PRODUCTION OF AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY IN THE USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01141A000400090001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 105
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 29, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 5, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT r
PRODUCTION OF AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY
IN THE USSR
CIA/RR 48
5 January 1955
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
4
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC,'. Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
PRODUCTION OF AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY IN THE USSR
CIA/RR 48,
(ORR Project 34.235)
Office of Research and Reports
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CONTENTS
Page
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . 1
I. Introduction . . . . . 2
A. General 2
1. Agricultural Machinery Defined . . . . . . . . 2
2. Agricultural Machinery Industry Defined . . . . 3
3. Importance of Agricultural Machinery Production . . . 3
B. Historical Development 4
C. Technology .6
1. General 6
2. Design and Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. Convertibility of the Industry . . . . . . . . . 9
a. To War Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
b. To Consumer Goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Expansion of the Industry, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
D. Organization and Administrative Structure . . . . . . . . 11
II. Supply . . . . . . . . . . 12
A. Production . 12
1. By Value 12
2. By Physical Units . . . 18.
a. Production during the Fourth Five Year Plan
(1946-50) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
b. Production in 1951-53 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
c. Production in 1954-55 and Future Production . . . 26
3. Comparison of Production in the USSR and the US . . . 28
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B. Imports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? ? ? . ? ? 35
1. From Soviet Bloc Countries 35
2. From Non-Soviet Bloc Countries . . . . . . . . . . . 38
C. Inventories and Stockpiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
III. Demand . . . . . 40
A. Use Pattern . . ? . .'. 40
B. Exports 43
1. To Soviet Bloc Countries . . . ? . . . . . ? . , . . 43
a. Quantity . 43
b. Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . ? ? . . ? . . 50
2. To Non-Soviet Bloc Countries 50
C. Essentiality and Substitutes 51
IV. Degree of Mechanization of Soviet Agriculture and Require-
ments for Selected Agricultural Machinery ? ? ? ? ? ? 52
A. Degree of Mechanization 52.
1. USSR .f ? . 52
2. Comparison of Agricultural Mechanization in the USSR
and the US ? ? ? ? . ? . ? ? . . ? ? ? ? . ? ? . ? 56
B. Requirements.for Selected Agricultural Machinery . ? . . 59
V.. Future Industry Expansion ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
VI. Inputs ? . . ? . ? . . ? . ? . . ? ? . ? ? . ? ? . ? . . 65
A. Raw Materials ? ? ? ? ? . ? ? . ? . ? . . . ? . . 65
B. Manpower ? . ? ? . . ? ? ? ? ? ? . ? ? . ? ? . . ? ? ? ? 68
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VII. Intentions and Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
A. Intentions.. . . . . 69
B. Vulnerabilities 70
Appendixes
Appendix A. Plant Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Appendix B. Methodology 83
Tables
1. Estimated Value of Soviet Production of Agricultural
Machinery, 1945-55 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2. Estimated Percentage Breakdown of Soviet Production of Agri-
cultural Machinery in 1953 and Actual US Production in 1952,
by Major Categories of Machinery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3. Estimated Soviet Production cf Selected Types of Agricultural
Machinery, Planned and Actual, 1940-41 and 1945-55 . . . . . 19
4. Estimated Soviet Production of Selected Types of Agricultural
Machinery as Compared with the Original Fourth Five Year Plan
and Subsequent Revisions, 1946-50 . 24
5. Estimated Soviet and Actual US Production of Selected Types
of Agricultural Machinery, 1952 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6. Estimated Soviet and Actual US Production of Grain Combines
and Tractor Moldboard Plows, 1952 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
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7. Estimated Value of.Product on and Imports of Agricultural
Machinery by the USSR, 1945-53 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
8.. Estimated Inventories of Selected Types of Agricultural
Machinery in the USSR, 1940 and 1951-53 . . . . . . . ? . . . 41
9. Estimated Distribution of Agricultural Machinery in the USSR,
Based upon the Number and Distribution of the Machine Tractor
Stations, 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
10. Estimated Value of Soviet Exports of Agricultural Machinery
to the Satellites, 1949-53 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
11. Estimated Soviet Exports of Selected Types of Agricultural
Machinery to the Satellites, in Units, 1949-53 . . . . . . . 46
12. Estimated Soviet Exports of Selected Types of Agricultural
Machinery to the Satellites as a Percentage of Total Soviet
Production, 1949-53 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
13. Estimated Soviet Exports of Grain Combines to the Satellites,
1949-53 and 1954 Plan, as Compared with Soviet Production . . 49
14. Estimated Degree of Mechanization of Selected Farm Operations
on Soviet Collective Farms, Actual and Planned, 1940 and
1951-55 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
15. Estimated Degree of Mechanization of Selected Farm Operations
in the USSR and the US, for Selected Years 57
16. Estimated Actual Productivity of Selected Types of Soviet
Agricultural Machinery Compared with Potential Productivity,
1953 ... ........................ 61
17. Estimated Inputs of Metal Products in Soviet Agricultural
Machinery Building, 1936 and 1949-55 . . ... . . . . . . . . 66
18. Agricultural Machinery Plants in the USSR 72
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Illustrations
Following Page
Figure 1.
16-Foot Tractor-Drawn Grain Combine Produced
in the USSR (Photograph) .
8
Figure 2.
12-Foot Tractor-Drawn Grain Combine Produced
in the US (Photograph) . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8
Figure 3.
Figure 4.
13-Foot Self-Propelled Grain Combine Produced
in the USSR (Photograph) . . . . . . . . . . .
12-Foot Self-Propelled Grain Combine Produced
in the US (Photograph)..
8
Figure 5.
Figure 6.
Figure 7.
Seed Drill Produced in the USSR (Photograph)
Seed Drill Produced in the US (Photograph) . . . . .
Rear View of a Soviet-Produced Cotton Picker
with Attached Bunker (Photograph) . . . . . . . .
8
Figure 8.
Type of US Cotton Picker Designed to Pull a
Wagon (Photograph) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8
Figure 9.
Soviet Ministries Responsible for the Produc-
tion of Agricultural Machinery, April 1954
(Chart) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12
USSR: Major Agricultural Machinery Plants,,
1954 (Map) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
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CIA/RR 48
(ORR Project 34.235)
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PRODUCTION OF AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY IN THE USSR*
Summary.
The production of agricultural machinery in the USSR will have
doubled in value from 1 billion rubles in 1948 to 2 billion rubles
in 1955. This enormous increase in. production is essential to the
fulfillment of the 1954-55 Soviet plans stressing the mechanization
of agriculture, the extension of cultivated areas, and the increased
production of food required by the new consumer goods program.
Present parks of agricultural machinery are inadequate for the
task, and the substitution of hand labor for machinery would be un-
realistic in a program of this size. The USSR is therefore engaged
in a large expansion of the agricultural machinery industry Facil-
ities are obtained by decreasing the production of machinery in good
supply; by farming out orders to other ministries or transferring
plants to the Ministry of Automobile, Tractor, and Agricultural Machine
Building; and by expanding producing plants and"building new facilities.
Although levels of production by units are difficult to estimate
and not a fair measure of production, it is assumed that the present
program will produce about 2.1 million units of agricultural machinery
in 1954 and about 2.4 million units in 1955.
Soviet trade in agricultural machinery is very limited. Imports
during 1945-53 amounted to less than 2 percent of all domestic pro-
duction, and exports from 1949-53 were about 2.5 to 3.0 percent of
Soviet domestic productions The motivating factor for the export of
agricultural machinery to the Satellites, judging from the relatively
small quantities' exported, the types of machines involved, and the
accompanying press and radio comment, appears to be the propaganda
value of the transactions'.!
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent
the best judgment of the responsible analyst as of 1 September 1954?
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The Soviet level of productivity in 1953 in the manufacture of
agricultural machinery is estimated at about 55 percent of that of the
US, rising to about 65 percent in 1954, and about 70 percent by 1955.
The quality and design of machinery is inferior, however, to US equip-
ment. 1,US machines are lighter in weight, less complicated, and more
productive.
Inputs into the industry included about 4 percent of the Soviet total
production of rolled steel and a labor force of about 120,000 workers
in 1951. The direct vulnerability of the.industry to Western export
controls is almost negligible..
The planned expenditures of time and labor directed towards in-
creasing the productivity of the agricultural machinery industry and
of agriculture, as a whole, are an indication that the Soviet economy
is not being mobilized for war.
Agricultural machinery plants in the USSR were among the first to
convert to the production of war materials under the threat of war
before World War II, and they are still producing a limited amount of
munitions. A sudden increase in the production of munitions or other
war materials indicating a conversion of the plants from peacetime
production is a possible indication of future Soviet intentions.
I. Introduction.
A. General.
1. Agricultural Machinery Defined.
For the purposes of this report, agricultural machinery is
defined as machinery used for the preparation and cultivation of the
soil, for the planting and harvesting of crops, for preparing crops
for market or for use, and for performing other farm operations around
farm. buildings. Agricultural machinery may be stationary, horse-drawn,
tractor-drawn, tractor-mounted, or self-propelled, depending upon the
use to which it is to be put.
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The machinery used for the operations described above may
best be broken down into the following major categories:* (a) plows
and listers; (b) harrows, rollers, pulverizers, and stalk cutters;
(c) planting, seeding, and fertilizing machinery; (d) cultivators and
weeders; (e) sprayers and dusters; (f) harvesting machinery; (g) haying
machinery;.(h) machines for preparing crops for market or for use;
(i) farm poultry equipment; (j) farm dairy machines. and equipment;
(k) barn. equipment; (1) barnyard equipment; and (m) farm elevators and
blowers.
2. Agricultural Machinery Industry Defined.
The agricultural machinery industry, as referred to in this
report, is defined as that group of plants whose major product is
agricultural machinery. As such, the industry in the USSR comprises
120 plants. The 36 plants listed in Appendix A are the most important,
and are estimated to produce approximately 80 percent of the total Soviet
output of agricultural machinery. 2J Except as their production is in-
cluded in the total inputs and the total production of agricultural
machinery in the USSR, this report is not concerned with the hundreds
of plants outside the agricultural machinery building industry which
produce agricultural machinery as a secondary product on a regular or a
special=order basis. 3 The production of these plants in completed
units probably accounted for less than 5 percent of total Soviet pro-
duction in 1953, and, because of increased production within the in-
dustry, probably will account for no larger a percentage of production
in 1954 and 1955.
The USSR is by far the largest producer of agricultural
machinery in the Soviet.Bloc, producing nearly eight times as much as
the rest of the. Bloc combined.
3. Importance of Agricultural Machinery Production.
The production of agricultural machinery, in the USSR as
anywhere else, is vital to the increased mechanization of agriculture.
Such mechanization, in turn, allows fewer people to produce more food
reports on agricultural machinery production in the US. 1/
*. These are the categories under which the US Department of Commerce
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on a larger area with less expenditure of effort per person, primarily
through less waste and more timely fulfillment of farm operations. The
latter factors are particularly important in times of adverse weather
conditions, when land preparation and planting are unavoidably delayed,.
In the event-of a war, the USSR would be able to forego production of
agricultural machinery temporarily, by more intensive use of available
machinery and by increased use of the. younger and the older elements of
the population for the many sowing and harvesting operations which can
be done by hand. In an extended war, however, the USSR would be forced
either to-retain a part of the facilities for production of agricultural
machinery instead of converting them to war materials, or to divert an
ever larger part of the total labor force to agriculture as the park
of machinery wore out.
B. Historical Development. 1
The period from 1928 to World War II, comprising the First
(1928-32), Second (1933-37), and part of the Third (1938-42) Five Year
Plans, was the period of major development in the agricultural machinery
industry in the USSR. With the aid of American and German engineers,
old plants formerly engaged in the production of simple horse-drawn
implements, particularly plows, were remodeled and enlarged. This was
the period of the introduction of the more complex tractor-drawn types
of machines and the decline in production of horse-drawn types. New
plants were built in Rostov-on-Dori, Zaporozh'ye, Syzran', Voronezh,
Gomel', Novosibirsk, and Tashkent. At the outbreak of World War II
there were about 20 plants which were important as specialized producers*
of agricultural machinery, and these 20 are still among the most im-
portant producers. With few exceptions (Kurgan, Omsk, Novosibirsk,
and Tashkent), the agricultural machinery plants were located west of
the Urals, particularly in the Ukraine and the Central Industrial
Region. As the danger of war increased in 1938 and 1939, most
agricultural machinery plants were partially or wholly converted to
the production of war materials, resulting in substantial decreases
in the production of agricultural machinery.
The agricultural machinery industry was severely damaged during
World War II. The plants in Rostov-on-Don,.Zaporozh'ye, Odessa, Gomel',
Kirovograd, and Pervomaysk, which accounted for about 75 to 80 percent
* For purposes of this report "specialized producers" are the producers
that produce agricultural machinery as a major product.
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of all production of agricultural machinery before'the war, suffered
particularly heavy damage. Considerable equipment was evacuated be-
yond the Urals, however, and used to help set up new plants in Tashkent,
Chirchik, Frunze, Akmolinsk, Kurgan, Rubtsovsk, and Krasnoyarsk. Pro-
duction of agricultural machinery virtually ceased from mid-1941 through
1944, as all available facilities were concentrated on the production of
war materials.
Facilities devoted to the production of agricultural machinery
were expanded greatly in the postwar period. War damage was repaired,
though somewhat slowly, not having been completed until 1949 or 1950.
New plants were built, and old plants were expanded and converted to
peacetime production. Particularly worthy of mention were the new.
plants in L'vov, Kamenka, Bezhetsk, and Tashkent (Ordzhonikidze Rayon).
Other plants in Leningrad, Dnepropetrovsk, Stalino, Taganrog, Kazan',
Tula, Voronezh, and Zlatoust were converted and became important pro-
ducers of agricultural machinery and spare parts. A number of small
plants, scattered throughout central and western USSR but concentrated
in the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Baltic area, also began production.
In addition to these many "specialized" plants, literally hundreds of
other plants outside the industry began limited production of agricul-
tural machinery and spare parts, particularly the latter. There was a
slackening of this production in some plants in 1949 and 1950, but it
was taken up again with renewed vigor in late 1953 to assist in the
mechanization program provided in the new agricultural decrees. The
motivating force behind this postwar expansion of production facilities
was the need not only to recoup enormous war losses of agricultural
.machinery but to increase machinery parks beyond prewar levels.
It is not possible to state the exact number of plants now
involved in the production of agricultural machinery and even less
possible to state the exact number which might be making spare parts.
The number of the latter could easily exceed 600 or 700 if all pro-
ducers identified since 1946 are still so engaged. The plants pro-
ducing completed machines, as distinguished from spare parts alone,
might number several hundred; but of these only about 120 have agri-
cultural machinery as their major product. It should be mentioned
that these specialized producers also produce consumer goods and, in
some instances, munitions. It is interesting to note that, in spite
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of the great postwar expansion of facilities for production of agri-
cultural machinery, the technological backwardness and poor production
record of the industry have received almost constant attention in the
Soviet press.
C. Technology.
Certain major points of similarity exist between the tech-
nology of the agricultural machinery industries of the US and the USSR.
Producing plants in both countries employ much the same types of general-
purpose metalworking machinery which is easily adapted to other uses.
In each industry most of the individual types of agricultural machinery
are manufactured by (in Soviet terms) "series production," that is,
production at levels between those of mass production and those of
"individual production." 5/* In each industry the product mix is ex-
tremely complex, comprising at least 100 or so different major types
of machines,** almost every one of which is intended for a different
farm operation.
On the, whole the technological development in the US agri-
cultural machinery industry is superior to that in the USSR. Whereas
t4 leading producers of agricultural machinery in the US are reported
to have the best equipped metalworking facilities in the country, with
efficient modern plants, 8J it is only in the past year or two that a
concerted effort has been made in the USSR to modernize the leading
plants of the industry and to provide them with equipment for the mechani-
zation of the handling of materials and completed machines, for the shot-
cleaning of castings, and for pneumatic sand molding.*** In spite of such
measures., there is still a considerable amount of time consumed in the
* The Russians refer to tractor plows and grain combines as examples
of mass-produced items, 1 but these items are at best actually semi-
mass-produced.
** In this count, all moldboard plows, for example, have been considered
as a single type of machine, whether horse-drawn, tractor-drawn, or
tractor-mounted. When the Russians reported that they produced 222 more
types of agricultural machines in 1950 than in 1940, or a total of 316, 1
they must have been referring to models and not types.
*** For a thorough explanation of the backwardness of the technology
in the Soviet agricultural machinery industry and the plans for improve-
ment, se Sel`khozmashina (The Agricultural Machine), No. 3, March 1951,
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production of agricultural machinery. In March 1953, it was reported
that in many plants 40 to 45 percent of all work was done by hand. 9J
The following reasons were given for this situation: (a) unsatisfactory
organization of production, (b) incorrect assignment of workers, (c)
existence of much unnecessary work in adjusting and finishing various
parts during machine assembly, and,(d) failure to make full use of
available machinery. 10 Thus, it appears that getting the human ele-
ment to function properly constitutes one of the major and most diffi-
cult problems of the industry.
A US research organization made a .study of the industrial
productivity of the US in 1939 and of the USSR in 1937 and concluded
that productivity in the Soviet agricultural machinery industry was
only about 60 percent of that in the US agricultural machinery industry. 11
The US agricultural machinery industry, in the face of the continued
prosperity of its only customer, the farmer, has made great strides in
improving its technical equipment and in building up an,experienced
working force since 1939? Only a small part of its facilities were
converted to military items during World War II.* The agricultural
machinery industry of the USSR, on the other hand, already behind US
industry in productivity, suffered tremendous damage during World War
II,** with complete conversion to military items in undamaged plants.
As a consequence, Soviet industry fell even further behind the US in
productivity and has had a difficult time in attempting to rebuild and
reequip its plants., Productivity in Soviet industry, on the basis of
weight of output per man, has been estimated at roughly 50 percent of
the productivity in US industry in 1951 and roughly 55 percent in 1954.
2. Design and Quality.***
The Soviet agricultural machinery industry is not equal to
that of the US in machinery design and quality. Not only has the US
* The 6-percent drop in the value of shipments (closely comparable to
production) of agricultural machinery in the US between 1941 and 1943,
probably as much the result of materials shortages as conversion, was
more than made up for by the 61-percent increase in shipments in 1944
over 1941. 12/
** The Russians. reported that the plants in Rostov-on-Don, Zaporozh'ye,
Odessa, Gomel', Kirovograd, and Pervomaysk, which before World War II
produced about 75 percent of all machinery used in agriculture, were
reduced to ruins. 13
*** Photographs of typical US and Soviet agricultural machines are
shown following p. 8.
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designed and built a more complete line of machinery,* but US machines
tend, to be lighter, less complicated, and relatively more productive.**
Soviet agricultural machines are probably somewhat heavier than their
US counterparts since they are intended for harder use on larger areas
of land. In 1953, however, the USSR began to. realize that a number of
the machines produced were unnecessarily heavy. The first step taken
to help correct this situation was a plan to substitute hollow rectangu-
lar sections for I-beam sections.17/ A second step was the plan to
favor production of tractor-mounted machines over tractor-drawn ma-
chines. 18 Tractor-mounted machines, as compared with tractor-drawn,
are more convenient to use, relatively more productive per pound of
weight and being lighter in weight, result in savings of metal. In
the US, 65 percent of the unit production of tractor moldboard plows
were tractor-amounted in 1952. 19/ In the USSR, tractor-mounted plow
production in 1952 (and in 19537-has been estimated as negligible,
although an actual quantity estimate was not possible.
The USSR, while claiming that its agricultural machinery
was technically as good as any foreign-produced machinery, admitted in
August 1953 that its machinery was inferior with respect to wear re-
sistance of working parts such as plowshares, plow moldboards, culti
vator teeth, gears, chains, and sprockets, and also with respect to
external finish produced by casting, machining, and painting. / The
high reject rates in castings and in completed machines serve as a
constant target in complaints against the industry. 2l/*** Much of the-**
* The USSR has admitted that it needs at least 80 more types of ma-
chines to attain a complete line of machinery for all-around mechaniza-
tion of agriculture (perhaps only 50 to 60 types, allowing for duplica-
tion, since this is probably a reference to models rather than major
types). / In the US, there is scarcely,a farm operation for which
some type of machine is not produced.
** The US rates a tractor-drawn 3-bottom moldboard plow at 10 to
12 acres per 10-hour day. 15/ The USSR rates a comparable. plow at
about 7.5 to 8.5 acres per-10-hour day. 16/
*** At the Tashsel'mash Agricultural Machinery Plant imeni
Voroshilov in Tashkent, the major Soviet. producer of.co on pickers,
39 percent of the cotton pickers and 76 percent of the cotton cleaners
produced in 1951 were reported as rejected at the first inspection be-
cause of defects. Several hundred defective cotton pickers had piled
up by the end of the year and had to be sent through the main conveyor
again in February 1952, thus slowing up the production of new machines.
Quality was said to be even worse in 1952, with 35 percent of the cotton
cleaners still at the plant because of serious production defects. 2/
**** Continued on p. 9.
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FIGURE 1. 16-FOOT TRACTOR-DRAWN GRAIN COMBINE PRODUCED IN THE USSR.
This combine is operated by 4 workers -- 1 on the tractor and 3 on
the combine itself. The machine has a 40-horsepower engine, operates
on 4 large steel wheels, and weighs about 11,330 pounds, or about
283 pounds per horsepower of the engine compared with about 105 pounds
for the US combine.
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FIGURE 2. 12-FOOT TRACTOR-DRAWN GRAIN COMBINE PRODUCED IN THE US.
This combine is operated completely by the tractor driver. The ma-
chine has a 56-horsepower engine, operates on 2 rubber-tired wheels,
and has a shipping weight (with standard equipment) of about
5,900 pounds.
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FIGURE 3. 13-FOOT SELF-PROPELLED GRAIN COMBINE _PRODUCED IN THE USSR. The operator's
platform is lower than on the US machine, and the operator Waist sit right next to the
engine.
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100,
Y181i.':
1, 1 ';tlr !,~'f:rr; '! . .. Yi 1
FIGURE 4. 12-FOOT SELF-PROPELLED GRAIN COMBINE PRODUCED IN THE US.
The high platform puts the operator up out of the dust and dirt, and
the placement of the engine behind the grain hopper keeps the engine
heat and fumes away from the operator.
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FIGURE 5. SEED DRILL PRODUCED IN THE USSR. This model is generally
comparable to the US seed drill shown in Figure 6. Note the large
wheels and the more complex appearance of the machine. Unlike the
US model, a man must ride on the back of the Soviet drill when it
is in operation to unclog the seed by hand.
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FIGURE 6. SEED DRILL PRODUCED IN THE US. This model, by changing
row spacings, can be adapted to handle almost every crop. Note
that the machine has small rubber-tired wheels. The use of rubber
tires is becoming-more and more common on US agricultural machinery.
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FIGURE 7. REAR VIEW OF A SOVIET-PRODUCED-COTTON PICKER WITH ATTACHED
BUNKER. The bunker innovation considerably complicates the machine
without improving the quality of the cotton picked. The machine is
said to replace about 40 hand pickers.
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FIGURE 8. TYPE OF US COTTON PICKER DESIGNED TO PULL A WAGON. The
wagon is drawn behind the picker and catches the cotton. The picker
can pick about 15 acres-a day. Like the Soviet machine, best results
are obtained after the leaves have been removed from the plants by
frost or a defoliant. Replacing from 30 to 4+0 hand pickers, the
quality of the picked cotton is reported to be as good as hand picked.
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blame is placed on the failure of the plants to follow technical speci-
fications, and on the practice of allowing a general slow-down of pro-
duction during the first half of the month, followed by a frantic rush
to make up the loss during the last half. 2/
Convertibility of the Industry.
The Soviet agricultural machinery industry should have
little trouble in making a full-scale conversion from peacetime to war-
time production within a matter of about 3 months. 24 The industry
began a gradual conversion to war production (primarily shells, shell
cases, fuses, bombs, grenades, and parts for tanks and airplanes) as
early as 1938 and converted completely during World War II. At the end
of 1946, Pravda openly complained of the slowness with which the in-
dustry was terminating its war orders and reconverting to production
of agricultural machinery. ~ Numerous prisoner-of-war reports* as
well as an examination of items picked up during the Korean War
indicate that certain agricultural machinery plants may still be en-
gaged in'the production of shell cases, fuses, and other war materials.
The industry has thus built up a wealth of experience in the production
of war materials. Many of the workers in the industry during the war
and in the immediate years thereafter probably are still available to
serve as a nucleus should full-scale conversion to war production be
ordered. The general-purpose, easily adapted metalworking machinery in
agricultural machinery plants contributes to the ease with which such
conversion could be made. In the US, the agricultural machinery in-
dustry reportedly had no difficulty in converting part of its facilities
to'the production of military items during World War II. 27/
b. To Consumer Goods.
The Soviet agricultural machinery industry differs sub-
stantially from its US counterpart in one respect. In the US, it is
not the standard practice to produce a large line of strictly consumer
goods items in the industry. The Soviet industry, on the other hand,
produces many consumer goods items. Probably the best illustration of
this point is the announced schedule of production for 1951. The follow=
ing production was scheduled in 1951 in addition to the Plan:
* CIA Industrial Register plant consolidations. The bulk of these re-
ports cover the period from 1946 through 1949, but a few are dated 1950.
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3,000 bicycles, 10,000 Pobeda clocks, 10,000 phonographs, 20,000 samo-
vars, 30,000 teapots, 21,300 primus stoves and 80,000 burners for them,
100,000 pieces of ironware, 228,000 pieces of enamelware, 20,000 loud-
speakers, and plastic products valued at 2 million rubles. 28/ It
appears from a few isolated reports that such production is still charac-
teristic of the industry. Under the new program of providing more con-
sumer goods, such production may have been increased.*
4. Expansion of the Industry.
Because of the relatively simple construction of many agri-
cultural machines, the agricultural machinery "industry" can easily ex-
pand by the simple expedient of farming out orders to other plants, with
an almost total disregard.for the type of plant to which the order is
given. Under the new agricultural machine building program, which was
initiated in September 1953, only one completely new plant is known to
have been planned for to date, and only 5.5 million rubles have been
allocated for reconstruction and expansion of four of the larger exist-
ing plants. 30/** The remainder of the necessary expansion was to have
been achieved by allocating production to other ministries, or simply
by transferring plants from other ministries to the main agricultural
machinery producing ministry, the. Ministry of Machine Building. Six
such transfers have been reported. 32
The agricultural machinery industry could expand also in
the sense that the production of. nonagricultural machinery items could
be stopped.
It would be impossible to estimate the exact increase in
capacity which the agricultural machinery industry might realize
through such measures.
* In January 1954, it was announced that the October Revolution
Agricultural Machinery Plant in Odessa, one of the largest plow
producers in the USSR, had pledged. to organize the production of
consumer goods. 29/
** It was reported as early as January 1953 that an agricultural
machinery plant was to be built in Batumi during the Fifth Five Year
Plan. 31/ The plant planned in the September 1953 agricultural de-
cree, however, was to be the responsibility of the Council of Ministers
of the Belorussian SSR. It has not yet been identified by exact
location.
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D. Organization and Administrative Structure.*
Effective with the ministerial reorganization of 5 March 1953,
primary responsibility for the production of agricultural machinery
and spare parts in the USSR rested with the Main Administration of
Agricultural Machine-Building (Glavsel'mash) of the Ministry of Machine
Building, to which most of the agricultural machine building plants
were subordinated. 33 The plants of this main administration probably
produce as much as 0 percent of total agricultural machinery output.
Secondary responsibility rested primarily with the Ministry of Trans-
port and Heavy Machine Building, but the Ministry of Agriculture, the
Ministry of Defense Industry, and the Ministry of Aviation Industry have
undertaken commitments under the September 1953 agricultural decrees.
On 27 April 1954, the Ministry of Machine Building was divided
into the Ministry of the Machine Tool Industry, the Ministry of Machine
and Instruments Building, and the Ministry of Automobile, Tractor, and
Agricultural Machine Building. 34 For the Main Administration of
Agricultural Machine Building, this was probably just a change on paper
to the Ministry of Automobile, Tractor, and Agricultural Machine Build-
ing. Also, on 27 April the Ministry of Transport Machinery and the
Ministry of Heavy Machine Building were formed from the Ministry of
Transport and Heavy Machine Building. Both of these two new ministries
are undoubtedly involved in producing agricultural machinery under the
commitments set up for the old Ministry of Transport and Heavy Machine
Building, but the exact extent of participation of each would depend
upon the manner in which the individual producing plants were divided
among them.
The picture with respect to the organization of construction,
supplies, and sales in agricultural machinery building has not been
clearly defined in the Soviet press. A separate main administration
existed for each of these functions under the former Ministry of
Agricultural Machine Building, which was dissolved on 5 March 1953
with the creation of the Ministry of Machine Building. 35 Under the
Ministry of Machine Building, it appears that the sale of all agri-
cultural machinery was not handled by one organization in the Ministry.
The sale of combines and their spare parts, for-example, was handled
by the Main Administration for Automobile and Tractor Sales (Glavavto-
traktbrosbyt) 36/ of the Ministry of Machine Building. Presumably all
other agricultural machinery either was handled by a main administration
# See the chart following p. 12.
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for agricultural machinery sales or by the Main Administration of
Machinery Sales (Glavmashsbyt) 37/ which also handled all other items
produced by the Ministry of Machine Building. Agricultural machinery
and spare parts produced in other ministries undoubtedly were handled
by the sales organizations of these ministries. Construction and
supply were probably set up along much the same lines as sales. Organ-
izations with similar names and functions undoubtedly exist under the
new Ministry of Automobile, Tractor, and Agricultural Machine Building.
The Main Administration of Agricultural Machine Building has
taken over from the former Ministry of Agricultural Machine Building
the scientific research institute and design bureaus which have primary
responsibility for research, design, and testing for agricultural
machinery. 38/ The institute, probably the All-Union Institute of
Agricultural Machine Building (VISKhOM) in Moscow, 39/ has branch
offices in about 10 of the more important agricultural machine building
plants, 40/ apparently for ease of operation and the exercise of con-
trol over the work of the plant Special Design Bureaus (SKB's) and
Design Bureaus (KB's). 41/ The three other design bureaus are the
State Special Design Bureau (GSKB) in Moscow, 42/ the State Special
Design Bureau for Cotton (GSKB po Khlopku) in Tashkent, 43/ and the
State Special Design Bureau for Tea (GSKB po Chayu) in Tbilisi. 44/
In research and design,assistance is also received from outside the
Ministry of Automobile, Tractor, and Agricultural Machine Building,
particularly from technological research institutes of the Ministry
of Agriculture 45 and the Ministry of Higher Education. 46/
II. Supply.
1. By Value.
The estimated value of Soviet production of agricultural
machinery (excluding attachments and spare parts) in 1945-55 is given
in Table 1.* It is estimated that perhaps as much as 90 percent of
this production has been accounted for in the physical unit production
shown in Table 3.**
* Table 1 follows on p. 14
P. 19, below.
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FIGURE 9
SOVIET MINISTRIES RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PRODUCTION OF AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY
April 1954
Other
Ministries a/
Ministry of Automobile, Tractor,
and Agricultural Machine Building
Ministry of
Transport
Machinery
Ministry of
Heavy Machine
Building
Main Administration o
Machinery Sales
(Glavmashsbyt)
Main Administration of
Agricultural Machine Building
(Glavsel'mash)
36
Plants b
Main Administration of
Automobile and Tractor Sales
(Glavavtotraktorosbyt)
a. Primarily the Ministries of Local Industry of the various Republics, the Ministry of Aviation
Industry, the Ministry of Defense Industry, and the Ministry of Agriculture.
b. See. Appendix A for a description of 36 plants believed to be under the Main Administration of
Agricultural Machine Building.
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The basis for Table 1 is the production for 1947 and 1950
which was reported in actual ruble value. Fourth Five Year Plan
(1946-50) production was also given in rubles (1926-27 prices).
Adjusting the plan figure upward by 10 percent (see footnote at end
of Table 1), planned production in 1946-50 may be estimated at about
4.95 billion rubles (1950 prices). In terms of value, then, the
Fourth Five Year Plan for the production of agricultural machinery was
fulfilled about 85 percent (an actual production of about 4.22 billion
rubles against a planned production of 4.95 billion rubles). This
fulfillment, however, is in terms of an adjusted Fourth Five Year
Plan. Actual fulfillment on the basis of the original plan (perhaps
as high as 6.3 billion rubles)* might be estimated at about 67 percent.
The failure to fulfill the plan was due primarily to the
poor production record in the first half of the plan period. This in
turn was a direct result of the slowness with which many agricultural
machinery plants were reconstructed or reconverted from wartime mu-
nitions production to peacetime production of agricultural machinery. 49/
The production of agricultural machinery in the USSR had
begun to level off at around 1.4 to 1.5 billion rubles annually in the
period 1951-53. Production in 1954 and 1955 probably would have in-
creased no more than 4 to 5 percent over 1953 had it not been for a
new impetus given to such production. In September 1953 agricultural
decrees were issued which called, in part, for increased mechanization
of farm tasks heretofore relatively ignored. The value estimates
given in Table 1 for 1954 and 1955 are the best that can be made until
more information on the implementation of the new agricultural decrees
becomes available.
The great increases in production of a number of types of
machines in 1954 and 1955 under the new program will, of course, be
offset by decreases in production of other types of machinery,
particularly those used for basic working of the soil and for grain
growing, where the degree of mechanization is already rather high.
After 1955, another leveling off in production may be expected (prob-
ably at about 2 billion rubles annually). The major drive of the
first two years of the program will have. spent itself, and planned
* Calculated from the revised total plan on the basis of the ratio
of the original plan for production of grain combines to the revised
plan for such production.
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mechanization, though not achieved, will have been approached to the
extent of making further programs of such magnitude unnecessary.
Estimated Value of Soviet Production
of Agricultural Machinery
1945-55 WbJ
'Million Rublesc_
1945
100
1946
250
1947
560
1948
1,000
1949
1,150
1950
1,265
1951
1,455
1952
1,410
1953
1,500
1954
1,800
1955
2,000
a. Estimated range of error, in 19+5-
50, + 20 percent.
b. Attachments and spare parts are not
included.
c. 1950 prices. For purposes of this
table, a 10-percent upward adjustment
of 1926-27 prices (in which 1947 pro-
duction of agricultural machinery was
reported) has been made, in an effort
to obtain comparability with 1950 pro-
duction which was reported in 1950
prices. This adjustment is estimated
as the maximum which should be made,
based on reported increases in the pro-
duction of agricultural machinery in
1945-50.
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Unfortunately, it was not.possible to obtain a suitable
ruble-US dollar ratio for converting Soviet production to US dollars
for comparison with US production.*
Table 2** gives the estimated percentage breakdown of
Soviet production of agricultural machinery in 1953, by major cate-
gories, as compared with actual US production in 1952. It is Sig-
nificant that production of machinery in the US for use around farm
buildings (as distinguished from machines used in the field) accounted
for 11.4 percent of 1952 production,*** whereas the same types of
machines accounted for only about 3 percent of Soviet production in
1953. The percentage for the USSR was even less in previous years.
This situation emphasizes the US practice of mechanizing all types of
farm operations concurrently, instead of concentrating on a particular
sector as the USSR has done in mechanizing grain growing. In the US
it has been the individual farmer, a man vitally interested in easing
the labor of all farm operations, who has for the most part dictated
the pattern of US production.
* At the official exchange rate of four rubles to the US dollar,
the following comparison may be made between Soviet and US production
(excluding attachments and spare parts) for the period 1950-53
(millions of US $):
Year
USSR
US
Percent USSR of US
1950
316
793
40
1951
364
960
38
1952
352
86o
41
1953
375
N.A.
N.A.
This rate of exchange is believed to place Soviet production in
approximately the proper relation to US production; but until addi-
tional information becomes available which will permit a more detailed
examination of this problem, the indicated rate is to be considered
strictly tentative.
Table 2 follows on p. 16.
*** Machinery used around farm buildings has accounted for the follow-
ing percentages of the value of US production of agricultural machinery
in postwar years: 50
1945: 22.1 1948: 9.8 1951: 11.1
1946: 18.6 1949: 10.5
1947: 12.3 1950: 12.1
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Estimated Percentage Breakdown of Soviet Production
of Agricultural Machinery in 1953 and Actual US Production
in 1952, by Major Categories of Machinery a
Category Y
Plows and listers
Harrows, rollers, pulverizers, and stalk
cutters
Planting, seeding, and fertilizing machinery
Cultivators and weeders
Sprayers and dusters
Harvesting machinery
Haying machinery
Machines for preparing crops for market or
for use
Farm poultry equipment
Farm dairy machines and equipment
Barn equipment
Barnyard equipment
Farm elevators and blowers
USSR
1953
US
1952 d
15.0
7.1
3.0
8.2
17.0
12.2
6.0
6.2
1.0
3.5
35.0
29.6
10.0
19.2
10.0
2.6
2.7)
1.6)
3.0
1.5)
11.4
1-7)
3.9)
a. It was not possible to convert the production of agricultural ma-
chinery in physical units for each major category into a total value
figure for each major category, because of the lack of suitable prices
for all the types of machines concerned. The estimated breakdown for
the USSR, therefore, is based primarily on the production in physical
units of various types of machinery in each major category for which
estimates were possible -- taking into consideration the types of
machines not included in the estimates and the relative value of
the machines in each category -- and on the. reported degree of
mechanization in various farm operations.
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Estimated Percentage Breakdown of Soviet Production
of Agricultural Machinery in 1953 and Actual US Production
in 1952, by Major Categories of Machinery
(Continued)
b. The categories are those used by the US Department of Commerce in
reporting on US production of agricultural machinery. 51
c. The year 1953 was chosen for the USSR because it provides a slightly
more favorable picture than 1952 in terms of the spread of production
among the various categories.
d. A breakdown of US production in 1953 is not yet available.
In the USSR, mechanization has followed a strict plan of
mechanizing those farm operations which not only are the easiest to me-
chanize, such as plowing,.but which will contribute most directly.to
the solution of the grain problem, that is, to maintain sufficient
acreage under cultivation to keep pace with the food requirements of an
ever increasing population, and, at the same time, to make certain that
the grain is harvested with a minimum loss.
As might be expected, harvesting machinery, as the largest
and most expensive agricultural machinery, accounted for the largest
percentage of production in the US and the USSR. The US has attained
a higher degree of mechanization in grain harvesting by combine than
has the USSR, and thus has less need for machinery used for the sub-
sequent processing of grains cut by hand or by grain binders.* In the
USSR, on the other hand, threshing machines account for the greater part
of.the production of machinery used for preparing crops for market or
for use.
The Soviet pattern shown in Table 2 is not expected to
change significantly by the end of 1955. Any increases in the pro-
duction of machines for use around farm buildings will be offset by
increases in the production of planting, cultivating, and harvesting
machines for use in potato and vegetable growing.
The US produced only 731 stationary grain threshers in 1951 and
only 802 in 1952. 52
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2. By Physical Units.
Estimated Soviet production of selected types of agri-
cultural machinery by physical units., both planned and actual, in
1940, 1941, and 1945-55 are given in Table 3.* It is estimated that
approximately 80 percent of total unit production for the period
1950-53 has been accounted for, and this percentage was used to
estimate total unit production for 1954 and 1955.
Estimates contained in Table 3 are based upon one or a
combination.of the following: (a) studies of individual producing
plants,** (b) plan. figures as indicated, (c) numerous isolated re-
ports of plan fulfillment at the plant and national level, (d) numer-
ous isolated reports of production increases of one year over another;
and (e) linear interpolation and extrapolation. An attempt was made
to keep the latter type of estimate to a minimum, but even so such
estimates account for about 25 percent of the total. In some cases,
plan figures were of necessity assumed to represent actual production.
The plan figures released with the September 1953 and subsequent agri-
cultural decrees were of inestimable value in expanding the product
mix. of Table 3-
a. Production curing the Fourth Five Year Plan (1946-50).
It may be noted from Table 3 that production for most
types of agricultural machinery increased rapidly immediately after the
war. The production levels of 1940 were generally attained in 1948 and
1949.
These figures, however, tell only part of the story.
Table 4*** shows the Fourth Five Year Plan (1946-50) planned production""
* Table 3 follows on p. 19.
** For a list and short description of the major agricultural ma-
chinery producing plants in the USSR, see Appendix A.. It was neces-
sary to consider a total of about 910 different plants in preparing
this report. Of these plants, it was concluded that only about 120 are
devoted primarily to the production of agricultural machinery. The re-
mainder are plants which produce agricultural machinery as a secondary
product, or on a job-lot basis, or make repairs. 53 The production of
the latter plants, however, was taken into consideration in making pro-
duction estimates for the USSR as a whole.
*** Table 4 follows on p. 24.
Continued on p. 23.
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Estimated Soviet Production of Selected Types of Agricultural Machinery
Planned and Actual, 1940-41 and 1945-55 a/*
1940 1941 1945 1946 1947 _ 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955
Type of Machine Actual Plan Actual Actual Plan Actual Plan Actual Plan Actual Plan Actual Plan Actual Plan Actual Plan Actual Plan Actual Plan Actual
Plows and Listers
Plows, Tractor-Drawn
45.6
41.45
7.9
13.8
N.A.
26.7
N. A.
62.0
N.A.
96.0 N.A.
141.2
N.A.
162.3
H.A.
116.3
S.A.
117.4
N.A.
87.0
N.A.
87.0
Moldboard
39.2
35.45
6.8
11.9
32.0
23.8
80.0
53.3
N.A.
82.6 110.0
121.4
N.A.
139.6
N.A.
100.0
N.A.
101.0
75.0
75.0
75.0
75.0
5-Bottom
N.A.
S.A.
5.0
8.7
N.A.
17.4
N.A.
39.0
N.A.
60.0 N.A.
88.6
N.A.
102.0
N.A.
73.0
N.A.
73.7
N. A.
55.0
N.A.
55.0
Other Types
6.4
6.0
1.1
1.9 .
N.A.
3.9
N.A.
8.7
N.A.
13.4 N.A.
19.8
N.A.
22.7
N.A.
16.3
N.A.
16.4
N.A.
12.0
N.A.
12.0
4
Plows, Horse-Drawn
61.0
71.0
17.0
30.0
80.0
60.0
140.0
70.0
N.A.
90.0 N.A.
100.0
N.A.
90.0
N.A.
80.0
N.A.
80.0
N.A.
60.0
N.A.
0.0
Harrows, Rollers, Pulverizers, and Stalk
Cutters
Tractor-Drawn
Disc Harrows
N.A.
N.A.
1.0
2.0
N.A.
4.0
N.A.
8.0
N. A.
12.0 N.A.
18.0
N.A.
21.0
N.A.
22.0
N.A.
23.0
N.A.
25.0
N.A.
25.0
,
Harrows, Horse-Drawn
60.0
120.0
25.0
50.0
N.A.
75.0
N.A.
90.0
N.A.
100.0 N.A.
110.0
N.A.
120.0
N.A.
100.0
N. A.
100.0
N.A.
90.0
N.A.
90.0
Planting, Seeding, and fertilizing
Machinery
Seed Drills, Tractor-Drawn
21.9
33.5
1.7
7.1
30.0
19.8
67.0
41.7
N.A.
65.1 83.3
120.3
N.A.
138.3
N.A.
110.0
N.A.
90.0
N.A.
80.0
N.A.
80.0
4
Seed Drills, Horse-Drawn
26.0
37.0
5.0
10.0
38.8
26.0
49.55
30.0
N.A.
50.0 N.A.
60.0
N.A.
70.0
N.A.
60.0
N.A.
50.0
N.A.
40.0
N.A.
0.0
Transpl~/ anters, Tractor-Drawn SR-6 and
SR-6M J
0
0
0
0
0
0
?.0
0
0
0 N.A.
0.1
N.A.
0.1
?
N.A.
0.2
N.A.
0.7
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
4
Transplanters, Tractor-Mounted, SRN-4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0
0
N.A.
0
N.A.
0.01
0.2
0.03
5.0
2.5
7.5
.5
Vegetable Planters, Tractor-Mounted,
SON-2.8
0
.0 .
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0
0
N.A.
0.03 N.A. 0.05
0.05
0.3
6.0
4.0
6.0
6.0
Grain and Vegetable Drills, Tractor-
Drawn, SOD-24
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0
0
N.A.
0.05 N.A. 0.1
N.A.
0.5
3.0
2.5
5.0
5.0
^/
Potato Planters, Tractor-Drawn 6
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
0.1
N.A.
0.3
N.A.
1.0
N.A.
1.0 N.A.
1.1
N'-A.
1.2 N.A. 1.3
N.A.
2.0
20.0
15.0
25.0
25.0
Fertilizer Spreaders, TR-1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0
0
0
0 N.A. 0.02
N.A.
0.1
5.0
3.0
10.0
8.0
Footnotes for Table 3 follow on p. 22.
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S-E-C-R-E-T
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S-E-C-R-E-T
. Table 3
Estimated Soviet Production of Selected Types of Agricultural Machinery
Planned and Actual, 1940-41 and 1945-55 a/
(Continued)
1940 1941 1945 11946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955
Type of Machine
Actual
Plan
Actual Actual Plan Actual
Plan
Actual
Plan Actual
Plan
Actual
Plan
Actual
Plan-
Actual
Plan
Actual
Plan
Actual
Plan
Actual
Planting, Seeding, and Fertilizing
Machinery
(Continued)
Manure Spreaders
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
S.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N. A.
N. A.
N. A.
N. A.
N. A.
1.0
N.A.
2.0
4.0
3.0
11.0
8.0
Universal Manure Spreaders, TUB-7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
N.A.
0
N.A.
0.005
1.0 d/
0.5
3.0 dJ
1.5
Manure Loaders
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
0.1,
N.A.
0.1
2.5
1.8
5.0
4.0
Cultivators, Tractor-Drawn and
Tractor-Mounted
32.2
32.5
0.9
15.3
37.0
32.1
55.0
42.1
N.A.
59.7
82.3
99.8
Cultivator.Hillers, Tractor-Mounted,
KON-2.8P
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
N.A.
0.1
0.5
0.45
12.0
10.0
18.0
15.0
Cultivator-Fertilizers, Tractor-
Mounted, ERN-2.8
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
N.A.
0.05
0.5
0.3
10.0
8.0
12.0
10.0
Cultivators, Horse-Drawn
28.5
43.0 a/
12.0
33.5
78.0
50.0 .
85.0
60.0
N.A.
70.0
N.A.
75.0
N.A.
80.0
N.A.
70.0
N.A.
60.0
N.A.
45.0
N.A.
45.0
Sprayers and Dusters
Duster-Sprayers, Tractor-Mounted, ONK
0
0
0
N.A.
N.A.
0.5
0.5
2.0
2.0
3.0
3.0
Sprinkling Units, DDP-30S
0
0
0 .
N.A.
N.A.
2.0
0.1
2.Q
1.2
3.0
2.7
Grain Combines
12.8
13.0
0.3
1.35
7.0
2.8
25.0
14.4
30.0
29.0
60.0
46.0
50.0
53.0
50.0
41.0
N.A.
41.0
N.A.
37.0
N.A.
37.0
Tractor-Drawn
12.8
13.0
0.3
1.35
6.3
2.52
N.A.
10.7
N.A.
17.0
N.A.
23.0
N.A.
24.0
N.A.
20.0
N.A.
19.0
N.A
20.0
N.A.
20.0
Self-Propelled
0
0
0
0
0.7
0.28
N.A.
3.7
N.A.
12.0
N.A.
23.0
N.A.
29.0
N.A.
21.0
N.A.
22.0
N.A.
17.0
N.A.
17.0
Cotton Pickers
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
0.01
0.03
0.03
1.1
0.3
N.A.
2.0
N.A.
10.0
N.A.
8.0
N.A.
6.0
N.A.
6.0
N.A.
6.o
Beet Harvesting Combines
0
0
0
0
N.A.
0.15
1.0
0.3
N.A.
0.4
N.A.
0.6
N.A.
0.9
N.A.
.1.1
N.A.
1.6
N.A.
2.4
N.A.
2.5
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/29: CIA-RDP79RO1141A000400090001-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 3
Estimated Soviet Production of Selected Types of Agricultural Machinery
Planned and Actual, 1940-41 and 1945-55
(Continued)
1940 1941 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955
Actual
Plan
Actual Actual Plan Actual
Plan
Actual
Plan Actual
Plan
Actual
Plan
Actual
Plan
Actual
Plan
Actual
Plan
Actual
Plan
Actual
Harvesting Machinery
(Continued)
Beet Diggers, Tractor-Drawn and
Tractor-Mounted
2.0
N.A.
0.5
2.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
H.A.
5.0
N.A.
5.5
N. A.
6.0
N.A.
6.0
N. A.
6.0.
N.A.
6.0
N.A.
6.0
Potato Harvesting Combines
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
N.A.
0
N.A.
0.1
N. A.
0.1
N.A.
0.1
1.3
0.5
15.0
13.5
25.0
25.0
Potato Diggers, Tractor-Drawn
2.5
2.5
0.2
0.5
11.0
5.0
2.0
2.0
N.A.
3.0
N.A.
5.0
N.A.
7.0
N. A.
8.0
'N.A.
9.0
N.A.
10.0
N.A.
12.0
Potato Diggers, Horse-Drawn
N. A.
N.A.
0.5
1.0
N.A.
3.0
N.A.
3.0
N.A.
4.5
H.A.
7.5
N.A.
11.0
N.A.
12.0
H.A.
10.0.
H.A.
10.0
H.A.
10.0
Forage Harvesting Machines
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
H.A.
0
N.A.
0.02
N.A.
0.04
H.A.
0.1
2.0
2.0
5.0
4.0
Corn Harvesting Combines
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
N. A.
0.01
H.A.
0.05
N.A.
0.5
2.5
1.5
3.5
3.0
Cabbage Picking Machines
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
N.A.
0.01
N.A.
0.05
2.0 /
1.5
4.0 J
3.5
Flax Harvesting Combines
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.1
0.1
N.A.
0.4
N.A.
0.8
N.A.
1.1
N.A.
1.5
N. A.
1.6
N.A.
1.8
N.A.
2.0
Flax Pullers
1.5
1.0
N.A.
0.1
2.0
0.3
N.A.
0.5
N.A.
1.0
N.A.
1.3
H.A.
1.5
H.A.
1.7
N.A.
1.9 .
N.A.
2.0
N.A.
2.0
Mowers, Self-Propelled
0
0
0
0
0
0
N.A.
0
0.3
0.2
N.A.
0.1
2.0
1.2
7.5
2.4
6.0
3.5
7.5
5.0
7.5
7.5
Mowers, Tractor-Drawn and Tractor-
Mounted
2.5
3.0
0.1
0.3
N.A.
0.6
N.A.
1.14
N.A.
20.0
N.A.
45.0
46.0
80.0
102.0
100.0
N.A.
50.0
19.0
19.0
23.0
23.0
Movers, Horse-Drawn
44.5
60.0
5.0
10.0
55.0
30.0
114.0
60.0
H.A.
62.0
N.A.
65.0
N.A.
75.0
100.5
80.0
N.A.
80.0
N.A.
80.0
N.A.
80.0
Rakes, Tractor-Drawn
N.A.
2.0
0.1
0.2
N.A.
0.4
N.A.
0.9
N.A.
1.5
N. A.
4.0
16.0
10.0
21.9
15.0
N.A.
20.0
35.0
35.0
45.0
45.0
Rakes, Sweep, Tractor-Mounted
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1.0
N.A.
1.5
N.A.
3.0
N.A.
10.0
26.8
20.0
83.0
75.0
123.0
123.0
Rakes, Horse-Drawn
39.0
60.0
5.0
10.0 45.0
30.0
90.0 60.0
N.A.
62.0
N.A. 65.0
N.A.
75.0
N.A.
80.0
N.A.
80.0
N.A.
75.0
N.A.
75.0
Hay Stackers
0
0
0
0 N.A.
0
N.A. 0
N.A.
0
N.A. N.A.
N.A.
0.05
N.A.
0.5
13.5
7.0
35.0
20.0
50.0
40.0
Machines for Preparing Crops for Market
or for Use
Threshing Machines, Complex
2.9
2.5
0.8
3.0 9.0
5.0
16.5 10.0
17.0
16.0
18.3 18.3
N.A.
19.0
N.A.
20.0
N.A.
20.0
N.A.
20.0
H.A.
20.0
Threshing Machines, Horse-Drawn
6:5
6.5
2.0
7.5 22.4
15.0
34.95 25.0
N.A.
39.0
N.A. 45.0
N. A.
45.0
N.A.
45;o
N.A.
40.0
N. A.
35.0
N.A.
35.0
Fodder Steamers
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A. N.A.
1.0
N.A. 2,0
N.A.
2.0
N. A. 8.0
N.A.
14.0
15.0
15.0
N.A.
25.0
37.0
37.0
41.5
41.5
S E-C-R-E-T
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S-E-C-R-E-T
Estimated Soviet Production of Selected Types of Agricultural Machinery
Planned and Actual, 1940-41 and 1945-55
(Continued)
1940 1941 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955
Type of Machine Actual Plan Actual Actual Plan Actual Plan Actual Plan Actual Plan Actual Plan Actual Plan
Farm Dairy Machines and Equipment
Milking Units
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A. N.A. N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1.0 N.A.
Cream Separators
N.A.
N.A.
3.0
90.0. N.A. 200.0
N.A.
225.0
N.A.
275.0
N.A.
300.0
N.A.
140.0 g/ 140.0
Barn Equipment
Automatic Watering Troughs
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
2.0 N.A. 5.0 .
N.A.
10.0
N.A.
16.0
N.A.
100.0
Units Accounted For 389.4 88.0 289.8 596.2 823.2 1,082.1 1,446.2
Estimated Actual Unit Production N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 1,629.0 1,746.0
Percent of Total N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 66 83
plus or minus 20 percent.
b. Model SR-6M only in 1954 and 1955,
c. Model SKG-4 check-row type only in 1954 and 1955-
d. These figures represent an arbitrary division between 1954 and 1955 of a reported planned 1954-55 production of 4,000 units.
e. Includes an indeterminable number of hand-operated cultivators.
f. These figures represent an arbitrary division between 1954 and 1955 of a reported planned 1954-55 production of 6,000 units.
g. Estimated marked decrease in production from 1950 due to production of larger capacity cream separators.
h. Figures. rounded.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Actual
Plan
Actual
Plan
Actual
Plan
Actual
-
2.0
N.A.
3.0
7.5
7.5
15.0
15.0
150.0
N.A.
200.0
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
250.0
1,557.6
1,601.2
1,694.7
1,954.7
2,041.0
2,041.0
2,100.0
)/
2,400.0 J
76
78
80.0 J
80.0 J
1,613;7
2,053.0
79
The over-all estimated range of error is 50X 1
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/29: CIA-RDP79RO1141A000400090001-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
and estimated actual production of 7 major types of machinery for which
data were available. Table 4 also shows. the two revisions in planned
production and the dramatic effect these revisions had upon Plan ful-
fillment.
It is evident from Table 4 that the actual increase in
production, although spectacular, was by no means as spectacular as that
originally planned.
By the end of the first 2 years of the Fourth Five Year
Plan, it must have become painfully apparent that the original goals
could not be met. The-slowness with which war orders were terminated
in agricultural machinery plants after the war and the slowness of re-
construction of war- damaged plants 55 had completely upset the origi-
nal plans for agricultural machinery production. Even the help re-
ceived from the many plants of other industries was insufficient to
fill the gap. To compensate for these difficulties, the plan was very
quietly lowered, in an effort to make it coincide more closely with
actual production. In March 1948, a new grain combine figure of
124,000 units for the Fourth Five Year Plan was released without refer-
ence to the previously announced plan of 174,000 units. A short 6 months
.later the planners were in trouble again. They proceeded to lower the
plan again, this time to 98,000 units, only 56 percent of the original
plan of 174,000 units. Again, no reference was made to previous plan
figures. Even the final plan figure of 98,000 units was met by only
96 percent. Production nearly doubled in 1949 and 1950, but it was
too late to make up. for the losses of 1946, 1947, and 1948.
It was assumed that the percentage reduction in
planned grain combine production, as outlined above, might apply also
to the other types of machines listed in Table 4. This assumption is
substantiated by the following: At the time of the second revision
of the planned grain combine production, it was also announced that
236,000 tractor seed drills were to be produced during the Fourth Five
Year Plan. If it is assumed that the ratio of production of tractor
seed drills to the total production of tractor seed drills, tractor
cultivators, tractor disc harrows, and tractor mowers was the same in
the original plan as in actual estimated production, the original plan
for tractor seed drills may be estimated to have been about 410,000 units.
Thus the total reduction in the original-plan for tractor seed drills
(42 percent) compares favorably with the total reported reduction in
the original plan for grain combines (44 percent).
- 23 -
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/29: CIA-RDP79RO1141A000400090001-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 4
Estimated Soviet. Production of Selected Types of Agricultural Machinery
as Compared with the Original Fourth Five Year Plan and. Subsequent Revisions
1946-50
Estimated
Fulfillment of Plans
Original
Plan
First
Revision a/
Second
Revision a
Actual
Production J
Origin
al First
Second
(Thousand
(Thousand
(Thousand.
.(Thousand
Plan Revision
Revision
Units) Units)
Units) Units)
(Perce
nt) (Percent)
(Percent)
174.0 56
124.0 57
98.0 58
93.6
54
75
96
Tractor Seed Drills
.Tractor Cultivators
Tractor Disc Harrows
1,000.0 59/
713.0 c/
563.3
614.6
61
86
109
Tractor Mowers
Mowing Machines, All Types 500.0 LO/ 356.5 J
(Including Tractor Mowers.)
281.6
294.3
59
83
105
Rakes, All Types .
4oo.o 61 285.2 c/
225.3 21
236.5
83
a.. The date of the first revision was March
which the revisions were reported.
1945,
and the second, September 194d, based on the date
b. Estimates taken from Table 3, p. 19, above.
c. Decrease in plan assumed to be the same as for
d. Decrease in plan assumed to be the same as for
grain combines, or 28.7 percent.
grain combines, or 21.0 percent.
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Table 4 emphasizes the Soviet practice of magnifying
their accomplishments by the simple expedient of unobtrusively lowering
the plan to suit reality. Such reductions in plan achieved absolutely
nothing in the practical sense of getting needed machines into the
fields; but the propagandist goal was admirably achieved -- the plan
was overfulfilled for all the machines listed in Table 4 except for
grain combines.
Table 4 also reflects the-apparent inability of the
Russians to maintain close coordination and control of various segments
of the economy for the accomplishment of a specific task -- in this
case the termination of war orders and the reconstruction of plants
for the production of agricultural machinery. This same difficulty, as
it applies to the various administrations of a particular ministry, was
pointed up in November 1953 by Pravda in connection with the implementa-
tion of plans for the production of agricultural machinery in 1954-55.
Pravda's complaint was that : "Main administrations of the Ministry of
Machine Building issue decrees and orders calling for increased output
of equipment for agricultural purposes, but there is no effective
system for seeing that these decrees and orders are carried out." 62
b. Production in 1951-53-
The Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55) as released did not
give figures for the production of agricultural machinery. The few
isolated plan figures included in Table 3 were picked up piecemeal
from the press and radio, or were estimated from information published
in connection with planned production it. 1954 and 1955. There is, there-
fore, little over-all data for the period from which plan fulfillment
might be judged.
For the 10 types of machines for which 1953 Plan
figures were available, an over-all fulfillment of about 63 percent
has been estimated. Actual fulfillment of the 1953 Plan for 6 types
of machines was announced, with fulfillment ranging from 13 percent
to 89 percent. In addition, it was reported that in the first
9 months of 1953 the production plans for grain combines, sugar beet
harvesting combines, potato planters, cultivators, and hay stackers
were not fulfilled, and that production in the first 10 months of
1953 fell short of the plan by thousands of tractor cultivators and
hundreds of cotton pickers, self-propelled mowers, and sugar beet
harvesting combines.
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Production in 1953 reportedly was poor simply because
the producing plants did not take the proper measures to improve pro-
duction or else ignored production orders completely. 6/ Supporting
plants which were supposed to supply component parts were particularly
remiss. 66 At the risk of oversimplification of the problem, it
appears that there is an almost constant underfulfiliment of plans
for production of agricultural machinery simply because the producing
plants actually are amazingly indifferent to their production tasks.
The industry as a whole seems to be in an almost constant state of
lethargy. Workers are alternately praised and pushed, and plant direc-
tors are issued medals or veiled threats. The production which is
achieved stems from the sheer number of workers and plants involved.
The decrease in production in 1952, the first general
decrease of the postwar period, was due to certain adjustments in the
product mix. Production of machines used for grain growing decreased
and new types of machines entered production. Nine of the 48 types of
machines listed in Table 3 were introduced into production in 1951 and
1952. According to reported figures, production in 1953 remained at
approximately the level of. 1952.
c. Production in 1954-55 and Future Production.
In September 1953 the first of a series of decrees for
the advancement of agriculture was announced. L7/ Perhaps the most
important aspect was the increase which was decreed in a number of new
or relatively new types of machines intended for the mechanization of
potato and vegetable growing and operations dealing with animal hus-
bandry. Increases in production of up to 7 to 10 times those origi-
nally called for in the plans for 1954 and 1955 were announced. The
only reference made to machines customarily reported upon in the past --
cultivators, grain combines, threshers, and similar machines used in
grain growing -- was to the effect that a new plan for these machines
would have to be drawn up. 68.
Little thought seems to have been given to the effect
of the new program on the production of the latter machines. The
reason for the new program, however, was undoubtedly the high degree
of mechanization already attained in the farm operations for which
such machines were used. Production of these machines had already
decreased in 1952 and 1953.
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Over-all fulfillment of the unit production program
for agricultural machinery in 1954-55 has been generously estimated
at about 85 percent in 1954 and about 94 percent in 1955. These
estimates are based upon the lowered production of other types of
machines not mentioned in the agricultural decrees, upon reported
fulfillment of the 1953 plan for 6 of the new types involved in the
program, ~qj upon estimated fulfillment for 4 other types of ma-
chines in 1953, and upon a number of isolated reports concerning the
implementation of the program in the first quarter of 1954. It has
been assumed that much of the confusion at the plant level, result-
ing from the sudden manner in which the new program was initiated,
will be remedied, and that underfulfillment in late 1953 and early
1954 will be made up to some extent later. The shifting of produc-
tion from plant to plant and the sudden replacement of old models
by new ones should decrease as time passes and plant commitments
are more clearly outlined. It is estimated that available fac-
ilities (planned and actual) for the production of agricultural ma-
chinery are adequate to produce the planned quantities of machinery.
The Russians have reported that the facilities of the agricultural
machine building enterprises, if employed to the full and in the most
.efficient manner, are adequate for the production tasks of 1954 and
1955. 70/ Presumably, then, planned production closely approximates
capacity of the industry, including assisting plants.*
Future increases of the 1954-55 magnitude are not
believed possible without a further expansion in producing facilities,
either by actual new construction or by an increased farming out of
orders to other industries. Increases of this magnitude should not
actually be necessary in view of the degree of mechanization which
should be realized by the end of 1955. An over-all increase in pro-
duction of perhaps 6 to 8 percent may be expected in 1956 over 1955.
* The Russians undoubtedly were taking into consideration the
assistance of plants outside the agricultural machinery industry.
Indeed, the very fact that production assignments for plants of the
Ministry of Aviation Industry, Ministry of Transport Machine Building,
Ministry of Heavy Machine Building, and Ministry of Defense Industry
were announced indicates that the agricultural machinery industry could
not cope with the job alone. It must be remembered, however, that
agricultural machinery plants themselves produce secondary products
which may occupy as much as 20 to 25 percent of the employment of the
industry. The utilization of these workers would decrease the need
for assistance from outside the industry considerably.
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An increase of 13 million hectares sown area (mainly
for grains) is planned for 1954-55. 7L The effect of this increase
on production of agricultural machinery is almost impossible to
estimate because of unknown factors related to machine utilization,
a detailed consideration of which is outside the scope of this re-
port. The agricultural decrees of late 1953 envisaged better training
of operators, better machine utilization, better repair facilities,
and an increased supply of spare parts, all of which would tend to
bring more of the existing park into use, prolong its life, and in-
crease its efficiency. This in turn would tend to decrease the need
for new machines. A degree of success is certain in all of the above
measures, although spare parts production still lagged in early 1954,
and only 57 percent of the 1953 plan for the building of Machine
Tractor Station (MTS) workshops was fulfilled. 72/ It should be noted
that, at the end of 1953, the USSR already had more than enough combines
to harvest all of the 1953 grain area plus the 13 million hectares to
be added in 1954-55. It could do so by using only 75 percent of the
1953 park instead of the 50 percent apparently used in 1953. Thus,
an increase of approximately 40 percent in the 1953 park would make
possible 100 percent harvesting of Soviet grain crops including the
additional acreage planned, in 1954.
3. Comparison of Production in the USSR and the US.
Table 5* gives the estimated Soviet unit production and
the actual US unit production for selected types of agricultural
machinery in 1952.
Since certain agricultural machines produced in the US and
the USSR are of varying sizes, comparisons may best be made by ex-
pressing production in terms of working width. Such a comparison was
possible only for grain combines and tractor moldboard plows. (.See
Table 6**.)
Soviet production compares favorably with US production
because of the concentration on larger sizes of machines. The average
tractor-drawn grain combine produced in the USSR in 1952 had about
2.3 times the width of cut of the average tractor-drawn combine pro-
duced in the US. The average Soviet tractor moldboard plow produced***
Table 5 follows
on p. 29.
Table 6 follows
on p. 34.
**# Continued on p.
33.
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Table 5
Estimated Soviet and Actual US Production of Selected Types
of Agricultural Machinery
1952
Type of Machine
USSR
US 73/
Plows and Listers
Plows, tractor-drawn
Moldboard
Less than 5-bottom
5-bottom or larger
Other types d
Plows, moldboard, tractor-mounted
116.3
100.0
27.0 a/
73.0 1
16.3
N.A. eeJ
216.3
102.8
86.0 a/
16.8 /
113.4.
141.0 f
Plows, horse-drawn
80.0
34.3
f
Harrows,,Rollers, Pulverizers, and Stalk Cutters
Disc harrows, tractor-drawn
22.0
198.3 g
Harrows, horse-drawn
100.0
337.8 h/
l
P
anting, Seeding, and Fertilizing Machinery
Seed drills, tractor-drawn
110.0
Seed drills, horse-drawn
60.0
57.9
Transplanters, tractor-drawn
0.2
Transplanters, tractor-mounted
0.01
12.1
Vegetable planters, tractor-drawn or mounted
0.05
1.0
Fertilizer distributors, drawn or mounted
0.02
95.6 1
Manure spreaders
1.0
93.7
Manure loaders
0.1
92.9
Cultivators and Weeders
Cultivators, tractor-drawn or mounted
97.0 f
295.9 1
Cultivators, horse-drawn
70.0
27.1
r
Harvesting Machinery
Grain combines
41.0
81.5
Tractor-drawn
20.0 m
62.9 m/
Self-propelled
~
21.0
18.6 1
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Estimated Soviet and Actual US Production of Selected Types
of Agricultural Machinery
1952
(Continued)
Type of Machine
USSR US ! 3/
Cotton pickers 8.0 4.8
Beet harvesting combines 1.1 1.3 1
Potato harvesting combines 0.1 0.4
Potato diggers,,tractor and horse-drawn 20.0 0.4
Forage harvesting machines 0.04 30.2 p/
Haying Machinery
Mowers, self-propelled 2.4 q/ 0 q1
Mowers, all other types 180.0 r 187.8 r
Rakes, all types 105.0 124.5
Hay stackers 0.5 4.0
Machines for Preparing Crops for Market or for Use
Threshing machines, complex, all types 20.0 .1.8 s/
Farm Dairy Machines and Equipment
Milking units 2.0 t 91.8 t
Cream (milk) separators, all types 150.0 u 26.5 I
Barn Equipment
Automatic watering troughs
300.0 J 295.0 v
a. It is estimated that 3- and k-bottom plows accounted for nearly all
of this figure. Eighty-one percent of US production was represented by
2- and 3-bottom plows.
b. It is estimated that nearly all of these plows were 5-bottom.
c. The breakdown as given in US.statistics is "4-bottom and larger."
This figure has been used here.
d. This item includes disc plows, subsoil plows, surface plows, and
terracing and ditching plows.
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Estimated Soviet and Actual US Production of Selected Types
of Agricultural Machinery
1952
(Continued)
e. The Russians have been aware of the convenience of operation, rel-
atively greater productivity, and savings of metal afforded by tractor-
mounted plows, but it was not until 1953 that any steps were taken to
develop tractor-mounted plows for mass production.
f. Ninety percent of these plows are 2-bottom and larger.
g. The US also produced 59,613 tractor-mounted disc harrows in 1952.
h. These harrows are not all horse-drawn in the strict sense of the
word. This figure represents total US production in 1952 under the
category "spike-tooth and spring-tooth harrows." It was not broken
down as to method by which powered. Large harrows for use with trac-
tors undoubtedly are included, and even.horse-drawn harrows may be
coupled together in sections for pulling by.a tractor. The same would
be true, of course, for Soviet horse-drawn harrows, although they refer
to them separately from tractor-drawn types.
i. This figure represents production only of the new TR-1 model. It
was impossible to estimate total fertilizer distributor production in
the USSR. Since the mechanization of fertilizer distribution is an
extremely new area of emphasis in Soviet agriculture, total unit pro-
duction of fertilizer distributors in 1952 was probably but a very
small fraction of US production. The 1954-55 planned production of
the TR-1 model is only 15,000 units.
J. This figure includes both manure and general utility loaders
(except hay, beet, and sugar cane loaders).
k. It was not possible to break down Soviet production into the num-
ber of tractor-drawn and of tractor-mounted cultivators. It is roughly
estimated that possibly as much as 80 to 90.percent of this figure is
represented by tractor-drawn types.
1. Fifty-four percent of this figure is accountea for by 2-row,
tractor-mounted cultivators. .
in. All Soviet tractor-drawn grain combines produced in 1952 were of
the 16-foot type. Eighty-eight percent of the tractor-drawn grain
combines produced in the US in 1952 fell in the category "6 feet and
under", and only 5 percent in the category "12 feet and over."
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Estimated Soviet and Actual US Production of Selected Types
of Agricultural Machinery
1952
(Continued)
n. All Soviet self-propelled grain combines produced in 1952 were of
the 13-foot type. Eighty-six percent of the self-propelled grain com-
bines produced in the US in 1952 fell in the category "over 10 feet."
In 1951, only 6 .percent of the US self-propelled grain combine park
was less than 10 feet in size and 75 percent were in the 12-foot and
14-foot size groups.
o. Beet diggers are not reported in US statistics as a separate item.
p. This figure includes forage harvesters, field ensilage harvesters,
and field hay choppers (basic machine only).
q. The Soviet self-propelled mower has a 10-meter cut (nearly 33 feet).
Mowers of this type were produced in the US many years ago but were dis-
carded as unwieldy and uneconomical. Their use in the USSR definitely
must be limited to large, flat areas of uniform grass or hay growth
where rocks and other obstructions do not exist or have been removed be-
fore mowing.
r. About 55 percent of Soviet production is estimated to have been of
the tractor-powered types, 60 percent of which are estimated to have
been tractor-drawn. In the US, 86 percent were tractor-mounted or
semi-mounted.
s. This figure includes 1,000 peanut pickers and threshers.
t. It is difficult to be certain that close comparability has been
achieved for milking units. The 91,771 units produced in the US are
listed as "Milker units for stationary installations." The milking
units included as Soviet production are believed to be for installa-
tion in barns and milking sheds, that is, stationary installations.
It is possible that some of the Soviet production may be of the smaller,
portable type with self-contained power unit of which the US produced
2,551 in 1952.
u. It is estimated that 50 to 60 percent of Soviet production was of
the 60-liter (136 pounds) per hour type. Only about 3 percent of US
production fell in the nearest comparable category, "250 pounds or
less per hour." The number of farms in the USSR which have milking
machines of one kind or another is not known. It is planned to mech-
anize milking on 5,000 farms in 1954 and 10,000 in 1955. 74/ In the
US, it is estimated that nearly 700,000 farms had milking machines on
1 January 1952.
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Table 5
Estimated Soviet and Actual US Production of Selected Types
of Agricultural Machinery
1952
(Continued)
v. Automatic watering troughs in the USSR are roughly estimated to
have accounted for as.much as 80 to 85 percent of total unit production
of barn equipment items in 1952. Automatic watering troughs ("live-
stock water bowls, inside") accounted for 33 percent of barn equipment
unit production in the US in 1952. 1952 represented the year of peak
production in the USSR up to that time. Over 387,000 of these troughs
were produced in the US in 1951, when they accounted for about 37 per-
cent of barn equipment unit production.
in 1952 had twice the number of bottoms of its US counterpart. Such
factors, including longer use per machine per season allow the USSR to
produce fewer machines than the US on a unit basis and yet to cultivate
approximately the same acreage. On the other hand, there are varying
rates of, productivity and more particularly, the matter of repair, which
tend to offset the advantage of the smaller unit production of larger
size machines by the USSR. Large size can be a disadvantage if it
prohibits the use of a machine in hilly or marshy areas of the country.
Large size can also be disadvantageous if, by slowing down the rate of
speed at which the machine can be used, it lowers the relative produc-
tivity of the machine.* US farmers take prompt and efficient repair
* A small, tractor-drawn grain combine on rubber tires, typical of
tractor-drawn grain combines in the US, is much more adaptable to vary-
ing types of terrain and crop. conditions than is the huge, lumbering
model on steel wheels which typifies the USSR tractor-drawn combine.
The Russians have admitted that their grain combines are too large with
motors too weak to be used in all parts of the country. 79/.
A 3-bottom, tractor-mounted plow, very common in the US, is in fact
about 14 percent more productive than a 5-bottom tractor-drawn plow, a
fact of which the Russians are well aware but upon which they have.just
begun to act. They have pointed out that a 3-bottom, tractor-mounted
plow can average about 4 hectares in a 10-hour day whereas a 5-bottom,
tractor-drawn plow can average only about 3.5 hectares in a 10-hour
day. 80/
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Estimated Soviet and Actual US Production of Grain Combines and Tractor Moldboard Plows
1952 J ?
Average Machine Size b
Units J
US Production as Percentage of Soviet Production
(In Terms of 1-Foot Units)
(Thousand)
Type of Machine
USSR
US
USSR
US
On Basis of
Total Production
Adjusted on
Basis of Unit Size
Grain Combines
All Combines
14.5
7.5
593.0
608.1
199
103
Tractor-Drawn
16.0
6.o
320.0
378.2
315
118
Self-Propelled
13.0
12.4
273.0
229.9
88
84
Plows, Moldboard, Tractor-Drawn
and Mounted
(In Terms of 1-Bottom Units)
4.6
2.3
459.5
555.6
244
Less Than 5-Bottom
3.5
2.1
94.5
482.2
841
510
5-Bottom and Larger
5.0
4.4 s/
365.0
73.4
23
20
a. This table is based on estimates of production unrounded for the US) reported in Table 5, p. 29. US production of grain
combines was converted to 1-foot units by a weighted average of 7.5 feet of cutting width per combine, computed from US
Department of Agriculture statistics. 75 The weighted averages of 6.0 and 12.4 feet, respectively, for tractor-drawn and
self-propelled grain combines were computed from the same data. US production of tractor moldboard plows was converted to
1-bottom units on the basis of the production by size reported in an official publication of the US Department of
Commerce. 76
The tractor-drawn grain combines produced in the USSR in 1952 were of the "Stalinets-6," 16-foot type; the self-propelled
grain combines were of the "S-4," 13-foot type. 77 Soviet production of tractor moldboard plows was converted to 1-bottom
units on the basis of an estimated average of 3.5 bottoms per plow in the "Less than 5-bottom" category and an estimated
average of 5 bottoms for the "5-bottom and larger" category. In 1947-48 the USSR produced a few experimental models of a
6-bottom plow which proved unsatisfactory and was not put into series production. 78 No plows larger than 6-bottom are
known to have been produced in postwar years.
b. Because of rounding, average machine size multiplied by unit production will not necessarily result in the exact figure
given in the "Units" column.
c. US production statistics on the larger types of plows include only the category "4-bottom and larger." It is this
category which has been used.
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of machinery almost for granted. In the USSR, on the other hand, it
appears that nearly half of.the grain combine park was out of service
in 1953 for lack of suitable "repairs. Annual unit production of new
machines, as a consequence, is higher than should be necessary. It
would be almost impossible to measure this."overproduction" in terms
of actual quantity estimates. Actually, under the system by which the
Russians use their machinery, perhaps it ought not even to be con-
sidered overproduction.
B. Imports.
Total Soviet imports of agricultural machinery (including spare
parts) from Bloc and non-Bloc countries in 1945-53 are estimated at
about 140.9 million rubles,or approximately 1.6 percent of total Soviet
domestic production (excluding spare parts) during the same period.
(See Table 7.)* Only in 1946 and 1947, when reparations deliveries
were at their highest, did imports amount to more than 5 percent of
Soviet domestic production. It was not possible to determine imports
by type of machine, on a basis either of value or of physical units.
J
1. From Soviet Bloc Countries.
Reparations from East Germany accounted for approximately
95 percent by value of all Soviet imports of agricultural machinery
in 1945-53. The value of such reparations is estimated at 134.5 million
rubles out of total imports of agricultural machinery valued at
11+0.9 million rubles.
German obligations to supply agricultural machinery and
spare parts as reparations in 1946-50 are estimated at about 115 million
rubles. /*-* This figure is estimated to have accounted for as much
as 85 percent of total reparations obligations to the end of 1953. 82/
The extent to which reparations obligations were fulfilled is not known,
but assuming 100-percent fulfillment, the approximately 135 million
rubles involved would amount to less than 2 percent of the estimated
total value of Soviet domestic production in 1946-53.
* Table 7 follows on p. 36.
* This estimate was obtained by converting Reichsmarks into US $ at
the rate of 1 Reichsmark = US $0..40 and then converting US $ to rubles
at the official rate of 5.3 rubles = US $1.
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Estimated Value of Production and Imports of Agricultural Machinery by the USSR
1945-53 a
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
Total
Soviet Production b
100.0
250.0
560.0
1,000.0
1,150.0
1,265.0
1,455.0
1,410.0
1,500.0
8,690.0
Soviet Imports
0.7
26.4
28.3
21.6
21.6
21.5
12.3
5.3
3.3
140.9
From Soviet Bloc Countries c/ 0
25.4
25.4
21.2
21.2
21.2
12.0
5.0 /
3.0 /
134.5
From Non-Soviet Bloc Countries 0.7
1.0
2.8
0.4
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
6.5
Total 100.7
276.4
588.3
1,021.6
1,171.6
1,286.5
1,467.3
1,415.3
1,503.0
8,830.9
Total Increment
0.7
9.5
4.8
2.1
1.8
1.7
0.8
0.4
0.2
1.6
Total Soviet Production
0.7
10.6
5.1
2.2
1.9
1.7
0.8
0.4
0.2
1.6
NOTE: Figures do not add to totals because of rounding.
a. Estimated range of error for Soviet production is + 20 percent; estimated range of error for imports is + 30 percent.
c. Imports from the Soviet Bloc represent deliveries from East Germany.
Quantity estimates of imports from the remaining Satellites were
not possible, but such imports are believed to have been negligible.
d. The value of reparations from East Germany for 1951-53, estimated at 20 million rubles, was arbitrarily broken down by
year as indicated.
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Reports of Soviet imports of agricultural machinery and
spare parts from other Satellites are too meager to.permit estimates
of value. It. is believed, however, that such imports were negligible
compared to reparations from East Germany.
An increase in-imports from the Satellites of unknown pro-
portions is anticipated by the USSR beginning in 1954. In the Soviet
agricultural decrees of September 1953, it was stated, without mention-
ing quantities, that the Soviet Ministry of Internal and Foreign Trade
and the Soviet Ministry of Machine Building were, within 2 months' time,
to draw up a plan for placing orders for agricultural machinery and
spare parts with the "People's Democracies." 84/ This implies either
that there were no orders for agricultural machinery from the Satellites
at that time, except for reparations, or that existing orders were to
be changed. No information on trade has been received which can def-
initely be attributed to the decree. A report dated January 1954
mentions that Czechoslovakia is sending the USSR some type of under-
water mowing machine for cutting reed, cane, and other water plants
in ponds. 85/ If this report may be considered an indication of future
developments in trade, certain Satellites might be asked to produce
various types of specialized agricultural machinery which the USSR
does not care to produce. It would be impossible to estimate 1954-55
imports from the Satellites in terms of actual value. A 100-percent
increase in 1954 over 1953 -- a possibility -- would mean imports of
about 6 million rubles, or only 0.3 percent of estimated Soviet domestic
production in 1954.
The total value of combined Satellite production of agri-
cultural machinery in 1948-53 may be estimated at approximately 1.05 bil-
lion rubles* or roughly 13 percent of Soviet domestic production during
the same period. The USSR could not, therefore, add substantially
to its supply of agricultural machinery through imports from the Sat-
ellites unless it imported total Satellite production. Such a move
is highly unlikely.
* Since a study of the Satellite agricultural machinery industry has
not been completed, this estimate is necessarily rough. It was obtained
by totalling estimated East German production for the period 86/ and
assuming that this total would account for approximately 40 percent
of total Satellite production.
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2. From Non-Soviet Bloc Countries.
In 1945-47, the USSR received from the US agricultural
machinery and spare parts valued at $638,590 (about 3.4 million rubles),*
60 percent of which was in small machinery not elsewhere classified,
30 percent in the larger items such as grain combines and binders (a
total of 9 units), threshing machines., balers, and horse- and tractor-
drawn plows, drills, planters, and cultivators, and 10 percent in spare
parts. 87/ US exports of agricultural machinery to the USSR ceased. after
1947.
The UK and Sweden together are known to have shipped agri-
cultural machinery valued at $72,000 (about 288,000 rubles) to the USSR
in 1951. 88/ The proportion which this figure represents to total UK
and Swedish postwar exports of agricultural machinery to the USSR is not
known. If the 1951 figure were assumed to represent the average annual
rate of such exports for the entire postwar period (an assumption which
would probably result in a maximum figure), then total exports might be
estimated at about $576,000 (about 2.7 million rubles).
No other country outside the Soviet Bloc is known to have
exported agricultural machinery to the USSR.in postwar years. For the
period. 1945-53, therefore, total Soviet imports of agricultural machinery
from non-Bloc countries (US, UK, and Sweden) may be estimated at about
6.1 million rubles, or less than one-tenth of 1 percent'of total estimated
Soviet domestic production.
In view of possible Soviet difficulties in meeting 1954 and
1955 production schedules, the USSR may attempt to increase imports of
agricultural machinery from outside the Soviet Bloc, particularly from
the major producers, the US and the UK.. In December 1953, the Director
of Tekhnopromimport (the Soviet agency handling imports /) informed a
US visitor that the USSR was interested in purchasing agricultural ma-
chinery (no quantities specified) from the US. 90/ As yet,, however,
there has been no move by theLRussians to implement such purchases.
Moreover, agricultural machinery has not been mentioned in the initial
trade negotiations between the,UK and the USSR which began in February
* US $ values up to March 1950 have been converted to rubles at the.
official rate of 5.3 rubles to the dollar; after March 1950, at the
official rate of 4 rubles to the dollar.
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1954. 9
In view of the. indicated Soviet interest in US agricultural
machinery, it appears strange that the item was not brought up in nego-
tiations with the UK. This may indicate either that the Russians prefer
US machinery and intend to negotiate for such imports in the future, or
that they have changed their minds about importing agricultural machinery
from non-Bloc countries.
The USSR imposed a voluntary policy of "self-sufficiency"
in agricultural machinery in the mid-1930's. Judging from the low level
of mechanization which admittedly still exists in a number of farm opera-
tions, the USSR could have been importing tremendous quantities of agri-
cultural machinery. It has chosen not to do so, however, and has de-.
pended almost entirely upon domestic production for increasing farm
mechanization. There is little reason to believe that this policy will
change significantly under the agricultural program for 1954-55. If the
USSR should attempt to increase imports on a short-term basis, to fill
in the gap left by underfullfillment of production in late 1953 and
early 1954, such imports probably would not amount to more than a very
small fraction of domestic production.
C. Inventories and Stockpiles.
Estimates of inventories are not.tenable except for the machines
for which the USSR has announced official figures. War losses of ma-
chines have been reported only in the very broadest categories, except
for grain combines. 92/ An attempt to determine retirement rates from
park figures for grain combines met with no success.* Because of the
* Analogy with the US could not be considered in estimating retirement
rates, since no such rates have ever been calculated for US machines.
The most exact statement which could be obtained for US machines was that
the' average-machine probably will last 15 to 20 years. 93 Even were US
retirement rates available, there is one reason above all why they could
not be applied to Soviet agricultural machines: the agricultural ma-
chinery in the USSR, under a system of some 98,700 large collective farms
and state farms ?/ with an average sown acreage of nearly 4,000 acres
per farm, obviously would not,be used in the same manner as agricultural
machinery in the US under a system of some 5.4 million farms with an
average sown acreage of perhaps 100 acres per farm. 9/ The US farmer
is pretty much on his own working his land and, therefore, must buy his
own machinery, even though a plow he buys might be capable of plowing
5 or 10 times the acreage which the farmer possesses. The machine is
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completely different design and operation of a grain combine from most
other agricultural machinery, a retirement rate, if determinable, would
have limited value as applied to other machines.
Inventories of grain combines, cotton pickers, and tractor
drills will not serve to indicate the over-all inventory of agricultural
machinery. Since these machines plant the crops and harvest them, how-
ever, such inventories are worth consideration. Table 8* gives the
estimated inventories. of these machines for 1940 and 1951-53.
The adequacy of the 1953 parks to meet the requirements of USSR
agriculture is discussed in Section IV.**
No reference to the stockpiling of agricultural machinery in the
USSR has been found. Under a program of increasing the mechanization of
agriculture as rapidly as possible, the USSR would not be likely to con-
sider stockpiling agricultural machinery.
III. Demand.
Agricultural machinery, by the very nature of its design and
construction, has but one consumer -- agriculture. In the USSR the
socialized sector of agriculture is broken up into collective farms
and state farms. The park of agricultural machinery for the collec-
tivefarms is centered in the Machine Tractor Stations (MTS). The
state farms maintain their own parks of machinery.
in service perhaps a week or so a year. Necessary repairs can usually
be made promptly and efficiently by a quick trip to town. In the USSR
conditions are just the reverse. Every available machine is used to
the fullest until a particular farm operation is completed, even though
it may mean shipping machines from one part of the country to another. 9
Since many machines, technically a part of the park, are unserviceable
at the time needed, 97/ the remaining machines must do even more, re-
sulting in even faster wear. Moreover, spare parts and repair shops for
machine maintenance are far from adequate 98 and are, of necessity under
a system of farms of thousands of acres, located considerable distances
from the machine in the field.
* Table 8 follows on p. 41.
P. 52, below.
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Table 8
Estimated Inventories of Selected Types
of Agricultural Machinery in the USSR,
1940 and 1951-53 1
Type of Machine
1940 1951
1952
1953
Grain Combines
182 99/
240 b
275 100
317 101/
Cotton Pickers
1 102/
11 c/
18 103
e
22 T
Tractor Seed Drills
315 T
400 of
480
556 104
a. Estimated range of error is + 10 percent.
b. Estimate based upon reported 1952 and 1953, parks.
c. Estimates based upon reported 1952 park.
d. Estimate based on reported 1939 park. 105
e. Estimates based upon reported 1953 park.
The MTS received nearly 80 percent of all the grain combines,
tractor moldboard plows, tractor cultivators, tractor seed drills, and..
complex threshing machines produced from 1945 through 1951. 106 It
is assumed, therefore, that approximately 80 percent of the present
total park of agricultural machinery belongs to the MTS. The remainder,
except for the small fraction in research institutes and testing sta-
tions, belongs to the state farms.
Because of the large percentage of the'total agricultural ma-
chinery park centered in the MTS, the distribution of the MTS has been
considered a fairly reliable basis for estimating the over-all dis-
tribution of the machinery park. Table 9* gives the distribution of _
agricultural machinery in 1953 on this basis. Available information
on the pattern of distribution of the MTS in earlier years did-not
permit the extension of Table 9 to cover- the entire postwar period.
It is probable, however, that the 1953 pattern does not differ greatly
from that for the earlier years. The'MTS were centered in the Ukraine
and the RSFSR even before World War II. Information on the distribution
Table 9 follows on p. 42.
## Continued on p. 43.
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Estimated Distribution of Agricultural Machinery in the USSR
Based upon the Number and Distribution of the
Machine Tractor Stations
1953 a/ 107/
Republic
Number of
MTS
Distribution of
Agricultural Machinery
(Percent of Total)
RSFSR
5,594 b/
62.5
Ukrainian SSR
1,347 -
?15.0
Kazakh SSR
459
5.1
Belorussian SSR
406
4.5
Uzbek SSR
245 c/
2.7
Lithuanian. SSR
142
1.6
Moldavian SSR
108
1.2
Latvian SSR
107
1.2
Georgian SSR
104
1.2
Azerbaydzhan SSR
99
1.1
Kirgiz SSR
70 c/
0.8
Estonian SSR
69
0.8
Armenian SSR
58 c/
0.6
Turkmen SSR
58 c/
0.6
.Tadzhik SSR
50
0.6
Karelo-Finnish SSR
34
0.4
8,950
100.0
a. Soviet reports on the number of MTS almost invariably include
specialized stations.such as land amelioration stations, pasture im-.
provement stations, animal husbandry stations, and forest shelterbelt
stations which cannot be broken out. The majority of the stations are
of the general farming station type.
b. Total for the RSFSR obtained by subtracting total of other Republics
from USSR total.
c. 1952.
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of the state farms, is practically nonexistent. Only 129 out of about
4,700 could be accounted for and those only on an oblast basis. 108
There are, of course, exceptions to the general distribution
pattern indicated in Table 9, which are directly related to the area
locations of certain crops. The three major concentrations of partic-
ular types of machinery concern those used for sugar beet, flax, and
cotton growing. About 95 percent of the machinery used in sugar beet
growing is concentrated in the northern part of the Ukraine, partic-
ularly in the Vinnitsa, Kiev, Poltava, and Kharkov areas, and in the
central regions of the RSFSR, particularly in the Voronezh, Kursk, and
Orlov areas. Nearly 80 percent of the flax-growing machinery is con-
centrated in the northwest, particularly in Vologda, Kirov, Kalinin,
Smolensk, and Yaroslavl' areas. Finally, about 75 percent of the cotton
machinery is concentrated in the Kazakh and Central Asian regions,
particularly in the Uzbek SSR, the Turkmen SSR, and the Tadzhik SSR.
The shift of machinery to take care of the added 13 million
hectares to be opened up in Kazakhstan, western Siberia, the Urals,
the Volga regions, and the northern Caucasus in 1954 and 1955 103/
will amount more to shifts within the RSFSR than it will to arrivals
from outside regions. It is reported that over 28,000 tractor plows
and seed drills, 8,429 grain combines, and thousands of harrows and
cultivators are to be sent to the new state farms to be set up in the
new areas in 1954. 110 To help insure the success of the program,
these machines probably will come from new production. The total
number of machines planned for shipment to the new areas is not
known. The percentage of the total machinery park in the RSFSR and
the Kazakh SSR may increase slightly; but, in general, the pattern
will remain much the same as it was in 1953.
B. Exports.
1., To Soviet Bloc Countries.
a. Quantity.
A complete breakdown of the value of Soviet exports
of agricultural machinery to the Satellites for individual postwar
years was not possible; nor was it possible, except for certain
items, to give a breakdown by type of machinery. The estimated value.
of Soviet exports of agricultural machinery to the Satellites for
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the period 1949-53* are given in Table 10.** On the basis of these esti-
mates, the USSR exported from 2.5 to 3.0 percent of the estimated value
of domestic production of 6.78 billion rubles during that period.***
The estimated minimum value of exports of 163 million
rubles was obtained by converting estimates of exports of individual
unit quantities of machines to values on the basis of prices of Soviet
agricultural machinery quoted at the 1952 Bombay Fair, 111 the only
price list available.**** To determine the possible maximum value of
exports, it was necessary to balance the reports which mentioned actual
quantities against those which did not and to roughly estimate the per-
cent of the total accounted for by the former. On this admittedly rough
basis, it was estimated that, for the Soviet Bloc as a whole, only about
80 percent of the total value of exports had been accounted for in the
minimum estimate of 163 million rubles. The calculated maximum esti-
mate of 200 million rubles, therefore, was. considered the best estimate.
The estimates for Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, China, and East Germany, on
which there were the greatest number of reports, are more firm than
those for. Rumania, Albania, Hungary, and Poland.
A survey of the factors, other than propaganda, which
might have dictated the distribution of Soviet exports among the
various Satellites would necessitate analyses of the agricultural econo-
mies of the individual Satellites. Such analyses are beyond the scope
of this report. The breakdown of total exports by country has been pre-
sented in Table 10 as a percent of the total merely to indicate more
clearly the uneven manner in which agricultural machinery has been ex-
ported.
Table ll***** gives estimated Soviet exports of selec-
ted types of agricultural machinery to the Soviet Bloc countries in
Exports prior to 1949 were impossible to estimate in terms of
value because of the paucity of reports covering earlier years.
** Table 10 follows on p. 45.
*** See Table 10.
**** Soviet production taken from Table 1, p. 14, above. Soviet production
was estimated in terms of 1950 prices. It was necessary to assume that
there were no major price changes in agricultural machinery between
1949 and 1950 or between 1950 and 1952.
***** Table 11 follows on p. 46.
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Estimated Value of Soviet Exports of Agricultural Machinery
to the Satellites, 1949-53.af
Country
Minimum Value
(Thousand
Rubles) Y
Maximum Value
(Thousand,
Rubles) n ~/
Best Estimate as
Percent of
Total E1
Albania
2,000
3,000
2
Bulgaria
68,000
75,000
38
Communist China
17,000
20,000
10
Czechoslovakia
30,000
35,000
18
East Germany
17,000
20,000
10
Hungary
8,000
12,000
6
Poland
5,000
15,000
8
Rumania
16,000
20,000
10
Total 163,000 200,000 100
a. Excludes exports of spare parts.
b. Based on 1952 prices.
c. Based on maximum value. Estimated range of error of best estimate
is - 20 to + 10 percent.
d. Individual figures do not add to total because of rounding.
1949-53. Estimated exports shown in Ta rie 11 are expressed in Table.12*
as a percentage or estimated Soviet production of the various types of
machines. Exports of the group of machines as a whole have amounted to
about 1 percent of USSR production in this period.
Although exports have, in general, been of only token
size, the propaganda extracted therefrom has been tremendous. This
factor is believed to be the primary motivation for agricultural ma-
chinery exports to the Soviet Bloc. To extract the greatest propaganda
value possible from exports, the machines have been shipped on a rather
selective basis with respect to size and operation, but with apparently"
Table 12 follows on p. 48.
Continued on p. 47.
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Estimated Soviet Exports of Selected Types of Agricultural Machinery to the Satellites, in Units
1949-53 J 112
Type of Machine.
Albania
Bulgaria
China
Czechoslovakia
East
Germany
Hungary
Poland
Rumania
Total
Grain Combines
50
1,550
100
820
46o
550
600
575
4,705
Beet Harvesting Combines
N.A.
5
N.A.
52
190
N.A.
N.A.
168
415
Flax Harvesting Combines
N.A.
3
N.A.
N.A.
50
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
53
Potato Harvesting Combines
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
52
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
52
Cotton Pickers
N.A.
15
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
4
19
Threshing Machines, Complex
N.A.
5,200
N.A.
N.A.
291
N.A.
N.A.
140
5,631
Tractor Moldboard Plows
70
1,200
N.A.
7,000
50
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
8,320
Tractor Seed Drills
70
400
N.A.
N.A.
50
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
520
Tractor Cultivators
N.A.
300
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
300
Other Agricultural Machines
3 .J
1,330 J
N.A. J.
670 J
500 J
N.A.
N.A.
J
'~
120 J
2,623
a. The over-all estimated range of error for all items except grain combines is - 0 + 50 percent. The estimated
range of error for grain combines is ?5 percent.
b. Represents incubators of 20,000-egg capacity. Reaper-binders, horse-drawn plows, horse-drawn seed drills,
and horse-drawn cultivators are known to have been exported to Albania, but no estimates of quantities were -
possible.
c. Represents grain-cleaning machines, reaper-binders, tree-planting machines, horse- and tractor-drawn mowing
machines, and electric sheep-shearing machines. Tractor disc harrows and electric milking machines are known to
have been exported. to Bulgaria, but no.estimates of quantities were possible.
d. Tractor moldboard plows, threshing machines, balers, sprayers, horse- and tractor-drawn mowing machines, and
various other types of horse-drawn implements are known to have been exported, but no estimates of quantities.
were possible.
e. Represents grain-drying installations, tractor disc harrows, and electric milking machines. Flax pullers,
potato planters and diggers, and fertilizer spreaders are known to have been exported to Czechoslovakia, but
no estimates of quantities were possible.
f. Represents grain-drying installations, potato planters, reaper-binders, horse- and tractor drawn mowing ma-
chines, electric milking machines, and silage cutters. Electric sheep-shearing machines are known to have been
exported to East Germany, but no estimate of quantity were possible.
g. Potato planters are known to have been exported to Hungary, but no estimate of quantity was possible.
h. Potato planters and diggers, tractor disc harrows, and horse- and tractor-drawn mowing machines are known to
have been exported.to Poland, but no estimates of quantities were possible.
i. Represents potato diggers and self-propelled mowing machines.
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little regard for domestic Soviet needs. Only a very small percentage
of total production of tractor moldboard plows, tractor seed drills, and
tractor cultivators, for example, has been exported, although the degree
of mechanization in farm operations employing these machines is rela-
tively high. Exports of. these machines are not slighted in propaganda,
of course, but the machines themselves are relatively unspectacular in
appearance and in the work they perform. Harvesting machinery, on the
other hand, is much more impressive, both in appearance and in operation.
Thus, although admittedly only 6 percent of the Soviet potato crop was
harvested by machine in 1952, 113 at least 6.5 percent of total produc-
tion of potato harvesting combines was exported in that year. Only
80 percent of the beet crop was harvested by machine in 1953, 114 but
nearly 10 percent of 1949-53 production of beet harvesting combines was
exported. Had the.USSR retained the 4,705. grain combines instead of
exporting them to the Bloc, an. extra estimated 1.2 million hectares of
grain might have been harvested,* or about 1.2 percent of the estimated
1953 grain acreage.** In theory, the export of these machines did not
affect Soviet plans for mechanization, since exports undoubtedly were
taken into consideration in the plan. As a matter of fact, the USSR
might have realized only a very slightly higher fulfillment of certain
planned levels of mechanization had exports not occurred. If, for
example, the 1.2 percent possible increase in area harvested by combines
were added to the 77 percent actually harvested by combines in 1953, 116
the 1953 planned level of 81 percent 117/ would have. been met by 96.5 per-
cent instead of 95 percent. It may be concluded, therefore, that the
propaganda value of Soviet exports of agricultural machinery through
1953 far outweighed any adverse effect upon the mechanization program
of the USSR.
Available information indicates that the USSR plans to
increase exports of agricultural machinery to the Satellites in 1954.
The full extent of these exports cannot be judged, but for certain types
of machines percentage increases of nearly 80 percent have been reported.
* The average productivity per combine of about 260 hectares per har-
vesting season was obtained by dividing the estimated number of combines
on hand in the USSR in 1953 by the total acreage harvested by combines
in 1953.
The figure used as estimated 1953 grain acreage was 103.8 million
hectares. 115/
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Estimated Soviet Exports of Selected Types of Agricultural Machinery
to the Satellites as a Percentage of Total Soviet Production
1949-53
Type of Machine
Total Soviet
Production 1
(Units)
Exports to
Satellites /
(Units)
Exports as
Percent of
Total Production
Grain Combines
210,000
4,705
2.2
Beet Harvesting
Combines
4,600
415
9.0
Flax Harvesting
Combines
5,400
53
1.0
Potato Harvesting
Combines
800
52,
6.5
Cotton Pickers
26,300
19
0.1
Threshing Machines,
Complex
93,300
5,631
6.o
Tractor Moldboard
Plows
544,600
8,320
1.5
Tractor Seed Drills
523,700
520
0.1
Tractor Cultivators
470,300
300
0.1
Total
1,879,000
20,015
1.1
a. Estimated Soviet production was obtained from Table 3, P. 19, above.
b. Estimated Soviet exports to the Satellites was obtained from
Table 11, p. 46, above.
Table 13* gives the pattern of Soviet exports of grain
combines to the Satellites in 1949-53 and the plan for 1954. To the
three countries for which plan information was available (Czechoslovakia,
East Germany, and Poland), exports are to increase 50 percent, from
1,100 units in 1953 to 1,655 units in 1954. It should be noted, however,
* Table 13 follows on p. 49.
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Table 13
Estimated Soviet Exports of Grain Combines to the Satellites
1949-53 and 1954 Plan, as Compared.
with Soviet Production. I/
Estimated Exports
Planned
Exports
Total
Country
1949
1950
1951,
1952
1953
1949-53
1954
Albania 118
0
0
10
15
25
50.
N.A.
Bulgaria 119
0
0
550
810
190
.1,550
N.A.
China 120
0
0
10
30
60
100
N.A.
Czechoslovakia 121/
0
0
120
300
400
820
600
East Germany 122
0
0
0
6o
400
460
555
Hungary 123/
0
220
330
0
0
550
N.A.
Poland I E
25
25
200
300
600
500
Rumania 125
0
0:
75
300
200
575
N.A.
50
245
1,120
1,715
11575
.4,705
N.A.
Soviet. Produc-
tion b
29,000
46,000
53,000
41,000
41,000
210,000
N.A.
Percent Exports of
Total Production
0.2
0.5
2.1
4.2
3.8
2.2
N.A.
a. For purposes. of this table, it was assumed that the grain combines
were exported in the same year in which they were produced.
b. Soviet production was taken from Table 3, p. 19, above.
that for each of these three countries there has been a gradual upward
trend in recent years. An upward trend on a much smaller scale has been
estimated for exports of grain combines to Albania and Communist China.
,For the remaining countries, the pattern is erratic. Assuming an over-
all increase to the Satellites of 50 percent over 1953, which is not
unlikely, exports of grain combines may be estimated at about 2,360 units
in 1954.
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Soviet exports of beet harvesting combines to Czechoslo-
vakia are scheduled to increase from 52 units in 1952 126 to 400 units
in 1954. 127/ (1953 exports are unknown.) Exports to East Germany are
scheduled to increase from 140 units in 1953 128 to 250 units in 1954,
129 or approximately 80 percent. Plan figures for other types of ma-
chines are not available.
Probably 1954 plan commitments will be met. The USSR
could not very well renege on these commitments without losing much of
the propaganda value already built up by press and radio. On the basis
of 'estimates of exports in 1949-53, an increase of even 50 percent in
exports of grain combines, for example, would not present a major threat
to agricultural mechanization in the USSR.. This conclusion is considered
tenable even when viewed in the light of the additional 13 million hectares
which are to be brought under cultivation in the USSR in 1954 and 1955,
primarily for grain growing. With only a slight improvement in mainte,
nance of the available combine park, as a result of the increased emphasis
placed on repair under the new agricultural decrees, the USSR should be
able to compensate for estimated 1954 exports of 2,360 grain combines.
b. Quality.
The glowing propaganda which accompanies Soviet exports
of agricultural machinery to the Satellites makes it difficult to ap-
praise the quality of the machines from the point of view of the Soviet
Bloc. The one concrete report on this subject concerns the 460 grain
combines which East Germany received from the USSR in 1952 and 1953.
They cost East Germany only about one-third of the cost of a somewhat
similar machine which is just beginning to be produced domestically;
but their productivity was reported to be far below the expected average.
The motor was reportedly rather weak for conditions in East Germany,
crop losses were considerable, straw losses were considerable because
of the high stubble left, and upkeep costs were extremely high. 130
These complaints are borne out by the fact that similar complaints have
appeared in the Soviet press with respect to the grain combines pro-duced,in the USSR. 131/ It would appear from such comments that Soviet
propaganda probably makes very little impression on , the, actual users of
the machines.
2. To Non-Soviet Bloc Countries.
Available information on Soviet exports of agricultural
machinery to countries outside the Soviet Bloc in postwar years is ex
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tremely fragmentary and includes unknown quantities of tractors. With
the possible exceptions of Argentina, Finland, and Iran, there is no
information to indicate that agricultural machinery is likely to become
a regular Soviet export item to countries outside the Soviet Bloc. If
the reports on India and Finland may be considered representative, one
of the important deterrents to Soviet exports appears to be the relatively.
poor quality of the machinery offered. Important exporters of agricul-
tural machinery, such as the US and the UK, have long been accustomed to
meeting the demands of foreign markets for machinery of good quality.
The USSR, on the other hand, has never engaged in large-scale exports of
agricultural machinery to non-Bloc countries.
Soviet exports of agricultural machinery to countries outside
the Soviet Bloc are difficult to estimate for 1954 and 1955 without in-
formation on the types of machinery involved in current trade negotia-
tions. The regular use of the term "agricultural machinery" precludes
an accurate appraisal of trade negotiations or agreements in terms of
types of machines. The USSR might export to non-Bloc countries the
types of machines employed in those areas where Soviet mechanization
.is most advanced, while not exporting those machines employed in areas
where the USSR is attempting a rapid increase in mechanization. The
export of a particular type of machinery, however, cannot serve as a
criteria for the Soviet supply of that particular type of machinery.
If the "right price" in terms of a scarce material or valuable propa-
ganda could be gained from the transaction, the USSR undoubtedly would
export potato harvesting combines, for example, even though the Soviet
potato crop might have to be harvested by hand as a consequence.
C. Essentiality and Substitutes.
There are many farm operations in which hand labor may be sub-
stituted for the work done by machinery. It is true that the operations
would be accomplished less efficiently but, nevertheless, they would be
accomplished. In the USSR, the degree of mechanization is very low or
almost nonexistent in many operations outside of grain growing; and even
here a number of operations are performed by hand labor or by simple
implements. Until the last year or so, for example, potato and vege-
table growing in the USSR was based entirely upon hand labor. 132 The
use of hand labor for all farm operations would,.of course, be inadequate
to feed the Soviet population of some 200 million. It would be increas-
ingly difficult during a period of war, as manpower requirements for
military purposes decreased the supply of agricultural labor. The USSR
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already has about 53 million persons, or approximately 25 percent of its
total population engaged in farm work of one kind or another. L33/* This
number of persons certainly could not be left to agricultural pursuits
during full-scale war. Should a full-scale war force the USSR to devote
a large part of its industrial facilities to the production of military
items to the complete exclusion of agricultural machinery, the loss in
food production would be a major contribution to the loss of the war.
Agricultural machinery designed to perform particular farm opera-
tions does not lend itself to use outside agriculture.
IV. Degree of Mechanization of Soviet Agriculture and Requirements for
Selected Agricultural Machinery.
A. Degree of Mechanization.**
By concentrating on about a half dozen basic farm operations,
the Russians have been able to achieve a higher degree of mechanization
for particular crops than any other country in the world, including the
US. It is on this level that the Russians base their claim of the most
mechanized agriculture in the world. Actually, the.Soviet effort has
been concentrated on those areas in which mechanization appeared most
desirable, such as grain growing, and in which machinery could be em-
ployed most efficiently, such as plowing. This policy has led to an
imbalance in the mechanization of Soviet agriculture not found in any
other major country in the world.
The imbalance in the mechanization of Soviet agriculture is
apparent in Table 14,*** which shows the degree of mechanization OD *4"**
* In the US there were only about 9.8 million persons employed in
farm work in 1952 or about 6 percent of the total population. 134/
** The degree to which a particular farm operation in the US and USSR
is mechanized is defined as that percentage of the total acreage (or
tonnage) involved in the operation which is worked by means of mechanical
draft power (tractor-drawn or tractor-powered machinery and self-propelled
machinery). 135 The rest of the operation is, of course, performed by
horse-drawn or horse-powered machinery and/or hand implements.
*** Table 14 follows on p. 53?
*#* Continued on p. 54..
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Table 14
Estimated Degree of Mechanization of Selected Farm Operations
on Soviet Collective Farms, Actual and Planned
1940 and 1951-55
Pla
Plan
Farm Operation
1
1940 116-/ 1951 37 . 1952 ~3g --f 1953 139
no
1954
1955 41
Grain Harvesting by
Combines
43 63 70
77
N.A.
80-90
Autumn Plowing
Plan-72
71 97
Plan-81
/
99 a
N. A. )
Fallow Plowing
96
84 ) 94
te
99 a/
N. A. )
95
Sowing of Spring
Grain Crops
72 Plan-78.
83
N.A.
Sowing of Winter
59
90-95
Grain Crops
85 Plan-88
93
N.A. )
Sugar Beet Planting
Sugar Beet Harvest-
ing
N.A.. N.A.
N.A. 70 Plan-90
N.A.
80
N.A.
N.A.
90-95
Cotton Planting
N.A. N.A. 98
N.A. b
N.A.
N.A.
Cotton Harvesting
Negligible 20 N.A.
N.A.W
N.A.
60-70
Vegetable Planting Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible 50
80-90
Seedling Planting
Negligible Negligible Negligible
N.A.J
35
70-80
Vegetable Between
row Cultivation
Negligible Negligible Negligible
N.A. b
70
80-90
Potato Planting
Negligible Negligible 14
N.A.b
45
8o-9a
Potato Between
row Cultivation
Negligible Negligible Negligible
N.A. J'
65
80-90
Potato Harvesting
Negligible Negligible 6
N.A. J
40
80-90
Haying (Cutting,
Raking, Stacking)
N.A. N.A. Plan-41
N.A. J/
65
80
8ilaging of Fodder
N.A. N.A. Plan-58
N.A. b
65
75
a. The degree of mechanization was reported as "almost st 100 percent-'rh+
b. The 1953 plan for the mechanization of these operations was not fulfilled. 143
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collective farms of the USSR for selected types of farm operations for
1940 and 1951-55. The figures apply to collective farms throughout the
USSR, but not to the State Farms.* In certain important-grain-growing
areas such as the southern Ukraine and the Kuban' in the Lower Don-North
Caucasus region, combines harvest 95 percent to 100 percent of the grain
even in the collective farms. 146 Likewise, combines harvest nearly all
of the grain in Orel and Kursk Oblasts and other central regions of the
RSFSR. 147
Grain growing, as the most important branch of agriculture
from the Soviet viewpoint, is the most mechanized, but even here there
are extremes. The high level of mechanization in the plowing, sowing,
and harvesting of grain crops contrasts sharply with the low level of
mechanization in the gathering and stacking of chaff and straw, in the
spreading of organic and mineral fertilizer, in grain transport, and in
grain cleaning. 148 Exact figures on the degree of mechanization of
the latter operations have not been published, but it is roughly esti-
mated that they are mechanized to no more than 20 percent to 25 percent.
The extent to which potato and vegetable growing have suffered in the
past as a result of the concentration on grain, sugar beet, and cotton
growing is readily apparent in Table 14. An interesting point is the
contrast in the mechanization of cotton planting and cotton harvesting.
The lower degree of mechanization of cotton harvesting may be principally
due to the fact that the Russians are still working to develop an accept-
able cotton picker. It is reported that the cotton picker now employed,
which has been in production since 1948, 149/ and has been improved
several times, 150/ does not pick the cotton completely; that it allows
too much to drop to the ground; and that it should be replaced by a new,
improved machine. 151
In the fall of 1953 the Russians instituted an intensive cam-
paign designed to correct the imbalance in agricultural mechanization.
In two years, that is, during 1954 and 1955, the Russians expect to
achieve a level of mechanization in potato and vegetable growing, haying,
* Except for those operations connected with potato and vegetable grow-
ing and animal husbandry, State Farms, with their own parks of machinery,
are reported to be from 95 to 100 percent mechanized. Potato and vege-
table growing are to be from 80 to 90 percent mechanized on State Farms
in 1954 and 95 percent mechanized in 1955. 144 No specific levels of
mechanization are reported for animal husbandry. It is reported only
that levels of mechanization here are seriously lagging. 145/
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and silaging of fodder only slightly below, or equal to, those planned
for the already highly mechanized operations connected with grain and
sugar beet growing and cotton planting. It was precisely because such
a high degree of mechanization had already been achieved in the latter
crops that such a tremendous two-year mechanization program for other
areas of agriculture could be considered at all.
The indications are that the planned 1955 goals for mech-
anization are already doomed to an underfulfillment, perhaps by as
much as 20 to 25 percent, for those operations connected with potato
and vegetable growing and animal husbandry.
As indicated in Table 14, no farm operation connected with
the new program was mechanized in 1953 to the extent planned. The de-
gree of underfu.lfillment was not announced. The reason for the failure
to achieve planned levels of mechanization in 1953 is apparent in the
figures announced for the production of the machines used in these opera-
tions. Plan fulfillment for such machinery ranged from 13 percent to
89 percent. The underfulfillment in 1953 will, of course, have to be
.made up at the same time that attempts to achieve the goals planned
for 1954 and 1955 are underway. Fulfillment of plans for the produc-
tion of agricultural machinery is estimated at only about 85 percent
in 1954 and 94 percent in 1955. In addition, the fulfillment of the
mechanization program will depend upon the availability of adequate re-
pair shop facilities and spare parts for machine maintenance. The 1953.
plan for the building of MTS repair workshops was fulfilled only 57 per-
cent, and the plan for production of spare parts was not carried out. 152/
Thus it appears that the damage already done will preclude complete ful-
fillment of the plan.
The decision to increase the sown area in the USSR by
13 million hectares in 1954 and 1955, mainly in grain, 153 was made
after the mechanization program for potato and vegetable growing and
for animal husbandry was released. This increase in acreage should
have little effect on the mechanization of the latter farm operations,
and should actually have little effect on plans for mechanization of
grain harvesting in 1955. This estimate assumes a seasonal productivity
rate at the estimated 1953 rate of about 265 hectares per combine in
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the park.* Due to the wide attention devoted to the program for area
expansionand.the frantic manner in which it is being pushed, there may
be a more careless use of the machinery than usual, but at least some
of this harder use should be offset by increased repair facilities and
spare parts.
2. Comparison of Agricultural Mechanization in the USSR and
the US.
The US and the USSR have roughly the same amount of sown area
to mechanize (about 370 to 380 million acres),** but since the breakdown
by crops is not the same, comparisons of mechanization are somewhat mis-
leading. Nearly 25 percent of the sown area in the US was planted in corn
in 1951, 158 while only about 2 percent of the sown area of the USSR was
planted in corn in 1953. 159 The peripheral nature of the crop in the
USSR and the consequent lack of attention to the mechanization of its
harvest is apparent in Table 15.*** On the other hand, sunflowers are an
important crop in the USSR, while in the US the acreage devoted to sun-
flowers is negligible.
Table 15 gives the estimated degrees of mechanization of
selected farm operations in the US in 1953 and in the USSR for the years
indicated. The table also shows the estimated acreages of the respec-
tive crops involved in such farm operations. In those farm operations
on which the USSR has concentrated attention, the over-all degree of
mechanization is impressive, particularly in the case of plowing. In
1954 and 1955, each of the operations in Table 15 are to be mechanized
even further, although plan goals in this respect will not be met. By
the end of 1955 the USSR will probably still compare unfavorably with ##*
* Total sown area in the USSR in 1953 has been estimated at about
157.2 million hectares, of which about two-thirds, or 103.8 million
hectares, was ingrain. 154 Seventy-seven percent of the grain acre-
age, or about 80 million hectares, was harvested by grain combine.
An estimated grain combine park during the harvest,season of 1953 of
about 300 thousand units, 155/ therefore,, gives an average seasonal
productivity-of about 265 hectares per combine.
** The total sown area of the USSR in 1953 is estimated at about
157.2 million hectares (388.4 million acres), 156 and the sown area
of the US in 1951 was about 370 million acres. 157
*** Table 15 follows on p. 57.
* * Continued on p. 59.
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Estimated Degree of Mechanization of Selected Farm Operations
in. the USSR and the US, for Selected Years a/ 160
Degree of Mechanization
Estimated Acreage
(Million Acres)
USSR
Crop Operation
1953
b
1951 1953
Small Grain
150.0 256.0
Plowing
95
99
-(1953)
Seeding
85
88
-(1953)
Discing and Harrow-
ing (Cultivating)
9o
50
-(1951)
Harvesting
95
77
-(1953).
Threshing.
100
50 -(Estimated 1951)
Corn
84.0
7.0
Plowing
85
99 -(1953)
Planting
50
N.A.
Cultivating
80
50 -(1951)
(f
ti
ng
or
Harves
grain)
41
-(1946)
Negligible -(1951)
Cotton
28.0 .
5.7
Plowing
65
99 -(1953)
Planting
48
98 -(1952)
Cultivating
56
75 -(Estimated 1951)
Harvesting
20
20 -(1951)
Sugar.Beets
0.8.
3.3
Plowing
9o
99 -(1953)
Seeding
6o
95 -(1952)
Cultivating
60
75 -(Estimated 1951)
Fertilizing
65
N.A.
Harvesting
75
80 -(1953)
Spraying and Dusting
70
N.A.
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Table 15
Estimated Degree of Mechanization of Selected Farm Operations
in the USSR and the US, for Selected Years a/ 160/
(Continued)
Estimated Acreage
Degree of Mechanization (Million Acres)
Crop Operation 1953 b 1951 1953
Potatoes
Plowing
Planting
Cultivating
Harvesting
Vegetables
Plowing
Planting
Cultivating
Harvesting
90. 99 -(1953)
55 14 -(1952)
6o N.A.
70 6 -(1952)
1.4
7.7 si
N.A. Negligible -(1953)
N.A. Negligible -(1953)
N.A. Negligible -(1953)
N.A. Negligible -(1953)
N.A. 2.5 c/
264.2 282.2
Percent of Total Sown Area 71 73
a. Data for the USSR are for the collective farms only. For the opera-
tions listed, except those concerned with hay, potatoes, and vegetables,
the state farms are said to be even more highly mechanized.
b. As indicated.
c. These are acreages for the socialized sector only. No machinery would
be allotted to the remaining areas made up of small plots cultivated by
individual farmers or urban dwellers.
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the US in the mechanization of over-all cultivation, grain threshing,
corn harvesting, and potato planting and harvesting.
Without further qualification, Table 15 can present an ex-
tremely misleading picture with respect to the respective over-all de~-
grees of mechanization in the US and the USSR. Two factors in partic-
ular should be mentioned with respect to the USSR: (a) the crops and
the operations listed in Table 15 represent practically the total effort
toward mechanization which the USSR has been able to achieve since the
drive for mechanization began with the First Five Year Plan (1928-1932);*
and (b) other types of farm operations not listed (such as gathering
and stacking of chaff and straw, spreading of organic and mineral ferti-
lizers, grain transport, grain cleaning, milking, poultry raising, cattle
care and feeding) are mechanized not at all in the USSR or only to a
negligible degree. 162 In the US the individual farmer controls the
degree of mechanization. Because the average US farmer always has been
interested in saving labor without regard to.a particular farm operation
or crop, mechanization has tended to proceed at a more even pace through-
out agriculture. Thus, in addition to the mechanization levels achieved
in the farm operations listed in Table 15, the US farmer has saved un-
told hours of labor through his purchases of farm poultry equipment, farm
dairy machines and equipment, barn equipment, barnyard equipment, and
farm elevators and blowers. To satisfy this desire to save labor in the
"peripheral" areas of agriculture, the agricultural machinery industry in
the US has devoted from 10 to 20 percent of total output to the produc-
tion of the above machinery throughout the postwar period. 163 It is
estimated that in 1953, the high year thus far, the USSR.devoted about
3 percent of the total value of output to this machinery.
B. Requirements for Selected Agricultural Machinery.
Available evidence indicates that on a unit basis the USSR has
already established parks of certain types of machinery. sufficient to
mechanize farm operations 100 percent. Under the system by which these
parks are employed, however, mechanization of only 75 to 80 percent has
been achieved. The discussion here is confined to grain combines, cotton
* There was considerable destruction of the agricultural machinery park
in the USSR during World War II 161 which adversely affected mechaniza-
tion, but the areas of concentration in the nine postwar years have been
the same as in prewar years.
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pickers, and tractor seed drills, but the implications of inefficient
use of the machinery may be applied to other types of agricultural ma-
chinery as well.
Table 16* shows the estimated parks for selected types of agri-
cultural machinery, and estimates actual productivity, based upon re-
ported percentages of the total crop planted or harvested by machine
(as contrasted with potential productivity, based upon the. rated pro-
ductivity of park machinery.)
At an average productivity of 500 hectares per machine per
season,** the USSR could have harvested 100 percent of the 1953 grain
crop with only about 210,000 grain combines, or 70 percent of the avail-
able park. At an average productivity of 300.hectares per machine per
season, the USSR could have planted 100 percent of the grain crop with
only about 350,000 tractor seed drills, or 67 percent,of the available
park. One hundred percent mechanization of cotton picking in 1952
would not have been possible with the available park, but mechaniza-
tion could have been increased from the 20 percent which actually was
achieved to at least 30 percent. The case for cotton pickers may be
somewhat overstated, since there are machine design difficulties in-
volved which are not present in the other two machines. 170
The lack of full utilization of available machinery is perhaps
the best measure of.a problem previously mentioned -- the inadequacy
of the supply of spare parts and of repair shops for machine maintenance,
the need for which is aggravated not only by the poor quality of new
machines but by improper use of machinery. The spare parts problem,
which has plagued Soviet agriculture throughout the postwar period, 171
is apparently such that the USSR has found it easier to produce new
machines each year rather than try to keep all the old ones in opera-
tion. Plans to improve the repair facilities for agricultural ma-
chinery and the supply of spare parts were included in the agricultural
decrees of 1953, as were plans for improving the training of machine
operators.***
* Table 1 follows on p. 61.
Productivity figures taken from Table 16.
*** According to the plan, 1,173 workshops, 6,200 repair shops,
18,000 mobile motor workshops, 86 repair works, and 146 interrayon
capital over-haul workshops are to be built between 1953 and 1956. 172
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Estimated Actual Productivity of Selected Types of Soviet Agricultural Machinery
Compared with Potential Productivity
1953
Average Area Potential Area
Park a/ Covered per Covered per
(Thousand Machine Machine
Type of Machine Units) (Hectares) (Hectares)
Grain Combines 300 265 500
Cotton Pickers eJ 18 32 165 45 V
Tractor Seed
Drills 520 173
300
In Terms of Total Acreage
Percent
Total Total Area Potential Area Actual
Crop Covered by Covered by Coverage
Area 1,64
Machinery Y Machinery of Potential
(Million Hectares) (Million Hectares) (Million Hectares) Coverage
103.8 8o.o 150.0 53
2.9 0.6 . 0.8 75
103.6 90.0 156.0 58
a. Estimated park at time planting and harvesting were in progress. End-of-year park figures from Table 8, p. 1.
b. This column was calculated on the basis of the following percentages of total crop harvested or sown by the machines
listed: grain combines, 77; cotton pickers, 20; and tractor seed drills, 88 (estimate). (See Table 15, p. 58.)
c. This column is the estimated acreage which could be covered, assuming that the park would be utilized almost completely
during the few weeks in which it was in use and that each machine in the park would operate approximately at rated pro-
ductivity.
d. This figure is the reported average 1952 seasonal productivity of the machines in the park which were actually in
use. 166 This figure also represents the rated productivity of the machine for a 10-hour day over a 25-day period. 16.7
e. Data on cotton pickers are for 1952.
f. This figure represents the estimated rate of productivity for a 10-hour day over a 20-day period. 168
g. This figure represents the estimated rate of productivity for a 10-hour day over a 20-day period. 169
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If the entire program for repair facilities in 1953-56 were fulfilled
only to the extent of the 1953 program for repair workshops, or 57 per-
cent, 173 the USSR would have an additional 14,000 repair shops of
various sizes by the end of 1955. The maintenance of the available
parks of machinery undoubtedly will improve under such circumstances,
although improvement in terms of a specific number of machines cannot-
be estimated.
The obvious solution to the problem would appear to be the
diversion of materials and manpower which now go into producing com-.
pleted units to the production of spare parts. The Russians have been
well aware of this fact for some time, but have been unable to act upon
it because of the attitude of many producing plants, in and out of the
industry, toward the production of spare parts. Many plants either
ignore orders for spare parts production completely, 174 or fail to
fulfill the plan. 17.5 There appears to have been but scant success
in the program during the first quarter of 1954, 176/ which means that
"excess" production of completed units may be expected to continue in
1954 and 1955.
In terms of requirements for machinery in 1954 and 1955, it
is apparent that the USSR does not actually need any new machinery.
No startling improvements in machine utilization are expected in the
next 2 years, however, so it may be assumed that rates of produc-
tivity in 1954 and 1955 will approximate those of 1953. In view of
this fact, and of plans to add 13 million hectares to areas under
cultivation in 1954 and 1955, it may be estimated that the USSR will
require from 350,000 to 400,ooo grain combines by the end of 1955.
Estimated 1954. and 1955 production of 74,000 units added to the esti-
mated end of 1953 park of 317,000 units, would give a park of about
390,000 units by the end of 1955, without allowance for retirement.
Roughly estimating a retirement of about 15,000 to 20,000 units,
the USSR should have no trouble in achieving at least the minimum
planned degree of mechanization in grain combining. Calculating re-
quirements for tractor seed drills in the same manner, about 610,000 to
640,000 units would be required by the end of 1955. Estimated produc-
tion of about 160,000 units in 1954-55, when added to the 1953 park of
about 556,000 units, indicates that the planned degree of mechanization
should be met here also. It is extremely doubtful that the plan for
cotton picking can be fulfilled by more than about 70 percent. At the
rates of production estimated for 1954 and 1955, the USSR could not
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have more than about 30,000 cotton pickers at the end of 1955. To pick
60 to 70 percent of the cotton by machine, on the basis of an estimated
acreage of about 2.3 million acres, 177 about 40,000 to 50,000 cotton
pickers would be. needed. It is doubtful that underfulf illment of the
plan would seriously affect production of consumer goods made of cotton,
since the remainder of the cotton would be picked by hand, as it has
always been in the past.
V. Future Industry Expansion.
The new program for agricultural machinery issued in the agricultural
decrees of 1953 was beyond the capabilities of the agricultural machinery
industry. In order to correct this defect, the following measures were
taken 178/: (a) the Ministry of Defense Industry, the Ministry of Trans-
port and Heavy Machine Building, the Ministry of Agriculture and Agri-
cultural Procurement, the Ministry of the Metallurgical Industry, the
Ministry of the Coal Industry, and the Ministry of the Aviation Industry.
were given production assignments for 1954 and 1955 amounting to 6,000 ma-
chines for making peat-humus pots for potato and'vegetable growing,
5,000 sprinkling units, 7,500 manure loaders, 14,000 potato harvesting
combines, and 15,000 manure spreaders; (b) five plants were transferred
from other ministries into the Ministry of Machine Building for the pur-
pose of building agricultural machinery, including a plant from the Min-
istry of Aviation Industry, a plant from the Ministry of Railways, a
plant from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and two plants from the Min-
istry of Agriculture; and (c) plans were made to begin construction in
1954 of a new agricultural machinery plant (somewhere in the Belorussian
SSR as nearly as can be determined) for the production of machinery for
potato growing with a yearly capacity valued at 150 to 200 million rubles.
This would represent about 10 percent of the total estimated value of
Soviet production of agricultural machinery. in 1953; (d.) four existing
plants of the agricultural machinery industry were to be,expanded by con-
struction and installations, valued at 5.5 million rubles, distributed
as follows: 1.0 million rubles at the Belinsksel''mash Plant in Belinsk;
2.0 million rubles at the Krasnaya Zvezda Plant in Kirovograd; 1.0 mil-
lion rubles at the Krasnyy Aksay Plant in Rostov-on-Don; and 1.5 million
rubles at the Ryazsel'mash Plant in Ryazan'; and (e) the Tula.Self-
Propelled Combine Plant in Tula was charged with the organization of
production of potato harvesting combines at the eventual rate of 15,000 a
year (6,000 in 1954 and 12,000 in 1955) and ,the cessation of production
of self-propelled combines.
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In addition to the physical expansion resulting from the construction
of new facilities and the expansion of old ones, "expansion" was also to
be achieved through the placing of orders for agricultural machinery and
spare parts with other countries of the Soviet Bloc. Ministries supply-
ing power, construction materials, and raw materials were charged with
the responsibility for supplying adequate quantities of these materials
to the plants producing agricultural machinery.
It may be observed that, except for the special orders outlined in
(a) above and the orders for machinery placed elsewhere in the Soviet
Bloc, these measures were designed to expand the production facilities
of the agricultural machinery industry itself. Since most of these
measures were not to take effect until 1954, there probably has not yet
been a significant increase in production.
Available information indicates that these measures have not all
been carried out with a uniform degree of success. Nothing has been re-
ported on the Ministries of Aviation and of Defense. The ministries
which are to supply the materials for expansion and for extra produc-
tion have been particularly remiss since the issuance of the decree.
Deliveries of raw materials and of component parts have not only been
delayed but have not.always been of the proper quality. These short-
comings are said to threaten disruption of the production programs at
certain plants.179 No information has yet been received on the loca-
tion or progress in construction of the new plant in Belorussia, nor
has anything been said on the planned expansion of the four existing
plants. The Tula Combine Plant put out its last self-propelled grain
combine on 31 January 1954 and began regular production of potato har-
vesting combines on 11 February, 180 with a production for the month
of February of 205 units, 5 over plan. 181 Since the plant was sup-
posed to have put out 55 units by the end of December 1953, 182 it
appears to be running about 6.weeks behind schedule. It is question-
able whether the plant can make up the lost time and produce the planned
6,000 units for 1954. At its peak, the plant produced an estimated
7,000 self-propelled combines in 1951. 183 Nothing has been reported
on the extent to which orders for machinery have been placed with the
Satellites.
The agricultural machinery industry can farm out many of its orders
for products of relatively si.mple design and construction to other
plants outside the industry. Future expansion on the present scale,
therefore, will probably not be required.
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VI. Inputs.
A. Raw Materials.
Table 17* gives the estimated inputs of metal products used in
the production of agricultural machinery in the USSR in 1936 184 and
in 1949-55. The categories shown are rolled steel, cast iron, and
"other."
The primary basis for Table 17 is the estimated total weight of
agricultural machinery produced for each year. Annual estimates of
total weight were obtained by multiplying unit production by a weighted
average weight per agricultural machine. These estimates of total weight
and weighted average weight per agricultural machine are believed to be
as accurate as possible on the basis of available information. Total
metal products, which account for approximately 92 percent of the weight
of the average Soviet agricultural machine, 185 were broken down on the
basis of official Soviet data and by analogy with the US.** Minor fluc-
tuations in the material make-up of the average agricultural machine from
year to year were considered too insignificant to invalidate the use of
a constant percentage. breakdown for metal products throughout the post-
war period.
The agricultural machinery industry is reported to be one of the
largest consumers of metal in the USSR. 186 Production of agricultural
machinery consumed in 1951 was an estimated 4 percent of the total Soviet
production of rolled steel, 22.4 million metric tons. 187 An even
smaller percentage of US steel production is consumed by production of
this type of machinery. In the US, about 1.36 million metric tons of
steel, largely sheet and rolled products, were purchased directly for the
production of agricultural machinery and tractors combined in 1950. 188/***
* Table 17 follows on p. 66.
The percentage of weight in metal products in the average US agri-
cultural machine does not differ appreciably from 92 percent. US machines
are usually equipped with rubber tires whereas Soviet machines are more
often equipped with wooden tires. For a more detailed explanation of the
methodology used in determining inputs, see Appendix B.
*** This figure does not represent total steel inputs for the production
of agricultural machinery and tractors; only direct purchases are given
in this figure. Total inputs would include purchases of components, for
which figures are not available.
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Estimated Inputs of Metal Products in Soviet Agricultural Machinery Building
1936 and 1949-55 /
Inputs
1936
1949 1950 1951
1952
1
953
1954
1955
Rolled Steel
582.7
548.5 730.4 888.9
796.3
779.7
808.5
933.1
Cast Iron
N.A.
185.3 246.8 300.3
269.0
263.4
273.2
315.2
Other bJ
N.A.
7.4 9.9 12.0
10.8
10.5
10.9
12.6
Total Metal Products
67 0.3
741.2 987.0 1,201.2
1,076.1
1
053-7
1,092.6
1,261.0
a. Inputs for spare parts for, agricultural machinery are not included. The estimated
range of error is + 20 percent.
b. "Other," comprising about 1 percent of total metal products, includes cast steel,
malleable iron castings, chromium, nickel, aluminum, zinc, copper, lead, and tin.
c. Total figures are accurate, although the rounding of individual estimates leads to
some discrepancy.
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This quantity amounted to 2 percent of total US'rolled steel production
of 67.9 metric tons in 1950. 189 It is estimated that in 1955, Soviet
production of agricultural machinery will consume somewhat less than
3 percent of total production.of rolled steel of 32 million metric
tons. 190 Agricultural machinery is expected to take a smaller share
of total Soviet production of rolled steel primarily because it is esti-
mated that such consumption will increase only 5 percent between 1951
and 1955, while total production, of rolled steel will increase by 43 per-
cent.
Shortages of metal products for agricultural machinery production
in the USSR resulting from delayed deliveries have been reported. 191
It is implied that deliveries of metal products are sometimes delayed to
the extent of adversely affecting the output of agricultural machin-,
ery. 192 Delays of from 1 to 3 months apparently are not uncommon. 193
Sporadic deliveries of this nature undoubtedly contribute to the much
maligned practice of producing half of the month's output in the last
10 days of the month. 194
It was not possible to break down the 1 percent of metal prod-
ucts in the "other" category, except to estimate that cast steel and
malleable iron castings comprised the greater part. 195/ The full list
of items included in'"other", as indicated in the footnote at the bottom
of Table 17, were taken from data on US inputs. 196 This list includes
nickel and copper, which in time of war would undoubtedly be diverted
entirely or primarily to the production of military items. The extent
to which the production of agricultural machinery might suffer thereby
cannot be ascertained in the absence of quantity estimates of inputs for
these metals.*
* An impression of the relatively small quantities of chromium, nickel,
aluminum, zinc, copper, lead, and tin which might be consumed in Soviet
agricultural machinery production may be gained from the percentages of
total US inputs of these items in 1949 which went into categories of
agricultural machinery produced on a very small scale in the USSR. (See
Table 2, p. 16). These categories were sprayers and dusters, farm ele-
vators;and blowers, farm dairy machines and equipment, barn equipment,
barnyard equipment, and farm poultry equipment. The percentages of total
US inputs going into them were: chromium, 85; nickel, 57; aluminum, 6;
zinc, 36; copper, 42; lead, 27; and tin, 40. 197/
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B. Manpower.*
The total number of Soviet workers engaged in the production of
agricultural machinery has been roughly. estimated at about 120,000 in
1951 and about 100,000 in 1954. These estimates are based on an annual
output per Soviet worker of approximately 11 tons per year in 1951 and
approximately 12 tons per year in 1954, or about 50-percent and 55 per-
cent, respectively, of US productivity per worker.** Estimating about
a 5-percent increase in productivity per worker between 1954 and 1955
(certain plants hope to achieve up to 8 percent 200/), the 1955 labor
force would only have to be about 105,000 to meet estimated production
goals. In 1952 there were 91,000 US workers in the agricultural machin-
ery industry..201 . It was not possible to break down the total figures
for the Soviet labor force into estimates of those within the agricul-
tural machinery industry and those outside the industry engaged in pro-
duction of agricultural machinery. Certainly the greater part of the
labor force would be in the agricultural machinery industry.
In general, the production of agricultural machinery does not
require a highly skilled labor force. A small nucleus of skilled workers
is necessary in each plant for foundry and machine tool operations, but
the bulk of the workers are semiskilled or unskilled and are engaged in
materials handling, simple punching and pressing operations, finished
assembly, painting, and other operations. Judging from Soviet comment
A thorough examination of individual plant information contained in
the CIA Industrial Register indicated that it would not be possible to
estimate total employment in agricultural machinery building in the USSR
from this source. Indeed, it was not possible to estimate even the total
employment of the industry, not to mention the number of workers engaged
in agricultural machinery production, as distinguished from those engaged
in the production of secondary products, such as munitions and consumer
goods.. The figures in this section, therefore, are intended to reflect
the number of workers engaged in agricultural machinery production.(ex-
cluding spare parts) throughout the USSR, without regard to the plants
in which the production took place.
** Before World War II, Soviet agricultural machinery building was rated
about 60 percent as productive as in the US. 198/ For reasons indicated
in the section on technology, it is estimated that the USSR has only now
reattained the prewar position which it held with respect to the US. For
purposes of the calculations on output of the Soviet worker, an estimated
output per US worker of about 22 tons per year was used. 199
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on the improper use of plant equipment in the major plants of the agri-
cultural machinery industry, 202/ it appears that there may be a short-
age of skilled workers.. This may be partly due to the increase in new
equipment which the industry has, received in recent years, 203 for
which suitable operators have not yet been trained.
Until early 1950, there appear to have been a large proportion,
of female workers in agricultural machinery plants, up to 50 or 60 per-
cent of the labor force in certain plants. 204 The female workers were
for the most part engaged in physical labor such as carrying materials
and parts from one shop to another. The effect which such- a large per-
centage of female labor might have had on agricultural machinery produc-
tion is almost immeasurable; for there is no information available to
indicate the percentage of the female labor force which worked on agri-
cultural. machinery, and the percentage which worked on munitions and
consumer goods. For the latter reason, it would be impossible to esti-
mate the percentage of female workers contained in the labor force esti-
mates for 1951, 1954, and 1955.
VII. Intentions and Vulnerabilities.
A. Intentions.
The close relationship between the agricultural machinery in-
dustry'and agriculture makes any development in one an indication of
Soviet intentions toward the other. Taken together, developments in
these two fields reflect Soviet intentions toward the development of
the economy as a whole, that is, whether the economy is to be directed
toward peace or toward war.
Judging from Soviet expenditures of time and effort, both past
and planned, for strengthening the agricultural base of the country
(expanding agricultural machinery production facilities, introducing
new types of machinery for agricultural mechanization, increasing crop
yields through the increased use of fertilizers, expanding acreages,
reorganizing the MTS, training farm operators and agricultural machin-
ery operators, and increasing repair facilities for agricultural ma-
chinery),the Soviet economy is not being mobilized for war. Con-
versely, a sudden reduction in production of agricultural machinery, or
the abandonment of the program as a whole, would serve as an indica-
tion that the USSR might be preparing for war. The measures which
have been introduced, however, are of such a magnitude that every
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facility necessary for their realization will have to be utilized to the
fullest extent possible. The agricultural expansion program in its pre-
sent form can be carried out only under peacetime conditions.
Although the study of munitions production in the agricultural
machinery industry is beyond the scope of this report, the very fact that
such production does take place puts the industry in the position of a
possible indicator of Soviet intentions. Thus, under the threat of war
in the late 1930's, agricultural machinery plants were among the first
to convert to war production. During the war in Korea, production of
munitions in agricultural machinery plants increased, but after the war
such production decreased. 205/
Any sudden increase of such production may well portend the out-
break of hostilities.
For all practical purposes, the agricultural machinery industry
of the USSR cannot be considered vulnerable. The weaknesses of the in-
dustry, such as poor quality of products, improper utilization of plant
equipment, poor organization of production, improper employee attitudes
toward production, are not easily exploited on an industry-wide basis,
even assuming the opportunity for exploitation were present.
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APPENDIX A
PLANT STUDIES
The 36 plants described in this appendix are those which the
Russians have indicated are the most important plants in the agri-
cultural machinery industry. The comment in the Soviet press on
these 36 plants comprises as much as 75 to 80 percent of total com-
ment on agricultural machinery plants. It is estimated that these
account for about 80 percent of total production of agricultural
machinery in the USSR. The remaining 20 percent is produced (a) by
85 to 90 small plants which are considered part of the agricultural
machinery industry but are under the control of the various Minis-
tries of Local Industries of the Republics, the Ministry of Agri-
culture, and the Ministry of State Farms, and (b) by the hundreds
of plants outside the industry which produce agricultural machinery
as a secondary product, on a regular or special order basis. It
was not practicable to list each of these plants individually.
The name of each plant listed in Table 18* is the title normally
given to the plant in the Soviet press.**
The shifts in production which have taken place since September
and October 1953 in the major agricultural machinery plants, with
consequent increases in output of some products and decreases in
others, have made estimates at the plant level subject to wide mar-
gins of error. The general range of error of the estimates given
below is 30 percent, except for those indicated as plan figures.
* Tabled follows on p. 72.
See the rap following p. 82 which shows the location of the 36 plants
described in Appendix A.
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Agricultural Machinery Plants in the USSR
Region Ilb
Belorussia
Region III
Ukraine
Gomsel'mash Agricultural
Machine Building Plant
imeni L.M. Kaganovich
Dnepropetrovsk Agricultural
Machine Building Plant
imeni K.Ye.Voroshilov
Serp i Molot Agricultural
Machine Building Plant
Threshing Machines
Tractor-Mounted Sweep
Rakes
Tractor-Mounted Hay
Stackers
Grain Dryers
Straw Cutters
Fanning Mills
Beet Harvesting.
Combines
Cultivators
Agricultural Machines
(16 Other Types)
Threshing Machines
Pickup Hay Rickers
(new production in
1953)
Check-row Planters
Combine Motors
Tea Harvesting Machines
(experimental)
Cultivators
Mobile Grain Cleaners
Self-Propelled Mowers
1,600
2,400
N.A.
4,000 to 5,000 One of nine plants having primary responsibility for produc-
tion of machines for animal husbandry and potato and
vegetable growing. Plant delayed production of hay
stackers by failing to install proper equipment. Plant is
criticized for high reject rate of finished products, caused
by sporadic manner of working.
3,000 to 4,000 This is the principal beet harvesting combine plant in the
USSR. It was stated in official Soviet sources that the
plant must radically improve its work methods to increase
production and to improve quality.
8,000 to 10,000
This is the largest producer of threshing machines in the
USSR. It has been designated as 1 of 9 plants primarily
responsible for production of machines for animal pus-
bandry and potato and vegetable growing. It is one of the
larger agricultural machinery plants in the USSR.
1953
1954
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Agricultural Machinery Plants in the USSR
(Continued)
Region III
Ukraine
(Continued)
Krasnaya Zvezda Agri-
cultural Machine
Building Plant
Tractor-Drawn and Mounted
Seed Drills
Horse-Drawn Seed Drills
7,000 to 8,000
Lvov 210
L'vovsel'mash Agri-
cultural Machine
Building Plant
Fodder Steamers
Tractor-Drawn
Sprayers and Dusters
Root Crop and Potato
ro-
(new
h
W
000
3
1954 Plan
2,000 to 3,000
Odessa Agricultural
p
ers
as
duct)
Tractor-Drawn and Tractor-
,
Machine Building Plant
imeni Oktyabr'skoy
Revolyutsii
Mounted Moldboard Plows
Tractor-Drawn Disc Plows
Tractor-Drawn Bog and
Marsh Plows (new type)
Plowshares
30,000
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1953
3,000 to 4,000
Pervomaysk Agricultural
Tractor Hay Rakes
N.A.
1,000 to 2,000
Machine Building Plant
Tractor Hay Stackers
Mowing Machines
Rake Teeth
1,000
N.A.
N.A.
1953
This is the basic Soviet plant for the production of
horse-drawn and tractor-drawn and mounted seed drills. It
is 1 of 9 plants primarily responsible for production of
machines for animal husbandry and, potato and vegetable
growing. The plant is scheduled for expansion. valued at
2 million rubles. It was behind schedule in producing
spare parts in 1953.
This is the basic Soviet plant for the production of
fodder steamer a.
This is one of the basic plow plants in the USSR. The plant
does not fulfill the plan for producing plowshares.
This is 1 of 9 plants primarily responsible for production of
machines for animal husbandry and potato and vegetable
growing. Before World War II, it was 1 of 7 plants Which
produced 75 to 80 percent of all Soviet agricultural ma-
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Agricultural Machinery Plants in the USSR
(Continued)
Region III
Ukraine
(Continued)
Stalino 213
Stalino Agricultural Ma-
chine Building Plant
imeni Oktyabr'skoy
Tractor-Drawn Marsh
Tillers
Tractor-Drawn Moldboard
c. 1,000
1953
1,000 to 2,000
Revolyutsii
Plows, Plantation Plows
Tractor-Drawn Land
Scrapers
Tractor-Drawn Sprayers
25,000
N.A.
N.A.
Beet Diggers
Cultivators
c. 1,500
N.A.
Kommunar Agricultural
Tractor-Drawn Grain Com-
7,000 to
1953
3,000 to 4,000
Machine Building Plant
bins
Cotton Seed Dryers
Corn Harvesting Combines
8,000
N.A.
Region IV
Lower Don - North
Caucasus
(experimental)
N.A.
1952
Rostael'mash Agricultural
Tractor-Drawn Grain Com-
10,000 -
.1953
15,000 to 20,000
Machine Building Plant
imeni Stalin
bines
Self-Propelled Mowing
Machines
Tractor-Drawn Moldboard
2,500
1953
Plows
15,000 to
1953
Corn Harvesting Combines
20,000
(new product)
Rice Harvesters
Sunflower Harvesters
50
N.A.
N.A.
1953
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This is one of the basic plow plants in the USSR. The plant
has been criticized for defective products and sporadic pro-
duction.
This is 1 of the 3 plants producing tractor-drawn grain com-
bines in the USSR.
This is the largest agricultural machinery plant in the USSR,
and 1 of 3 plants producing tractor-drawn grain combines. It
is 1 of 9 plants primarily responsible for the production of
machines for animal husbandry and potato and vegetable
growing. It was reported in November 1953 that radical im-
provements in work methods must be made at the plant. The re-
ject rate in 1953 increased over 1952. The plant is behind
in production of spare parts.
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Table 18
Agricultural Machinery Plants in the USSR
(Continued)
Region IV
Lower Don - North
Caucasus (Continued)
Rostov-on-Don 216
Region VI
Volga
Kazan' 218
Krasnyy Aksay Agricultural Tractor-Drawn and
Machine Building Plant Tractor-Mounted Cultiva-
tors 50,000 1953
Seed Drills apd Planters N.A.
Cultivator-Fertilizers 300 1953
Tree-Planting Machines N.A.
Taganrog Self-Propelled Self-Propelled Grain
Combine Plant imeni Combines 8,000 1953
Stalin Cotton Pickers (for Un- Small
irrigated cotton) Series 1952
Kazan' Self-Propelled
Combine Plant
Self-Propelled Grain 1,000 1953
Combines
- 75
S-E-C-R-E-T
6,ooo to 7,000 This is one of the largest and oldest agricultural machine
building plants in the USSR. It is 1 of 9 plants primarily
responsible for producing machines for animal husbandry and
potato and vegetable growing. It is reported to have
suffered considerable losses due to rejects in 1952 and is
behind in production of spare parts. The plant is under-
going an expansion valued at 1 million rubles.
8,000 to 9,000 This is the largest producer of self-propelled grain combines
in the USSR. It was reported in November 1953 that self-
propelled combine production would be concentrated at this
plant and at Krasnoyarsk. Reportedly the plant must radically
improve its work methods. Considerable losses were suffered
in 1952 from rejects. The plant is far behind in production
of spare parts,.
1,000 to 2,000 This is the smallest producer of self-propelled grain combines
in the USSR. Other products of the plant are not known. The
plant may cease production of combines with the concentration
of such production at Taganrog and Krasnoyarsk.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/29: CIA-RDP79RO1141A000400090001-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
-Agricultural Machinery Plants in the USSR
(Continued)
Region VI
Volga
(Continued)
Saratov 219
KombaynAgricultural
Tractor-Drawn Grain Com-
1,000 to
1953
3,000 to
4,000
This is 1 of 3 Soviet plants which produce tractor-drawn grain
Machine Building Plant
bines
2,000
combines. Other agricultural machinery products of the plant
is unknown.
Syzran' 220
Syzran' Self-Propelled
Self-Propelled Grain
1,500
1953
2,000 to
3,000
This is 1 of the 6 plants producing self-propelled grain com-
Combine Plant
Combines
bins in 1953. The plant may cease production of combines
Overhead Conveyors
N.A.
with the concentration of such production in Taganrog and
Forage Harvesting Ma-
Krasnoyarsk. The entire planned production of forage
chins
2,000
1954 Plan
harvesting machines is concentrated in this plant.
- 76 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
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S-E-C-R-E-T
Agricultural Machinery Plants in the USSR
(Continued)
Region VII
Central European USSR
Belinskiy 221
Belinsksel'mash Agri-
cultural Machine
Building Plant
1,500 1953
10,000 195+
1,000 to 2,000 This plant is 1 of 9 plants primarily responsible for the pro-
duction of machines for animal husbandry and potato and
vegetable growing. It is to be the main plant for production
of potato planters. It is operating very badly, having achieved
only 15 percent fulfillment of planned production of potato
planters in the first 10 months of 1953. It is poorly
supplied with parts from other plants. The plant is under-
going expansion valued at 1 million rubles to improve pro-
duction facilities
Bezhetsksel'mash Agri-
cultural Machine
Building Plant
Iyubertsy Agricultural
Machine Building Plant
imeni Ukhtomskiy
Flax Scutching Ma-
chines c. 1,000 1953
Winnowing-Sorting Ma-
chines (begun July 1952) N.A.
Flax Threshing Machines N.A.
Hemp Threshing Machines
(simple. and complex) N.A.
Flax Harvesting Combines 1,000 1953
Self-Propelled Mowing
Machines N.A.
Tractor-Drawn and
Tractor-Mounted Mowing
Machines 1 20,000 1953
- 77 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
This is the basic Soviet plant for the production of flax and
hemp machinery. Information is too fragmentary for any re-
liable estimates of production. The plant was reported to be
far behind in production of spare parts in 1953.
7,000 to 8,000 This is one of the basic mowing machine plants in the USSR.
It has been designated as 1 of 9 plants primarily responsible
for producing machines for animal husbandry and potato and
vegetable growing. It is reported that drastic measures are
needed to increase production of spare parts.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/29: CIA-RDP79RO1141A000400090001-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
Agricultural Machinery Plants in the USSR
(Continued)
Region VII
Central European USSR
(Continued)
Ryazsel'mash Agricultural
Machine Building Plant
Potato Harvesting Com-
bines
500
1953
2,000 to
3,000
4,000
1954
Plan
4,000
1955
Plan
Potato Planters
2,000
1953
Potato Cultivators (ex-
perimental in 1953)
Potato Diggers
N. A.
10,000
1953
Tula Self-Propelled Com-
bine Plant
Potato Graders
Self-Propelled Grain.
Combines
H.A.
6,000
1953
4,000 to
5,000
Potato Harvesting
C.
10
1953
Combines (new product)
205
Feb
1954
6,000
1954 Plan
12,000
1955 Plan
15,000
Capacity
Machines for making
Peat Humus Pots
Voronezh 2L6/ Voronezhsel'mash Agri-
Grain-Cleaning Machines
1953
2,000 to
3,000
cultural Machine
Building Plant
Region VIII
Urals
Chelyabinsk Agricultural
Seed-Cleaning Machines
Sprayers
Tractor-Drawn Moldboard
3,000 to
4,000
Machine Building Plant
imeni Ordzhonikidze
Plows
Cultivators
Grain Cleaners
N. A.
N.A.
N.A.
- 78 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
This is one of the basic Soviet plants for the production of
machines for potato growing. It is 1 of 9 plants primarily
responsible for animal husbandry and potato and vegetable
growing machinery. Only 50 percent of 1953 plan for potato
harvesting combines was met. Plant suffers from insufficient
deliveries by cooperating plants. To improve conditions, re-
construction valued at 11.5 million rubles is scheduled.
Until the end of 1953, this was the second largest producer of
self-propelled grain combines in the USSR. The plant has been
switched completely to potato harvesting combines. It was
planned that 55 of the latter be made by 31 Dec 1953, but this
plan was not met. Plant did not actually begin regular pro-
duction until mid-Feb 1954, producing 205 in the remainder of
the month. Presumably the plant will reach capacity some time
in 1956. With cessation of self-propelled grain combine pro-
duction at this plant, production is to be concentrated at
Krasnoyarsk and Taganrog.
This is the basic Soviet plant for the production of grain and
seed-cleaning machinery. It has been awarded prizes for its
good production record.
This plant has had trouble because of delays by suppliers of
parts. Information on production levels is extremely
fragmentary.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/29: CIA-RDP79RO1141A000400090001-6
Molotov Machine Building Cream Separators
Plant imeni Dzerzhinskiy Small Engines
Table 18
Agricultural Machinery Plants in the USSR
(Continued)
Region VIII
Urals
(Continued)
Molotov 228
Region IX
West Siberia
Zlatoust Self-Propelled Self-Propelled Grain
Combine Plant imeniLenin Combines
Uralsel'mash Agricultural Hay Balers
Machine Building Plant Grain-Sorting Machines
Tree-Planting Machines
Threshing Machines,
Horse-Drawn
S-E-C-R-E-T
150,000 1953
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
-79-
S-E-C-R-E-T
This plant was operating poorly at the end of 1953. Production
was considerably under plan, both for hay balers and for spare
parts. Plant was extremely slowin preparing for 1954 production
tasks.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/29: CIA-RDP79RO1141A000400090001-6
This is the basic plant in the USSR for the production of cream
separators. Most of the engines produced by the plant are of
the ZID-3 type for use with small garden tractors.
3,000 to 4,000 This is 1 of 6 Soviet plants producing self-propelled grain com-
bines. This plant may cease production of these combines with
the concentration of such production in- the Taganrog and
Krasnoyarsk plants.
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S-E-C-R-E-T
Agricultural Machinery Plants in the USSR
(Continued)
Major Products
N.A.
c. 1,000
This plant is reportedly operating well, producing over-plan
N.A.
products. It is supposed to save 100 tons of metal products
N.A.
during 1954. A substantial increase in production of water
pumps is planned for 1954.
N. A.
.1,000 to
2,000
This plant appears to have decreased in importance in recent
N.A.
N. A.
N.A.
years. Information on production is extremely fragmentary.
N. A.
3,000 to
4,000
This plant appears to have decreased in importance in recent
N.A.
years. Information on production is extremely fragmentary.
Region IX
West Siberia
(Continued)
Kurgan 231
Novosibirsk 232/
Omsk 233
Rubtsovsk 234
Region Xa
Kazakh SSR
-Ahmolinsk 235
Kurgansel'mash Agri-
cultural Building Plant
Sibsel'mash Agricultural
Machine Building Plant
Sibsel'mash Agricultural
Machine Building Plant
Altaysel'mash Agri-
cultural Machine
Building Plant
Kazakhsel'mash Agricultural
Machine Building Plant
Straw Cutting Machines
Hay Balers
Electric Water Pumps
Tractor Seed Drills
Tractor Surface Plows
Tractor Disc-Harrows
Cultivators, Horse-drawn
Grain Separators
Plows
Automatic Pumps and
Presses
Tractor-Drawn Moldboard
Plows
Tractor-Drawn Drainage
Plow (experimental)
Tractor-Drawn Ridgers
Vegetable Planters
Plowshares
Tractor Rakes
Tractor-Drawn Hay
Stackers
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
- 8o -
S-E-C-R-E-T
This is one of the basic plants producing tractor-drawn plows in
2,000 to 3,000 the USSR. Production of special types of plows began in 1954,
past production having been of the 5-bottom moldboard type.
Production of vegetable planters began in early 1953. Through
the installation of an automatic production line, the plant is
to increase production of tractor plowshares considerably.
1,000 to 2,000 This is the only large agricultural machinery plant in the
Kazakh SSR. Reportedly this plant from the time it was built
(about 1945-46) up to 1952, had never fulfilled its program by
r ~. r Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/29: CIA-RDP79RO1141A000400090001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/29: CIA-RDP79RO1141A000400090001-6
S-E-C-1 E-T
Agricultural Machinery Plants in the USSR
(Continued)
Region Xa
Kazakh SSR
(Continued
Region Xb
Central Asia
Overhead Conveyors
N.A.
more than 50 percent. The plant was already 500 tractor rakes
Tractor-Drawn Land
Scrapers
Well Diggers
Machines for making Peat
N.A.
N. A.
behind in the first 9 months of 1953.
Humus Pots
Chirchiksel'mash Agri-
cultural Machine Building
Plant
Cultivator-Fertilizers
Swivel Plows
Trench Diggers
N.A.
N. A.
4,000
Frunze Agricultural Ma-
Universal Couplers
Cotton Planters
Cotton Dryers
Land Scrapers
Tractor-Drawn Rakes
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
C.
2,000
chine Building Plant
imeni Frunze
Tractor-Drawn and Mounted
Mowing Machines
Tractor-Drawn Hay
N. A.
Tashsel'mash Agricultural
Stackers .
Tractor-Drawn Dusters
Cotton Pickers
N.A.
N.A.
6,000
3,000 to 4,000
Machine Building Plant
imeni K.Ye. Voroshilov
Cotton Cleaners
Tractor-Drawn Cotton
Planters
N.A.
N.A.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Central Asia, producing machinery primarily for cotton growing.
The plant is reported to have suffered considerable lospes due
to rejects in 1952. Equipment was inefficiently used and pro-
duction was poorly organized.
This plant is intended to be an important producer of machinery
for animal husbandry, but it has a record for not fulfilling
the plan. Only 50 percent of the plan for tractor-drawn hay
stackers was met in 1953. Production of spare parts is also be-
hind schedule. It is reported that radical improvements must
be made in the plant's work methods.
This is the basic plant in the USSR for the production of cotton
pickers and cotton cleaners. The plant threatened the cotton
mechanization program by fulfilling only 66 percent of its pro-
duction plan for-cotton pickers in the first half of 1953. It is
also behind schedule in production of spare parts, Production
equipment is reportedly operating at only 75 percent of capacity.
It is reported that the plant must make radical improvements in
its work methods.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/29: CIA-RDP79RO1141A000400090001-6
S-E-C -R-E'T
Agricultural Machinery Plants in the USSR
(Continued)
Region Xb
Central Asia
(Continued)
Tashkent 239
Uzbeksel'mash Agricultural
Machine Building Plant
Tractor-Drawn Dusters
and Sprayers
Horse-Drawn Dusters and
Sprayers
2,000 to 3,000
Tractor-Drawn Nest Cotton
Planters
10
Tashkent 240
Tashkhlopkomash Cotton
Tractor Cultivators
Tractor Couplings
Rotary Hoes
Cotton Machinery
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
(Ordzhonikidze
Rayon)
Machine Building Plant
Cotton Cleaners
Region XI
East Siberia
Krasnoyarsk 241
Krasnoyarsk Self-Propelled Self-Propelled Grain
Combine Plant Combines
This is one of the basic plants in the USSR for producing ma-
chinery for cotton growing. It is reportedly the largest
agricultural machinery plant in the Uzbek SSR. Reject rate
on completed machines was 7 percent to 8 percent higher in
1953 than in 1952. Plant is able to operate production
equipment at only about 75 percent of capacity.
This plant has been producing cotton growing machinery for
about 3 years. There is very little information available
with respect to the specific products produced. The plant
did not fulfill the plan for 1952.
2,000 to 3,000 This is one of the basic plants in the USSR for the production
of self-propelled grain combines. The plant has failed to
fulfill the plan in the past because of sporadic production:
57 percent of all output is in the last 10 days of the month.
It is reported that production of self-propelled combines is
now to be concentrated in this plant and the Taganrog Com-
bine Plant.
- 82 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A000400090001-6
Per Crornaysk OIII
iromgrad13
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