THE ROLE OF THE TRACTOR INDUSTRY IN THE USSR, 1940-54

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 100
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 16, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
SECRET
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE ROLE OF THE TRACTOR INDUSTRY IN
THE USSR, 1940-54
CIA/RR 37
16 August 1954
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Sees. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE ROLE OF THE TRACTOR INDUSTRY IN THE USSR
1940-54
CIA/RR 37
(ORR Project 32.292)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
a
S-E-C-R-E-T
FOREWORD
This report has five intelligence objectives: (1) to assess the
Soviet tractor industry's past, present,-and future capacity to pro-
duce tractors; (2) to assess the pattern of allocation of tractors
between economic sectors in the USSR from 1946 through 1955; (3) to
analyze the factors which have determined the demand for, and allo-
cation of, tractors in the USSR during this period; (4) to relate
changes in production and allocation to national economic policy
and (5) to determine what conclusions concerning the capabilities,
vulnerabilities, and intentions of the USSR bearing upon the national
interest of the US may be drawn from an analysis of the activity of
the tractor industry and its consumers. Throughout the report the
objective will be to explain the function of the industry and its
product in the economy.
Soviet Marxists have a boundless faith that a change in the "pro-
ductive forces" (for example, substitution of tractors for animal
draft power) will bring about a change in the "productive relations"
(for example, the structure and scale of the agricultural economy).
In 1919, at the VIII Party Congress, Lenin stated:
"If we could give 50 agriculturg 100,000 first class
tractors tomorrow, supply them with fuel, supply them with
drivers -- you well know that at this time this is a fan-
tasy -- then the middle peasant would say: 'I am for
Communism! but in order to do this it would be necessary
either to first defeat the international bourgeoisie,
force them to give us the tractors, or to raise our own
productive capacity to the point where we can supply our-
selves with the tractors. Only in this manner can this
question be truly decided."
The "bourgeois" world was neither overthrown, nor did it collapse.
Therefore, in 1928 the USSR began to construct its own tractor indus-
try. In 1930, on the occasion of the opening of the Stalingrad
tractor plant, Stalin sent a greeting to the workers and managerial
staff in which he wrote:
"The fifty thousand tractors which you must give to the
country each year will be 50,000 5rtilleril shells which
will plow up the old bourgeois world and pave the way to
the new, socialist order in the villages."
_
S7E-C,11-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Twenty-two years later in August 1952, when the XIX Congress of the
Communist Party of the USSR convened, there were 585,000 tractors
in the agricultural economy. The USSR had "socialism" in terms of
the harsh Stalinist definition of "to each according to his work,
from each according to his abilities." But it was a "socialism"
of scarcity, not of abundance, and nowhere was the scarcity more
intense than in the villages, all the tractors notwithstanding.
Within the context of the economy of the USSR, any judgment
concerning the economic justification of the tractor industry
ultimately depends upon the industry's success or failure in ful-
filling its function in the economy -- that is, did it make the
required contribution to the economy as a whole? For intelligence
purposes, it is desirable to go one step beyond, describing the im-
pact of the tractor upon the principal consuming sector, agriculture.
- iv -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
?
S-E-C-R-E-T
CONTENTS
Sumsry
I. Tractor Production and Soviet Agricultural Policy, 1928-45
Page
1
4
A.
Production
7
B.
Allocation of Tractors to Agriculture
9
C.
Utilization
11
D.
Effect of World War II
13
II.
Tractor Production in the Fourth and Fifth Five Year Plans .
14
A.
Postwar Situation
14
B.
Plans and Objectives, 1946-50
15
C.
Plan Fulfillment, 1946-50
18
1. Tractor Allocations
18
2. Spare Parts
20
III.
Production Goals of the Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55) . . .
24
IV.
Tractor Allocations and Economic Policy, 1946-53
26
V.
Socialism in the Countryside
30
A.
Decrease in Agricultural Productivity
31
B.
Lower Costs of Production
33
C.
Mechanization and Stability
38
VI.
Post-Stalin Policy
40
A.
New Program
42
B.
Additional Facilities
11.11. .
C.
Labor Incentives
45
D.
Conclusions
45
- v -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Appendix A.
Appendix B.
Appendix C.
Appendix D.
Appendix E.
Appendix F.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Appendixes
Page
Tables 47
Preliminary Estimate of Minimum POL Storage
Capacity in MTS's and State Farms at the End
of 1953
PQL Consumption of the Soviet Tractor Park . .
Planned and Actual Allocation of Tractors
to Agriculture'
Methodology
Gaps in Intelligence
69
71
75
77
87
50X1
4-
Tables
1. Estimated Production of Tractors in the USSR,
1940, 1945-55
2. Estimated Consumption of Intermediate Distillates
by Tractors in the USSR, 1940, 1945-55
3. Agricultural Tractor Park of the USSR, Selected Years
4. Composition of the Agricultural Tractor Park of the USSR,
Selected Years
5. Structure of Draft Power on Soviet Collective Farms,
Selected Years
6. Tractor Work on the MTS's of the USSR, 1937, 1940 . . ? ?
7. Sown Area of all Crops in the USSR, Selected Years
- vi -
S-E-C-R-E-T
? ? ?
5
6
10
10
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E7C-R-E-T
Page
8. Tractor Production in the USSR, 1946-50 19
9. Material Inputs for the DT-54 Tractor 21
10. Agricultural Tractor Park of the USSR on MTS 'S and State
Farms, Selected Years 27
11. Allocations of Tractors to Agriculture in the USSR,
1946-50 27
12. Comparative Structure of Agricultural Tractor Park
of the USSR, 1940 and 1950 29
13. Agricultural Tractor Park of the USSR on MTS's and State
Farms, 1951-53 30
14. Output of Soviet Agricultural Tractor Park in Soft
Plowing Units, Selected Years 31
15. Cost of Fuel in Rubles per Hectare by Tractor Model . . 34
16. Direct Cost (Sebestoimost') of Tractor Work in the MTS's,
Selected Years 34
17. Tractor Work Performed by the MTS's in the USSR,
Selected Years 35
18. Norms of Output per Tractor Shift (10 hours) for Plowing
by Tractor Models 37
19. Tractor Work Performed by the MTS's in the USSR for Soft
Plowing Units, Selected Years 38
20. Marketed Share of the Grain Crop of the USSR, Selected
Years 40
21. Trends in the Value of Output of the Industrial
and Agricultural Sectors of the Economy of the USSR,
Selected Years 41
22. Production of Tractors in the USSR, 1928-41 48
- vii -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
.23. Agricultural Tractor Park of the USSR, 1928-40 . .
24. Designations and Characteristics of Postwar Tractor
Models in the USSR
Page
49
50
25. Tractor Production in the USSR by Model, 1942-55
53
26. Tractor Production in the USSR by Producing Plant,
1942-50
54
27. Production Goals in the USSR by Row-Crop, Tractors,
1954 - 1 May 1957
55
28. Comparison Between the 1955 Tractor Production Goals
of the Fifth Five Year Plan and the Goals as Revised
by ,Agricultural Decrees of September, October 1953 . ?
?
56
29. .Allocation of Tractor Production in the USSR, 1946-55. ?
?
57
30. Growth of the Agricultural Tractor Park in the USSR,
1940-55
58
31. Growth of the MTS Tractor Park in the USSR, 1945-55 . ?
?
59
32. Growth of State Farm Tractor Park in the USSR, 1945-55 .
.
60
33. Output of Soft-Plowing Units per 15-horsepower Tractor
Unit in the USSR, 1937, 1940, 1945-53
61
34. Tractor Work Performed by MTS's in the USSR,
1940, 1946-55
61
35. Annual Increment to the Sown Area of the USSR, 1946-53 .
.
62
36.. Sown Area of the USSR, Selected Years
62
37. Dynamics of the Direct Cost (Sebestoimosti') of Tractor
Work in the MTS's of the USSR, 1949-52
63
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Page
38. Changes in the Relative Weight of Work Performed
by Kerosene, Ligroine, and Diesel Tractors
in the USSR, Selected Years ? ? . 64
39. Comparison of Expenditures and Cost of Fuel per Unit
of Work between Kerosene and Diesel Tractors in the USSR . 65
4o. Comparison of Fuel Expenditures, Output per Worker,
and Net Costs of Operation for Six Models of Soviet
Tractors in Saratov Oblast, 1950 66
41. Comparative Data on Heavy and Wheeled Tractors
in the USSR 67
42. Value of Soviet Tractor Production, 1940-55 68
43. Average Capacity (Emkosti) of "Typical" MTS POL Storage
Facilities . 69
44. Consumption of POL by the Agricultural Tractor Park
of the USSR, 1940, 1947-55 71
45. POL Consumption of the Agricultural Tractor Park
of the USSR, 1948 73
4
46. Planned and Actual Production and Allocation of Tractors
to Agriculture, 1946-50 75
47. Size and Composition of the MTS's Tractor Park, 1940 . . 80
48. Structure of the MTS's Tractor Park, 1940 81
49. Agricultural Tractor Park of the USSR, 1940 81
50. Agricultural Tractor Park of the USSR, 31 December 1945 83
S-E-C-R-E-T
? _ _ _
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Illustrations
Following Page
Figure 1. Heavy, General-Purpose Tractor, 6-80 . . 6
Figure 2. Medium, General-Purpose Tractor, DT-54 . ? ? 6
Figure 3. Small, General-Purpose Tractor, KD-35 . 6
Figure 4. Row-Crop Tractor, Universal-1 6
-x -
S-E-C-R-ET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
CIA/RR 37
(ORR Project 32-.292)
S-E-C-R-E-T
THE ROLE OF THE TRACTOR INDUSTRY IN THE USSR*
1940-54
Summary
The low growth of Soviet agricultural output relative to the rate
of growth of industrial output seriously limits increases in food con-
sumption and exports and indirectly, through the resulting effects on
labor productivity, hinders the growth of the entire economy of the
USSR. As part of the solution of this problem, allocations of trac-
tors to agriculture have been increased. The tractor industry of the
USSR has thereby been committed to a relatively fixed production
program extending through at least 1957. The scale of past resource
allocations which resulted in a threefold expansion (compared with
1940) of the tractor industry during the Fourth and Fifth Five Year
Plans reflected the belief of the leaders of the USSR that mechani-
zation is not only the key to increased agricultural productivity but
also the very foundation of the collectivization system. Failure to
have supplied the demand for tractors in agriculture could have un-
periled the stability of the agricultural sector of the economy.
The tractor industry of the USSR is capable of meeting the pro-
duction goals which have been set for the period 1954-57. Although
the industry failed to achieve the extraordinary goals of the Fourth
Five Year Plan (1946-50) as a whole, the high rate of production
reached by the end of the Plan (1950), and the further increases in-
cluded in the Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55), have enlarged the agri-
cultural tractor park to the point where completion of the current
program will virtually permit realization of the Soviet dream of full
mechanization of agricultural field work. See Table 1.**
Output of agricultural, field work per tractor unit in the MTS'S
and State Farms has consistently fallen short of the technological
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent
the best judgment of the responsible analyst as of 1 July 1954.
** Table 1 follows on p. 5.
XXX The abbreviation for Mashino-Tractornaya Stantsii in Soviet
usage is MTS. The abbreviation MTS'ss, as used in this report, refers
to the English translation, Machine Tractor Stations.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
capabilities of the equipment because of disproportionately law invest-
ments in repair and maintenance facilities. Disproportionate investment
in this sense means that in achieving full mechanization of field work
in 1957-58 the tractor industry will be forced to supply the agricultural
sector of the economy with more tractors than would otherwise be neces-
sary if adequate ancillary investment had been made.
Although the Soviet tractor industry in 1955 will produce only
175,000 tractors, compared with current US production of nearly 750,000,
the high proportion of heavy track-laying diesel tractors coupled with
the MTS system of utilization, will enable the USSR to reach a satura-
tion point in the application of mechanical draft power for field work
in 1957-58 with an agricultural tractor park of less than 1 million
tractors compared with a current US agricultural inventory of almost
5 million tractors. (The sown areas of the US and the USSR are roughly
comparable.) The comparison illustrates the distortion which occurs
when direct comparisons of annual production or size of tractor in-
ventory are made between the USSR and US without taking into account
the entirely different systems of utilization of equipment employed in
the two countries.
' Achievement of full mechanization will reduce the demand of the
agricultural sector of the Soviet economy for heavy tractors to approxi-
mately the level required for replacement purposes. Consequently,
beginning in 1956-57 the production of tractors in the USSR will be
sufficient to enable the Russians to (1) resume the "great projects";
(2) export 25,000 to 30,000 heavy track-laying diesel tractors per year
to carry out collectivization in the Eastern European Satellites;
(3) export to any area deemed expedient, for example Communist China,
or some non-Communist nation such as India; (4) initiate some other
large-scale construction program such as building motor roads; or
(5) carry out some combination of these alternatives.
Preoccupation with goals for producing tractors has resulted,
within the tractor industry, in a chronic failure to produce suffi-
cient spare parts. Shortages of high-quality material inputs and
certain types of tempering and hardening equipment forced the in-
dustry to produce tractors until well into the Fifth Five Year Plan
requiring relatively rapid and frequent replacement of many of the
moving parts. In spite of the costs involved, and the relative loss
in efficiency, the USSR still has several hundred thousand prewar
tractors operating in agriculture. The continued manufacture of
expensive, special-purpose machine tool equipment to make spare parts
- 2 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
for the prewar tractor models indicates the Soviet intention to
continue to use such tractors for a period far in excess of the
length of time believed feasible in western nations, even though
such retention will continue to aggravate the Soviet spare parts
problem. Although the tractor industry devotes considerable re-
sources to spare parts production, Communist Party decrees have
repeatedly assigned major responsibilities for parts production to
other industries such as the defense and aircraft industries.
Conversion to the production of military end items did not occur
within the tractor industry in the postwar period. The Leningrad
Kirov plant, which historically has not been a permanent part of the
industry, ceased tractor production in 1951, but the reasons remain
obscure. There is no direct evidence, however, indicating conversion
of the tractor facilities to military end-item production. With the
prob,sble exception of the Chelyabinsk tractor plant, which was a
major producer of heavy track-laying armored vehicles in World War II,
the changing technology of modern tanks almost precludes the future
possibility of conversion of the tractor industry to tank production,
as such. The defense industries themselves mirror the synthesis which
the USSR has achieved in reconciling internal needs with maintaining
adequate ftrces in being, in that the defense industries have con-
sistently acted as major suppliers of component and spare parts to
the tractor industry.
Within the tractor industry, investment in highly specialized
machine tools designed to produce single models over long, periods
of time (10 t2 15 years) has reduced unit costs of production but at
the same time has somewhat limited the industry's capabilities to
convert to any other major end item. In an extreme emergency, how-
ever, the indust7y could be converted to the mass production of
essential military hardware such as track-laying prime movers or
component parts for tanks and other types of track-laying armored
vehicles.
Historically, the tractor park has been the largest single con-
sumer of intermediate distillates (kerosene and diesel fuel) in the
USSR. During the period 1947-53 the tractor park as a whole
(agriculture and other) consumed from 52 percent (1947) to 69 per-
cent (1953) of the intermediate distillates produced by the USSR.*
In 1955 the tractor park as a whole will consume approximately 75
percent of the estimated Soviet production of intermediate distil-
lates. The agricultural part of the total tractor park has
* For data on Soviet tractor fuel consumption, see Table 2, follow-
ing p. 6.
- 3 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
consistently consumed from 50 to 55 percent of the Soviet production
of intermediate distillates. The increasing substitution of mechanical
for animal draft power in agriculture sharply reduces Soviet capabili-
ties for diverting tractor fuel to other uses, including military.
Any significant reduction of fuel supplies for agriculture would have
serious effects upon the production of foodstuffs in the USSR.
The pattern of tractor allocation has consistently reflected
shifting priorities in the economy. The reduced share of total trac-
tor production allocated to agriculture from 1951-52 was occasioned
by the demands created by massive investment in the construction
projects and in the timber and petroleum industries. In 1953, with
the re-emergence of agriculture as the dominant economic problem
requiring immediate attention, the agricultural share of tractor pro-
duction returned to its very high 1949-50 proportion. All available
evidence indicates that the present leadership has every intention of
increasing the production of tractors and the allocation of tractors
to agriculture. The present Soviet policies stand out as a clear
re-affirmation by Stalin's heirs of their Unbounded faith that mechani-
zation will increase agricultural productivity, the failures of the
past notwithstanding.
In general, the growth and development of the tractor industry in
the postwar period leads to the conclusion that the Soviet leadership
has been primarily concerned with the solution of internal economic
problems while maintaining and improving defensive capabilities. The
growth and development of the tractor industry in the USSR does not
reflect preoccupation with preparations for offensive warfare on a
large scale.
I. Tractor Production and Soviet Agricultural Policy, 1928-45.
The economic policies initiated in the USSR at the start of the
drive for the collectivization of agriculture in 1928 were designed:
(a) to substitute large farms susceptible to centralized planning
for the small, atomistic farms of the Russian peasantry; (b) to apply
to those new farming units large inputs of capital equipment such
as tractors, agricultural machinery, and combines, which would result
- 4 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4 ?
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 1
Estimated Production of Tractors in the USER
1940, 1945-55
Estimate
Plan
1940
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
Physical Units (Thousands)
30
7
13
28
57
86
104
100
111
120
146
175
Index of Production (1950=100)
29
7
13
27
55
83
100
96
107
115
140
168
Increase over Previous Year (Percent)
86
115
103
51
21
. -4
il
8
22
20
15-horsepower Units (Thousands)
73
13
28
66
137
199
245
236
256
267
298.
333
Index of Production (1950=100)
30
5
11
27
56
81
100
96
104
109
122
136
Increase over Previous Year (Percent)
115
136
108
45
23
-4
-8
4
12
12
Value (Million 1951 Rubles)
840
175
358
836
1,669
2,458
2,984
2,849
3,120
3,295
3,823
4,373
Index of Value -(1950=100)
28
6
12
28
56
82
100
95
105
110
128
146
Increase over Previous Year (Percent)
105
134
100
47
21
-5
10
6
16
14
- 5 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 2
Estimated Consumption of Intermediate Distillates by Tractors in the USSR 2/
1940, 1945-55
Agricultural Tractor Park
1940
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954 Plan
1955 Plan
Consumption (Million Metric Tons)
4.17
N.A.
N.A.
3.63
4.80
5.56
6.24
6.95
7.53
8.67
10.09
12.12
Consumption Index (1950=100)
67
58
77
89
loo
111
121
139
162
194
Percentage Increase over Previous Year
32
16
12
11
8
15
16
20
Consumption as Percent of Estimated
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
46
54
55
54
53
52
52
54
58
Total Soviet Intermediate Distillate
Production
Total Tractor Park
1940
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954 Plan
1955 Plan
Consumption (Million Metric Tons)
4.39
N.A.
N.A.
4.14
5.27
6.11
7.26
8.58
10.04
11.40
13.28
15.74
Consumption Index (1950=100)
60
57
73
84
loo
118
138
157
183
217
Percentage Increase over Previous Year
27
16
19
18
17
14
16
18
Consumption as Percent of Estimated
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
52
59
60
62
66
. 69
69
71
75
Total Soviet Intermediate Distillate
Production
a. Intermediate distillates include kerosene and diesel oil. The consumption figures above do not, therefore, represent
total POL consumed. In the earlier years 1940-50, for example, ligroine consumption in the agricultural park amounted to
from one-half to three-quarters of a million metric tons. By 1955 ligroine consumption will be negligible.
.4
- 6 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
SECRET
Ifik,.
III
44 .1;
11,111iih111,3t,
fiatrr ITFOrZA4'
Figure 1. heavy, Genera1-Purpose Tractor, S-80
Figure 2. Medium, General-Purpose Tractor, DT-54
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
SECRET
40,zarEf
41,
70/7,4r
? if ,Itif ;77:Adic4174 ?
"5tio)
-
Figure 3. Small, General-Purpose Tractor, KD-35
Figure 4. Row-Crop Tractor, Universal-1
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
in higher yields, and which would release agricultural labor for
industrialization; and (c) through the new centralized control, to
assure the State a sufficiently large marketed share* of grain to feed
the growing urban population. By placing the tractors and other agri-
cultural machinery in MTS (Machine Tractor Stations) which were located
apart from the farms themselves, the Government separated the capital
equipment from the land. Thus, it increased its control over the
peasantry, tranforming the latter into part-time wage laborers, a kind
of rudimentary rural proletariat, which was, however, still linked to
the past by the retention of the private garden plot. The USSR could
not carry out this sweeping economic and social revolution in the
countryside, without large numbers of tractors.
A. Production.
The present Soviet tractor industry had its beginnings in the
First Five Year Plan (1928-32) with the construction of tractor plants
at Stalingrad and Khartkov. The tractors produced at these plants
were wheeled, kerosene-fueled, general-purpose tractors that delivered
15 drawbar horsepower.** They were Soviet copies of an International
Harvester model of US design. A small wheeled row-crop tractor was
also being produced in Leningrad at the "Krasny Putilovets" factory.
To supplement domestic production, the USSR imported approximately
6o,000 tractors in the period 1928-31. 1/*** In 1932 when Soviet pro-
duction reached 50,000 tractors per year, imports ceased. 2/
During the Second Five Year Plan (1933-37), the USSR built a
large factory at Chelyabinsk to produce a Soviet copy of an imported
Caterpillar model of US design. Production of this heavy track-laying
tractor increased rapidly, reaching 29,000 in 1936. i/ Construction
of this tractor at Chelyabinsk marked the beginning of the significant
Soviet trend toward the production of heavy track-laying tractors.
* The "ffarketed share" is that part of the grain crop which is
available to feed the non-agricultural population. Most of it passes
through state procurement and distribution channels.
Y* Drawbar horsepower may be defined as the horsepower equivalent
Df the pull exerted after the "drawbar" is affixed to the rear oP the
tractor. All statistical accounting measures of tractor power used
in the USSR are in terms of drawbar horsepower. Unless otherwise
specified, the term "horsepower" in this report will always mean draw-
bar.
- 7 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
That trend was climaxed in 1937 (the end of the Second Five Year
Plan) when the tractor plants at Stalingrad and Khartkov converted
from the production of wheel tractors to the production of a kerosene-
fueled track-laying type tractor.*
There were several reasons for the conversion from wheeled
to track-laying models: (1) track-laying traction delivers more
horsepower at the drawbar than wheeled traction with equal engine
horsepower; (2) the Russians held that, with the large fields which
characterized the emerging collective farm system, heavy track-laying
tractors would accomplish considerably more work, and in a consider-
ably shorter time than was possible with wheeled tractors (chiefly by
using large machinery aggregated, such as, combinations of plows,
plows, and disk harrows); (3) the fuel inputs per hectare tilled would
be reduced 30 percent or more; and (4) labor costs per unit of work
would be reduced.. On the other hand, these economies were not with-
out their cost, for track-laying type tractors are considerably
heavier and more complex than wheeled models of equivalent engine
horsepower, and require larger labor, material, and capital inputs to
manufacture. The Russians considered, however, that both the direct
and indirect advantages (for example, less demand for fuel trans-
portation and storage facilities) far outweighed the greater unit
cost of the track-laying models.
Similar considerations prompted the Chelyabinsk tractor fac-
tory to change from a ligroine-fueled model** to a diesel-fueled
model. A diesel tractor consumes approximately 25 percent less fuel.
(by weight) per unit of land tilled, and diesel oil is cheaper than
other fuels.
By the beginning of the Third Five Year Plan (1938-42), the
Russians were producing primarily track-laying tractors of both the
kerosene and diesel categories. Only the "Krasny Putilovets" plant
in Leningrad continued to produce wheeled tractors. Owing to the
greater cost of producing track-laying tractors, problems resulting
* The new tractor was designated SEhTZ-NATI. The foregoing desig-
nation is derived as follows: Stalingrad Kharkov Traktor Zavod
(plant) - Nauchno Avto Traktorniy Institut?TScientiTic Automobile
and Tractor Institute --the designer of the tractor).
** Ligroine is a light petroleum distillate used as a tractor fuel
and as a solvent. In English-speaking countries this fraction is
known as heavy haphtha or a heavy gasoline.
- 8 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
_ _ _ _ _
from change-over to new models, and the impact of the armament pro-
gram, tractor production dropped sharply to 50,000 in 1937 from a
high of 116,000 in 1936.* Only 28,000 tractors were scheduled for
production in 1941. V Approximately half of the 1941 production
was to be gas generator models** designed to operate on non-liquid
fuels.
B. Allocation of Tractors to Agriculture.
Approximately 90 percent of the tractors produced in the USSR
during the period 1932-40 were allocated to agriculture. 2/ During
the period from 1929 to 1938, Soviet agriculture received 537,000
tractors totaling 10 million horsepower from domestic production
whereas total production was approximately 601,000 tractors. XXX The
growth of the agricultural tractor park is shown in Table 3. xxxx In
1936 some 328,500 tractors (comprising 392,400 15-horsepower units)
were in the MTS's servicing the approximately 240,000 collective farms,
with the remainder or the 5,000 State Farms. Y By 1940 there were
435,000 tractors (totaling 557,300 15-horsepower units) in the 7,069
MTS's, and 88,000 tractors (totaling 126,000 15-horsepower units) on
the State Farms. xxxxx As a result of the conversion to production
of track-laying type tractors, the composition of the agricultural
tractor park****** also changed radically over the years. See
Table 4. ****xxx Together with its large number of tractors, Soviet
agriculture in 1940 possessed 182,000 combines and 228,000 trucks. I/
In 1940, however, horses and working cattle still accounted for -
almost half the total draft power available to the collective farms.
See Table 5. xxxxxxxx
* See Appendix A, Table 22.
** A gas generator tractor is one which operates on producer
gas derived from the combustion of solid fuels, for example, wood,
peat, coke, and others. The fuel is burned in a large combustion
chamber mounted on the tractor.
xxx See Appendix A, Table 22.
Table 3 follows on p. 10.
***** See Appendix A, Table 23.
***XX The term "park" is used in the USSR to designate any in-
ventory of capital equipment. It will be used throughout this report
in that sense.
*xxxx** Table 4 follows on p. 10.
*****XXX Table 5 follows on p. 11.
- 9 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
'
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 3
Agricultural Tractor Park of the USSR 2/
Selected Years
Thousand Units
1932
1936
1938
1940
15-horsepower 12/
148.3
513.4
600.3
683.0
Physical
148.5
422.7
483.5
523.0
a. See Appendix A, Table 23.
b. The 15-horsepower unit is a statistical measure used in
the USSR to convert tractors of various types and horsepower
into comparable units for planning and accounting purposes.
It is calculated by dividing the "rated" drawbar horsepower of
the tractor by 15. Thus, the DT-54 tractor with a 'drawbar .
horsepower of 36 equals 2.4 15-horsepower units and the Uni-
versal-1 with a drawbar horsepower of 10 equals 0.67 15-horse-
Dower units.
All conversions from physical units to
15-horsepower units appearing in this report have been done in
accordance with the methodology outlined in Shol'ts.
Table 4
Composition of the Agricultural Tractor Park of the USSR 2/
Selected Years
Percent of Total Horsepower
1932 . 1938 1940
50X1
50X1
50X1
Wheeled
91.5
62.2
56.0
Track-laying
8.
37.8
44.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
- 10 -
S-E-d-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
.1+
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 5
Structure of Draft Power on Soviet Collective Farms 12/
Selected Years
Percent
1928
1932
1937
1940
Working Livestock 2/
98.6
85.7
52.2
48.0
Tractors
1.4
14.3
47.8
52.0
Total
100.0 100.0
100.0 100.0
a. Translated into equivalents of mechanical power.
C. Utilization.
By 1940 the USSR had, in the space of a decade, built up a
large agricultural tractor park. From the point of view of production,
the USSR had achieved considerable success, but from the point of
view of utilizing the equipment produced, the achievements were not
nearly so successful.
In the USSR all field work is measured by an accounting unit,
the so-called "soft plowing unit," into which all work (for example,
plowing, harrowing, and harvesting) is translated using a standard
conversion table promulgated by the central statistical authority.
Similarly, tractor utilization is measured by the average number of
"soft plowing" units performed per 15-horsepower tractor unit, and
fuel consumption is accounted for and planned as an average consump-
tion (in kilograms) per unit of tractor work for each type of tractor.
.Data on utilization are available for 1937 and 1940.
Although total field work increased with the growth of the
park, the decline in tractor productivity from 1937 (hich was the
highest prewar year) to 1940 was pronounced. See Table 6.*
The investment program in tractors and related agricultural
machinery had significant indirect investment effects, such as in-
creased need for buildings and machine tools for repair facilities,
* Table 6 follows on p. 12.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 6
Tractor Work on the MTSts of the USSR La/ 11/
1937, 1940
Soft Plowing Units
1937 1940
Total Field Work 200,114,000 225,000,000
Work per 15-horsepower Tractor Unit 470 411
a. The figures in this and subsequent tables are from official
Soviet sources. Because the average work per tractor unit includes
a small amount of non-field work (approximately 2 percent in 1940)
the MTS tractor park cannot be derived simply by dividing total
field work by the official average of work per 15-horsepower
.tractor
increased petroleum refining capacity, and- increased. transport and
storage facilities. 'No detailed estimate of the agricultural demand
for repair facilities, transport, and other needs, is available,
but it is possible to estimate the demand of the agricultural tractor
park for refined petroleum products for the year 1940 (and for later
years). In 1940 the agricultural tractor park consumed approximately
5 million tons of kerosene, ligroine, diesel oil, gasoline, and
lubricants. In the same year the agricultural sector of the economy
as a whole consumed 66 percent of all kerosene; 82 percent of all
ligroine, and 70 percent of all diesel oil produced in the USSR. 12/
The rapid increase in the agricultural tractor park. enabled
the USSR to greatly expand the sown area during the period 1928-40
in comparison with the pre-collectivization period. See Table 7.*
Most important of all, the application of modern capital
equipment to the larger farm units did not have the expected, and
desired, effect upon productivity per unit of land. In general, the
supply of bread grains barely kept pace with the growth in the popu-
lation so that the amount available per capita was very little above
the pre-collectivization level. In 1940, after some 12 years of
* Table .7' follows on p. 13.
- 12 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 7
Sown Area of all Crops in the USSR 12/
Selected Years
Millions of Hectares
1913
1928
1934
1938
1940
Grain
94.4
92.2
104.7
102.4
111.2
Technical Crops
4.5
8.6
10.7
11.0
11.8
Potatoes and Vegetables
3.8
N.A.
8.8
9.4
10.1
Fodder
2.1
N.A.
7.1
14.1
18.1
Total Sown Area
105.0
113.0
131.5
136.9
151.1
"socialist construction" in the villages, the livestock herds had
not, on the whole, regained the 1928 level, and consequently the
supply of meat per capita had declined somewhat. The marketed share
of the grain harvest, however, had increased from 10.3 million tons
in 1927-28 to 40.0 million tons in 1940. Consequently, for the
peasantry the fruits of mechanization and collectivization consisted
of a stagnated standard of living, coupled with greatly increased
State control over economic activities in the countryside. In two
respects, however, mechanization had been an outstanding success:
(1) the State was able to extract sufficient quantities of grain from
the villages to feed the urban population and to build up reserves
for wartime use; and (2) labor had been released for industrializa-
tion.
D. Effect of World War II.
On the eve of World War II the USSR possessed a tractor indus-
try which had produced approximately 640,000 tractors in the 12 years
since ground was broken for the first major factory. Production in
1940 was approximately 30,000 track-laying tractors despite the fact
that most of the industry's energies were devoted to the armament
effort.*
* See Appendix A, Table 22.
-13-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
World War II wreaked havoc with the tractor industry and with
the agricultural tractor park. Both the Stalingrad and Khar'kov trac-
tor plants were destroyed, and the Chelyabinsk tractor plant was con-
verted to the production of heavy armored track-laying vehicles.
Some of the machinery from the Stalingrad and Kharlkov plants was
evacuated to Rubtsovsk in the southern Kuznetsk Basin for what became
known as the Altai Tractor Factory. This plant produced 3,000 of
the SKhTZ-NATI 32-horsepower track-laying tractors by October 1944.1)1/
The tractors in the countryside, meanwhile, were being decimated by
requisitions for the Red Army, destruction and seizure by the Germans,
lack of spare parts, and by the shortage of skilled drivers and
mechanics. In the unoccupied regions, the draft power available for
field work declined 32 percent while the truck park was reduced to
11 percent of 1940. 12/ The value of the production of spare parts
declined roughly from 594 rubles per tractor in 1940 to a low of 142
rubles per tractor in 1942 and then rose during 1943 to 239 rubles
per tractor. 1.?i
The output of soft plowing units per 15-horsepower unit
declined from 411 in 1940 to 182 in 1943, and the aggregate for the
unoccupied areas was only about 100 million soft plowing units 12/
compared to 225 million in 1940.* In 1943, each (15-horsepower unit)
was supplied with only 4.2 tons of fuel compared to more than 8.1
tons in 1940. 1L31 In the later years of the war some 25,000 tractors
were transferred from the unoccupied areas to the newly recovered
areas. 12/ Finally, according to Voznesenski E2/ the Germans destroyed
or looted 137,000 tractors. Direct battle losses where the track-
laying models were used extensively as prime movers were apparently
not included. At the end of the war the bulk of the agricultural
tractor park consisted of the 15-horsepower, wheeled, kerosene-fueled
SKhTZ tractors, most of which had been produced prior to 1938. At
the end of 1945 the entire Soviet agricultural tractor park was esti-
mated at 469,000 15-horsepower units, as compared with a high of
683,000 in 1940.**
II. Tractor Production in the Fourth and Fifth Five Year Plans.
A. Postwar Situation.
The destruction and dislocation wrought by the war in the
tractor industry and in its consumers, the MTS's,presented the USSR
See Appendix A, Table 33.
** See .Appendix A, Table 30.
-14-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
a
S-E-C-R-E-T
with very serious problems in the Fourth Five Year Plan (1946-50).
In the industry, the Chelyabinsk tractor plant not only had to be
reconverted to tractor production, but also had to participate in
the postwar plans for production of track-laying armoured vehicles.
The Stalingrad and Khar'kov tractor plants virtually had to be
rebuilt from the ground up. Many of the MTS repair shops and fuel
storage facilities had also been destroyed.
By 1946 the decline in the agricultural tractor park,
together with the general dislocation occasioned by the war, had
seriously affected not only agricultural production but also the
entire collective farm structure. Official Soviet statistics indi-
cate that in 1945 the grain harvest was about 55 percent of 1940,
sugar beets approximately 4o percent, and cotton approximately 45
percent of 1940. 21/ Livestock had declined sharply 22/ and the
areas sown to grain and technical crops were considerably smaller. 2.31
The private plots of the peasantry had encroached upon the land of
the collective farms, and in many cases land ostensibly cultivated
by the collective was in fact being cultivated for the benefit of
individual peasant households. Despite war losses, horses (in 1945)
still accounted for more than 40 percent of total draft power avail-
able for field work, and a substantial part of the herd apparently
was in the hands of individual households rather than the collective
farms. 2/1/
In the eyes of the Soviet leadership the decline in agri-
cultural productivity and peasant encroachment upon collective farm
land constituted serious threats to the economic and political
stability of the regime. Elimination of these threats revird, among
other things, the expeditious reconstruction of the agricultural
tractor park. This determined the objectives and the function of the
Soviet tractor industry in the Fourth Five Year Plan.
B. Plans and Objectives, 1946-50.
The plan for the production of tractors embodied in the Fourth
Five Year Plan was very ambitiously aimed to provide the tractors
necessary to rebuild the agricultural tractor park, to replace out-
worn prewar tractors, to bring agricultural field work closer to the
ultimate goal of complete mechanization,. and, at the same time, to
provide tractors for the other sectors of the economy. Despite almost
complete destruction and dislocation in the industry, production for
the entire Plan was to be at least 348,000 tractors, comprising
-15 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
814,000 15-horsepower units.* Total production in the 5 years imme-
diately preceding the war had been approximately 278,000 tractors
equaling 501,000 15-horsepower units. The 1950 planned output was
to be 112,000 tractors, 22/ or almost four times the 1940 output.
Approximately 80,000 tractors were to be the heavy track-laying,
general-purpose models,** or more than two and one-half times the
1940 output of track-laying tractors. In addition to the reconversion
and reconstruction of the large prewar plants at Chelyabinsk, Khar'kov,
and Stalingrad, three new plants were to be constructed and the plant
at Altai was to be expanded and completed.
Reconstruction had begun at the Stalingrad plant some time in
1944, and at the Kharlkov plant immediately after the German evacua-
tion. These plants were to resume production of the prewar general-
purpose SKhTZ-NATI. In order to take advantage of the greater effi-
ciency and lower cost of diesel engines, the Stalingrad and Khar'kov
plants were, by 1949, to convert to the DT-54, a diesel model based
upon the SKhTZ-NATI design. Eighty percent of the parts on the new
DT-54 were interchangeable with the SKhTZ-NATI. The Chelyabinsk
plant experienced difficulties in reconverting to tractor production
and was not able to get into full production until the last few months
of 1946. Instead of the model produced in 1940, it began production
of a new larger track-laying diesel, copied from the American "Cater-
pillar" D-7.***
By 1950 both the Kbartkov and Stalingrad plants were to be
producing the DT-54 model at the rate of 25,000 per year, and the
Chelyabinsk plant was to be producing the S-80 model at the rate of
18,000 per year. E?/
Paralleling the Khartkov and Stalingrad plants, the Sltai
plant was to convert from the SKhTZ-NATI to the DT-54 at the end of
the Five Year Plan period, producing at the rate of approximately
15,000 per year.
* See Appendix A.
** Postwar Soviet tractor production can be divided conveniently
into two categories: "general-purpose" and "row-crop." General-
purpose are heavy, all-purpose, track-laying models, and row-crop
are small (usually wheel) tractors designed for cultivation between
rows.
*** In contrast to the American prototype which delivers 80 horse-
power, however, the USSR copy is governed to deliver only 65 horse-
power in order to conserve fuel.
-16-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
As necessary as the large tractors were to the fulfillment
of the agricultural goals of the Fourth Five Year Plan, track-laying
tractors of 36 horsepower and above were, however, too large to be
used with Maximum efficiency on the smaller fields that characterized
the collective farms of the podsol' regions.* For podsol' regions
the Russians designed a smaller, track-laying, diesel tractor of 24
horsepower, the KD-35 ("Kirovets" Diesel - 35). The Fourth Five
Year Plan provfded for the construction of 2 new plants to build this
tractor, 1 at Lipetsk and 1 at Minsk. Both locations are in or near
the podsol' regions. Planned production at these plants in 1950 was
approximately 5,000 for Minsk and 5,000 for Lipetsk. 2_8./
All of the track-laying models were designed for grain
cultivation and deep plowing (8 - 12 inches). Apparently only two
types of row-crop tractors were scheduled for production during the
Fourth Five Year Plan. The Vladimir tractor plant was to produce
the 10-horsepower kerosene-fueled U-1, 2, and 4 models, and the
Khar'kov Tractor Assembly Plant was to produce the 7-horsepower,
gasoline-fueled KhTZ-7. Actual production of the KhTZ-7 did not
begin until 1950. Most of the parts for this tractor were originally
made in the main Khar'kov Tractor Factory but it was assembled at a
separate assembly plant. In 1950 the Vladimir plant was scheduled
to produce 18,000 tractors, L2.1 and, while planned production of the
KhTZ-7 for 1950 is not available, it is probable that not more than
2,500 were scheduled.**
The Fourth Five Year Plan also provided for a gas generator
tractor for the timber industry. This was the KT-12, a track-laying
30-horsepower tractor operating on generator gas produced from wood
chips, thus being admirably suited to the timber industry, which
experiences considerable difficulty with supplies of petroleum products
because logging enterprises are usually far from the centers of petro-
leum production and railheads. Approximately 4,500 KT-12 tractors
were to be produced during the entire period, 12/ but the Plan was
subsequently revised upward. L./
In general, in the Fourth Five Year Plan the Russians continued
to implement their theory that application to the land of larger capital
* In general the coniferous forested areas north of the chernozem,
or "black earth," regions. The podsol' regions are characterized
by white or gray ashlike soil.
** Based upon the scale of production actually achieved in 1950.
-17-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
units would lower operating costs and increase productivity per unit
of land. To increase yields the Russians in the postwar period
planned two basic innovations in cultivation practice: (1) the in-
crease of average depth of plowing from approximately 6 or 7 inches
to at least 8 to 10 inches, and in some cases to 12 inches; and,
(2) the introduction of crop rotation with perennial grasses which
would not only increase fertility but would also provide the fodder
base necessary for the livestock plans. For deep plowing of heavy
sod,track-laying diesel tractors are, of course, much more efficient
than wheeled models. However, since the heavy tractors are not
suitable for the harvesting part of fodder cultivation, the Russians
apparently relied upon the collective farm herds of horses and work-
ing cattle for most aspects of fodder cultivation.
C. Plan Fulfillment, 1946-50.
The production goal of 348,000 tractors) amountingto approxi-
mately 814,000 15-horsepower units in the Fourth Five Year Plan)proved
to be beyond Soviet capabilities. For several reasons the plan was
only about 83 percent fulfilled. The reconstruction of the Stalingrad
and Khar'kov plants lagged and the Chelyabinsk plant experienced
great difficulties in reconversion. Construction at the new plants
at Minsk and Lipetsk was slow and wasteful. It is quite apparent
that the estimates of construction costs and indirect investment effects
in the entire Fourth Five Year Plan were too low, and not precise
enough. The tractor industry part of the plan was no exception. Re-
quirements for material input, fuel, power, metal, and other require-
ments' had also been underestimated; apparently machine tools were the
only items available to the industryin sufficient quantity and close
to the original time schedules. 2/ It is probable, however, that the
tractor industry was given priority over the MTS's which did not receive
the planned quantities of machine tools for the repair installations.
1. Tractor Allocations.
Lagging production in the tractor industry and in the
agricultural sector of the economy were the principal items of
business placed before the February 1947 Plenum of the Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party of the USSR. In his report to the
Plenum, Andreev, then a member of the Politbureau, noted that in
1946 the tractor industry (then part of the Ministry of Agricultural
Machine Building) had failed to deliver nearly 3,500 tractors to
agriculture. 13./ On the basis of Andreev's report, the Central
-18-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Committee issued a decree specifying that in 1947 agriculture was
to receive some 37,900 tractors, 34,000 of which were to be track-
laying models. Apparently the allocations also represented the
total planned production for the tractor industry. According to
the same decree the industry was to produce 75,500 tractors in
1948, 67,000 of which were to be allocated to agriculture. The
plans outlined in the February decree were not fulfilled. A
summary of planned and actual production follows in Table 8.
The actual production of tractors during 1946-50 expressed in phy-
sical units and in 15-horsepower units is presented in Appendix A.
Table 8
? Tractor Production in the USSR
1946-50
Thousand Units
Plan 2/
(1946-50
Actual
(19)-i-6-50
Fulfillment
(Percent)
Physical
348
288
83.0
15-horsepower
814
676
82.0
Plan
Actual
(1950)
(1950)
Physical
112
104
92.8
15-horsepower
265
245
92.5
a. The total plan for 1946-50 has been interpolated from
the known yearly plans for 1946, 1947, 1948 (February
1947 Plenum), and 1950 plan as given in the Fourth Five
Year Plan. For further details see Appendix A.
By the end of 1948 the Soviet leadership realized that
because of lagging construction, bad planning, shortage of material
inputs, and other reasons, the tractor production goals of the Fourth
Five Year Plan could not be attained. Consequently, the plants at
Chelyabinsk, Stalingrad, and Kharikov which produced the heavy track-
laying tractors were given priority over the new plants being con-
structed for the smaller tractors. There was good reason for this
-19-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
decision because the heavy tractors were primarily designed for
grain cultivation. An adequate supply of bread grains is necessary
for survival. A very inadequate supply of vegetables, meat, and
dairy products is inconvenient, and undesirable, but can be sacri-
ficed for a time.
As a consequence of the continued priorities for the
production of the heavy tractors, the neW Minsk and Lipetsk plants, .
designed to produce the 24-horsepower diesel, track-laying KD-35 were
not completed. The original plan had provided for the installation
in these plants of modern automatic transfer lines for machining
the engine blocks at a mass production rate of 35,000 to 37,000 per
year. 22/ These transfer lines were produced and installed very
close to the original schedule, but were not fully used because of
the failure to complete the plants. In 1950 the Minsk plant produced*
only about 500 KD-35 tractors, and the Lipetsk plant only 4,500, as
compared to a plan of at least 5,000 for each. Development of a
22-horsepower, wheeled model, designated "Belarus," with the KD-35
diesel engine, was also delayed. The impact of the failure to pro-
duce the KD-35 according to plan was somewhat eased by the collective
farm consolidation program which the regime introduced in 1950. This
administrative consolidation involved the reduction in the number of
collective farms (from 250,000 in 1950 to 97,000 in 1952) and the
merger of their fields as well, which meant that the larger tractors
could now be utilized more efficiently. Thereafter, the future of
the KD-35 model lay primarily in wheeled versions and in modifica-
tions of the tracked model which make it (KDP-35) suitable for row-
crop tractor cultivation. The only major producer of wheeled row-
crop tractors in 1950, the Vladimir Tractor Plant, also lagged, pro-
ducing only 13,500 tractors in 1950 as compared to a planned goal
of about 18,000.
2. Spare Parts.
Substantial quantities of ferrous and non-ferrous metals
are consumed in the production of tractors and the spare parts
necessary to maintain the tractor inventory in operating condition
in the USSR. The inputs listed in Table 9* are minimum inputs for
the current range of production, about 6o,00o per year for the
standard general-purpose agricultural tractor, the DT-54.
* Table 9 follows on p. 21.
- 20-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 9
Material Inputs for the DT-54 Tractor
Material
Finished Weight 2/
(Kilograms)
Coefficient 12/
of Utilization
Minimum Estimate of
Input Requirement for
One Year's Production
of 6o,000 Tractors 2/
(Metric Tons)
Cast Steel
1,329
.85
93,780
Rolled Steel
1,549
.65
142,980
Cast Iron
2,059
.85
145,380
Wire
12
720
Bearings
92
5,520
Copper
1.5
N.A.
90 1/
Bronze
8.5
N.A.
510 1/
Brass
13.7
N.A.
822 1/
Aluminum Alloy
9.9
N.A.
594 1/
a. The finished weight of the various materials is subject to a negli-
gible margin of error because the weights have been calculated from a
Russian parts handbook which lists the material of which each part in the
tractor is made, and weight of the finished part.
b. In the USSR the "coefficient of utilization" is defined as the frac-
tion of weight of the raw inputs which is represented by the weight of
the finished article. For example, a machined shaft which weighs 6.5
kilograms when finished, and has a "coefficient of utilization" of 65
percent, has been machined from a piece of bar stock weighing 10 kilo-
grams. The average coefficient of utilization for ferrous metals in the
DT-54 tractor is given as 65 percent by Russian writers. Hence allowing
a coefficient of 85 percent for cast steel and cast iron is most generous,
and the result probably has a margin of error of about 15 percent. Since
the general problem of resource allocations to the tractor industry,
capital and labor as well as material inputs, is the subject of a current
ORB project, this estimate of material inputs has been introduced pri-
marily to illustrate the general order of magnitude.
c. Estimated margin of error for figures in this column, +0 percent,
-15 percent.
d. Minimum estimates are calculated at a coefficient of utilization
of 1.0.
- 21 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
An important part of the industry's job is the production
of spare parts. However, plant managers do not always see it this
way, and apparently have a strong proclivity toward neglecting the
production of spare parts and concentrating on the production of trac-
tors. Complaints of this practice are almost ceaseless in the press.
Indeed, the February 1947 Plenum found it necessary to decree that,
upon leaving the factories, tractors and combines be accompanied by
a complete set of parts and instruments necessary to put them in
running condition. Furthermore, the decree specified that the plants
must produce: (a) one "complekt" (homogeneous spare parts kit) of
parts for "current repair" (rings, bearings, gaskets, and so forth)
for each 10 tractors produced; and (b) one "complekt" of parts for
"capital repair" (pistons, crankshafts, major bearings, and other
major parts) for each 50 tractors produced. lY Nineteen different
ministries were engaged in the production of spare parts for tractors
in 1947. Whereas available information does not permit an estimate
of the aggregate value of yearly Soviet spare parts production, some
idea of the order of magnitude can be obtained. For example, 100,000
S-80 tractors (65-horsepower, track-laying diesels) produced at the
Chelyabinsk plant in the postwar period would require in a 10-year
period the following number of major spare parts 17/: piston rings,
54,600,000; bearings, 15,041,000; lower rollers, 5,460,000; pistons,
5,250,000; transmission gears, 4,580,000; cylinder sleeves, 2,730,000;
track links, 34,270,000*
It is necessary to replace approximately half of the track
links on each S-80 tractor each year. Thus, when 100,000 S-80 trac-
tors in the USSR have each reached an age of 10 years, they will have
consumed in the aggregate more than 500,000 metric tons of cast steel
for the replacement of track links alone. The total cast steel re-
quired for this single replacement item is equal to the total cast
steel input needed for 6 years' production of new DT-54 tractors at
the current production level of 6o,000 tractors per year.*
The Soviet spare parts problem has been complicated by
the shortage of quality metal inputs and of tempering and hardening
equipment. Until 1951,when higher quality inputs became available,
the factory?guaranteed period before capital repairs for the S-80
tractor was only 2,000 hours. By the end of 1951, the guarantee was
4,000 hours, 6,000 by the end of 1952, and 10,000 by the end of
1953. 2.!Y
* This has been calculated at a coefficient of utilization of 85 per-
cent for finished part over raw material input. See DT-54 input
table, p. 211 above.
- 22-
S-E-C-R-E-T
t,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Rapid expansion of the agricultural tractor park and
retention of pre-1938 tractors continued to aggravate the problem
of producing sufficient spare parts. For example, in 1953 the
Russians installed two automatic lines for the production of piston
pins. Each line was 100 meters long and consisted of 15 automatic,
special-purpose machine tools, capable of producing 450,000 piston
pins per year for the SKhTZ and the SKhTZ-NATI tractors. .2_/ This
quantity of piston pins would provide new pins for 100,000 tractors.
It must be remembered that the SKhTZ tractor went out of production
in 1937: The SKhTZ-NATI tractor was replaced by the DT-54 tractor
at the KharTkov and Stalingrad plants in 1949 and finally ceased
production entirely with the conversion to the DT-54 tractor at the
Altai plant in the latter part of 1951.
The production of spare parts remained behind schedule
although the expansion of the agricultural tractor park and the
retention, rather than retirement, of prewar tractors rapidly in-
creased demand. The persistence, the seriousness, and the institu-
tional nature of spare parts shortages are summed up by Khrushchev's
statement in his report to the February 1954 Plenum of the Party1-12/:
"It is quite reasonable to ask the Minister of Machine
Building, Comrade Akopov, why the production of spare
parts has become a kind of insoluble problem, why the
workers of this Ministry show an irresponsible attitude
toward this important task and aloofness from the needs
of MTS and State Farms. It is essential to raise the
responsibility of workers of industry and distribution
organs for the implementation of the production plan
and the delivery of spare parts, and to sternly demand
an accounting from executives who are wrecking the plan
and are not assuring the dispatch of spare parts."
In the last 2 years of the Fourth Five Year Plan pro-
duction rose rapidly, reaching approximately 92 percent of the
original production goal for 1950 of 112,000 tractors. Aggregate
production for the period (19)+6-50) was 288,000 tractors, com-
prising 676,000 15-horsepower units. The principal weaknesses in
the industry at the beginning of the Fifth Five Year Plan were the
failure to complete the Minsk and Lipetsk plants, and the chronic
shortages of spare parts which the industry apparently could not
satisfy.
-23-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
III. Production Goals of the Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55).
When the Fifth Five Year Plan was finally announced in August 1952,
the goals (later to be revised upward by the September-October 1953
decrees) for the tractor industry were quite modest, in comparison with
those of the Fourth Five Year Plan. The program for the production
of tractors set forth in the Fifth Five Year Plan was a simple projec-
tion of the trend at the end of the Fourth Five Year Plan. In 1955
the planned production of 292,000 15-horsepower units was to be only
19 percent above the 1950 production of 245,000 units. In contrast
to the Fourth Five Year Plan, the construction of additional tractor
plants was not to be necessary. The planned increase in production
could easily be accounted for by completion of existing plants still
unfinished or not yet up to capacity in 1950. The new models to be
introduced were designed for raw-crop and fodder cultivation and were
to be adaptations of already-existing models. Mass production* of
the "Belarus," was to begin by the middle of the Plan, and the experi-
mental KDP-35 was to be introduced. In 1950 the small assembly plant
in KharTkov producing the KhTZ-7 received components from 150 wide-
spread subcontractors, but by mid-1952 these had been reduced to 5
plants in the Kharikov area, the principal plant being the heavy
tractor plant. The original Fifth Five Year Plan provided for
production of 16,000 tractors in 1955.** In 1955 the Soviet tractor
industry as a whole was to produce approximately 47,000 15-horse-
power units more than in 1950 with the row-crop tractors accounting
for more than 90 percent of the increase.***
Production dropped slightly in 1951. This drop, however, was
not occasioned by any general cutback in production. Rather, it
was the result of losses incurred in a shift of production of the
special-purpose KT-12 timber-hauling tractor from Leningrad to the
Minsk tractor plant, and a changeover at the Altai plant from the
kSKhTZ-NATI kerosene tractor to the DT-54 diesel tractor. The fact
that the chassis and running gear of the KT-12 timber-hauling trac-
tor is a direct copy of a German World War II prime mover suggests
the possibility that the Kirov plant in Leningrad may have converted
to the production of a tractor modified to meet the specifications
of a military prime mover. While there is no confirmation of this
hypothesis, it is offered because of the estimated paucity of Soviet
* In the USSR, "mass production" of tractors is defined as a rate
of output of at least 5,000 units per year. 121/
** See Appendix A.
*** See Appendix A.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
military prime mover production in 1946-50. With the possible excep-
tion of the Kirov plant in Leningrad, therefore, there was no conver-
sion to what might have been military production in the tractor
industry at any time in the postwar period.*
In 1950 the Minsk tractor plant was not completed and was pro-
ducing at only a fraction of the original Plan despite the fact that
a number of highly specialized and expensive machine tools had been
installed -- for example, the largest automatic transfer line in
the USSR. The decision to make this plant responsible for KT-12
production, at the very time it had been prepared for KD-35 produc-
tion, further limited Soviet capabilities to produce the KD-35
and the row-crop models based on it.
The main body of the industry, the Khar'kov, Stalingrad, and
Chelyabinsk plants, continued in 1951 to operate at the same levels
as in 1950. The Vladimir plant began to approach. its planned capac-
ity of 18,000 row-crop tractors, and production of the small
KhTZ-7 tractor at Khar'kov increased.
Over-all production in 1952 increased to approximately 111,000
tractors comprising 256,000 15-horsepower units.** Whereas 1952
production represented a sizable increase over 1951, it represented
only a 6.5 percent increase in physical units over 1950 and a still
smaller increase of only 4.4 percent over 1950 in 15-horsepower units.
One of the few noteworthy events was the designing and testing of a
very heavy track-laying diesel, the S-140, a 6-cylinder version of
the 65-horsepower S-80. This new tractor was developed at the
Chelyabinsk plant but production was limited to experimental models.
The uniqueness of this tractor lies in the fact that it is the only
known Soviet tractor adapted primarily for a nonagricultural use,
in this case, construction. A gas generator version of the DT-54
diesel (designed to operate on various solid fuels) was developed,
and production initiated at the Stalingrad and Khar'kov plants.
When Stalin's heirs laid down the new policy in August-September
1953, the USSR possessed a tractor industry producing 111,000 trac-
tors comprising 256,000 15-horsepower units per year. Of these,
* It should be noted again that the Kirov Plant in Leningrad
historically has never been a permanent member of the tractor indus-
try as have the other plants. Thus its phasing out of tractor pro-
duction cannot be considered too unusual.
** See Appendix A.
-25 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
85,000 tractors comprising 233,000 15-horsepower units were track-
laying diesels. Moreover, the industry required relatively little
additional investment in order to meet its goals in the Fifth
Five Year Plan. Production of wheeled tractors) so necessary to
row-crop cultivation, still lagged, however, and was below the rate
of increase necessary to meet the Plan.
IV. Tractor Allocations and Economic Policy, 1946-53.
The agricultural tractor park of the USSR consisted of 360,000
physical units equaling 469,000 15-horsepower units at the beginning
of 1946 (the first year of the Fourth Five Year Plan) as contrasted
with 523,000 tractors equaling 683,000 15-horsepower units in 1940.
The bulk of the 1945 park consisted of the older wheeled models, and
the park as a whole was in a bad state of repair. Consequently, the
Russians scheduled the allocation of 325,000 tractors comprising
720,000 15-horsepower units for delivery to agriculture during the
Fourth Five Year Plan.* The industry's failure to fulfill the pro-
duction plan resulted in the allocation to agriculture of only
244,000 tractors equaling 536,000 15-horsepower units.*
It is probable that with planned allocations to agriculture exceed-
ing the total park in 1940 the Russians hoped to retire many prewar
tractors. The agricultural tractor park in 1950 is estimated to have
contained more than 200,000 wheeled tractors of pre-1938 vintage.*
At the end of the Fourth Five Year Plan the total agricultural tractor
park reached 878,000 15-horsepower units.* See Table 10.**
Actual allocation to agriculture for 1946-50 in 15-horsepower
units is summarized in Table 11.***
In the first three years of the Fourth Five Year Plan allocations
to the agricultural sector of the economy apparently received top
priority with few tractors remaining for other sectors. Beginning
with 1949, however, there appeared to be a shift in allocational
priorities. Although 1950 production (in physical units) reached
92 percent of the original production plan, the allocation to
* See Appendix A.
** Table 10 follOws on p. 27.
*** Table 11 follows on p. 27.
-26-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 10
Agricultural Tractor Park of the USSR
on MTS's and State Farms 2/
Selected Years
Thousand 15-horsepower Units
1936 1940 1946 1948 1950
mTs's 392.4 557.3 400.o 515.0 718.0
State Farms 121.0 125.7 88.0 113.0 160.0
Total 513.4 683.0 488.0 628.0 878.0
a. See Appendix A.
Table 11
Allocations of Tractors to Agriculture in the USSR
1946-50
Thousand 15-horsepower Units
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 Total 1946-50 (Percent of Plan)
Plan 34 87 152 203 244 720 100
Actual 28 59 119 150 180 536 74
agriculture in that year was only 74 percent of the original allo-
cation plan.* Production for the entire period (19)#6-50) reached
87 percent of the goal, while allocations to agriculture were only
75 percent of the originally planned allocation. Most of the
allocational underfulfillment for agriculture occurred in 1949 ,and
1950. It is probable that, despite their importance, agricultural
allocations were reduced in order to satisfy demand for tractors
elsewhere in the economy.
* In order to fulfill the original Fourth Five Year Plan goal of
720,000 15-horsepower units to agriculture, allocations in 1950 must
have been planned at approximately 244,000 15-horsepower units, as
compared with planned production of approximately 270,000 15-horse-
power units.
-27-
S-E-C-R-E-T
-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Known increases in tractor requirements occurred in several areas
of economic activity. For example, the Fourth Five Year Plan planned
the allocation (during the period of 19)46-50) Of 12,000 tractors
comprising 40,000 to 50,000 15-horsepower units to the timber industry.
These were to consist of the KT-12 timber-hauling tractor, and the
S-80 track-laying diesel.
The planned allocations to the timber industry were probably
revised upward because by January 1948 the goal for KT-12 production,
alone, was for 16,500 tractors to be produced by the end of 1950.
The petroleum industry is known to use large numbers of tractors,
particularly the S-80 in exploratory drilling. Allocations to con-
struction activities apparently were relatively mall until 1949-50
when the initiation of the "Great Projects" (that is, the Volga-Don
Canal, Stalingrad hydroelectric project, and others) began to require
ever-increasing deliveries. Military construction projects, parti-
cularly airfields, may also have required above-plan allocations of
tractors during 1949-50. It is possible, therefore, that the require-
ments of the timber industry (which was the only industry to con-
sistently underfulfill every yearly production plan), the petroleum
industry, the "Great Projects," and possibly military construction,
created a greater demand on the available tractor output than had
been anticipated. Underestimation by the planners of the demand of
the non-agricultural sector for tractors did, indeed, cut into agri-
culture's allocations. Despite this demand, agriculture received
,about 75 percent of the tractors producedduring the Fourth Five Year
Plan. Inroads into the agricultural allocations were to be even
greater during the l'irst 2 years of the Fifth Five Year Plan, only
to be reversed again in 1953 when agriculture re-emerged as the
dominant economic problem facing the new leadership.
The allocations to agriculture of 536,000 out of a planned
720,000 15-horsepower units in addition to the retention of prewar
tractors enabled the MTS tractor park in 1950 to possess more horse-
power than the entire agricultural sector in 1940. The impact of the
heavier tractors is quite apparent in the ratio of physical units to
15-horsepower units as shown in Table 12.*
Originally the Fifth Five Year Plan provided for increasing the
MTS park by 50 percent and presumably provided for some increase in
* Table 12 follows on p. 29.
-28-
S-E-C-R-E-T
to
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 12
Comparative Structure of Agricultural Tractor Park
of the USSR 2/
1940 and 1950
Thousand Units
NTS Park
State Farm Park Total
(Sovkhoz) Agricultural Park
Physical 15-horsepower Physical 15-horsepower Physical 15-horsepower
Year Units Units Units Units Units Units
1940 435 557 88 126 523 683
1950 415 718 91 160 506 878
a. See Appendix A.
the State Farm Park. Assuming a slight increase in the relatively
low rate of retirement which existed in 1950, the program of increas-
ing the MTS park to its 1955 goal would require an allocation to agri-
culture averaging 125,000 15-horsepower units per year which, in turn,
would result in a net increase of 450,000 15-horsepower units for the
entire 5-year period. In 1951, 137,000 15-horsepower units were allo-
cated to the agricultural sector, and 131,000 in 1952. 21/ Although
this scale of allocation was reduced from the 180,000 15-horsepower
units allocated to agriculture in 1950, the resultant net increase
(111,000.15-horsepower units per year) was sufficient to ensure that
the 1955 planned goal for the agricultural tractor park would be
\attained.
Judging from Stalin's discussion of the problem before the XIX
Party Congress,* the question of more rapid retirement of the pre-
war tractors was still undecided at that time.L1-2/ During the first
9 months of 1953 allocations continued at approximately the 1952
rate. Consequently, the agricultural tractor park in the period
from 1 January.1951 to 1,September 1953 increased as shown in Table 13.**
* Discussed in "On the Economic Problems of Socialism," which was
presented at the Congress. Actually Stalin had written this article
some time in the spring of 1952, but it was not generally released until
the Party Congress in August, 1952.
** Table 13 follows on p. 30.
- 29 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
'Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 13
Agricultural Tractor Park of the USSR
on MTS's and State Farms 2/
1951-53
Thousand 15-horsepower Units
1951
1952
1 September 1953.
MTS's
810
900
969
State Farms
180
199
213
Total
990
1,099
1,182
a. See Appendix A Table 30.
Lower allocations to agriculture permitted increased allocations
to the nonagricultural sectors. In 1951-52 the nonagricultural sectors
of the economy received a total of 76,000 physical units comprising
224,000 15-horsepower units* as compared with an allocation of 45,000
physical units comprising 140,000 15-horsepower units for the entire
period 1946-50. Almost all of the nonagricultural allocations were
track-laying models. The timber and petroleum industries continued
to receive substantial allocations, but construction of the "Great
Projects" apparently accounted for most of the nonagricultural
demand. 1E/ Military construction requirements, particularly air-
fields, may have increased substantially in the early part of the
Fifth Five Year Plan, and some additional tractors may have been allo-
cated to the army for use as prime movers.
V. Socialism in the Countryside.
There are two basic parameters used in the USSR for measuring
the economic efficiency of the tractor in agriculture: (1) quantita-
tive -- the amount of field work performed by each tractor unit; and
(2) qualitative -- the effect of the tractor on productivity in the
agricultural sector of the economy, either by facilitating an exten-
sion of the sown area or by increasing productivity per unit of land,
or by some combination of these factors.
* See Appendix A.
- 30-
$-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
A. Decrease in Agricultural Productivity.
It is one thing to put the tractor on the field and the pea-
sant on the tractor, but it is quite another to induce the peasant
to use the tractor efficiently. In 1937 at the beginning of the
Third Five Year Plan the agricultural tractor park consisted almost
entirely of new tractors, and most of them were the wheeled models
which were relatively simple to operate and repair. Consequently,
in 1937 the Russians reached their highest degree of efficiency in
the prewar period: the average output of soft plowing units per 15-
horsepower tractor unit reached 470 units per year. In the subsequent
years, output per 15-horsepower unit declined owing to spare parts
shortkges, the increasing age of the park, and the drafting of skilled
tractor drivers and mechanics for the armed services. In 1940, each
15-horsepower unit produced only 411 soft plowing units and by the
middle of the war production per unit had dropped to 182. In the
postwar period '(1946-50), despite large numbers of the new, more
powerful, and efficient tractors allocated to agriculture, output
per tractor unit did not exceed the 1937 level until 1949 and even
then fell slightly below the 1937 level again in 1950. See Table 14.
Table 14
Output of Soviet Agricultural Tractor Park
in Soft Plowing Units 21
Selected Years
Soft Plowing Units per 15-horsepower Tractor Unit
1937
1940
1943
1945
1947
1949
1950
1951
1952
470
411
183
299
423
481
469
484
467
a. See Appendix A Table 33.
Despite the greater potential output of each tractor unit
in the postwar period, actual output per unit had remained at the
level of the 1930's. The reasons for the low productivity were
varied. In the first place, the NTS's.experienced considerable
difficulty in keeping the tractors in operation. The shortage of
spare parts was a particularly vexing problem. Obviously also,
spare parts requirements per tractor were much larger in the postwar
- 31-
S-E7C-R-E-T
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
_ _ _ _ _ _
period than before, primarily because of wartime inability to main-
tain equipment at optimum levels. In his report to the February 1947
Plenum, Andreyev noted that at that time there were 10,000 tractors
in the MTS's which could be "rehabilitated" if sufficient parts were
available. Apparently these were tractors requiring major repairs
to put them into running condition. Moreover, Andreyev also noted
that during the 1946 season 20,000 to 30,000 tractors had remained
idle for lack of spare parts. The decree based upon Andreyevia
report provided for considerable production of spare parts and compo-
nents by various plants in the enterprises subordinate to 16 Minis-
tries, among them the Ministry of Armaments and the Ministry of the
Aviation Industry.
In addition to spare parts, repair facilities were also lack-
ing. The February 1947 Decree of the Central Committee specified
that in the period 1947-49 there were to be constructed: 631 repair
shops in MTS's which lacked such shops, 194 rayon shops for capital
repair, and 30 oblast repair factories. In 1947-48 the Ministry of
Agriculture was also to receive 10,000 mobile repair shops (truck
mounted). To equip the repair installations, the February Plenum
decreed that agriculture was to be allocated in 1947, 20,000 machine
tools, primarily from defense industries, and 5,000 new machine
tools from current production in 1947-48. Although the exact degree
to which this plan was fulfilled is not known, the fact remains
that 6 years later when the September 1953 Plenum met, the problem
was still unsolved.
If machinery to maintain tractors and other agricultural
machines was in short supply, skilled labor apparently was in even
shorter supply, This problem received almost no public attention ?
until Khrushchav reported to the September 1953 Plenum of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party. From his report it is apparent
that the population movement from the rural areas to the cities in
the Fourth Five Year Plan transferred the more highly skilled members
of the agricultural labor force to the factories. It must be remembered
that the increment to the industrial labor force planned in the Fourth
Five Year Plan was fulfilled by the end of 1948, undoubtedly reflecting
this movement. The industrial sector of the economy obviously bene-
fited from the acquisition of labor recruits already possessing some
skills (in contrast to the lower level of training and education in
the 1930's), as the Russians reported yearly increments to labor produc-
tivity of 12 percent or more during the Fourth Five Year Plan. Migra-
tion of skilled labor to the cities meant that agriculture paid the
-32-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
price for the high rate of increase in industrial labor productivity
and the increases in industrial production of 20 percent and more
per year.
While a population movement from farm to city is a "natural"
concomitant of industrialization, and was undoubtedly accentuated
in the USSR by the exceptional priorities given heavy industry, the
flight of skilled labor from collective farms and MTS's was influenced
by other factors as well. Following the war, life in the villages
became increasingly unpleasant because of measures imposed by the
State and Party. The principal repressive measure was that tax rates
on the income from the private plots were increased, with that income
calculated on the basis of estimates made by the authorities, not on
the basis of the peasants' actual income from these plots. The con-
sumer goods program in the Fourth Five Year Plan was conservative
from the beginning -- it was underfilled, and the villages fared
badly in the allocations of the few consumer goods that were produced.
The general postwar policy of-applying punitive politico-
economic measures in the agricultural sector of the economy is clearly
set forth in the February 1947 Decree of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party which defined the most important tasks in agriculture
as follows:
1. Revival of the Party and Soviet leadership and control
in the villages and in the MTS's;
2. Elimination of the private encroachment on the collec-
tive farm lands, a development toward which the local Party organs
and Soviets had manifested considerable carelessness, and even con-
nivance;
3. Revision of the NTS plan to emphasize fulfillment of the
basic work indexes such as plowing and harrowing, not just the total
plan for soft plowing units; and
4. Revision of labor payments to encourage high producers,
but to penalize those who underfulfilled the plan.
B. Lower Costs of Production.
Although the larger, more technologically advanced, capital
units (such as tractors) applied to agriculture in the postwar period
-33-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
did not result in any significant increase in the output of agricul-
tural commodities, the direct cost (that is, fuel, repair, wages,
and administrative expenses) of field work was reduced. This was
achieved primarily as a result of the lower fuel consumption of the
newer tractors, and to a lesser degree as a result of increased out-
put of field work per tractor unit per a given number of labor units.
The lower fuel costs of the larger diesel tractors are evidenced in
Tables 15 and 16. The changes in the structure of direct cost of field
work over the years reflect the changes in the structure of the tractor
park.
Table 15
Cost of Fuel in Rubles per Hectare by Tractor Model
Ruble Cost of Fuel for STZ = 100
Wheeled, Kerosene-
Fueled Models
STZ
100
Tracked, Kerosene- TrackedlDiesel-
Fueled Models Fueled Models
U-2 SKhTZ-NATI S-60 S-80 DT-54 KD-35
107 71 78 34 40 43
a. See Appendix A, Table 39.
Table 16
Direct Cost (Sebestoimost') of Tractor Work in the MTS's/12/
Selected Years
Percent of Total Cost
1940
1947
1949
1950
1951
Fuel
49.5
40.7
40.0
39.3
35.8
Repair
18.5
28.0
33.0
30.0
31.6
Wages of Collective Farm Workers
16.8
12.9
11.0
13.7
14.8
Wages of NTS Personnel
11.5
15.0
13.0
14.0
14.7
Administrative Expenses
3.7
3.4
3.0
3.0
3.1
Total Cost 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
-34-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
8-E-C-R-F-T
The increased share of repair expenditures (1951 aver 1940)
reflects the large number of old tractors retained in the agricultural
park, while the trend toward lower fuel costs reflects the introduc-
tion of the diesel tractors beginning in 1950. Direct costs declined
30 percent from 1949 to 1951, but, as Soviet writers point out, this
was due almost entirely to the improved technological 22/ efficiency
of the new tractors and to a reduction in fuel prices, and was not a
result of more intensive utilization of equipment.*
By the end of the Fourth Five Year Plan, output per unit of
capital in agriculture had failed to rise as a consequence of insuffi-
cient ancillary investment (that is, maintenance equipment and so
forth), and to the lack of any significant rise in labor productivity
in agriculture. Operating costs, however, had declined Owing to the
technological improvement in the new tractors. Furthermore, large
allocations of new tractors and retention of several hundred thousand
prewar tractors increased the total field work mechanized in the MTS's
in 1950 to 143 percent of 1940. See Table 17.
Table 17
Tractor Work Performed by the MTS's in the USSR pi
Selected Years
Million Soft Plowing Units
191.1.0 1946 1948 1950
225 140 221 321
a. See Appendix A, Table 34.
In 1940, approximately 52 percent of the basic field work,
plowing, harrowing, sowing, cultivating, and harvesting, was performed
by tractors, and in 1950 about 55 percent. 21/ In the latter year
* It should be noted that no capital charges, not even an amortiza-
tion charge, are included in the direct cost (sebestoimost') category.
Interest charges as the price of capital, of course, do not exist
in the USSR.
- 35 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
?Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Z-E-C-R-E-T
approximately 85 percent of all plowing and 65 percent of sowing was
performed by tractors. 22/ In, general, the cultivation of technical
crops was the most highly mechanized.
The Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55) planned a 50-percent in-
crease in the average daily output of work per tractor by 1955. At
first glance, an increase of 50 percent in daily output seems quite
imposing. "Daily output" refers to the intensity of use, the
actual number of hours of operation, in any given 25-hour period.
Hence an increase in the daily output does not necessarily result in
a corresponding increase in yearly output. In 1952 an editorial in
the MTS journal summed up the current situation in the following
fashion:
It is sufficient to say, that if in 1951 all tractors
had worked 2 shifts (20 hours per day) and had fulfilled
the output norms per shifts, then the period of agriculture
work would be cut in half. 2],/
The significance of this is simply that a very short delay in the
preparation of the seed bed and sowing may mean the difference
between a good crop and a failure, especially in the Russian
steppes.
Since much of the cultivated land in the USSR is in areas
where drought is a constant menace, it is important to complete
preparation of the seed bed and sowing in the shortest possible
time. It is important to note, in Table 18,* that larger tractors
not only do more work .in a given time period but also increase
productivity per worker.
Whereas the average yearly output per 15-horsepower unit
rose to 484 soft plowing units in 1951, it fell to 467 units in
1952, compared with 470 units in 1937.** The official plan fulfill-
ment report for 1952 did not mention output per 15-horsepower
tractor unit, indicating only that all was not well in the MTS's.
Although the volume of agricultural work performed
on the collective farms by the Machine Tractor Stations
* Table 18 follows on p. 37.
** See Appendix A, Table 33.
-36-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-O-R-E-T
Table 18
Norms of Output per Tractor Shift (10 hours)
for Plowing by Tractor Models 2/
Hectares
Output Norms Output Norms
Model per Tractor per Worker
s-8o
15.0
5.0
DT-54 and SKhTZ-NATI
7.7
3.85
KD-35
5.8
2.9
SEhTZ
4.0
2.0
a. See Appendix A, Table 41.
increased significantly in 1952, the Machine Tractor
Stations did not fulfill the work plan for harvesting
of potatoes, ensilaging of fodder, and plowing.2)1/
The reasons for these failures were the same as in 1946-50.
Spare parts were still short, and apparently the ancillary invest-
ment in repair facilities and equipment sheds was insufficient.
For example, from 10 July to 30 October 1953 approximately 15 per-
cent of the entire Ukrainian agricultural tractor park stood idle
for lack of spare parts and proper management. 22/ Total mechanized
field work, however, continued to increase in the Fifth Five Year
Plan despite the continued low productivity per unit. The explana-
tion.was obvious: The MTS's were equipped with an ever-increasing
number of tractors: 557,000 15-horsepower units in 1940; 718,000
in 1950; and 1,0051000 at the end of 1953. See Table 19.*
By the end of 1952, almost 75 percent of all basic field
work was mechanized, including approximately 95 percent of the
plowing and 80 percent of the sowing. 2W By the end of 1953 the
continued increment to the heavy tractor park enabled the Russians
to report that 96 to 97 percent of the plowing, 87 percent of the
sowing, and 70 percent of the harvesting was mechanized. El For
cotton and sugar beets, virtually all plowing and harrowing and
* Table 19 follows on p. 38.
t-
-37-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - 'Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 19
Tractor Work Performed by the MTS's in the USSR
by Soft Plowing Units 21
Selected Years
Million Soft Plowing Units
1940 1946 1948 1950
1951
1952
1953
225 140 221 321
382
430
505
a. See Appendix A, Table 34.
95 to 98 percent of the sowing was mechanized. On the other hand,
the lack of row-crop tractors resulted in a very low mechanization
of row-crop cultivation, so low that the Russians seldom mentioned
it. In September 1953 it was reported that in 1952 only 14 percent
of the potato planting and less than 7 percent of the harvesting
was mechanized. 27 Mechanization in vegetable cultivation was
negligible.
Thus from 1946 to 1952 the increased volume of mechanized
field work in the collectiye farms was a function of the increase
in the number of tractor units. Output per tractor unit and labor
productivity in agriculture apparently were still near the 1937
level. In contrast to agricultural productivity, the Russians
reported increments in the productivity of the industrial labor
force of at least 81 percent per year during the entire period,'
1946-50. Even the decline in direct costs of field work brought
about by the more technologically advanced tractors and lower fuel
prices was reversed-. Direct costs of field work in 1952 increased
as compared with 1951. 22/ As long as these conditions prevailed,
the increased mechanization of agriculture required a continuing
high level of production in the tractor industry.
Mechanization and Stability.
From the Soviet point of view,the primary economic justi-
fication for the tractor industry of the USSR has been its function
as a supplier of capital equipment to the agricultural sector of
of the economy. The industry thus contributes to the stability of the
-38
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-EC7R-E-T
regime by supplying the MTS's with sufficient tractors to insure
maintenance of State control in the countryside and, as a consequence
of this system of control, assurance of a marketed share of the grain
crop sufficient to feed the urban population and to provide for
necessary exports and reserves. Most important of all, the USSR is
ideologically committed to the dogma that mechanization will assure
greater productivity per unit of land.
As has been pointed out, productivity per unit of capital
has been very low, which means that capital investment in the agri-
cultural sector has been greater than would be necessary were the
tractors used with something approaching maximum efficiency. Con-
sequently, direct investment in the industry has been larger than
would otherwise have been necessary, and other sectors of the economy
such as the transportation facilities have been affected accordingly.
Having paid this price for their agricultural mechanization program,
the Russians have received a mixed return.
In respect to assuring the stability of the regime through
mechanization of the countryside, the Russians have achieved con-
siderable success: collectivization was carried out, it survived
the war (although badly shaken in the process), and in the postwar
period it had been reestablished more firmly than ever. From the
point of view of the Soviet leadership, this is an important achieve-
ment, and the tractor industry is an indispensable prerequisite
thereto. With regard to assurance of a marketed share of the grain
crop, the Russians have achieved at least their minimum objective:
the marketed share of the grain crop has increased sufficiently to
feed the urban population and, if World War II is an example, to
build up considerable reserves for emergencies. See Table 20.*
Despite the large number of heavy tractors supplied to
agriculture by the tractor industry, yields apparently have not
increased. Increases in total output have come from increased area
under cultivation for both grain and technical crops. By 1953 the
supply of bread grains still was barely keeping abreast of the
growth in the population, although technical crops may have grown
somewhat faster. What was true for grains was also true for fodder.
As a result, livestock herds in 1953 were still, in general, under
the precollectivization levels, and even under the pre-World War I
levels. Consequently, the per capita supply of animal proteins
Table 20 follows on p. 40.
-39
S-E-C-R-E-T
_ _ _ _ _
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
B-E-C-R-E-T
Table 20
Marketed Share of the Grain Crop of the USSR .?.2/
Selected Years
Million Metric Tons
1913
1927-28
1932
1937
1940
1950
1952
21.3 10.3 19.8 38.0 40.0 38-41
apparently had declined as a result of collectivization.
40.4
Since the
USSR has a rapidly growing population, the failure to raise the pro-
ductivity per unit of land through large-scale mechanization presented
the Soviet leadership with a very serious problem at the midpoint
of the Fifth Five Year Plan. In order to understand the seriousness
of these problems, it is necessary only to briefly examine the ambi-
tious plan for agricultural commodities outlined in the Fifth Five
Year Plan. The goals for increasing yields and the aggregate produc-
tion of major commodities were extremely ambitious, ranging as high
as 80 to 90 percent for meat production. The results of the Plan's -
first 2 years, however, were anything but encouraging. The Russians
reported a smaller grain harvest in 1951 than in 1940, and the grain
harvest reported for 1952 was only 5 percent above 1950. The cotton
harvest in 1952 also showed a negligible increase over 1950. In
1952, large-horned cattle numbers declined by 2 million head. It
was clear to Stalin's heirs that as the Fifth Five Year Plan passed
its midpoint, the original goals for the agricultural sector would
not be achieved.
VI. Post-Stalin Policy.
The foregoing sections of this report have been designed to
define the function of the tractor industry of the USSR in the
economy as a whole, the successes and failures in meeting the
various planned goals, the problem arising in the utilization of
tractors which influenced the demand for them, and the impact of
the tractor on the agricultural sector of the economy.
On 5 March 1953, Joseph Stalin died. In September 1953, his
heirs, in the middle of a Five Year Plan, promulgated a series of
policies designed to deal with some of the serious problems facing
the economy, primarily in agriculture. The problems themselves
- 40 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
were not new. Indeed, in the article entitled "On the Economic Prob-
lems of Socialism" -- his last major work before his death -- which
was delivered to the XIX Party Congress, Stalin was preoccupied with
the socio-economic problem of the private peasant plot) a problem
which in his eyes represented a major threat to the stability and
progress of the regime.
In September 1953, 6 months after the death of Stalin and 2
months after the fall of Beriya, a Plenum of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party met to consider the general problem of the
disproportion between the production of producer goods and the
production of consumer goods and to consider the problem of lagging
production in the agricultural sector.
When the reporter to the Plenum, First Secretary of the Communist
Party, Nikita Khrushchev, delivered his report on agriculture collec-
tivization had been in effect 25 years. During that 25-year period,
tractor power in agriculture had risen from a few thousand 15-horse-
power units to almost 1 million. The number of 15-horsepower units
had almost doubled since 1940, and about 80 percent of the total
had been produced since 1945. Despite the massive capital investment
in the mechanization of agriculture, Khrushchev, in September 1953,
was able to report few successes in increasing the output of agri-
cultural products and in some cases was forced to report complete ?
failure.
Official Soviet statistics show that production in the agri-
cultural sector has lagged far behind the growth of the industrial
sector. See Table 21. A
Table 21
Trends in the Value of Output of the Industrial
and Agricultural Sectors of the Economy of the USSR L./
Selected Years
1940 = 100
1940
1950
1952
1953
Industry
100
173
230
250
Agriculture
100
108-109
110
107-108
- la -
?
S-E-C-R-E-T
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Khrushchev reported that at the end of 1952 there were fewer
cattle, sheep, and goats than in 1928, and only about a million
more swine. .?.2/ According to official Soviet statistics, the grain
harvest in 1952, the best of postwar years, was only 10 percent above
1940, .?._V and the harvest in 1953 was below 1950 owing to drought. 64/
Even the marketed share of grain, 40.4 million tons in 1952-53 was
very little above 1940-41. While Khrushchev was able to report a
considerable increase in technical crops, cotton, and sugar, as com-
pared with 1940, the cotton crop in 1952 showed only a negligible
increase over 1950. .6.2/ The Fifth Five Year Plan called for in-
creases in cotton production of 55 to 65 percent in 1955 as compared
with 1950. .?6/ Very large increases had been planned for other
crops, such as grain, 40 to 50 percent; meat, 80 to 90 percent; and
milk 45 to 50 percent. ?1/ By September 1953 it was obvious such
Increases were out of the question.
The low output per unit of capital equipment and the failure of
mechanization to effect any substantial increase in output per unit
of land continued to show no signs of improvement. Even the one
previously favorable trend, the downward trend in the direct cost
of field work which had continued into 1951, was reversed in 1952.
(The Fifth Five Year Plan had planned a 25-percent decrease in the
direct cost of field work.) 68/ The 1952 increase, according to
Zverev in a speech to the Supreme Soviet on 5 August 1953, resulted
in losses in the MTS's amouhting to 386,000 million rubles.
A. New Program.
Thus in the fall of 1953 the new Soviet leadership found
it necessary to promulgate policies designed (1) to reduce the
disproportion in the growth rates between the agricultural and in-
dustrial sectors of the economy, and (2) to provide the agricultural
sector with sufficient capital equipment to increase output of agri-
cultural products and, at the same time, to increase the produc-
tivity of capital in agriculture.
If the problems facing the Soviet leadership in the fall
of 1953 were not new, the methods chosen to solve them were a
mixture of old and new. Under the new program, allocation of trac-
tors to agriculture was to be increased across the board, and the
increase in row-crop tractors would be strikingly large. Accord-
ing to the Decree of the Party and the Soviet of Ministers, in
the period 1954 to 1 May 1957, allocations to agriculture were to
-42-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
be "not less than 500,000 general-purpose (track-laying diesel)
tractors expressed in 15-horsepower units, and 250,000 row-crop
tractors expressed in physical units." .?.2/ The magnitude of these
goals is highlighted by the fact that at the end of 1953 there
were 46o,000 15-horsepower units of track-laying diesel tractors
in the MTS's and that as of 1 February 1953 22/ the entire agri-
cultural sector possessed only 108,000 row-crop tractors. 11/
For the track-laying diesel tractors, this allocation represents
a yearly average of 150,000 15-horsepower units compared with
115,000 allocated to agriculture in 1952. For the row-crop
tractors, this allocation represents a yearly average of approxi-
mately 75,000 physical units compared with 19,000 row-crop tractors
actually received by agriculture in 1952.
For the tractor industry, the new production goals meant
an increase over the original Fifth Five Year Plan goals for 1955
of about 23,000 15-horsepower units (approximately 19,000 physical
units), almost all of them row-crop tractors. To complete con-
struction of existing tractor plants not yet finished and to provide
additional facilities at completed plants, the industry is to
receive an allocation of 750 million rubles in 1954-55, 350 million
rubles of which are to be for the year 1954. The 750 million
rubles probably represent the total capital investment required to
bring the industry's tractor plants to the capacity needed for the
new goals. Fifteen thousand additional row-crop tractors (approxi-
mately 22,000 15-horsepower units) are to be produced in 1954-55
by the Ministry of the Defense Industry. The installed machine
tools in existing tractor plants are capable of producing enough
engines for the tractors produced in the tractor industry itself
(the then Ministry of Machine Building, now the Ministry of
Automobile, Tractor, and Agricultural Machine Building) as well as
for the tractors to be produced by the Ministry of the Defense In-
dustry.
In increasing the allocations of track-laying diesel trac-
tors, the Russians are planning to extend the sown area, increase
the average depth of plowing, and possibly replace more of the
prewar tractors. The row-crop tractors, which were particularly
behind plan in the postwar period, are to be used in the program to
increase the supply of vegetables, technical crops, and fodder for
the livesttiek program, all of which are essential elements in the
increased consumer goods program first announced in the Supreme Soviet
in August 1953. Planned expansion of the sown area, to be devoted
-1[3-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
to grain cultivation, in 1954 and 1955 is 13 million hectares. 2/
This expansion is to take place in Siberia, Eamakiattag? the Uta14,
the Altai, and the Volga basin and will require approximately 120,000
15-horsepower units of diesel tractors which will be supplied in
1954. 12/ The importance of increasing the area sown to grain crops
is highlighted by the fact that tractor allocations to the new pro-
gram will come from a readjustment of previously planned agricultural
allocation. IV
B. Additional Facilities.
In order to increase the field output per tractor unit, the
Russians significantly increased resource allocations for the con-
struction and improvement of repair facilities and at the same time
promulgated certain policies intended to increase labor incentives.
In 1954-55 they plan to increase the storage capacity of petroleum
products in the MTS's and State farms by more than 2 million cubic
meters (528 million US gallons, or approximately 1.7 million metric
tons of POL). In addition, 500,000 iron barrels, as well as portable
tanks with a capacity of 200,000 cubic meters, will be supplied.
It is estimated that this capacity will more than double the perma-
nent storage capacity of the MTS's and State farms by the end of
1955.* In 1954-56 the construction program for repair facilities
provides for the addition of 2,000 machine repair shops, 4,000
garages, 4,000 sheds, 4,000 houses, and 2,000 dormitories. 22/ The
cost of this total construction program is given as follows 76/:
1954, 3,256 million rubles; 1955, 3,504 million rubles; l95673,752
million rubles; totaling 10,512 million rubles.
In addition, 9 new repair factories and 6 intra-rayon shops
for capital repair of tractors and agricultural machinery are to be
constructed in 1954-55, 36 repair factories and 15 intra-rayon shops
for capital repair presently under construction are to be completed,
and 41 repair factories and 125 intra-rayon shops for capital repair
are to be reconstructed. 27/ This program will require an additional
expenditure of 850 million rubles, which, when added to the NTS
construction, gives a total of 11,362 million rubles. A remarkable
similarity existed between the ancillary investment program set forth
in the decrees of February 1947 and September 1953. Six years had
passed with no solution to the problem. The rate of growth of the
agricultural tractor park continued to outstrip the growth of
* See Appendix B.
-44-
S-E-C-R-E-T
_
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
I.
S-E-C-R-E-T
maintenance facilities. Moreover, during 1954-55 the Ministry of
Agriculture was granted the right to use all amortization allowances
for the construction and equipping of the repair facilities. /L3/
It is estimated conservatively that such allowances- amount to at
least 2 to 2.5 billion rubles per year.
C. Labor Incentives.
In the speeches before the Supreme Soviet in August 1953 and
LI_ the September 1953 Decrees, the Russians announced a series of
measures to improve labor incentives. An increase in the output of
consumer goods was planned. The pressure on the peasants' private
plots was reduced by cutting taxes on peasant income from that
source. Procurement prices for meat mid_ dairy products were raised.
The peasant was henceforth to be encouraged to keep a cow -- a
reversal of the 1949-51 policy, when the private herds were denuded
to build up the collective farm herds. Credit for such purposes and
for private construction was to be supplied. Sale of produce from
the private plots was to be facilitated. 12/ All these measures
were designed not only to increase the output of vegetables, meat,
and dairy products,but also to provide the incentives for increased
productivity throughout the agricultural sector.
One of the most significant aspects of the new program is
the transfer of the tractor drivers from collective farm members to
full-time employees of the MTS1s. Thus the Russians will for the
first time have a fairly substantial agricultural group, between
1.25 and 1.5 million men and their families, converted into wage
laborers. Moreover, a general effort will be made to raise the
educational level and technical competence of MTS personnel by
directing engineers and skilled labor to than. The need for this
may be appreciated from Khrushchev's statement that 30 percent of
the NTS directors, 64 percent of the chief engineers, and 90 per-
cent of the chief mechanics possessed less than an eighth grade
education. Any improvement in labor productivity resulting from
these measures will have a significant effect upon the demand of the
agricultural sector for tractors.
D. Conclusions.
There is little question that the tractor industry will be
able to fulfill its obligations to produce the necessary tractors
and ship them to the MTS's and State farms. Production and delivery
-45-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
schedules on, the row-crop tractors may fall somewhat behind, but
the aggregate effect should not be great. Production of tractors
by the industry at the planned rate, and allocations to agriculture
according to schedule, will increase the total agricultural tractor
park. to approximately 1.5 million 15-horsepower units by the end of
1955. Assuming an output of soft-plowing units per 15-horsepower
tractor unit of at least 500 per year (the 1953 level) and assuming
an increase in total field work (which can be performed by tractors)
of 20 percent, as a result of changes in the crop pattern and exten-
sion of the sown area, it is estimated that agricultural field work
will be totally mechanized by the end of 1956. A few possible
exceptions in certain aspects of vegetable and technical crops may
occur, but the demand for heavy track-laying tractors will be
limited to replacement needs. Production of track-laying tractors
will be running at the rate of 100,000 per year. Replacement needs
after 1956 are estimated at not more than 40,000 track-laying trac-
tors per year, leaving at least 60,000 track-laying tractors avail-
able for allocations to other purposes. Consequently, it is estimated
that beginning in 1957 the production of tractors will be sufficient
to enable the Russians to either: (1) resume the "great projects";
(2) export 25,000 to 30,000 heavy track-laying diesels per year to
carry out collectivization in the Eastern European Satellites;
(3) export to any area deemed expedient (for expqmpTe) China or
some non-Communist nation such as India); and (4) initiate some other
large-scale construction program such as building motor roads; or
(5) carry out, some combination of these alternatives.
The supply of capital equipment to the land will be the
least troublesome problem facing the new leadership. The most
important problem in the current program is whether or not the
Incentives are sufficient to increase labor productivity. If the
tractors are kept in good repair, adequately supplied with fuel,
and utilized with maximum intensity in the fields, then the over-
capitalization which has been characteristic of the past and which
has been continued by the present leadership will be reduced or
may even cease. If the tractor is utilized intensively, the field
work done properly and on time, and full advantage taken of the
possibility of deep plowing with the heavy tractors, the Russians
should at last achieve some increase in productivity per unit of
land as a result of mechanization. In view of the past failures, how-
ever, the success of the current program may well depend upon the success
or failure of the incentives part of the agricultural program.
-46-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
APPENDIX A
TABLES
S-E-C-R-E-T
_ _ _ _ _ _
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 22
Production of Tractors in the USSR _E101
1928-41
Thousands
1941
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
(Plan)
Physical Units
1.2
2.3
15.5
33.0
50.6
78.1
94.5
112.5
115.6
50.0
49.0
33.0
30.0
28.0
15-Horsepower Units 2/
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
32.6
50.3
81.3
116.0
154.7
174.6
90.0
89.0
74.3
73.3
69.5
a. The Soviet "15-horsepower unit" is a planning and accounting unit utilized to reduce different types of
tractors to a common denominator. Each type of tractor is rated at its drawbar horsepower and then reduced to
15-horsepower units: that is, the DT-54 caterpillar diesel model has a drawbar horsepower rating of 36 horse-
power, or 2.4 horsepower units.
S-E-C-R-E-T
_ _ _ _ _
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100-002-4
S-E-C,R-E-T
Table 23
Agricultural Tractor park of the USSR ?1/
1928-40
Thousand Units
Total Agricultural Park
Physical ?.2/
15-Ifforsepowr 831
Machine Tractor Station Park ?1)1/
Physical
15-Rorsepower
State Farm Park
Physical .t2/
15-Horsepower
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
27.6 2/ h/
N.A.
6.7 2/
5.2 a/
34.9 2/ h/
26.1 2/
2.4 2/
1.6 2/
9.7 LI/
8.2 2/
72.1 h/
66.8
31.2
24.8
27.7
32.2
125.3 h/
123.3
63.3
56.6
51.6
59.5
148.5 b
148.3
77.8
71.8
64.0
69.5
210.9
213.9
123.2
117.2
83.2
93.4
12/
276.4
297.5
177.3
183.6
311:7
12/
360.3
N.A.
254.7
285.4
105.6
LA..
422.7
513.4
328.5
392.4
94.2
121.0
454.5
555.0
365.8
445.2
84.5
109.8
12/
483.5
612.6
394.0
495.8
85.0
116.8
507.7
650.0
422.0
533.3
85.0
116.8
523.0
683.0
435.3
557.3
87.7
125.7
2/
a. October figures.
b. In the earlier years the MTS's and State farm parks did not equal the total agricultural tractor park because some tractors were operated by the .
collective farms and other enterprises. By 1940 almost all tractors were either on MTS's or State farms.
c. Calculated as a residual.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 24
Designations and Characteristics
.of Postwar Tractor Models in the USSR
1. ASKhTZ-NATI Altai Stalingrad Khartkov Tractor Zavod (Plant)
NauchnT) Avto Traktorni Institut (Scientific Automobile
and Tractor Instituter -
2. DT-54
Type:
Fuel:
Horsepower:
Weight:
Produced at
Track-laying, general purpose.
Kerosene.
46-52 engine; 32-36 drawbar.
5,100 kilograms (11,200 pounds).
Altai, 1942-52; Stalingrad, 1944-49; Khar'kov,
1945-49.
Diesel Traktor - 54 (rated engine
Type:
Fuel:
Horsepower:
Weight:
Produced at:
horsepower).
Track-laying, general purpose.
Diesel.
54 engine; 36 drawbar.
5,400 kilograms (11,880 pounds).
Stalingrad, November 1949 to present; Khar'kov,
December 1949 to present; Altai, 1952 to
present.
KD-35"Kirovets" Diesel - 35 (rated engine horsepower).
. _
4. KDP-35
Type:
Fuel:
Horsepower:
Weight:
Produced at:
Track-laying, general purpose.
Diesel.
35-37 engine; 24-26 drawbar.
3,700 kilograms (8,140 pounp).
Lipetsk, 1948 to present. A few models were
produced at Minsk in 1950.
"Kirovets" Diesel Propashnikh (cultivator, or rowcrop) - 35
Trated engine horsepower).
The IOP-35 is a KD-35 modified so that there is additional
ground clearance, and fitted with very narrow tracks that
can be used for row-crop cultivation. Its characteristics
are essentially the same as the 10-35.
-50-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
1.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 24
Designations and Characteristics
of. Postwar Tractor Models in the USSR
(Continued)
5. ChTZ-S-80 Chelyabinsk Tractor Zavpd (Plant) "Stalinets"
-Trated engine horsepower). ;
Type:
Fuel:
Horsepower:
Weight:
Produced at:
Track-laying, general purpose.
Diesel.
93 engine (maximum.)-; 65-73 drawbar.
11,400 kilograms (25,000 pounds).
Chelyabinsk, 1946 to present.
6. U-1, 2, or 4 Universal - 1, 2, or 4 (model number).
7. KT-12
8. ICEITZ-7
Type:
Fuel:
Horsepower:
Weight:
Produced at:
Wheeled, rowcrop.
Kerosene..
22-24 engine; 10-12 drawbar.
3,000 kilograms (4,400 pounds).
Vladimir, 1944 to present.
"Kirov" Trelevochnogo (skidding) - 12 (model number).
Type:
Fuel:
Horsepower:
Weight:
Produced at:
Track-laying, special purpose (timber hauling).
Gas generator.
35 engine; 25-30 drawbar.
5,750 kilograms (12,600 pounds).
Leningrad "Kirov," 1948 to 1951; Minsk, 1951
to present.
Kharikov Tractor Zavod (Plant) - 7 (model number).
Type:
Fuel:
Horsepower:
Weight:
Produced at
Wheeled, rowcrop.
Gasoline.
12 engine; 7,5 drawbar.
1,300 kilograms (2,800 pounds).
Khar'kav Tractor Assembly Plant, 1950 to
present. Plans call for production also at
Khar'kov Tractor Plant beginning in 1954.
-51-
S-B-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 24
Designations and Characteristics
of Postwar Tractor Models in the USSR
(Continued)
9. VTZ -T24
10. GT-58
Vladimir Tractor Zavod (Plant) Tractor
?horsepower).
Type:
Fuel:
Horsepower:
Weight:
Produced at:
24 (rated
engine
Wheeled, rowcrop.
Diesel.
2)4 engine; 12 drawbar.
N.A.
To be produced at Vladimir beginning in 1954.
Gas-generator Tractor - 58.
Type:
Fuel:
Horsepower:
Weight:
Produced at:
Track-laying, general purpose.
Gas generator.
53 engine; 30-35 drawbar.
5,850 kilograms (12,880 pounds).
Stalingrad and Khartkov, 1952 to present
11. "Belarus" Named for the Belorusskaya SSR, in which the Minsk Tractor
Plant, producer of the tractor, is located.
Type:
Fuel:
Horsepower:
Weight:
Produced at
Wheeled, rowcrop.
Diesel.
37 engine; 22 drawbar.
3,250 kilograms (7,100 pounds).
: Minsk, 1953 to present. Will also be pro-
duced by the Ministry of the Defense
Industry in 1954 and 1955.
- 52
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 25
Tractor Production in the USSR by Model
1942-55
Tractor Model
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
Physical
15-Horsepower
Physical
15-Horsepower
Physical
15-Horsepower
Physical
15-Horsepower
Physical
15-Horsepower
Physical
15-Horsepower
Physical
15-horsepower
Physical
15-horsepower
Physical
15-horsepower
Physical
15-horsepower
Physical
15-horsepower
Physical
15-horsepower
Physical
15-horsepower
Physical
15
ASKhTZ-NATI
-horsepower
(32-36 Horsepower, Kerosene, Track-Laying)
500
1,100
1,100
2,400
1,900
4,100
5,800
12,400
10,800
23,100
19,500
41,700
33,700
72,000
43,400
92,900
15,000
320100
9,000
16,800
DT-54
(36 Horsepower, Diesel, Track-Laying)
s-8o
(65 Horsepower, Diesel, Track-Laying)
900
3,900
5,300
22,800
13,200
56,800
2,400
17,500
5,800
75,200
40,600
19,000
97,400
81,700
45,300
18,000
113,500
77,400
60,500
18,000
145,200
77,400
60,500
18,000
145,200
77,400
60,000
18,000
139,000
77,400
60,000
18,000
139,000
77,400
ND-35
(24 Horsepower, Diesel, Track-Laying)
700
1,100
3,500
5,600
5,000
8,000
5,000
8,000
6,000
9,600
7,000
11,200
8,000
12,800
11,000
17,600
KDP-35
(24 Horsepower, Diesel, Track-Laying)
1,500
2,400
10,300
16,500
17,000
27,200
"Belarus"
(24 Horsepower, Diesel, Wheeled)
1,000
1,600
15,000
22,500
25,000
36,500
11-1, 2, and 4
(10 Horsepower, Kerosene, Wheeled)
300
200
1,200
800
1,400
900
3,000
2,000
8,300
5,600
12,400
8,300
13,500
9,000
14,800
9,900
16,800
11,300
17,500
11,700
18,200
12,100
19,000
12,700
KhTZ-7
(7.5 Horsepower, Gasoline, Wheeled)
1,400
700
1,900
900
2,500
1,200
5,800
2,900
10,500
5,200
18,000
9,000
XT-12
(30 Horsepower, Gas Generator, Track-Laying)
1,000
2,000
4,00o
8,000
6,500
13,000
3,000
6,000
4,000
8,000
6,000
12,000
6,500
13,000
7,000
14,000
Other (Primarily STZ-1, 15 Horsepower,
Kerosene, Wheeled)
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
Yearly Total
500
1,100
1,100
2,400
2 200
4,300
7,000
13,200
13,100
27,900
27,800
66,5oo
56 9oo
137,500
86,200
198,800
104,000
244,900
122)222
235 500
110,600
255,700L2,122
267 400
146,500
298,500
175,000
333 400
Total, 1942-45
Physical 10,800
21,000
15-Horsepower
- 53 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 26
Tractor Production in the USSR by Producing Plants
1942-55
Units
Tractor Plant
Model
1942-45
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954 Plan
1955 Plan
Physical
15-horsepower
Physical
15-horsepower
Physical
15-horsepower
Physical
15-horsepower
Physical
15-horsepower
Physical
15-horsepower
Physical
15-horsepower
Physical
15-horsepower
Physical
15-horsepower
Physical
15-horsepower
Physical 15-horsepower
Khar'kov L3Y
KhTZ-NATI, DT-54
500
1,070
2,200
4,800
5,600
12,000
12,450
26,600
17,700
38,200
19,600
47,000
19,600
47,000
20,500
49,200
20,500
49,200
20,000
46,000
20,000
46,000
Stalingrad ?1/
STZ-NATI, 02-54
2,850
6,100
5,200
11,100
7,300
15,600
13,740
29,400
18,000
38,900
21,000
50,400
22,700
54,500
25,000
6o,000
25,000
60,000
25,000
58,000
25,000
58,000
Altai gy
ATZ-NATI, 02-54
5,900
12,630
3,400
7,200
6,6co
14,100
7,500
16,000
10,100
21,600
15,000
32,100
12,000
28,800
15,000
36,000
15,000
36,000
15,000
35,000
15,000
35,000
Chelyabinsk ?21
s-8o
900
3,900
5,300
22,800
13,200
56,800
17,500
75,200
19,000
81,700
18,000
77,400
18,000
77,400
18,000
77,400
18,000
77,400
18,000
77,400
Minsk 22/
KD-35
500
800
1,000
2,000
4,000
8,000
7,000
13,600
16,500
28,000
22,000
36,000
Lipetsk 21/
KD-35, KDP-35
700
1,100
3,500
5,600
4,500
7,200
5,000
8,000
6,000
9,600
8,500
13,600
18,300
29,300
28,000
44,800
vimimir 2/
U-1, 2, and 4 (vTz-T24)
1,500
1,000
1,400
900
3,000
2,000
8,300
5,600
12,400
8,300
13,500
9,000
14,800
9,900
16,800
11,300
17,500
11,700
18,200
12,100
19,000
12,700
Khar'kov Assembly Plant
KhTZ-7
1,400
700
1,900
900
2,500
1,200
5,800
2,900
10,500
5,200
18,000
9,000
Leningrad
KT-12
1,000
2,000
4,000
8,000
6,500
13,000
2,000
4,000
Other (primarily Varz)
STZ
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
Ministry of the Defense Industry
5,000
7,500
10,000
14,500
Total Production
10,750
20,800
13,100
27,900
27,800
66,5oo
56,890
137,500
86,200
198,800
------
104,000
244,900
100,000
235,500
110,800
255,700
120,300
2.6.12122
146,500
298,500
175,000
333,400
Estimated Accuracy (Physical Units)
-2 Percent
-2 Percent
-2 Percent
-4 Percent
-3 Percent
+3 Percent
-3 Percent
-3 Percent
+3 Percent
- 54 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 27
Production Goals in the USSR by Row-Crop Tractors
1954 - 1 May 1957
Units
Tractor Model
1954
1955
1956
1 May 1957
Total
Physical
15-horsepower
Physical
15-horsepower
Physical
15-horsepower
Physical
15-horsepower
Physical
15-horsepower
Universal
KDP-35
KhTZ-7
"Belarus" (Machine Building)
"Belarus" (Defense)
Yearly Total
18,200
10,340
10,500
10,000
5,000
54,040
12,140
16,540
5,250
15,000
7,500
56 430
19,000
17)000
18,000
15,000
10,000
79,000
12,670
27,200
9,000
22,500
15,000
86,370
20,000
17,000
21,000
20,000
10,000
88 000
13,340
27)200
10,500
30,000
15,000
96,040
6,700
5,400
7;000
6,700
3,300
29,100
4,490
8,640
3,500
10,000
5,000
31,630
63,900
49,740
56,500
51,700
28,300
250,140
42,640
79,580
28,250
77,500
42,500
270,470
- 55 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 28
Comparison Between the 1955 Tractor Production Goals of the Fifth Five Year Plan
and the Goals as Revised by Agricultural Decrees of September, October 1953
General Purpose
Row Crop Special Purpose
Units
Tractor Model
s-80
00-54
GT-58
(Gas Generator)
KD-35
KDP-35
U-2 and 4
"Belarus"
KhTZ-7
KT-12
(Timber Hauling)
Total
Physical
15-hp.
Physical
15-hp.
Physical
15-hp.
Physical
15-hp.
Physical
15-hp.
Physical
15-hp.
Physical
15-hp.
Physical
15-hp.
Physical 15-hp.
Physical
15-hp.
Estimated
Fifth Five Year
Plan Goal (1955)
Estimated
Goal (1955)
As Revised
By Decrees
18,000
18,000
76,000
77,000 12/
50,000
50,000
118,000
118,000
10,000
10,000
21,000
21,000
8,000
11,000
13,000
18,000
10,000
17,000
16,000
27,000
18,000
19,000
12,000
13,000
10,000
25,000
15,000
36,000
16,000
18,000
8,000
9,000
7,000
7,000
14,000
14,000
147,000
293,000 fy
175,000
333,000
a. It will be noted that the figure of 293,000 is higher than the figure of 292,000 appearing in the methodology. The discrepancy is caused by rounding.
b. The figure 77,000 more nearly corresponds to known past production in 15-horsepower units than does the figure 76,000. The figure 76,000, has been retained in the line above because the method of derivation
is 'explained in the section on methodology.
- 56 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Rerease 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100.002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 29
Allocation of Tractor Production in the USSR 2/
1946-55
Units
Allocated Allocated to Rem:,nder
to Agriculture
of Economy b Total Production
Year
Physical
15-horsepower
Physical
15-horsepower
Physical
15-horsepower
1946
13,000
28,000
0
0
13,000
28,000
1947
26,000
59,000
2,000
7,000
28,000
66,000
1948
52,000
119,000
5,000
19,000
57,000
138,000
1949
71,000
150,000
16,000
49,000
86,000
199,000
1950
82,000
180,000
22,000
65,000
104,000
245,000
1951
68,000
137,000
32,000
99,000
100,000
236,000
1952
67,000
131,000
44,000
125,000
111,000
256,000
1953
8o,00o
152,000
40,000
115,000
120,000
267,000
1954
115,000
208,000
31,000
90,000
146,000
298,000
1955
141,000
239,000
34,000
94,000
175,000
333,000
a. See Table 45, p. 73, for planned and actual production.
b. Calculated as residuals. Includes tractors allocated for foreign trade.
-57-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 30
Growth of the Agricultural Tractor Park in the USSR
1940-55
Units
End of Year
Machine Tractor
Stations
State Farms
Total
Agricultural Park
Physical
15-horsepower
Physical
15-horsepower
Physical
15-horsepower
1940
435,000
557,000
88,000
126,000
523,000
683,000
1945
297,000
385,000
63,000
84,00o
360,000
469,000
1946
302,000
400,00o
64,000
88,000
366,000
488,000
1947
313,000
435,000
67,000
96,000
380,000
531,000
1948
343,000
515,000
73,000
113,000
416,000
628,000
1949
383,000
615,000
81,000
134,000
464,000
749,000
1950
415,000
718,000
91,000
160,000
506,000
878,000
1951
456,000
810,000
99,000
18o,000
555,000
990,000
1952
498,000
900,000
107,000
199,000
6o5,000
1,099,000
1953
549,000
1,005,000
116,000
220,000
665,000
1,225,000
1954
593,000
1,110,000
127,000
245,000
720,000
1,355,000
(Estimated)
1955
647,000
1,225,000
142,000
275,000
789,000
1,500 000
(Estimated)
-58-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4 ?
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4 ;
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 31
Growth of the MTS Tractor Park in the USSR
1945-55
Units
End of Year
Allocation
Retirement
Net Increase
Total Park
Physical
15-horsepower
Physical
15-horsepower
Physical
15-horsepower
Physical
15-horsepower
1945
297,000
385,000
1946
11,000
23,000
6,000
8,000
5,000
15,000
302,000
400,000
1947
21,000
49,000
10,000
14,000
11,000
35,000
313,000
435,000
1948
43,000
97,000
13,000
17,000
30,000
80,000
343,000
515,000
1949
58,000
123,000
18,000
23,000
40,000
100,000
383,000
615,000
1950
67,000
148,000
35,000
45,000
32,000
103,000
415,000
718,000
1951
56,000
112,000
15,000
20,000
41,000
92,000
456,000
810,000
1952
55,000
107,000
13,000
17,000
42,000
90,000
498,000
900,000
1953
66,000
125,000
15,000
20,000
51,000
105,000
549,000
1,005,000
1954
94,000
170,000
50,000
65,000
44,000
105,000
593,000
1,110,000
(Estimated)
1955
116,000
196,000
62,000
81,000
54,000
115,000
647,000
1,225,000
(Estimated)
Total
587,000
1,150,000
237,000
310,000
350,000
8140,000
- 59 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 32
Growth of State Farm Tractor Park in the USSR
1945755
Units
End of Year
Allocation
Retirement
Net Increase
Total Tractor Park
Physical
15-horsepower
Physical
15-horsepower
Physical
15-horsepower
Physical
15-horsepower
1945
63,000
84,000
1946
2,000
5,000
1,000
1,000
1,000
4,000
64,000
88,000
1947
5,000
10,000
2,000
2,000
3,000
8,000
67,000
96,000
1948
10,000
22,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
17,000
73,000
113,000
1949
13,000
27,000
5,000
6,000
8,000
21,000
81,000
134,000
1950
15,000
32,000
5,000
6,000
10,000
26,000
91,000
160,000
1951
12,000
25,000
4,000
5,000
8,000
20,000
99,000
180,000
1952
12,000
24,000
4,000
5,000
8,000
19,000
107,000
199,000
1953
14,000
27,000
5,000
6,000
9,000
21,000
116,000
220,000
1954
21,000
38,000
10,000
13,000
11,000
25,000
127,000
245,000
1955
25,000
43,000
10,000
13,000
15,000
30,000
142,000
275,000
Totals
129,000
253,000
50,000
62,000
79,000
191,000
- 6o -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 33
Output of Soft-Plowing Units per 15-horsepower Tractor Unit
in the USSR
1937, 1940, 1945-53
Year
Percent
Soft-Plowing Units
1937 2.e
1940 21
1945 2_56/
1946 22
1947 27/
1948 2L/
1949 22/
1950 100/
loo
87
64
74
90
99
102
100
103
99
107
470
411
299
349
423
468
481
469
484
467
505
1951 101/
1952 102/
1953 103/
Table 34
Tractor Work Performed by MTS's in the USSR
1940, 1946-55
Year
Index
(1940=100)
Million Soft-
Plowing Units
1940
100 104/
225
1946
62 105/
140
1947
80 106
180
1948
98 i7'/
221
1949
119 108/
268
1950
143 109/
321
1951
170 110/
382
1952
191 111/
430
1953
224 112/
505
1954
266 2/
598
1955
320 2,./
719
a. Extrapolated.
- 61 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
? ? ? ? ? ?
Table 35
Annual Increment to the Sown Area
of the USSR 113/
1946-53
Million Hectares fil
1946
1947 114/
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
8.2
10.0
13.8
6.0
6.6
6.7
2.76
1.4
(Plan)
(Plan)
8
(Actual)
a. A hectare is the equivalent of 2.471 acres.
Table 36
Sown Area of the USSR
Selected Years
Million Hectares Li
1940 112/
1946 12/
1950
116/
1952 112/
1955 (Plan)
151.1
105-110
156.5
(Plan)
146-147
(Actual)
156.4
167-170
a. A hectare is the equivalent of 2.471 acres.
b. Estimate derived by subtracting sum of yearly increases from
the known 1950 figures.
-62-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4 ?
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 37
Dynamics of the Direct Cost (Sebestoimosti') of Tractor Work in the MTS's of the USSR 118/
1949-52
Elements of Direct Cost
1949
1950
1951
1952
(Plan)
Percent
of Total
Percent Percent
of 1949 of
Total
Percent
of 1949
Percent
of Total
Percent
of 1949
Percent
of Total
Fuel
4o.o
80.9
39.3
65.7
35.8
51.1
29.0
Repairs
33.0
76.6
30.0
72.0
31.6
60.6
28.0
Wages of "Producing Workers"
11.0
99.3
13.7
98.7
14.8
141.4
23.0
Wages of MTS Personnel
13.0
91.7
14.0
85.5
14.7
91.7
17.0
Administrative Expenditures
3.0
86.4
3.0
77.9
3.1
71.1
3.0
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
-63-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 38
Changes in the Relative Weight of Work
Performed by Kerosene, Ligroine, and Diesel Tractors
in the USSR 119/
Selected Years
Percent
Type of Tractor
1940
1948
1951
1952 (Plan)
Kerosene
73.9
81.6
62.8
52.2
Ligroine
19.6
10.9
5.7
5.5
Diesel
6.5
.6.7
31.1
41.9
Others
0
0.8
0.4
o.4
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
-64-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100-002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 39
Comparison of Expenditures and Cost of Fuel per Unit of Work between Kerosene and Diesel Tractors
in the USSR El 120/
Type of Tractor
Per Hectare of Soft Plowing
In Percent of Expenditure
on the SKhTZ
Per Hectare of Plowing
In Percent of Expenditure
on the SKhTZ
Kilograms
(Bales)
Kilograms
(Rubles)
Kilograms
(RUbles)
Kilograms
(Rublab).
STZ-KhTZ
16.4
7.31
100.0
100.0
23.9
10.70
100.0
100.0
Universal
14.0
6.27
85.7
85.7
24.2
10.84
101.2
101.2
STZ-NATI
15.2
6.80
93.0
93.0
21.4
9.58
89.5
89.5
Average for Kerosene Tractors
15.6
6.98
95.4
95.4
22.3
10.00
93.3
93.3
sTz-60
15.2
7.78
92.6
106.4
20.8
10.64
87.0
99.4
5-80
9.3
2.94
56.7
40.2
12.3
3.89
51.4
36.3
sTz-65 .
10.1
3.20
61.5
43.7
13.7
4.31
56.9
40.3
KD-35
11.6
3.67
70.5
50.0
14.7
4.65
61.5
43.4
DT-54
10.2
3.23
62.1
44.0
13.4
4.24 .
56.0
40.0
Average for Diesel Tractors
9.98
3.16
60.85
43.2
13.0
4.12
54.3
38.5
a. The STZ-KhTZ tractor used as the basis for comparison is the 15-horsepower, wheeled, kerosene model produced at the Stalingrad and Khar'kov
plants before 1938. The first comparison, "soft plowing," is an average for all field work, the second for plowing only. It will be noted that the
track-laying diesels (the S-80, DT-54, KD-35, and S-65) are much less expensive to operate than any of the other models.
- 65 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 40
Comparison of Fuel Expenditures, Output per Worker, and Net Costs of Operation
for Six Models of Soviet Tractors in Saratov Oblast a/ 121/
1950
Economic Indexes
Variation of the Indexes for Tractors of Different Types
(in Percent of STZ)
U-2
STZ-NATI
s-6o
5-80
ST-5'+
KD -35
Expenditure of Fuel (in Rubles) per Hectare
Harrowing
89
86
94
34
40
41
Cultivation
82
72
87
29
38
46
Sowing of Grain
81
76
85
30
38
42
Output in Hectares per Worker of Tractor
Brigade
Harrowing
91
194
194
236
199
156
Cultivation
89
160
148
198
172
148
Sowing
84
153
141
176 -
158
136
Expenditure of Workdays per Hectare
Harrowing
108
67
63
52
65
79
Cultivation
99
71
61
48
63
83
Sowing
109
69
57
46
64
80
Net Cost in Rubles per Hectare of Soft
Plowing
107
71
78
34
4o
43
a. While regional variations in the USSR are so great as to preclude use of one oblast in estimates of absolute quantities,
relationships between models are sufficiently stable for the purposes of illustration. The STZ tractor against which the others are
compared is a wheeled, kerosene, 15-horsepower, general-purpose prewar model. In 1953 there were more than 100,000 STZ's operating
in Soviet agriculture.
- 66 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 41 .
Comparative Data on Heavy and Wheeled Tractors in the USSR 122/
Type of Tractor
Plowing
Sowing
Shallow Plowing of Stubble
Output per Workers Output Output per Workers Output Output per Workers Output
Tractor per Needed to per Worker Tractor per Needed to per Worker Tractor per Needed to per Worker
Shift (in Service the (in Shift (in Service the (in Shift (in Service the (in
Hectares) "Aggregate" Hectares) Hectares) "Aggregate" Hectares) Hectares) "Aggregate" Hectares)
Number of
Workdays
per Shift
Norm Worker
by "Tractorists"
S-80 2./
15.0
3
5.00
'8o
6
13.3
55
2
27.5
6.o
DT-54 and STZ-NATI
7.7
2
3.85
44
4
11.0
35
2
17.5
5.0
KD-35
5.8
2
2.90
33
2
16.5
26
2
13.0
5.0
STZ-KhTZ 12/
4.o
2
2.00
18
2
7.0
14
2
7.0
4.5
?
a. One of the most important advantages of the heavy tractors (S-80, DT-54, STZ-NATI) is illustrated by this table: their field output in a given time period
is much greater than that of the wheeled tractors. This characteristic is particularly important in the climatic conditions of the Russian steppes.
b. The STZ-KhTZ is the wheeled, 15-horsepower, kerosene model produced at Stalingrad and Kharkov plants before 1938.
- 67 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 42
Value of Soviet Tractor Production
1940-55
1940
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955 Plan
Value in Millions of 1951 Rubles Li"
840
175
358
836
1,669
2,458
2,984
2,849
3,120
3,295
3,823 .
4,373
Index: 1950=100
28
6
12
28
56
82
100
95
105
110
128
146
Percentage Increase over
Previous Year
105
134
100
47
21
-5
10
6
16
14
a. 1951 ruble values were derived for each tractor model by adjusting prices (appearing in 1948 and 1949 Soviet price catalogues)
according to industrial price indexes. Each year's total was then calculated according to the tractor production estimates
appearing in Table 25.
- 68 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
6
S-E-C-R-E-T
APPENDIX B
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF MINIM,' POL STORAGE CAPACITY
IN MTS'S AND STATE FARMS AT THE END OF 1953
Recently information has become available which permits a first
approximation of the POL storage capacity of the MTS's. Table 43
represents the capacity considered necessary for MTS's of various
sizes:
Table 43
Average Capacity (EMkosti)
of "Typical" MTS POL Storage Facilities 2/ 21/
Metric Tons
Type of Machine Tractor Station
50 Tractors
75 Tractors
100 Tract irs
Kerosene
140
180
245
Diesel Oil
13
34
4o
Gasoline
25
36
50
Avtol
13
18
25
a. This level of storage capacity for MTS's was approved
by the Soviet Ministry of Agriculture, 8 April 1947.
Table 43 gives an average of 3.6 tons per tractor. The mix, of
course, will have been changed considerably since 1948, when there
were very few diesel tractors in agriculture. According to present
plans there will be approximately 750,000 tractors in the agricultural
tractor park at the end of 1955, and in the meantime it is planned
to construct permanent storage capacity in the MTS's for 1,700,000
metric tons of POL. This construction probably makes due allowance
not only for tractors but also for the coniabines, stationary engines,
and trucks in agriculture. If it is assumed that by the end of 1955
the Russians plan to have adequate storage capacity installed in all
-69-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
MTS's and State farms, the minimum requirement for tractors alone
will be 2.7 million metric tons (750,000 multiplied by 3.6). Since
trucks, combines, and stationary engines will increase the require-
ments for storage capacity, it is estimated that, if the present
construction program is completed, the MTS's and State farms at the
end of 1955 will have a minimum installed, permanent storage capacity
for P0I, of 3 million metric tons.
- 70 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
a
a
S-E-C-R-E-T
APPENDIX C
POL CONSUMPTION OF THE SOVIET TRACTOR PARK
The consumption of the major categories of POL products by the
agricultural tractor park is summarized in the following table:
Table 44
Consumption of POL by the Agricultural Tractor Park
of the USSR 2/ 124/
1940, 1947-55
Million Metric Tons
1940
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
Kerosene, Diesel Oil,
and Ligroine
5.12
4.38
5.36
6.o4
6.67
7.39
8.00
9.08
10.33
12.12
Gasoline
0.06
0.08
0.09
0.10
0.14
0.15
0.17
0.20
0.23
0.28
Lubricants
0.48
0.42
0.54
0.63
0.72
0.81
0.93
1.10
1.29
1.58
a. The methodology for computing these figures is basically the same for
all years, and may best be explained by using one year, 1948, as an
example. (See Table 45.*)
The consumption of gasoline and lubricants by the MTS's has been
individually expanded in Table 44 to include consumption by the
State farms. In Table 45, the aggregate of intermediate distillates,
lubricants, and gasoline has been adjusted. In each case the metho-
dology is identical: for example, column 6 in Table 45 gives 0.42
as MTS's lubricant consumption. This figure is divided by 82 and
the dividend multiplied by 105 (the loss factor). The answer 0.54
is the same as that given in Table 43. (See footnotes to Table 45.)
The consumption of intermediate distillates by the Soviet tractor
park as a whole (agricultural and other) which is given in Table 2
is based upon the assumption that the nonagricultural park consumes
at least as much per 15-horsepower unit as the agricultural park.
* Table 45 follows on p. 73.
-71-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
For purposes of calculating the percentage of intermediate distil-
lates derived from domestic crude consumed by the agricultural tractor
park, and by the tractor park as a whole, it was assumed that the
Russians could not have refined more than 36 percent of domestic crude
oil in the form of kerosene and diesel oil. The estimate of Soviet
production of intermediate distillates, therefore, represents a
maximum estimate. Domestic crude oil production is taken from a CIA
estimate for the years 1947-52, and is defined as the net crude oil
available after allowance for field and refinery losses. Crude oil
production for the years 1953-55 is based upon the assumption that
the Fifth Five Year Plan will be fulfilled. In summary, the estimates
of intermediate distillates available are thought to be a maximum,
the tractor consumption estimates a minimum.
The margin of error for the estimates of POL consumption by the
agricultural tractor park are believed to be plus or minus 3 percent
for the years 1947-52. Estimated margin of error for 1953-55 is plus
or minus 7 percent. For the consumption of the Soviet tractor park
as a whole the estimated margin of error is plus or minus 10 percent
for all years.
-72-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 45
POL Consumption of the Agricultural Tractor Park of the USSR
1948
1
Percent of
Total Field
Work 125/
Kerosene
2 3
4
Soft Fuel Consump-
Plowing tion per Primary Fuel
Units 2/ Hectare 12/ 126/ Consumption i/
(Millions) (Kilograms) (Metric Tons)
5
6
8 9
10 11
12
13
Lubricant Gasoline Nonfield Work Total Fuel Storage Loss in Total POL
Norms .1./ 127/ Lubricant Norms 128/ Gas in Percent of Consumption in Percent of Total Total POL Consumption
(Percent of Fuel Consumption i/ (Percent of Consumption ij Fuel Expended in Field Work and Fuel and Lubricants Consumed including
Consumed) (Metric Tons Fuel Consumed) (Metric Tons) Field Work E/ 129/ Nonfield Work h/ State Farms h/
by MTS's 1/
Consumed 1/ 130/
SKhTZ
46.4
102.54
19
1.95
10
0.20
1.5
0.03
Universal
8.3
18.34
17
0.31
10
0.03
1.5
0
NATI
26.9
59.4
17.2
1.02
11.5
0.12
3
0.03
Total
81.6
180.3
3.28
0.35
0.06
7.8
3.56
Ligroine
10.9
24.1
17.5
0.42
10
0.04
1.5
0.01
2.8
0.43
Diesel
6.7
14.8
11.5
0.17
17
0.03
3
0
13.2
0.20
Total
99.2
219.2
3.87
0.42
0.07
4.19
5
4.91
5.99
a. Computed as the percent of total soft-plowing units as given in Table 34.
b. This is the average amount of fuel consumed per soft-plowing unit for each type of tractor in the MTS's for the USSR as
a whole.
c. The product of columns 2 and 3 is given in column 4. This represents the direct expenditure of distillates, excluding
gasoline for the starter engines -- columns 7 and 8 -- in field work on the MTS's.
d. Lubricant norms are computed as a percentage of distillates consumed.
e. Column 5 as a percent of column 4.
f. Column 7 as a percent of column 4.
g. This represents the percent of total distillate consumption in nonfield work.
h. According to the data in column 9, the kerosene expended in field work -- 2.86 million tons in column 4 -- represents only 92.2
Percent of total kerosene consumption on the MTS's. The figures for ligroine and diesel consumption appearing in column 10 are
similarly derived.
i. This is a minimum allowance for losses in storage.
j. Represents 105 percent of the sum of columns 6, 8, and 10 and consequently represents the total consumption of distillates and
lubricants by the MTS's.
k. Since the State Farm Tractor Park has maintained an almost constant ration to that of the MTS's, (see Table 30) it is assumed that
column 12 represents 82 percent of total POL consumption of the agricultural tractor park. Consequently, column 13 has been calculated
in this manner and represents total POL consumption of both the MTS's and the State farms.
-73-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
APPENDIX D
PLANNED AND ACTUAL ALLOCATION OF TRACTORS TO AGRICULTURE
From the data given by Voznesenskiy, 131/ the February 1947 Plenum,
and the Fourth Five Year Plan, it is possible to construct an index
of planned tractor production, and planned allocation to agriculture,
with an estimated margin of error of not more than plus or minus 5 per-
cent. Table 46 shows planned and actual production and allocation of
tractors to agriculture. There seems to be a slight discrepancy in
Table 46
Planned and Actual Production and Allocation
of Tractors to Agriculture
1946-50
Thousand Units
Planned Physical
1946
1947 1948 1949
1950
Production
17.0
44.0 75.5 100.0
112.0
Allocation to Agriculture
17.0
41.5 67.5 91.0
108.0
Planned 15-Horsepower
Production
33.5
93.0 180.0 235.0
272.0
Allocation to Agriculture
33.0
87.0 152.0 204.0
244.0
Actual Physical
Production
13.1
27.8 56.9 86.2
104.0
Allocation to Agriculture
13.1
25.9 53.0 70.6
82.4
Actual 15-Horsepower
Production
27.9
66.5 137.6 198.8
244.9
Allocation to Agriculture
27.9
58.3 118.9 150.0
180.0
-75-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
the planning data for 1950, the difference between production and
allocation in physical units being not sufficiently large to account
for the difference in 15-horsepower units. Nevertheless, the general
trend appears quite clear that the original plan provided for the
allocation of a larger share of 1949-50 production for agriculture than
was actually allocated. The only known explanation is that there was
a change in priorities, and, as has been pointed out in the text, the
timber industry definitely received more tractors than originally
scheduled. It is also possible that the "Great Projects" were actually
started prior to the original planned date.
-76-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
APPENDIX E
METHODOLOGY
The methodology for the major part of this report is embodied in
the text. Methodology for individual tables follows in this appendix.
A. General Methodology and Appraisal of Tables 24, 25, and 26.
Table 26 is a composite of yearly production estimates drawn up
for each Soviet tractor plant. Official Soviet indexes were applied
to the yearly total production figures after the plant-by-plant esti-
mates had been made. Although the yearly totals varied slightly
(maximum variance, approximately plus or minus 3 percent) from the
Soviet index, no effort was made to alter the totals, because of the
composite nature of their make-up and the fact that the variance from
the index was not significant.. The data on which the plant-by-plant.
estimates are based were generally more accurate in showing total
plant production up to a given date than in showing the level of pro-
duction during a monthly or quarterly time period. Thus, in Table 26.,
a figure for total production at a plant over a 3- or 4-year time
period will generally be more accurate than any single segment within
that time period. The aggregate production figures in Tables 25 and
26 are believed accurate to within 2 percent. All conversions from
physical units to 15-horsepower units were made in accordance with
Soviet methodology.
Total Soviet tractor production for the period 1946 through 1949
has been announced at 430,000 15-horsepower units. 132/ The esti-
mates in these tables total 430,700 units for that period.
Official Soviet indexes of tractor production are as follows 133/:
1946=100
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
Production
Percent as of
58 2/
100
209
426
661
813
780 2/
835 2/
944 2/
Preceding Year
172
209
204
155
123
96 2/
107
113
a. Estimated. All other figures are official Soviet figures.
- 77 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
A detailed production graph, utilizing all available information,
was drawn up for each of the tractor plants appearing in Table 26.
Types of data were as follows: (1) Official Soviet announcements
that a certain tractor (for example, the ten thousandth) has been
completed at a particular plant on a certain day; (2) official Soviet
announcements of 1 year's production at a plant as a percentage of a
previous year's production; (3) 1 year's production at a plant as a
percentage of an earlier year's production (for example, the year
1940); (4) the officially announced plan for production for a given
period, with a subsequent announcement indicating the percent of
fulfillment; and (5) serial number data appearing in various open-
source publications such as Soviet parts catalogues and agricultural
journals and newspapers. There was considerable information of the
types for each of the plants involved. Combining the various kinds
of information into a single chart for each plant, therefore, resulted
in plant-production figures of considerable accuracy. Interpolation
and extrapolation were utilized to fill gaps between known information,
and, where necessary, to project production trends. The primary sources
for the information used to compile production tables for each of the
plants will be found in the footnotes to the tables.
B. Methodology for Tables 27 and 28.
The official Soviet automobile aria tractor journal outlined the
tractor goals of the Fifth Five Year Plan as follows:
"The growth of the production of tractors (1955 over 1950)
is specified at 19 percent. By the Ministry of the
Automobile and Tractor Industry, the production of trac-
tors will increase by 47 percent, in which the production
of diesel tractors will increase by 57.2 percent." 134/
The relative proportions expressed in the foregoing statement are such
that the percentages involved apply reasonably only when 1950 produc-
tion in terms of 15-horsepower units is used as the base. Using
1950 production in 15-horsepower units as the base, the following steps
were carried. out: (all calculations which follow are in terms of 15-
horsepower units unless specified otherwise).
1. The figure of 292,000 units representing the 1955 goal for
total production was derived by multiplying the 1950 figure of
245,000 by 119 percent. The Automobile and Tractor Ministry's portion
of 1950 production (1)47,000) was multiplied by 147 percent, which
-78-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
results in a figure of 216,000 representing the 1955 goal for produc-
tion by that Ministry. The difference between 292,000 and 216,000
is 76,000, which coincides Filmost exactly (76,000 against 77,000) with
the current level of production at Chelyabinsk, which, in 1953, was
the only tractor plant not located in the Ministry of the Automobile
and Tractor Industry.
2. The Automobile and Tractor Ministry's production of diesel
tractors in 1950 (105,000) was multiplied by 57.2 percent, which
yields a total of 165,000, which represents the 1955 goal for diesel
tractor production by the Automobile and Tractor Ministry. The
Ministry's diesel tractor goal was subtracted from its total goal to
derive a figure of 51,000, representing nondiesel production.
3. Production of nondiesel tractors at the Vladimir plant (U-2
and )4), the Khartkov Assembly Plant (KhTZ-7), and the Minsk plant
(KT-12) was estimated in physical units on the basis of known planned
capacities, and the physical unit totals were converted to 15-horse-
power units deriving a figure of 30,000. This figure was subtracted
from the nondiesel goal of 51,000, leaving a residual of 21,000
representing production goals in 1955 for gas generator tractors
(GT-58 model) manufactured at the Kharikov, Stalingrad, and Altai
plants.. The gas generator total was converted to physical units and
subtracted from the current level of DT-54 production at the 3 plants,
leaving a residual of 49,000 physical units of the diesel DT-54, as
the diesel goal of the 3 plants in 1955. The 49,000 physical unit
figure was converted to 15-horsepower units (118,000) and subtracted
from the Ministry's 1955 diesel tractor goal of 165,000. The residual
of 47,000 was portioned among the Lipetsk (KD-35), Minsk ("Belarus"),
and Vladimir (VTZ-T24) plants, Using the production goals outlined in
the September 1953 agricultural decrees to determine the ratio of pro-
duction between the 3 plants.
4. The revised production goal for 1955 has been estimated on the
basis of information released in the September 1953 agricultural
decrees. The Ministry of Machine Building, Ministry of Transport and
Heavy Machine Building, Ministry of the Defense Industry, and Ministry
of the Aviation Industry are called upon to supply agriculture with
not less than 500,000 general-purpose tractors (expressed in 15-horse-
power units) and 250,000 raw-crop tractors (expressed in physical units),
during the period 1954 to I May 1957. 112/ The raw-.crop tractor goals
were outlined in detail in another of the decrees and are given in
Table 27 as they appeared in the decree. 136/
-79-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
C. Methodology and Sources for Tables 30, 31, and 32.
The methodology and sources for Tables 31 and 32 are outlined
together because of their close interrelation and interdependence.
Considerable data used in one or the other of the tables have been
used for calculations in the other.
1. Size and Composition of the 1940 MTS's Park.
Table 47 outlines the stmcture of the 1940 MTS'is park by
tractor model in percentages of the total 15-horsepower units on
the MTS's 137/:
Table 47
Size and Composition of the MTS's Tractor Park
1940
Percent of Total MTS's Tractor Horsepower
Wheeled Caterpillar
SKhTZ- ChTZ- ChTZ- STZ- SG- Total
Year NATI U-1 Total S-60 5-65 NATI T2G 65 Caterpillar
1940 47.0 9.0 56.0 22.0 7.0 11.0 3.0 1.0 44.0
The total 15-horsepower units on the MTS's at the end of 1940 were
557,000. 138/ The percentages in Table 47 were applied to the MTS's
15-horsepower unit total, and then the portions were each converted
from 15-horsepower units to physical units according to Soviet con-
version factors and methodology. 39/ There were 435.3 thousand
physical units in the 1940 MTS's tractor park. 140/ Table 48* shows
the composition of the 1940 MTS's park.
2. Size and Composition of the 1940 Non-MTS's Park.
A physical unit figure of 88,000 was derived for the 1940
non-MTS's park by subtracting the 1940 MTS's physical unit figure of
453,000 from a figure of 523,000,which represented the total number
* Table 48 follows on p. 81.
-8o-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 48
Structure of the MTS's Tractor Park
1940
Thousand Units
Wheeled.
Caterpillar
Total
SKhTZ-
ChTZ-
ChTZ-
STZ-
SG-
Model
NATI U-1
Total
S-60
S-65
NAI
T2G
65
Total
Park
15-horse-
power
262 50
312
123
39
61
17
5
245
557
Physical
267 76
747
39
12
30
9
2
92
;35
of tractors in all of Soviet agriculture in 1940. 141/ A non-MTS's
15-horsepower unit total was similarly calculated as a residual from
a total agricultural park figure of 683,000 15-horsepower units. 142/
Within the 88,000 total, the breakdown of 72,000 wheel-type tractors
(equaling 54,000 15-horsepower units) was derived by projection of
ratios which existed in the 1938 non-MTS's park. 11-LV
3. Composition of the Total Soviet Agricultural Tractor
Park, 1940.
From the data in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, Table 49 is derived:
Table 49
Agricultural Tractor Park Of the USSR
1940
Thousand Units
MTS's Non-MTS's
Cater- Cater- Total
Unit Wheeled pillar Total Wheeled pillar Total Park
15-horse-
power 312 245 557 72 54 126 683
Physical 343 92 72 16 77 523
-81-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
4. Calculation of Wartime Losses and Composition of the 1945
Tractor Park.
The purpose of calculating wartime losses is to estimate the
composition and number of physical units contained in the 1945 tractor
park. The tdtal 1945 park in terms of 15-horsepower units (469,000)
has been calculated with considerable accuracy by extrapolation from
data covering the 1946-53 period, but those data do not indicate the
composition or number of physical units in the park. The methodology
for calculating wartime losses is centered upon determining losses in
the wheel-type tractor category. The 1945 track-laying tractor park
was then calculated as a residual resulting from subtracting the
wheeled-tractor total from the estimated total 1945 tractor park.
The wheel-type tractors were used as the base because produc-
tion of such tractors had ceased in the USSR by 1939. The 1940 figures,
therefore, represent a stable base from which to calculate.
During World War II 137,000 tractors Were destroyed or looted
by the occupying forces in the occupied regions of the USSR. 144/
Seventy?five percent (102,000 tractors) of the 137,000 tractors thus
lost are estimated to have been wheel-type tractors. A factor of
75 percent has been used because it is known that the Soviet Army
requisitioned many caterpillar tractors from agriculture immediately
after outbreak of hostilities for military uses (therefore, they would
not be in the " ... looted by occupying forces ... " category); and,
further, the fact that the type of tractor least likely to have been
included in evacuation planning and movement to Eastern areas, would
have been the smaller wheel-type tractors. It is estimated that, in
addition to direct losses to the Germans, approximately 10 percent
of the remaining wheel-type tractors in Soviet agriculture were
rendered non-usable due to other causes during the war. A factor of
10 percent represents the closest approximation that can be drawn
from available data. Ten percent of the 313,000 wheel-type tractors
remaining (415,000 prewar minus 102,000 lost 'to the Germans) in the
non-occupied Soviet agriculture equal's 31,300 tractors. Thus, total
wartime losses in the wheel-type category are estimated at 133,000
tractors. If 133,000 tractors are subtracted from the prewar wheel-
tractor park of 415,000, a figure of 282,000 is derived which repre-
sents the total number of wheeled tractors remaining in Soviet agri-
culture at the end of the war.
-82-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
The 282,000 figure, representing wheel-type tractors, was
converted at the 1940 ratio of wheeled tractors to 15-horsepower
units (.9)-i- 15-horsepower units per wheel tractor), to derive a post-
war total of 265,000 15-horsepower units in the wheel-type category.
The wheeled tractors were then divided at the prewar ratio of SKhTZ's
to Universals to derive a 1945 figure of 236,000 SKhTZ wheeled,
general-purpose tractors and 46,000 Universal row-crop tractors.
The figure of 265,000 15-horsepower units (wheel-type) was
subtracted from the 469,000 15-horsepower units over-all agricultural
total (see paragraph 6, below, for derivation of the )-i-69,000 figure)
to derive a figure of 204,000 15-horsepower units, which represents
the total 15-horsepower units in the track-laying tractor category
in Soviet agriculture as of 1 January 1946.
The 1942-45 production of 20,000 15-horsepower units was
subtracted from the 204,000 15-horsepower unit figure, above, to
derive a figure of 184,000 15-horsepower units which is the total
15-horsepower units represented by prewar track-laying tractors in
Soviet agriculture on 1 January 1946.
The 184,000 15-horsepower unit figure was converted to physical
units at the 1940 ratio of track-laying tractors to 15-horsepower
units (2.66 15-horsepower units per track-laying tractor), to derive
a 1 January 1946 total of 69,000 prewar track-laying tractors in Soviet
agriculture.
Division of the 1945 tractor park between the MTS's and non-
MTS's was done on the basis of 1940 ratios.
From the foregoing calculations, Table 50 is, thus, derived:
Table 50
Agricultural Tractor Park of the USSR
31 December 1945
Thousand Units
MIS's State Farm (Sovkhoz)
Total
Wheeled Caterpillar Total Wheeled Caterpillar Total Park
SKhTZ-
SKhTZ-
Unit
NATI
U-1
NATI
U-1
Physical
192
41
64
297
44
5
14
63
360
15-horse-
power
192
26
167
385
44
3
37
84
469
-83-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
5. Division of the Total Agricultural Allocation between
MTS1s and Non-MTS's.
Division of each year's total agricultural allocation between
the MTS's and non-MTS's was made at a ratic of 82 percent of the 15-
horsepower units to the MTS's and 18 percent to the Sovkhozes. This
is based on the known ratio of the size of each tractor park to the
other for the years 1940, 1952, and 1953. The Fourth Five Year Plan
directives specified that the MTS's were to receive 290,000 tractors
of the planned 325,000 total to be. delivered to all of agriculture
during the period l9)-i-6-50. 145/ Judging from the known composition
of the park, the MTS's apparently received fewer small-wheeled tractors
than had been originally planned, therefore, they received a smaller
percentage of the total horsepower than is indicated in the planned
allocation.
6. Retirement Calculations 1946-53.
Yearly retirement figures were calculated as residuals by
subtracting the yearly net increases in each tractor park from the
yearly allocations. Yearly allocations have been taken from official
Soviet announcements. Retirement figures, therefore, have the same
accuracy as do the individual park estimates.
? 7.. Retirement Estimates for 1954 and 1955.
The estimated 1954 and 1955 MTS's retirements are based upon
the probability that a majority of the prewar tractors are to be
retired by the end of 1955. In view of the large increase in the
agricultural tractor allocations, outlined for 1954, 1955, and 1956,
in the September 1953 decree's, and the modest goals previously out-
lined in.the Fifth Five Year Plan for the 1955 MTS's park (50 per-
cent over 1950), it is believed highly probable that the prewar
tractors will be retired. The 1954 and 1955 retirement figures in
Tables 31 and 32 are based upon that assumption. The Sovkhoz
retirement figures for 1954 and 1955 are based on the probability
that most of the prewar tractors will be retired by the end of 1955.
? 8. General Appraisal of Tables 30, 31, and 32.
The yearly park totals are believed to be .accurate within
less than .4- 4 percent. The 1953 estimate is based upon an official
March l95 figureand, therefore, should be accurate within 1 percent.
-84-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
There will be a compensating factor in any error which might occur
in the division of allocations between MTS's and Sovkhozes in that
the total agricultural allocation figures for each year are accurate
within 1 percent and any error in one direction (plus or minus) in
.division of the allocation will be compensated for by an error in
the opposite direction for the other park. The MTS's park figures
are believed accurate to within + 3 percent in that the 1940, 1944
and 1953 totals are officially accepted Soviet figures. The total
increment and retirement for 1946 - 1953 should be accurate within
+ 3 percent. Table 30,which is a composite of Tables 31 and 32,
is believed accurate in its yearly figures to within + 3 percent.
0
-85-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
APPENDDCF
GAPS IN INTELLIGENCE
Within the framework of this report there are no significant
gaps in intelligence. The focus of this report has been on produc-
tion, aistribution, and utilization of tractors in the USSR.
Soviet open-source literature provides copious information on all
three of the major categories mentioned above.
- 87 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
? ? ? ? ?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
R
Next 8 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4
SECRET
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A000300100002-4