THE ECONOMIC CONTROL MECHANISM OF COMMUNIST CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01141A000600070001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 20, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

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73
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE ECONOMIC CONTROL MECHANISM
OF COMMUNIST CHINA
CIA/RR 69
20 January 1956
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE ECONOMIC CONTROL MECHANISM OF COMMUNIST CHINA
CIA/RR 69
(ORR Project 41.524)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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FOREWORD
This report attempts to describe analytically the economic organi-
zation of Communist China and to evaluate the effectiveness of that
organization as an economic control mechanism. Through a description
of the nature of Soviet influence and control over the Chinese eco-
nomic structure and of the close parallel between the Soviet and
Chinese systems, the degree of Chinese dependence upon the USSR is
made manifest.
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CONTENTS
Summary and Conolusions
I. Introduction
II. Economic Control Organization
Page
1
3
3
A. Productive and Extractive Industry Agencies 5
B. Service Agencies 6
C. Planning and Control Agencies 6
1. State Planning Commission 6
2. National Construction Commission 8
3. Ministry of Finance 9
4. The People's Bank 10
5. Ministry of Labor 11
6. Ministry of Local Industry 12
7. Third Ministry of Machine Building 12
8. State Statistical Bureau 13
9. Central Handicraft Industry Administrative
Bureau 13
10: Central Industry and Commerce Administrative Control
Bureau 14
11: Ministry of Public Security 14
12. Ministry of Supervision 15
III. Role of the USSR in the Chinese Communist Economic Control
Mechanism 16
A. Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation ? ? ? 16
B. Use of Soviet Administrative Prototypes
and Procedures 17
C. Soviet Influence at the Plant Level 20
D. Soviet Advisers at the Ministerial Level 21
E. Soviet Influence on Chinese Communist Economic Policy
and Planning 22
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Appendixes
Appendix A. Counterpart Economic Agencies in Communist China
and the USSR
Appendix B. Methodology
Pace
25
29
Illustrations
Figure 1. Communist China: The State Council and Its
Subordinate Bodies
Figure 2. Communist China: Sectors of the Economy Controlled
by Productive and Extractive Industry Ministries .
Figure 3. Communist China: Organization of the Ministry
of Heavy Industry
Figure 4. Communist China: Sectors of the Economy Controlled
by Service Ministries and Agencies
Figure 5. Communist China: Tentative Structure of the State
Planning Commission
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CIA/RR 69 S-E-C-R-E-T
(ORR Project 41.524)
THE ECONOMIC CONTROL MECHANISM OF COMMUNIST CHINA*
Summary and Conclusions
The economic control mechanism of Communist China is formally in
the hands of 24 ministries, 2 commissions, and 5 specialized agencies --
all under the State Council, which is China's equivalent of the Council
of Ministers of the USSR. The number of economic control agencies has
steadily increased over the brief life of the regime as various sectors
of the economy have, developed and as China has increasingly modeled- its
economic and political institutions after those of the USSR.
The 12 ministries which contrOl the productive and extractive
industries and the 10 ministries (and 1 specialized agency) which con-
trol the service industries are typically organized into line and staff
units with Control Bureaus responsible for the industrial installations
or other producing units in the various economic subsectors and with
staff offices concerned with such functions as planning, design, fi-
nance, and production techniques. There is reason to believe, however,
that in some cases the principles of line and staff organization are
violated with resulting confusion of authority.
The remaining agencies in the economic structure are primarily con-
trol and coordination agencies concerned with such matters as over-all
planning, budgeting, and auditing. Although'these organs would appear
to have what are normally considered staff functions, there is a
tendency to give some of them line responsibility so that, for example,
the accounting function throughout the state-controlled operating
sector of the economy is directly under the jurisdiction of a separate
accounting administrative system under the Ministry of Finance. A
further administrative anomaly is the formal independence of the
People's Bank of China from the Ministry of Finance, although it
functions as the operating arm of that ministry. Much of the recent
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent
the best judgment of ORE as of 15 December 1955.
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growth in the bureaucracy and the proliferation of new economic agencies
at the central level can be attributed to the growing need for central-
ized control over industry which is not part of the state enterprise
sector. Two new ministries have been established for this purpose, and
there are, in addition, two special agencies of the State Council which
have responsibilities for these sectors.
In addition to the normal economic controls exercised by the econom-
ic agencies, the Ministries of Public Security and Supervision act as
watchdogs over these agencies and their subordinate enterprises in
order to ensure against inefficiency and mismanagement as well as
against the more flagrant crimes and misdemeanors. Finally, the Chinese
Communist Party maintains ultimate control over the economy through
the placement of trained Party members at key posts within the govern-
ment hierarchy and in all important industrial installations. Thus
the mechanism described herein is in fact an instrument for the exe-
cution of Party policy and Party decisions,
Much of the economic control mechanism appears to be closely modeled
on Soviet prototypes. The presence of large numbers of Soviet advisers
with assignments all the way from the State Council down to the indi-
vidual plants reflects the continuing close ties between the USSR and
Communist China and is reflected in the increasing Soviet cast being
given to Chinese manufacturing and productive processes, management
and control techniques, and planning procedures and methods. Soviet
advisers appear to participate in all these activities, although
there is no evidence of their regular participation in major policy
decisions. Such decisions may, of course, reflect Soviet decisions
as to the direction and amount of aid which is granted to China and
in many instances are doubtless arrived at in ad hoc discussions
between Soviet and Chinese leaders.
Although certain administrative weaknesses are apparent in the
mechanism as described here and although the Chinese Communist
press and radio frequently complain of waste, inefficiency, and
mismanagement, it has not been possible to evaluate the strengths
and weaknesses of the Chinese economic control mechanism in any
detail on the basis of presently available information. It is
apparent that accounting and statistical techniques still leave
much to be desired. There appears also to be considerable dupli-
cation and an overelaborate hierarchy for the control procedures
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in many key sectors. Paradoxically, this situation probably reflects
the shortage of trained managerial personnel, since there is an appar-
ent tendency to regard quantity as a substitute for quality in this
field. In spite of these weaknesses, however, the progress made by
the Chinese Communist economy and the apparent success of the control
mechanism in such key matters as the control of inflation are some
evidence that the system is increasingly developing an ability to
provide the strong controls required at this stage in China's econom-
ic growth.
I. Introduction.
The economic control mechanism of Communist China consists in
part of that portion of the formal structure of government devoted
to economic matters and in part of the Communist Party organiza-
tion, which has firm control over the government structure through
the placement therein of reliable Party functionaries. Although
this report is devoted largely to a description of the government
structure, it should be borne in mind that major policy decisions
are made in the high organs of the Party and that the structure
described here exists primarily to carry out these decisions and
other expressions of the Party's will.
II. Economic Control Organization.
The Chinese Communist economy is formally controlled by a
number of economic ministries, commissions, and agencies under
the State Council, a body similar in structure and function to
the Council of Ministers of the USSR. (See Figure 1.*) The
State Council, although responsible to the National People's
Congress and its Standing Committee, is the highest administra-
tive organ of the state. Of the 34 ministries which comprise
the Council, 24 may be classified as economic, and 2 of the 5
commissions and 5 of the 20 specialized agencies have primarily
* Fbllowing p. 4.
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economic responsibilities. The number of these economic agencies has
grown considerably over the period since the establishment of the
regime. For example, only 13 economic ministries were listed in the
People's Handbook as of 3 February 1951. 1/* New ministries have
been created by dividing the functions of a predecessor ministry, as
in the case of the Ministries of the Coal Industry, the Petroleum
Industry, and the Electric Power Industry, which were created from
the several control bureaus of the former Ministry of the Fuel Indus-
try in June 1955 ..?"; by taking functions away from an existing minis-
try, as in the case of the several Ministries of Machine Building
which were created out of the Ministry of Heavy Industry _V; or by
establishing a new ministry to handle some function that has assumed
pressing importance, as in the case of the Ministry of Agricultural
Products Procurement created in June 1955. V
The gradual increase in the number of economic agencies reflects
an increasing degree of specialization and probably is designed also
to reflect the growth of developing sectors of the economy to the
extent where full-fledged ministries are required to administer them.
The creation of new ministries .r. .bly also reflects the Soviet
influence, following a major reorganization 50X1
of the government in the fall of 1952: "The Chinese leaders have
been taught by the Soviets to be fanatical believers in specializa-
tion. They aim to increase the number of ministries to as many as
sixty when the construction program gets into full stride." 2/
In the majority of cases the name of each economic organization
is sufficient clue to its general function. An attempt is made
here, however, to delineate the responsibilities and functions of
the more important of these agencies so far as is currently possible
in order to present in detail a picture of the organization of the
economy.
For the purpose of this delineation, the several agencies may
be divided into those which control productive or extractive indus-
tries, those which provide services, and those which perform over-all
planning and control functions. It is recognized that this division
is somewhat artificial because certain of the agencies have respon-
sibilities which cut across these lines. The approach serves,
however, the purpose of placing them in a workable order for examina-
tion and analysis.
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SECRET
COMMUNIST CHINA
The State Council and Its Subordinate Bodies
as of I December 1955
State Council
Prime Minister
Vice Prime Ministers (10)
Ministers (34)
Commission Heads (5)
Secretary General
1mm.ImmiH Eight
Staff Offices
Ministries
Internal Affairs
Foreign Affairs
Defense
Public Security
Justice
Supervision
Finance
Food
Commerce
Foreign Trade
Heavy Industry
First Machine Building
Second Machine Building
Third Machine Building
Geology
Agricultural Products Procurement
Building
Textile Industry
Light Industry
Local Industry
Railroads
Communications
Posts and Telecommunications
Agriculture
Forestry
Water Conservancy
Labor
.Culture
Higher Education
Education
Public Health
Coal Industry
Electric Power Industry
Petroleum Industry
14955 12-55
Commissions
State Planning Commission
National Construction Commission
Physical Culture and Sports Commission
Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission
Nationalities Affairs Commission
SECRET
Specialized Agencies
State Statistical Bureau
People's Bank of China
State Bureau of Measures and Standards
Central Handicrafts Administrative Bureau
Civil Aviation Bureau
Central Meteorological Bureau
Central Industry and Commerce Administrative Bureau
New China News Agency
Broadcasting and Motion Picture Administrative Bureau
Committee for Reform of tho Chinese Written Language
Foreign Cultural Relations Liaison Bureau
State Council Religious Affairs Bureau
State Council Law Codification Bureau
State Council Personnel Bureau
State Archives Bureau
Central Confidential Communications Bureau
State Council Office of Councillors
State Council Expert Work Bureau
State Council Government Organs Affairs Bureau
Prime Minister's Staff Office
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Figure 1
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A. Productive and Extractive Industry Agencies.
The 12 ministries which make up this group and the sectors of
the economy which they control are shown in Figure 2.* The typical
ministry in this group is organized into staff or functional
offices and into control bureaus, which are the line organizations
responsible for the state-operated plants of the several subsectors
of the economy assigned to the ministry.
Figure 3* presents a summarized organization chart of the
Ministry of Heavy Industry as an example of the typical ministerial
structure. Y This ministry and others in the group appear to
follow simple line and staff organizational principles, but infor-
mation on the actual working relationships of the functional offices
(staff) and the control bureaus (line) is too fragmentary to provide
an accurate picture of the true nature of the organization. In
some cases it appears that the offices have functional authority
over units in the line organization; in others their responsibility
appears limited to staff advisory and technical assistance to the
line organization. For example, in the planning process, the min-
istry's Planning Office appears to have some functional authority.
Plans made by units at each level in the organization are drawn up
in accordance with a format imposed by the immediately superior
unit based on the requirements of that unit and on the requirements
and regulations of all organizations higher in the scale. Thus the
plan of a Control Bureau is a consolidation of the plans submitted
by the individual enterprises under its control. The approval of
the ministry's Planning Office is required before the bureau plan
can be included in the comprehensive plan for the ministry. It
appears, however, that the approval is given or withheld in the
name of the ministry itself, so that the principle of line authority
is honored. //
The principle of functional authority of organs at the office
level appears to obtain also in the field of design. At a confer-
ence of subordinate designing units called by the main Designing
Office of the First Ministry of Machine Building in September 1953,
it was noted that a policy had been established of unifying and
* Following p. 6.
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concentrating the designing force with the main bureau responsible for
directing design work and the subbureaus responsible for undertaking
it. /
In other instances the office units probably function as line units
themselves. This is evidently true of the Basic Construction Offices
which are characteristically a feature of ministries of this type and
which have construction and engineering companies under their control.
The large number of construction agencies which results from this
organizational arrangement appears to have been recognized as a pos-
sible source of the chronic problems in the construction field, which
the National Construction Commission (see p. 8, below) presumably
was created to solve.
B. Service Agencies.
The 10 ministries and 1 specialized agency which make up this
group and the sectors of the economy which they control are shown in
Figure 4.* Because of the great variation in activities and the lack
in several cases of detailed information on organizational breakdown,
no one ministry in this group can be considered typical. It is
believed, however, that, where feasible, the same pattern exists which
was observed in the industrial ministries -- that is, Control Bureaus
in charge of subsectors of the economy and staff offices handling
such functions as planning, personnel, and other specialized matters.
Thus the organizational pattern of line and staff appears to be
generally characteristic of the ministries in both groups.
C. Planning and Control Agencies.
There are 11 agencies in the administrative structure of the
Chinese Communist government whose duties may be characterized as
including economic planning or control functions. This figure includes
5 ministries, 2 commissions, and 4 agencies of the State Council.
1. State Planning Commission.
Like its predecessor, the State Planning Committee, the
State Planning Commission has been little publicized, and its exact
* Following p. 6.
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SECRET
COMMUNIST CHINA
Sectors of the Economy Controlled by Productive and Extractive Industry Ministries
()soft November /955
Ministry
of
Heavy
Industry
Ministry
of
Light
Industry
First
Ministry
of
Machine
Building
Second
Ministry
of
Machine
Building
Third
Ministry
of
Machine
Building
Ministry
of the
Textile
Industry
Ministry
of
Local
Industry
Ministry
of
Agriculture
Ministry
of
Forestry
Ministry
of the
Coal
Industry
Ministry
of the
Electric Power
Industry
Ministry
of the
Petroleum
Industry
Iron and Steel
Construction
Materials
Nonferrous
Metals
Chemicals
Tobacco
Liquor
Processed Foods:
Salt
Sugar
Canned Goods
Oils and Fats
X-Ray and Med-
ical Equipment
-Pharmaceuticals
Paper Goods
Rubber Goods
Leather Goods
Paint
Weighing and
Measuring
Equipment
Machine Tools
Shipbuilding
Locomotives
and Rolling
Stock
Automobiles
Electrical
Equipment
Mining
Machinery
General
Industrial
Machinery
and
Equipment
Agricultural
Tools and
Equipment
Arms and
Munitions
Local, public-
private, pri-
vate, and
cooperative
machine and
electrical
industries
Textiles
Textile Machin-
ery and
Equipment
Other local,
public-private,
private, and
cooperative
industries
Agriculture
Fisheries
and Marine
Products
Reforestation
Timber-cutting
Lumber Mills
Coal
Electric Power
Petroleum
14963 12-55
SECRET
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Figure 2
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SECRET
COMMUNIST CHINA
Organization of the Ministry of Heavy Industry?Simplified
as of 29 April 1955
Minister
Deputy Ministers
Bask
Financial
Production
Management
Planning
Construction
Affairs
Technique
Office
Office
Office
Office
Office
_I_
Labor Wage
Office
Geological
Office
Designing
Office
Anshan
Iron and Steel
Construction
Nonferrous Metals
Chemical
Steel and Iron
Industry
Materials Industry
Industry
Industry
Company*
Control Bureau
Control. Bureau
Control Bureau
Control Bureau
*This important industrial complex is administratively separate from the rest of the iron and steel industry
14956 12-55
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Cadre Office
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Figure 3
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Ministry of
Commerce
Domestic Trade
(including
supervision of
State Trading
companies)
14964 12-55
Ministry of
Foreign Trade
Export and Import
Administration
Customs Admini-
stration:
Shipping
Registration of
Private and
Foreign Export-
Import Firms
Ministry of
Geology
Geological Survey
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COMMUNIST CHINA
Sectors of the Economy Controlled by Service Ministries and Agencies
Ministry of
Building
Construction
City Planning
Ministry of
Railroads
Railroad Operations,
Construction and
Maintenance
as oft November 1955
Ministry of
Posts and Tele-
communications
Postal Service
Telephone Service
Telegraph Service
Radio Service
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Ministry of
Communications
Highways
Ports, Harbors,
and Waterways
Inland, Coastal,
and Ocean Ship-
ping
Civil Aviation
Bureau
Civil Aviation
Ministry of
Water
Conservancy
Flood Control
Irrigation Projects
Ministry of
Food
Storage and Distri-
bution of Grain
.(See also
Mini-
stry of Finance)
Some food pro-
cessing
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Ministry of
Agricultural
Products
Procurement
Collection and
purchase of grain,
cotton, vegetable
oilseeds for
domestic supply
and rationing
purposes
Figure 4
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structure and functions are not known. Because the Commission is now
listed as one of 39 ministries and commissions, all presumably equal
in rank, it is believed that it holds a lesser position in the govern-
ment hierarchy than did its predecessor. Further evidence for this
belief is the purge of its former Chairman, Kao Kang, and the fact
that appointees to the new commission appear to have less stature in
Party and government ranks than did their predecessors. Also, the
establishment of a National Construction Commission may have divided
in some degree the over-all planning responsibility in the Chinese
economy.
In Figure 5* is shown the tentative structure of the
State Planning Commission, the subordinate bureaus of which are
those of the predecessor committee. Only the Bureau of Technical
Cooperation has been identified since the reorganization. 2/ If
this bureau, as is implied by its title, is involved in the program
of technical aid from the USSR and the European Satellites, it
probably plays an important role in the functions of the Commission.
Although the State Planning Commission may have lost
some power and prestige, as has been conjectured, it still remains
one of the key economic control bodies. Its place in the economic
planning process makes it responsible for the internal consistency
of the national economic plans, and accordingly it must play a role
in resolving conflicts between other economic agencies over the
all-too-scarce resources of capital, raw materials, and skilled
labor. The problems confronting such an organization are compounded
in Communist China by the transitional nature of its "progress towards
socialism." At present, there is a complicated combination of state
enterprises (some under the control of the central government and
some under the local governments), private enterprises, cooperatives,
and public-private joint enterprises. The organizational changes
which have recently taken place are undoubtedly a reflection of the
enormous task of coordinating the activities of these various groups
with a limited number of trained economic planners, statisticians,
and other experts.
* Following p. 8.
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2. National Construction Commission.
The National Construction Commission is a relatively new
organization, created in September 1954, under the chairmanship of
Po I-po, who has held other leading government posts in the regime
and is a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party. Although little is known about the functions of this com-
mission, it is probably modeled after the State Committee on Con-
struction Affairs of the USSR, which acts as an advisory and con-
sultative body to the Council of Ministers.
Probably the major reason for the creation of such a
commission in China was the lack of coordination between the con-
struction units of the various industrial ministries and their
subordinate organs, the numerous local state-operated construction
enterprises, and the Ministry of Building. A recent announcement
indicated that there are 183 civil engineer construction companies,
8 installing companies, 50 designing units, and 178 enterprises
engaged in construction work in China. 12/ Instead of being cent-
rally coordinated through one ministry or some other control organ,
these apparently have been responsible to a multiplicity of author-
ities, including the various industrial ministries and the provincial
and municipal governments. The exact role of the Ministry of Building
and its relationship to these various construction units has never
been clear. It is, however, apparent either that the ministry was
never intended to coordinate the activities of these units or that,
if it was so intended, it was a conspicuous failure in this respect.
Chronic complaints in the press of waste, inadequate planning, and
nonessential construction have reached a peak in 1955, 11/ and it is
assumed that the new commission will be expected to cope with this
problem. Probably its activities will thus include a role in the
detailed planning of the capital construction program, which is the
core of China's Five Year Plan.
A further organizational step which was taken to centralize
control of the construction enterprises was the creation of the People's
Construction Bank in September 1954. 1?_/ This bank was placed under the
Ministry of Finance and accordingly is discussed below under that body.
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SECRET
COMMUNIST CHINA
Tentative Structure of the State Planning Commission
as of /5 March /955
Chairman
Li Fu-ch'un
Deputy Chaimen
Chang Hsi Han Cho-i
Hsueh Mu-ch'iao Yang Ying-chieh
P'eng Tao Lo Keng-mo
Ku Cho-hsin
State Supplies
Allocation Bureau
14957 12-55
Comprehensive
Planning Bureau
Local Industry
Planning Bureau
Labor Wages
Planning Bureau
SECRET
Technical
Cooperation Bureau
Statistical Bureau
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3. Ministry of Finance.
The Ministry of Finance is one of the major control organs
of the Chinese Communist government because of its responsibilities
(a) for tax collection and administration 1.3/; (b) for the preparation,
execution, and audit of the National Budget 1L/; (c) for inspection and
supervision of financial policies, budgets, accounts, and audits of
enterprises and agencies of the Central Government W; and (d) for the
management of the National Treasury. 1W In addition, the ministry's
Office of Food Control has responsibility for the organization and
control of China's public granaries, which are considered part of the
treasury system. 17/
Although the People's Bank of China appears to be charged
with the detailed administration of many of the functions formally the
responsibility of the Ministry of Finance (for example, it acts as the
national treasury and exercises monetary control over state organs,
state-owned enterprises, and cooperatives 1.3./), it was established as
an independent organ and retains that status as one of the 20 special-
ized agencies under the direct supervision of the State Council. (See
Figure 1.*) It is noteworthy that a major banking function -- that of
providing investment funds for capital construction -- has recently
been put under the Ministry of Finance by the establishment, in
September 1954, of the People's Construction Bank. The announced func-
tions of the new bank were as follows: channeling investment funds to
capital construction units, supervising the use of these funds and the
execution of investment plans, and implementing cost accounting and
financial controls in capital construction units. 12/ The bank thus
became the successor to the Bank of Communications, which had previ-
ously been charged with these responsibilities, and it accordingly
took over the accounts of the various construction units originally
with that bank. 2.2/ This transfer, which appears to be a further
symptom of generally unsatisfactory performance in the field of
capital construction, removes the responsibility for overseeing the
use of construction funds from a subsidiary of the People's Bank
and places it directly under the Ministry of Finance. It is not yet
clear whether the Bank of Communications, which may have had some
nominal private interests, has been abolished. Possibly it continues
* Following p. 4, above.
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its responsibility for controlling long-term investments in public-
private enterprises. ?1,/ In any event, it is apparent that the move
is expected to provide a greater degree of supervision by the central
authorities over construction activities. The Ministry of Finance's
role in supervision of the budgets, accounts, and audits of subordinate
organizations, including enterprises of the Central Government, gives
it a control function over these enterprises which is apparently inde-
pendent of the industrial ministries. According to a textbook on govern-
ment accounting, "... The agencies or divisions in charge of a unit or
general accounting system are independent from other agencies or divi-
sions of the same government organization. ... The accounting offi-
cials ... in the central government have jurisdiction in accounting
matters over the accounting agencies in their affiliated agencies,
organizations, and enterprises. ... No accountant shall be appointed,
dismissed, or transferred without the consent of his superior in the
accounting administrative system. However, all accountants obey the
principal officials of their organizations in executive matters. In
this sense, a dual system of control exists." This system is said to
be adopted from the accounting laws and practices of the USSR. .2_2/
4. The People's Bank.
The People's Bank of China was established in December 1948
as the state bank of the regime. Under its direction were the following
four special banks: the Bank of China, responsible for controlling
foreign exchange operations; the Bank of Communications, responsible
for investment in basic construction and now superseded by the People's
Construction Bank; the Agricultural Cooperative Bank, responsible for
investment in agriculture, water conservation, and forestry (this bank
apparently never functioned, and on 25 March 1955 a new Agricultural
Bank under the People's Bank of China was established LV); and the
People's Insurance Company (transferred to the Ministry of Finance
in July 1952). ?II/
The functions of the People's Bank of China can best be
summarized by the statement that it is the operating arm of the
Ministry of Finance, although it is formally subordinate not to that
body but directly to the State Council. It is the national treasury
and clearinghouse and exercises monetary and currency control. It
also serves as the tax-collecting agency and conducts the construc-
tion bond drives and other national borrowing activities.
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A major activity of the People's Bank of China has been the
monetary control system which is designed to minimize the use of cash
and commercial credit in order to maintain price stability. The bank
acts as a clearinghouse for all transactions undertaken by government
offices, the armed forces, state enterprises, and cooperatives. By
limiting the amounts of cash which may be held by the various enter-
prises and by handling their receipts and disbursement, thus channeling
all transactions involving the transfer of funds through the books of
the state banking system, the bank is allegedly able to "assure that
the budget is faithfully executed, ... strengthen economic planning, ...
and keep monetary circulation at a normal level." ?2/ Although it is
doubtful that these objectives are achieved as completely as stated,
there seems little doubt that the monetary control system does give
the bank a strong supervisory and control role in the national economy
and probably has been a major factor in the Communists' ability to
halt the runaway inflation which characterized the last years of
Nationalist rule on the mainland.
5. Ministry of Labor.
The Ministry of Labor, which has no counterpart in the
USSR, does not appear to play an important role in the Chinese
Communist economic control mechanism. Its unimportance may have been
attributable to the fact that the Minister until the recent reorgani-
zation was Li Li-san, formerly a powerful figure in the Party but
in recent years very much in eclipse. Since policy apparently was
against an outright purge, it may have been decided to give him a
high-sounding but relatively meaningless post. He has now lost even
this vestige of power, and it may well be that the ministry itself
will disappear as the Chinese government organizational structure
grows ever closer to its Soviet prototype.
The control of labor appears to lie not with this minis-
try but in the labor union organizations headed by the All-China
Federation of Trade Unions. The Federation was originally controlled
by Li Li-san, from his post as First Vice Chairman, but he was removed
in 1953 when Lai Jo-yu took over the chairmanship. LY The union
organization also took over from the ministry the administration of
the labor insurance program in June 1954. E/ The labor insurance
office of the Ministry of Labor was forthwith abolished, leaving only
a staff office, a Labor Disputes Office, and a Labor Protection Office
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identified as subordinate units of this ministry. There is no informa-
tion on the activities of these offices, but, given the totalitarian
nature of the regime, it is doubted that they are particularly active.
6. Ministry of Local Industry.
The Ministry of 'Local Industry was established in the
government reorganization of September 1954. Nothing has been published
about its actual functions and responsibilities, but it seems probable
that it was created to coordinate the work of the local state-operated
industries and of other small plants which have assumed importance with
the increased program of conversion of private capitalistic enterprises
to state capitalism. _2.?./ Its Minister, Sha Ch'ien-li, was formerly a
Deputy Minister of Commerce, while 2 of the 3 Deputy Ministers were
formerly with the local industry bureaus at the regional administration
level. The third was director of the finance department of the Hunan
provincial government. 22/
7. Third Ministry of Machine Building.
The Third Ministry of Machine Building was established in
April 1955 as a further step in the program to centralize control over
smaller factories which did not come under the direct control of the
previously established Machine Building Industry Ministries but which
contributed to their over-all production program through contractual
arrangements. The official announcement of its establishment stated
that it was to direct the machine and electrical engineering indus-
tries of local State enterprises, joint State-private, co-operative
and private enterprises." Ej The new Minister, Chang Lin-chih, is a
former Deputy Minister of the Second Ministry of Machine Building,
which is believed to control the armaments industry.
The recent establishment of these two ministries with
jurisdiction over the nonnationalized state and other enterprises is
indicative of the belated recognition which is being given to the
importance of this sector of the economy. Such plants, while coming
increasingly under government control and dependence on government
orders for their continued existence, were apparently considered
among the prime targets of the campaigns against inefficiency, waste,
and corruption. Although ministries exist to control state enter-
prises in the economic sectors served by them, it was apparently
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felt that separate organizational status was needed for the detailed
planning and supervision of production in the plants scattered through-
out the country which have been working on government contracts with
little systematic supervision. It may prove very difficult to achieve
adequate control apparatus in this area because of the large number
of small enterprises concerned and the shortage of trained supervisory
personnel.. 21/
8. State Statistical Bureau.
The State Statistical Bureau was established in the fall
of 1952 as the highest organ of a nationwide statistical organization,
designed to provide the basic data for national planning. Subject to
the approval of the State Planning Commission, this bureau was authorized
to establish statistical systems and forms for the use of all govern-
ment organs and economic control agencies and enterprises. It also
has the duty, as the highest organ of statistical wo-k in Communist
China, of collecting and analyzing all statistical data for the develop-
ment of the national economy. 22/
It is evident that difficulties in the field of statistical
reporting remain one of the principal weaknesses in Communist China's
efforts to establish and operate a planned economy. The accurate and
timely presentation of data so essential to modern industrial organi-
zations and control systems is hampered in China not only by the lack
of trained personnel and the variety of types of economic organization
but by the language itself, which is ill-adapted to this purpose.
Moreover, China's efforts in the statistical field have apparently
been marked by overzealous efforts to fill the control and reporting
channels with forms and charts which bear little relationship to
the realities of the situation being reported on or to the facts
needed for control purposes. 22/
9. Central Handicraft Industry Administrative Bureau.
There is no information on the structure or functions of the
Central Handicraft Industry Administrative Bureau. Presumably it is
responsible for organizing and controlling the vast number of small-
scale handicraft industries, which play a large role in the Chinese
economy. It is estimated that handicraft enterprises account for about
one-third of the total industrial production of Communist China by
value and that they supply between 70 and 80 percent of the peasant
needs for capital and consumer goods. 3141
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10. Central Industry and Commerce Administrative Control Bureau.
There is a similar lack of information on the structure and
functions of the Central Industry and Commerce Administrative Control
Bureau. It is assumed to be the central government's counterpart of
and controlling agency for the provincial and municipal Control Bureaus
of Industry and Commerce which have jurisdiction over the private firms
in their respective areas. .a2/ The State Council Control Bureaus for
Handicrafts and Industry and Commerce, if they in fact have the respon-
sibilities noted, would appear to overlap with the newly established
Ministry of Local Industry and the Third Ministry of Machine Building.
As a matter of conjecture, it is suggested that the ministries concern
themselves with the production problems of the enterprises concerned,
particularly for those items produced under contract for state enter-
prises, while the State Council Bureaus probably are concerned with
organization control and with the program for bringing such enterprises
along the path toward socialism.
There remain two ministries -- the Ministry of Public
Security and the Ministry of Supervision -- which, although not prima-
rily economic, play an important role in the economic control system.
11. Ministry of Public Security.
The Ministry of Public Security, although not ordinarily
considered an economic ministry, has certain functions which bear
directly on the area of economic controls. Not only does it have
control of the reform-through-labor program, which plays an impor-
tant role in water conservancy work, highway construction, and main-
tenance and construction programs of a varied nature in hardship
areas, but its various measures for control of the population, in-
cluding efforts to prevent mass migration of the peasantry to the
cities, must be considered to have an economic effect. In addition,
at least one economic ministry, the Ministry of Railroads, has a
Public Security Bureau, which appears to be subject ultimately to
the Ministry of Public Security rather than to its nominal parent
organization. 2//
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12. Ministry of Supervision.
The Ministry of Supervision is the successor to a former
committee-level organization, the Committee of People's Supervision.
It presumably controls the People's Supervisory Offices which are
attached to government organizations and enterprises at all levels.
A press report on their activities in November 1954 stated that there
were almost 4,000 supervisory organs -- "mainly supervisory offices
of financial and economic enterprises." These organs were alleged
to be "supervising all activities of production and finance, concen-
trating on the supervision of economic construction." .1?./ These
supervisory organs appear to serve several functions. They are a
channel through which individuals can bring complaints to official
attention. "... The masses of people are entitled ... to prosecute
and charge lawbreaking Government officials. ... Supervisory
organs at all levels have consistently paid attention to the pros-
ecution and charges of the people, thereby 2romoting closer relations
between the Government and the people ... Land enabline the people
to develop their supervision of the implementation of State poli-
cies, laws and decrees, and economic construction plans." 391/ They
also supply the government with a system of unpaid informers in the
Communist tradition. Under the various supervisory offices is a
network of secret supervisory correspondents, charged with investi-
gating and reporting on "all kinds of lawbreaking activities and
dereliction of duty" and collecting "people's opinions towards the
government policies, orders and work." 40 As of May 1954 there
were 78,196 of these correspondents. 41
In the case of the Ministry of Railroads, a People's
Supervision Bureau was established in June 1954. Although under
the joint jurisdiction of the railroad ministry and the then Com-
mittee of People's Supervision, primary responsibility fell upon
the latter)2_/ and presumably now lies with the Ministry of Super-
vision. The establishment of the new bureau was coupled with the
abolition of the investigation units under the finance and accounting
agencies of the Ministry of Railroads. Thus it would appear that
an important function was being moved from the Ministry of Finance
to the Supervision Committee. There is no evidence that similar
changes have taken place in other economic ministries, and it is
probable that the railroads constitute a special case. If irregu-
larities or problems arise in other ministries, however, it may be
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that the new ministry will acquire supervisory powers, beyond what it
now holds, in other areas of the economy.
III. Role of the USSR in the Chinese Communist Economic Control Mech-
anism.
The ramifications of the Soviet technical assistance program to
Communist China spread throughout the Chinese economic and political
system. The Chinese are modeling their economic administrative
framework on Soviet prototypes, and Soviet advisers are believed to
be present at all levels in the Chinese economic ministries, adminis-
trative organs, and industrial organizations. Although such formal
mechanisms for Soviet control as the Sino-Soviet joint companies
have been abandoned,* the widespread Soviet influence continues
through a number of different devices discussed in the sections
below.
A. Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation.
Among the several agreements between the USSR and Communist
China announced on 11 October 1954 was an agreement on scientific
and technical cooperation. This agreement called for the exchange
of technical documents, information, and specialists and was care-
fully phrased to indicate a two-way exchange.Ii2/ The agreement
also provided for a joint commission to administer the exchange.
This commission held its first meeting in Moscow in December 1954
and defined in greater detail the mutual obligations of the parties.
Under the agreement approved at this meeting, the USSR will furnish
(free of charge):
1. Plans and blueprints for industrial construction (in-
cluding metallurgical and machine building plants,
power stations, and others).
2. Blueprints for machinery and equipment.
3. Plans for producing many types of industrial goods.
4. Scientific, technical reference, and training material.
* As of 1 January 1955.
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The Chinese, in their turn, will furnish (also free of charge):
1. A description of production methods and samples of prod-
ucts from light, pharmaceutical, and local indus-
tries.
2. Samples of agricultural crops (including subtropical
plants, citrus, vegetables, grain, and others).
The effort made in this and other communiques on technical
exchange to emphasize the Chinese Communist contribution is shown
by the following oblique reference to Soviet specialists: "The
Chinese People's Republic will enable Soviet specialists to learn
about the achievements and work experiences of the national econ-
omy." L-2/ Thus, in Communist logic, the furnishing of Soviet
specialists to China becomes a Chinese contribution to the USSR.
This agreement is the latest of a number of similar agree-
ments which provide the formal basis for the continuing program
of Soviet technical assistance to Communist China. The program is
not limited to the announced Soviet assistance in renovation or
construction of 156 major industrial projects, which is covered by
separate agreements but appears to cover every phase of economic
activity. The detailed arrangements for Soviet advisers to China --
including their numbers, assignments, and arrangements for compen-
sation and upkeep -- continue to be concealed, but there is ample
evidence that the number is large and that they are assigned not
only at the plant level but also at the various administrative
levels, including that of the State Council itself. Thus the
influence which they are able to bring to bear on the Chinese
economy is widespread.
B. Use of Soviet Administrative Prototypes and Procedures.
The Soviet influence on the Chinese Communist economy is
readily apparent in the types of institutions which have been
established to handle Chinese economic affairs and in the proce-
dures used. It is apparent in the management and control proce-
dures used within industry and in the techniques and work methods
used by the workers themselves.
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It is logical that Communist China, in its efforts to establish
a planned economy and to follow the course of growth which its leaders
ascribe to the USSR, should adopt many of the formal institutions which
the mentor country had established for this purpose. Thus the State
Council, the supreme governmental administrative body, is obviously
modeled on the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and the State Plan-
ning Commission is modeled on Gosplan, the State Planning Committee
of the USSR. The State Statistical Bureau of Communist China is
believed to be modeled on the Central Statistical Administration of
the USSR. Although China's economic ministries do not imitate the
USSR in every instance, those which can be compared appear to be
close copies of Soviet prototypes, and the trend which has been
noticed in China of increasing the number of ministries as certain
sectors of the economy grow in importance also appears to mirror
Soviet practice. A list of the Chinese Communist economic agencies
and their counterparts is given in Appendix A.
Chinese Communist management practices are also closely
similar to Soviet ones. For example, the effort is made in Chinese
industry as in Soviet industry to combine the principles of one-man
management with those of collective responsibility. Definite areas
of responsibility for labor unions, workers' committees, and Party
representatives are specified, so that these groups act as watchdogs
on management, while at the same time the factory manager is given
full responsibility for the fulfillment of production goals, allo-
cation of resources, and other administrative matters.lig This
attempt to integrate a system of centralized authority with so-
called "democratic management" appears very similar to efforts of
like character in the USSR./ Frequent mention of the adoption
of "advanced Soviet management practices" is made in Chinese
publications and broadcasts. li.EY This description presumably
refers not only to the planning, statistical, and accounting pro-
cedures but also to the Soviet practices for the development of
improvement of worker morale and efficiency, such as "socialist
competition," campaigns against waste, patriotic production drives,
and similar devices which have characterized Soviet industry.
The Chinese Communist planned management system requires
an elaborate system of controls and reports, which in turn require
sophisticated statistical and accounting procedures. The weaknesses
of the Chinese in these fields have been and still are particularly
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glaring, and they have accordingly made extensive use of Soviet help.
Soviet advisers have been called upon to lecture on specialized sub-
jects and to set up statistical and accounting systems, and workers
in these fields are continually urged to adopt the advanced experi-
ences of the USSR. Most of the Chinese texts on these subjects
currently in use appear to draw heavily on Soviet materials and
methods. )12/
Although it is impossible to estimate accurately the extent
to which the Chinese have been successful in adopting Soviet methods
of planning and control, it appears that this is a field in which
problems will continue to exist for a long period. One problem
appears to be the enthusiastic adoption of elaborate records and
charts without adequate understanding of their uses. One instance
pf a cotton mill in Shantung, which had a special
section of 30 workers (out of a total working force of 500) engaged
in keeping statistical records on production norms, conducting
speedups of the stakhanovite type, and preparing elaborate graphs
and charts of output increase, none of which activities bore any
relation to reality
Early in 1955 the problem of adopting Soviet accounting
techniques received official attention in a press release of the
Bureau of Accounting and Financial Affairs of the Ministry of
Commerce. This release, after describing the vast improvement in
Communist China's commercial operations attributable to the assis-
tance of Soviet specialists since early 1951 in drafting an account-
ing system for state commercial enterprises, complains of the
failure to "coordinate the advanced experiences of the Soviet Union
with actual conditions in China." It was stated that the disregard
of urgent suggestions of Soviet specialists to proceed with caution
in carrying out the new economic accounting system by state commer-
cial enterprises produced a series of "irrational measures" and
warned that failure to adapt Soviet experience to conditions in
China would lead to continued difficulties. 21/ That this problem
is not susceptible of easy solution is indicated by the appearance
of this caveat some 4 years after the inauguration of Soviet
assistance.
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Judging from the frequent exhortations to follow Soviet models
more closely, it is evident that the Chinese Communist leadership is
frequently dissatisfied with the performance of lower echelon manage-
ment in respect to this problem. For example, a Jen-min Jih-pao
editorial of 16 April 1955 complains that "the study of Soviet exper-
iences has been ... without system ... 5nd hag caused imbalance
in work." 22/ At a meeting of cadres and technical personnel of
the Ministry of Heavy Industry in October 1954, there was further
complaint of shortcomings in carrying out Soviet suggestions, and
it was decided to set up inspection committees to promote acceptance
of proposals by Soviet experts. 231 It is concluded that among the
most glaring weaknesses of Chinese industrial management is the
continuing inability to make effective use of modern techniques,
particularly in planning and control mechanisms.
With regard to working methods and techniques, there appears
to be no field of the Chinese Communist economy which is not under
considerable pressure to adopt the teachings of Soviet specialists.
This is particularly noticeable in fields where complicated equip-
ment and advanced technology are required, such as petroleum explor-
ation, production, and refining; coal mining; iron and steel manu-
facture; electric power production; and machine tool operations,
but it extends also to light industry and agriculture. The complaints
indicated above of slowness in adopting Soviet proposals undoubtedly
apply in the case of working methods also, inasmuch as claims of
tremendous improvement in production because of the use of such
proposals are only a little more frequent than complaints that more
must be done in this field.
C. Soviet Influence at the Plant Level.
The great majority of gains in efficiency or productivity
in various Chinese Communist plants are attributed in press reports
to the suggestions of Soviet technicians or of Chinese who have
received training at Soviet hands. Thus in the coal-mining indus-
try, for example, it is alleged that the Fu-hsin coalfield is devel-
oping "along the lines of the Soviet Donets coal basin under the
guidance of Soviet specialists." Soviet technical supervision is
credited with doubling the extraction rate, improving safety con-
ditions, and mechanizing 74 percent of the works at Fu-hsin.
The steel complex at An-shan is alleged to have benefited from
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some 30,000 Soviet proposals in 5 years, 22/ while in the field of
electric power "progressive Soviet techniques" at plants of the
Wu-han Power Bureau have led to a 50- to 85-percent reduction in
the repair and inspection of boiler time. These are only frag-
mentary examples of the claims of alleged benefits received from
the Soviet technical aid program which have filled Chinese press
and radio reports since the Communist accession to power. This con-
tinued reiteration, although impossible to judge as to accuracy of
content, does indicate that Soviet technical advice must be widespread
and substantial. On the other hand, the sustained propaganda cam-
paign may be a response to considerable reluctance on the part of
Chinese workers to acknowledge the practical value of Soviet advice.
There is considerable evidence of this reluctance, seemingly com-
pounded of generalized Chinese resentment against the USSR and its
representatives in China and of contempt for many of the Soviet
suggestions themselves on the part of some Chinese workers. 21/
D. Soviet Advisers at the Ministerial Level.
The group of Soviet personnel in Communist China is not
limited to technicians and skilled workmen at the plant level but
includes a substantial number of advisers within the ministries
themselves.
Although in most instances it is not possible to ascertain
accurately the role played by the Soviet advisers in the various
economic ministries, the following description of the activities
of seven principal advisers to the Ministry of Communications
between May 1949 and January 1953 may be cited as an example of
the claimed extent of influence and assistance which the USSR has
provided to Communist China. Allegedly the Deputy Minister of
Communications reported the following activities of the Russians
attached to the ministry:
1. Assistance in organizing the ministry, especially in
developing a detailed division of labor and a clearly
defined command channel.
2. Formulation of standards and principles for planning
the engineering of highway bridges and tunnels.
3. Planning and direction of repair and construction
projects involving 34,077 kilometers of highways,
harbors at Pu-kou and T'anku, and wharves at
Tsingtao.
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4. Direction of the Shanghai Ship Repair Factory.
5. Introduction of a system of inspection of oceangoing
vessels.
6. Supervision of the introduction of an Improved manage-
ment program for (navigation on ?) the Sungari River.
7. Inspection and recommendations concerning management,
distribution of 'vessels, selection of harbor sites,
adjustments in navigation routes, and transportation
methods on the Yangtze River.
8. Introduction of Soviet methods of "automobile trans-
portation planning and calculation." 2.?/
If this example may be accepted as typical, it appears that
Soviet influence at the ministerial level is widespread, including
not only advice on technical matters but also activities in the organ-
ization and management of the ministries themselves.
E. Soviet Influence on Chinese Communist Economic Policy
and Planning.
In addition to the Soviet advisers in Communist China who
are assigned at the ministerial level and the Soviet technicians
assigned to major industrial installations, there are believed to
be Soviet personnel functioning as advisers at high-policy levels.
It has been acknowledged that the program of Soviet material aid
has been accompanied by "proposals in principle and in the concrete
concerning the task of China's five-year plan." 22/ It is probable
that the program has been developed through hard bargaining sessions,
at which Soviet decisions played a role in limiting and directing
Chinese plans for industrial development. The assignment of Soviet
personnel to Chinese government bodies, although undoubtedly wel-
comed by the Chinese, who readily admit their need for high-level
guidance, gives the USSR an opportunity for influencing Chinese
decisions in carrying out their plans.
The highest public body to which the assignment of Soviet
advisers has been publicly acknowledged is the State Council.
Although it is impossible, of course, to assess their precise role
and influence on the Council's decisions, the mere fact of their
assignment at such a high level is evidence enough of the extent
of Soviet influence in the government hierarchy.
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The principal Soviet advisers at the ministerial level
function as an advisory group to the Committee of
Finance and Economics, which was, until the reorganization of the
Chinese Communist government in the fall of 1954, a coordinating
body of the several economic ministries.
the group met weekly to study reports sub-
mitted by the Chinese. These reports contained data on the use of
manpower and materials, cost, and so forth, and indicated problems
which came up during the production period. The Soviet advisers
would attempt to eliminate the problems by rewriting the plans
and adding new specifications to improve the final results. The
advisers also made inspection tours to plants and factories through-
out China. Di
Although the Committee of Finance and Economics was elimi-
nated from the Chinese Communist governmental structure in the fall
of 1954, it is probable that the group role of the chief Soviet
advisers at the ministerial level has not been substantially altered.
Possibly the Soviet advisory group referred to above now functions
in a similar fashion with respect to the State Planning Commission.
Little is known about the day-to-day operations of this body, but
there has been no concealment of Chinese adoption of Soviet tech-
niques in planning procedures since early in the regime. In the
introduction to a book entitled Planning in Industrial Enterprises
published in Peking in 1951, it was stated that the industrial
plans for 1951 (of the Ministry of Heavy Industry) were drawn up
with the assistance of Soviet specialists and that Soviet national
plans were used as reference material for drawing up the industrial
plans for China. 62/
It should be noted, however, that there is no substantial
evidence of formal Soviet influence or participation in the councils
of the Chinese Communist Party. As stated above, the higher Party
organs are the real policymakers in Communist China, and it is
probable that their deliberations and decisions are carried on with-
out active Soviet participation. Such influence as the USSR may be
able to bring to bear at this level doubtless stems from the per-
sonal relationships of individual Russians with key Chinese Party
officials and from whatever pressure can be achieved in the negoti-
ations over the extent and direction of Soviet aid.
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The over-all picture which emerges from this brief survey of
the widespread Soviet influence on the Chinese economy has the follow-
ing general characteristics:
1. There is no area of the Chinese economy which has not
been influenced by Soviet techniques and methods, but
they have been particularly pervasive in the fields
of extractive and heavy industry and in the organi-
zation and control of the economy.
2. There has been some resistance on the part of Chinese
workers and lower level administrators and managers
to the Soviet innovations, but this has not been of
proportions serious enough to threaten the existing
relationships between the parties.
3. Conversely, there has been a tendency toward blind
accqptance of Soviet innovations without adaptation
to local conditions or, in the case of accounting
and statistical control methods, without effective
use being made of the results.
4. The influence of Soviet technology and of Soviet
principles of organization and control is combining
with material aid to create in China a replica of
the Soviet economic system which, as Chinese indus-
trialization proceeds, will be only in minor details
distinguishable from its prototype.
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APPENDIX A
COUNTERPART ECONOMIC AGENCIES IN COMMUNIST CHINA AND THE USSR
Communist China
State Council
Commissions_
State Planning Commission
National Construction
Commission
Specialized Agencies
State Statistical Bureau
People's Bank of China
State Bureau of Measures
and Standards
Central Handicrafts
Administrative Bureau
Civil Aviation Bureau
Central Industry and Commerce
Administrative Bureau
Ministries
Agriculture
USSR
Council of Ministers
State Planning Committee (long-term
planning)
State Economic Commission (current
planning)
Gosstroy -- State Committee for Con-
struction Affairs
Central Statistics Directorate
Gosbank
Chief Directorate of Standardi-
zations
Chief Directorate of Civil Air
Fleet
Agriculture
Meat and Dairy Products
Fish Industry
State Farms
* No identified counterpart on the national level.
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Communist China
Agricultural Procurement
Building Construction
Coal Industry
Commerce
Communications
Electric Power Industry
Finance
Food
Foreign Trade
Forestry
Geology
Heavy Industry
Labor
Light Industry
Local Industry
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USSR
Agricultural Procurement
Construction
Coal Industry
Construction of Coal Industry
Enterprises
Internal Trade
Automobile Transport and Highways
Maritime Fleet
River Fleet
Electric Power Stations
Electric Power Statichs Construction
Finance
Foreign Trade
Timber Industry
Geology and Conservation of Mineral
Deposits
Chemical Industry
Construction of Metallurgical and
Chemical Industry Enterprises
Building Materials Industry
Ferrous Metallurgy
Nonferrous Metallurgy
State Committee of Labor and Wages
Chief Directorate for Organization
and Recruitment of Manpower (?)
Light Industry
Paper and Wood Processing
Foodstuffs Industry
* No identified counterpart on the national level.
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Communist China
Machine Building (First)
Machine Building (Second)
Machine Building (Third)
Petroleum Industry
Posts and Telecommunications
Public Security
Railroads
Supervision
Textile Industry
Water Conservancy
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USSR
Automotive Industries
Construction and Road Machine
Building
Heavy Machine Building
Machine Instrument Building
Machine Tools Industry
Medium Machine Building
Electrical Industry
Radio-Technical Industry
Transport Construction
Transport Machine Building
Shipbuilding Industry
Tractor ?and Agriculture Machine
Building
Defense Industry
Aviation Industry
Oil Industry
Construction of Petroleum Industry
Enterprises
Communications
State Security Committee
Transport
State Control
Textile Industry
Chief Directorate of Labor Reserves
Chief Directorate of State Material
Reserves
State Committee for New Techniques
* No identified counterpart on the national level.
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