Continued on p. 100.
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Table 29
Soviet Foreign Trade in Ferrous Metallurgical Raw Materials
1550-55
Thousand Metric Tons
Trade
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
Exports
Iron ore (50 to 54 percent Fe)
Bloc '
2,072 2/
3,453 y
5,065 y
5,875 1/
6,757 y
8,729 2/
Manganese ore 2/
Bloc (25 to 40 percent MO
204
205
304
442
394
400
Non-Bloc (45 percent Me)
101
51
94
162
383
237
Total
305
256
398
604
777
937
Coke 2/
Bloc
PLA.
61
386
162
420
Non-Bloc
35
26
10
2
102
Total
35
87
It
- 164
522 '
.Scrap 2/
Bloc
247
-Negligible
2
N.A.
1
Non-Bloc
81
51
120
Total
247
Negligible
83
. 51
121
Chromite (48 percent Cr203)
Bloc
5E/
lo
14 yi/
3.6w
14 j/
7 hi
Non-Bloc
64 VLA.
0
12 E/
62W
889/
? Total
69
191
14
28
76
95
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Table 29 .
?
Soviet Foreign Trade in Ferrous Metallurgical Ray Materials
1950-55
(Continued)
Thousand Metric Toni
Trade
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
Exports (Continued)
Nickel (metal) 2/
Bloc
2.5
2.8
2.6
3.6
3.2
4.3
Import?
Tungsten (68 percent W03) 3/
Bloc (Cemnimist China)
9-9
10).
14.2
15.7
17.1
18.5
Yolybdenm (metallic equivalents) r/
Bloc (Communist China)
0.125
0.515
' 0.28
' 0.29
0.29
0.30
a. !2gf. All figures in this table are minimum figures.
b. Fummi
C.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h. 0
1.
3.
k.
1.
m.
II.
p. These estimates are based on miscellaneous data available in CIA files.
q' 112/
r' 22/
lidie estimates are based on miscellaneous data available in CIA files.
These estimates are based on miscellaneous data available in CIA files.
21/
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Table 30
Soviet Foreign Trade in Ferrous Metals 9,./
1950-55
Thousand Metric Tons
Trade
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
Exports
Fig iron
Bloc
173
210
748
483
377
386
Non-Bloc
0
10
15
9
381
665
Total
173
220
763
492
758
1,051
Crude steel
Bloc
87
107
8o ?
.106
Negligible
N.A.
Non-Bloc
Negligible
2
1
63
:222
41
Total
87
109
81
169
222
41
Finished steel
Bloc
417
436
386
755
875
930
Non-Bloc
29
62
65
98
172
326
Total
446
498
451
853
1,0147
1,256
a. These estimates are based on miscellaneous data available in CIA
files. All figures in this table are minimum figures.
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Table 30
Soviet Foreign Trade in Ferrous Metals
1950-55
(Continued)
Thousand Metric Tons
Trade
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
Imports
Pig iron
Bloc
$.A.
N.A.
N.A.
160
200
200
Finished steel
Bloc
24
26
31
223
228
210
Non-Bloc
35
23
78
105
157
127
Total
22
49
109
328
385
337
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Soviet exports of nickel are limited to the European Satel-
lites and Communist China on a restricted basis, and to a considerable
extent the nickel is returned to the USSR in alloy steel or as com-
ponents of manufactured items.
Soviet imports of tungsten and molybdenum from Communist
China represent substantially the total Chinese Communist production
of these minerals.
In the Sino-Soviet Bloc sector, Soviet exports of pig iron
serve to relieve the iron deficiencies of the European Satellites,
principally those of East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and much
finished steel is shipped to Communist China to supplement China's
growing but still small production of steel. It ia probable that
exports of finished steel to China are offset, to a considerable
extent, by Chinese shipments of pig iron to the Soviet Far East and
Siberia.
Trade with the Free World in pig iron and steel, however,
appears to reflect political as well as economic considerations.
In 1954, significant exports of pig iron began as a part of trade
agreements providing for substantial Soviet imports of other com-
modities. Of total exports of pig iron to non-Bloc countries in
1955, the UK accounted for 40 percent; Belgium-Luxembourg, 20 per-
cent; West Germany and Italy, about 15 percent each; and Argentina,
9 percent.*
In 1955, about 30 percent of exports of finished steel to
non-Bloc countries were consigned to Argentina. Other major Free
World importers are Finland, on an exchange agreement, and India,
which is to receive a total of 1 million tons in 1956-58. Since
1953, Turkey, Libya, and Afghanistan have been small purchasers.*
Soviet imports of finished steel in 1955 were largely from
within the Sino-Soviet Bloc, principally from Czechoslovakia and
Poland. The USSR has been a consistent bidder for finished steel
in Free World markets, however, and recently acquired 8,000 tons of
sheet steel in the US.
Soviet imports of iron and steel scrap and some alloying
materials (cobalt, nickel, molybdenum, columbium) from the Tree World
* These estimates are based on miscellaneous data available in
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have been restricted by COCOM controls. Of finished steel, however,
only alloys of embargoed metals and special forms of pipe and tubing
are controlled. A major impediment to the conversion of Soviet
requests for finished steel items, particularly sheet and strip,
into imports has been the recent world shortage of steel and the
desire on the part of Free World producers to sell their production
in a dependable market.
B. Raw Materials.
. Iron Ore.
Soviet exports of iron ore increased from 5 percent of
annual production in 1950 to 12 percent in 1955. The USSR has be-
come the principal external source of iron ore for the European
Satellites, supplying an estimated 51 percent of the total Satellite
requirements in 1955. About three-fourths of Soviet shipments are
to Czechoslovakia and Poland. The only current Soviet impofts are
small, sporadic shipments from Communist China. 313/
2. Manganese Ore.
Soviet exports of manganese ore have increased threefold
since 1950) but they are still lower than they were before World
War II, when manganese was 1 of the 6 major Soviet export items and
accounted for about 3 percent of the value of all exports. It was
not until 1954 that the USSR was able to offset the loss of the US
market) which resulted from the Soviet withdrawal from the world
market in 1948 and the development of other sources of supply by
Free World consumers. Before World War II the US took 30 percent
of Soviet exports of manganese and in 1948 imported 387)000 tons --
the equivalent of 62 percent of Soviet exports and one-fourth of
US requirements. Since 1952, when manganese again was offered
to the Free World, an increasing volume has been shipped to the UK,
France, Belgium-Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The UK and France
combined took about one-fourth of the total Soviet exports of man-
ganese in 1955 and 43 percent of the manganese shipped to non-Bloc
countries. Intra-Bloc shipments are to East Germany, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia, Satellites which are dependent on Soviet supplies
for 75 to 90 percent of their imports of manganese. 322/
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3. Coke and Scrap.
The limited data available indicate that about 80 percent
of the exports of coke are to Rumania (370,000 tons in 1955)) Hungary)
East Germany, and Finland. 316/ There is no evidence of significant
shipments of scrap from the West to the USSR since COCOM controls
were applied to scrap in 1950. The USSR had trade agreements pro-
viding for exports to Finland amounting to 70,000 tons in 1953 and
50)000 tons in 1954 and 1955, and for shipments of 70,000 tons to
Argentina in 1955. 3.1//
4. Chromite.
Western European countries) particularly Sweden, France)
and Norway) are the principal current markets for Soviet exports of
chromite. Shipments to Western Europe have increased considerably
since 1952) when the USSR abandoned the policy, adopted in 1950, of
refusing to sell chromite to the West. The increase, however, has
not offset the Soviet loss of a market in the US, which absorbed
357,000 tons of Soviet metallurgical-grade ore in 1948 -- equal to
98 percent of Soviet exports and to 42 percent of the US supply in
that year Small quantities of chromite are supplied to the European
Satellites. 318/
5. Nickel, Tungsten, and Molybdenum.
The USSR has been a net exporter of nickel since 1948.
Most of the nickel has been shipped to other countries of the Sino-
Soviet Bloc) principally to East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and re-
turned to the USSR in nitkel-bearing alloys, frequently as components
of machinery and equipment. 31
Imports from Communist China provide about 70 percent of the
Soviet tungsten supply and about 6 percent of Soviet molybdenum require-
ments. 221/
C. Ferrous Metals.
1. Pig Iron.
Increasingly large shipments to non-Bloc countries, par-
ticularly the UK and Argentina) account for the growing volume of So-
viet exports of pig iron. Negotiations to supply Spain and Portugal
with 55,000 tons of pig iron in 1956 have been reported. Most of the
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Soviet exports to other countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc were to East
Germany (260,000 tons) and Czechoslovakia (1200000 tons), the two prin-
cipal Bloc importers of Soviet pig iron during the postwar years. Com-
munist China has an excess of pig iron, and it is likely that significant
quantities of the surplus are being shipped to the Soviet Far East and
Siberia, as reported in 1953. 3E1/
2. Finished Steel.
Soviet foreign trade in steel consists largely of exports
of finished ateel, but relatively small crude steel shipments also
have been reported. Exports of finished steel to other countries of
the Sino-Soviet Bloc and to tbe Free World are increasing, but net
exports to Bloc countries in 1955 were about 3.5 times as large as
those to the Free World. About 60 percent of net exports to Bloc
countries and 48 percent of total net exports of finished steel in
1955 went to East Germany.* These shipments consisted of rails,
rail accessories, wire and wire rod, pipe, heavy and light sections,
strip, sheet,. plate, forgings, and castings. Shipment of rails
reached 100,000 tons in 1954, but only 50,000 tons were shipped in
1955.* Communist China, Rumania, and Bulgaria consume virtually all
the remaining Soviet exports to Bloc countries.
Increased exports to non-Bloc countries since 1953 are
primarily the result of the Soviet trade agreement with Argentina,
which became effective in 1954. The USSR shipped 157,000 tons of
finished steel in that year and 200,000 tons in 1955. Other major
Free World importers are Finland and India. The USSR has had trade
agreements with Finland since 19510 providing for annual shipments
by the USSR averaging 50,000 to 60,000 tons. Of more recent origin
are the agreements with India, under which the USSR shipped 50,000
tons in 1955 and is obligated to export a total of 1 million tons
In 1956-58.*
Soviet imports of finished steel in 1955 were largely
from within the Sino-Soviet Bloc, including 140,000 tons from Czecho-
slovakia and 70,000 tons. from Poland. Communist China recently was
reported to have sent wire and pipe to the USSR. 322/ The principal
Free World sources were France (53,000 tons)) Japan (470000 tons),
and Austria (19,000 tons).*
* These estimates are based on miscellaneous data available in CIA
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VII. State Reserves.
The USSR is maintaining reserves of materials which significantly
increase the flexibility of the economy and provide a valuable asset in
the event of gar. These reserves, known as "state reserves," are dis-
tinct from the normal inventory (tekushchiy zapas) and emergency stocks
(strakhovyy zapas) located at individual enterprises and under the con-
trol of the plant directors. State reserves are administered by the
Main Administration of State Material Reserves attached to the Council
of Ministers.
State reserves are classified in three categories. The first cat-
egory consists of reserves maintained at plants and warehouses of the
Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy, representing at least a 3-month supply
of selected inputs and finished products of an enterprise. These ?
reserves may be borrowed to alleviate shortages and bottlenecks. The
second category, also maintained at plants and warehouses of the Minis-
try, is the mobilization reserve. It consists of materials, usually
tools, and raw materials that would be required to convert the enter-
'prise to its mobilization plan and maintain production for a certain
time period. The third category is kept at special bases of the Main
Administration of State Material Reserves, located throughout the USSR)
and is used only after all other stockpiles have been exhausted. For
materials that may deteriorate in storage, there is a regular withdrawal
and replenishment program.
At one time or another, additions to stockpiles in the first cat-
egory are known to have included the following products of the ferrous
metallurgical industry: chrome, nickel, cobalt, molybdenum, tungsten,
and vanadium metal; ferrosilicon; pig iron; coke and coking coal; char-
coal; mazut for open hearth furnaces; various types of finished steel;
and alloy steel. Allocations to the second and third categories prob-
ably are similar. 323/
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VIII. Inputs.
In estimating material input requirements and in drawing up material
balances for the ferrous metallurgical industry, Soviet planners have
established utilization norms, or input coefficients, for all types of
material. Coefficients are usually based on a ton'of production for_
which the input material was consumed. The major material inputs to
the Soviet coke and byproducts industry, the blast furnace industry,
the steel plant and rolling mill industry, the iron casting industry,
and the steel castings industry are shown in Appendix A, Tables 40, 41,
42, 43, and 44.*
An input requirement of major importance in the iron ore mining '
industry, the manganese ore mining industry, and the electrometallurgical
ferroalloy industry and its subsidiary mining activities is electric
power, which in 1951 amounted to about 3.4 billion kilowatt-hours.
Other inputs are not shown for these industries.
* Pp. 154, 155, 157, 160, and 162, respectively, below.
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IX. Technology.
A. General.
Steel plant technology in the USSR generally is on a par. with...
that of leading Western nations including the US. The results obtained
by the application of technological advancements:to:the various metal-
lurgical processes have had a significant effect on quality of product
and on productivity in the Soviet.steel.industrY. Although Soiliet.
research and developmental ability-is now of a fairly high caliber, :
fully capable of original research, many past achievements have been
"borrowed" from German and US techniques.*
?
. .
Most new steel plant technology is well known to,ali advanced ,
industrial nations, and none has been as willing.to,adopi new techniques
on as broad scale as has the USSR. The results of adopting practices
only partially proved by experience have been mixed, but success has
outweighed failure. The widespread adaptation of blast furnaces to high
top pressure, contrary to the conservative approagh of,most,NS.concerns,
yielded significant returns, but the construction of 3.j8.plants%to pro-
duce continuously cast iron -sheet apparently has been somewhat less than
a complete success. .The .contrast of rapid introduction of new technot.-.
ogy, as typified by the USSR, -and the cautious approach of the U$:
reflects a basic difference in the two economies. The controlled econ-1
omy of the USSR can apply new methods even if subsidization is required',
but in the US) the ability of the unit to operate .t a profit is usually
the determining factor.
The application of new technology in different sectors of Soviet ?
ferrous metallurgy has varied markedly. Soviet research has been directed
primarily to blast furnace and open hearth processes and. to.high-teMper-
ature alloy steel for military applications, whereas attention to roll-
ing mill and finishing line technology has until recently been deferred.
Investment in technological improvements in ore preparation and iron-
making and steelmaking at Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk) for example, has
been unstinted. A conscious effort has been made to outstrip the best
plants in the world and to provide models for other Soviet -steel works
* An example is the high to pressure technique developed in the Us,. .
assiduously copied by the Russians and applied to their blast furnaces
with great success. As in many ether fields of,endeavor, however, the
USSR claims that the original inventor of the technique was Russian
(Yesmansky, 1915) and not an American (Avert, 1930). Ell/
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in "socialist competition." As a result, these enterprises are not
typical Soviet steel plants. Production of crude steel per worker at
Magnitogorsk in 1955 was twice that of the industry average, and at the
Kuznetsk .open hearths, production was 11 percent better than at those
at Magnitogorsk. 325/
During the Sixth Five Year Plan period, there will be increasing
stress on the role of automation* in the Soviet steel industry. Pros-
pects for increased production from automated facilities, according to
Bulganin in 1955, are good: "In ferrous metallurgy,. automation of
blast and open hearth furnaces has raised their productive capacities
by 7 to 10 percent and obtained a 6-percent economy in fuel. Experience
at the Magnitogorsk plant has shown that automation of bar mills in-
creases their rate of production by 15 to 20 percent, reduces power
input, and makes work at mills much easier." Bulganin went on to say
that in 1955 the rate ,of introducing automated facilities was not ade-
quate. 21/
Because automation is based on mechanitatien, it Will be neces-
sary first for Soviet engineers to improve substantially the level of '
basic mechanization and modernization in many mills. Exemplifying the
Soviet lag in some areas is the fact that certain steel plant finishing
processes, mechanized in the US during the 1920's and 1930's, are still
performed manually in Soviet plants. Such a seemingly insignificant
Improvement as fluorescent lighting, egsential for adequate inspection
of tinplate, was installed for the first time in a Soviet steel plant in
November 1954. 328/
Research on scientific and technical problems in ferrous metal-
lurgy is supported by many Soviet institutions. Foremost among these
are the Metallurgical Institute imeni A.A.,Baykov of the Academy of
Sciences and the Central Scientific Research Institute of Ferrous
Metallurgy. The Central Scientific 'Research Institute has a staff of
1,800 people, of which 950 are engaged In scientific research and 850
work in the practical application of new teehnology. In 1955 the
Institute spent 39 million rubles oh research and development. Other
research is performed by. affiliates of the Academy of Sciences and by
metallurgical institutes. The various design bureaus of the Ministry
of Ferrous Metallurgy (Gipromez, Giprostal', Giprokoks, and the like)
* Automation is the evolvement of continuous production methods, as
contrasted to batch operation methods, with as many automatic self-
directing and self-inspecting features as may be economically justi-
fied. 326/
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are responsible for putting new technological advances into operation.
The importance attached to technical achievement in the USSR is perhaps
best illustrated by the granting of 250 doctorates in metallurgy in the
USSR during 1955. In the same period, only 58 were given in the US. 329/
B. Preparation of Iron Ore.
No other technological achievement holds as great a prospect for
increasing the productivity of existing blast furnace installations as
the careful preparation of raw materials, particularly iron ore and
coking coal. Preparation of iton ore consists primarily of the concen-
tration of raw ores at the mine; the agglomeration, or sintering, of
ore fines at either the mine or plant; and the use of proper bedding
and blending techfiiques at the steel plant.
The employment of self-fluxing sinter* in the blast furnace has
been increasing steadily in both the US and the USSR. Several years
ago at Magnitogorsk a small rise in the sinter rate to 50 percent
resulted in a 6-percent increase in production of pig iron. By 1955
the sinter content had increased to between 85 and 90 percent of the
charge, and productivity, again increased. Some Ukrainian furnaces
operate on an all-sinter charge. Although at least one US furnace has
operated on 100-percent sinter, the blends of foreign and domestic ores
available to US operators at present do not necessitate such extensive
preparation of materials. Soviet designers have adopted the 6- and
8-foot Dwight-Lloyd type (US) sintering strands and have achieved rates
.of operation comparable to the US (30 tons per square meter of hearth
per 24 hours).
The cost of preparing sinter other than fines and flue dust is
justified economically only for ores with certain characteristics. In
such cases, blast furnace production may be increased as much as 20
percent, and the initial investment for sintering facilities to feed
one blast furnace is considerably less than 20 petcent at the cost of
one 'furnace. The declining quality of Soviet iron ores (partly caused
by. the Soviet policy of mining all 'grades from a deposit), the com-
petition among all sectors of Soviet heavy industry for investment
funds, and the cOnstant emphasis on increased production tend to encour-
age the greater use of sinter throughout the steel industry. By 1960,
* Self-fluxing sinter contains enough ground limestone to neutralize
the acidic nature of the ore fines.
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judging from the Sixth? Five Year Plan 73-million-ton annual goal for
prcduction of'sintef, the USSR will be using sinter _at a greater rate
than any other country.* 332/.. .
C. Preparation of Coke and Coking Coal.
One of the most pressing problems in Soviet ferrous metallurgy
Is the procurement of supplies of coking coal of satiefactory quality.
Technological improvements have been directed primarily toward.main-
taining and improving standards in the face of increasing.demands,,which
doubled between 1940. and 1955. . As a result 'of extensive investment in
plants for the preparation of coal, some success has been achieved since
1940 in improving quality. The ash content of all coking coal has- ,
decreased from 10.8 percent in 1940 to 10.2 percent in 1955, and sulfur
content has decreased from 1.4 percent to 1.2 percent. A 1-percent
reduction in ash content raises blast furnace production 2.5 percent;
the tame effect is also achieved by a 0.1-percent reduction in sulfur
content. By 1954/ preparation of coal bad reached a point where 95 per-
cent of all coking coal was cleaned mechanically. 333/
?
? Blends of various coking coelt currently are being tested in
Soviet coke ovens.. These tests may provide, the chief avenue for
expanding the coking coal base by permitting the use of poorer coals
In increasing amounts. Several substitute fuels have been tested, but
the use of them is limited and costly. -Chief among these is lignite,
or brown-coal, coke. If the USSR is using these cokes, indications are
that it is on a small scale. ? Other substitutes tested are, heat-treated,
high-volatile coal; peat briquettes; peat coke; peat semicoke; and.
lignite-charcoal-tar briquettes. In November 1955 an experimental
unit for the continuous coking of' coal went into operation at the
Khar'kov coke-chemical plant.. 334/.
D. Blast Furnace.
The level of Soviet blast furnace technology compares favorably
with that of the US. Probably the outstanding achievement of-Soviet
furnacemen has .beets the use of newstechnology.in plants such as Magnito-
gorsk. Here cleaned coking coal, a self-fluxing sinter, rate of 85 to
* US sinter capacity on 1 january.1955 was 29 million tons; estimated
1965 capacity will be about 58 million tons. 331/.
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90 percent, top pressure operation, and constant blast humidification
have combined to give what are believed to be the most highly productive
units in the world..* 336/ _
In1.954 the USSR claimed that 95 percent of all pig iron was
produced in "automatically controlled" furnaces. Automatic control
represents a .level of mechanization and. instrumentation usually asso-
ciated, with good US practice and is typified by the blast furnace con-
trol room of the Dneprodzerzhinsk plant shown ?in Figure 10.** 337/
. .
. Adoption of higher gas pressures in Soviet furnaces and out-
right conversion to high. top: pressure operation) pioneered in the US,
have resulted in approximately a 10-percent -increase in production of
pig iron, a 5-percent decrease-in consumption of coke, and a 30-percent
decrease in the rate of flue dust. The 1955 Soviet claim that 60 per-
cent of Soviet furnaces operate under higher gas pressures appears to
have referred to pressures up to 6.5 pounds per square inch and not the
10 to 12 pounds- per square inch commonly used in true high top pressure
operation. Fifteen to 20 Soviet. furnaces have been converted to. these
higher pressures, however, compared with. 10 to. 15 conversions in the US
and 2 in-the UK. 338/ Experiments with. constant humidity control have
met with considerable sueceasy in spite Of the -increased blast temper-
ature required. ?
Blast furnace refractories have been improved, carbon hearths
put into use, and hearth cooling practiced:- An interesting new develop-
ment, tried on at least one furnace, is the Use of lead-encased radiol
active cobalt ?capsules In- the refraCtory iinihg. When the refractory
is eroded "to: a predetermined depth the capsule falls out, and the
resultant increase in the radioactivity bf? the molten pig .iron warns '
of the state of ' the lining: .32/-
?
? The prospective ? deVelopmerit of new blatt furnaces ? at sites
having only low-grade raw materials, coupled withthe decreasing quality
of ore and coke at existing locations, hae led to a study of .uncon-
ventional blast furnace processes. In view of the availability Of
* The Magnitogorsk"record is 2;200 tons per day.' .The US record) made
by the Bethlehem Steel Company at Sparrow's Point, Maryland, is 1,800
tons per day. 335/
** Following p.
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surplus power at the contemplated sites, the Technical Council of the
Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy, has tended to favor the electric blast
furnace rather than the low-shaft blast furnace. 340/
A comparison of the economics of the standard coke blast furnace
process and of the electric blast furnace process indicates that the
production of electric blast furnace pig iron, using concentrated low-'
grade iron ores and poor-quality coke, would be advantageous if located
near cheap and abundant hydroelectric power, such as on the Angara, Amur,
or Zeya Rivers in Siberia or in some areas of the Karellskaya ASSR. Al-
though furnace production is small compared with conventional furnaces',
the low investment required has induced the Ministry of Ferrous Metal-
lurgy to construct a large experimental furnace to study this relatively
little-used process.* 341/
E. Steelmaking.
The level of technology in Soviet steelmaking compares favorably
with that of the US, on which, in fact, Soviet furnace design and opera-
tion is based. Although Soviet steelmaking technology is most advanced
In the application of oxygen in opet hearth furnaces, other important
developments are the extensive use of chrome-magnesite refractories, the
use of large furnaces, continuous casting, and the formulation of plans
to introduce the oxygen converter process.
The extensive use of oxygen in open hearth furnaces normally
Increases production of steel 10 to 17 percent and decreases conven-
tional fuel inputs 5 to 10 percent. The first Soviet use of oxygen on
an industrial scale occured in 1948. Maximizing production has always
been the cardinal tenet in Soviet operations and seems to account for
Soviet plans to use oxygen on a massive scale during the Sixth Five
Year Plan period. By 1960, oxygen enrichment will be employed to pro-
duce a minimum of. 1t5 percent of the open hearth production of steel.
A recently constructed, oxygen plant is the 10,000-cubic-meter-per-hour
unit at Nizhniy Tagil shown in Figure 11.** 342/
* Other installations are found in Norway, Switzerland, India, and
Italy.
** Following p. 116.
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Figure 10. Blast Furnace Control Room of the Dneprodzerzhinsk Metallurgical Plant, 1955.
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. - The use of oxygen at Zaporozh'ye and the installation of chrome-
magnesite roofs in the ten 200-ton open hearths effected a 20-percent
Increase in capacity between 1953 and 1955. Present enrichment prac-
tice at Zaporozh'ye is to add enough oxygen to raise the content of the
intake air from 21 to 25 percent oxygen; Soviet operators believe that
the content can be raised to 30 percent without destroying the furnace
roof. The net result has been a 17-percent reduction in smelting time
(smelting time decreased from 9.8 hours per heat to 8.1 hours) with a
corresponding increase in annual furnace capacity. 343/
The oxygen converter is now in successful commercial operation
In Austria, Canada, and the US. Although it is not in operation in the
USSR, tests with experimental models have been carried out at Tula and
Yenakiyevo. The Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy intends to introduce
this process during the Sixth Five Year Plan period. Bessemer converter
plants at Dnepropetrovsk and Dneprodzerzhinsk are scheduled for conver-
sion.during 1956. The principal advantages of the process are its greater
productivity when compared with conventional converters, its low invest-
ment and maintenance costs when compared with open hearth furnaces, and
quality equal for some products to open hearth steel. 344/
The large-scale replacement of silica refractory brick by chrome-
magnesite brick for roofs of open hearth furnaces has increased the pro-
ductivity of Soviet furnaces by lengthening the time between repairs.
The technology of chrome?magnesite refractories is well known the world
over, but the cost discourages their wider application. It is probable
that the USSR has introduced chrome-magnesite on a larger scale than has
the US and has achieved slightly better roof life. Introduction of the
all-basic furnace (one with chrome-magnesite hearth, wall, roof, check-
ers, and uptakes) is planned but will be deferred until most Soviet
furnaces have had their roofs converted and until the productive capa-
city for chrome-magnesite refractories is increased. 345/
The technology of the operation of very large furnace units is
restricted to the US and the.USSR. At the present time, one 500-ton
open hearth furnace is, in operation at the Voroshilov Metallurgical
Plant in Voroshilovsk. -The world's largest open hearth, a 545-ton unit,
is Under construction at Weirton, West Virginia. Electric furnaces)
which are now closely competitive on a cost basis with open hearths, are
moving out of the traditional 25- to 50-ton size in both countries. The
US has 180-ton units in operation, and the USSR is thinking in terms of
80- and 180-ton units. Such technical innovations as jet tappers and
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induction stirrers, used for open hearths and electric furnaces, respec-
tively, are well established in the US but are only in the planning
stage in the USSR. 346/
There are at least two continuous steel-casting/installations
in the USSR. The 50-ton-per-hour unit at Gorlkiy in the Krasnyy Sormovo
Works is a twin-strand machine consuming the production/of four open
hearth furnaces. ' The other unit is at Tula. By eliminating the bloom-
ing mill unit, continuous casting permits a substantial saving in invest-,
ment as well as an increase in yield. 347/
F. Alloy Steel.
Information on production technology applied to Soviet alloy
steels -- as distinguished from alloy steel research* -- is scarce. The
vacuum melting process, however, deserves mention. The process is in
fairly wide use in the US, and its importance lies in the uniform high
quality of the product for aircraft, electronics, specialty steel, and
tool steel uses. Vacuum melting and casting is employed in the USSR,
but to what degree and for what purposes are not known. 348/
G. Rolling Mill and Finishing Line.
The level of technology in Soviet rolling mill and finishing
line equipment is notably inferior to that in the US, largely because
in the USSR, emphasis has been thus far on the development of iron-
making and steelmaking facilities. Typical of obsolete practices in
the Soviet design of rolling mills and finishing lines is the new 300-
millimeter (mm) bar mill with hand-operated screw-downs (the large
wheels on each stand) located at the Chelyabinsk Bakal plant. (See
Figure 12.**) Soviet rolling mill designers and machine builders have
achieved some success, however, with some of the simpler types of mills,
particularly those for rolling blooms and rails. 349/
Basic organizational difficulties and obsolescent design and
production techniques at heavy machine building plants like Uralmash
and Novo-Kramatorsk resulted in an underfulfillment in the planned pro-
duction of rolling mill equipment in 1953, 1954, and 1955.
* See IV, p. 23, above.
** Following p. 116.
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0;110i ,
gas? to
grese,41;
orasmOillralti
ignainosetra,IN,
Alitionmatt,
oar yaltrgt,
4
era
tIturorn
?
}4
k.wMe
?
Figure U. Oxygen Installation Under Constructicin at the
Nithniy Tagil Metallurgical Plant, 1955.
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Figure 12. A 300-mm Bar Mill in the Rolling Mill Division of the
Chelyabinsk Metallurgical Plant (Bakal), 1955.
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During 1954 and 1955 the USSR undertook the design ahd construc-
tion of continuous hot and cold sheet and strip mills. At present the
US has about 35 continuous hot sheet mills; the USSR has only 3 Or 4 in
operation and several under construction. 350/ The manufacture of these
highly productive mills requires a considerable degree of technical
competence, a competence that is confined primarily to two US companies.
With the partial relaxation of =OM controls in 1954) the USSR, be-
lieving that it could obtain prototypes for copying) placed an order
for a 5-stand continuous cold strip mill with a British company that
was building such mills under license from a US firm. When the embargo
on rolling mills was not modified, the USSR renewed its own construction
efforts on sheet and strip mills. Scheduled to go into operation at
Magnitogorsk in the near future is a Soviet-designed and manufactured
10-stand, 4-high continuous hot sheet mill with a speed of 2,000 feet
per minute. If this mill is 100 inches wide, as reported, it will be
the widest in the world. Also under construction is a similar 68-inch
mill.
There are numerous categoried of final processing and finishing
equipment important to high quality in the finished product. Since
World War II, notable technical advances have been made in the US in
electrolytic tinning lines and continuous pickling, annealing, and
galvanizing lines. The degree to which the USSR has lagged in this
field is highlighted by the existence in the USSR of only one electro-
lytic tinning line, only a few continuous pickling lines) and no known
continuous sheet annealing or galvanizing lines. Facilities of this
kind are common in the US. 351/
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X. Costs.
A. Cost Accounting and Analysis.
The introduction and application of cost accounting procedures
(khozrazchet) as a means of effective economic control in the Soviet
steel industry lagged for some time behind the development of account-
ing procedures in other Soviet industries. Beginning in the latter
years of the Fourth Five Year Plan, however, considerable attention
was given to the improvement and enforcement of cost accounting in
the steel industry. A stimulus was provided by the elimination of
the subsidy) made possible by the 1949 increase in the wholesale price
of steel products. Poor accounting procedures and incomplete knowledge
of actual costs were partly responsible for the error in overestimating
the price rise necessary for the elimination of the subsidy.* 22/
The USSR defines cost of production at the metallurgical enter-
prise (zavodskaya sebeststoimost' or fabrichnaya sebeststoimost') as
the sum of the cost of raw materials, the cost of conversion, and
general plant expenditures. When costs of warehousing and transport-
ing finished products from the plant or warehouse of Glavmetallosbyt'
to the consumer's freight station are added to the plant cost of pro-
duction, the sum is known as the total cost of production (polnaya
sebestoimost'). The value (stoimost1), or wholesale price of the prod-
uct at the station of destination, is the sum of the total cost of pro-
duction and the planned profit. Currently no turnover tax is applied
to finished steel products. 353/
The system of cost accounting used in the Soviet steel indus-
try does not differ markedly from systems in operation elsewhere.
Analyses of costs are used to determine the profitability of the enter-
prise, process) And products; to assist in establishing prices; to
determine planned costs and cost reductions for the next plan year;
to compare actual and planned costs; and to determine whether or not
planned cost reductions have been achieved.** 354/
* See XI, p. 125, below.
** It is important to note that when such statements are made as "the
cost of production in ferrous metallurgy was reduced 3 percent in 1954
compared with 1953" and "the cost of production at Magnitogorsk is
planned to be reduced 4.3 percent in 1954 compared with 1953," the state-
ments normally are based on reductions in plant cost of comparable pro-
duction (sravnemaya produktsiya), which compares the production of the
same group of products for two different time periods. Such comparisons
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B. Cost Structure.
The primary factors influencing costs in ferrous metallurgy
are the level and degree of technical development, the organization
of production, the level of wages, freight rates, and the wholesale
price of raw and other materials purchased. The components of cost
in the ferrous metallurgical industry of the USSR in selected years,
1930-55, are shown in Table 31.
Table 31
Components of Cost in the Ferrous Metallurgical Industry of the USSR fi
Selected Years, 1930-55
Percent
Items of Cost
1930
194o
1948
1949 12/
1951 2/
1955 1/
Raw and primary
material
25.8
,1933
22.7
41.0
31.8
32.5
43.8
42.0
Auxiliary and other
material
7.0
8.1
7.1
6.2
5.1
5.5
5.6
Fuel 2/
22.2
15.9
18.1
12.5
10.4
18.6
22.5
Electric power and
steam f/
0.6
1,.6
1.6
1.4
2.9
1.8
1.6
Basic wages and
bonuses
34.9
39.2
22.2
39.5
38.8
23.3
20.7
Amortization
3.4
4.3
3.5
4.6
5.2
4.o
5.1
Other monetary ex-
penditures
6.1
8.2
6.5
4.o
5.1
3.0
2.5
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
a. 355/
b. These figures exclude the effects of the 1949 price change.
c. These figures include the effects of the 1949-51 price changes.
d: These figures are given in terms of current 1955 prices.
e. These figures include only that portion obtained from outside the
industry.
do not necessarily reflect total cost conditions in the enterprise ac-
curately; they do not account for the output of new, and hence non-
comparable, products or production (nesravnemaya produktsiya).
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The large increase between 1933 and 1940 in the relative cost
of raw materials was caused by the increase in prices of these ma-
terials in 1936. After 1941 the decrease in the costs of raw materials
was caused by increases in wage levels during and: after World War II,
while costs on materials were held almost constant. The upward ad-
justment in the price of raw materials in 1949 again caused an in-
crease in the share of cost accounted for by raw materials.
The approximate relationship of components of cost in the
steel industries of the US and the USSR in 1951 are shown in Table 32.
Table 32
Approximate Relationship of Components of Cost
In the Steel Industries
of the US and the USSR 2./
1951
Percent
Item of Cost
US USSR12/
Materials and services
49.0
69.7
Wages
34.5
23.3
Amortization
3.4
4.o
Other
13.1 2/
3.0
Total
100.0 100.0
a. 356/
b. Soviet data include a greater amount of
mining activity.
c. This figure includes provisions for taxes
and interest charges.
Components of cost in the ferrous metallurgical industry of
the USSR, by producing unit, in 1954 areshown in Table 33.*
* Table 33 follows on p. 122.
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Table 33
Components of Cost in the Ferrous Metallurgical Industry of the USSR
by Producing Unit 21
1954
Percent
Item of Cost
Producing Unit
Iron Ore
Mining
Limestone
QuArrying
Coke-Chemical
Plant
Integrated
Steel Plant
Tube
Mill
Raw and primary
materials
Auxiliary and other
0
0
82.4
27.5
67.9
material
19.5
14.3
2.1
6.1 ,
2.5
Fuel 12/
2.2
9.3
o
38.0
4.4
Electric power
and steam hi
3.0
4.4
1.8
1.3
1.8
Basic wages and
bonuses
59.5
54.3
8.5
15.4
18.2
Amortization
10.0
12.7
4.o
7.3
3.1
Other monetary ex-
penditures
5.8
5.0
1.2
4.4
2.1
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
a. 357/
b. These figures include only that portion obtained from outside the
industry.
C. Cost-Price Relationship.
In the Soviet steel industry the difference between cost and
price is termed profit (priby11) or intraindustry accumulation
(vnutri-promyshlennoye nakopleniye). Profits serve as an incentive
toward and a measure of more efficient operation. Reductions in whole-
sale steel prices in 1952 and 1955 would seem to indicate that as
annual planned decreases in the cost of production are made prices
also are adjusted downward.
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As a result of the 1949 price increase in the USSR, prices
of steel exceeded 'costs for the first time since before World War II,
and subsidization of the steel industry ended. All-union wholesale
prices are based on the cost of production at an average or typical
plant, however, and a number of enterprises with higb production
costs are operating at planned losses and are subsidized by low-
cost operations elsewhere in the industry.
The cheapest steel in the USSR is produced by the Magnitogorsk
complex, where low-cost iron ore and investment in technological im-
provements have resulted in lower costs -- in terms of per unit of
output -- for raW materials, conversion, and labor. Pig iron, which
is uniformly priced throughout the USSR, costs only one-half as much
to produce at Magnitogorsk as it does in blast furnaces at Ukrainian
plants. The cost of a ton of steel ingots at Komsomol'sk (Amurstal!
plant) in the Soviet Far East is 1.5 times greater than at Magnitogorsk.
At the many small plants of the Chief Directorate of Urals Metal-
lurgy (Glavuralmet) the cost of pig iron is from 3 to 4 times greater
than at the leading plants, and production per worker is only 40 per-
cent of the average in the industry. 358/
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XI. Prices.
A. System.
Wholesale prices (optovyye tseny) of finished steel in the
USSR are established by the Main Administration of Metal Sales (Glav-
metallosbyt) of the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy with the approval
of the Soviet Council of Ministers. These delivered wholesale prices
are uniform throughout the USSR -- that is, 1 ton of ordinary carbon
bars costs 545 rubles whether it is sold in Leningrad, in Tashkent,
or in Khabarovsk. Wholesale prices established for other products
of the industry, such as pig iron or ferroalloys, are also believed
to be uniform, or all-union, prices. Two known exceptions to this
system are iron ore and coking coal, which are priced regionally,
and it is probable that other ores are also priced regionally. 2'23V.
Before 1951 a price system "f.o.b. the warehouse of the
seller" (franko stantsiya'otpravleniya) had been in effect. Since
1951 the price system "station of designation" (franko stantsiya
naznacheniya) has been used. Under this system the wholesale price
is quoted for steel delivered to the railroad station or steamship
wharf designated by the buyer. This delivered priee includes the
cost of production, a planned profit (or loss), a nominal charge by
Glavmetallosbyt for storage and handling, and an average transporta-
tion charge. Intraindustry transfers of semifinished steel are based
on wholesale prices "station of designation." Currently) with a few
minor exceptions, there is no turnover tax or sales tax applied to
the products of the steel industry.* ]?(2/
Although the wholesale price as described is believed to be
In effect as the actual transfer or exchange price, additional
charges are made for deviations from standard specifications. These
"extras," as they are known in the US steel industry) are not applied
as widely in the USSR as in the US) but in general, Soviet extras do
cover the ordering of special shapes and sizes) added guarantees of
physical and chemical specifications, and certain minimum quantities.
(Steel plants will not ship less than carload lots without penalty.)
Special prices to certain ministries can be permitted with the consent'
of the Council of Ministers, but none has been noted. 361/
* A turnover tax is applied to the sale of blast furnace slag, dis-
tilled water, electric power, and manufactured metal products (metiz)
sold outside the industry.
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Soviet steel prices are found in the price catalogs of the
Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy and of other ministries consuming
steel. The catalogs contain detailed price lists; extra charges
(priplaty); deductions (skidki); and physical and chemical standards,
or GOST's. The latest available set of these catalogs contains
prices effective 1 July 1955. Another source of prices are the
catalogs published by planning and construction organizations and
designed for use in estimating construction costs. Prices in these
lists are often highly aggregated, and in many cases, ruble prices
are historic rather than current.
B. Policy.
The basic Soviet pricemaking policy is to set prices at a
level at which the average plant can earn a profit for the state
and for reinvestment.
The large upward revision in the price of steel in 1949
marked the end of the policy of subsidization that had existed be-
fore that time. The magnitude of those subsidies was revealed by
the threefold increase in steel prices. In spite of this change
in policy, at least one mill, the new Rustavi combine, operated
at a planned loss in 1955. In effect, the level of all-union steel
prices was not sufficiently high to counterbalance the effect of
the Rustavi combine's dependence on high-cost and poor-quality
Dashkesan iron ore* and Tkibuli and Tvarcheli coking coal. The
new Northwest Metallurgical Combine at Cherepovets probably operated
at a planned loss in 1955, and it is expected that subsidies will
continue there for some time. The two plants enhance the self-
sufficiency of the regions where they are located, and the govern-
ment may feel that the losses are justified.** 3?2/
* Under the system of regional prices for iron ores, Dashkesan
ore concentrates are 31 rubles per ton, and Krivoy Rog concentrates
are only 22 rubles per ton.
** These losses) in whole or in part) may not be real, for the all-
union uniform prices probably do not reflect the freight advantage
of these two plants in their local markets: that is, the total cost
of production (polnaya sebestoimost') of steel from the nearest alter-
native source may be greater in the Baku and Leningrad markets than
the total cost of Cherepoveta and Rustavi Steel.
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Before the price changes of 1 January 1952 and 1 Jul' 1955,
Soviet price policy was designed to control the demand for the scarcer
alloying materials. Inspection of 1950 ruble/dollar price ratios
Indicates that this policy was implemented by the establishment of a
higher price on alloying ores and alloy steel, relative to ordinary
or carbon grades, than would appear to be justified by cost relation-
ships. A typical example was cold-rolled nickel-bearing stainless
steel strip, with a ruble/dollar price ratio of 24 to 1 as against
a ratio of 12 to 1 for cold-rolled carbon strip. These stainless
steels contain only about 8 to 10 percent nickel. For almost pure
nickel metal, the ruble/dollar ratio was 37 to 1, and for strategic
cobalt the ratio was 103 to 1. Also, discriminatory pricing apparently
was unemployed to discourage the demand by consumers for relatively
scarce unalloyed nonstrategic items, such as hot-dip tinplate which
has a ruble/dollar ratio of 43 to 1. 363/
Since the price changes of January 1952 and July 1955, evi-
dence definitely indicates an adjustment of internal Soviet steel
prices toward the price relationships found among steel products in
the US. Proof of this is the preponderance of July 1955 ruble/dollar
ratios for finished steel products, falling between 5 and 6 to 1 re-
gardless of whether the steel is of a carbon, alloy, or stainless
grade. This apparent modification of policy is best exemplified by
nickel-bearing stainless types. In 1950, various stainless steel
products had ratios 100 percent above the average for all finished
steel, and in 1955 the ratios were both above and below, but quite
close to, the finished steel average of 5.6. Pending the availability
of more 1955 price data; the tentative conclusion is that the policy
of discriminatory pricing is disappearing and that the actual cost
of production seems to be the principal factor determining the
price. 364/
Before 1951, Glavmetallosbyt supervised the allocation of
steel but had no responsibility for the cost of freight; the con-
sumer paid all freight charges but had no control over the selection
of suppliers. Glavmetallosbyt had no tangible incentive 'to effect
economies by the elimination of excessively long and needless trans-
port. Partly for this reason the average haul of ferrous metals in-
creased from 966 kilometers in 1940 to about 1,177 kilometers in
1951. ifl/
The responsibility of Glavmetsillosbyt was greatly increased
by the change to pricing by station of designation and by the
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establishment of freight tariffs based on the average haul of 13
major categories of finished steel. As a result, if the actual
transport distance is greater than the established norm, Glav-
metallosbyt loses money; if it is less than the norm, Glavmetallosbyt
makes a profit) part of which it retains. Average transport charges
for ferrous metals constitute 5 percent of the wholesale price at
the station of designation. The introduction of the new price system
resulted in a 122-kilometer decrease in the average haul of ferrous
metals between 1951 and 1955) although in the latter year it was
still greater than in 1940. 2?.?/
There is little available information on the Soviet policy
for pricing exports to other countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and
to the Free World. Pig iron, which for the last few years has
been moving in quantity to the UK) Belgium) West Germany, and Italy,
has been selling at less than domestic prices in those countries.
In 1955, Soviet pig iron was selling at 267 West German Marks per
metric ton c.i.f. Duisberg, which is 5 to 10 percent below the West
German domestic price. Prices of the 1 million tons of finished
steel to be shipped by the USSR to India over the next 3 years are
variously quoted as equal to or greater than European Coal and Steel
Community prices. El/
C. Trends.
The historical trend of Soviet prices of finished steel has
been one of relatively long periods of unchanged prices followed by
large upward adjustments. Since 1 January 1950) however) the three
price changes of 1 July 1950, 1 January 1952, and 1 July 1955 have
been downward revisions.
During the period from 1928 to 1936, steel prices were held
nearly constant, and the cost of production rose primarily because
of increased wage rates. This necessitated subsidization of the
steel industry. The prime objective of the 1936 upward price adjust-
ment was the elimination of subsidies. After this adjustment, except
for an average 30-percent price rise in 1939, steel prices remained
constant until 1949. Although planning and production accounting
were simplified by leaving prices unchanged, wartime inflation and
rising costs of production again required heavy subsidies in the
period after World War II. 368/
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The price decrees of 1949, aimed again at the elimination of
subsidies, raised steel prices threefold. The increase apparently
was greater than necessary, and on 1 January 1950, prices of ordi-
nary finished steel were cut almost 30 percent. Since 1950, prices
of ordinary finished steel have decreased from 10 to 20 percent,
and the decrease in the price of quality steels has been markedly
greater.. 369/
Price changes in ordinary finished steel have not always
been followed by changes in quality and in alloy grades. On the
other hand) quality grades have been revised when no change was
made in the price of ordinary steel -- for example, the small
adjustment of 1946. Prices of quality steel have been characterized
by considerably smaller fluctuations than have those of ordinary
steels, except for the 1 January 1952 revision, which cut prices
of stainless steel 35 to 45 percent. 2/2/
D. Ruble/Dollar Price Ratios.
A comparison of ruble prices for products of the Soviet fer-
rous.metallurgical industry with dollar prices for comparable items
? produced in the US throws some light on the dollar value of the
ruble, in terms of these products, and on the points of divergence
of the two parallel price structures.
Ruble/dollar price ratios for a comprehensive list of prod-
ucts of the steel industry and Soviet wholesale prices for various
years are shown in Appendix Al Table 44.* Weighted ruble/dollar
ratios in sectors of the ferious metallurgical industry of the USSR,
by US Standard Industrial Classification Number, in 1950 and 1955
are shown in Table 34.**
Ratios of individual items indicate that over-all internal
prices for Soviet iron and steel products in 1955 are basically re-
lated to cost and availability: The relatively low prices for
electric furnace ferrosilicon, ferromanganese, and ferrochrome) for
example, probably reflect both the abundance of these ores in the
USSR and the low cost of the hydroelectric power serving some of the
ferroalloy Works.
P. 162, below.
** Table 34 follows on p. 130.
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? Table 34
Weighted Ruble/Dollar Ratios in Sectors of the Ferrous Metallurgical
Industry of the USSR, by Standard Industrial Classification Number Et/
1950 and 1955
Classification Number
Sector
Ruble/Dollar Ratio
3311
3312
3312
Blast furnace (1950)
Steel plant (1950)
Steel plant (1955)
9.0
11.0
5.6
3313
Ferroalloy plant (1950) I2/
7.5
3321
Gray iron foundry (1950)
11.6
3322
Malleable iron foun-
dry (1950)
13.0
3323
Steel foundry (1950)
10.7
3391
Steel forging plant (1950)
13.8
a. 371/
b. Based on electric furnace ferrosilicon, ferromanganese, and
ferrochrome.
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XII. Investment.
Little information is available on the magnitude of investment
in the ferrous metallurgical industry of the USSR. Capital outlays
since the Fourth Five Year Plan (1946-50) can be estimated only by
applying tenuous assumptions to inadequate data.
The Fourth Five Year Plan budgeted approximately 27 billion rubles*
for investment in ferrous metallurgy. 372/ This program was not ful-
filled, however, and actual investment has been estimated at about
23 billion rubles. 2/3/
During the period of the Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55)1 con-
struction for both ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy reportedly in-
creased 1.8 times above that in 1946-50; 374/ but only 77 percent of
the construction planned for the Ministry of Ferrous Me-barna-fry was
accomplished. 312/ Assuming an equal rate of increase in investment
in ferrous and in nonferrous metallurgy, expenditures for ferrous
metals may have been about 41 billion rubles. Investment in iron
ore mining, 7 billion rubles, 376/ presumably is included in the total
for ferrous metallurgy as a whole.
The Sixth Five Year Plan (1956-60) provides for an increase of
almost 100 percent in total capital investment in the Soviet ferrous
metallurgical industry. El/ This increase would indicate a level
of investment approximating 8o billion rubles - -.equal to about 13
percent of the planned capital investment in all industry and to.
about one-fifth of that in heavy industry. Apparently included in
total investment are capital outlays of 20 billion rubles in iron
ore mining. 378/ The almost threefold increase in capital expendi-
tures in iron ore mining in 1951-55 reflects the heavy emphasis given
in the current Plan to the expansion of ore production and the con-
struction of ore treatment plants. It also reflects the fact that
capital expansion in iron ore mining during the previous Five Year
Plan was greatly below expectations. Presumably, a portion of the
large increase planned for 1956-60 is, in effect, a carryover from
the preceding period.
The planned 1956-60 increase of 100 percent in capital invest-
ment in the Soviet ferrous metallurgical industry is considerably
* Unless otherwise indicatedyinvestment data are given in terms
of 1955 prices.
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greater than the planned percentage increase in steelmaking capacity
because of (1) the substantially larger investment in facilities for
mining and processing ores, (2) the apparently larger role of new
plant construction as opposed to expansion of existing facilities
as sources of additional capacity, and (3) increasing capital costs
per unit of production.
The average capital cost of crude steel capacity to be added in
1955-60 apparently is about 3,000 rubles per ton. This is about 30
percent larger than the average of 2,300 rubles per ton indicated .
for the preceding Plan period. Capital costs of new construction
at new plants, per ton of steel, have increased 15 to 20 percent
since the beginning of the Fifth Five Year Plan period. 312/
During 1951-55, when the cost of a tot of added capacity in the
USSR averaged about 2,300 rubles, the US cost averaged about US $211
per.ton. Assuming that. this ruble/dollar ratio of 11 to 1 is ap-
plicable to the current Plan period, the cost of an added ton of
capacity in the USSR would be approximately US $273 in 1956-60.
A figure for the US is not available for the same period, but the
contemplated investment in the US iron and steel industry in
1956-58 will cost an average of about US $265 per ton.
The over-all calculated capital cost of 2,300 rubles per ton in
the USSR in 1951-55 is in line with a similar figure calculated for
the Rustavi metallurgical plant, much of which was constructed dur-
ing 1951-55. Total :investment at this plant is said to be 1.8 bil-
lion rubles, of which 1.5 billion were spent on the plant and 300
million on housing and other nonproductive facilities. 2?2/ This
represents a capital outlay for production facilities of 2,500 rubles
per ton of crude steel capacity, which, if converted on an 11 to 1
ruble/dollar ratio, is about US $227 per ton.
Funds allocated to an enterprise in the Soviet state budget pro-
vide the major source of investment capital. Expenditures also are
made from the director's fund, which represents a portion of profits.
Amortization accounts, accumulated on a specified percentage basis,
provide funds for capital repairs and for replacement of worn-out
equipment. 111/ At the present time, the director of an enterprise
has authority to spend up to 3 million rubles without obtaining de-
tailed clearance of a proposed project. A ceiling of 25 million
rubles is imposed on chief directorates, and the Ministry of Ferrous
Metallurgy may authorize expenditures of up to 130 million rubles
without detailed approval from the Soviet Council of Ministers.
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XIII. Employment) Labor Productivity) and Wages.
A. Labor Force.
In 1955, about 590,000 workers were employed in the Soviet
ferrous metallurgical industry, including iron, manganese) chrome)
and vanadium ore mining; limestone quarrying; ferroalloy plants;
coke-chemical plants; and iron and steel plants. Another 40,000
to 70)000 persons were employed in the administrative structures
of the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy) its chief directorates
and trusts) and the Ukrainian Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy.
Not included in these figures are the employees of the Ministry
of Nonferrous Metallurgy who are engaged in the mining of tungsten)
molybdenum) nickel) and cobalt and who are estimated to number less
than 30)000. The estimated labor force in the ferrous metallurgical
industry of the USSR in 1955 is shown in Table 35.
Table 35
Estimated Labor Force in the Ferrous Metallurgical Industry
of the USSR a/
1955
Sector of Industry
Number of Employees
(Thousand)
Iron ore mining
71
Manganese ore mining
16
Limestone quarrying
9
Ferroalloy production 12/
30
Coke-chemical plants
53
Iron and steel plants
- 411
Administration 2/
40 to 70
Total
630 to 66o
a. Lly. Employment figures shown in this table are
closely comparable with the data shown in source 383/. In
that source, employment is derived from a breakdown of the
total industrial labor force. There were no known occur-
rences of slave labor in the industry during 1955. German
prisoners of war were employed at the Revda and Pervoural'sk
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Table 35
Estimated Labor Force in the Ferrous Metallurgical Industry
of the USSR
1955
(Continued)
steel plants in 1954. Whether or not any are still employed
Is unknown; but, in any case) they are no longer of impor-
tance in the labor force.
b. Included in this sector are chrome ore miners attached
to the Aktyubinsk ferroalloy combine; not included are the
fewer than 30,000 workers engaged in the mining of other
alloying ores.
c. Administrative personnel at the enterprise level are
Included in other sectors.
The steel industry proper (excluding mining, quarrying, and
production of ferroalloys employed 504)000 to 534,000 workers in 1955.
The comparable labor force in the US steel industry in 1955 was
650,000. The Soviet Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy employs more than
85 percent of the ferrous metallurgical labor force; the remainder
are employed, for the most part, in nonintegrated steel plants con-
trolled by other ministries. 21,11
The Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy classifies its personnel
as either "industrial-production" or "nonindustrial." The latter
category) which is relatively unimportant, includes people engaged
in nonindustrial activities controlled by the plant director --
housing) schools and cultural affairs, canteens and company stores,
transportation facilities outside of the plant, capital repair of
buildings and equipment) and the like. The category of industrial-
production personnel) which includes most of the employees within
the plant, is subdivided further into manual workers of all skills;
engineers and technical workers; apprentices and students; office-
workers; and guards, messengers, char force, and the like. An
analysis of the 1955 industrial-production labor force at 4 Soviet
steel plants typical of the industry shows that.workers composed
81 percent; engineers and technicians, 9.7 percent; officeworkers,
4.2 percent; the guards) messengers) and char force category, 4.5
percent; and apprentices, 0.6 percent. 312/
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Women constitute 20 to 30 percent of the labor force of a
Soviet steel plant. In planning the industrial labor force the
Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy uses a 20-percent factor for the
portion of women in the total. In actual practice, however) the
number of female workers may reach 30 percent of the total) and
In some plants about 40 percent of the labor force are women. In
Soviet steel plants) women do virtually all kinds of work) includ-
ing operating cranes and carrying bricks. 22.Y
About 39 percent of the workers at integrated steel plants
in the USSR are engaged in basic production activity, 20 percent
in maintenance and repair, 24 percent in transport) 6 percent in
the generation of power) 3 percent in scrap preparation) 3 percent.
in technical and quality control) 3 percent in producing consumer
goods, and 1.5 percent in plant laboratories. The number of workers
engaged directly in production activities varies substantially from
plant to plant. It reaches 60 percent in nonintegrated steel plants
and drops to 19 percent at the Krivoy Rog iron ore mines) where there
are only 7,600 miners in a labor force of. 40,000. Production and
employment at the Magnitogorsk steel plant in the USSR, by department,
.in 1955 are shown in Table 36.*'3,182/
B. Labor Productivity.
Changes in labor productivity in the Soviet steel industry
are primarily reflections of the emphasis on capital investment and
technological advancement) but the supply and skill of labor and the
ability of the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy to organize the factors
of production are elements of some significance. When correctly inter-
preted, the level of labor p?oductivity, or production per worker, may
serve as another tool with which to effect a comparieon between the
Soviet steel industry and the steel industries of other countries. A
lack of detailed, industrywide postwar information permits, however,
only general observations.
In the Soviet steel industry, labor productivity is consider-
ably lower than it is in the US industry. In 1955,. US production
per worker was 163 tons of crude steel, and Soviet prOduction'per
worker amounted to only 88 tons, equal to 54 percent of the US figure.
* Table 36 follows on p. 136.
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Table 36
Production and Employment at the Magnitogorsk Steel Plant in the USSR
by Department a/
1955
Department
Iron ore mining
Mining
Washing and dressing
Sintering
Transport and other
Total
Coke and byproducts
Blast furnace
Open hearth
Rolling mills
Refractory
Foundry
Raw material handling
Powerhouses
Electrical maintenance
Pipe and weld shop
Mechanical maintenance
Laboratory and technical
control
Engineering) technical
staff, and main office
Production
10.80 million metric tons per year
5,180,000 metric tons of coke per
year
504500000 metric tons of pig iron
per year
5,790,000 metric tons of crude
steel per year
41540,000 metric tons of finished
steel per year
131,000 metric tons of refrac-
tories per year
216,000 metric tons of iron
castings per year
273,000 kilowatts (capacity)
350 motors per month
1,200 units per month
Employees
878
1,071
830
1,471
14,250
1,931
791
2,270
6,296
770
1,106
788
871
257
948
866
1,253
689
a. 3
88
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Table 36
at the Magnitogorsk Steel Plant in the USSR
by Department
1955
(Continued)
Department
Rail .transport
Loading and reloading
Water
Storage
Guard force
Dining room staffs.
Other
Grand total
Production
33;500,000 ton-kilometers per
month
1)577)000 metric tons of material
per month
70,000)000 cubic meters per month
Employees
1,232
456
264
143
483
858
5,937
21,4.22
A similar calculation for 1952 showed UK production per worker to be
only 50 percent of that of the US. 3?2/
The salient achievements of labor in Soviet ferrous metal-
.
lurgy are summed up by the following: "From 1928 to 1937 labor pro-
ductivity in ferrous metallurgy increased 204.4 percent. If the
productivity of one worker in 1940 is taken to represent 100 percent,
then in 1954 labor productiVity for the entire metallurgical industry
increased 74.2 percent. Labor Productivity increased 89.5 percent
in the blast furnace shops) 80.9 percent in the open hearth shops,
and 44.8 percent in the rolling mills. In 26 years (1928-1954) labor
productivity in the ferrous metallurgical industry increased by seven
times. The average increase for each year was 7.6 percent." In 1953
and the first 6 months of 1954, however, many enterprises -- and the
industry as a whole -- did not fulfill plans for increasing labor
productivity: Great improvement obviously has been made, but the 1928
productivity base was very low by any standards. Because the statistics
on productivity are not defined) they can be used for comparative pur-
poses only) and they must be used with great care. 390/
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Within the USSR, between blast furnace and open hearth shops
on the one hand and rolling mills on the other, and also among.metal-
lurgical plants, there exist vastly different levels of labor pro-
ductivity. While the labor productivity in blast furnaces and open
hearths was increasing from 80 to 90 percent between 1940 and 1954,
labor productivity in rolling mills increased only one-half as
much. This difference reflects the investment lavished on the tech-
nological improvement of blast furnaces and open hearths. The spread
among plants is indicated by the fact that at Magnitogorsk, produc-
tion of pig iron per worker was 3.5 times and of crude steel 2 times
the average for the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy. in 1955. The
very high level at Magnitogorsk results from a supply of well-pre-
pared raw materials; large, technologically advanced furnace units;
and a concerted effort to provide for other steel plants a goal
worthy of emulation in "socialiat competition." 321/
Labor productivity in the Soviet steel industry is measured
in three ways: by value of production; by physical production; and
by a unit-accounting method which, by means of predetermined coef-
ficients, reduces various kinds of production to one, basic type.
The value-of-production method, based Oh the evalUation of gross
production) is the principle system in use. Before the change in
wholesale prices in 1949, gross production was valued in terms of
wholesale prices of 1926/27. ,The use of 1926/27 prices, which did
not accurately reflect postwar labor costs, imparted an upward bias
to statistics on labor productivity. Since 1949, gross production
has been valued in current wholesale prices: .322/
C. Wages.
In the Soviet steel industry) wages range from 15 to 20 per-
cent of the cost of production at integrated steel plants to 55 to
60 percent at iron mining installations. Between 1940 and 1953 the
total wages of ferrous metallurgical workers increased 2.5 times.
Because of inflation in the intervening years, however, the buying
power of the workers did not increase at the same rate. Wherever
possible, wages are based on progressive pieceWork and production
norms for which.basic wage rates are set. Wage rates remained almost
constant between 1940 and 1953. Because total wages rose substantially,
production norms must, have been set at relatively low levels) and
premiums for overfulfillment must have been substantial. In 1955 the
norm was set at 80 percent of planned production. The worker received
pay at double the wage rate for all additional production up to the
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planned production and at treble the rate for any production in excess
of planned production. M./
The average annual wage in the Soviet metallurgical industry
during 1955 was 12,000 rubles. The 1954 average annual wage for the
five major classifications of employees was as follows: workers,
12)800 rubles; engineers and technicians, 20,000 rubles; office-
workers) 9,000 rubles; guards) char force, and the like, 5:000
rubles; and apprentices) 4,000 rubles. Wages in the Urals and Siberia
are 20 percent greater than elsewhere in the USSR.
On the basis .of the amount of .wages and premiums received,
the best paid positions are those held by directors) engineers) fore-
men, senior rollers and melters, and underground miners. One typical
plant manager received 7,000 rubies in 1 month in 1955 -- 4,000
rubles from base rates and 3)000 rubles in premiums. At the Krivoy
Rog ore field, workers at the surface receive 1,000 rubles a month;
auxiliary underground workers, 1,500 rubles; and underground miners,
2,000 to 3,000 rubles. In addition to tonnage premiums, bonuses are
given for effecting certain operating economies. The wages, premiums,
and bonuses earned by a steel melter (first helper) at the Zaporozthe
steel plant in March 1953 are shown in the following tabulation 395/:
Payments Rubles
Basic gage for meeting production norm 1,268
Premium for above-norm production 529
Compensation for idle time during furnace overhaul 260
Bonus for good .furnace maintenance 164
Bonus for saving electricity 218
Bonus for saving fuel 621
Other payments 169
Total 3,229
At the official exchange rate of 4 rubles to the dollar, the
average 1955 wage in the Soviet ferrous metallurgical industry was
US $3)000. In the US the average steel worker earned US $5,200 in
1955. The average Soviet engineer earned US $5,000 in 1955; the aver-
age director earned US $24;000. In terms of "real income" the Soviet
worker fared even worse. The prices the average Soviet worker with
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an income of 1,000 rubles per month paid for food, clothing, and con-
sumer durable goods in 1955 are shown in the folldwing tabulation 396
Item
Ruble Price*
Butter) per pound
Meat, per pound
Eggs, per dozen
Black bread, per pound
Chocolate, per pound
12
8 to 9
8.5
2.5
49
Man's suit
1,400 to 1,500
Man's overcoat
700 to 1,200 to 2,000
Shirt
185
Women's shoes, per pair
267
Vacuum cleaner
500
Bicycle
600 to 700
Television set
1,100 to 2,700
Radio
170 up
Automobile
9,000 to 28,000 to 38,000
Against high prices the Soviet worker is required to pay must
be measured the cost of housing, pensions, and other items of social
benefit that are provided for him. A family of 4 would pay only about
48 rubles per month for their 36-square-meter (2 rooms, each 9 by 18
feet) apartment space.** A worker earning 1,000 rubles a month must
set aside 13 percent of his earnings for income taxes, and he is unaer
strong moral obligation to contribute 1 month's pay (8 percent) to the
State Loan. After 1 year of service, the worker has his basic wage
rate increased 10 percent periodically, up to a maximum of 30 percent
at 15 years. After 20 years of service, provided he is over 50 years
old, the worker receives a tax-free pension from the Ministry of
Ferrous Metallurgy, which amounts to 50 percent of his average annual
basic wage.*** The pension fund is administered by the trade union,
which is also responsible for the allocation of housing, for operating
plant health clinics, for supervising safety in the plant, and for
other tasks. About 95 percent of Soviet workers belong to the union;
dues are 1 percent of wages. 221/
* These are 'State Shop" prices, some of which vary regionally.
** In the Fourth and Fifth Five year Plan periods the Ministry of
Ferrous Metallurgy constructed 7.9 million square meters of housing
for its workers.
*** Social security is provided for by the enterprise, which must set
aside for this purpose an amount equal to 7.9 percent of the wage bill.
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XIV. Distribution and Consumption.
A. Distribution.
The distribution of finished steel) a "funded commodity"
allocated only by authority of the Soviet Council of Ministers)
is under the control of Glavmetallosbyt of the Ministry of Ferrous
Metallurgy and is based on demands developed as part of the planning
procedures. In addition to supervising direct shipments from steel
plants to consumers, Glavmetallosbyt operates a system of warehouses
at strategic locations throughout the country.* 398/
In general the Soviet distribution system appears to work
reasonably well. Nevertheless, there are occasional stoppages of
production because of inadequate steel supplies, and spot shortages
occur with considerable frequency. The stoppages are caused prin-
cipally by the constant pressure on producing and consuming plants
to hold down inventories, by the difficulty of estimating require-
ments in advance, and by the bureaucratic delays involved in obtain-
ing supplementary allocations.
Finished steel is shipped principally by rail. High tariffs
and inadequate highways make shipment by truck generally impractical
for distances greater than 10 kilometers. The north-south orientation
of most Soviet waterWays does not accommodate itself to the move-
ment of finished steel, the bulk of which is east-west. Although
water rates are 'low and water transportation is subsidized by arti-
ficially high tariffs of parallel rail shipments, the usual necessity
for transshipment en route makes the combined rail-and-water tariff
higher, in most cases, than that for all rail shipment. 222/
The average haul of ferrous metals from plants and ware-
houses to the consumer rose from 966 kilometers in 1940 to 1)177
kilometers in 1951, an increase of 22 percent. This rise reflected
the increased crosshauling of steel products that resulted from the
disproportionate expansion of steel consumption in the Central Region
of the USSR -- particularly in the Moscow, Leningrad, and Gorlkiy
industrial areas -- relative to the growth in production of finished
steel in the Central Region. This region was a steel-deficit area
in 1940. Between 1940 and 1951 the region's dependence on supplies
* See the map, Figure 13, inside back cover.
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of steel produced elsewhere in the USSR. Increased as a result of an
expansion of 61 percent in consumption as against an increase of
only 7 percent in production of finished steel in the Central Region.
The amount of finished steel shipped into the region increased from
4.2 million tons in 1940 to 7.5 million tons in 1951, much of which
was transported long distances from steel plants in the eastetn and
southern areas.
Between 1951 and 1955 the average haul of ferrous metals in
the USSR decreased to 1,055 kilometers, primarily as a result of a
change in pricing policy.*1E2/
The production and consumption of finished steel in the USSR,
by geographic areal. in 1940, 1951, and 1953 are shown in Table 37.
Table 37
Production and Consumption of Finished Steel in the USSR
by Geographic Area
1940, 1951, and 1953
Million Metric Tons
Production
Consumption
Area 12/ .
1940
1951,
1953
1940
1951
1953
East
4.1
12.4
14.9
2.5
7.4
8.9
South
7.6
9.9
12.5
5.0
7.4
8.9
Central
1.4
1.5
2.0
5.6
9.0
11.6
Total
13.1
23.8
29.4
13.1
23.8
29.4
a. _If. Consumption data do not make allowances for
inventory changes, additions to stockpiles, and foreign
trade in finished steel, which in 1953 amounted to
853,000 tons exported and 328,000 tons imported -- net
exports of 525,000 tons.
b. East includes Economic Regions VI, VIII, IX, X, XI,
and XII; South includes Economic Regions III, IV, and
V; and Central includes Economic Regions I, II, and
VII.
* See XI, p. 125, above.
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B. Consumption.
The demand for finished steel in the USSR appears to be
United. only by the availability of investment funds for the ex-
pansion of the consuming industries. Although particular alloca-
tions among industries may be more generous for political or stra-
tegic reasons, the over-all policy is to maintain a "tight" supply
situation. Allocations are directed toward preVenting the accumu-
lation of excess inventories in producing and consuming plants.
State reserves serve to absorb surpluses and to provide, at least
partially, for unforeseen demands.
It appears that the rate of consumption of finished steel
in relation to the gross national product (GNP) of the two coun-
tries is higher in the USSR than in the US. GNP in the USSR in
1955 was estimated at US $138 billion, equal to 36 percent of that
Of the US. To achieve this GNP the USSR consumed* an estimated
3i.3 minion tons of finished steel, 46 percent as much as the US.**
The high Soviet rate of consumption of finished steel reflects,
among other things, the larger share of GNP devoted to defense and
inVestment, each of which is a heavy consumer of steel. Although
the GNP in the USSR was only 36 percent of that in the US, Soviet
outlays for defense were about equal to those in the US, and funds
allocated to investment were equal to about 6o percent of those in
the US. Investment in the USSR, moreover, is concentrated on heavy
industry and transportation, which are large users of steel. 'al/
Perhaps because a detailed account of the consumption of
steel by industry or by ministry may be -- especially in a wholly
planned economy-- an indicator of preparations for mobilization,
the relaxation in the dissemination of industrial information that
has taken place since Stalin's death has not been extended to the
steel consumption aspect of the Soviet economy.*** Data on the
allocation or distribution of finished steel to consuming industries
have been carefully concealed since 1938. 11.2Y
Consumption is estimated on the basis of production less exports
plus imports; no allowances are made for inventory changes.
** On a per capita basis, however, Soviet consumption of steel was
relatively much lower (as was GNP). At 372 pounds per capita, Soviet
consumption of steel was about one-fourth that of the US and one-half
that of the UK and of West Germany. 402/
*** Information of a general nature concerning the consumption of
finished steel products by type in the various sectors of the Soviet
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A general indication of the pattern of Soviet steel consump-
tion can be derived by regrouping the estimated finished steel prod-
uct mix.* Such a regrouping into "heavy" products (used primarily by,
heavy industry, construction, and rail transportation) and "light"
products (used primarily for consumer goods) provides further evidence
of the relatively larger consumption by heavy industry in the USSR
than in the US. In 1955, for example, "heavy" products accounted for
56 percent of total Soviet production of finished steel but for only
31 percent of US production. /222/
economy has been received recently. The need for further clarifica-
tion precludes its use at present.
* See IV, p. 23, above.
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XV. Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Intentions.
A. Capabilities.
The Soviet steel industry probably will meet the primary pro-
duction goals of the Sixth Five Year Plan (1956-60) and thus will
provide the planned support for the growing Soviet economy in 1960. ?
The industry is self-sufficient in basic raw materials and employs
technological practices that: in selected plants, compare favorably
with Free World standards.
B. Vulnerabilities.
The Soviet steel industry would not necessarily be affected
by external economic conditions. Economic self-sufficiency in steel
has not been achieved, however: without cost. Dependence solely on
internal resources for new and modern equipment has resulted in a
lowering of the over-all efficiency of the Soviet industry and the
continuance in operation of many obsolete facilities. The exploita-
tion of remote and low-grade native resources of some alloying ma-
terials, particularly of cobalt, is a factor in the relative scarcity
and high price of those materials.
A potential vulnerability of the industry is its major de-
pendence on rail transportation: requiring the maintenance of an un-
interrupted flow of raw materials and finished products between
centers of production and consumption.
C. Intentions.
Currently planned increases in production of crude and finished
steel in the USSR are commensurate with increases in other sectors of
the Soviet economy and show no significant deviation or intention to
do other than support the planned growth of the economy* and to pro-
vide for the needs of the European Satellites, particularly those for
iron ore.
Intentions of the Soviet government to place the steel indus-
try on a wartime footing or to initiate a mobilization program might
be indicated by detailed information on the types of semifinished and
finished steel produced, particularly of the alloy grades. Informa-
tion of this nature, however: is closely concealed by the Soviet govern-
ment.
* This planned growth is, however, heavily oriented toward military
supporting industries.
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APPENDIX A
STATISTICAL TABLES
Table 38
Distribution of Coke) Pig Iron) Crude Steel) and Finished Steel
in the USSR) by Republic
1955
Percent
Republic
Coke
Pig Iron I)/
Crude Steel hi
Finisheoi
Steel 12/
RSFSR
41.2
48.9
59.1
58.3
Ukrainian SSR
52.8
49.8
37.4
38.6
Belorussian SSR
o
o
0.1
0.1
Uzbek SSR
o
o
0.5
o.4
Kazakh SSR
o
o
0.5
0.7
Georgian SSR
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.6
Armenian SSR
o
o
Negligible
Negligible
Azerbaydzhan SSR
o
o
0.8
Negligible
Latvian SSR
o
o
0.2
0.3
Estonian SSR
0
0
Negligible
0
Kirgiz SSR
o
0
Negligible
0
Unallocated
4.7
0
0
0
a. These estimates are based on regional studies of the ferrous
metallurgical industry of the USSR which are available in CIA
, files.
b. 408/
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Table 39
Wholesale Prices and Ruble/Dollar Ratios
for the Ferrous Metallurgical Industry of the USSR
Selected Years,
1948-55
Price
Ruble
Year of (Rubles per
Dollar
Product
Price RI* Metric Ton)
Ratio
Iron ore
Krivoy Rog (6o percent iron) 12/
1949
32.6
N.A.
Krivoy Rog (54 percent iron) 2/
1955
31
N.A.
Krivoy Rog igigant concentrates) 2/
1955
21
N.A.
Krilioy Rog average concentrates)
1955
25
N.A.
Magnitogorsk (58 percent iron lump) h/
1949
26.3
N.A.
Coke and coking coal
Tkibuli and Tkvarcheli coking coal sy
1955
130
N.A.
Donbas coking coal 2/
1955
About 170
N.A.
Foundry coke (Donbas) bJ
1950
280
N.A.
High-temperature coke (Moscow) 2/
1955
210 ?
N.A.
High-temperature coke (Rustavi) 2/
1955
280 to 300
N.A.
Manganese ore
Nikopol' 12/
1948
N.A.
Scrap
Approximately No. 1 heavy melting 1/
1949
227
12.6
Pig iron
Bessemer pig 1/
1950
400
7.7
Bessemer pig 2/
Basic pig si./
1955
1950
378
476
5.7
9.0
* Footnotes for Table 39 follow on p. 153.
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Table 39
Wholesale Prices and Ruble/Dollar Ratios
for the Ferrous Metallurgical Industry of the USSR
Selected Years, 1948-55
(Continued)
Product
Year of,
Price !V
Price
(Rubles per
Metric Ton)
Ruble
Dollar
Ratio
Pig iron (Continued)
Basic pig !I
Foundry pig gray) d/
Foundry pig malleable) d/
Foundry pg malleable) 2/
1955
1950
1950
1955
383
427
660
452
5.9
8.7
12.9
B.A.
Blast furnace ferroalloys
Ferromanganese 78 percen t manganese
h/
1949
1,650
N.A.
Ferromanganese 78 percen t manganese
d/
1950
1,487
7.8
Ferromanganese 78 percen t manganese
e
1955
1,080.
N.A.
Spiegeleisen 18 percent manganese) b
1949
77o
N.A.
Spiegeleisen 18 percent manganese)
1950
600
8.6
Spiege1eisen 19 percent manganese) e
19
1955
592
5.9
FerrosilicOn 10 percent silicon b
1949
750
N.A.
Ferrosilicon 16 percent silicon 1/
1950
720
9.0
Ferrosilicon *16 percent silicon 2/
1955
581
N.A.
Electric furnace ferroalloys
Ferromanganese (80 percent manganese
medium carbon) g
1950
2,355
6.o
Ferromanganese.( percent manganese
medium carbon) 2/
1955
1,495
N.A.
Ferrosilicon (75 percent silicon) g/
1950
1,650
7.4
Ferrosilicon (75 percent silidon 2/
1955
975
N.A.
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Table 39
Wholesale Prices and Ruble/Dollar Ratios
for the Ferrous Metallurgical Industry of the USSR
Selected Years, 1948-55
(Continued)
Product
Price
Year of (Rubles per
Price 2/ Metric Ton)
Ruble
Dollar
Ratio
Electric furnace ferroalloys (Continued)
Ferrochrome 60 percent chromium) 1/
Ferrochrome 60 percent chromium) 2/
Silico-manganese (17 percent silicon,
82 percent manganese) 1/
Silico-manganese (17 percent silicon,
82 percent manganese) 2/
Ferrotungsten (72 percent tungsten) f/
Ferromolybdenum (60 percent molybde-
num) f/
Ferrophosphorus (17 percent phospho-
rus) 2/
Ferrovanadium percent vanadium) 1/
Ferrotitanium 20 percent titanium) f/
Ferrotitanium (20 percent titanium) i/
Ferrocolumbium (35 percent columbium f/
Nickel (99.95 percent nickel) _,/
Nickel (99.8 percent nickel) e
Cobalt 97 to 99 percent cobalt) 1/
Cobalt 98 percent cobalt) 2/
Refractories
Chamotte (fire brick)/
Dinas (silica brick) b
1950
1955
1950
1955
1950
1950
1955
1950
1950
1955
.1950
1950
1955
1950
1955
1950
1950
3,700
4950
1,300
1,125
56,100
7413d0
1,055
60,300
5,500
3,715
200,000,
36,000
24,000
456,000
241,000
220
247
9.0
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.AI
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
.N.A.
37.2
About
16
103.4
About
42
N.A.
N.A.
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Table 39
Wholesale Prices and Ruble/Dollar Ratios
for the Ferrous Metallurgical Industry of the USSR
Selected Years, 1948-55
(Continued)
Product
Finished steel
Rails (P-43) 2/
Rails r-43) g/
Rails P-4 2/ 3)
Rails P-50) 2/
Rail accessory (two-flanged tie plate) 4/
Rail accessory. (two-flanged tie plate) 2/
Wheels a/
Pipe (seamless average excluding stain-
less) 4/
Pipe (seamless average excluding stain-
less) 2/
Pipe (seamless stainless) di
Pipe (welded average) di
Pipe welded average) 2/
Heavy 'sections channels) 2/
Heavy sections channels) !J
Heavy sections I-beams) d
Heavy sections I-beams)_,/
Heavy sections angles) d
Heavy sections angles) 2/
Light sections light channels) 2/
Light sections junior I-beams) 2/
Light sections angles) 2/
Light sections hot rolled bars) 2/
Light sections hot rolled bars) 2/
Light sections cold finished bars) 2/
Light sections cold finished bars) 2/
Light sections (hot rolled alloy bars) 2/
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Price
Year of (Rubles per
Price LI/ Metric Ton)
Ruble
Dollar
Ratio
1950
1952
1955
1955
1950
1955
1950
621
6o4
565
651
590
664
450 to 550.
i
7.6
N.A.
N.A.
5.8
6.4
5.0
6 to 7
1950
1,350
9.8
1955
967
6.2
1950
6,830
15.3
1950
1,420
10.4
1955
976
5.4
1950
564
6.8
1955
649
5.7
1950
Boo
9.8
1955
649
5.7
1950
660
8.2
1955
648
5.7
1950
587
6.3
1950
815
8.8
1950
650
8.7
1950
786
9.4
1955
652
5.3
1950
1,172
8.9
1955
1,059
5.4
1950
1,218
8.9
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Table 39
Wholesale Prices and Ruble/Dollar Ratios
for the Ferrous Metallurgical Industry of the USSR
Selected Years, 1948-55
(Continued)
Price Ruble
Year of, (Rubles per Dollar
Product Price EV Metric Ton) Ratio
Finished steel (Continued)
Light sedtions (hot rolled
Light sections (tool steel
Light sections (tool steel
Light sections hot rolled
bars) 1/
Light sections (hot rolled
bars) 2/
Wire rod (ordinary) 2/
Wire rod (ordinary) d
Wire rod (quality) d
Sheet hot rolled) 1/
Sheet hot rolled) 2/
Sheet cold rolled) d/
Sheet cold rolled) e
Sheet galvanized) d
Sheet tinplate) d
Sheet electrical 1/
Sheet *electrical)
Sheet (stainless) d
Strip (hot rolled) d/
Strip (hot rolled) 2/
Strip (cold rolled) 1/
Strip (cold rolled) &
Strip (stainless) d
Plate (ordinary) d
Plate (ordinary)y
Plate (quality) d
alloy bars) 2/
bars) d/
bars) 2/
stainless
stainless
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1955
1146o
6.7
1950
25,760
6.1
1955
261400
5.5
1950
10,320
14.7
1955
4133o
4.2
1955
639
5.2
1950
777
8.1
1950
1,300
11.0
1950
828
9.8
1955
668
5.6
1950
960
9.7
1955
1,118
7.7
1950
2,640
18.0
1950
6167o
43.o
1950
2,350
8.5
1955
1,309
5.5
1950
13,360
15.0
1950
891
8.0
1955
789
6.3
1950
1,67o
11.7
1955
1,050
5.6
1950
17,500
21.2
1950
829
9.1
1955
616
5.4
1950
1,200
10.0
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Table 39
Wholesale Prices and Ruble/Dollar Ratios
for the Ferrous Metallurgical Industry of the USSR
Selected Years, 1948-55
(Continued)
Product
Price
Year of (Rubles per
Price 2/ Metric Ton)
Ruble
Dollar
Ratio
Finished steel (Continued)
Plate (stainless) d/
Blooms and billets (ordinary) 1/
1950
1950 '
12)780
611
13.8
7.6
Billets (forging quality) .e./
Blooms and billets (quality) (1./
1255
1950
.594
1,727
5.3
10.4
Castings
Gray iron (average) 1/
1950
1,800
11.6
Malleable iron (average) di
1950
3,940
10.7
Steel (average) 1/
1950
3,880
10.7
Metal articles (metiz)
Wire nails h/
1950
1,140
N.A.
Welding rod bi
1950
1)180
N.A.
Steel cable h/
1950
2,800
N.A.
Railroad spikes h/
1950
1,220
N.A.
Rivets bJ
1950
1,350
N.A.
a. Prices
those of 1
b. Prices
c. Prices
d. Prices
e. 'Prices
f. Prices
g. Prices
for 1950 are those of 1 January 1950, and prices for 1955 are
July 1955) unless otherwise noted.
are f.o.b. station oforigin.140;/
are f.o.b. station of origin. .0 /
are f.o.b. station of origin. 409/
are delivered prices.Ii12/
are f.o.b. station of origin. ill./
are as unloaded at station of destination. Li22/
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Table 40
Selected Input Requirements for the Coke and Coke Byproducts Industry (SIC No. 2932) in the USSR 2/
1955
Input
Unit - Amount
Coking coal b/ Million metric tons 59.8
Coke oven gas 2/ Million cubic meters 5,280.0
Blast furnace gas sy Million cubic meters 250000.0
Electric power e Million kilowatt-hours 828.0
Refractories if Thousand metric tons 227.0
Process steam g/ Million metric tons 17.5
Water h/ . Million gallon 69,400.0 (minimum)
Sulfuric acid (100 percent) 1/ Thousand metric tons 470.0
. .
a. The requirements are based on 1955 production of high-temperature coke of 43.6 million tons.
b. This estimate is based on a 73-percent yield of coke from coking coal.
c. Thirty-one percent of all coke oven gas produced is used in coke plant operation. Every ton of
coke yields 390 cubic meters of gas (43.6 x 10? coke x 390 x 0.31 = 5.28 x 109 m3 gas). 414/
d. Twenty percent of all blast furnace gas produced is used in coke plant operation. Every ton of
pig Ar0e (including ferroalloys) yields 3,750 cubic meters of gas (33.3 x 10? x 8,750 x 0.20 = 25.0
x 107 mi gas). 10.5./
e. For each ton of coke produced, 19 kilowatt-hours (kwh) are consumed. 416/
f. The average coke oven produces 45500 tons. A new coke oven requires 17,000 9-inch fireclay
shapes and 26,000 9-inch silica shapes. A 9-inch fireclay shape and a 9-inch silica shape weigh 3.6
and 3.0 (kg), respectively. Annual maintenance requires 10 percent of the refractory material that
new construction requires. In 1955, 3.3 million tons of new capacity came in, and 40.3 million tons
had to be maintained. The number of new ovens: (3.3 x 10? + 4,500 = 734). The number of old
ovens: (40.3 x 10? + 4,500 = 8,960). Fireclay for new ovens: (3.6 x 17,000 x 734 . 44.9 x 1?6
ig). Silica for new ovens: (3.0 x 26,000 x 734 = 57.2 x 1006 kg). Fireclay for old ovens: (3.6
k 17,000 8,960 x 0.1 = 55.0 x 106 kg). Silica for old ovens: (3.0 x 26,000 x 8,960 x 0.1 =
70.0 x 10? kg). Total requirements: (44.9 + 57.2 + 55.0 + 70.0 = 227,1000 tons). 417/
g. Steam requirements for byproduct plant operations amount to 0.4 ton per ton of coke. 418/
h. Minimum water requirements are 6 m3 for every ton of coking coal charged. One cubic foot
equals 7.48 gallons. 11/.
421/5
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Table 41
Selected Input Requirements for the Blast Furnace Industry (SIC No. 3311) in the USSR hi
1955
Input
Iron ore (54 percent iron) hi
Coke 2/
Charcoal
Manganese ore (40 percent manganese) 2/
Scrap and miscellaneous metallics 1/
Limestone gi
Refractories hi
Blast furnace gas 1/
Electric power 1/
Water ki . "
Unit Amount
Million metric tons
Million metric tons
Thousand metric tons
Million metric tons
Million metric tons
Million metric tons
Million metric tons
Million cubic meters
Million kilowatt-hours
Billion gallons
62.6
31.2
390.0
1.53
1.97
16.6
0.113
50,000.0
500.0
3.45
a. The requirements are based on 1955 total production of pig iron, including ferroalloys,
of 33.3 million tons.
b. The 'average iron content of Soviet ores and concentrates, as charged, is estimated at
54 percent. The iron content of the ore comprises 94.5 percent of the metallic require-.
ments. Efficiency of use of iron: 0.93 (33.3 + 0.54) (1.0 + 0.93) 0.945 = 62.6 million
tons. 1.121/
c. The estimated rate for the USSR is 0.95 ton of. coke per ton of pig iron. Total coked
pig iron and ferroalloys: 32.8 million tons.
d. Six cubic meters of charcoal are required to smelt 1 ton of charcoal pig. Charcoal
pig production is estimated to be 1.5 percent of total production -- that is, 500,000 tons.
A cubic meter of charcoal weighs 130 kg: (33.3 x 0.015) (6 x 0.130) 390,000 tons of char-
coal. 123/
e. The average manganese content of Soviet pig irons is 2 percent. About 55 percent of
the manganese content comes from charging lover grade (average 40 percent manganese) ore.
The efficiency of manganese ore in the blast furnace is 60 percent. (33.3 x 0.02 x 0.55)
(1.0 + 0.4) (1.0 + 0.6) = 1.530 million tons. Li2Lii
f. Of the metallic inputs to the blast furnace charge, 5,5 percent comes from scrap, mill
scale, and open hearth slag.lin/
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Table 41
Aed.CTEMT-11.-Teluiltements for the Blast Furnace Industry (SIC No. 3311) in the USSR
1955
(Continued)
g. This estimate is based on limestone requirements of 500 kg per ton of pig iron.. 426/
h. This estimate is based on 3.4 kg of refractory brick needed for every ton of pig iron
and does not include refractories for new construction.. 427/
i. This estimate is based on 40 percent of the production of blast'fUrnace gas being
used in the blast furnace industry (25 percent in stoves and 15 percent-in powerhouses).
Gas production is 3,750 cubic meters per ton of pig iron, (33.3 x 3,750 x 0.40) = a to-
tal of 50 billion cubic meters. 428/
j. This estimate is based on 15 kwh per ton of pig iron.
It. This estimate is based on 391 kg of water required-per ton of pig iron. At normal
pressures and temperatures, water weighs 62.4 pounds per cubic foot, and 1 cubic foot
equals 7.48 gallons.
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Table 42
Selected Input Requirements for the Steel Works and Rolling Mill Industry (SIC No. 3312) in the USSR Et/
1955
Input
Pig iron hi
Scrap Ei
Iron ore (54 percent iron) aJ
Electric power si
Limestone
Manganese ore (40 percent manganese) gi
Refractories hi
Fuel oil (mazut) 1/
Blast furnace gas 1/
Coke oven gas
Coal for gas producers Ai
Electrodes hi
Tin 1/
Unit
Million metric tons
Million metric Lona
Million metric tons
Million kilowatt-hours
Million metric tons
Million metric tons
Million metric tons '
Million metric tons
Million cubic meters
Million cubic meters
Million metric tons
Million metric tons
Thousand metric tons
Amount
25.250
19.364
3.411
10,200.0
3.360
0.407
, 2.360
1.570
37,500.0
4,430.0
2.62
0.053
2.82
a. The requirements are based on a production of 45.3 million tons of crude steel in 1955 of which 3.22
million tons were part of the stecl.casting industry leaving 42.08 million tons as the production of the
steel rolling and drawing industry. Of the 42.08 million tons, 38.37 million tons were produced in open
hearth furnaces, 2.39 million tons in electric furnaces, and 1.32 million tons in Bessemer converters.
b. The percentage of metallics charged as pig iron (usually as hot metal) are: open hearth, 56 percent,
electric, 3 percent; and converter, 90 percent. The efficiency of each process is: open hearth, 90 per-
cent; electric, 93 percent; and converter, 90 percent. Total metallic input requirements (pig iron,
scrap, and iron in iron ore) are: open hearth, 42.6 million tons; electric, 2.57 million tons; and con-
verter, 1.47 million tons. Pig iron requirements are, therefore: open hearth, 23.85 million tons; elec-
tric, 0.077 million tons; and converter, 1.323 million tons -- a grand total of 25.25 million tons of
pig iron.122,9i
c. The percentage of metallic? charged as scrap are: open hearth, 40 percent; electric, 94 percent;
and converter, 6 percent. Total scrap inputs are: open hearth, 17.04 million tons; electric, 2.415
million tons; and converters, 0.088 million tons -- a total of 19.543 million tons. 112/
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Table 42
Selected Input Requirements for the Steel Works. and Rolling Mill Industry (SIC No. 3312) in the USSR
1955
(Continued)
d. Iron ore concentrates, as charged to furnaces for feed and charge ore and coolants, are estimated
to average 54 percent iron. 431/ The percentage of metallics charged as 54 pereent ore are: open
hearth, It percent; electric, 3 percent; and converter, 4 percent. Total ore inputs are: open hearth,
3.16 million tons; electric, 0.142 million tons; and converter, 0.109 million tons -- a total of 3.411
million tons of 514 percent iron ore. 432/
e. This estimate is based on 242.5 kwh per ton of crude steel and includes all power necessary for
rolling and finishing.
f. This estimate is based on an average use of 8o kg per ton of crude steel. 433/
g. An average of 10 kg of 40 percent manganese ore is added to each ton of open hearth steel. This
amount is assumed to cover electric furnaces but not converters. Mt/
h. Refractory brick requirements, not including new construction amount to 16 kg per ton of crude
steel. This includes reheating furnaces in the rolling Mills. In addition, large amounts of refrac-
tory materials, usually powders, are required in the amount of 4o kg per ton of crude steel. 435/
i. About 4.5 million British thermal units (Btu) per ton of open hearth steel are required. Fuel
oil (mazut) contains 39,600 Btu per kg, and therefore 113.5 kg of mazut are required per ton of crude
steel produced in oil-fired furnaces. An estimated 20 percent of the open hearth steel is produced in
oil-fired furnaces. Soaking pits require about 2 million Btu per ton of crude steel. About 20 percent
of the soaking pits are oil fired. All finished steel is estimated to undergo one reheat at about an
80-percent yield where, again 2 million Btu per ton are required. 213?/ Open hearth oil would amount to
(38.37 x 0.20) (113.5) = 872,600 tons. Soaking pits (38.37 x 0.20) (2.0 x 10? 39,600) = 388,000
tons. Reheating furnaces (38.37 x,0.20 x 0.80) (2.0 x 10? 39,600) = 310,000 tons. 437/
j. Btu requiremeRts for the 80 percent of open hearth furnaces not oil fired would amount to (38.37
x 0.8o x 4.5 x 101. = 138 x 1o12 Btu. Excluding oil-fired soaking pits, Btu requirements for the re-
mainder would be 2.08 - j38.37 x 0.20)L7 2.0 x 10? or 69 x 1012 Btu. For reheating furnaces the
Btu requirement would be 2.08 - (38.37 x 0.20)1 5.80 x 2.0 x 1027 or 55 x 1012 Btu. Total Btu .
requirements are 263 x lOZ Btu. Total blast furnace gas production is 125 x 109 cubic meters of
which 30 percent is used in steelmaking and finished operations; this would amount to 37.5 x 109
cubic meters. Blast furnace gas contains 3,570 Btu per cubic meter. Blast furnace gas, therefore, ?
supplies (37.5 x 109 x 3,570) or 134 x 1012 Btu of a total of 263 x 1012 Btu. Coke gas supplies 30
percent of the Btu requirements or (263 x 1012 x 0.30) or 79 x 1012 Btu. Coke oven gas contains
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Table 42
Selected Input Requirements for the Steel Works and Rolling Mill Industry (SIC No. 3312) in the USSR .2/
1955
(Continued)
17,860 Bt R per cubic meter. Total coke gas requirements would then be (79 x 1014 + 17.460 x 103) or
4.43 x 10 cubic meters. Prvaucer gas made in coal-fired gas generators would supply the remaining
Btu, or 263 - 213) = 50 x 101.2 Btu. Producer gas contains 4,760 Btu per cubic meter.. Producer gas
requirements are (50 x 1012 + 4.76 x 103) = 10.5 x 109 cubic meters. One pound of dry coal produces
65.0 cubic feet of gas converted to cubic meters of gas per ton of coal is 4,013 (65 x 2,205 x 0.028).
Coal required for gas generators is, therefore, (10.5 x 109 + 4.013 x 103), or 2.62 million tons.
k. This estimate is based on a requirement of 22 kg of electrodes per every ton of crude steel produced
in electric furnaces (0.22 x 2.390) or 53,000 tons. Lila/
1* LI-12/
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Thble 43
Selected Input Requirements for the Steel CastingIndustry (SIC No.
1955
3323) in the USSR 2/
Input
Pig iron b/
Scrap E/
Iron ore 1/
Electric power a/
Limestone 1/
Manganese ore (40 percent manganese) g/
Refractories h/
Fuel oil (mazut).1/
Coal for gas producers 1/
Electrodes k/
Sandy
Unit
Million metric tons
Million metric, tons
Million metric tons
Million kilowatt-hours
Million metric tons
Million metric tons
Million metric tons
Million metric tons
Million metric tons
Thousand metric tons
Million metric tons
Amount
? 1.145
2.260
0.246
177.0
0.183
0.073
0.576
0.049
0.405
18.0
8.85
a. The requirements are based on a steel casting of 1.77 million tons (rough-finished
casting). Ata yield of 55 percent from the "as-poured" condition to the rough finished
casting the metallic "pour" would be 3.22 million tons. It is estimated that in the USSR
60 percent of the steel castings are made in open hearth furnaces, 25 percent in electric
furnaces, and 15 percent in converters. Furnace efficiencies are: open hearth, 90 per-
cent; electric, 93 percent; and converter, 90 percent.
b. The percentage of metallics charged as pig iron are: open hearth, 30 percent; elec-
tric 3 percent; and converter, 90 percent. Total metallic inputs are 3.54 million tons,
'of which open hearth requires 2.14 million tons; electric, 0.87 million tons; and conver-
ter, 0.53 million tons. Pig iron requirements are, therefore: open hearth, 0.642 mil-
lion tons; electric, 0.026 million tons; and converter, 0.477 million tons -- a total of
1.145 million tons. 440/
c. The percentage of metallics charged as scrap are: open hearth, 66 percent; electric,
94 percent; and converter, 6 percent. Total scrap inputs are: open hearth, 1.41 million
tons; electric, 0.818 million tons; and converter, 0.032 million tons -- a total of 2.26
million tons. 441/
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Table 43
Selected Input Requirements for the Steel Casting Industry (SIC No. 3323) in the USSR 1/
1955
(Continued)
d. Iron ore concentrates as charged to furnaces are estimated at: open hearth, 4 per-
cent; electric, 3 percent; and converter 4 percent. Total iron ore inputs (average 54
percent iron) are: open hearth, 0.159 million tons; electric, 0.048 million tons; and
converter, 0.039 million tons a total of 0.246 million tons. LiLq/
e. This estimate is based on a requirement of 100 kwh per ton of steel castings. !Al/
f. Limestone requirements are equal to 5 percent of the charge of 3.651 million
tons.
g. Manganese requirements are equal to 2 percent of the charge. La12/
h. Refractory brick requirements are 10 percent of the charge, and refractory materials
are 5.8 percent. .12-24S
i. This estimate is based on a requirement of 5 million Btu per ton of crude steel.
Sixty percent of the crude steel for castings is made in open hearth furnaces, 20 per-
cent of which are oil fired. 14147/ There are 394? Btu in 1 kg of mazut. Fgel oil
requirements are (3.220 x O.e x 0.20) (5.0 x 10 + 39,600) = 48,700 tons. 121171/
J. Btu required for use in open hearth furnaces producing castings with producer gas
(3.220 x 100 x 0.60 x 5 x 100) = 7.74 x 1012 Btu. Producer gas contains 4,760 Btu per
cubic meter. Therefore, tpe cubic meters of producer gas required are (7.74 x 1012 +
4.760 x 103) or 1,620 x 10? cubic meters. One pound of dry coal produces 65 cubic feet
of gas converted to cubic meters of gas per ton of coal is 4,013 (65 x 2,205 x 0.028).
Coal required for gas generators is, therefore, (1,620 x 100 + 4.013 x 103) or 405,000
tons.
k. This eStimate is based on 22 kg per ton of electric furnace steel produced for
castings (0.022 x 810 x 103) or 18,000 tons. 449/ .
1. Five tons of sand are required for every ton of rough finished casting: (1.77
x 100 x 5.0) = 8.85 million tons.
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Table 44
Selected Input Requirements
for the Iron Casting Industry (SIC Nos. 3321'and 3322) in the USSR
1955
Input
Pig iron hi
Scrap
Electric power 1/
Limestone
Coke 1/
Refractories g/
Sand h/
Coal for gas producers
Unit
Million metric tons
Million metric tons
Million kilowatt-hours
Million metric tons
Million metric tons
Million metric tons
Million metric tons
Million metric tons
Amount
4.570
7.780
699.0
0.495
1.730
0.827
35.0
0.350
a. The requirements are based on a total production of iron castings of
6.994 million tons, of which gray cast iron is 6.436 million tons and mal-
leable cast iron is 0.558 million tons. At a yield of 63 percent from the
"as-poured" condition to the rough finished casting the metallic "pour"
would be 11.1 million tons. Cupola efficiency is 90 percent.
b. Thirty-seven perc9nt of the foundry charge is pig iron. The metallic
charge is 11.100 x 100 + 0.90 or 12.35 million tons. 451
c. Sixty-three percent of the foundry charge is scrap. 52/
d. Power requirements are 100 kwh per ton of iron castings. 453/
e. Limestone requirements are equal to 4 percent of the charge of 12.35
million tons. 454/
f. Coke requirements are equal to 14 percent of the charge. 455/
g. .Refractory brick requirements are 5.7 percent of the charge, and re-
fractory materials are 1 percent. 456/
h. This estimate is based on 5 tons of sand required foF every ton of
rough finished casting: (6.994 x 106 x 5.0) = 35.0 x 10?.
i. This estimate is based on 0.315 tons of coal required per 1 ton of
cast iron obtained from a cupola furnace. 458/
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APPENDIX B
METHODOLCGY
1. Section V, B, 5, Vanadium.
For 1 ton of 4o percent ferrovanadium, 840 kg of vanadium pentoxide
(V205) is required. 459/ The production of vanadium pentoxide at Chusovoy
is related to the production of pig iron. On the basis of this relation-
ship, production of ferrovanadium was estimated by applying the following
factors:
? a. The vanadium in the pig iron is "slagged" off in a converter
at the rate of 45 kg per 1 ton of pig iron. 1?2/
b. This slag contains 14.5 percent vanadium pentoxide; 45 kg x
14.5 percent = 6.5 kg of vanadium pentoxide per 1 ton of pig iron. 461/
c. The slag is treated at a chemical plant to release the
vanadium pentoxide from the slag. The recovery rate is 8o percent; 6.5
kg x 80 percent = 5.2 kg from 1 ton of pig iron. 462/
d. If each ton of 40 percent ferrovanadium requires 84o kg of
vanadium pentoxide, it will take 840 + 5.21 160 tons, of pig iron for
each ton of ferrovanadium. Dividing the pig iron production at Chusovoy
by 160 provides a reasonable estimate of ferrovanadium production in the
USSR.
2. Section V, B, 8, Ferroalloys.
The derivation of estimated production of electric furnace ferroalloys
in the USSR in selected years, 1931-55, is shown in Table 45.*
* Table 45 follows on p. 164.
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Table 45
Estimated Production of Electric Furnace Ferroalloys in the USSR
Selected Years, 1931-55
Metric Tons
Year
? 1931
1932
1933
1935
1937
1943
1945
1946
1950
1955
Production
' 4,614 2/
15,299 2?/
21,000 2/
94,162 2/
172,000 2/
225,000 2/
225,000 1/
258,000 2/
315,000 1/
42o;000 E/
a. 463/
b. This estimate is 46o percent of production of 1931. 464/
c. 465/
d. the loss of Zaporozh'ye was offset by 50X1
increased production at Aktyubinsk and Kuznetsk. 466/
e. 5,600 percent of 1931. 467/
f. Production was planned to be 80 percent above the 1945 level,
but all other evidence points to a lesser figure. One-half, 4o
percent, of planned production was used in this table. Also the
estimate for 1945 may be high)
g. This estimate is based on an analysis of estimated require-
ments, plant capacity figures, miscellaneous production figures,
US analogy, and the historical pattern developed to 1950.
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a. Ferromanganese.
Total manganese required for steel production in the USSR
in 1955 was 351,000 tons. liY1/ The amounts of manganese contained in
various types of ferromanganese are as follows:
Type
Electric furnace (80 percent manganese)
Spiegeleisen (Sp, 17.5 percent manganese)
Blast furnace (72.5 percent manganese)
The amounts of manganese consumed converted into
follows:
Type
Amount
(Metric Tons)
128,000* 470/
75,000** LEV
148,000***
ferromanganese are as
Amount
(Metric Tons)
Electric furnace
160,000 472/
Spiegeleisen
427,000*He* 4
3
Blast furnace
164,000**Hei
7
/
b. Ferrosilicon.
Consumption of silicon in terms of 45 percent ferrosilicon
constitutes on the average 0.3 percent of the total amount of steel
produced in the.USSR.12.72/ The 0.3 percent applied to the 1955 steel
production of 45.3 million tons gives 136,000 tons of 45 percent ferro-
silicon containing 61)000 tons of silicon.
* Estimated 1955 production of ferromanganese at Zestafoni and Zapo-
rozh'ye: 160,000 tons x 0.80 average manganese content = 128,000 tons.
** 0.4 kg of spiegeleisen per ton of steel x 45.3 million tons x 175 kg
of manganese in 1 ton of spiegeleisen= 75,000 tons.
*** 148,000 tons is a residual figure.
**** 9.4 kg/ton x 45.3 million tons = 427,000 tons.
xxxxx 148,000 tons of manganese 0.725 average manganese content
204,000 tons of ferromanganese x 0.80 to compensate for manganese losses
in producing ferromanganese = 164,000 tons.
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A study of all available data on ferrosilicon production ca-
pacity in the USSR indicates a capacity of 125,000 tons capable of produc-
ing approximately 100,000 tons of ferrosilicon requiring 45,000 tons of
silicon. 476/ The remaining 16,000 tons of silicon is used for making
blast furnace ferrosilicon, which is called "silvery pig" and which con-
tains 11 percent silicon on the average. The 16,000 tons of silicon can
support a production of 145,000 tons of silvery pig.
3. Section XIII, Employment, Labor Productivity, and Wages.
a. Iron Ore Mining.
In the USSR in 1955, 86.1 million tons of raw iron ore were
mined of which 34.4 million tons were mined underground and 51.7 million
tons were mined by the open-pit method. At Krivoy Rog) 40)000 workers
produced 32.1 million tons in 1955 of which 86.4 percent, 27.7 million
tons, were mined underground. Underground mining requires approximately
three times the labor force per ton of raw ore mined that open-pit mining
requires. Therefore, to obtain production per worker for open-pit and
underground mining, the following equation was used:
u = tons per underground worker
x = tons per open-pit worker
3u = x and 27.7 + 4.4 =0x 103
u = 730 tons and x = 2)190 tons
The production per open-pit worker of 2)190 tons compares with
a productivity of 2)540 tons per worker at Magnitogorsk and 1,800 tons
per worker at the Tagil open-cut mines. For this a figure of 2)220 tons
per open-pit worker seems plausible. Based on the estimates given above,
all open-pit mining would require 23)500 workers, and underground opera-
tions would require 47,200 workers -- a total labor force of 71,000
workers.
b. Manganese Ore Mining.
In the USSR in 1955, 11 million tons of raw manganese ore were
mined of which 2.75 million tons were mined by the open-pit method and
8.25 million tons were mined underground. At Chiatura, 10,000 workers
mined 6 million tons of raw ore; 15 percent was mined by the open-pit
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method, and 85 percent was mined underground. Underground mining re-
quires about three times the labor force per ton of raw ore mined that
open-pit mining requires. The calculation used is similar to that used
for iron ore mining. Therefore, 145100 underground and 1,570 open-pit
workers were required for a total manganese ore mining labor force of
15,670, or approximately 16,000.
c. Limestone Quarrying.
About 20 million tons of limestone were mined in the USSR in
1955 under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy for
use in iron and steel plants. Limestone is readily won by the open-pit
method, so a productivity of 2,200 tons per worker has been assumed. The
required labor force would then be 9,100 workers.
d. Ferroalloy Plants at Coke-Chemical Plants.
In the case of Soviet ferroalloy plants, estimates based on
documentary sources were made plant by plant. Production per worker
for all workers in coke-chemical plants is given in a Soviet journal.
e. Iron and Steel Plants.
At Magnitogorsk in 1955, 28,278 workers were required for the
production of 5.8 million tons of crude steel, an average of 220 tons
per worker. Production of crude steel per worker at Magnitogorsk is
known to have been twice the average for the industry in 1955. The
production of 45.2 million tons of crude steel therefore would require
(at a rate of 110 tons per worker) 411,000 workers.
f. Administrative.
An estimate of the number of administrative workers required
in the Soviet ferrous metallurgical industry was based on the number
of main administrations and administrative staffs in the Soviet Ministry
of Ferrous Metallurgy and the Ukrainian Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy.
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50X1
25443 7-56
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/16: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800020002-8
50X1
I . leen. n-? ra-roalloy Plants, 1955
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy ApprovedilOr?Release 2013/09/16: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800020002-8
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25494 7.56
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/16: CIA-RDP79R01141A000800020002-8
50X1
OX1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/16 :
CIA-R DP79 R01141A000800020002-8
SECRET
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/16 :
CIA-R DP79 R01141A000800020002-8