SOLID FUELS AND COAL GAS IN EAST GERMANY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01141A000400010001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 85
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 15, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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11
SECRET
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
SOLID FUELS AND COAL GAS IN
EAST GERMANY
CIA/RR 40
1 September 1954
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
2
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SECRET
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WA'It1UNG'
This mateAal containS inforn1.6t1:gi affQcting
the National Degense' of the liiited States
within the meaning of tiw est-0'4 i' ?e laws,
Title 18 qsc, 8ecs, .'1 and 794 the trans-
mission dr revelation of Whi6h in any manner
to an unauthorized .persOn is prohibited by law.
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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
SOLID FUELS AND COAL GAS IN EAST GERMANY
CIA/RM40
(ORR Project 26.196)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
S-E-C-R-E-T
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Surmnary
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CONTENTS
Page
1
I. Introduction 3
II. Coal 4
A. General . **** ? ? OOOOO ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
B.
C.
1. History
2. Organization
Supply
1. Production
2. Imports and Exports ? ? ? ??? ??? ? ? ? ?
3. Stocks ..... . ? ? ? . ? ? ? ? ? ? ....
Consumption . ? ? ? 0 OOOOOOOOOOOOO
? ?
? ?
? ?
..
? ?
4
6
9
9
18
23
25
1. Hard Coal
.........
,
.
..
,
? ?
25
2. Brown Coal
29
D.
Reserves
31
1. Hard Coal
31
2. Brown Coal
.
0
?
? ? 0 ?
?
..
?
04,
??
31
III.
Fuel Briquettes .
???
.
.......
. ....
??
34
A.
General , . .
.
?
. . . .
?
?
. ?
..
?
34
B.
Supply . , .
?? .
????????????????
??
35
C.
Consumption
38
1. Internal
? ?
38
2. Exports
42
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IV.
Coke
A. General
B. Supply
Page
42
42
.42
1. Production
42
2. Imports
47
C. Consumption ?
? ? ? eeeeeee OOOOOO?
?
0
?
48
V.
Coal Gas
51
A. General
?
?
51
B. Supply
53
1. Production
OOOO . OOOOOOO ? ?
?
?
.
?
53
2. Imports
54
C. Consumption
55
VI.
Fuelwood OOOO .
? ? ? ? OOOOOOOOOOO ?
?
?
.
?
56
A. General
56
B. Supply
57
VII.
Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Intentions ? .
?
4
?
?
57
A. Capabilities .
OOOOOO 0 .??? OOOOO
?
?
?
?
57
B. Vulnerabilities
. OOOOOOO ?
?
?
?
?
59
C. Intentions ......? ? ? ? ? OOOOOOOOO
4.
OO
60
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Page
Appendixes
Appendix A. Coal Deposits in East Germany 63
Appendix B. Technology 67
Appendix C. Labor ? 73
Tables
1. Estimated Balance of Sources of Primary Energy in East
Germany, 1953 4
2. Production of Hard Coal in East Germany, 1936-55 13
3. Actual and Estimated Production of Brown Coal in East
Germany, 1949755
15
4. Production of Brown Coal in East Germany, 1936-55 . . . . 16
5. East German Imports of Hard Coal by Countries of Origin,
1948-53 22
6. East German Imports of Brown Coal, by Countries of Origin,
1946-53 23
7. Estimated Consumption of Hard Coal in East Germany,
1547-53 27
8. Estimated Consumption of Brown Coal in East Germany,
1547-53 32
9. Reserves of Hard Coal in East Germany, Selected Years,
1913-51 34
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10. Estimated Reserves of Brown Coal in East Germany,
1936 and 1947
Page
35
11. Estimated Production of Brown-Coal Briquettes in East
Germany, 1938, 1943, 1946-53, and 1949-55-Plans 37
12. Estimated Consumntion of Brown-Coal Briquettes in East
Germany, by Major Consumers, 1947-53 39
13. Estimated East German Exports of Brown-Coal Briquettes,
by Countries of Destination, 1947-53
14. Estimated Production of Coke in East Germany, 1947-55 ? 44
15. Estimated East German Imports of Metallurgical Coke,
by Countries of Origin, 1947-53 49
16. Estimated Consumption of Coke by the Metallurgical and
Carbide Industries in East Germany, 19148-51 50
17 Planned Availability of Metallurgical, Gas, ? and Low- ?
T,6mperature Carbonization Coke in East Germany, 1952 .
18. Planned and Actual Consumption of Metallurgical, Gas, and
Low-Temperature Carbonization Coke in East Germany, ?First
Six Months of 1953 . ... 4 ... . ... '?
19. Estimated Production of coal Gas in East -Germany,
1947-55
20. Production of Fuelwood in East Germany, Prewar Average
and 1946-55 58
21. Number of Employees in the East German Coal Industry,
1937, 1949, 1950 74
Map
Coal Production in East Germany: 1953 . , . . . Inside Back Cover
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(ORR Project 26.196)
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SOLID FUELS AND COAL GAS IN EAST GERMANY*
Surranary
Solid fuels provide the main sources of primary energy in East
Germany. In 1953, almost 99 percent of the total supply of primary
energy in East Germany was derived from coal and 1 percent from fuel-
wood. Hydroelectric power supplied only 0.1 percent of the total.
Brown coal** is the basic industrial fuel in the East German econ-
omy. Of the total supply of primary energy in 1953, brown coal pro-
vided 94.1 percent and hard coal*** 4.8 percent. Reserves of brown
coal are adequate to supply the predicted needs of East Germany, but
reserves of hard coal are scanty and are expected to be virtually
exhausted by 1960.
Total production of coal in East Germany in 1953 was about 176
million metric tons,*** z- of which only 3 million tons were hard coal.
In terms of tonnage production of coal, East Germany, ranks second to
Czechoslovakia among the European Satellites and produces slightly
more than half as much coal as does the USSR. In terms of energy
equivalents, however, Polish production, although it amounted to. only
95 million tons in 1953, exceeded East German production by about one-
third. Almost all of the coal produced in Poland is hard coal.
Production of brown coal in East Germany, in spite of adequate re-
serves, has not been sufficient to meet all requirements. Industrial
consumption, particularly by the electric power industry, has often
been curtailed, and household needs have been only partially satisfied.
* The estimates and conclusions contained in, this report represent
the best judgment of the responsible analyst as of 1 July 1954. -
** 'The term brown coal in European terminology includesail grades
of brown coal aiirlIgnite.
*** The term hard coal, used in this report in the European sense,
includes all grades of coal which, in US terminology, would be called
anthracite or bituminous coal.
**** Tonnages throughout this report are given in metric tons.
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In 1953, about 3.5 million tons of brown coal were imported from
Poland, but the supply still failed to meet the demand.
Domestic production of hard coal in 1953 supplied only about
one-third of East Germany's consumption. Imports, primarily from
Poland, amounted to about 5.3 million tons. Hard coal is essential
to the production of metallurgical cokel'which, in turn, is a basic
requirement for the iron and steel industry upon which East Germany's
industrial economy is based.
The estimated 1953 use pattern for brown coal in East Germany -
was as follows: 73 percent of total supply for the manufacture of
brown-coal briquettes, and the remainder for use in the unprocessed
state -- 24'percent for thermal power stations, 1.3 percent for the
chemical industry, 0.7 percent for gasworks, 0.3 percent for rail-
roads and inland water transportation,- and 0.7 percent for ."other
users." The estimated 1953 brown-coal briquette use pattern was as
follows: 11 percent of the total brown-coal briquette consumption by
railroads, 30 percent by synthetic fuel plants, 14 percent by thermal
plants, 10 percent by domestic users, and 35 percent by "other users."
Significant in the coal use pattern or East Germany is the attempt
to substitute brown-coal briquettes for scarce hard coal, particular-
ly in the operation of railway locomotives. This substitution effort,
has involved the conversion and reconversion of locomotives original-
ly designed to burn hard coal. In general, brown-coal briquettes
are not an efficient fuel in locomotive operation, and the East Gen-
man railroads have suffered a serious loss in efficiency. -
. The coal industry in East Germany is controlled by the Ministry
for Heavy Industry. The industry is state owned as a part of the
Vereinigung Volkseigner Betriebe (VVB), the Federation of People-
Owned Enterprises. All installations previously under Soviet Owner-
ship -- SAG's (Staatliche Aktiengesellschaften -- State Corporations*)
had been returned to East German ownership by 1 January 1954. There
are now 3 VVB's for brown coal subordinate to a Main Administration
for Brown Coal and 1 VVB for hard coal subordinate to the Main
Administration for Hard Coal.
The East German Five Year Plan (1951-55) production goal for
1955 is 225 million tons of brown coal and 3.5 million tons Of hard
* Formerly Sowjetische Aktiengesellschaften -- Soviet Corporations.
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coal. Achievement of the planned production of brown coal, about 50
million tons more in 1955 than in 1953, will depend on greater
mechanization and better maintenance of facilities, and it appears
to be possible but doubtful. Achievement of the planned production
of hard coal in 1955 appears very unlikely, considering the dwindling
reserves and the 1953 performance of the producers of hard coal. The
shortage of spare parts and repair materials for coal mining equip-
ment and the difficulty of obtaining new equipment, formerly imported
from the West, constitute serious limitations to the capabilities of
the East German solid fuels industry.
The industrial economy of East Germany is almost completely
dependent on coal. Many of the basic industries of the country --
the synthetic fuels, railroads, and metallurgical industries, among
others -- cannot operate without coal and are therefore vulnerable
to stoppage or curtailment of coal supplies. Particularly vulnera-
ble is the metallurgical industry, which depends on imports of hard
coal and coke from Poland and Czechoslovakia for about one-fourth
of its requirements. Throughout the European Satellites there is
a shortage of metallurgical coke, and the operation of East Germany's
iron and steel industries would be seriously affected should that
shortage become acute., At the present time it appears unlikely that
East German attempts to produce Metallurgical coke from brown coal
will be successful enough to ease the pressure materially.
The solid fuels industry of East Germany is an indicator of
intentions only to the extent that unusual efforts to increase
production and imports of coal would indicate unusual industrial
expansion, which, in turn, might indicate production for military
use. At the present time, all production and import plans appear
to be designed to meet the normal needs of the.East German industrial
structure.
I. Introduction.
The supply of primary energy in East Germany
entirely from solid fuels. Only a fraction of 1
total 1953 supply was furnished by hydroelectric
remainder was provided by coal and fuelwood. In
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is derived almost
percent of the
power, and the
1953, 94.1 percent
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of the total primary energy supply came from brown coal, 4.8 per-
cent from bituminous coal, 1 percent from fuelwood, and 0.1 per-
cent from hydroelectric power.
Table 1 gives the estimated balance of sources of primary energy
in East Germany in 1953.
Table 1
Estimated Balance of Sources of Primary Energy in East Germany
1953
Source
Production
Standard Fuel
Equivalent a/
(Thousand
Metric Tons)
Percentage
of Total
Primary
Energy
Amount
Unit
Coal'
Hard
3,000,000 b/
Tons
3,010
4.8
Brown
173,125,200 -6/
Tons
59,357
94.1
Hydroelectric
Power
700,000,000 d/
Kilowatt-Hours
86
0.1
Fuelwood
3,250000 -4/
Cubic Meters
604
1.0
Total
63,057
100.0
a. Standard fuel equivalent of 7,000 -kilocalories per kilogram.
b.
c.
d.
e.
Average heat value of 7,030 kilocalories per kilogram.
Average heat value of 2,400 kilocalories per kilogram.
Average heat value of 860 kilocalories per kilowatt-hour.
Average heat value of 1.3 million kilocalories per cubic meter.
II. Coal.
A. General.
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Wore 1945, production of coal within the present
boundaries of East Germany represented i relatively small part of
the total production of coal in Germany. 'The present industrial
significance of East German production of coal stems from the inter-
war years when the burden of World War I reparations and of prepara-
tions for future wars forced the German Reich to develop all possible
domestic sources of energy and of raw materials previously imported.
It was then that the provinces of Sachsen and Sachsen-Anhalt became
the center of the synthetic liquid fuel and chemical industries
based on brown coal as the raw material.
Production of hard coal in East Germany has always been
confined to small areas in the Erzgebirge region and in the southwest
section of Sachsen. These areas are still productive. Minor quanti-
ties of hard coal have been produced from time to time in the Wettin-
Loebejuen and Nieder Lausitz districts.*
In 1937, production of hard coal in these areas reached
a high of 3.6 million tons. The total German production of hard
coal during that same year was 184.5 million tons. During World
War II, production of hard coal decreased steadily to a low of 2.5
million tons in 1944. 2/
Although East Germany is short of hard coal, there are
ample supplies and reserves of brown Coal. In prewar Germany,
approximately two-thirds of all production of brown coal had been
derived from the central and east German brown-coal beds, now almost
entirely within East Germany. There are three brown-coal fields in
East Germany: the Lausitz field, the Braunschweig-Magdeburg field,
and the Thueringen-Sachsen field. The reserves of the entire
Lausitz field and of the Halle-Leipzig district of the Thueringen-
Sachsen field are the most important. Before World War II the fields
were divided into districts commonly named after their principal
cities, as follows:
-a. Lausitz Field -
Senftenberg District
Forst District
Goerlitz District
* See the map, Coal Production in East Germany: 1953; inside
back cover.
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b. -Braunschweig-Magdeburg Field
eschersleben District ,
Egeln-Stassfurt District
Nachterstedt-Aschersleben District
Bernburg and Schonbect District
c. Thueringen-Sachsen Field
Koethen District
TIalle-Leipzig District
Geiseltal District
Zeitz-Weissenfels District
!leuselwitz-Rositz District
Northwest Sachsen District
Bitterfeld District
The shift of practice from shaft mining (75 percent of
total brown-coal mining in Germany in 1890) to strip mining (85
percent of total brown-coal mining in Germany immediately preceding
World War II) was influential in increasing production. Another
major influence was increased mechanization through the use of more
and better equipment, which helped to increase German production of
brown coal from 138 million tons in 1926 to 183.5 million tons in
1937. Of this total, 114.3 million tons were from mines in the
area which is now East Germany. Strip mining of coal reduces the
tonnage losses incurred in mining. An average of 35 to 40 percent
is lost in deep mining, but only 10 percent is lost in mechanized
strip mining. Although equipment for modern strip mining requires
large initial capital investment, it has a low investment rate per
unit of coal mined. Its efficiency and the consequent low labor
costs have made feasible the exploitation of the German low-grade
brown coal.
During World War II, production of brown coal decreased
only slightly in comparison with the decrease in production of hard
coal. The prewar production high for mines in the area which is now
East Germany, 169 million tons, was reached in 1940. By 1944, pro-
duction had decreased only slightly -- to ?150 million tons. 3/
2. Organization.
a. Pre-World War II. 4/
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Hard-coal mining and brown-coal mining in Germany
prior to World War II were controlled by the Ministry for Economic
Affairs (Wirtschaftsministerium)., One of the 3 units of this
ministry was the Reich Industrial Group (Reichsgruppen Industrie),
consisting of seven divisions, one of which was the Mining Division
(Bergbau Wirtschaftsgruppe). Hard-coal mining and brown-coal mining
were 2 of 8 subdivisions of the Mining Division., The Hard-Coal
Mining Subdivision had seven regional sections, of Which Sachsen was
one. The Brown-Coal Mining Subdivision consisted of three regional
sections, of which one was central Germany. Sales and distribution
of coal were effected by the private coal syndicates, which were
partially controlled by the Reich Coal Council. The syndicates deal-
ing in hard coal were:
The Rhine-Westphalia Coal Syndicate
The Upper Silesian Hard-Coal Syndicate
The Lower Silesian Hard-Coal Syndicate
The Sachsen Hard-Coal Syndicate (now in East
Germany)
?The Lower Sachsen Coal Syndicate
The three syndicates connected with the brown-coal industry were:
The Rhenish Brown-Coal Syndicate
The East Elbe Brown-Coal Syndicate (now in
East Germany)
The Central German Brown-Coal Syndicate (now
in East Germany)
During the years immediately preceding the war, this
organization was superceded by the Reich Association of Coal
(Reichsvereinigung Kohle), which was directly under the control of
the Minister for Armament and War Economy. 5/
b. Post-World War TT.
Under Soviet occupation the East German coal industry
was divided into two sections. One, controlled directly by Soviet
personnel and administered for Soviet purposes, consisted of ?8 sec-
tions each. called Sowjetische Aktiengesellschaft (SAG-Soviet
Corporation). The other, the socialized, or 7,1B, segment of the
industry was subordinate to the.r.a.st German Central Administration
for the Fuel Industry as of 19454
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In-1948, in conjunction with all other socialized
industries, the VVB Segment of the coal industry became subordinate
to the newly formed German Economic Commission. In 1949, with the
establishment of the German Democratic Republic and its various
ministries, the coaIindustry came under the Main Administration for
Coal in the Ministry, for Heavy Industry. This Administration com-
prised Ei'VVBIs for brown 'coal Borna, Meuselwitz, Nerseburg, Bitter-
feld, Magdeburg, Mueckenberg, Senftenberg, and Welzow; 1 VVB for hard
coal -- Zwickau;-and the VVB for the Construction of Equipment and
Shaft Installations 'for? the Coal Industry (GEM). 6/
Early in 1952, an administrative reorganization
divided the Ministry for Heavy Industry into a Ministry for Stelting
and tnree State Secretariats. One of these secretariats, the State
Secretariat for Coal and Power, controlled the Main Administration
for Coal. 7/
In October 1953, there was created a new Ministry
for Heavy Industry which was to absorb, among other things, the
State Secretariat for Coal and Power. Under the Minister for Heavy
Industry was established the office of State Secretary and First
Deputy' Minister; which was immediately above.4.Deputy Ministers,
one each in charge of Coal, Power, Metallurgy, And Heavy Chemistry
(including Liquid Fuels). The new organization plan became effective
on 1 November 1953. New achievement plans for the Ministry were to
have become effective on 1 January 1954. 8/
The SAG group of mines produced about one-third
of total production of brown coal iii. 19)48. The total operating
activity of the plants was not greatly different under the Russians
than it had been under the Germans. (See Appendix A.) These mines
of which there were 8, were transferred entirely to Soviet owner-
ship and management by Orders of the Military Governor, numbers
124 and 126, dated December 1945.
Information dated March 1951 stated that all the
SAG'S concerned with coal produotion Were combined to form SAG
Brikett,'With headquarters in Leipzig. 10/
As of 1 May 1952 the folloWing cotbines which had
been under SAG administration were reportedly returned to German
management and came under VVB administration: Borna, Deutzen,
Deuben, Profen, Pfaennerhall, Nachterstedt, and Lauchhammer (SAG,
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Synthese). 11/ It is believed that the actual physical transfer of
the .combines did not occur until 31 December 1952. The remaining
brown coal SAGIs? Espenhain and Boehlen, became part of the SAG for
synthetic fuel .(SAG Synthese), and it is believed that their entire.
production was consumed by synthetic fuel plants.
After the riots of June 1953 and the resulting
development of the "New Course," it was decided to return to German
ownership all those enterprises still under SAS control. Included
in this group were the brown-coal installations at Espenhain and
Boehlen (Kombinat Otto Grotewohl). Ostensibly this transfer was
to occur an 1 January 1954. 12/
Although SAG production of coal has always been
included in total production figures for East Germany, plans, alloca-
tions of funds, and distribution of end products have customarily
been carried out by a Soviet body independent of the East German
State Planning Commission.
B. Supply.
1. Production.
a. Hard Coal.
Since World War II, production of hard coal in East
Germany has been insufficient to fill the industrial requirements of
the area. Some conception of the discrepancy may be obtained by
comparing peak prewar requirements of 17 million tons with peak post-
war supplies of 8.2 million tons. Despite the establishment of the
high production goal of 4 million tons in 1951, 13/ which was designed
to stimulate productivity, extraction has lagged seriously. In
1952 the hard-coal administration went through the throes of purge
and reorganization because the production of 2.8 million tons that
year 14/ was 400,000 to 700,000 tons below the goal. 15/
Some gains in production were made in the first
5 years following World War II. The postwar low of 2 million tons
in 1945 was surpassed in 1946 by an apparently large increase to
2.5 million tons. Actually, this was merely a return to the 1944
level. War damage and dismantling apparently had little effect on
the hard-coal industry.
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Because of the variety of plan figures available for
1953, it is difficult to estimate the actual production of hard coal
in that year. Because of the variety of plan figures available,
these figures range from 3.3 million to 2.9 million tons. Informa-
tion dated mid-August 1953 shows an expected underfulfillment of
plan by 150,000 tons. 16/ Assuming this relates to the latest full-
year plan up to that age, estimated production for 1953 would be
3,125,000 tons. Actual production for-the first half of 1953,
1,460,000 tons, and the revised production plan for the second half,
1,535,000 tons, 17/ total, however, only 2,995,000 tons. It is
believed that prFauction of hard coal did not exceed 3.1 million
tons nor fall below 2.9 million tons, and an average of these 2
estimates, 3 million tons, is used for 1953 production of hard coal.
Realizing the poor conditions of the already existing
shafts, the Main Administration for Coal in the Ministry for Heavy
Industry, in an attempt to increase production, planned the develop-
ment of three new shafts in the Freital and Doberlug-Kirchain areas.
18/ By 1950, however, the mines in Freital were producing only
about 136,000 tons 19/ a year, and development work at Doberlug had
just reached the coal-bearing formations. 20/
During 1947 and 1948, small gains were made in the
production of hard coal, and only in 1949 was the output of 3.0
million tons greater than the World W2r 11 peak of 2.9 million
tons. 21/
Planned figures for 1950 and 1951 were 3.3 million
and 4 million tons, respectively. 22/ Attainment of these goals
seemed possible at the end of 1949. In June of 1950, however, a
meeting of the representatives of the Main Administration for Coal
decided that these goals would be reached only through, expansion and
reorganization of the Zwickau coal mines. Primary equipment require-
ments were the installation of emergency haulage cables and the
procurement of 1,813 mine cars. Additional power and steam genera-
tion were to be provided with new boiler installations, and a new
high-tension power line was to be brought from outside the area.
Actual total production for 1950 (2.8 million tons) and 1951 (3.2
million tons) indicates that the pressing needs of the important
Zwickau area were not supplied. 23/
The original Five Year Plan for industry, drawn up
in 1950, reestablished a more realistic production goal of 4 million
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tons of hard coal for the year 1955. 24/ According to a 1950
Delin press release, this increase was to be attained by continued
mechanization of the conveying and excavating processes, improved
4 ventilation, additional compressed air and power supplies, increased
labor, and better underground communication facilities. 25/ During
the first quarter of 1951, planned production was not re:Fazed,
reportedly because of the increased stone content and the decreasing
thickness of the coal seams. In April 1950, Polish blasting methods
were applied for the first time. 26/ Because of the geological
conditions prevailing in the coal seams in Sachsen, such hard blast-
ing was thought to be hazardous and unprofitable and might result
in the loss of large developed areas. 27/ The Martin Hoop mine
disaster in April 1952 and four other Mtal accidents have been
attributed to the use of explosives. 28/
During the first quarter of 1952, revised plan
objectives gave tacit recognition to the fact that existing hard-
coal mines in Sachsen are nearing the end of their productive lives.
Instead of a 4.0-million-ton target for 1955, extraction is to
decrease from 3.2 million tons, in 1953 to 3.1 million in 1955. 29/
Even these planned figures sem too high, for only 2.8 million tons
were obtained in 1952 30/ and planned production of hard coal for
1953 was varied from 575 million tons to 2.9 million tons. Plans
? for 1954 and 1955 have recently been revised upward to 3.5 million
tons in each year. Estimated achievement in 1953 does not indicate
the fulfillment of these plans, which could be achieved only through
enlargement of capacity by means of the new mines at Doberlug.
The basic causes of failure in 1952 were more complex
than the political sympathies for which 12 technicians from the
Zwickau District were arrested in early 1953. First of all, the
hard-coal resources are limited, and deposits are so irregular that
mining is difficult, hazardous, and unproductive. 31/ Second, equip-
ment and machinery are in bad repair and short supipIr. For instance,
at 1 mine there were only 92 pneumatic hammers for 170 miners 32/;
ventilation and compressed air pipes were leaky, and lack of sufficient
air lowered the efficiency of the miners and their hammers 33/;
signal devices are lacking 34/; and hoisting cables have been re-
paired so often that they are presently in an irreparable condition.
35/ Perhaps the most important deficiency of all has been the severe
shortage, since 1950, of trained and experienced labor. At that
time the Annual Report for VVB Zwickau claimed that the shortage of
personnel was the restricting factor in the achievement of planned
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production in every mine, despite the transfer of personnel from
closed or exhausted shafts. 36/ The main contributing factors to
the labor shortage were the greater salary attraction of the Wismut
uranium mines 37/; insufficient food, clothing, and wages, which
reduce the wilrand incentive to work 38/; the 50-year average age
among the trained workers; and the inexperience of the youthful
labor draftees. 39/ In 1951 the labor problem became so pressing
that recruitment among juveniles, convicts, 40/ and even women
was instituted, and in May of that year, at the Karl Marx Mine in
Zwickau, the first woman employee began training as a foreman. 41/
The results of the unfavorable conditions mentioned have been fires,
flooded mines, explosions, and the failure of the hard-coal industries
to meet their goals. The actual and planned production of hard coal
in East Germany is given in Table 2.*
b. Brown Coal.
Coincidental with the dropping of the Iron Curtain
in 1948, intensified efforts were directed toward increased produc-
tion of brown coal in East Germany. Before that time, in the 21
years following the end of World War II, the industry was one of
those which suffered heavily from the dismantling policy of the /
Soviet Occupation government. 42/ Because of this policy and because
of military operations in the brown-coal areas, production was 83
million tons in 1945. 43/ This production increased to 109.7
million tons in 1946, Tv but in 1947, production slumped again to
101.7 million tons 45/-is the full impact of the dismantling was
felt. By the end o7-1948, however, the 1947 production loss of
8 million tons had been recovered, and annual production reached
110.8 million tons. 46/
In 1948 a Two Year Plan for 1949 and 1950 was
established, 47/ a preliminary to the first East German Five Year
Plan (1951-55)7 which was stiil.in its formative state. In this
plan, production goals for brown coal were set at 117 million tons
in 1949 and 122.5 million tons in 1950. 48/ In early 1949 there
was doubt in some quarters that these targets would be reached.
By November of 1949, however, it became clear that 1949 production
would equal that planned for 1950. Production figures for the first
9 months of 1949 for the VVBis alone showed an increase in output
of 9.2 percent over the output during the first 9 months of 1948. 49/
* Table 2 follows on p.13.
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Table 2
Production of Hard Coal in East Germany
1936-55
6
Thousand Metric Tons
Year
Actual
Production 50/
Planned Production
Original Revised
1936
1937
1938
1939
190
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
, 1953
1954
1955
3,523
3,694
3,513
3,300 a/
2,934
2,950 a/
2,925 T/
2,820 31/
2,500 7
2,000 V
2;513
2,753
2,848
3,019
2,807
3,200 54/
2,850 7/
3,000 7
3,200 707/
3,300 IV
2,850 52/
3,300 77/
4,000 75/
3,565 77/ 3,000 58/
3,350 7/ 3,275 6.-/
-- 3,500 67/
4,000 64/ 3,500 b7/
a. Estimated average based on reported expected
underfulfilIment of plan by 150,000 tons 59/ and the
sum of actual first half of 1953 production,
1,460,000 tons, and revised productionplan for
second half of 1953, 1,535,000 tons. .0/
.b. Estimate.
For these months there were similar increases in productivity per
worker: 11.8 percent in removal of overburden, 14.5 percent in
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strip mining, and 18 percent in underground mining. 66/ Total
production for 1949 was 124.4 million tons.
On 15 March 1950 the Long-Range Plat, 1949-1958,
Brown Coal Production (Perspectivtplan 19)49-1958, Rohkohlenforderung,
Braunkohlenverwaltung), was drawn up by the Ministry for Heavy
Industry, Main Administration for Coal. This document established
a production figure for 1949 of 122.9 million tons, which had already
been surpassed and was even more than the original target figure
for 1950. 67/ Future goals for the industry showed progressive
annual increases ranging from 4.4 million tons more in 1951 than in
1950 to 21.5 million tons more in 1955 than in 1954. In 1950 the
production of 137.5 million tons 68/ of brown coal was greater than
the planned amount to be extracted during 1951 (132.6 million tons)
and almost reached the quantity planned for 1952 (138.)4 million
tons). In spite of these considerable gains during 1949 and 1950,
the production of 155.6 million tons in 1951 69/ was still not up
to the peak wartime production of 168.7 million tons in 1940. 70/
During 1951, however, the Five Year Plan was revised upward, and the
1955 goal was increased from 205.1 million tons to 225.0 71/ million
tons. There were proportional increases made in planned figures
for 1952 and 1953. Table 3* gives the actual and planned production
of brown coal in East Germany for 1949-55.
Actual production of brown coal in East Germany in
1953 has been inadequately reported, but it is known that difficul-
ties were encountered in the very beginning of the year. During the
first quarter, total .brown-coal production at all brown-coal enter-
prises (excluding mining operations subordinate to the liquid fuel
authorities) was 600,000 tons below plan. That this trend toward
underfulfillment continued into the second quarter is indicated
by the fact that on 28 May increased production norms were introduced
in an attempt to raise production. The Berlin riots of 17 June
were reflected by conditions of general strike in all the brown-coal
fields of East Germany, and it is believed that total production
quotas were not met in the second quarter and that during the same
period output certainly did not approach the production of over 44
million tons achieved in 1952. 72/ The most recent information
indicates that 1953 production was 125.9 percent of 1950 production
a 1953 production of 173,125,000 tons. Another percentage increase
reported is 110 percent of 1952 production. If total production for
1952 is accepted as 173,154,000 (101 percent of plan), this shows a
N.. Table 3 follows on p. 15.
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Table 3
Actual and Estimated Production of Brown Coal in East Germany
1949-55
Million Metric Tons
Year
Actual
Production
Two Year
Plan
Five Year
Plan 73/
Revised Five
Year Plan
1949
124.4 74/
117.0 75/
122.9
1950
137.5 76/
122.5 77/
128.2
1951
1556 78/
132.6
1952
173.187
138.4
171.4 79/
1953
173.1 3/
152.1
174.5 76/
1954
183.6
N.A.
1955
205.1
225.0 81/
a. Estimate
production of 190,469,000, an improbable figure which cannot be reached
by any addition of quarterly or monthly, actual, or average production
figures. It is believed that 110 percent has been applied to total
VVB production in 1952, 158,462,000 tons. Such an application would
place 1953 production in a more favorable light,. .thanwould direct
comparison with total SAG and WB production for 1952. This is a
possible statistical feat, because there were 8 SAG's in the coal
industry, at least statistically, through 1952, and only 2 during
1953. According to Premier Grotewohl, increased brown-coal and
power production is "the foremost and crucial" task of the East
German people in 1954 and 1955. "
Table 4* gives actual, estimated, and planned pro-
dUction of brown coal in East Germany, 1936-55.
The continuous revival of the production of brown
coal through 1952 was achieved in spite of the dismantled condition
of the industry. Production goals were attained largely because it
was possible to overcome unfilled requirements for production equip-
ment by the addition of more labor. 82/
* Table 4 follows on p. 15.
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Table 4
Production of Brown Coal in East Germany
1936-55
Thousand Metric Tons
Year
Production
1936
101,056 83/
1937
114,300
1938
119,647
1939
145,000
1940
168,716
1941
167,000
1942
166,000
1943
165,101
1944
150,000
1945
83,000
1946
109,796
1947
101,713
1948
110,863
1949
124,480
1950
137,510
1951
155,626 84/
1952
173,154 7
1953
173,125 BY
1954
180,000 -6/
1955
190,000 -6/
1955 (Plan)
225,000 'EV
a. An estimate based on production during the first,
second, and third quarters of 1952 plus an estimated
fourth-quarter production of 37.2 million tons. 85/
b. An estimate based on 125.9 percent of 1950. BE/
C. Preliminary estimate.
The extent to which the Russians dismantled the
installations for mining and processing brown coal is unknown, but
it is estimated that 200 million reichsmarks worth of equipment, all
of modern design, was removed from approximately 40 percent of the
mines. The equipment that remained is reported to have placed the
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industry on a productive basis equal to that of the 1880,s. The
installations of the former I.G. Farben mining concerns were dis-
mantled of equipment valued at 104 million reichsmarks (1944). 88/
The first steps toward the reconstruction of the
dismantled areas were taken during 1947. 89/ During 1948, other
mines in Sachsen and Sachsen-Anhalt were restored. 90/ The
cannibalization of remaining equipment and its tran-grer to the most
productive areas (such as Borna and Senftenberg) contrived to
increase production of brown coal. 91/
In addition to the reconstruction and rehabilitation
of certain mines, the development of new deposits also has been
undertaken. According to the Two Year Plan, the opening of 6 new
mines and the expansion of 5 others was to be completed by 1950.
This development was not accomplished until 1952. 92/ The Five
Year Plan provides for the opening of 3 more new mines 93/ and the
expansion of 19 other open-pit mines. 94/ It is noteworthy that
all planned development of brown coal was and is in open-pit mining
rather than in deep mining.
The postwar labor force has almost doubled since the
prewar period, on both the production and office levels. Considera-
ble increase in employment has occurred on the office and controlling
level, causing the same kind of confusion as exists in the hard-coal
industry. It is estimated that because of the serious lack of
machinery and the increase in personnel, the annual productivity per
employee has decreased from 3,400 tons per man-year in 1938 to 1,500
tons per man-year in 1950. 95/ As long as the labor supply is
sufficient to compensate for the decreasing efficiency of the
machinery, production goals will be met. The number of laborers,
however, will have to increase out of proportion to the deficiencies
of equipment, for lack of food and clothing and low morale are
impairing the efficiency of the labor force. The participation of
the labor force in the June strikes is a good example of how in-
creasing the number of employees, under poor working conditions, may
not increase production.
Concurrent with the steadily growing labor force, there
has been a serious shortage in new machinery, hauling equipment, and
spare parts. The only plant technically equipped for the production
of large, open-pit brown-coal excavators is the Lauchhammer Excava-
tor, Conveyor, and Apparatus Construction Plant in Sachsen-Anhalt.
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Production at this plant is limited by the shortage of metals, both
nonferrous and ferrous. 96/ According to Sobottka, chief of the
Main Administration for Coal in 1950, there was a shortage of 10,000
mine cars in that year in the hard-coal and brown-coal industries. 97/
In 1952 there was such a shortage of railroad coal cars that the ?
unshipped piles of extracted coal hampered the operation of mine
equipment. 98/ Since the Western blockade had cut off the legal
procurement of spare parts from West Germany, the official East
German agencies have been obtaining parts illegally but not in
sufficient quantities to fill requirements. 99/
2. Imports and Exports.
a. Imports.
The area which constitutes East Germany has been a
net importer of hard coal and hard-coal coke since before World
War II. At that time the total industrial requirements for hard
coal were 17 million tons, of which more than 13 million were sup-
plied from the Ruhr and Upper and Lower Silesia. 100/ Although
East Germany has made serious efforts to convert industries using
hard coal to the use of brown coal, hard-coal requirements are still
in excess of production. Because of the Western blockade, these
requirements must be filled almost exclusively by imports from
Satellite countries. 101/ Czechoslovakia and Poland are the most
important sources of East German coal imports.
The earliest postwar records of coal imports from
Poland and Czechoslovakia are for 1947 and 1948, and because they
are Polish and Czechoslovak export figures for all of Germany, they
are not conclusive. The decrease in imports from Czechoslovakia in
1948 from those in 1947 is of no great significance; the over-all
tonnages in both instances were small. It is probable that the
distribution of the bulk of the imported Polish coal followed the
traditional prewar distribution pattern of Silesian coal. The des-
tination of the Czechoslovak coal cannot be determined as easily,
but the proximity of the hard-coal fields of Czechoslovakia to the
southern border of East Germany is a possible indicator that this
area was the logical destination. The shipment of a comparable
amount of coal in 1949 to West Germany from Czechoslovakia, however,
offers the other possibility that prior to 1950 all reported
Czechoslovak exports went to West Germany.
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Imports of Polish coal have fluctuated during the
years 1947 through 1953 and reached a postwar high in 1953 with an
estimated delivery total of 5.19 million tons. The peak of Czecho-
slovak exports to East Germany was reached in 1950 with the arrival
of 528,621 tons. 102/ It is evident that the industrial expansion
planned in the Two Year Plan, 1949-50, was beginning to increase
requirements for hard coal for the metallurgical, manufactured gas,
and electric-power industries.
In May and June of 1951 the East German Minister for
Heavy Industry, pressed by the increasing need for coking coal, made
personal visits to Poland and Czechoslovakia in an attempt to assure
increased shipments. 103/ By mid-May of that year, no formal agree-
ment had been signed ;:igh Poland, and Polish deliveries were proceed-
ing at a monthly rate of 2.7 million tons per year, no qualities or
types specified. 104/ The original requested tonnage for this year
was 3.7 million tons, but the actual deliveries were only 2.68
million tons. Czechoslovak deliveries also fell off during 1951,
and no tonnages were reported after the first quarter of the year.
Deliveries from the USSR, which had started in 1949 at the low
figure of 10,000 tons, 105/ increased to 25,500 in 1950, 106/ and
by the end of the first half of 1951 were almost double the total
for 1950. 107/ Planned imports for 1952 and 1953 were 100,000 tons
per year. This coal, however, was of use only to specialized con-
sumers in the manufacture of buna rubber, nitrogen, and electrodes
by SAG plants. In no way did these imports-ease the pressing need
for coking or gas coal. 108/
The probable reason for the falling off of Czechoslo-
vak imports in 1951 was that Czechoslovak production for 1951 was
substantially below plan. 109/ The decrease in imports from Poland
may have been caused by several factors: (1) increased requirements
in Polish industry, (2) increased demand by the USSR for reparations
in the form of coal, and (3) failure of East Germany to supply,
Poland with the desired manufactured items as its part of the bargain
for coal.
In 1952, East German coal imports from the other
Soviet Bloc countries increased considerably over 1951 imports. By
30 September it was reported that 86 percent of the planned imports
for the year had already been received. 110/ The total imports for
1952 are reported to have included 100,000 tons of Donets anthracite
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from the USSR 1171 and at least 23,000 tons of Czechoslovak coal. 112/
The remainder -1;iYg of Polish origin. (See Table-5.)
Plans for 1953 imports of coal originally specified
a quantity of 3,690,000 tons. 113/ In view of the breakdown by
country of origin for 1952, it is presumed that 100,000 tons were
to be Donets anthracite and 90,000. tons were to be Czechoslovak coal,
leaving 3,500,000 tons to be obtained from Poland. A 1953 trade
agreement with Poland provided for Polish delivery of 3.5 million
tons, which bears out the presumption. 114/ The results of the up-
heavals in June had a marked effect on TOTeign coal procurement.
If the then stated promise to make available more brown-coal bri-
quettes for household consumption was to be kept, it became apparent
that the additional quantities of brown coal would have to be with-
drawn from allocations to other consumers, primarily railroads, which
are among the most inefficient consumers of brown coal. These
quantities would therefore have to be replaced by increased coal
imports. 115/ According to Otto GrotewohIls speech in August of
1953, 2 million tons of hard coal were to be supplied to East Germany
by the USSR between 1 September and 30 December 1953. 116/ It has
been reported that this coal was delivered by Poland to the USSR
and then sold to East Germany. 117/ It is believed that bilateral
negotiations for increased deliveries by Poland and Czechoslovakia
had been under way during July and August and that the failure to
arrive at, any acceptable solution precipitated Soviet 'intervention.
In September, Poland was ordered to ship the 2 million tons of coal
forthwith, starting on 26 September. Under these circumstances it
is believed that total imports of hard coal in 1953 would be as
follows:
Metric Tons
Estimated quantity received 1 January
to 1 September 1953 31296,000*_
* This figure is an estimate based on daily freight reports of ,
activity at the border freight stations of Forst, Frankfurt-an-der-
Oder, Horka, Guben, and Kuestrin. Where complete figures are not
available because of discontinuation of .a specific source, monthly
averages have been derived from previous or pursuant monthly data.
This has been done for Forst for the months of June, July, and August.
It should be noted that Kuestrin was not a coal-importing station
until 25 August 1953.
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Metric Tons
Delivery required by USSR from Poland from
1 September through 31 December 1953 2,000,000
Total 5,296,000
The final total of about 5.2 million tons is about
400,000 more than would have been reached had shipments continued
at the monthly rate achieved during the first 8 months of the year
(399,543 tons per month, or 4.8 million tons per year). It is
doubtful, however, whether this rate would have been maintained dur-
ing the harvest months of September and October, or that any more
than planned tonnage of 3,690,000 tons would have been delivered,
in the long run, had not the USSR stepped in.
A study of coal traffic through the border crossing
points at Horka, Guben, and Kuestrin (bituminous coal) and Frankfurt-
an-der Oder (anthracite) reveals a steady rise in the monthly import
rate from Poland through December 1953. It is believed that the
final total of Polish hard coal imported was approximately 5 million
tons.
Plans for '1954 imports of coal are even higher than
those of 1953: bituminous coal, 6,790,000 tons; anthracite, 190,000
tens; and brown coal, 4,250,000 tons. 118/ An actual coal trade
agreement, reported in May 1954, was signed by East Germany, Poland,
and the USSR, but it did not raise the Polish coal quota, which is
still listed as 2.5 million tons. 119/
East German imports of brown coal from Poland cannot
be considered as ordinary imports. They exist only because the
postwar Polish-East German border happens to separate the former
German brown-coal mines of Turow, in Poland, from the traditional
consumer of their product, the Hirschfelde brown-coal briquette
plant in Germany. It is believed that the total output of the mines
is imported by East Germany. A possible explanation of the gradual
decrease in quantity of these imports from 4.2 million tons in 1947
to 3.6 million tons. in 1951 is the gradual exhaustion of the mines.
An alternative explanation is increased local distribution for
civilian consumption. because of the heavy demands of reparations
and industrial requirements upon other Polish coal supplies. It is
estimated that total 1953 imports of brown coal from Poland did not
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exceed 3.5 million tons. The marked decline in imports from West
Germany which occurred in 1952 may be explained by the constantly
tightening border control of personnel and freight.
East German imports of hard coal, by countries of
Origin, are given in Table 5 and of brown coal, in Table 6.*
Table 5
East German Imports of Hard Coal, by Countries of Origin
1948-53
Thousand Metric Tons
Country of
Origin
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
Czechoslovakia 120/
o
1,562.1
o
458.0
2,020.1
di
-
o
2,966.7
10.2
o
2,976.9
528.6
3,389.2
25.5
29.3
3,972.6
450.0 a/
2,686.0
88.0 e/
340.0
3,564.0
30.0 b/
3,856.0 -
100.0 T/
0 -
3,986.0
0
5,196.0 c/
100.0 7/
0 -
5,296.0
Poland 122/
ussR 1237-
West Germany 124/
Total
a. Estimate based on exports through April 1951 of 213,000 tons, or a monthly rate of
approximately 50;000 tons, and an average monthly decrease from May to December of 6,000.
tons to reach the 1952 monthly average of 2,500 tons derived from planned imports of
30,000 tons for the year 1952.
b. Fulfillment expected, as first 6 months showed no backlog. 121/
c. Estimated on basis of daily freight reports. See text above.
d. Estimated to be none.
e. Estimate based on twice the reported figure of 43,800 tons received during the first
half of 1951.
f. Plan.
* Table 6 follows on p. 23.
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_ _ _ _
Table 6
East German Imports of Brown Coal, by Countries of Origin
- 1948-53
Thousand Metric Tons
Country of
Origin
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
Czechoslovakia 125/
a/
5.0
a/
a/
100.0 b/
0 c/
West Germany 126/
1,570.0
1,532.0
1,95'5.0
2,073.0
842.0
0 F/
Poland 127/
4,261.0
3,619.0
3,840.0
3,633.0
3,500.0 c/
3,500 Z./
Total
5,781.0
5,156.0
5,805.0
5,686.0
4,442.0
3,500
a. Negligible.
b. Plan. At the end of 6 months 50,000 tons were Contracted for delivery.
c. Estimate.
b. Exports.
There are no exports of hard coal or brown coal from
East Germany. Exports of brown-coal briquettes are discussed later
in this report. (See III, B, below.)
3. Stocks.
There has been little or no accumulation of coal stocks
in East Germany since World War II. The extreme shortage of hard
coal, the poor storage qualities of brown coal, and the inability
of the transportation facilities to keep the various consuming
industries supplied with more than their most urgent day-to-day
needs have made stockpiling impossible. It is probable that each
consumer has attempted to maintain operational stocks, but the general
tenor of reports has been that, if the day-to-day deliveries did not
pick up, plants would be forced to decrease production or to shut
down. Gasworks and thermal power stations have been particularly
affected, although their total stocks did show a gain in 1949, in-
creasing from 257,407 tons on 1 January 1949 to 295,453 tons on
1 January 2_950. 128/
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A constant effort has been made to maintain railroad stocks
of coal at a safe level. There is little information concerning
operational Or emergency stocks for the railroad prior to December
1949. At that time, however,. there were distributed among the 8
Reichsbahn (Reich Railroad) Directorates sufficient stocks for
20 days of operation.- 122/ By January 1950 these had dwindled to an
amount sufficient for Fi-y 7 .days of operation, 130/ probably as a
result of the heavy traffic in winter, when watertiansport is
curtailed. It is probable that during the winter Of 1950 railroad
coal stocks, continued to decrease and in April were sufficient for
only 2 days of operation. 131/ In February of 1951, stocks were
adequate for 6 days of opeREion at the daily consumption rate of
20,000 metric tons. 132/ By October of that year, Stocks had in-
creased to 320,000 tons, sufficient to cover 14.5 days of operation
at the increased consumption rate of 22,000 tons per day. 222/
During the first quarter of 1952, railroad stocks of coal continued
to increase to 302,780 tons in April, DIA/ enough coal for 15.2 days
of operation. Hard-coal stocks in AprirConstituted 47 percent of
the total. During the summer of 1952, Reichsbahn stocks of coal
fell off again to a 12 days' operational supply. 135/ In order to
forestall any such Shortages as occurred in 1950,-Effe Soviet authori-
ties ordered the Reichsbahn to accumulate; by the end of 1952,
480,000 tons each of brown-coal-briquettes And hard coal, the equiva-
lent to 60 days' requirements. 13.6.11 In November 1952 the Secretariat
of Coal and Power made known the necessity for the construction of
2 large storage sites for 50,000 tons of coal, one at Frankfurt/Oder
and the other at FUerstenberg/Oder. 137/ It is not known Whether these
were to be railroad reserves or'storage places for Polish coal
delivered by water. In any case, there were many indications in
1952 that 60 days' supply for railroads was desired.
Railroad stocks continued to deteriorate during 1953.
The quantity of coal on hand between April and June 1953 ranged
from 8 to 11 days supply, compared with 16 to 17 days' supply
during the same period in 1952.138/ Instead of increasing to a
normal summer reserve of 20 days' operational requirements, stocks
declined to 8 days' supply in July 1953, 139/ 6.4 days' supply in
August, 140/ and 5 days' supply in October. 141/ The supply situa-
tion became increasingly serious when the wiralir started in Novem-
ber and there were stocks sufficient for only 9 days. 142/ The
situation was aggravated by the almost complete converircin of
locomotives to the use of hard coal and the transfer, according to
the 'Mew Coursen plan, of their brown-coal briquette allocations to
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other consumers. 143/ Although increased imports from Poland were
having some effect-13n stocks, they also caused increased operational
requirements. A drop in coal imports from Poland in late December,
however, brought railroad stocks down again to a 7-day level. 144/
During the first 4 months of 1954, railroad coal stocks
continued to decline. To a certain extent it might have been expect-
ed that no noticeable increase would occur in this period. The
constant decline which took place, however, continued from the
coldest month of the year, January, into April. Stocks at the end
of January'were sufficient for 6 days of operation. 145/ The lowest
point was reached on 14 April when stocks were suffiaTint for 4.9
days. 146/ In the following week, a slight increase occurred,
bringing stocks up to 5.6 daysIsupply. 147/ All available informa-
tion indicates a protracted shortage of coal for Reichsbahn opera-
tion during the winter of 1953-54.
C. Consumption.
1. Hard Coal.
Total estimated hard coal available in East Germany for
the years 1947-53 has ranged in quantity from 4.2 million tons to
8.2 million tons, as is shown in Table 7.* Compared to peak prewar
availability conditions, this is a reduction in total available
supplies of from 9 million to 14,8 million tons. Under these
circumstances, it is not surprising that only the most critical con-
suming industries have received supplies. Household heating with
hard coal has ceased, and various attempts have been made to convert
railroads, thermal power stations, and other industries to the use
of brown coal, both in pulverized and briquetted form. Complete
conversion has not been feasible in the metallurgical industry,
particularly in the ferrous metallurgy industry; in certain Chemical
industries, such as the buna-producing and carbide-producing indus-
tries; in gasworks; and in the railroad industry. The conversion to
brown coal in already existing thermal power plants has been fraught
with technical difficulties, but new facilities have been based on
brown coal.
Because available data is inadequate, it is difficult to
estimate the consumption pattern for hard coal during 1953. It is
* P. 271 below.
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expected that in the future, data will show that the bulk of the
increase in available hard-coal supply, from 6.8 million tons in
1952 to 8.2 million tons in 1953, was consumed by the railroads.
This would appear to be an essential result of the channeling of
added brown-coal briquettes to household consumers. It is also
probable that the gasworks which use hard coal may show an increased
consumption.
Consumption of hard coal in East Germany during 194743
increased most notably in the thermal power and gas-manufacturing
industries. This increase is a result of the expanding industrial
requirements for these secondary sources of energy. Through 1951
the increased consumption of hard coal by thermal power plants was
brought about by the rehabilitation of existing thermal power plants
rather than by the construction of any new power plants Which used
hard coal. The relatively static consumption of hard coal by the
metallurgical industry, ranging from 298,000 to 347,000 tons, has
been caused by the limited coking capacities of the industry,and
by the limited supply of suitable coking coal.
In 1948 the first steps were taken toward theconversion
of locomotives from hard-coal firing to raw brown-coal firing. In
May of 1949 the first locomotive using brown coal made a trial run.
Apparently it was decided about this time to convert all locomotives
to raw brown-coal firing. 148/ In April 1952, 72 locomotives had
been converted. Only 32 or-These were in service, however, and the
remainder were under repair. A satisfactory method of using raw
brown coal had not been developed, and the conversion of l000mo-
tives was stopped. As of April 1952, however, the only hard-coal
locomotives Operating in East Germany were those of international
express trains and of freight trains hauling Soviet exports and im-
ports to and from Germany. 149/ Therefore, consumption of hard
coal declined sharply in l9 and the railroads' requirements of
solid fuel were met by brown-coal briquettes. In 1953, reconversion
of all locomotives to hard coal was ordered. In Table 7,* which
gives the estimated consumption of hard coal in EastGermany,
1947-53, allowance has been made for the resulting expected in-
crease in the consumption of hard coal. Because of the great num-
ber of locomotives and the limited facilities for their conversion,
however, it is difficult to estimate the day-to-day increase in
hard coal use. It is indicated that the reconversion'plan was not
Carried out by the end of 1953 as ordered.
* Table 7 follows on 1: 27.
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Table 7
Estimated Consumption of Hard Coal in East Germany
1947-53
Thousand Metric Tons
Consumer
19147
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
Railroad
340 a/
430 151/
720 b/ 152/
800 153/
1,036 c/
635 d/
1,009 e/
Inland Water
46 ?/
64 735/
55- 156/
68 F7-
67/
66
66/
Thermal Power
Gasworks k/
850/
1,100 ?
157/
1,046 E7-
1,271
1,650 TY
2,196
1,850 I/
2,526 --
1,803 TY
3,064
1,750 3/
3,033
1,1400 --
1, 643
High-Tempera-
ture Coke 1/
298
302
319
329
344
347
395
Other
Industry m/
1,626
1,755
1,859
1,737
941
921
2,043
Total
14,260
4,868
'5,996
6,780
6,764
6,836
8,296
a. Estimate based on consumption by the railroads of 8 percent of available hard coal in 1948.
b. Plan figure.
c. Estimate based on average daily consumption of 20840 tons and 365 operational days per year.
d. Estimate based on average daily consumption of 1,736 tons and 365 operational days per year.
e. Estimate based on daily average consumption of 1,736,000 tons for the first 8 months, and a
return to 1951 daily average of 2,840 tons for the last 4 months. This is justified by the order
for reconversion of all locomotives fired by brown-coal briquettes to hard-coal firing by
30 December 1953 and assumed partial compliance with the order.
f. Estimate based on annual consumption by inland water transport of 1.3 percent in 1948,
0.9 percent in 1949, of total available hard coal. 154/
g. Estimate based on past performance.
h. Estimate based on average percentage of consumption by thermal-power stations of 20 percent
of total hard coal available in 1947 and 23.3 percent in 1949. 158/
i. Estimate based on annual kilowatt-hour production by hard coal in 1947 and 1949.
j. Estimate based on an estimated kilowatt-hour production of 25 billion kilowatt-hours in 1953,
93 percent of which was supplied by brown coal in various forms. 159/
and
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Table 7
Estimated Consumption of Hard Coal in East Germany
1947-53
(Continued)
k. Input of hard coal in 'the manufacture of gas Is based on a conversion factor of 350 cubic
meters of gas per.ton of hard coal and the following percentage of gas from plants based on hard
coal: 1948, 63.9 percent (386.195 million cubic meters); 1948, 55 percent (4)4.807 million cubic
meters); 1949, 55 percent (575 million cubic meters); 1950, 55 percent (768.57 million cubic
meters); 1951, 55 percent (883.96 million cubic meters); 19521.55 percent (1,072.5 million Cubic
meters). 160/ _
1. Coal-IEFut for the production of high-temperature coke is derived from the production of.coke-
ancla percentage yield basis as follows: 1947 and 1948, coke yield of 67 percent of coal input,
coke production known; ,1949,52, coke yield of 75 percent of coal input, coke production known
and estimated (see IV, below).
m. A residual figure including the synthetic rubber, carbide, and other industries.
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At the beginning of January 1954, hard-coal imports
from Poland declined, and at the end of the quarter they were con-
siderably lower than they had been during the last quarter of 1953.
Railroad stocks of hard coal immediately registered the lack of
supply, and brown-coal briquette deliveries to the railroads were
increased at the expense of household allocations. 150/ In March
1954 the only locomotives using hard coal were those of the best
passenger trains, and even these were using a half-and-half mixture
of brown-coal briquettes and hard coal.
The use of hard coal for inland water transport in East
Germany is almost negligible, and its slight upward trend, estimated
from 40,000 tons in 1947 to 66,000 tons in 1953, may have been
caused by increased traffic rather than by any increase in the
number of vessels dependent on hard coal.
The consumption of coal by "other industry" fluctuates
with the increase and decline of supplies. If hard coal is not
available, the industries in this group must find other fuel or
must shut down.
2. Brown Coal.
Raw brown coal is consumed in the greatest volume by
the brown-coal briquette industry. Raw brown coal is not an effi-
cient fuel for most purposes. Its low heat value per ton, its
excessive moisture content of 45 to 56 percent, 161/ and its high
friability result in difficult and incomplete combustion. The
manufacture of briquettes from raw brown coal improves its heat
value by drying and reduces friability. It is understandable, there-
fore, that on the average, 72 percent of total production of brown
coal has gone to briquette plants during 1947-53. Each year from
69.8 million to 129 million tons of an inefficient coal, which
cannot even be transported satisfactorily, has been transformed into
26 million to 41 million,tons of a relatively satisfactory fuel.
(See III, below.) In order to maintain an increasing briquette
production, it is believed that the allocations to railroads and
to "other uses" were reduced in 1953.
In 1947, thermal power stations depended upon raw brown
coal for the production.of. approximately 68 percent of the total
kilowatt-hours produced. Thermal power stations consumed about 29
percent of total brown coal available. 162/ From 1949 through 1952
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the consumption of brown coal reached a stable relationship with
the total availability of brown coal, and this relationship is
expected to continue as the capaeity of electric power plants and
the production of brown coal increase proportionally. 163/ In
spite of an increasing consumption of brown coal, totarFequirements
of fuel by these plants have not been met recently. In 1947,
shortages were explained by the failure of the transportation
facilities to deliver the coal. 164/ In 1950, although planned
kilowatt-hour production was allegedly surpassed, electric power
restrictions remained in force. 165/ Early in 1953, thermal power
plant requirements for brown coaniere not filled, possibly because
of transportation difficulties. 166/
The conversion of railroad locomotives to the use of
raw brown coal was tried and proved unsatisfactory. Brown-coal
briquettes are preferred. Because of its high moisture and sulfur
content, raw brown coal has corrosive effects on locomotive boilers.
In addition, during the operation of the locomotive the raw brown
coal tends to break into small pieces which fall through the boiler
grate before combustion is complete. For these reasons, the con-
sumption of raw brown coal by railroads has declined. Brown-coal
briquettes are now used in a tonnage roughly four times that of raw
brown coal. 167/
?
In 1947, approximately 20 percent of the total coal gas
produced in EastGermany was derived from gasworks using brown coal.
Approximately 90 percent of the gas was manufactured at the SAG
Boehlen plant near Leipzig. 168/
A probable explanation of the rise in the allocation of
crude brown coal to "other uses" may be the availability of other
fuels In 1947, brown-coal briquettes were in .short supply, and
crude brown coal was used wherever possible. By 1949 the production
of brown-coal briquettes had increased considerably, and briquettes
were used to replace brown coal. Since 1949 the Western blockade and
general East German industrial expansion have brdught about a coal
crisis which has forced industrieS classified as "other uses" to use.
other types of coal. The use of crude brown coal by these industries
therefore increased from 6.3 million tons in 1950 to 11.9 million
tons in 1951. It is believed that the various plants producing
brown-coal cOke as a byproduct in the manufacture of low-temperature
carbonization tar are included in the "other uses" group. Because
of the complexities of this process and its relationship to the
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SECRET
pynthetic liquid fuel and chemical industries, it is not possible
to make any definite statements of the actual or estimated tonnages
required. The production of brown-coal coke is discussed in IV,
below.
Table 8* gives the estimated consumption of brown coal
in East Germany, 1947-53.
D. Reserves.
1. Hard Coal.,
Reserves of hard coal in East Germany, as estimated for
1951, approximate 88,526,000 tons. Deposits which are currently
being mined, however, had reserves of only 23,196,000 tons and,
according to planned production quotas, were expected to last until
1960. The reserves at the other deposits which constitute the
greater part of the total have not been exploited up to the present
time because of the difficulties encountered in mining operations.
A mine is under construction, however, in this area. The character-
istics of deposits and qualities of coal are discussed in detail
in Appendix B.
Table 9** shows the comparative position of reserves of
hard coal in East Germany in selected years, 1913-51. 169/
2. Brown Coal.
In order of magnitude of reserves, the three brown-coal
areas of East Germany are the Lausitz Field, the Thueringen-Sachsen
Field, and the Braunschweig-Magdeburg Field. It is estimated that
the reserves of brown coal will suffice for 1,000 years at the pro-
duction rate of 200 million tons per year. Table 10*** shows
reserves of brown coal in East Germany as estimated in 1936 and 1947.
A downward correction of 22 percent has been made in the total for
the Lausitz Field in 1936 because of the transfer of part of the
Goerlitz Field to Poland at the end of World War II. A detailed
description of qualities and deposits of brown coal is given in
Appendix B.
* Table -8 follows on.p. 32.
** Table 9 follows on p. 34.
*** Table 10 follows on p. 35.
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Table 8
Estimated Consumption of Brown Coal in East Germany
1947-53
Thousand Metric Tons
Consumer
1947
1948
194.9
1950
1951
1952
1953
Brown-Coal
Briquettes a/
Inland Water
Transport'
Railroads
Thermal
Power e/
Gasworks h/
Chemical
Industry 178/
Othen.Uses7R7
Total
69,758
100 b/
500 zi
30,875 174/
---
78,897
100 b/
.480 712/
90,214
108
430
30,800
869
1,100
6,115
129,636
170/
177/
100,074
93 171/
400 -67-
33,900 f/
931 -
1,500
6,417
143,315
107,577
90b/
- 385 Ti/
38,200 f/
1,071 -
2,000 j/
11,989 -
161,312
122.5902
90b/
440 IT/
42,521 f/
1,180 -
2,300
8,173
177,596
129,046
90 b/
1400 Tv
42,657 g/
1,239
2,301
892
176,625
31,000 175/
176/
108
218 i/
5,459 -
107,018
' 512
1,000
4,655
116,644
---
a. Allocations of brown coal to the brown-coal briquette industry are estimated for
of known and estimated production of brown-coal briquettes and estimated requirement
brown coal for every ton of briquettes.
b. Estimate based *actual consumption in 19149 and 1950.
C. Estimate.
d. Estimate based on daily average consumption by railroads of 1,054 tons
1,210 tons in 1952..
e. Includes raw brown coal and dry brown coal.
f. Estimate based on 1949 performance and extrapolated through 1952.
g. Estimate based on past performance.
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of brown
194/-53 on the basis
of 2.6 tons of raw
coal in 1951, and
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Table 8
Estimated Consumption of Brown Coal in East Germany
1947-53
(Continued)
h. Estimated on the basis of 19 and 19.6 percent of all coal gas produced from brown coal in 1947 and
1949 respectively, at a rate of 300 cubic meters of gas to 1 ton of brown coal. 177/ For 1950-52, 20
percent of total gas production has been used. For total gas produced see V, below.
i. Four times requirements for the fourth quarter of 1947.
j. Estimate based on planned allocation of 2 percent of total 1955 availability to the chemical indus-
try in 1955. ?
k. Residual figure which shows a sharp rate of increase in 1951 and 1952 because of the increased availa-
bility of brown coal in those years and decreased availability of hard coal.
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Table 9
Reserves of Hard Coal in East Germany
Selected years, 1913-51
Thousand Metric Tons
1913 1928 1950 1951
Zwickau
Karl Marx Mine N.A. N.A. 6,557 6,180
Martin Hoop Mine N.A. N.A. 6,969 6,459
August Bebel Mine N.A. N.A. 170 N.A.
Subtotal 85,000 N.A. 13,696 12,639
Lugau-Oelsnitz
Liebknecht Mine N.A. N.A. 7,306 61384
Deutschland Mine N.A. N.A. 4,039 4,000
Subtotal 125,000 150,000 a/ 11,345 10,384
Freital 15,000 6,000 244 173
Gittersee b/ b/ b/ 330
Doberlug-Kirchhain EV EV U/ 65,000
Total 225,000 156,000 25,285 88,526
a. Includes Zwickau Basin reserves.
b. Not known.
III. Fuel Briquettes.
A. General.
In the past 8 years the manufacture of brown-coal briquettes
has been developed to a greater extent in East Germany than in any
other country. In 1951, about 72 percent of the total production of
brown coal was made into briquettes. 179/* Since the end of World
War II, this industry has become vital to the economic life of the
* Using 2.6 tons Of raw brown coal for each ton of briquettes
(1955 Plan)..
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A Table 10
Estimated Reserves of Brown Coal in East Germany
1936 and 1947
Thousand Metric Tons
1936
1947
Lausitz Field
12,771,400
10,405,000
Braunschweig-Magdeburg Field
1,025,700
a/
Thueringen-Sachsen Field
8,738,200
10,01,000
Total
22,535,300
20,632,000
a. Included in reserves of the Thueringen-Sachsen Field.
area. Decreases in supplies of hard coal have compelled many of the
coal-consuming industries and domestic consumers to use the available
brown coal, in raw, pulverized, or briquetted form. 180/ To satisfy?
the demands of industry, domestic consumption of briquettes has
dwindled from a prewar 60 percent 181/ of total production of
briquettes to 8 percent in 1949. The emphasis in the "New Course"
upon the satisfaction of all aspects of demand for consumer goods,
however, leads to the belief that in the future greater allocations
of briquettes will be made to householders.
B. Supply.*
The production of brown-coal briquettes increased steadily
after 1946 and reached an estimated 49.2 million tons in 1953.
(See Table 11.**) This total surpasses the wartime high of 44,619,000
tons in 1943. 182/ Output of 26,837,000 tons in 1947 was only 60
percent of tha-1-31 1943. 183/ This decrease was the result of
postwar chaos lasting through 1946-47 and the dismantling program
carried out on both mines and plants by the USSR. 194/ The most
serious effect of the dismantling program was decreased production
of coal, Which, in turn, limited the quantity of brown coal available
for briquettes. The briquette plants themselves have been severely
affected by the stopping of machine imports from West Germany since
the establishment of the blockade in 1948. The replacement of worn-
out equipment, chiefly molds and presses, 185/ has been curtailed,
* Because East Germany does not import fuel briquettes, total
supply is limited to production.
P. 37, below.
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and production of briquettes has been retarded. For example, in
1949, only 71 percent of the 1938 stocks of briquette presses was
available. 186/
In 1950 the Planning Commission of East Germany envisaged
an increase in total production of brown-coal briquettes to 38,195,000
tons in 1952 187/ and to 56 million tons in 1955. In 1949-and 1950,
production goals were surpassed by a considerable amount. Had the
plan figutes for 1951 remained Unchanged from the original Perspectiv-
plan, 1953, production would have surpassed the plan by approximately
7711lion tons. Encouraged by past performance in 1949 and 1950,
however, the government increased the 1951 goal from 36.5 million
to 41.7 million tons 188/ and on 10 August 1950, introduced
measures for increased mechanization. The actual production, did
not quite reach the revised target, a fact which indicated that some
difficulty was experienced in attempts to increase the mechanization
of the briquette plants. 189/ Original plans for 1952 were increased
in early 1952 from 38 million tons 190/ to 47.2 million tons. 191/
Estimated production of brown-coal briquettes for 1952, based on
100 percent achievement of plan, was about 47.3 million tons. 192/
Production in 1953 did not reflect the downward trend of production
of brown coal but continued upward to an estimated:49.6 million
tons, 193/ about 300,000 tons over the planned 490 million tons. 194/
It is believed that a slowing up in annual production gains will
continue because of shortages of machinery, and it is improbable
that the planned achievement for 1954 will be reached. ,^nnual
increases in production during 1950-53 have averaged 3.5 million
tons. At this rate of increase, output in 1955 could be approximately
56.0 million tons, equal to planned tonnage for that year.
. Table 11* gives estimated production of brown-coal briquettes
in East Germany, 1938, 1943, 1946-53, and 1949-55 :plans.
Concurrent with the drive to increase production, there has
been a tendency to allow the moisture content of the briquettes to
increase, thereby decreasing their over-all efficiency and increas-
ing the net weight. This has occurred, probably, through shortening
of the process in order to teet output goals. Cognizant of this
condition, the State Planning Commission has decided upon a recon-
struction, expansion, and conversion profzram which will involve
changes in 17 briquette plants. 195/
*
Table 11 follows on p. 37.,
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Table 11
Estimated Production of Brown-Coal Briquettes in East Germany
1938, 1943, 1946-53, and 1949-55 Plans
-Thousand T,fetric Tons.
Year
Production
1938
1943
1946
1947
1948
1949 Plan
1949
1950 Plan
1950
1951 Plan
1951
1952 Plan
1952
1953 Plan
1953
1954 Planla
1955 Plan
30,334 196/
44,619 T97/
28,912 1-_7/
26,830 199/
30045 T65/
33,310 20f/
202'
34,698/
35,058 203/
38,490 TOT/
41,700 755/
1 7
1417:270 37/
(/
47,270 TM/
49,350 27/
4,10 211 /
536:000 77;
5960
/
a. Estimate based on l05 percentof .1952 production. 210/
Theproduct of these factories, fine-grain briquettes, will
have a water content of only 10 percent, compared with a water con-
tent of not less than 12 percent 213/ and usually from 14.4 to 18
percent 214/ in the product of unconverted plants. It is believed
that the conversion and reconstruction will involve the introduction
of better drying apparatus and grinding or pulverizing machines.
The briquettes produced by the converted plant S should be more
efficient as fuel. Because of uniformity of .size of the coal
particles prior to manufacture, they will have a lower moisture con-
tent and reduced friability. Substitution of the new briquettes
in locomotives alone was :expected to result in a 15.5-percent saving
in fuel, 265,000 'tons' in 1952 and 530,000 tons in 1953. 215b AnOther
purpose in the production of these briquettes is to obtain a fuel
suitable for the production of brown-coal metallurgical coke at
Lauchhammer.
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C. Consumption.
1. Internal.
The consumption pattern of brown-coal briquettes in East
Germany was radically changed during the postwar years. Before
World war 11, 60 percent of total production was consumed in house-
hold use 216/; in 1949, only 8 percent was so used. A distribution
pattern for 1949 was reported as follows: 23 percent, railroads;
22 percent, production of synthetic fuel; 20 percent, thermal power
stations; and 8 percent, domestic use. The remaining 27 percent
was used for export and by the occupation powers. 217/
Table 12* shows the estimated consumption pattern of
brown-coal briquettes in East Germany for 1947-53. Specific in-
formation on the consumption pattern of the solid fuel industries
is scarce, and with a few modifications and exceptions, the alloca-
tions to the five main consumer groups have been made on the basis
of repotted 1949 percentages and requirements of consuming industries.
The railroad consumption figure for 1948 is an actual and official
figure Which was presented simultaneously with the quantity planned
for 1949. 218/ Railroad consumption for 1950, 1951, and 1952 is
based on daTly average consumption rates for those years. Conver-
sion of railroad locomotives from brown-coal briquettes to hard coal
late in 1953 may have released appreciable quantities of briquettes
for domestic heating during the winter months, heretofore a period
of short fuel supply.
The input of brown-coal briquettes into the synthetic
fuel industry has been calculated on the basis of 22 percent of the
total production as given for 1949. Provision has been made for an
increase in production in this industry (Of 73 percent for the
Boehlen Combine alone) since the outbreak of the Korean war by
increasing the input percentage to 23 percent in 1950, to 25 percent
in 1951, and to 32 percent in 1952. 219/ The final figure of 13,280,000
tons is considered sufficient to produce the-increase in synthetic
fuel production of 1.8 'million tons claimed for 1952 over 1949.
The estimates of consumption of brown-coal briquettes
by the thermal power stations of East Germany for 1949-52 are based
upon zonal plant operating reports for 1949 prorated over the balance
* Table 12 follows on p. 39.
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Table 12
Estimated Consumption of Brown-Coal Briquettes in East Germany, by Major Consumers
1947-53
Consumer
1947
1948
Railroads
6,000 a/
6,097 a/ 220/
Synthetic
Fuels
5,902 c/
6,676 c/
Thermal Power
Stations
3,000 e/
3,000 e/
Domestic 222/
2,146
2,427 T/
Other Uses
7,834 T/
10,403 i/
Total 24,882
28,603
19)49
6,820 ?a/
7,633 c/ 221/
3,452 e/
2,776 lc/
11,491 -g"/
32,172
Thousand Metric Tons
1950
1951
1952
1953
6,022 a/
9,237 2/
6,113 a/
11,715 c/
6,205 a/
14,181 c/
5,165 b/
15,230 d/
3,893 e/
4,382 e/
4,835 e/
5,508 e/.
2,694 ?/
3,103 ?/
4,300 ?/
5,022723/
13,039 701
13,921 i"/
15,058 -Ey
16,528
34,614
39,234
44,579
41,513
a. Estimate based on daily consumption by the Reichsbahn of 16,500 tons per day in 1950; 16,750
tons per day in 1951; 17,000 tons per day in 1952; and 365 operational days per year.
b. Estimate based on an increase in hard-coal consumption by the railroads thus releasing brown-
coal briquettes,in the Approximate ratio of 3 tons of briquettes to 1 ton of hard coal'.
c. Estimate based on the consumption of 22 percent of total production of brown-coal briquette pro-
duction by the synthetic fuel industry in 1949, increasing to 30 percent in 1952.
d. Estimate based on a 7.4 percent increase in production of synthetic fuel in 1953 over 1952 and
the application of the same percent to the consumption of brown-coal briquettes by the industry.
e. Tonnages for thermal power plants include brown-coal briquette Chips. These estimates were
made on the following premises:
1. Thermal power production as follows: 1947, 13.0 billion kilowatt-hours; 1948, 14.7 billion
kilowatt-hours; 1949, 16.3 billion kilowatt-hours; 1950, 18.4 billion kilowatt-hours; 1951, 20.7
billion kilowatt-hours; 1952, 22.8 billion kilowatt-hours.
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Table 12
Estimated Consumption of Brown-Coal Briquettes in East Germany, by Major Consumers
1947-53
(Continued)
2. Brown-coal briquettes and briquette caps account for approximatel:y 17.2 percent of all
thermal power produced. .
3. One kilowatt-hour equals 1.295 kilograms of brown-coal briquettes, or 1.79 kilograms of
brown-opal briquette chips.
f. Estimate based on household consumption of 8 percent of total production of brown-coal briquettes,
decreasing to 7 percent in 1952.
g. A residual figure.
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of the industry and. projected beyond 1947 on the basis of kilowatt-
hour production estimates. In Table 14, the difference between
the given quantities and 20 percent of total production has been
included with that attributed to other industries. It is believed
that the difference may be explained by the fact that a number of
power stations are in operation solely for the benefit of certain
plants and do not contribute to the electric c.rid.
In 1949, only 8 percent of the total production of
brown-coal briquettes was used in domestic consumption. According
to a report dated 1951, as the production of synthetic fuel has
risen, the domestic consumption of brown-coal briquettes has declined.
For 1950-52, therefore, it, is estimated that domestic consumption
used 7 percent of total production. Information dated January 1953
indicated that the fuel distribution system had collapsed and,
according to the journal Neues Deutschland, had become "alarming
and menacing." The allocation Of 5 hundredweight of brown-coal
briquettes per person, made earlier in the winter of 1952, had
been completely exhausted by January 1953, 225/ and free shops (as
distinct from State Trade Organization stores 7 had been forbidden
to sell coal for household use.* Information dated August 1953
revealed the allocation of approximately 1 million more tons of
brown-coal briquettes for household use in 1953 than in 1952. The
exact amount received, however, is not known and would depend
largely on the amounts made available through conversion of brown-
coal locomotives to hard,-coal use. 226/
Recent experiments have undertaken to prove the
feasibility of using brown-coal briquettes as a raw material for the
manufacture of metallurgical coke. .The apparently successful experi-
mental work at VEB Gaswerk Delitzsch, Bitterfeld, resulted in
plans to remodel the two briquette plants at Lauchhammer according
to the proven specifications. It was planned that these 2 plants
would have a capacity of )4,700 tons of brown-coal briquettes per
day. Of this production, 4,200 tons were to be used to produce
2,000 tons of metallurgical coke per day. The coke Was to be used
for low-shaft blast furnaces in the iron and steel industries and
in the chemical industries. The planned date of completion was
1 January 1953. 227/
domestic consumption in 1953
increased to 10 percent of total production.
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2. Exports.
Table 13* shows the estimated quantity and the destina-
tion of East German exports of brown-coal briquettes for 1946-53.
In the majority of cases, figures for 1946-50 are data supplied by
importing countries. Quantities exported to the USSR are estimated
from the knowledge that 65,000 tons in July and 61,000 tons in
August 1948 were shipped through Rostok and that, in addition,
a considerable quantity probably was shipped by rail. In 1952 the
major importers of East German brown-coal briquettes were West
Germany (including West Berlin), Sweden, Poland, and the Netherlands.
The planned total export figure for 1951 was 2.4 million
tons. Reported totals for other years are not available, and the
data by countries of destination are fragmentary.
Indications of which briquette plants supply the export
quotas for which country are not conclusive or complete.
IV. Coke.
A. General.
Production of coke in East Germany maybe divided into
three categories: metallurgical coke derived froM hard coal at the
August Bebel and Karl Marx cokeries in the Zwickau and Lugan-
Oelsnitz coal basins; gas coke derived from hard coalat municipal
gas plants; and brown-coal coke or char produced at low-temperature
carbonization plants. In the latter two categories, the gases, oils,
and tars are the products of primary importance, and the coke pro-
duced may be considered a byproduct. Estimated production of coke
in East Germany, 1947-55, is given in Table 14.**
B. Supply.
1. Production.
According to the Five Year Plan, metallurgical coke is
of primary importance to the expansion of the East German economy.
* Table 13 follows on p. 43.
** Table 14 follows on p. 44.
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Table 13
Estimated East German Exports of Brown-Coal Briquettes, by Countries
1947-53
of Destination
Thousand Metric Tons
Country
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
Austria 228/
0 a/
0
0
4.7
321.0
187.0
20.0
Belgium 229/
0
0
0
0
7.0
1.0
N.A.
Czechoslovakia 230/
0.1
o
0.1
137.5 b/
N.A.
300.0 c/
300.0 d/
Denmark 233/
248.0
0
199.0
259.0 -
103.0
211.0
N.A.
Finland 234/
0
0
0
0
11.0
45.0
50.0 e/
France 2757
0
0
0
0
102.0
52.0
N.A.
Italy 2367
0
0
0
0
0
N.A.
Netherlands 237/
0
0
0
0
0
N.A.
Norway 238/ 7-7
12.0 f/
25.0
10.0
0
27.0
141.0
N.A.
Poland 737/
0
8.0
600.0
106.0
N.A.
N.A.
Sweden 747/
688.0
175.0
3.0
5.0
537.0
494.o
100.0 g/
USSR 2L
300.0
1,200.0
1,508.0
2,120.0
0
N.A.
N.A.
West Germany 242/
N.A.
123.0
6.0
604.0
329.0
813.0
650.0 g/
West Berlin 2E37
200.0
211.0
200.0
640.0
405.0
546.4 h/
1,000.0 i/
?
Total
1,948.1
1,742.0
2,526.1
3,876.2
2,142.0
2,690.14
2,120.0
a. Assumed none.
b. East Germany failed to deliver 162,504 tons of contracted agreement. It is believed that
planned exports were to be approximately 300,000 tons. 231/
c, Estimate based on 1951 deliveries.
d. According to reports, 6,640 carloads (136 trains) of brown-coal briquettes Passed through
Bad Schandau to Czechoslovakia between 1 March and 31 May 1953, and 1,920 carloads (42 trains)
passed through the same station between 21 September and 10 October 1953. Reports for inter-
vening periods show no shipments of brown-coal briquettes, althOugh some may have been in-
cluded in trains corposed of mixed cargoes. Assuming that each car averaged 22 tons, reported
shipments amounted to more than 200,000 tons. In view of 1951 and 1952 performance, total
annual shipments of 300,000 tons are estimated. 232/
e. Estimate based on 6 months, reported deliveries.
f. Believed to be reparations to the USSR from East Germany, then exported to Norway.
g. Plan.
h. As of 21 December 1952, 546,380 tons of the agreed amount of 700,000 tons specified for
delivery between 1 August and 31 December 1952 had been delivered. There were no deliveries
between 21 and 31 December 1952. 244/
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Table 14
Estimated Production of Coke in East Germany
1947-55
Thousand Metric Tons
Year
Metallurgical
Coke
Gas Coke
Low-Temperature
Carbonization Coke
All Coke
Total
VVB
SAG
Total
1947 245/
224
227
241
254
262
264
296 h/
N.A.-
N.A.
600
970 b/
1,112 -
1,365
1,440
1,660
1,910 i/
2,080 EV
2,260 F/
244
287
332
335
357 e/
420 -6/
3,734 -S/
N.A.
N.A.
2,756 a/
3,213 C-/
4,415 Z./
4,715 Fi
5,000 F/
5,354 Ey
2,220 Tc/
N.A.
N.A.
3,000
3,500
4,748
5,050 d/
5,357 T/
5,774 "i"/
5,954 -
N.A.
N.A.
3,824
4,697
6,100
6,669
7,059
7,698
9,160
1948 246/
1949 771
1950 248/
1951 747/
1952 27/
1953 7-51/
1954
1955
a, Estimate based on given figure for total production of low-tempera-
ture carbonization coke and VVB production.
b. Estimate.
c. Estimate based on given figures for total and VVB production of
low-temperature carbonizationicoke.
d. Estimate based on 6 months' actual production of 2,529,924 tons of
low-temperature carbonization coke.
e. Plan.
f. Estimate.
g. Estimate based on 6 months' production and a planned annual production
of 5,487,000 tons.
h. Estimate based on twice 6 months' production of 148,000 tons.
i. Estimate based on twice 6 months' production of 955,300 tons.
j. Estimate based on twice 6 months' production'of 1,867,000 tons.
k. Estimate based on twice 6 months! production of 1,110,000 tons.
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4 Its domestic manufacture, however, is ?severely limited by the supply
of coking coal. East Germany has never been able to fill its own
needs for coking coal. In 1937, 3.7 million tons of coking coal
were imported, and in 1938, 7.9 million tons were imported. 252
Since the war, production has increased slowly, and every ef ort has
been made to increase imports. Since East Germany has been isolated
from any Western source by the blockade, Czechoslovakia and Poland
have become the principal sources of imports of coke and coking coal.
It has been estimated that in 1952 metallurgical coke
produced in East Germany represented a 76-percent yield from the
input of coal. This is a 0.5-percent increase over the yield of
75.5 percent in 1949 and a 1-percent increase over the yield in
1946. This increase in yield could have been attained either by
an improvement in the quality of the coal used or by an improvement
in operating methods and coking cycles as the coking capacity was
increased. The gain in coking capacity would have resulted from
the repairs to war-damaged plants, estimated to have had 30 percent
?of total prewar capacity. 253/
Gas coke is produced from hard coal in East Germany in
approximately 205 gasworks. 254/ Before World War II, there were
approximately 228 such plants, but because of war damages and hard
coal shortages, the number of plants in operation was reduced to
about 177 in 1949. .W./ Imports of coal from Poland and Czechoslo-
vakia facilitated the return to operation of the most important
plants, particularly those in Brandenburg and Mecklenburg. Of
these plants, 26 are under Zonal administration. 254/ The yield of
gas coke from the coal input has been estimated iFT7 percent for
the years 1947 and 1948 and at 69.5 percent thereafter until 1955,
when, it is expected, a yield of 69.7 percent will result from the
improved facilities.
Brown-coal coke, or char, is obtained in the low-
temperature carbonization process by which the gases and tars are
produced for use in the production of synthetic fuels and chemicals.
There are at least 11 plants in East Germany: Boehlen, Deuben,
Deutzen, Edderitz (Bitterfeld), Espenhain, Groitzschen (leuselwitz),
Hirschfelde (delzow), Kulkwitz (1953), Nachterstedt, Profen, and
Rositz. It has been reported that approximately a 50-percent yield
of coke, or char, is obtained for every ton of dry or briquetted
brown coal charged. Of this char, only that which is in excess of
the consuming capacity of the plants is made available for outside
consumption. 257/
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Perhaps the most ambitious undertaking in the Five Year
Plan has been the construction of the Lauchhammer brown-coal
metallurgical-coke plant. Itis believed that this plant has been
constructed according to specifications drawn up by Professors
Rammler and Bilkenroth of the Freiburg Mining Academy. 258/ The
proposed plant was to consist of 20 batteries of coke furnaces,
each having 24 chambers. The daily capacity was to he 2,000 tons
of coke, an annual capacity of 650,000 tons. The plant is located
adjacent to the Lauchhammer briquette plant, VEB Senftenberg.
The primary requirement of the process is a special
type of brown-coal briquette known as a fine-grain briquette, Which
must be low in tar, sulfur, and ash content. 259/ Briquettes of
fine-grain texture are needed to obtain a fuerTharge with evenly
distributed moisture content, which prevents disintegration of the
briquettes during coking. After the coking process, the charge is .
cooled slowly for 16 hours. The techniques involved were perfected
at the Delitzsch experimental plant.
The original date of initiation for the Lauchhammer
brown-coal metallurgical-coke plant was to have been 1 March 1952,
260/ but because of material shortages, it was delayed until June
191,2. 261/ At that time, one .oven unit consisting of 4 ovens:of
6 coke chambers each was put into operation. In February 1953,
another oven unit was completed, and in March a fourth ovcn was
brought into production. During 1953, there were continuous com-
plaints of the inadequacy of the coke thus produced for use in.
blast furnaces. The primary problem has been insufficient structural
hardness of the coke. The result is that the coke crushes and
settles under the weight of the iron ore and limestone charge in
the blast furnace and thus inhibits the passage of hot air up through
the charge. 262/ Another defect of the brown-coal hard coking
process has been the failure to obtain an adequate amount of coke of
the proper size (over 30 mm) per input of brown-coal briquettes.,
Experimental use of the Remmler-Bilkenroth method showed a yield
of 60 to 85 percent of coke of 30 mm and larger. 263/ Actual
practice at Lauchhammer has produced only a 30 percent yield of
these sizes, and even that is usable only in conjunction with
hard-coal metallurgical coke. 264/
In view of these defects in the method, it is not diffi-
cult to understand why there have been rumours of the imminent clos-
ing down of the plant. 265/ It is believed, however, that this will
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not actually occur, for the byproduct yield is good, and there have
been plans for further development of the tar, oil, and coal-gas
potential of the plant. Even though inadequate as metallurgical
coke, the brown-coal coke obtained is superior to ordinary brown-
coal coke as a fuel. 266/
Before the failure of the process had become apparent,
optimistic production plans had been drawn up. Annual production
was to range from an initial 300,000 tons in 1952, to 1,200,000 tons
in 1955. 267/ Planned production in 1953 was 375,000 tons. By the
end of September, however, total deliveries to metallurgical plants
had reached only 63,500 tons, and last-quarter deliveries of only
21,000 tons were predicted. 268/
2. Imports.
Metallurgical coke is, apparently, the only grade of
coke imported by East Germany. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the
USSR have been the primary external sources of metallurgical coke
for East Germany since 1948, and imports have increased since that
time. The coke is required to fulfill the plans for the expansion
of the East German ferrous metals industry. The plans propose to
raise the 1950 production level by 253.6 percent by 1955. 269/ The
year of peak imports since World War II was 1950, when 1.7 million
tons were obtained from the other Satellites. Polish exports to
East Germany showed a decline from 1,074,000 tons in 1950 to
836,000 tons in 1951, probably because of increased Polish domestic
requirements. Planned Polish exports to East Germany in 1952 were
800,000 tons. 270/ This decrease in Polish coke did not pass un-
noticed by the Germans. Premier Grotewohl wrote to Polish Premier
Cyrankiewicz in NOvember 1951 in an effort to speed up delivery and
improve the quality of the coke delivered. 271/ Toward the end of
1951, neither the grades nor the quantities of coke delivered had
been those specified in the contract. Instead of 90,000 tons from
Dolny Slask, only 19,184 were delivered; and instead of 100,000
tons from Gorny Slask, only 62,144 tons were delivered. In addition,
the deliveries were so inadequately sorted and the coke was of such
poor quality that there was danger of explosions in the blast furnaces.
During the years 1950, 1951, and 19521, East German
imports of coke from Czechoslovakia have increased from 348,000 tons
in 1951 to a planned amount of 670,000 tons in 1952. 272/ Imports
from the USSR have been more or less constant in the past 3 years
at about 250,000 tons.
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Planned East German imports of metallurgical coke for
1953 have been reported variously as 1,750,000 tons 273/ and 2,350,000
tons. 274/ In view of actual imports in previous,years, it is
believed that the smaller figure is the mOre plausible one. This
quantity has been broken down by countries of origin as follows:
Metric Tons
Poland 900,000 )
Poland (for USSR) 250,000 ) 1,150,000
Czechoslovakia 600,000
Total 1,750,000
The possibilities of these coke imports actually material-
izing, however, are somewhat remote. Table 15* gives estimated East
German imports of metallurgical coke, by countries of origin, 1947-
53. Those estimates are based on a study of day-to-day freight-
station traffic over a period of from 6 to 8 months. They indicate
a deficit in imports from Poland of 610,000 tons and an overage in
imports from Czechoslovakia of 25,000 tons. There are no specific
indications as to what part of the Polish coke thus far delivered
is on Soviet account, but an estimate of the total deficit, based
on available statistics, approaches 600,000 tons.
C. Consumption.
Table 16** gives estimates of the consumption of metallurgical
and gas coke as an input requirement for the ferrous metals and
calcium carbide industries in East Germany.
The State Planning Commission of the German Democratic
Republic publishes an annual plan of production, import, availability,
and distribution of all raw materials and sources of energy, in-
cluding coke. Unfortunately, these plans are broken down by admini-
strative rather than industrial recipients. In the plans, plants
Of the same industry, but controlled by several administrative
units, appear under different allocations. This is particularly
true of the production of calcium carbide, of which from 85 to 90
percent is believed to have been a SAG product. The coke requirement
* Table 15 follows on p. 49.
** Table 16 follows on p. 50.
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Table 15
Estimated East German Imports of Metallurgical Coke, by Countries of Origin
1947-53
Thousand Metric Tons
Country
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
Czechoslovakia 275/
a/
143 e/
N.A.
317 j/
462
79 b/
297 -
N.A.
0
376
404
725
102
0
1,231
348
1,074
233
46
1,701
417
836
252 h/
N.A.
1,505
670 c/
785 Y/
207 I/
0 T
1,662
625 d/
540 g"/
N.A.
N.A.
1,165
Poland 277/
USSR 28d-/-
West Germany 281/
a. Negligible.
b. Czechoslovak exports to "all Germany" but believed to be to East Germany only.
c. Planned and contracted for delivery; 6-month figure shows no backlog.
d. Estimate based on a known import of 16,950 carloads of coke during the period
1 March to 30 September 1953 through the freight station at Bad Schandau (or 339,000
tons at 20 tons per carload) and an estimated average import of 3,000 carloads during
January, February, October, November, and December 1953. 276/
e. Polish exports to "all Germany" but believed to be to East Germany only.
f. Estimate based on delivery of 73.5 percent (588,000 tons) of agreed total of
800,000 tons by 30 September 1953, making an average monthly delivery of 65,000
tons. 278/
g. Estimate based on total deliveries from 1 January to 30 September 1953 of.
413,336 tons and an average monthly delivery of 41,666 tons for October, November, and
December 1953. The monthly average for the last quarter is considerably lower than
those for the first and second quarters: first quarter, 53,776 tons; second quarter:
43,667 tons. It is, however, approximately equal to the third quarter monthly
average of 40,335 tons. The monthly import figures show a steady decline from
January through September. 279/
h. Plan.
i. Total deliveries through 30 September 1953 were 7,000 tons in excess of plan.
It is not believed likely that any further deliveries would have been made, although
it is possible there were.
j. Estimate based on total West German exports of Coal and coke of 1,577,600 tons
broken down on an assumed ratio of 80 percent coal to 20 percent coke. 282/
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Table 16
Estimated Consumption of Coke by the Metallurgical and
Carbide Industries in East Germany a/
1948-51
Thousand Metric Tons
1948
1949
1950
1951
Ferrous Metallurgy
Pig Iron
b/
(299.0)
(398.0)
(415.0)
Iron Casting
(65.4)
(101.6)
(128.6)
(148.0)
Subtotal
N.A.
400.6
526.6
563.0
Calcium Carbide
247.4
317.4
380,8
407.0
Other Uses
1,260.2 c/
14867.0 .c.t
2,336.6 2.1
2,237.0 c/
Total
Availability
1,573.0
2,585.0
3,244.0
3,207.0
a. These consumption figures are -Based on the tonnage produced
by each industry. The conversion factor for pig iron production
is 1.2; for iron castings, 0.2; for calcium carbide, 0.6.
b. Included in "Other Uses.?
c. Residual figure.
for the production of calcium carbide in SAG plants would necessarily
be included with that of total SAG requirements and would not be
included with that of the State Secretariat for Chemicals. Table
17* shows the planned availability of metallurgical, gas, and low-
temperature carbonization coke in East Germany for the year 1952,
according to official plan. Table 18** shows planned and actual
consumption of metallurgical, gas, and low-temperature carboniza-
tion coke in East Germany for the first 6 months of 1953.
* Table 17 follows on p. 51.
** Table 18 follows on p. 52.
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#
Table 17
Planned Availability of Metallurgical, Gas, and Low-Temperature
Carbonization Coke in East Germany 283/
1952 .
Thousand Metric Dins
Metallurgical Low-Temperature
Recipient Coke Gas Coke Carbonization Coke
Percent Percent Percent
of Total of Total of Total
State Secretariat
for Coal and Energy 19.2 1 288.3 18 515.6 9.0
Ministry for
Metallurgy 1,220.0 60 85.2 5 , 6.9 0.1
State Secretariat
for Chemicals 108.6 5 107.5 6 437.6 7.5
SAG's 570.5 27 604.5 37 4,127.0 71.0
Provinces 50.2 2 357.0 22 143.4 2.4
Other 106.6 5 190.3 12 579.0 10.0
Planned
Availability 2,075.1 100 1,632.8 100 5,809.5 100.0
V. Coal Gas.
A. General.
Before World War II the area which is now East Germany
produced a relatively small share of the total coal gas produced in
Germany. Of approximately 15 billion cubic meters produced in 1940,
only about 1.2 billion were produced in the area now constituting
East Germany. There were two basic reasons for this: (1), the
concentration of German heavy industry, the largest consumer of
coal gas, in the western regions of Germany near sources of coal;
and (2), the scarcity in the eastern regions of Germany of coals
suitable for the production of gas. In 1948, approximately four-
fifths of the distributed gas in West Germany was consumed by trade
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Table 18
Planned and Actual Consumption of Metallurgical, Gas, and
Low-Temperature Carbonization Coke in East Germany 284/
First Six Months of 1953
Thousand Metric Tons
Recipient
Metallurgical
Coke
Gas Coke
Low-Temperature
Carbonization Coke
State Secretariat
Planned
Actual
Planned
Actual
Planned
Actual
for Coal and Energy
0
o
145
172
341
320
State Secretariat
for Metallurgy
715
861
42
114
State Secretariat
for Chemicals
)
41
65
29
934
930
Ministry for
) 60
lo
8
25
Reconstruction
)
10
8
25
Ministry for Light
Machine Building
70
49
44
40
24
24
Ministry for
Industry
0
o
14
31
143
148
VEBts (former SAG1s)
288
123
311
389
1,416
1,440
Local Industry
25.8
23
185
128
55
51
Trade
o
o
o
o
21
31
Other Users
53.2
15
103
28
12
16
Export
0
0
0
0
14
25
Total
1,212.0
1,123
917
156
2,960
2,985
and industry, whereas in 1947 only an estimated one-third of total
gas produced in East Germany was so consumed and the remaining
two-thirds went to domestic and governmental users. 285/ By 1950,
however, industrial consumption exceeded domestic consumption in
East Germany.
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?
As a result of this large domestic consumption, the pattern
of the pre-World War IT gas industry in East Germany was one of
a great number of small gas plants located close to areas of consump-
tion in the many towns. The size of each gas plant was determined
by the size of the town. Until 1947, most of these plants were
operated by public authorities as communal undertakings. When the
German Democratic Republic was established in 1947, all gasworks
were nationalized, except the Grossgaswerk at Boehien, near Leipzig,
which became part of the Soviet SAG Boehlen, Operation of the gas-
works has always been controlled by the Main Administrator for
Energy of the Ministry for Heavy Industry and by its successors.
Gas supply and investment planning have been handled by the State
Planning Commission. By 1950, however, the gas plants had not been
consolidated in VVB's, as had the plants in other industries, but
had been placed under the administration of the pertinent provincial
bodies. The only exceptions were the gas plants in the neighborhood
of Leipzig, which were joined in the Long-distance Gas Union
(Ferngasverband). 286/
Future plans for the coal-gas industry include the establish-
ment of large production installations suitable for the recovery
of all byproducts. The long-distance distribution of the gas is
to be effected by means of an efficient net paralleling the electric-
power grid. These projects are both to be completed by the end of
the Five Year Plan in 1955. Because of the extreme shortage of
materials such as pipes, sheets (steel plate), machines, appliances,
and apparatuses, plan fulfillment is believed improbable. 287/
B. Supply.
1. Production.
There are three types of gasworks in East Germany. The
most important, in both number and volume of output, are those which
use hard coal. In 1947, as ?in pre-World War II years, there were
228 of these plants in existence, but because of the extremely tight
coal supply both in Nest Germany and in East Germany, only 171 of
them were in operation. 288/ War damage and Soviet dismantling
were also factors contributing to the shutdown of certain plants.
By 1950, in spite of the Western blockade of coal supplies, increased
imports from Poland and Czechoslovakia had permitted the reopening of
additional gasworks, bringing the total of hard-coal gasworks up
to 205. During the war the largest of all of these plants, the
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Grossgaserei Magdeburg-Rothenberg, lost about 50 percent of total
installation by bombing and 25 percent through dismantling. By the
beginning of 1951, 75 percent of its original capacity was again
functioning, and complete restoration and modernization are planned
for 1955. 289/ It is not known whether or not it is planned to
reconstruct and repair the remaining plants.
In 1950, in addition to the hard-coal gasworks, there
were only 4 other installations producing gas in East Germany.
Two of these were based on brown coal and 2 Were coal cokeries, the
August Bebel and Karl Marx works, which produced manufactured gas
as a byproduct. 290/ The largest brown-coal gasworks is that at
Boehlen, part of SAG Boehlen, which was built according to experience
gained in the construction of another and smaller one at Hirschfelde.
In 1950 the Boehlen plant produced 169 million cubic meters of gas
from pre-dried brown coal. 291/
The production of coal gas in 1949 showed considerable
gains over that of 1947. Original planned production for 1950 was
1 billion cubic meters, which was to rise to 1.43 billion cubic
meters in 1955. 292/ Production in 1949 actually exceeded plans
for 1950 by 51.3 million cubic meters, 293/ and 1950 production
surpassed the plan by 397 million cubic meters. 294/ Planned pro-
duction for. 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, and 1955 indicates an annual
increase averaging about 200 million cubic meters. 295/ Actual
production in 1951, 1.7 billion cubic meters, 296/ exceeded planned
quantities by 161 million cubic meters, but actual production in
1952, the same approximate amount, fell short of plan by 126 million
cubic meters. Table 19* shows estimated production of coal gas in
East Germany, 1947-55.
2. Imports.
An unknown quantity of coal gas is imported into East
Germany at Neustadt from Poland and at Goslar from West Germany.
In 1949 there existed between Czechoslovakia and East
Germany a gas-exchange contract whereby equal amounts of gas were
to be exported to Czechoslovakia from Markneukirchen (East Germany)
and imported from Czechoslovakia at Ebersbach (East Germany). 297/
It is believed that imports are roughly equivalent to exports; hence,
production is the same as available supply.
* Table 19 follows on p. 55.
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Table 19
Estimated Production of Coal Gas in East Germany
1947-55.
Million Cubic Meters
Year Amount
1947 604.088 298/
1948 808.741 -g.7-
1949 1,051.363 799/
1950 Plan 1,000.000 300/
1950 1,397.400 35-1/
1951 Plan 1,552.000 302/
1951 1,713.900
1952 Plan- 1,896.500
1952 1,770.000
1953 Plan 2,167.500
1953 1,930.400 b/
1954 Plan 2,783.000 -
1955 Plan 3,009.000
a. Estimate based on one-half Of Increase between 1947
and 19494
b. Estimate based on first 6 monthst production of
965.2 million cubic meters. 303/
C. Consumption.
Approximately two-thirds of the total available coal gas
was consumed by the civilian population of East Germany in 1947. 304/
In 1950, consumption by industry had increased and exceeded: domestic
use by approximately 10 million cubic meters. 305/ If plans to
expand over-all industrial activity in 1955 to-735 percent of 1950
activity are successful, the industrial consumption of coal gas will
be double the consumption for household use and will represent two-
thirds of the total output. 306/ Since World War II, rationing of
household gas has been in effect almost continuously, except for the
summer of 1950. Constant difficulties in obtaining adequate supplies
of hard coal, coupled with increased industrial consumption, have
brought about extreme shortages in the gas Supply to the domestic
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consumer. Whenever a shortage threatens, restrictions upon the
domestic consumer are inevitable in order that industry may carry
on. It is believed that no relaxation of the gas-rationing system
was contemplated for the near future. This assumption is supported
by the neglect suffered by the gas appliance industry. In 1950,
East Germany was far behind the progress of the rest of the world
Ln the production of modern room-heating and refrigeration appliances:
307/ Currently, the gas supply to domestic consumers has been
curtailed, and it is even possible that industries not engaged in
reparations or vital production are being affected. 308/
VI. Fuelwood.
A. General.
The current trend in the administration and organization of
fuelwood procurement is toward the Soviet pattern, according to
which the timber industry will be state-controlled and self-
sufficient. Production of fuelwood (other than that gathered by
local producers, peasant farmers, and so forth, for their own use) is
a subordinate function of the Forestry Division of the Ministry for
Agriculture and Forestry.
The Forestry Service of East Germany was reorganized in
1952. In the new organization, the Ministries for Agriculture and
Forestry of the various states control newly created people-owned
forestry enterprises (formed from the old District Forestry Offices).
Through District Forestry Offices, the forestry enterprises control
state and town forests, which are broken up into Forest Control
Districts which, in turn, are divided into forest sections and pri-
vately owned forests.
The Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry gives the planned
fuelwood production quotas to the forestry enterprises. The quotas
are then assigned to the District Forestry Offices and to the various
forest sections.
All roundwood* produced, including that from privately owned
forests, is bought by DHZ-H (Deutsche Handeszentrale4Iolz -- German
Trade Center-Lumber), and this organization passes it on to con-
sumers. 309/
* The term roundwood includes both fuelwood and lumber logs.
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B. Supply.
Fuelwood constitutes approximately one-third of the total
East German annual production Of roundwood of between 11 and 12
million cubic meters. It is believed, however, that this proportion
will decrease in relation to industrial wood production as the total
production of roundwood decreases.
War damage and postwar overcutting have depleted timber
reserves to such an extent that the East Germans have been forced
to restrict tiMber felling to preserve the forests. 310/ Available
reports indicate an even greater decrease in fuelwood production
with less waste being left in the forests after logging operations
and with wood once used for fuel being diverted to other uses. .
A continued decline in the production and consumption of
fuelwood is believed to have occurred during 1953. Conditions
during 1953 may be attributed to the same causes of previous annual
post-World War II decreases: more wood to cellulose and wood
chemical industries, more lumber obtained from each log (therefore
less wastage for fuelwood purposes only), and less wood for household
consumption. The provisions of the 'Mew Course'? to make added
brown-coal briquettes available for space heating in the home imply
that there will be no attempt to make greater quantities of fuelwood
available.
Table 20* gives the estimated production of fuelwood in
East Germany, prewar average and 1946-55.
VII. Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Intentions.
A. Capabilities.
Annual production of brown coal in East Germany in 1949-52
consistently exceeded planned annual production. During 1949 it
became quite obvious that actual production of brown coal would
surpass planned production. Accordingly, the original goals for
the Two Year Plan, 1949-50, were raised. Even these goals were
surpassed by 1.5 and 9.3 million tons. From 1949 through 1952,
production of brown coal rose constantly in increasing percentages,
and plans were consequently adjusted upward in order to be constantly
in advance of production. The effect of the labor unrest in April,
* Table 20 follows on p. 58.
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Table 20
Production of Fuelwood in East Germany
Prewar Average and 1946-55
Million Cubic Meters
Year
Production
Prewar Average
5.50 311/
1946
9.60
1947
9.20
1948
5.70
1949
4.50 a/
1950
4.00 a/
1951
4.00 a/
1952
3.50 F/
1953
3.25 797/
1954
2.75-7.00 b/
1955
2.50-2.75 13/
? a. Estimate.
b. Preliminary estimate.
May, and June of 1953, and the resultant "New Course," cannot
easily be assessed. Production of brown coal in 1953 already had
started to decline by the end of the first quarter, and possible
underfulfilIment in that industry during the remainder of the year
cannot be attributed directly to any political or high-level economic
change in the country. On the contrary, the-decline indicates that
the capability to increase production up to or beyond the goals set
for 1955 is ebbing. The saturation point has been reached in the
process of substituting increased labor for increasing equipment
needs.
Plans for production of hard coal show a slight annual
decrease to 3.1 million tons by 1955. This probably indicates
exhaustion of deposits. In 1952 the loss of 400,000 tons of
planned production was caused by the removal of one mine from pro-
duction because of a mine disaster, but it is believed that this
Mine will return to production in the near future. For this
reason, the annual decline in tonnage as planned is considered
neither optimistic nor excessively pessimistic.
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The production of brown-coal metallurgical coke is still
a problematical achievement. In spite of ambitious plans for the
completion of the initial installation at Lauchhammer by June 1952
and a planned production of 565,000 tons of coke by the end of 1952,
no actual production has been reported. Structural defects in both
the subsurface foundations and the oven batteries have stopped con-
struction to permit correction of faulty plans. It is believed
that East German plans for the successful operation of this plant
are far too optimistic. It is evident that, in expanding the plans
from pilot-plant stage to large-scale-production stage, considerable
difficulties have been encountered.
Increased production of briquettes depends entirely upon the
ability of East German industry to replace old briquette presses
and to add new ones. As stated above, the brown-coal supply will
be adequate. Production of briquettes during 1950 and 1951 showed a
small but steady annual increase. Production in 1949 and 1950
even exceeded plan. In 1951 and 1952, the rate of increase in the
production of briquettes decreased, and, if the lag in annual produc-
tion continues, there is little-chance that the 1955 goals will be
attained. It is believed that the failure to meet planned production
in 1952 resulted partly from the gradual deterioration of briquette
machinery, most of which is of prewar vintage and of West German
manufacture. The establishment of an industry producing briquette
presses cannot be determined, but without new presses the production
plans cannot be fulfilled.
The attainment of all goals in the production of coal gas
is foreseen. It is believed that, because of the shortage of such
structural materials as pipes and steel plate, the plans for the
construction of new gas works will encounter difficulties.
Production of fuelwood will probably decrease as planned,
but if the winter of 1953-54 is any indication of future conditions,
the civilian population will attempt to continue the private and
"illegal" gathering of fuelwood whenever the distribution of other
solid fuels fails.
B. Vulnerabilities.
The basic weakness of the East German economy is its almost
100-percent dependence on an inferior and inefficient grade of coal.
The ramifications of this dependence extend into the liquid-fuel
supply, of which 75 to 80 percent is obtained by synthesis from this
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very coal. The railroad industry is likewise dependent in that
almost 100 percent of all freight moved is hauled by coal-fired
engines. Furthermore, according to the East German Premier, Otto
Grotewdhl, "the chemical industry is dependent on lignite (brown
coal)." 312/
A serious disadvantage to the East German metallurgical
industry is the lack of both domestically produced and imported
metallurgical coke. The only plants producing it are of pre-Worid
War II origin and are of limitedcapacity. The result is an almost
complete dependence upon imported Coke, Which comes largely from
Poland and Czechoslovakia. Since 'these Countries, in common with
the rest of the European Satellites, are hard pressed to meet
their own needs, East Germany's requirements constitute an additional
strain on an already tight Bloc-supply position.
Planned expansion in the production of solid fuels and coal
gas is a vulnerability in that it can be accomplished only with
adequate supplies of a variety of machinery, large and small, and
of sufficient spare parts, and with the manufacture of steel plate,
nuts, and bolts.
The production of coal can be seriously curtailed by any
means which cause a stoppage of electric power, a perSistent
interruption of rail movement, or a distraction of the labor force.
These means may include sabotage or-psychological warfare.
C. Intentions.
The objectives of the First Five Year Plan for East .Germany
are to increase the production of brown coal to 225 million tons by
1955, 63.6 percent above 1950 production, and 'to increasethe pro-
duction of brown-coal briquettes to 56.0 million tons, 45 percent
above 1950 production. These increments are to be achieved by
development of additional installations, some of which were to be
completed by 1952. The remainder were to be constructed throughout
the duration of the Five Year Plan and through 1957. Included in
the planned development is the enlargement of 22 already existing
mines, the reconstruction of 8 installations (presumably destroyed
during the war), the opening of 13 new brown-coal mines, and new
construction, repair, and enlargement involving 34 briquette plants.
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Production of hard coal shows a planned gradual decrease
from 1952. Because of the approaching exhaustion of the hard-coal
seams, expansion of the hard-coal industry apparently is not possible.
Plans have been made to hold production as high as possible by
sinking two new shafts by 1952 (unconfined) and by installing
urgently needed safety equipment and improving operating procedures.
Bedause of the gradual exhaustion of indigenous hard-coal supplies,
no significant expansion is planned in the hard-coal coking plants.
Great expansion is planned in the manufacture of brown-coal
coke, both of the metallurgical and low-temperature types. The
production of the former is predicated upon the growing requirements
of (the metallurgical industry and the increasing difficulty in
obtaining hard-coal coke, both by import and by domestic production.
The expansion of the low-temperature carbonization industry will
make available increased quantities of products such as tars and
gases, which are vitally important to all industry -- particularly to
the chemical industry.
A gradual increase in the production of coal gas by about
100 million cubic meters a year was included in the Five Year Plan.
Continuous rationing of ,household gas implies that although the
goals have been surpassed annually during the past 2 years, the
installed capacity of the plants is not adequate. It is planned to
construct new and larger installations, but details are not known.
The production of fuelwood is expected to decrease primarily
in the percentage of total wood felled it represents. Methods used
in obtaining this goal are to consist mainly of better logging
practices. Probably the greatest cause for the reduction is the
seriously depleted condition of the German forests, which were
damaged by war and postwar overcutting.
Planned increases in the production of coals, gas, and other
solid fuels, although not directly indicative of warlike intentions,
are absolute prerequisites, nevertheless, for the achievement of
industrial expansion, a possible indicator of such intentions.
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APPENDIX
COAL DEPOSITS IN EAST GERMANY
I. Hard Coal. 313/
The hard-coal deposits of East Germany are located in the
Erzgebirge region of the Sachsen Basin. In order of importance and
quantity of reserves, the principal areas are the Zwickau, the Lugau-
Oelsnitz, and the Freital Basins.
The Zwickau Basin is located about 60 miles west-southwest of
Dresden and underlies an area of about 20 square kilometers. The
coal-bearing strata are about 400 meters thick and contain about 11
coal beds, which average 2 or more meters in thickness. The princi-
pal bed ranges from 6 to a5 meters in thickness. The economical
mining of this deposit is limited by an extreme condition of fault-
ing. The coal tined in Zwickau is known as Gasflammkohle, a high-
volatile bituminous coal, some of Which is good cokingcoal.
The Lugau-Oelsnitz Basin is 40 miles west-southwest of Dresden
and underlies an area of about 20 square kilometers. There are 8
coal seams of an average thickness of 12 meters in an over-all
formation 150 meters thick. The seams are intermixed and are quite
irregular in thickness. The productive area is limited by frequent
geological faults. The type of coal mined in this area is a Gas-
flammkohle which is similar to that found in Zwickau but yields a
smaller proportion of coking coal. In 1951 the reserves of this
basin were officially estimated to be 10,384,000 tons, 314/ and it is
believed that this deposit also will be exhausted by 19657
The Freital Basin, about 4 miles southwest of Dresden, is a
productive area of not more than 25 square kilometers. The coal
seam being exploited at present averages from 2 to 4 meters in
thickness, occasionally becoming as thick as. 9 meters. Below this
Seam, there are believed to be 3 to 6 other beds, regarded as un-
workable. The faulting in this basin is not as frequent as in the
Zwickau and Lugau4)elsnitz Basins; there is but one major fault.
The quality of Freital coal is superior to that of the coal of -
other basins and is almost all good coking coal. In 1951, reserves
in this basin were estimated at only 173,000 tons, 315/ and it is
believed that the areas presently under exploitation are nearing
exhaustion. A new shaft is presently being sunk in the vicinity at
Gittersee, where reserves were estimated in 1951 at 330,000 tons. 316/
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A new coal deposit is currently being developed northeast of the
lower Saxony hard-coal basin, in the vicinity of Doberlug-Kirch-
hain, in the province of Brandenburg. As yet, there have been few
reports on the nature of this coal. A report obtained in 1949
gives what is considered a rather optimistic view of conditions and
claims the following: reserves of 65 million tons composed of
coal strata from 60 centimeters to 2 meters in thickness and from
7.5 to 8 kilometers in length. 317/ Another report claims that only
poor-quality coal was discovered, and that the high extraction cost
(118 DME per ton) would make mining impracticable. Additional
problems are caused by the necessity of freezing the 160-meter
overburden because of its high water content, in order to sink a
shaft. 318/
II. Brown Coal. 319/
The three brown-coal producing areas in East Germany, in order
of importance of reserves, are the Lausitz Field, the Thueringen-
Sachsen Field, and the Braunschweig-Magdeburg Field.
The Lausitz Field is composed of the Senftenberg, Forst, and
Goerlitz Districts. The Senftenberg District, most important of the
three, has 2 coal seams, an upper and a lower, which lie from 30 to
60 meters apart. The upper bed is from 5 to 45 meters below the
surface. The lower seam averages 12 meters in thickness and the
upper seam, about 22 meters. In the Forst District there are also
2 .ems, of which only the upper bed (13 meters thick) is worked.
The overburden on this seam consists of 23 meters of sand and clay.
The Goerlitz District has a main seam of from 40 to 50 meters in
thickness below an overburden of 25 meters.
The qualities of the coals in the Lausitz Field range from those
with a-moisture content of 46 percent and a heat value of 2,500
kilocalories per kilogram to those with a moisture content of 58
percent and a heat value of 1,800 kilocalories per kilogram. Almost
all coal from the Senftenberg and Goerlitz DistriCts is made into
briquettes in order to lower the moisture content. The self-binding
bitumen content of the coal facilitates this process by eliminating
the necessity for any additional binding material. Coal from the
Forst District is very soft and friable, is very low in bitumens,
and is used largely in its raw state.
in 1947 the Lausitz Field contained approximately half the
brown-coal reserves of East Germany.
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The Braunschweig-Magdeburg Field is part of the central German
brown-coal region. Overburden in this region ranges from 40 to 80
meters in depth. The coal has a moisture content of from 45 to 47
percent and a heating Value of from 2,800 to 2,850 kilocalories
per kilogram. It is used chiefly in the manufacture of briquettes.
The region includes several isolated producing districts, of which
the most important are the Oschersleben, the Egeln-Stassfurt, and
the Nachterstedt-Aschersleben. These districts lie in a southeast-
northwest line and are roughly 25 kilometers from Magdeburg at their
southern tips. The Oschersleben District is 7 kilometers wide and
consists of 2 upper beds. To the west of the fault the upper bed is
15 to 26 meters thick, and the lower is 10 to 15 meters thick; to
the east the upper is 3 to 6 meters thick, and the lower is 12 to
20 meters thick. The structure of the Egeln-Stassfurt District is
similar to, and a continuation of, the Oschersleben District. It
has one group of coal beds, of which only the uppermost, which is
from 6 to 20 meters thick, is workable. The Nachterstedt-Aschersleben
District is located about 15 kilometers southwest of, and roughly
parallel to, the Oschersleben and Egeln-Stassfurt Districts. It has
coal beds which are as great as 53 meters in thickness in the northern
sections and are divided by shale and clay in the southern sections.
The Thueringen-Sachsen Field is located around the cities of
Halle and Leipzig and consists of.7 districts, the most important
of which are the Weissenfels-Zeitz, the Meuselwitz-Rositz? and the
Northwest Sachsen Districts. The.Weissenfels-Zeitz District is
located about 20 kilometers southwest of Leipzig and consists of the
southwest section of the entire Thueringen-Sachsen Field. There is
only 1 seat, which is 1 to 20 meters thick and has an average thick-
ness of about 12 meters. The Meuselwitz-Rositz District is about
20 kilometers directly south of Leipzig in the vicinity of Altenburg.
The only workable seam is from 10 to 20 meterS in thickness, and the
overburden ranges from 3 to 80 meters in depth. The Northwest Sachsen
District is directly north of and contiguous to the Meuselwitz-Rositz
District. The production center is Boma, a city about 20 kilometers
south of Leipzig. There are 2 main seams of Which the lower is the
more important. At the center of the district, it has a thickness
of 12 to 14 meters. The seam slopes downward in a northerly direc-.
tion from Borna, where the overburden is 15 to 19 meters thick, to
Leipzig, where it is 83 meters thick. The important characteristic
of the coal from these areas is the resinous* component, which makes
* Given in source as "pyropisite," an Americanization of Pyropissit,
meaning Wachskohle (wax coal).
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the coal particularly suitable for the production of liquid fuels
and waxes by means of the low-temperature carbonization Process.
:Wisture content of these coals is about 54 percent, and heat values
range from'2,475 to 2,700 kilocalories per kilogram.
The other four districts of the Thueringen-Sachsen Field are
known as the Koethen, Geiseltal, HaIle-Leipzig, and Bitterfeld
Districts. They are located to the north and to the west of Leipzig.
The Bitterfeld District is believed to be a continuation of the
East German coal basin. The remaining districts range in size from
the unknown size of the Bitterfeld District to the size of the
Geiseltal District, which is only 4 by 12 kilometers. There are
many seams in these districts, some from 20 to 100 meters thick,
as at Geiseltal, and others from 6 to 15 meters thick, as at Bitter-
feld. The moisture content of these coals ranges from as low as
46 Percent in the Koethen coal to 53.5 percent in the Geiseltal coal,
which have values of 3,000 and 2,266 kilocalories per kilogram,
respectively. Coal from the Halle-Leipzig District, particularly
from the Oberroeblingen area, is very rich in bitumen (II to 23 per-
cent) and is used in the synthetic fuel industry.
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APPENDIX B
TECHNOLOGY 320/
I. Underground Mining.
All hard coal mined in the Sachsen coal fields is obtained by
underground mining methods. As in the West German coal fields the
longwall mining technique is used. Becuase of the faulted and
broken conditions of the coal veins, heavy timbering of the entries
and rooms and extensive use of backfill are required.
The most recent estimates of the type and quantity of equipment
used in the Sachsen coal basin are dated 1938. At that time, 14.6
percent of production was obtained by the use (iz_7 cutting machines,
75.2 percent by pneumatic hammers, 3.4 percent by manual pick axes,
and 6.8 percent by blasting. In all, 2,941 pieces of mining equip-
ment were in use, only 23 of which were electrically powered. In
1938, 28,384 meters of conveying facilities were installed, including
shaker, rubber belt steel link, and scraper types.
During and after World War II, very little additional equipment
was installed in these Mines, and operating conditions have steadily
deteriorated. According to the annual report of the hard-coal in-
dustry in 1950, there were, in addition to the shortage of labor,
five main causes of production failure. The first is inherent in
the faulted and disturbed nature of the strata, which promotes floor
upheaval and roof collapse. All other deterrents to production are
in some way connected with aging equipment: for example, 5 instances
of power stoppage; 5 instances of conveyor breakdown; 3 accidents,
of Which 2 were fires; and 11 instances of failure resulting from
the deterioration of equipment, particularly hauling ropes and
cables. Although the supply of materials was better in 1950 than
in 1949, there were still serious shortages. Hoisting cable was in
short supply because the rope wire of which it is made had always
been obtained from West Germany. Pneumatic stowing pipes for the
placement of backfill were scarce. Particularly serious was the
shortage of electric cable, especially heavily insulated trench.
cable, the lack of Which had already led to several accidents.
Pneumatic hammers and pick hammer tips, which formerly came from
West Germany and which were shipped in surplus to the Wismut uranium
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installation, were difficult to obtain. 321/ Explosives are about
the only item in which there has been no curtailment of supply, and
the excessive use of these, following Polish techniques introduced
by Soviet experts, has had adverse effects. 322/
Underground mining of brown coal is much the same as that of
hard coal. The major difference is the comparative safety of mining
brown coal. In the brown coal mines there is little coal dust and
few gases. In 1940 it was estimated that 7 percent of all brown
coal in all Germany was obtained from shaft installations. In 1951
it was estimated that only 5 percent of East German brown coal was
produced by underground mining methods.
II. Strip Mining.
The production of brown coal by strip mining hs been increasing
since 1924. The biggest increase came in 1937, when the 1936
production total was surpassed by 16 million tons. In 1951 it was
estimated that 95 percent of the brown coal produced in East Germany
was obtained by strip mining. The principal determining factor in
the selection of this method instead of shaft mining has been the
ratio of coal to overburden. Generally it has not been considered
economical to remove more than 2.5 feet of overburden for every
foot of coal thickness. In some cases, however, the ratio has
been increased to as much as 5 to 1.
The equipment used in open-pit mining is extremely large and
includes traveling rigs, conveyor bridges spanning distances of 300
meters, bucket and shovel dredges, and excavators capable of moving
up to 2,600 cubic meters of overburden or coal per hour. Some
equipment is designed to operate from the surface and drag the coal
to the top for loading, and some is designed to work in theNpit and
scrape the coal to the bottom. In order to allow the exposed coal
to dry before excavation, it is necessary to keep the resulting pit
free of water, and in some areas considerable pumping equipment is
required.
Before World War II, brown-coal operations in the present East'
German Zone were well mechanized, but immediately following the war
a great,deal of the most important production equipment was dismantled
or destroyed: An estimate based on available reports indicates that
the excavating equipment, reportedly all modern, at a total of 21
different mines was totally dismantled or destroyed. Ten of these
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mines were in the Senftenberg District of the Lausitz Coal Field
and all but one of the remainder were in the Thueringen-Sachsen Coal
Field. 323/ The exact cohdition of the remaining equipment is not
known.
III. Mining Equipment and Machinery.
Little is known about the domestic manufacture of mining equip-
ment and machinery in East Germany, but it is known that equipment
and machinery has been imported from the West and from the USSR
since World War II. The administrative division of the State
Secretariat for Coal and Energy, which is in charge of mining machinery,
is known as VVB GESKO (the Federation of People-Owned Enterprises for
the Construction of Equipment and Shaft Installations for the Coal
Industry). The following plants are controlled by this organization
(VVB GESKO):
Lauchhammer Excavator Plant 234/
Goerlitz Machine Plant 325/
Dresden Electrical Plant
Grossenhain Steam Hammer Plant
Boesdorf Chilled Castings Plant
Ruhland Iron Works
Nordhausen Mining Equipment Plant 326/
Senftenberg Iron Works
Wetterzeube Steel Plant
Zerbst Screw Plant
Niederwuerschnitz Iron Foundry and Machine Plant
Ballenstedt/Harz Rubber and Cable Plant.
Other plants which produce equipment for the coal industry but
are segments of the Heivi Machine Industry are 327/:
VEB Koethen
VEB ARTS (Ausruestung von Bergbau und Schwerindustrie 7--
Mining and Heavy Industrial Machinery) Wildau
Heavy Machine Plant '
VEB ABUS - Leipzig Steel Construction Plant
SAG AMO.- Zemag? Zeitz; Brown Coal Mine and Briquette plant
equipment for SAG installations only.
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Other mining machinery equipment plants scheduled for activation in
order to meet Five Year Plan goals were listed in 1951 at Ebefswald
(crane plant), Gotha (car plant), Leipzig (steel plant), Magdeburg,
Wolf-Buckau (machine plant), SAG Krupp-Gruson (machine plant),
SAG Mackensen (machine plant), and SAG Zeitz (iron foundry and
machine plant). 328/ In the first quarter of 1950, GESKO did not
meet its targets7Tecause.of lack of steel plate for repairs and
steel for casting.? 329/ The Five Year Plan requires the 14 sub-
sidiary mining machigry plants 330/ to produce 36 bucket-conveyor
excavators, 67 shovel and bucket dredgers, 15 separators, and 5
conveying bridges.
An urgent need also exists for mine cars. 331/ It appears that
the shortage of raw materials will seriously limit production of
them. 332/ Recent reports indicate the manufacture of 1 excavator,
report;Ey the largest in the world, now being assembled in the
Bitterfeld lignite field 333/ and 4 cutter-loaders for Zwickau. 224/
SAG Blankenburg and TEB (Volkseigener Betrieb People-Owned Enter-
prise) Ballenstedt were reported to have started production of
rubber conveyor belts early in 1952. 335/
Numerous attempts have been made to acquire mining equipment
from Czechoslovakia, the USSR, and Poland, as well as from West
Germany. Up to the present time, imports from the USSR have consisted
of 3 digger-loaders, 1 of which was displayed at the Leipzig Fair
in 1951, 336/ and 5 scraper-conveyors. 337/ All but the digger-
loader df5ilayed at the Fair were reported as part of a third ship-
ment to East Germany from the USSR. The contents of the first and
second shipment are not known. In December 1952, drilling and
urgently needed ventilating equipment was received at Zwickau from
the USSR. 338/
Imports from West Germany have not been extensive. During
1949 or 1950, 300 pneumatic coal hammers of the type Korfman,
Friko 80K were obtained from the West, 339/ and 82.3 percent of all
hard coal was produced by these implemeag in 1950. 340/ Since
then deliveries have stopped, except for what is obtained through
illegal channels. During 1950 there was established a reserve fund
for the purchase of Western equipment. This fund consisted of the
sale value of 20;000 tons of brown-coal briquettes -- 560,000 to
580,000 MOO -- plus 1,015,000 DM(W).
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r.
IV. Fuel Briquettes.
The manufacture of fuel briquettes originated in Germany in
1861. In the beginning the process was applied solely to bituminous-
coal dust Which was mixed with coal-tar pitch and then pressed into
briquettes. The finished briquettes were of 2 sizes, 1 weighing
about 50 grams and the other about 500 grams. The briquetting of
brown coal was introduced in Germany at a somewhat later date.
In modern practice, there are four steps involved in the manu-
facture of bituminous-coal briquettes, and they are usually accom-
plished by the same unit driven by the same motor. The coal fines
and the coal-tar pitch, in cold crushed form, are mixed intimately
and kneaded for not less than 6 minutes at a temperature between
20 to 25 degrees centigrade. The mixture, now the consistency of
paste, is then cooled in a conditioner at a temperature of 5 to 6
degrees centigrade and distributed to the presses for molding. The
2 German types of presses are the roll press and the hydraulic press.
The latter has an hourly capacity of 4 to 20 tons of briqUettes.
The roll press may be either the single-mold or double-mold roll
type with capacities of 10 to 40 and 20 to 80 tons per hour,
respectively. The durationof compression is about 0.1 second in a
double-mold roll press and 0.4 second in a hydraulic press'.
The first press for the manufacture of brown-coal briquettes
was of a ram type and was known as the T'Exter,11 after its inventor.
Some 20 years ago the Krupp and Lurgi firm developed a new type,
known as the ring-roll press.
The procedure in the manUfacture of brown-coal briquettes
differs in three ways from that of bituminous coal briquettes: the
raw brown coal must be crushed to a uniform size, the crushed
high-moisture-content coal must be carefully and quickly dried
before entering the briquette presses, and no binding material is
required in the production of brown-coal briquettes. At an early
date in the technological development of the briqUetting process,
it was realized that the uniformity of the size of the brown-coal
particles which entered the presses was the factor which ultimately
determined the firmness of the briquette. If there is a combination
of particles of various sizes in the briquette mixture, the drying
process is not uniform and the bigger pieces retain moisture, which
later promotes the crumbling of the briquettes. The smaller the
grain of coal- the more exactly the drying process can be controlled.
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Until recent years the acceptable size for coal grains was from 4 to
6 millimeters. In the past 2 years,East German coal research groups
have developed a briquette called Feinkornbrikette (fine-grain bri-
quette), which is made from coal ground to 1-millimeter particles.
This is claimed to be a more efficient fuel and to have a harder
structure than the previously developed types. Because of this last
characteristic, the East German mining engineer, Professor Bilken-
roth, believes it to be a suitable raw material for the production
of a brown-coal metallurgical coke.
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_ _ _
APPENDIX C
LABOR
Statistics of the employment and productivity of the mining
industry in East Germany are not based on a uniform method of
collection and, therefore, present a problem in any attempt to
prepare a rational statement. Table 21* gives the apparent growth
in size of the labor force in both the brown-coal and hard-coal
industries and their affiliated installations.
In the VVB coal industry, Which includes all hard-coal mining
and about 70 percent of the brown-Coal mining (based on 1951 pro-
duction figures for VVB and SAG groups, 342/ there has-been a con-
stant effort to increase the mining personnel. In the hard-coal
mines there was a particularly serious shortage of skilled and
technical workers in 1950, 343/ and the general tightness of the
labor supply was the greatest limiting factor in the hard-coal
mines in that year. During 1950 a labor turnover Of about 25 per-
cent, also limited the over-all productivity in the mines. Main-
taining an adequate labor force in the brown-coal mines has not
been as much of a problem, because the working conditions are less
hazardous, and women may be employed in this work.
Currently, the hard-coal mines are operating on 3 shifts of
8 hours each a day, on a 6-day week basis. 344/ Overtime is de-
manded constantly, and in 1949, 24 out of 577Sundays were worked. 345/
Productivity on this basis is reportedly 0.5 tons, presumably per
man-day, including all employees. 346/ Similar information concern-
ing the brown-coal industry is not available.
Efforts to increase the number of employees in all types of
mining have taken various forms: wage increases, youth recruitment,
employment of women, establishment of prizes, honorary titles,
premiums, wage collectives, and admission of convict labor. Even
before World War II the hard-coal industry had the lowest wage
scale in Germany, and, until the Miners', 'Decree of 10 August 1950,
the situation was unremedied.
* Table 21 follows on p. 74.
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Table 21
Number of Employees in the East German Coal Industry
1937, 1949, 1950
Industry
1937 347/ 1949 348/ 1950 349/
Hard Coal
Laborers 10,950 a/ N.A. 19,631
Others 4,050 E/ N.A. 1,421
Total 15,000 20,761 21,052
Brown Coal
VVB c/
Laborers
Technicians
c/
-c-/
N.A.
N.A.
73,646 351/
3,875 ---
Administrative
E/
N.A.
3,578
Total
77,201
81,099
SAG c/
c/
40,000 d/
40,000 d/
Total
64,466
117,201
121,099
a. In 1935, underground wdiTers constituted 73 percent of the
total hard-coal labor force. 350/
b. Residual figure.
c. Before World War II, there was no division of the brown-
coal industry into VVB and SAG components; likewise no break-
down of the labor force is available for this year.
d. it is estimated that 40,000 persons were employed in SAG
enterprises in 1950 and the same figure is believed valid for
1949. 352/
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Before the increases in hourly wage rates stipulated in the
Miners' Decree, wages for mine laborers were, on the average, 30
percent lower than the average in the metallurgical industry. The
highest paid worker in the mining industry, a hewer, made a salary
12 percent lOwer than the highest paid worker in metallurgy. 353/
At that time, the hourly wage of all six wage groups, both technical
and administrative, in both brown-coal and hard-coal mining indus-
tries, was 2.50 DM(E). 354/ After the change the average hourly
wage had increased to 27U DM(E).. It is difficult to come to any
estimate of the actual average daily wage in the East German coal
industry because it is not known how many laborers constitute each
wage group. 355/ In any case, it is apparent that the wage increases
were not sufficient, for new increases) planned for 1953, were
expected to reach a total of 7.4 percent above wages in 1952. 356/
Payment in the future will be increasingly determined by work
norms on a piecework basis. The meaning of piecework in this context
is somewhat different from that usually given; it applies to the
part of the norm achieved by the worker. Work norms are to be set
up for every aspect of the mining process. Each miner will receive
the established wage When the norm is achieved. If he fails, he ?
will be paid proportionately less; if he surpasses the norm, pre-
sumably, he will be elegible for a bonus, a premium, and so forth. 357/
During the first half of 1953, norms suddenly assumed increased -
importance because of the serious underfUlfilImeht of planned pro-
duction in the first quarter. In brown-coal enterprises this
amounted to an underproduction of 6 million tons, about 1/6 of the
planned quantity. The result of this underproduction was a decree
raising production norms by 6 percent in the hard-coal industry and
by 5 percent in the brown-coal industry. 358/ In response to the
June strikes and general unrest, these norm increases were immediate-
ly rescinded. 359/ A six months' production fulfillment drive, how-
ever, was waged during the last half of the year.
Attempts to increase the labor force have also involved the
enlistment of women and youths. For many years women have been -
employed in the surface installations of the German mines,
specifically in the capacity of coal washers and sorters. Recent
developments have indicated that women are to be employed under-
ground, at the face. Within the Five Year Plan, the employment of
women is to be increased 32 percent, and the training of women
apprentices is to be doubled. 360/ The Miners' Decree stated that
2,000 new miners were to be employed by the end of 1950 and an
-75-
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additional 2,000 during 1951. 361/ It is believed that drafting
and impressing were the only ways in which these goals could be
met.
Another aspect of the drive to increase the employment in the
mining industry was the establishment of bonuses, premiums, and
honorary titles and badges, to be awarded on the basis of seniority,
continuity of service, and productivity. Bonuses and premiums were
to be awarded not on the basis of individual achievement, but --
after the establishment of collective wage groupe -- on the basis of
the collective achievements of the group. The mutual supervision'
and criticism thus encouraged is believed to increase the will to
produce. Titles such as. Outstanding Miner and Master Hewer have
also been introduced, the first bringing a tax exemption of 10,000
DM(W) and the second of 1,000 DM(W) per year. 362/
A tacit admission that all efforts to swell- the labor force in
the mining industry have failed may be found in the Decree. issued by
the Ministry of the Interior and Justice in September 1952, Which
permits the use of convict labor. in Ithealth-impairing" industries,
including-hard-coal mining.- -363/ ?
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Coal Production in
East Germany
1953
Thfiringen-Sachsen field
11.11111111111111 41
GRAPH LEGEND
6 20'-actual production
5 ?
--standard fuel equivalent
Figures OM in millions of Ted* tons.
chersleben
Egels
Halberstadt C:70
Nachterstedt ? Sta.ssfurt
Aschersleben efunbu
New Doberlug-
Kirchttain Deposit L a
e
Doberlug-Kirchhain?
e'
0 Senft nberge wOeizowei
0
Lauch turner
PRODUCING FIELDS
0 Brown coal (lignite)
GOP Hard coal (bituminous)
SAG (Sowietische
Aktiengesellschaft)
(prior to January, 1954)
VVB (Verelningung
Volkselgener Betriebe)
? Thiiringen?
Delitzsch
Sachsen
Leipzig
Pfannerhall
Weisseenubtelezs.ne6.P.\,sofc.).en 0
p 0
Deutzen? sAG)
D
? etseh.eitz
'et
Sitichse??Chemnitz
Zwickau,0 t8.84)1--"?""Dth'itz
Zwickau foam
Basin
Oelsnitz
12860 CIA, 4.54
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? SECRET
0
SECRET
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