PRODUCTION OF MARINE STEAM TURBINES AND GEARS IN THE USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01141A000400070001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 19, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 8, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
PRODUCTION OF MARINE STEAM TURBINES
AND GEARS IN THE USSR
CIA/RR 46
8 October 1954
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
SECRET
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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
PRODUCTION OF MARINE STEAM TURBINES
AND GEARS IN THE USSR
CIA/RR 46
(ORR Project 35.239)
? CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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CONTENTS
Summary
I. Introduction
A. Definition
B. Importance
C. History of Soviet Production ....... . .
Page
1
2
3
The Manufacturing Process . . . .. , ........
A. Organization . . . . ....... - . .
B. Location
?
?
?
?
?
7
1. Concentration
7
2. Dispersion
7
C. Technology ? ? ? ? . ? ? .
8
III.
Production of Gears and Turbines . ? ? ?
?
.
.
9
A. Types of Steam Turbines
9
B. Production of Marine. Steam Turbines.
10
C. Production of Gears for .Steam Turbine Drives
11
IV.
Input Requirements: ? ?
14
A. Materials
14
B. Manpower . . , ? , ... . , ? ? ?
.
.
.
14
C. Power 0
?
?
?
. ?
?
15
D. Transportation
16
E. Summary of Input Requirements . . . , ... , .
4
.
?
? ,
?
17
V.
Distribution
17
VI.
Intentions, Limitations, and Vulnerabilities
18
A. Intentions
18
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Page
B Limitations 19
C. Vulnerabilities
Appendixes
20
Appendix A. Plant Studies 21
1. Three Soviet Turbine Types
Tables
? OOOOOOOOO ? ?
2. Production of Marine Steam Turbines, in the 'USSR,
1949-55
Production of Reduction Gears for Marine Steam
Drives in the USSR,-1949=55-_ . ? ? OOOOOOO
V. Materials Requirements for Marine Turbine and 'Gear
Production in the USSR, 1949-55
? ? ?
Labor Requirements for Marine Turbine and Gear
Production, 1949-55 . . . . . ? . . . . O .
. Average Annual. Requirements for Marine' Turbine and -
Gear Production in the USSR, 1949-55
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10
12
13
15
16
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Illustrations
Figure 1. USSR: Probable Control Channels for Marine
Turbine Procurement and Production . . . .
Figure 2. USSR: Marine Geared-Turbine Assemblers
and Users
Figure 3. Khartkov Turbogenerator (KhTGZ) and Electric
Motor (KhEMZ) Plant
Following Page
22
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(ORR Project 35.239)
PRODUCTION OF MARINE STEAM TURBINES'
AND GEARS IN TM USSR*
SummA.ry
The current Soviet program for building cruisers and destroyers
has created an unprecedented demand for marine steam turbines. Soviet
factories have met the requirements by diverting some facilities
formerly engaged in building turbines for land power installations and
by eliminating geared turbine drives in merchant ship construction.
Inability to produce all the new turbines needed for both naval construc-
tion and the expanding industrial economy has led the USSR to import
turbines for stationary uses. In some recent years, Soviet imports of
stationary turbines have run as high as 20 percept of requirements.
During the period 1949 to 1955, Soviet production of marine turbines
is estimated to average 1,450,000 horsepower annually. This is more
than twice US production for the same period. About 67 percent of US
production has been for merchant ships. Soviet production has so far
been allocated entirely to naval combat ships. The horsepower output of
turbines produced for warships in the US during the past 5 years has
been less than 17 percent of Soviet production. -
There are few plants in the USSR capable of producing large marine
geared turbine units. As a result, the industry is highly concentrated
with 67 percent of the production in Leningrad, 25 percent in Khar'kov,
and 8 percent in Sverdlovsk.
There is little information on Soviet Plans for the industry, but
there are some indications that planned increases in turbine produc-
tion through 1955 will permit deliveries'of destroyers and larger
vessels from Soviet shipyards through late 1956 or early 1957.
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent the
best judgment of the responsible analyst as of 1 July 1954.
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I. Introduction.
A. Definition.
Marine steam turbines, are propulsion engines which convert
heat energy into rotary' Motion. In many cases, diesel, gasoline,
or reciprocating steam engines can be used as substitutes, but
wherever a large amount of power is needed, as in large, fast
merchant ships and major surface warships, there is presently no
satisfactory substitute for the marine steam turbine.
The rotary speed at which marine turbines operate most .
powerfully is much faster than the efficient speed of the propeller
which drives the ship. The power of the revolving turbine shafts
is, therefore, transmitted to the propeller shaft through:a reduc-
tion gear which permits the turbine and the propeller to revolve at:
different speedb.
The production of turbines is a specialized process which
requires highly trained technicians, skilled labor, and complex,
special-purpose machines. There is no basic difference in the
capital equipment or skills needed to manufacture marine turbines
and stationary turbines. A factory which produces marine steam
turbines can usually produce stationary turbines and frequently
produces both types.
Gear production, however, is more specialized. There is no
need to reduce the shaft speed for most stationary turbines.
Accordingly, the gear industry will usually have a,spaller capacity
than the turbine industry.
B. Importance.
The ability of a country to manufacture turbines is one
measure of its industrial capability. Inadequate .production of
turbines or gears can limit the growth of the economic or naval
strength of a nation. 2/* In turbine ptoduction, the limitation
may be the priorities granted the industrial, merchant fleet,
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and naval users. In gear manufacturel the limitation may be in-
adequate productiOn facilities* as well aapriority. g/
Since the end of World War II, all of the marine steam turbine
production in the USSR is believed:to have been Used in warships-. The:
result has been a denial of further expansion: in the merchant fleet
About 35 percent of all turbine production, !:marine and stationary',
during 1911.9-51 was for the navy. _3./ One ofJthe results of this policy:
was the'necessity to import from the European Satellites and from
WesternCountries 2O percentof the turbines needed for stationary
uses, 1LV
C. History of Soviet Production.
Foreign successes in the use of marine steam turbines in
ships influenced the Czarist fleet to try an imported turbine as the
main machinery for the naval yacht Lastochka in 1904. 2/ During the
years 1905 to 1907, the Baltic Shipyard was expanded and rebuilt,
and in the reorganization of the yard shops, construction facilities
were provided for Parsons-type turbines. In 1911, the Petrovski Metal-
works also began to produce marine turbines, manufacturing the first
large native-built main propulsion turbines used in the Russian Navy.
These were for the Petropavlovsk class battleships. The total horse-
power for each of these ships was 38,000. 6/ In the same building
program were the 40,000-horsepower destroyers of the Novik class.
Most of the destroyer turbines were imported, but the choice of
propulsion is interesting because the destroyers, at the time, were
claimed to be the most powerful in the world. 7/
With the advent of the Soviet regime in 1917, production of
marine turbines was limited to the Petrograd (Leningrad) area. The
neglect of heavy industry which characterized the first 10 years of
Soviet rule was especially evident in shipbuilding and allied
fields. 8/ By 1928, the annual Soviet turbine production for both
marine and stationary use totaled only 35,700 horsepower -- less than
was used in one of the old 1911 class battleships. 9/
* In the US in World War II) shortage of reduction gears was a major
factor' in the decision to build many ships with reciprocating steam
engines, diesel, and turboelectric propulsion.-
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Special attention was given to turbine production during the
First Five Year Plan (1928-32). By 1932, steam turbine production,
marine and stationary, had risen to 6 times that of 1928. 10/
Following the Czarist pattern, the Soviet authorities turned to the
West for designs, adopting Italian and Swiss turbine designs for
production in Soviet plants. 11/ During the Second (1933-37) and
Third (1938-42) Five Year Plans, new turbine plants were built and
older plants modernized and enlarged. This development occurred at a
time when new shipyards at Nikolayev and Komsomol'sk were being built
and expanded.12/ Equipment 'necessary to manufacture turbine reduction
gearing was included in shops of the turbine plants, with the result
that the USSR today probably has a balance of gear production facilities
to turbine facilities better than that of many Western countries.
Quantity production of marine turbines began in the mid-thirties and
has constituted a significant percentage of turbine production ever
since.
II. The Manufacturing Process.
A. Organization.
In the USSR today, most of the plants which produce marine
turbines and gears are under the Main Administration of the Boiler
Turbine Industry (Glavkotloturboprom) of the Ministry of Heavy Machine
Building. Main reduction gears are often produced in the turbine
plants. 13/ Marine turbine producers, generally speaking, also pro-
duce steam, gas, and water turbines for stationary purposes and may
also do same boiler making. There are additional plants under the same
main administration which specialize in boiler construction. Thus, for
factories producing marine propulsion equipment in the USSR, the basic
idea underlying plant organization is the principle of horizontal
integration. Plants producing like products have similar ministerial
subordination.
With one exception, the turbine producing plants are not subject
to the administrative authority of the navy or the shipyards. 14/
Orders from these organizations are funnelled up through channels to
the ministerial level, then downy through the Main Administration '
(Kotloturbopram), and then to the plant which eventually makes the
propulsion unit. The exception is the turbine shop located in the
Zhdanov Shipyard., which is believed to be subordinate to yard manage-
ment. The shop is adjacent to the turbine shop of the Kirov plant and
works closely with it.
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The interests of the navy and of the shipyards are protected,
however, by the presence of navy and shipyard inspectors, who in-
spect materials and production procedures in the shops, and who make
an acceptance test on the stands before a turbine can be accepted for
delivery. 15/
A plant producing a turbine for the navy may also be producing
turbines and related products for other ministries, thereby creating
problems of priority in supplies, in production scheduling, and
especially in interplant cooperation. In theory, accountability to
the Main Administration permits specialization of effort, but in many
cases it may also add unnecessary administrative delays to factory
operations. Thus production at a Khar'kov plant dropped because the
Main Administration failed to provide appropriate materials, and be-
cause bearings, instead of being delivered directly to the plant, were
delivered to the warehouse of the Main Administration, where they lay
undelivered for as long as two weeks. L4,/
'A principal organizational weakness stems from the absence of
direct controls and of good plant-to-plant coordination between
assemblers and the factories supplying blades, castings, and the like.
The lack of 2-way charge sheets and the refusal of other plants to
accept responsibility for rejected castings supplied to the plant are
reasons cited in the press for. long-drawn-out production cycles,
plant losses, and underfulfillment of the plan. 17/ Similar complaints
found in the pre-World War II.newspapers indicate that many of the
shortcomings of Soviet industrial administration are chronic. lg./
To avoid administrative delays, many plants appear to have
developed a modus operandi which often cuts across some of the
established organizational control lines. Direct plant-to-plant
negotiations often take place without prior approval of the Main Ad-
ministration. In such cases, the Main Administration receives notice
of-transactions actually made, as a de facto formality. 12/
On the whole, the plant retains a great deal of independence
in execution of assigned tasks, but it must adhere to ministerial
instruction for over-all direction and delivery dates. Any failure
to meet deadlines can be the occasion for carping criticisms from the
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press,* which will assign responsibility for errors to anyone from the
minister dawn to the shop foreman. 22/
The organizational system tends to fix the responsibility for
each phase of production on a specific individual. The Glavk.officer,
plant director, or shop foreman not only must do his productive work,
but presumably must be prepared to defend any departure from
established procedures. Thehierarchy, of cOntrol levels inevitably
impeded some plant operations. Plant-to-plant contracting without
prior approval of the Main Administration is not only permitted but
is. sometimes encouraged by the-Glavkl. which will set up for the sub-
ordinate-plantaa dredit at the State Bank to finance direct
contracting. 21/ instances of this nature appear to constitute re-
cognition of some of the fundamental organizational weaknesses of
'strong centralization-in Soviet industrial administration. With the..
reorganization which followed Stalin's death, all of the consuming.
shipyards and producing plants were brought under the Ministry of
Transport and Heavy Machine Building, thereby eliminating several
intermediate offices. 22/ The- Ministry -of Shipbuilding re-emerged
as a separate :entity on 27- April 1954, 23/ indicating that the
original merger was primarily a political move and was not designed .
for greater economic efficiency.
The organization chart. (Fig. 1)** shows the control channels
to theTroducing,plants from the yarioua ministries and shipyards
concerned with-marine turbine production.
* The role of the press in fixing responsibility for failure-is:
seen from the following excerpts... Iwyestiya on:8 September 1949 re-
ported that "the foreman of the M7 shop has turned his work area in-
to a stable. Mountains of metal shavings lie between brand new
lathes making high-speed work methods impossible. The gap between
words and deeds at this plant must be closed." Izvestiya on 3 July
1951 reported 'five-month losses were 1,799,000 rubles.. The
minister's attitude is restricted by formalism. He issued an order
(for corrective measures) but failed to demand that all underlings
execute all measures of the order."
** Fig. 1 follows p. 6.
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USSR
PROBABLE CONTROL CHANNELS FOR
MARINE TURBINE PROCUREMENT AND PRODUCTION
(Selected Plants and Yards)
Minister
N. S. Kazakov
Other Ministers
COUNCIL OF
MINISTERS
MINISTRY OF
HEAVY MACHINE BUILDING
MAIN ADMINISTRATION
FOR BOILER AND
TURBINE BUILDING
d Kirov
Heavy Machine
Zavod 185 ?
Leningrad
Minister
I. I. Nosenko
Minister
N. A. Bulganin
MINISTRY OF SHIPBUILDING
MAIN ADMINISTRATIONS
FOR YARDS BUILDING
MAJOR VESSELS
Nevskiy Zavod
Lenin (NZL)
?1
Leningrad
Khar'kov Turbo-
Generator Zavod
(KhTGZ)
Khar'kov
Stalin Heavy
Machine Zavod
(LMZ)
Leningrad
I . Ural
Turbine Zavod
1?
Sverdlovsk
dOther Plants
Parts and
Auxiliary Drives
13360 CIA, 9-54
Marti Shipyard
Leningrad
Zhdanov
Shipyard
Leningrad
Turbine Shop
Other
USSRUSSR Shipyards
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Figure 1
DEFENSE MINISTRY
DEPUTY
NAVAL FORCES
FOURTH DEPUTY
TECHNICAL CONSTRUCTION
AND REPAIR
? Administrative control channel
Production control through inspectors
Direct p ant to plant liaison (typical channel)
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B. Location.
1. Concentration.
The production of marine steam turbines is centered in
the European part of the USSR. The largest concentration of plants
is in Leningrad, where the Leningrad Metal Zavod imeni Stalin (LMZ),
the Nevsk Zavod imeni Lenin, the Heavy Machine Plant imeni Kirov,
and the Turbine Shop of the adjoining Zhdanov Shipyard, produce
about 67 percent of the national output.
Another major plant is located in the Ukraine at Khartkov.,.
This plant, the Khar'kov Turbogenerator Zavod (KhTGZ), produced 25 per-
cent of the yearly production and is 1 of 3 plants believed to have
manufactured gears and turbines for the Sverdlov class cruisers. The
second largest turbine plant in the USSR, it has been the leading
producer of marine turbines in several recent years. 24/
Two cities, Leningrad and Khartkov, account for over
90 percent of marine 'turbine and gear production in the USSR today.
To the east at Sverdlovsk is the Ural Turbine Zavod, built just
before the outbreak of World War II and designed for the production
of smaller turbines. E2/ It may have produced some small turbines
of 8,500 horsepower for minelaying Vessels in 1940741: It was ex-
panded during the war, however, With equipment evacuated from
Leningrad and Khartkov, 26/ and production of large marine turbines
for destroyers was begun in 1945. 22/ On the Baltic coast, the
naval 'base at lePaya is known to have ,done repair work on turbines
for several ships,/ but it is not a manufacturer of new turbines.
The accompanying map, Fig. 2r shows clearly that the concentration
of marine gear and turbine producers is in the western part of the
USSR.
2. Dispersion.
The Sverdlovsk area, which produced no large marine
turbines before the German invasion of the USSR, now accounts for
8 percent of the national production of marine steam turbines.
Sverdlovsk is about 1,400 miles east of Leningrad and Khar'kov, but
is 4,400 miles west of the Komsomol'sk Shipyard. There is no other
evidence of an attempt to disperse the industry to the east, despite
the many economic and strategic advantages of having a turbine plant
close to the Far East shipbuilding area.
* Fig. 2 follows p. 8.
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C. Technology.
The Russians have made no significant advance in either turbine
design or the technology of manufacturing. The eclectic methods re-
peatedly demonstrated in procuring designs, prototypes, and detailed
productive techniques from the West are indicative of Soviet reliance
on proved processes. 29/
The Orgtyazhmash Institute,: part of the central apparatus of
the Ministry for Heavy Machine Building, has as one of its main
functions the rationalization of production techniques and processes
of factories in the Ministry. The Institute. works in close coopera-
tion with the Central Boiler and Turbine Institute, which has duties of
a research nature. Orgtyazhmash teams assist various plants by
suggesting new production equipment and methods.: 12/ Among the _
techniques which Orgtyazhmash has been urging the plants to adopt in
recent years are wider application of precision casting and increased
uses of modern forge press and stamping machines. 31/
Leningradskaya Pravda, 31 March 1951, pointed out that 25 to
30 percent of the total work involved inbuilding a steam turbine is .
blade manufacture. The blades are made from billets, with as much as
80'percent of the high cost alloy steel going off.into chips. The
Orgtyazhmash Institute had made blades by precision casting with
negligible loss of chips, but Pravda pointed out that the Leningrad
Plant itheni Stalin had done very little toward using the method, with
the result that tons of valuable high alloy steel, are wasted for
every steam turbine built. A similar situation existed at the Lenin
plant in Leningrad, where the plant manager, Moykin, and the chief
engineer; Kholin, were slow in applying precision casting.* .
Five weeks later, Pravda decried the lack of modern forging
and stamping equipment in Leningrad and pinpointed the heat treat-
ment shops of the Kirov works and the Stalin works, which process
turbine blades, as being equipped only with drop hammers. "The
* The US Navy has found precision casting to be unsatisfactory for
turbine blade manufacture. Higher rejection rate and difficulty in
achieving required tolerances have characterized recent experiments.
Soviet efforts to introduce precision casting are indicative of
preoccupation with conservation of alloy steels.
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USSR: Marine Geared-turbine
20 40 80 120 160 180
4
NORTH
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Government. Sakhalin Island south of 3e North and the
/7 /1'....,.
/
a#0
of Estooio. Latvia, and Lithuania into the
cOrrespond to the bourolaries recognised by the U.S.
Kuril Islands are undo' Soviet administration.
-s ?
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100 120
0 Marine geared-turbine assembly plant
II Shipyard using marine geared-turbine drives
0 250 500 I0 1500 2000.
678
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116111NE
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GEARED-11.1861NE PRODUCTION
smostsse al taut arodeetleet
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?'?' -- -
?
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conservatism and backwardness shown in these and other Leningrad
plants in regard to modern casting and stamping machines and methods
is intolerable." 2/
The KhTGZ made a contribution to improved turbine produc-
tion technology when a plant worker named Drokin suggested an improved
design on the carriage of a plant machine. His suggestion reduced
handling operations and permitted a reduction in machine time from 698
to 166 hours. 33/
It appears that the principal aim of new processes and
techniques is the conservation of scarce materials, particularly
special steel alloys. A second important consideration is reduction
in processing time with the resultant conservation of highly skilled
labor and the release of special-purpose production equipment for
other work.
The Soviet press plays an Important role in prodding the plant
managers to accept changes in technology. It does so by giving
favorable publicity to persons who have made successful innovations and
castigating those who are slow to accept recommended techniques. Press
articles on technology are sometimes quite detailed and are an excellent
source of intelligence information.
III. Production of Gears and Turbines.
A. Types of Steam Turbines.
Open Soviet literature is quite detailed in its mention of the
many different turbines used for stationary purposes. Very few marine
turbines are described, however, and no model numbers are given.
Most of the marine turbines are produced for the navy, and security
measures render the information sparse. Occasionally an interesting
reference is made. A 1949 textbook mentions that the largest marine
turbine built in the USSR is a 55,000-horsepower unit. 34/ The
accompanying diagram shows the turbine to be similar to the unit of
the Italian Duca D'Aosta class cruiser, upon which the Kirov class
turbine is patterned. Another Soviet text .3.2/ shows a geared turbine
unit which develops 60,000-horsepower. Since a report 36/ mentions
production at the Kirov works in Leningrad of a 60,000-horsepower
unit for cruisers, it could be concluded that the propulsion unit in
the Sverdlov class cruisers is made up of two 60,000-horsepower tur-
bine units. Estimates based on known speed, draft, and dimensions
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of the Sverdlovs vary from 55,000 to 75,000 horsepower, Although
neither of thesciurces can be _regarded as completelyreliable and.
definitive, the 60,000-horsepower figure will be used in this report,
The horsepower figure used for the Skoryy class destroyers
is 70,000, and this figure agrees with official ONI estimates.-E/
The-coastal class destroyer type now in production has been estimated
by various-sources to have 35,000 to. 45,000 horsepower. 1_3/ In this
report they are assumed to have 40,000 horsepower. Turbine, types are
summarized in Table 1.
Table 1
Three Soviet Turbine Types
Ship Type
Horsepower Range
Sverdlov Class Cruisers
(CL)
2x 60,000
55,000 to 75,000 Horsepower
Fleet Type Destroyers
(DD)
2 x 35,000
33,500 to 35,000 Horsepower
Smaller Destroyers
(DC)
2 x 20,000
17,500 to 22,500 Horsepower
B. Production of Marine Steam Turbines..
In the immediate postwar period1-1945-46, the Russians began a
long-range program of reconstruction and expansion of plants and
equipment in an effort to increase prbduction of marine steam turbines
over that of-prewar years. The Soviet radio pointed out that turbine-
driven ships of up to 200,000 horsepower dere afloat* and that a great
expansion in the ability of the USSR to produce marine turbines was
planned for the postwar Five Year Plan. 39/ A short time latery
Stalin prizes were awarded to-several turbine designers "for the,
development of the construction and technology of manufacturing
engines for combat ships." ThOse receiving the prizes' included;
Leonid 'Aleksandrovich Shubenke-Shubin, Director of the central-Boiler-
Turbine Insitute; .0sip AlekbandroviCh:Pyzhr Vulf Elyevich Berg,-
Vidtor'Efim6Vich Solevei,'ahd Vasili TikhonOvich Kholin, engineers in
Leningrad plants.
* A reference to US carriers-and battleships.
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The large number of stationary turbines which had been
damaged or destroyed during the war created a large volume of work
for the turbine industry at a time when normal operations at the
factories were subject to disruption because of recurrent power
failures 41/ and plant reconstruction. It is apparent that produc-
tion of turbines for the navy at the scale planned was not possible
for several years. The priorities given to production of stationary
units may have contributed to the slow production of naval vessels
immediately after the war, but major war damage to many of the
important shipyards was probably the chief obstacle to production.
Production in the 1945-47 period consisted of some new tur-
bines for Bird class destroyers, together with completion, repair,
and reconditioning of propulsion units for a cruiser and for
destroyers of prewar design. Completion of these vessels had been
delayed by the war. New turbine construction was concentrated at
the Ural Turbine Zavod and the Zhdanov Shipyard, both of which
emerged from the war in good condition. Considerable reconstruction
of plant facilities went on at the Khar'kov Factory, which had been
severely damaged. Plant reconstruction and conversion from other
production delayed production at the Stalin, Lenin, and Kirov plants
in Leningrad. By 1948-49, however, production was under way in all
plants, and the output curve shows a sharp rise from 1949 to 1951.
In 1952, a changeover from production of turbines for fleet type
destroyers to production of smaller units for coastal type destroyers
caused a marked reduction in output for that year. A summary of
production is given in Table 2.*
C. Production of Gears for Steam Turbine Drives.
Published Soviet source information on reduction gear pro-
duction is quite limited, and the press is especially careful to
omit references to specific types ofzears. However, there have
been occasional references in the press and in technical periodicals
that indicate that the Khar'kov Turbogenerator Zavod, and the Zhdanov
Shipyard in Leningrad produce the gears for their own turbines. 43/
In addition, many prisoner-of-war report confirm gear production at
Kharkov and also mention gear production in the Stalin, Lenin, and
Kirov plants in Leningrad.121/ From the information in these reports,
it appears that gear production is conducted in separate departments
in the turbine plants. The evidence indicates that these departments
* Table 2 follows on p. 12.
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Table 2
Production of Marine Steam Turbines in the USSR1E/
1949-55
Thousand Horsepower
Ship
Plant
Location-.
Type
1949
1950
.1951.
1952
1953:
1954.
Ural Turbine Zavod
Sverdlovsk
DD
105
140
140
DC
80
120- '
120:
Nevsk Heavy Machinery
Leningrad
DD
12(
Li
Li
Zavod imeni Lenin
DC
40
80
80 .
Shipyard imeni Zhdanav
Leningrad
DD
140
280
280
280
,210
210
DC
' 40
Leningrad Metal Zavod
Leningrad
DD
245
315
-490
210
-210
280
imeni Stalin (LMZ)
CL-
6o
120-
180
'120
60
60
?
Heavy Machinery Plant
Leningrad
DD .
210
210
420
210
140
70
imeni Kirov '
DC
40
160
CL
60
120
180
'120
60
2/
Khar'kov Turbogenerator-
Khartkov
DD
350
350
350'
140
Zavod (KhTGZ) imeni Kirov
DC
120
-.16o
200.
CL
120
, 120.
120
120
6o
6o
?
Subtotals
DD
1,050
1,295
1,680
:840
560
560
DC
n-6-
440
-5-.67 -
CL
240
360
480
...-615
DEU
12o-2/
Grand Total
1,220
1,655
2)160
.1) 440
1,180
ilLzIa ,/
a. Capacity available.
b. Auxiliary drives only.
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1955
120
40
280
280
2..0./
210
8o
2/
240
770
480
7-8
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are parts of the turbine plants and are administratively,subordinate'to
them. There is no report of production of gears 'at the Urafitiirbine
ZaVod at Sverdlovsk. It seems likely, however, that. thisjlant
assembles its awn gears, although other local plants may supply some
components.
There'are Separate factories throughout the USSR which,manu-
fact:ure parts, castingsand.fOrgings for the assembly-p1ants.: A few
of the larger shipyards have produced gears in the pastand may still
have some production potential.
The Table 3 include production at final .assembly
plants producing marine steam turbine drives.
Table 3
Production of Reduction Gears for Marine Steam:Drives.
? in the USSR 112/
1949-55
Units
Location
Ship
Type
1949
1950
1951
1952
Leningrad
? DD
17
23
34
20
Area
DC
? 2
CL
2
14
6
4
Khar-Tkov
DD
10
10.
10
4
Ar.e.a.. ?
, DC -
6
CL
2
2
2
2
Sverdlovsk
DD
3
4
4
Area
-DC
?4
Totals
DD
30
37
48
_
24
_
DC
12
CI,
6
8
?7
1953 1954 1955
16 16 22
8 12 8
2 1W a/
6 6 6
16 16 22
22 7?7

a. Capacity available.
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IV. Input Requirements.
A. Materials.
Carbon steel and alloy steel are the two principal materials
used in marine turbine and gear production. 46/ It is believed that
Soviet practice conforms to Western standards in this respect. In
recent years, the Soviet annual production has contained some 2,000
tons of finished carbon steel, which is a very small fraction of
Soviet production./21/ Alloy steels used in turbines also form a
small drain on annual national output. The average of 630 tons of
finished alloys contained in 7 years' production has represented a
negligible percentage of national output. 48/
The constant concern which the turbine plants have shown in
regard to the conservation of alloy steels 49/ may be a result of the
necessity to maintain working inventories of the several kinds of
alloys used in various parts of the turbines and gears. The ma-
chining of some alloys is difficult, even under optimum conditions,
and constant care is necessary to avoid excess wastage and depletion
of working inventories.
Turbine blades for the high pressure units use a chromium
stainless steel which contains about 12 percent chrome and 0.5 per-
cent nickel. 50/ Other blades use more nickel and less chrome. 51/
Forgings used in the rotors contain from 2.5 to 12.5 percent nickel
and up to 0.5 percent manganese and/or molybdenum. Requirements for
other metals are negligible.
A summary of finished material weights for both turbines and
gear production is shown in Table 4.* Figures are based on US
practice and are unadjusted for differences in technology and design.
B. Manpower.
Building marine turbines on the scale undertaken in recent
years has required from 21 to 37 percent of the total number of
employees engaged in turbine construction of all types. Since much
of the work deals in very close tolerances, this figure includes a
large number of skilled machinists and technicians. 22/
Table 4 follows on p. 15.
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Table 4
Materials Requirements for Marine Turbine and Gear Production
in the USSR a/ Z/
1949-55
Thousand Pounds
1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955
Gross Weight
'Carbon Steel
Alloy Steel 12/
4,060
3,050
1,010
5,270
3,950
1,320
7,340
5,500
1,840
4,990
3,740
1,250
4,330
3,250
1,080
4,850.
3,640
1,210
4,600
3,450
1,150
a., Finished materials are based on US practice.
b. The alloy steel includes the following finished weights of
nonferrous metals:
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
Nickel
43.6
56.5
78.9
53.6
46.5
52.1
49.5
Chrome
14.2
18.4
25.6
17.4
15.1
16.9
16.1
Manganese
0.1
0.13
0.18
0.12
0.1
0.12
0.11
In any large-scale industrial mobilization, marine turbine pro-
auction would be somewhat hampered by a shortage of skilled labor,
unless it received sufficient priority to draw labor from stationary
turbine production.
The yearly requirements-in man-years are shown in Table 5.*
C. Power.
. In the immediate postwar period, 1946-48, production was re-
peatedly interrupted at the Khartkov Turbogenerator Zavod by power
shortages and power failures. 'Li/ The shortages were a direct result
of war damage, however, and by 1949, power requirements Were being met
by repaired and new facilities.
* Table 5 follows on p. 16.
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_ _ _ _ _
Table 5
Labor. Requirements for Marine Turbine and Gear .Production
1949-55-?
Man-Years
Year
Direct Labor
Administrative
Total
1949
5,800,
1,900
:7,700
1950
7,500
2,500
10,000
1951
,10,500,
3,200
13,700
1952
6,800
2,200
9,000
1953
5,500
1,800
7,300
1954
6,000
2,Q00
8,000
1955
5,900
21000-
7,900
The average annual requirement of power for marine turbine
production in the period Under-review is 50 million kilowatt-hours.
This compares with average annual power output of 120 billion kilo-
watt hours. 55/ Marine turbine production has consumed only.0.04
percent of available power. ,
D. Transportation.
Transportation requirements for delivery of completed geared
turbine units to the shipyard are small. The Leningrad area, which
produces 67 percent of the turbines, also produces a larger per-
centage of the vessels which use turbine drives. Several of the
Leningrad turbine shops have private rail connections with the ship-
yards. Deliveries consequently form a negligible requirement on the
rolling stock of the country.
There are several haulages involved, however, which are of '
intelligence interest. Deliveries to the Komsomoltsk Shipyards are
estimated to require about 6 million ton-kilometers of rail transporta-
tion on the Trans-Siberian Railroad annually. Computed on a weight
basis, this is 0.002 percent of the average annual eastbound
traffic. 56/ The shipyard at Molotovsk is dependent upon a haulage
of 1,275 kilometers on the Leningrad-Vologda Railroad.
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} .Several prisonerslof-war have ?reported-on the extreme-Cre.
given to packing the turbine parts 57/ Of specialinterest are
statements that detachments of sailors from the Far East came to.
1 Khar'kov to guard the freight cars on which the turbines were shipped
over the Trans-Siberian Railroad. This information suggests that ?
/ the safe, handling of freight over this route leaves much to be desired,
and that delivery schedules might not be dependable.
) E. 'Summary of Input Requirements.
I The average annual input requirements for the Industry .are
shown in Table 6.
'Table 6
Average Annual Requirements for Marine Turbine and Gear Production
in the USSR
1949-55
Item
'Percentage of
Quantity National Output
Carbon Steel (Tons) 2,000 -0.009
Alloy Steel (Tons) 630 Negligible
Man-Years 9,100 0.6 2/
Kilowatt-Hours 50,000,000 0.04
Ton-Kilometers, Trans-Siberian 6l000.l000 Negligible
Railroad, Eastbound -
a. Percentage of industrial labor force.
V. Distribution.
Marine geared turbine drives are used in warships and can be used
efficiently in merchant vessels of more than 4,000 to 5,000 gross tons.
There is no concrete evidence to suggest use of geared turbine drives
in any merchant ship built' in the USSR since 1945. All the known newly
built Soviet merchant ships are diesel-powered. Maximum estimates of
production of large merchant vessels in the USSR' 'since World War II
could account for no more than 1 percent of the marine turbines produced.
For all practical purposes, the Soviet Navy can be considered the only
user of marine turbines in the USSR.
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The shipyards which:install the turbines in cruisers and destroyers
are located in Leningrad., Nikolayev, Komsomolvsk, Molotovsk, and
Kaliningrad. 58/
Except for a few units installed in imported ships, there are no
exports or imports of marine turbines to or from the USSR at the
present time.
VI. Intentions, Limitations, and Vulnerabilities.
A. Intentions.
Marine turbines ordinarily take from 18 to 24 months to build.
They are delivered to the shipyard 1 to 4 months before the hull is
launched, or from 8 to 16 months before the ship is completed. For
this reason) information on planned turbine production can indicate
shipbuilding intentions as much as a year before the keels are laid
and in some cases 2 to 3 years before the ships are delivered.
Reports from released prisoners of war who had worked in the
Leningrad and Khar'kov plants from 1947 to 1950 were sufficient to in-
dicate that a large-scale destroyer-cruiser building program could be
expected in 1949-52. This program was eventually substantiated by
sightings on the building ways.
Current information is largely limited to occasional news-
paper and radio releases and to information gleaned from the analysis
of plan announcements. These official sources are careful not to
give out information of Obvious value, but there is an occasional
slip. A 1952 newspaper, reporting on metal savings at the KhTGZlin-
dicated that reduction gear housings, probably for destroyers) were
being produced in the spring of that year. This information suggested
that destroyer yards, probably at Nikolayev or Komsomol'sk, would con-
tinue to build destroyers through 1953.
The 1955 goal set by the Fifth Five Year Plan 59/ is an in-
crease in steam turbine production to 2.3 times the 1950 figure. There
is, of course, no clue here as to the proportion allocated to ship-
building or that going to land power installations. In 1949-50, a
high percentage of the total turbine production went into shipbuilding.
Since the plan announcement does not indicate a disproportionately large
number of new steam power projects for 1955 as compared with 1950, it
can be assumed that production of ship turbines and gears will continue
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through 1955. This deduction in turn indicates that construction of
destroyers or larger vessels will continue, if on an unknown scale,
through late 1956 or early 1957.
The plan announcement also provides for the development of
shipbuilding and the manufacture of turbines in the Lithuanian Republic.
This plan might include Creation of new facilities for production of
ship turbine's for merchant ships.
B. Limitations.
Well developed industrial economies need plants to produce
power-generating equipment including turbines. Turbine facilities
can easily be converted to production of marine turbines. Gear pro-
duction, however, is usually limited to the requirements of a normal
shipbuilding program, and shortages of gear-production facilities and
equipment may consequently limit shipbuilding expansion. During World
War II, such shortages led the.US to build many merchant vessels and
smaller naval vessels (including some destroyer escorts) with diesel,
reciprocating steam engines, or turboelectric drives. ?2/ This fact
has led to speculation in intelligence circles that the Soviet gear
production may also limit shipbuilding. Li
The USSR has only two plants which normally produce the large
gear-cutting machinery needed for the production of marine gears. These
plants are the IqComsomolets" plant at Yegorevsk and the Kolomna Heavy
Machine Tool plant. Expansion of gear production facilities would
depend on the ability of these two plants to provide the necessary ma-
chine tools. Althdugh .Soviet ability to expand gear production may be
somewhat limited, the industry is already operating at a high level of
production. Soviet gear-manufacturing facilities and turbine
ties are well balanced.
Construction and expansion of turbine plants occurred in
1932-38, at a time when a large-scale building program for the Soviet
Navy was under way. ?.2/ Provision was made for gear production in
adequate proportion to turbine production. Postwar reconstruction and
expansion of plants also coincided with a large naval construction ,
program, and the proportion was maintained. In the USSR, then, gear
production may not limit shipbuilding to the extent that it does in
many Western countries.
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Turbine production, however, is more limited in capacity.
The slow rate of naval shipbuilding from 1946 to 191.1.8 was partially
caused by the inability of turbine plants to meet the demands of both
postwar factory reconstruction and an accelerated shipbuilding program.
In 1949, with reconstruction of plants largely completed, steam tur-
bine output was twice that of 1948. It was in 1949 that construc-
tion of cruisers and destroyers began in earnest. In the years since
1949, naval shipbuilding has required from 19 to 35 percent of esti-
mated total Soviet turbine production. Lt/ From 1949 to 1951, the
USSR imported 20 percent of its stationary turbine requirements from
Satellite and Western countries.
C. Vulnerabilities.
In Soviet marine turbine and gear manufacture there are few
areas of weakness which are capable of economic exploitation. The
USSR does import turbines, alloy forgings, arid other parts for its
turbine production, but these are for small stationary units. _62/
Disruption of such shipments would have some annoyance value in
creating tighter supply schedules. Production of geared turbines
for naval use would undoubtedly receive sufficient priorities for
scarce materials so that even total embargo would have little prac-
tical value. In any case, much of the importing is done from the
European Satellites.
The concentration of marine turbine production facilities
does present several areas of extreme vulnerability to direct
action. In Leningrad, 38 percent of national production is 'con-
centrated at the adjoining buildings of the Kirov Zavod and the
Zhdanov.Shipyard. A few miles away, the LMZ produces 25 percent of
the national production. To the south at Khar'kov, the KhTGZ pro-
duces an additional 25 percent of total output. Elimination of these
three entities -- the LMZ, the Kirov-Zhdanov Shops, and the KhTGZ --
would destroy 88 percent of the output of marine steam turbines.
The isolation of the Komsomol'sk Shipyard from the turbine
producers presents another area of vulnerability. From the nearest
turbine plant at Sverdlovsk, the minimum rail haul to the shipyard
is 4,500 miles. Komsomol'sk has produced from 15 to 25 percent of
destroyer production in some recent years. .
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APPENDIX A
PT STUDIES
1. Khar'kov Turbogenerator Zavod (KhTGZ) imeni Kirov.
Under construction in 1933, the Khar'kov Turbogenerator Zavod
was originally designed for the manufacture of 2 million kilowatts
of steam-power generating equipment per year. The factory was
built beside the existing Khar'kov Electro-Mechanical Zavod (KHEMZ)
and shared with KHEMZ the foundry and other plant facilities.
The KHEMZ-KhTGZ plant compound is about 4.5 miles east-south-
east of the Khar'kov railroad station. The plant is situated in a
6-sided enclosure and lies between the KharfkoV-Ghuguyev railroad
and the Khar'kov-Chu ev highway. The plant is served by rail,
truck, and streetcar..
On completion, the KhTGZ plant became the second largest turbine
producer in the USSR, the largest being the Stalin Plant in Lenin-.
grad. The KhTGZ became a manufacturer of marine turbines soon after
production began. It produced the turbines for a Soviet cruiser and
for many of the new destroyers. Large-scale production began in
1936-39, at a time when new and modernized shipyards at Nikolayev in
the Ukraine and Komsomol'sk in the Far East were taking an active
part in the naval construction program. In 1939 the Khar'kov plant
is reported to have become the largest producer of marine steam
turbines in. the USSR.
During World War II, the plant suffered major damages. Some of
the equipment was evacuated, but the fixed installations, including
most of the foundry facilities and power equipment,were damaged con-
siderably. Reconstruction began immediately after reoccupation of
Khar'kov. By 1946 the plant was able tb turn out a few units, which
were tested and sent to Leningrad. Rebuilding and expansion of old
shops continued through 1948, and by the spring of 1949 the plant had
regained much of its prewar capacity. The last recurrent power
stoppages are reported for April of 1949. Construction of new foundry
and:machine shops continued through 1949 and 1950.
* Fig. 3 (diagram of plant) follows p. 22.-
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During the postwar period, the plant was under the administrative
authority of the Ministry of Heavy Machine Building, but many naval
officers had technical inspectors' and supervisors' positions. The
acceptance tests were conducted by naval personnel.
The main erection and assembly shop of the turbine plant is a
3-story building with a concrete floor. The first floor contains
1 very large milling machine, 20 smaller millers, 20 lathes, a:large
turret. lathe, 10 planers, 5 drill presses, and several other metal-
cutting machines. Heavy parts, including shafts, propellers, and
large gears, and turbines are machined on -Te ground floor. The
second floor houses about 100 smaller boring and milling machines,
lathes, and grinding machines. Smaller parts are produced here.
The third floor is equipped with machine tools, and part of it is
used,as a school for apprenticed girls and boys 12 to 18 years old.
The main building is a restricted area requiring a special pass
for admission. Prisoners of war were allowed inside only for special
maintenance work
A great many prisoners report quantity, production of small tur-
bines for warships and submarines.. Their reports, however, appear
to describe large marine pumps, which resemble turbines in many
respects. The.KIITOZ is therefore believed to be an important pro-
ducer of pumps for the navy as well as turbines, gears, shafts, and
possibly propellers.
From 1946 to 1950, castings for turbines and gear housings.
arrivedin a semifinished condition and were machined in the plant.
By 1952, however, castings for reduction gears were being produced,
probably indicating that the new foundry was in operation.
Shortages of materials plagued the plant as late as 1950, and the
workers apparently were not paid for idle time resulting from lack of
materials'. The norms required of the workers were high, and .a great
deal of cheating Went on, sometimes with-the help of the foremen.
One method reported was the stealing of accepted piecework from the
storerooms and changing the control stamp. The pieces were then run
through the assembly,line and credited as new production. In such
cases, bonuses 'for production above the norm would be split between
the worker and his supervisor. There was .a lively black market in
materials of all kinds from 1946 to 1949, and workers were sometimes
searched before leaving the plant. One prisoner of war reportS'that
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Kharkov Turbogenerator (KhTGZ) and Electric Motor (KhEMZ) Plants
KhTGZ?Khar'kovskiy Turbogeneratornyy Zavod imeni Kirova
KhEMZ?Khar'kovskiy Elektromotornyy Zavod imeni Stalina
City of Kharkov
t I C,
(./
Plant 1-17
location
KhEM
administratio
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Storage area
?4-1? Railroad
590 10400 feet
0 100 290 390 meters
JrIII
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specialists earned 800 to 1,000 rubles per month, while general labor
was paid 500 to 700 rubles. Morale was especially poor among the
least skilled workers, who were paid the same wages as the German
prisoners. Morale affected Production, and several Germans described
the plant philosophy as "quantity before quality." Rejects were high.
The plant works closely with the Kirov and Stalin plants in
Leningrad, and there is apparently an interchange among these three
plants of semifinished parts as well as technological information.
Other suppliers of semifabricated parts are the UraImash Zavod in
Sverdlovsk and-the ,Electrostal factory in Novo Kramotorsk.
A great deal of care is taken in packing the turbine parts for
shipping. The flatcars with the loaded parts were covered with
canvas. One shipment is reported to have required 14 flatcars..
There are indications that the plant: suppliesturbines to the shipyard
at Komsomol'sk, which is the only user of turbines for new ship con-
struction in the Far East. Other reports mention shipments to
Nikolayev, Odessa (for transshipping), and Leningrad.
In 1950 and 1951 the plant was the object of several unfavorable
press editorials because of failure to meet the plan. A poorly
organized supply of semifabricated materials to the plant, long-
drawn-out production cycles, and disregard of advanced technology
all contributed to plan failures. The Ministry of Heavy Machine
Building issued an order to correct deficiencies by establishing
a 3-shift schedule for operating special-purpose equipment. The:
order was ignored, ''with the result that thousands of machine tool
hours are lost as bottleneck production equipment remains idle at
night."
In the same compound as the KhTGZ, the KHEMZ plant also produces
marine components which are mistakenly credited by some sources to
the KhTGZ. These include switchboards and control panels for sub-
marines, several lArods of electric motors, switch boxes, resistor
sets, and generators.
Production of geared,turbine units at the KhTGZ is 25 percent of
national production.
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2. '-'Heavy Machine Zavod imeni Kirov'
The Kirov Heavy Machine Zavod was founded in the 1880'S
and was known in Czarist times as the Putilov Works. It was and is
one of the largest industrial eomplexesiin the USSR. The plant is
situated on the eastern bank of the south fork of the Neva; in the
Alekeevka district of Southwest Leningrad. It is about 2 miles
southwest of the Leningrad railroad station and occupies an area
directly north and northeast of the Zhdanov Shipyard.
At the close of World War I, the plant had complete facilities
for shipbuilding. Its furnaces and mills furnished the Steel
plates and shapes required. Its machine shops manufactured the ma-
chinery_and many of the components needed at the building ways and
outfitting piers. Under Soviet administration the shipyard became
a separate entity and is now known as the Zhdanov Shipyard under
the administration of the Ministry of Shipbuilding.
The other shops of the Putilov Works became part of the Ministry
of Heavy Machine Building. The plant has several departments and
produces cranes, winches, and lifting devices, as well as vehicles,
plate, castings, and forgings. During World War II, it produced
ammunition and parts for tanks.
The main turbine shop is located in the southwest part of the
plant' area, close to the boundary of the Zhdanov Shipyard. This
shop is at least 3 stories high and is reported to be thetallest
building in the plant area. It is equipped, with 2 overhead
traveling cranes of 25-ton capacity each. The building is very
close to and parallel to the turbine shop of the Zhdanov Shipyard,
across the boundary wall.
?
Part of the equipment of the turbine shops was evacuated to
Chelyabinsk and Sverdlovsk in late 1911.1. Much of what remained was
damaged when the shop was shelled by German artillery, and recon-
struction began before the war ended.
From 1945 to 1947, the turbine department was primarily engaged
in repairing war damage, replacing old and evacuated machinery, and
in building additional facilities. At the end of 1946, the turbine
section covered 27,000 square meters, and 1,000 new machines had
been installed. In June 1947, the local papers reported that the
turbine shop was virtually a new shop.
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The turbine department draws on some of the Other Kirov shops
for various services. Among shops identified as contributing to the
first postwar turbine, which was completed as a special project in
1947, were the pattern shop/ machine shop, metal-fabrication shop,
steel foundry/ turbine blade manufacturing department, the new forge,
and the old forge. The main machine shop of the plant produced the
condensor for the first turbine.
During 1946-47, the turbine shop was also able to produce some
turbine parts and do repair Work-on damaged units. An initial
production assignment of eight turbines was given to the plant in
1947. A ground floor section of the turbine shop is partitioned off
from the rest of thebuilding, and here the turbine gears are produced.
No great advances have been made in technology, but a few improvements
were introduced in 1947, including increased use of weldings, on cast
turbine parts. The turbine blade manufacturing shop may now be in a
separate building.
-Turbine designers V.E. Berg and V.Y. Solovei worked on plans for
the new turbines. Both of these men received Stalin Prizes in 1946
for perfecting the design and technology of production of turbines for -
combat vessels.
After early 1947, one prisoner of war was allowed to work on im-
provements in the production methods for reduction gear wheels.
was working on two different
in 1947 the plant
types of turbines for cruisers.
August .1947 the yard was planning to
capacity units for ships.
in
resume serial production of high.
The Kirov plant also produces steam turbines for large industrial
and municipal power plants, but the frequent visits of naval officers
during 1948 and 1949 indicated that a large part of the work was for
the navy. Under normal conditions/ production initiated in late 1947
could be completed 20 to 24 months later. Since these were new de-
signs being produced in a rebuilt factory, with new and semiskilled
labor, completion may have been delayed until late 1949 or early
1950. At this time the cruiser-destroyer program was readily
discernible in the shipyards.
The Kirov plant is believed to account for about 21 percent of
national production of units for the cruiser-destroyer program.
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Shipyard imeni Zhdanov. 01*
Also knownas the Northern Yard- the Zhdanov
Shipyard is the former Putilov Yard of Czarist times. It became a
separate entity in the early thirties, when it was detached from
the Kirov Works. It has been administered at various times by the
Ministry of Transport Machinery Construction, the Ministry of Trans-
port and Heavy Machine Construction, and the Ministry of Shipbuilding.
Since late April of 1954, it has been under the Ministry of Ship-
building.
The plant is located along the eastern bank of the south fork.of
the Neva River and occupies an area south and southwest of the Kirov
Zavod in Southwest Leningrad.- The turbine shop is situated along the
northern boundary wall of the shipyard and Stands parallel to the
turbine shop of the Kirov Zavod. The two plants account for 38 per-
cent of the annual Soviet production of marine steam turbines and
gears. The close proximity of the two shops and their importance to
national production make them a prime target of intelligence interest.
In the middle thirties, facilities in the turbine shop were ex-
panded, and by 1936 the yard was able to produce its own reduction
gearing as well as turbines up to 25,000 horsepower.
During World War II, some of the equipment was evacuated. The
few available reports indicate that the plant has .2 overhead
traveling cranes, is well equipped with machine tools of Russian
and foreign manufacture, and has 2 test beds for turbines. Several
sources indicate that the yard produces all the turbines for-its
own ships.
Two qualified observers, who worked in the yard from 1934 to 1946
and in 1949-50, indicate that the entire yard had been put into good
condition by 1946 and that the turbine and gear shops were especially
well equipped. The turbine sh6p Manufactures many turbine and gear
parts and makes the complete final assembly and test. It is
apparently dependent on shipments of parts from the Kirov Zavod and
other plants. Completed units leave the erection and assembly shop
and are delivered to the turbine installation shop. About 120 men
in the shop prepare the propulsion unit for installation.
Production'eatimates for the-yard are based entirely on launching
information and on the assumption that the yard builds all the geared
* Fig. 4 (diagram of plant) follows p. 26.
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turbine units required for its own shop but does not deliver
propulsion machinery to othershipyards. Production is estimated at
17 percent of the average national output.
4. Leningrad Metal Zavod (LMZ)
One of the oldest heavy industrial plants in the USSR, the
Stalin Zavod, was built as the Petersburg Engineering Works in 1857.
It is located in the northern section of the city, on the north bank
of the Neva River, approximately 1 mile east-northeast of the
Liteynyy Bridge.
The Stalin plant has manufactured a.wide variety of products.
It is primarily a turbine plant, but has alsoproduced tanks, guns,
boilers, hull sections, subway equipment, and refrigeration and re-
finery plants.
The factory is the leading plant of the Main Administration of.
the Boiler Turbine Industry and is the largest producer of turbines
in the USSR, accounting for about 30 percent of .annual output.'
Production includesgas and hydroturbines, as well as steam turbines
for both marine and stationary use. The Stalin plant produces about
25 percent of the national output of marine steam turbines, but
there are indications that marine turbine production will constitute
a much smaller percentage of total plant output than it did before
the war.
The Stalin plant has an excellent steam turbine research and de-
sign laboratory. Under the direction of Professor M.I. Grinberg,
this laboratory was instrumental in the development of warship
propulsion both before and after World War II. Stalin- prize-winning
designers at the plant include A.G. Antonov, M.N. BUshvyev,
V.P. Yegorev, A.S. Zilberman, V.N. Zubkov, A.V. Levin, A.A. Lomakin,
and M.Z. Kheyfets. The plant management has long advocated that the
plant confine itself to production of turbines only.
5. Zavod imeni Lenin Leningrad: /2/
The Lenin plant is located on the west bank of the Neva
in Southeast Leningrad.
The plant address
Leningrad.
River
is ll b Sela Smolensk Prospekt,
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In the center of the grounds along the eastern boundary is a
large L-shaped building where cranes are assembled. Boiler construc-
tion may also take place in one wing of this building. In the
southeast corner of the grounds is a large open-hearth foundry
building which also houses the pattern and core-making shops.
4
In 1936, two turbine assembly shops were built, designed prima-
rily for production of smaller units. These shops are reported to
have built turbines for minesweepers in 1941. The turbine shops pro-
duced armaments during World War II and were slow in converting back
to turbine production. Until 1949, only a few units were produced.
Even today, the turbine shops turn out a great many drives for air
blowers used in industrial furnaces, compressors, and pumps. In 1950,
it was the only large producer of these items in the USSR.
The plant is equipped with a good turbine research and development
laboratory, which does a great deal of work for the Main Administration
of the Boiler-Turbine Industry on units to be produced in other plants.
The plant is of special intelligence interest, because it is a
potential center for experimentation and development of gas-turbine
drives for submarines. Naval officers were present in the plant
from 1946 to 1949 and are reported by several prisoners of war to
have held administrative and supervisory jobs.
The factory does not produce turbines for cruisers. Its geographic
location indicate that its units are most likely used in destroyer
construction in shipyards in Leningrad, Molotovsk, and/or Kaliningrad.
Turbines currently in production are not believed to exceed 20,000
horsepower. They are probably used in small destroyers and for
auxiliary propulsion units on larger ships. Postwar production of
geared turbine units is estimated at not more than 4 percent of the
national output.
6, Ural Turbine Zavod Sverdlovsk (UTZ). 11/
The Ural Turbine Zavod is the only producer of large marine tur-
bines east of Khar'kov. It is located at Sverdlovsk, about a mile and
a quarter northeast of the railroad station. The plant was designed
in 1936, and was in production before the outbreak of World War II.
It is located in the Same plant compound as the Ural Turbomotor Zavod
which makes diesel engines. The plants probably share some
_loading, storage, and shipping facilities, and foundry space.
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The Ural Tutbine Zavod was originally designed to produce tur-
bines of up to 16,800 horsepower. Before 1942 it could not have pro-
dUced marine turbines for ships larger than minelayers or small
coastal type destroyers During World War II, however, the plant
was expanded and equipped With machinery evacuated from the Kirov
Works in Leningrad and from the KhTGZ in Khartkov.
By 1945, the Ural Tatbine Zavod had initiated production of
marine turbines. In the first quarter of 1946 it completed its first
unit, probably for a Bird class destroyer. A second unit was
scheduled for completion in the same year. By 1947, high pressure
marine steam turbines were in serial production. During the period
1945 to 1947, stationary turbines were also produced, the largest
unit being of 33,500 horsepower. Information from 1945 to 1948 in-
dicates that naval officers had administrative or inspectors' posi-
tions in the plant.
In 1947 the staff was working on the design of new high pressure
units, and the plant was being enlarged.
The plant probably receives many larger forgings and castings
from the nearby Uralmash Plant, which is one of the best eqUipped
plants in the USSR for such production. Uralmnsh is known to have
shipped castings and forgings to marine turbine producers in Lenin-
grad and Khar'kov. Present production is believed to represent at
least 8 percent of the national output.
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