THE SOVIET POTENTIAL FOR THE PRODUCTION OF MUNITIONS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Page Count: 152
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 17, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 18, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
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THE SOVIET POTENTIAL FOR THE PRODUCTION
OF MUNITIONS
CIA/RR 36
18 August 1954
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18; USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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ECONOMIC IN1ELLIGENCE REPORT
THE SOVIET POTENTIAL FOR THE PRODUCTION OF MUNITIONS
CIA/RR 36
(ORR Project 31.212)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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FOREWORD
The objectives of this report are to estimate the potential of the
USSR to produce munitions and to develop a check on the consistency of
estimated current munitions production with budgetary allocations for
munitions procurement. For the purposes of this report, munitions are
defined to include all military hard goods such as aircraft, naval
vessels, artillery, small arms, mortars, armored vehicles, other
military vehicles, and ammunition.
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CONTENTS
Summary
I. Introduction
A. Statement of Objectives
B. Statement of Problem
C. Procedure for Estimating Soviet Mobilization
Potential
II. Munitions Expenditures, Industrial Growth, and the
Page
1
L.
4
5
6
Potential to Produce Munitions
9
A. Munitions Expenditures, 1940, 1944, and Postwar
Years
9
B. Soviet Industrial Growth and Munitions-Producing
Potential
13
?
III.
Dollar Cost Estimates for Major Items of Soviet
Munitions
19
A. Reason for Dollar Cost Estimates
19
B. Methods of Estimating Dollar Cost and Cost
Estimates
21
IV.
Production of Munitions in 1944, and Potential Output
of Munitions by Class in Future Years
23
A. Production of Munitions in 1944
23
B. Potential Production of Munitions by Major Class
in Future Years
26
V. Internal Consistency of Munitions Production
and Capacity Estimate 35
A. Introduction 35
B. Munitions-Production Estimates 35
C. Munitions-Producing Capacity Estimates. ? ? ? ? ? 38
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Appendixes
Appendix A.
Appendix B.
Appendix C.
Appendix D.
Aggregate Increase in Soviet Munitions-
Producing Potential
Industrial Production Indexes for the USSR
Dollar Cost Estimates of Soviet Items
of Munitions
Technological Change and the Cost
of Munitions
?
?
Page
45
63
77
99
Appendix E.
Appendix F.
Appendix G.
An Estimate of Soviet Wartime Requirements
for Munitions
Reference Tables
Methodology
103
111
127
Tables
A Probable Distribution of Soviet Potential
Munitions Production in 1956
3
2. Intelligence Estimates of Soviet Munitions Production
Compared with Budgetary Allocations for Munitions
Procurement 4
3. Defense Expenditures in the USSR, 1940, 1944-53 10
4. Index of Real Munitions Based on Budgetary Allocations,
1940, 1944-53 11
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Page
5. Index of Munitions Output in the USSR, 1 94o-48 12
6. Indexes of Munitions Production in the USSR for Selected
Years and a Combined Index, 1940-53
7. Index of Soviet Industrial Output from 1940 to 1957
with 1951 Sector and Intrasector Value-Added Weights. . 15
8. Indexes of Munitions-Producing Potential and Industrial
Output, 1944, 1949-57
9. Comparative Estimate of the Aggregate Increase in Munitions-
Producing Potential with Increases in Selected Basic
Materials, 1944, 1953-57
18
10. Estimated Costs of Soviet World War II and Current Items
of Munitions 20
11. Dollar Value and Percentage Distribution of Soviet Munitions
Production, 1944 24
12. Potential Value of Munitions Production in the USSR, 1944,
1954-57
27
13. Proportions of Major Classes of Munitions for the US in
World War II, in 1952 and 1953, and in a Future
Mobilization Period 28
14. A Probable Wartime Distribution of Soviet Munitions
Output, 1954 30
15. A Probable Wartime. Distribution of Soviet Munitions
Output, 1956 32
16. Soviet Munitions Production by Classes, 1952-53 36
17. Comparison of Estimated Aggregate Value of Postwar
Munitions Output in the USSR 37
18. Capacity Estimates and Dollar Costs for Soviet
Munitions 40
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Page
19. Comparison of Amounts of Resources Available in the USSR
to Produce Munitions with Amounts Required to Produce
All Munitions at Estimated Capacity Levels 42
20. Indexes of Soviet GNP, Industrial Output, and Producer
Goods Output 48
21. Indicators of Munitions-Producing Potential, Comparing
Pre-World Wax II Base Years with Pre-Hypothetical-
Mobilization-Years Base 49
22. Indicators of Munitions-Producing Potential for the USSR,
Comparing Changes in Amounts of Resources Available Over
and Above Minimum Consumption Requirements 51
23. Indexes of Munitions-Producing Potential 52
24. Comparison of the Eotimated Increase in Munitions-
Producing Potential with Increases of Selected Basic
Materials for the USSR, 1944, 1953-57 54
25. Industrial Production Indexes, Selected Years, 1940-57 . 56
26. Capital Goods Production for the USSR 57
27. Gross National Product Indexes for the USSR 59
28. Gross National Product Index 61
29. Indexes of Price Changes and Changes in Soviet
Expenditures for Munitions, 1940 and 1944-53 64
30. Units, 1945 Dollar Value, and Index of Munitions Output
in the USSR, 1940 to 1948 65
31. Estimated 1940 Value Added Weights for Industrial
Sectors 69
32. Estimated 1951 Value Added Weights for Industrial
Sectors 70
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Page
33a Original and Revised Indexes of Output in the Chemical
Industry, 1914.0146 72
34. Consumer and Producer Goods Indexes Recomputed with 1940
and 1951 Value Added Weights 72
35. Soviet Index of Industrial Output 1951 Weights 74
36. Soviet Index of Industrial Output 1940 Weights 75
37. Estimated 191.4.5 Dollar Costs of Major World War II Items
of Soviet Munitions Excluding Aircraft and Naval Vessels
Vessels 78
38. Estimated 1945 Dollar Costs of Major Current Items
of Soviet Munitions Excluding Aircraft and Naval
.Vessels 81
39. Estimated 1945 Dollar Cost of Soviet World War II
Aircraft 87
40. Estimated 1945 Dollar Costs of Current Soviet Aircraft
41. Average Costs of World War II Soviet Aircraft
by Category 94
42. Average Costs of Current Soviet Aircraft by Category . 95
43. Estimated Costs of Current Soviet Naval Craft by Class 97
44: Cost Ratios of Current and World Wax II Items of
Munitions and Average Annual Compound Rates of Cost
Increase 100
45. Soviet Munition Requirements by Major Class for a
Future Mobilization Period 103
90
46. Relative Magnitudes of Soviet Wartime Munitions
Requirements 105
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Page
47. A Probable Distribution of Major Classes of Soviet
Munitions in a Future Wax 110
48. Dollar Value and Percentage Distribution of Soviet
Munitions Production in 1944 111
49. Production of Munitions in the USSR in 1952 and the
Relative Significance of Classes 115
50. Production of Munitions in the USSR and Relative
Significance of Classes, 1953 117
51. Production of Munitions in the USSR in Units and Dollars,
1949-53 121
52. Capacity Estimates and Dollar Values of Soviet Items
and Munitions 124
NOM ON CLASSIFICATION
The over-all classification of this report
is TOP SECRET. Appendix G, however, is classified
SECRET.
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(ORB Project 31.212)
THE SOVIET POTENTIAL FOR THE PRODUCTION OF MUNITIONS*
Summary
The potential of an economy to produce munitions is determined by
the capability of the economy to produce total output and by the
proportions of that output that can be allocated to military purposes.
This allocation, for any given time period, is primarily a matter of
policy, though within broadly defined limits.
The potential of the USSR to produce munitions in a future year
may be estimated by alternative techniques utilizing different sets
of data. The means selected in this report is to develop a systematic
relationship between 1944, a year of presumably maximum allocation of
economic effort toward the production of munitions, and the future
year for which an estimate of potential munitions output is desired.
An index of potential munitions output, with 1944 as the base year, is
estimated from an index of industrial production. The value of
potential munitions production in a future year is then determined as
the product of the 1944 output of munitions and the munitions potential
output index as projected to the future year.
The industrial production index is aggregated from indexes for three
classes of activity: producer goods, consumer goods, and munitions
production. Indexes for producer and consumer goods have been developed
previously. The index of munitions production is estimated by com-
bining Soviet defense budget data with munitions output data. The
munitions production index serves two purposes. In addition to its use
as a component of the industrial production index, it is used to check
the consistency of current Soviet munitions output estimates. The
industrial production index is converted into an index of potential
munitions output by an upward adjustment to account for repressed con-
sumption during a mobilization period. The resulting series, called
an index of munitions-producing potential, is extrapolated to 1957:
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent the
best judgment of the responsible analyst as of 1 April 1954.
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Year
Index
1944
100
1954
224
1955
242
1956
264
1957
286
To estimate the value of munitions production in 1944, the base year,
prices for Soviet munitions produced during that year are computed and
expressed in dollars because ruble prices are not available. These
prices are the estimated dollar costs of producing Soviet items of
munition in the US at 1945 price levels. In addition to prices for
World War II equipment, dollar prices for current Soviet munitions are
computed (in terms of 1945 price levels) in order to obtain comparable
costs for current and World War II type Soviet weapons. Taking unit
dollar prices and multiplying by the quantity of munitions produced in
1944, gives an amount equal to US $10.7 billion (in 19)-I-5 prices), the
value of munitions produced in that year. This amount, multiplied by
the index of munitions-producing potential, places the potential out-
put of munitions in the USSR (in billions of US dollars at 1945 prices)
as follows:
Year
Billion 1945 Dollars
1954
23.9
1955
25.8
1956
28.1
1957
30.5
These aggregate values may be expressed in units of military hard
goods by combining them with the dollar costs of current Soviet weapons.
For example, the 1956 aggregate value of US $28.1 billion could represent
the units of military end items* shown in Table 1.**
To check the consistency of estimates of current munitions production
with budgetary allocations for munitions procurement, the 1952 and 1953
values in a munitions production index, based primarily on procurement
data, are multiplied by the value of munitions production in 1944.
* See Section IV, B, and Appendix E for assumptions required to
derive these figures.
** Table 1 follows on p. 3.
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Table 1
A Probable Distribution of Soviet Potential
Munitions Production in 1956 a/
Military End Items
Amount of Production
Aircraft (Units)
38,500
Armored Vehicles (Units)
36,800
Artillery Pieces (Units)
116,000
Small Arms (Units)
4,800,000
Mortars (Units)
42,000
Naval Vessels (Displacement Tons)
173,000
Ammunition (Tons)
8,850,000
Automotive Vehicles (Units)
266,700
a. The distribution of the aggregate potential among categories
is a probable one. Conceptually, the possible number of dis-
tributions is infinite, limited only by the aggregate value.
The resulting magnitudes are compared with the computed dollar cost of
current munitions production estimated . These 50X1
values are shown in Table 2.*
These data indicate that current estimates of munitions production
are about 10 percent too high if the munitions index is taken as the
criterion. The index of munitions production, however, is not
sufficiently precise to allow this conclusion without considerable
qualification. It is, perhaps, as important that the two sets of
independent data agree so closely.
Independent estimates of capacity output for individual items of
munitions have been developed by intelligence research. These estimates,
when aggregated, may be compared with the estimated potential (maximum)
output of munitions given above. The individually derived capacity
estimates in the aggregate are from 30 to 50 percent higher than the
maximum level indicated by the analysis in this report. An aggregation
of the dollar value for individual estimates of capacity output totals
* Table 2 follows on p. 4.
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Table 2
Intelligence Estimates of Soviet Munitions Production
Compared with Budgetary Allocations
for Munitions Procurement
US $ Million (1945)
Value Computed
from Munitions Value of Intelligence
Index Based Estimates of Munitions Percentage
Year on Budget Production a/ Difference
1952
5,240
5,800
4-11
1953
5,480
5,920
+8
a. Intelligence estimates as of 1 April 1954 of munitions pro-
duction multiplied by unit dollar costs.
from US $36 billidn to US $42 billion; the comparable figure for potential
value of Soviet munitions output in 1956 is about US $28 billion. This
discrepancy is explained by the methods used to determine capacity output
for individual items. These have often been made with reference to one
limiting factor only, such as plant capacity. They may or may not take
into account activities required simultaneously in other sectors of the
economy.
I. Introduction.
A. Statement of Objectives.
The objectives of this report are (1) to estimate the potential
of the USSR to produce munitions during selected years in the future
and (2) to check the consistency of estimates of munitions production
in the USSR with budgetary allocations during the post-World War II
period.
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n. Statement of Problem.
The potential of a nation to produce munitions is only one
aspect of its national power. National power is often held to be
based upon industrial capacity, natural resources, population, national
morale, national character, geography, military preparedness, and
diplomacy. 1/* The first three of these elements are the most signifi-
cant for the purposes of determining a nation's total output of goods
and services and thus indirectly the potential output of munitions.
In a peacetime economy these productive resources "axe conceived as
being engaged with a certain rhythmic regularity in producing the
national dividend, or national real income, of successive years." 2/
If the peacetime economy is "stationary,"** about the same volume of
!goods and services is produced and consumed each year, annual depre-
ciation of capital goods being a part of consumption. In a progressive
economy, as most modern economies are, some portion of the national
real income takes the form of increments to the capital stock -- for
exaople, net investment, which Makes for a larger real income in the
future.
In time of war or during full mobilization the productive
resources of any economy are essentially the same as in peacetime, but
they are devoted to different uses and are more intensively utilized.
In such a time the goal of the national economy is maximum military
effort including an optimum output of munitions. This situation
usually implies running the economy at higher than normal rates. Thus,
"when the normal income-producing power of the country is given, there
are four principal sources from which this amount -- the real war fund,
as it were -- can be,drawn. They are: (1) augmented production,
(2) reduced personal consumption, (3) reduced investment in new forms
of capital, and (4) depletion of existing capital." 3/
The flow of total output represented by the "real war fund"
will be divided between (1) finished munitions and personnel services,
including all goods and services used by the armed forces and
(2) capital goods for the munitions industries. The distribution of
a real war fund between current munitions and capital goods for pro-
ducing future munitions will depend on the conditions prevailing at
time of mobilization. For instance, the output of capital goods
** That is, if net investment is zero.
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relative to the output of munitions will depend on the stock of capital
goods currently available for the production of munitions -- that is,
on the size of the "mobilization base," on inventories of finished
munitions, and on the current "munitions needs relative ? to the expected
requirements a few months later."* In ?addition, the size of the real
war fund obtained from a given national income will vary with the
urgency of war and the degree Of governmental control.
C. Procedure for Estimating Soviet Mobilization Potential.
In making an estimate of the quantity of resources available
to the USSR for the production of munitions during a future mobili-
zation period, it is clearly not possible to take into account all of.
these .conditions. Attention will be directed to a future period when
a maximum industrial mobilization for war can be asSumed. Only the
hard goods component of the real wax fund -- that is, munitions and
capital goods production -- will be considered explicitly, and no
account will be taken of personnel services, subsistence, and other
factors. The distribution of this hard goods component of the real
war fund between munitions and capital goods will be taken as similar
to the distribution in 1944.
The magnitude of the military hard goods, or munitions, com-
ponent of the real war fund is estimated indirectly. It is assumed
that the budgetary allocation to munitions procurement in 1944
represents the maximum value of resources that could have been used
for that purpose. It is assumed that changes in the magnitude of
munitions-producing potential are uniquely related to changes, in
an adjusted industrial output index. These assumptions are discussed
in Appendixes A and G.
The procedure used in this report thus involves the measure-
ment of changes in munitions-producing potential in future years by
means of changes in industrial production from a base year (1944) in
which potential was closest to realization. The main assumption
* A country will not usually be interested in the maximum amount of
munitions that could be produced in some particular year. Rather, it
will be concerned with the discounted sum of the outputs of munitions
that can be produced from the start of mobilization to the time when
it is expected that the war will be over. That is, the country will
try to arrange its productive resources so that the sum of all munitions
that could be produced from the start of mobilizatibn to the end of the
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underlying this procedure is that changes in munitions potential can
be measured by changes in an adjusted industrial production index.*
Other magnitudes, such as manufacturing output, capital goods output,
or gross national product, could be considered as alternative in-
dicators.**
Some would argue that any of the alternative magnitudes noted
above would be better indicators of changes in the capability to
'produce a combination of munitions and capital goods than munitions
alone. Thus an additional assumption becomes necessary -- that the
proportion of capital goods to munitions during the future full
mobilization years would be the same as it was during the World War II
base year. If this assumption holds, the adjusted industrial pro-
duction index is a useful indicator of changes in munitions poten-
tial.***
prospective war will be a maximum, making allowances for the different
value placed on munitions available during the different periods of
time.
* The adjustments are described in Section II.
** Except for manufacturing output these alternatives are not attrac-
tive. Capital goods output, a component of industrial output, is
subject to more intense year-to-year fluctuations than the larger aggre-
gate. Munitions potential would not be expected to vary significantly '
from year to year. Gross national product is not a good alternative,
since the USSR is becoming relatively more industrialized with the
passage of time. This situation implies that a larger share of national
product could be munitions output in future mobilization years than in.
the past. The output of manufacturing industries, although a reasonable
alternative, is not likely to differ significantly from industrial pro-
duction. In addition, the availability and comprehensiveness of data
favor the use of the industrial output index. See Appendix A for more
detailed discussion.
*** It should be noted that the second (proportionality) assumption is
not so crucial as the first. Capital goods output was a relatively,
small part of 1944 munitions and capital goods output. Therefore, even
if the percentage of capital goods produced during a future full mobili-
zation year is quite different than the 1944 percentage, the impact on
the munitions component of the total is not very great.
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The third assumption of the estimate of potential is that a
single figure will adequately measure the value of the potential out-
put of munitions. This assumption amounts to saying that munitions
can be substituted for each other at ratios equal to the costs of
production. Since the estimate applies only to a full mobilization
period, sufficient time is available during the mobilization period
for most of the adjustments in the magnitude and/or distribution of
the capital stock that would be necessary.* In any event, this
assumption sets an upper limit to the quantities of different types
of munitions that could be produced within the total resources
limitations imposed by the aggregate figure.
Several assumptions are necessary to translate this aggregate
potential into items of munitions. It is hardly necessary to point
out that any procedure used to arrive at quantitative estimates for
a magnitude as complex as munitions-producing potential must inevita-
bly rest on a series of these or similar assumptions. It is only
possible to make what appears to be the most realistic of alternative
ssumptions, given the limitations imposed by the data.
* Given the stock of capital equipment available on the date of mobili-
zation, one collection of munitions will be more consistent with it than
another collection. If aircraft facilities are limited but the collection
of munitions with one-half made up of aircraft is chosen, the aggregate
value of munitions produced may be les than it would be if the mix with
one-fourth aircraft had been selected. This would result from the
relatively inefficient employment of the productive resources in the air-
craft industry. A situation such as this is not likely to be present if
future war requirements are adequately anticipated, nor is it likely to
exist during years following the first mobilization years.
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II. Munitions Expenditures, Industrial Growth, and the Potential
to Produce Munitions.
A. Munitions Expenditures, 1940, 1944, and Postwar Years.
An index of munitions production is determined for the period
from 1940 to 1953 by linking an index of munitions output from 1940 to
1948 to an index of munitions procurement from 1948 to 1953. The
explicit allocations for defense and estimated supplementary funds for
munitions procurement in the Soviet budgets for 1940 and 1944 to 1953
are given in Table 3.* The supplementary allocations listed in Table 3
are believed to be funds designated primarily for the procurement of
armament from the internal and secret police allowances. The total
defense allocations, including explicit and supplementary funds,
probably do not include expenditures from large-scale nuclear programs.
These expenditures are mainly for construction and special production
equipment, items likely to show up elsewhere in the annual Soviet
budget.
Military personnel costs are independent estimates of per-
sonnel pay and cost of maintenance. The figure for 1946 relative to
1945 may seem high in view of the known fact that the armed forces
were drastically reduced in size. Pay rates, however, are believed to
have doubled during that year. Even if the pay increase was more
gradual, the postwar trend in the residual, major procurement of
munitions, would not be affected.
Expenditures for military construction, operations, maintenance,
and similar items are estimated at 20 percent of total defense allo-
cations, a proportion somewhat lower than US expenditures for similar
services. This figure .could easily be in error by as much as 20 to 30
percent. The effect of a - 25 percent error in this category would
result only in about ? 5 to 10 percent error in the procurement figures
for the postwar period. Moreover, it is of greater importance that
there be consistency in the procurement estimates than that each
absolute amount be correct, because the relative changes in the aggregate
value of munitions procurement are the important factors for both the
industrial output index and the check on intelligence estimates of
munitions production.**
* Table 3 follows on p. 10.
** See Appendix G.
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Table 3
Defense Expenditures in the USSR 2/
1940, 1944-53
Billion Current Rubles
1940
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
Defense Budget 12/
56.8
137.9
128.2
73.6
66.3
66.3
79.2
82.9
93.9
108.6
110.2
Supplementary Allocations 2/
2.0
2.0
2.5
4.4
6.0
6.4
5.8
5.2
6.0
6.0
6.0
Total Defense Allocations
58.8
139.9
130.7
78.0
72.3
72.7
85.0
88.1
99.9
114.6
116.2
Military Personnel Costs
12.3
44.0 1/
44.o
38.0 2/
38.0
34.0
32.0
30.0
28.0
28.0
28.0
Military Construction
2.0 1/
3.0
3.0 f/
2.0
2.0
2.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
Operations, Maintenance,
12.0
28.0
26.0
16.0
14.0
15.0
17.0
18.0
20.0
23.0
23.0
Research, Transportation,
Military Finance, and
General Overhead g/
Nonhatd Goods
26.3
75.0
73.0
56.0
54.0
51.0
52.0
51.0
51.0
54.0
54.0
Residual: Major Procurement
32.5
64.9
57.7
22.0
18.3
21.7
33.0
37.1
48.9
60.6
62.2
a. Data from Appendix B.
b. Published budget allocation to defense.
c. These figures are the estimated portion, 25 percent, of the expenditures for internal security which may be expected to include
outlays for personnel pay and equipment.
d. Estimated personnel costs Were 42.2 billion rubles for 12 million troops. The personnel costs are increased to amount for 12.5
million troops.
e. Estimated from personnel cost for subsequent year.
f. Estimated from the 1941 economic plan, which gave a range of 3 to 4 billion rubles.
g. These expenditures were estimated at about 20 percent of total expenditures.
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The above estimates of military expenditures are subtracted
from the total defense appropriations, leaving munitions procurement
as the residual. In order to make a comparison in real terms of
munitions procurement expenditures in one year relative to other
years, it is necessary to know the change in the level of munitions
prices* during the period. Unfortunately, there are few indexes of
price changes in the USSR for the past decade and none for price
changes in the munitions sector. An index of price changes in capital
equipment used as a munitions price index is listed in Table 4.
Table 4
Index of Real Munitions Based on Budgetary Allocations a/
1940, 1944-53
Year
Munitions
?Procurement
(Billion
Current Rubles)
Capital
Equipment
Price Index
Index of
Real Munitions
Output
(1940 100)
1940
32.5
100
100
1944
64.9
82
243
1945
57.7
91
195
1946
22.0
94
72
1947
18.3
99
57
1948
21.7
104
64
1949
33.0
135
75
1950
37.1
115
99
1951
48.9
109
138
1952
60.6
106
176
1953
62.2
104
184
a. Data from Appendix B, Table 29.
* Price changes as used in this context include changes only in the
prices of similar munitions; they do not include changes in price due
to changes in quality or complexity.
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This method of calculating a munitions output index is
especially unreliable for the period 1940-48 because price indexes for
the period are difficult to interpret as resources are shifted into and
out of the munitions sector. Costs of munitions production vary sharply
during such a period, decreasing rapidly during the conversion period
while large-scale production is being achieved and changing without any
clear pattern during demobilization. The price indexes are likely to
be considerably more reliable during the 1948-53 period, as are the
munitions procurement indexes computed from them.
In. providing a more reliable index for the period 1940-48 it
is possible to use the year-to-year changes in physical output during
the same period. Estimates of munitions production by model and class
for the USSR during World War II have been derived
These
data can be combined into an index of real munitions output by
weighting with unit prices for the munition items.* The resulting
index shown in Table 5 is accurate to the extent that the quality, com-
plexity, and prices of the individual items remain constant.
Table 5
Index of Munitions Output in the USSR a/
194o-48
Year
Output Index
1940
100
1941
116
1942
209
1943
332
1944
370
1945
258
1946
62
1947
59
1948
66
a. Sources: Data from Appendix B, Table 30.
* Estimated dollar costs for Soviet World War II munitions are
developed in Appendix C and are given in Section III; they are
utilized in developing the output index.
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Since the USSR did not begin extensive modernization of its
military end-item program until sometime in 1946 or 1947, it is
believed that the output index retains validity until that date. The
use of 1945 US dollar cost weights biases the index to an extent, but
it is likely that the bias is not serious. Several major changes were
made in the process of developing the dollar cost weights. None of
the changes appeared to make much difference in the growth rate shown
by the index.
The two indexes of munitions output -- one derived from procure-
ment (budget) data and one from production data -- are combined in
Table 6* to give an index of munitions output in real terms from 1940
to 1953. The production index is used from 1940 to 1947; the procure-
ment index, from 1949 onward. The indexes are linked in 1948 and will
hereafter be referred as the combined munitions output index.
The combined index shows an increase from 1940 to 1948 somewhat
greater than the procurement index because of the fact that the procure-
ment index was lower than the output index, relative to 1940, during
the year in which the two indexes were linked. It is reasonable that
such would be the case, since munitions costs probably fell, relative
to other industrial costs, between 1940 and 1948.** Since the procure-
ment index is based on current ruble amounts deflated by an industrial
equipment index, it will tend to understate the growth of munitions
output when munitions costs decline relative to industrial costs.
B. Soviet Industrial Growth and Munitions-Producing Potential.
As indicated in Section I, it is proposed that changes in
munitions-producing potential be measured in terms of changes in
aggregate industrial output. Output indexes for the consumer goods
and producer goods sectors of industry have been computed
* Table 6 follows on p. 14.
** It is known that munitions costs fell considerably, relative to
other industrial costs during the war period, going from 100 in 1940
to approximately 60 in 1944. 4/ While the decline in the scale of
munitions output after the war probably reversed this situation, the
fact that the Russians continued to produce on a moderately large scale
means that part of the gain was retained. Industrial costs
declined slightly during the wax period.
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. The index for actual defense output is taken from Table 6
and extrapolated from 1953 to 1957 at the annual rate of 5 percent per
annum.*
Table 6
Indexes of Munitions Production in the USSR
for Selected Years and a Combined Index
1940-53
?
Year
Munitions a/
Output Index
(1940 = 100)
Procurement
with CIA
Price Index b/
(1940 = 100.7
Combined
Index c/
(1940 = Too)
1940
loo
loo
loo
1941
116
116
1942
209
209
1943
332
332
1944
370
370
1945
258
258
1946
62
62
1947
59
.59
1948
66
64
66
1949
75
77
1950
99
102
1951
138
143
1952
176
182
1953
184
190
a. Table 5, above.
b. Table 4, above.
c. The difference between use of the CIA price index and
the UN price index is about 7 percent; the UN index would
show a slightly lower postwar rate of growth than the above
index with CIA prices.
* This rate of increase is the estimated cost of maintaining inventories
of munitions now on hand in the USSR allowing for the introduction of
new model weapons. See Appendix D.
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The indexes in Table 7 are aggregated on the basis of 1951
value-added weights for both the major sectors shown directly and
for the subsectors from which the major sectors were computed. The
1951 period is used as the base because of the known tendency Of
industrial output indexes to show a strong upward bias if weighted in
accordance with outdated scarcity relationships. 5/
Table 7
Index of Soviet Industrial Output from 1940 to 1957
with 1951 Sector
and Intrasector Value-Added Weights a/
Year
Industrial
Consumer Goods
Producer
Goods
Defense
Goods
Industrial
Output
1940
76
54
70
63
1941
69
42
81
56
1942
53
24
146
49
1943
11.11.
25
232
59
1944
38
29
259
63
1945
39
35
18o
56
1946
50
42
43
45
1947
58
51
41
52
1948
71
64
46
64
1949
83
77
54
76
1950
92
91
71
89
1951
loo
loo
loo
loo
1952
107
107
127
110
1953
114
117
133
118
1954
123
129
140
129
1955
133
141
147
139
1956
143
153
154
150
1957
154
166
162
162
a. Data from Appendix B, Table 35.
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The only other reliable alternative to a 1951 base period would be a
1940 base period, and the relative cost structure of Soviet industry
has changed substantially since 1940.* The increases from 1955 onward
in the consumer and producer goods index were projected by assuming
annual increases of 7.5 percent and 8.5 percent, respectively, and are
consistent with CIA estimates.
The index of Soviet industrial output shows an increase of
about 160 percent between 1940 and 1957, and about 90 percent between
1940 and 1953. If a 1940 period had been used for the weight base,
these figures would be about 190 percent and 115 percent respectively,
or about 12 percent in excess of the figures in Table 7. The use of
CIA price weights rather than the UN price weights for the defense
index (see Appendix B) makes a difference of less than 1 percent.
One further adjustment is needed to convert the industrial
output index into an index of growth in munitions production potential.
It is clear that munitions production potential has grown by at least
as much as the growth of industrial output. During World War II it
was necessary to divert part of industrial output to the production of
co,---mmer goods and some capital equipment. During a future full mobili-
zation it would be necessary to do the same, although the proportion of
outp-t so diverted might not be as large. The World War II per capita
of industrial consumer goods has therefore been projected forward
on the basis of population changes. Any resources used to produce con-
sumer goods over and above this minimum requirement could presumably be
used for the munitions or capital goods 'sector in the event of industrial
mobilization. These potential resources available from consumption cuts
are added to the producer goods and defense sectors in computing the
munitions potential "index." This index (Table 8**) indicates the rate
of growth of industrial resources that could be used for either muni-
tions or capital goods production. To compare industrial potential
during the World War II year of maximum effort with industrial potential
during future hypothetical full-mobilization years, the index is shown
for selected years with the 1944 period equalling 100. For comparison,
the industrial output index is presented with the same base year.
As is clear from Table 8, the munitions potential index shows a
slightly larger growth than industrial output, which necessarily follows
from the manner of construction. Indicators of growth in potential other
* See Appendix B.
** Table 8 follows on p. 17.
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Table 8
Indexes of Munitions-Producing Potential
and Industrial Output
1944, 1949-57
1944 . 100
Year
Munitions-Prodlicing
Potential 21
Industrial
Output 121
1944
100
100
1949
124
121
1950
147
141
1951
169
159
1952
188
175
1953
203
187
1954
224
205
1955
242
221
1956
264
238
1957
286
257
.a. Details of calculation shown in
Appendix A, Table 22.
b. Data from Table 7, recomputed to a
1944 base.
than the adjusted industrial production index are calculated in
Appendix A. Alternative calculations are all within plus 5 and minus
25 percent of the index calculated in Table 8. Reasons for the choice
of the munitions-producing potential index are discussed in Appendix A.
One comment should be made concerning the nature of a munitions
potential index. The measure is designed to show the relative change
over time in the ability of the USSR to produce munitions under con-
ditions of full mobilization. Thus the 1953 index of 203 may be
interpreted to mean that the USSR could have produced about twice as
many munitions in 1953 as they produced in 1944, provided the Russians
were mobilized to the same extent and provided that shortages of
particular kinds of industrial resources did not impede the munitions
efforts.* Measures of munitions-producing potential for other years
must be interpreted in a similar fashion.
* This would have been true, of course, only if the USSR had originated
mobilization during, say, 1951.
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The increase in munitions-producing potential shown above is
imposing. However, the growth of Soviet economy has been equally
imposing. In addition to the aggregate growth indicators discussed
above and in Appendix A, the increases in availability of basic
materials shown in Table 9 are instructive.
Table 9
Comparative Estimate of the Aggregate Increase
in Munitions-Producing Potential
with Increases in Selected Basic Materials a/
1944, 1953-57
Indexes of Output
1944
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
Munitions-Producing Aggregate
100
203
224
242
264
286
Steel
100
335
370
400
430
460
Copper
100
90
100
105
115
120
Aluminum
100
110
125
140
155
170
All Metals
100
260
280
310
330
355
Electric Power
100
330
370
425
470
515
Coal
100
275
290
310
330
350
POL
100
255
265
280
295
310
All Fuels
100
290
315
345
370
400
a. Further data in Appendix A, Table 24. The 1944 figures include
Lend-Lease materials supplied to the USSR.
These data all show increases that seem to be of the same order
of magnitude as the increase in aggregate potential, although individual
items vary greatly as might be expected. Additional evidence of the
genetal validity of the CIA estimate is contained in the fact that the
metal-fabricating capacity of the USSR, as measured by the inventory of
machine tools, is expected to be approximately 1.5 million units by 1956,
compared to between. 0.5 and 0.6 million units in 1944. This represents,
an expansion of from 2.5 to 3 times.
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III. Dollar Cost Estimates for Major Items of Soviet Munitions.
A. Reason for Dollar Cost Estimates.
The output during World War II of various items of Soviet
munitions multiplied by appropriate ruble prices would give a magni-
tude which should equal the estimated munitions procurement portion of
the defense budget. Furthermore, ruble prices coupled with proportions
among items of munitions would permit the current aggregate value of
munitions procurement estimated from the defense budget to be expressed
in terms of output by type of munitions. An aggregate potential value
of munitions could be handled in a similar fashion. Unfortunately,
ruble prices for Soviet munitions are not available.* If it is
assumed that a similar relationship between cost structures in the US
and USSR exists, relative dollar prices can be used as an approximation
to relative ruble prices. Since the ruble aggregates mentioned above
can also be expressed in dollars; the aggregates can then be translated
into quantities of munitions by type. The assumption is therefore made
that the cost of producing an item of munition in one munitions cate-
gory relative to the cost in another is the same in the US as it is in
the USSR, with due allowance for differences in US and Soviet models
of munitions. That is, it is assumed that the cost of a MIG,-15 fighter
aircraft relative to the cost of a T-54 medium tank is the same whether
these items are produced in the US or in the USSR. Estimates of the
cost of producing the various items of Soviet munitions in the US at
1954 prices are presented in Table 10.**
* There are virtually no direct Soviet price data available for the
major items of munitions, although it is possible to derive estimates
of ruble price for some items of munitions from scattered open publi-
cations. For instance, the director of the Kirov Tank Plant in 1945
stated that "during the war the net cost of producing a heavy tank was
reduced 53 percent. The saving effected by this cost reduction was
2500 million rubles." 5/ It is stated further that from the beginning
of heavy tank production to the end of the war 18,000 tanks were
produced by the plant. The price index for this tank is estimated to
have fallen from 100 in 191.1.1 to about 66 in 1942 and to 47 in 1945. If
it is assumed that all these tanks were sold at prices which were on
the average those prevailing in 1943, the average saving per tank would
equal 34 percent of the 1941 cost (the average saving per tank would be
2.5 million rubles divided by 18,000, or 13)4,000 rubles). The resulting
1941 cost would be a little more than 400,000 rubles, and the 1945 cost
would be a little less than 200,000 rubles.
** Table 10 follows on p. 20.
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Table 10
Estimated Costs of Soviet World War II
and Current Items of Munitions a/
1945 Dollars
Class or Item
Estimated Cost
World Wax II Model
Current Model
Aircraft
Fighter
42,000
91,000
Ground Attack
83,000
N.A.
Bomber
127,000
417,000
Transport
48,000
72,000
Trainer
9,000
10,000
Other Aircraft
Tanks and Assault Guns
Light
24,970
N.A.
Medium
50,200
89,400
Heavy
90,940
135,000
Artillery
Light (45-57 mm)
2,150
3,220
Medium (76-122 mm)
3,260
9,930
Heavy (152 mm and up)
17,100
24,260
Antiaircraft
6,340
47,700
Small Arms
6o
35
Mortars
910
2,700
Ammunition
(Tons)
950
1,140
Trucks and Jeeps
1,200
2,200
Naval Vessels
(Displacement Tons)
Cruiser
2,000
2,000
Destroyer
3,540
3,540
Submarine
3,460
3,460
Other Vessels
2,300
2,300
a. Data from Appendix C.
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B. Methods of Estimating Dollar Cost and Cost Estimates.
Estimates of dollar costs are made by two methods: (1) on the
basis of dollar cost per unit weight determined from counterpart US
munitions items and (2) on the basis of dollar cost per unit weight
determined from counterpart US munitions items with adjustments for
differences in quantity and quality of attached and accompanying equip-
ment, such as electronics and armaments. The latter method was used
for aircraft and antiaircraft artillery, the former for all other
major items. The US and Soviet counterpart models were selected on
the basis of (1) function, (2) physical attributes, and (3) rate of
production of US model. The first two criteria were most important.
Often it was discovered that 2 or 3 US models could be compared with
a particular Soviet model. In such a case the third criterion was
applied, and the item with the highest rate of production in the US
was used. Models with low production rates are often experimental
models, the cost of which does not reflect the real costs of pro-
duction for standard models.
The resulting dollar costs estimates are given for World War
II type equipment and for current models in Table 10. All prices are
expressed in 1945 dollars.
The dollar cost estimates for the Soviet World War II equip-
ment given in Table 10 are probably minimum estimates. The importance
of comparing US and Soviet models that were both produced in relatively
large quantities lies in the fact that unit cost and scale of output
are inversely correlated. That is, unit costs which presuppose
efficient levels of production are lower than unit costs for new models
or for models produced in small quantities.
The dollar costs for the current Soviet models of munitions
excluding aircraft were computed from the most reliable current prices
for US weapons.* It may be assumed that the prices for the current
US models are prices for relatively high levels of production, because
.counterpart models were selected from those with the highest production
rates. The prices for the Soviet equipment may be assumed to hold for
production once conversion to economic mobilization has taken place and
the initial organizational problems overcome -- that is, probably during
part of the second year of mobilization and all of the third year. '
After the second year there may be a tendency for prices to decline,
although the decline might be offset by the introduction of new and more
expensive models.
* See Appendix C.
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Implicit in some of the computations of dollar cost of current
Soviet models is an assumption concerning changes in the quality of
munitions. For artillery, small arms, and ammunition, there is little
data on the latest Soviet models. The most recent US models in quantity
production have been selected as counterparts. The USSR is assumed to
have introduced changes in the quality of these particular weapons as
rapidly as has the US. For all other items, counterpart models have
been selected as carefully as possible on the basis of physical simi-
larity.
Dollar cost estimates for Soviet aircraft were made from com-
parisons with US aircraft with respect to function and physical
characteristics. The cost for the counterpart US aircraft was divided
among airframe, engine, electronics and communications, and government-
furnished equipment including armament. The cost of the airframe and
the engine was divided by the empty weight. This cost per unit weight
was multiplied by the empty weight of the Soviet aircraft to obtain .
the cost of the Soviet airframe and engine.
Generally, Soviet aircraft are equipped with less complex types
of communications and electronics and other accessories. In order to
make adjustments for these differences, estimates of the value of such
equipment carried on Soviet aircraft relative to the value carried on
counterpart US aircraft were made. 6/ These percentages were applied
to the cost of equipment for counterpart US aircraft to obtain the
dollar costs of the equipment for the Soviet aircraft.
The costs for the counterpart US aircraft are costs at relatively
high levels of output, 5,000 units per year for fighter aircraft and
1,000 units for other aircraft. 7/ The resulting cost estimates are
therefore comparable to the cost estimates for other munitions and may
be expected to apply for the second year of mobilization.
The rate of technological advance, insofar as costs are con-
cerned, has been less rapid in the design of naval craft than it has
for most other items of munitions. Therefore, dollar costs per unit
weight for US World Wax II ships have been used to make dollar cost
estimates of current Soviet models.*
* Bureau of Ships estimated costs per displacement ton for many
different US models in 1947 are generally consistent when adjusted for
price changes with the 1945 costs per ton used to compute the costs of
Soviet ships. The few discrepancies between the two can be explained
on the basis of scale of output.
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IV. Production of Munitions in 1944, and Potential Output
of Munitions by Class in Future Years.
A detailed inspection of Soviet munitions production in 1944 is
made in this section to develop a base year magnitude for comparison
with later years and to calculate the relative magnitudes of major
munitions classes in the past. The relative magnitudes of munitions
classes, or the munitions mix, for future mobilization years cannot be
forecast with accuracy for any country. It can, however, be antici-
pated within ranges. Furthermore, broad limits must be placed on the
proportions of the munitions mix during a future Soviet mobilization
period if the aggregate munitions-producing potential is to be expressed
in units of armament. Past Soviet experience will be of aid in setting
up alternative mixes, particularly when coupled with estimated wartime
munitions requirements.
Once a munitions mix or a series of mixes has been constructed, the
potential value of munitions production in future years, determined
from the indexes cited in Tables 3-8 and the value of munitions pro-
duction in 1944, can be expressed in units of munitions. Two such
examples are given in part B of this chapter. Units of munitions
derived in this manner but in accord with the proportions among items
of military hardware required by an expected Soviet war plan should be
taken as the maximum quantities of such hardware available to the USSR
from current production.
A. Production of Munitions in 1944.
Data on munitions production during 1944 is presented in
Table 11* classified by major groups of military end items. Estimates
of expenditures on spare parts, signal and engineering equipment, and
other costs are included. The data are expressed in both physical
units and 1945 dollar costs** in Table 11.
The total value of munitions produced in 1944 is given in
Table 11 as $10.7 billion. This amount must be considered a minimum
for a number of reasons. First, the dollar cost estimates are based
on the assumption of highly efficient production levels. This
Table 11 follows on p. 24.
** When dollar costs are referred to in subsequent sections of this
report, it will be understood that dollars at 1945 price levels are
meant.
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Table 11
Dollar Value and Percentage Distribution
of Soviet Munitions Production a/*
1944
Class of Munitions
Production
(Units)
Dollar Value
(Thousand Dollars)
Percentage
of Total
Aircraft
Fighter
17,300
727,000
6.8
Ground Attack
11,700
971,000
9.1
Bomber
5,200
660,000
6.2
Transport
1,000
48,000
0.5
Other Aircraft
4,800
41o,000
3.8
Total
2,816,000
26.4
Armored Vehicles
Light
9,710
243,000
2.3
Medium
- 17,420
874,000
8.2
Heavy
2,400
218,000
2.1
Other Armored Vehicles
267,000
2.5
Total
1,602,000
15.0
Artillery
87,100
/.1-21z222
3.8
Small Arms
6,980,000
395,000
3.7
Mortars
100,000
91,000
0.9
Naval Vessels
Destroyers
1
7,000
0.1
Submarines
7
20,000
0.2
Total
27,000
0.3
* The footnote for Table 11 follows on p. 25.
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Table 11
Dollar Value and Percentage Distribution
of Soviet Munitions Production a/
1944
(Continued)
Class of Munitions
Ammunition (Tons)
Trucks
Communications and
and Electronics
Engineering Equipment
Transportation Equipment
Other Munitions
Dollar Total
Production
(Units)
3,680,000
79,400
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Ruble Total
(Thousand Rubles)
a. Data from Appendix F, Table 48.
Dollar Value Percentage
(Thousand Dollars) of Total
4,062,000 38.1
123,000 1.1
2.7
1.8
1.8
4.5
10,659,000 100.0
(64,900,000)
assumption may be valid for many of the items, but for classes of
munitions with rapid qualitative changes, highly efficient production
levels may never have been reached. Second, the estimates for spares
and other categories not given directly are conservative. Except for
trucks, spare parts estimates relative to the pertinent categories
never exceed and usually are less than similar US ratios. In general,
Soviet equipment may have endured more intensive use than counterpart
US equipment. Hence, the spare parts maintenance cost may well have
exceeded US practice. Third, many items have not been included because
production has never been determined. For instance, many armored cars
and caissons for artillery pieces were known to have been produced but
are not included, because the quantity of such items produced cannot be
determined.
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In spite of these qualifications, there is little reason to
suspect serious inaccuracies in the percentage distribution among the
major classes of munitions in Table 11. In the absence of specific
information, it is assumed throughout the report that the relative
ruble prices are the same as relative dollar prices.*
The ruble: dollar ratio of 6.1:1 that can be computed from
the aggregate values of Table 11 is subject to a sizable margin of
error. The ratio may be high since the aggregate dollar value is a
minimum; it may be too low if the ruble procurement total is under-
stated. Thus, the ruble prices obtained as the product of estimated
dollar cost and the ruble: dollar ratio may differ from actual ruble
prices used for procurement accounting purposes. The use of these
ruble prices for different years (other than 1944) implicitly assumes
that the procurement of unimportant and unidentified items of munitions
relative to the major items remains constant except when differences
are openly taken into account.** However, this ratio is presented only
as a point of interest and does not form an integral part of the study.
B. Potential Production of Munitions by Major Class in Future
Years.
Indexes for determining changes in Soviet munitions potential
were developed in Section II. This potential may be expressed in
dollars, given the dollar value of 1944 munitions production. For
instance, the munitions potential index, with 1944 as 100 increases
to 242 in 1955. In the preceding section, the value of munitions
production in 1944 was estimated at $10.659 billion. Multiplying the
munitions potential index by $10.659 billion gives a figure of about
$25.8 billion as the potential value of munitions production in 1955.
Potential munitions value for 1954-57 are listed in Table 12.***
In order to translate these aggregate values into specific
items of munitions, relative magnitudes of major munitions classes must
be given. The relative magnitudes of the major classes of munitions
* The question of subsidies is distinct from this problem so long
as procurement accounting remains unchanged.
** It should be emphasized that for purposes of calculating munitions
potential, relative prices of munitions, rather than absolute prices,
and the distribution of the major categories are the only determinants.
*** Table 12 follows on p. 2Y.
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Table 12
Potential Value of Munitions Production in the USSR
1944, 1954-57
Year
Munitions Dollar Value
Potential of Potential
Index (Billion Dollars)
1944
100
10.659
1954
224
23.9
1955
242
25.8
1956
264
28.1
1957
286
30.5
for 1944 are shown in Table 11.* These proportions, however, cannot
be used without adjustment for a future Soviet mobilization year,
because future war conditions are unlikely to be similar to con-
ditions prevailing in World War II. To observe the nature of changes
in such proportions over time, the relative value of major classes of
munitions produced by the US may be inspected.
Relative values of five major classes of munitions in the US
procurement program are shown in Table 13** for 2 World War II years,
2 peacetime years, and the expected average proportions for 3 future
mobilization years.
It is clear from casual inspection that there is considerable
variation in the munitions mix of the US from period to period.
Circumstances unique to the US will explain these variations in part.
In general, however, the munitions mix for a mobilization period is
dependent on: (1) war strategy and the resulting initial requirements
to arm the military forces, (2) the level of munitions inventories,
and (3) expected rates of attrition.
* P. 24, above.
** Table 13 follows on p. 28.
?
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Table 13
Proportions of Major Classes of Munitions
for the US in World War II, in 1952 and 1953,
and in a Future Mobilization Period
,
Three-Year
Mobilization
Class of Munitions
1943 8/
1944 9/
195221
1953 21
Period
Aircraft
23.9
27.8
49.0
46.5
33.0
Ships
23.9
23.2
5.4
5.9
12.0
Combat Vehicles
6.2
3.6
10.0
13.0
6.0
Weapons
6.1
and Fire Control
6.1
5.1
2.7
2.9
3.9
Ammunition
9.4
10.0
10.9
14.7
19.1
Other
30.6
30.3
22.0
17.0
26.0
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
A recent study has
attempted to determine the Soviet Bloc requirements for the first and
succeeding years of a war beginning in mid-1954. 10/ From these
requirements the demands on the USSR alone can be computed. These
demands may be used with qualification as a measure of the probable
munitions procurement mix. The estimated requirements for the first
and succeeding years of a war beginning in 1954 do not include the
initial weapons to arm the forces, but only the weapons used up during
the period. Further, no account of the effect of beginning inventories
on the munitions mix is made. If the estimated requirements are averaged
for a 2-or-3 year period, however, the resulting. mix may be similar to
the proportions in a munitions procurement program.
These proportions (with arbitrary adjustments -- see Appendix
E) should be interpreted as one of an infinite number of possible
distributions of munitions by class. The proportions selected may be
expected to be valid only within broad limits. For instance, armored
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vehicles may make up as much as 25 to 30 percent of munitions in a war
in which the USSR would rely primarily on aground offensive. Gontrari-
wise, aircraft may make up 4o percent or more of all munitions in war
fought primarily in the air. It is clear that such possibilities can
cause unlimited variations from any given set of proportions. The pro-
portions of Table 14*, and the resulting numbers of munitions by type,
should, therefore, be interpreted as only one of an infinite set of
proportions and numbers of Soviet items of munitions in a future
mobilization period. The only limiting factor lies in the aggregate
value of munitions, which cannot exceed $25.8 billion in 1955, $28.1
billion in 1956, and $30.5 billion in 1957.** Potential output of
munitions by class, computed from the proportions, are shown in
Tables 14 and 15*** for 1954 and 1956.
?
* Table 14 follows on p. 30.
** These amounts are the products of estimated munitions production
in 1944 and the index of munitions production potential of Table 8,
p. 17, above.
*** Table 15 follows on p. 32.
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Table 14
A Probable Wartime Distribution
of Soviet Munitions Output
1954
Percentage
Class of Munitions of Total./*
Dollar
Allocation b/
Dollar c/
Cost per Unit
Number d/
of Units
Aircraft (Units)
Fighter
Bomber
Transport
Trainer
Other
7.3
8.6
1.1
0.3
2.7
1,723
2,030
260
71
637
91,000
417,000
72,000
14,000
18,900
4,9oo
3,600
5,100
Wotal
20.0
4,700
Armored Vehicles
(Units)
Medium Tanks
and Assault Guns
10.2
2,407
89,000
27,000
Heavy Tanks
and Assault Guns
2.3
543
135,000
4,000
Other
2.5
590
Total
15.0
3,5)1.0
Artillery (Units)
Light ( 57-mm)
0.8
189
3,200
59,100
Medium (85-100 mm)
0.9
212
10,600
20,000
Heavy (122-mm and up)
0.5
118
15,400
7,700
Antiaircraft
2.3
543
48,000
11,300
Other
0.5
118
Total
5.0
1,180
* Footnotes for Table 14 follow on p. 31.
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Table 14
A Probable Wartime Distribution
of Soviet Munitions Output
1954
(Continued)
Percentage/
Allocation b/
Dollar c/
Number d/
Class of Munitions
of Total 2V
(Millions)?
Cost per Unit
of Units
Small Arms (Units)
0.6
142
35
4,o57,o00
Mortars (Units)
94
2,700
34,800
Naval Vessels
Cruisers
(1,500-Ton)
1.0
236
30,000,000
7.9
Destroyers
9,560,000
30
(21700-Ton)
1.2
283
9,560,000
30
Submarines
(1,500-Ton)
0.8
189
5,200,000
36
Other
3.0
708
Total
6.0
1,1116
Ammunition (Tons)
26.0
6,136
820
7,480,000
Automotive Vehicles
(Units)
Trucks
1.8
425
2,350
180,900
Jeeps
0.2
47
1,050
44,800
Total
2.0
472
Other
25.0
5,900
Total
100.0
23,600 e/
a. Estimate from Appendix E, Tables 47.
b. Total dollar estimate from Section IV, p. 26. Other data derived
from total and first column.
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Table 14
A Probable Wartime Distribution
of Soviet Munitions Output
1954
(Continued)
c. Data from Appendix E, Table 46.
d. Column two divided by column three.
e. The computed value of $23.6 billion for potential in 1954 was
later adjusted to $23.9 billion.
Table 15
A Probable Wartime Distribution
of Soviet Munitions Output
1956
Percentage4
Dollar
Allocation b/
Dollar c/
Number d/
Class of Munitions
of Total 21
(Millions)?
Cost per Unit
of Units
Aircraft (Units)
Fighter
7.3
2,037
91,000
22,400
Bomber
8.6
2,400
417,000
5,800
Transport
1.1
307
72,000
4,300
Trainer
0.3
84
14,000
6,000
Other
2.7
753
Total
20.0
5,580
Armored Vehicles
(Units)
Medium Tanks
and Assault Guns
10.2
2,846
89,000
32,000
Heavy Tanks
and Assault Guns
2.3
642
135,000
4,800
* Footnotes for Table 15 follow on p. 34.
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Table 15
A Probable Wartime Distribution
of Soviet Munitions Output
1956
(Continued)
Dollar
Percentage Allocation b/ , Dollar c/ Number d/
Class of Munitions of Total jY (Millions) Cost per Unit of Units
Armored Vehicles
(Units)
(Continued)
Other
Total
Artillery (Units)
2.5
15.0
698
4,185
Light (57-mm)
0.8
223
3,200
69,700
Medium (85-100 mm)
0.9
251
10,600
23,700
Heavy (122-mm
and up)
0.5
140
15,400
9,100
Antiaircraft
2.3
642
48,0oo
13,400
Other
0.5
140
Total
5.o
1,395
Small Arms
0.6
167
35
4,770,000
Mortars
7:7
112
2,700
41,500
Naval Vessels
Cruisers
(1,500-Ton)
1.0
279
30,000,000
9.3
Destroyers
(2,700-Ton)
1.2
335
9,560,000
35
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Table 15
A Probable Wartime Distribution
of Soviet Munitions Output
1956
(Continued)
Dollar
Percentage Allocation b/ Dollar c/ Number di
Class of Munitions of Total a/ (Millions)? Cost per Unit of Unit
Naval Vessels
(Continued)
Submarines
(1,500-Ton)
Other
Total
0.8
3.0
6.0
223
837
1 674
5,200,000
43
Ammunition (Tons)
26.0
7,25-i-
820
8,850,000
Automotive Vehicles
Trucks
1.8
502
2,350
213,700
Jeeps
0.2
56
1,050
53,000
Total
2.0
558
Other
25.0
6,975
Total
100.0
27,900 e/
a. Estimate from Appendix E, Table 47.
b. Total dollar estimate from Section IV, p. 26. Other data derived
from total and first column.
c. Data from Appendix C.
d. Column two divided by column three.
?e. The computed value of $27.9 billion for potential in 1956 was later
adjusted to $28.1 billion.
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V. Internal Consistency of Munitions Production and Capacity Estimate.
A. Introduction.
The munitions prices presented in Section III can be used to
check the internal consistency of two kinds of intelligence estimates
that have been developed through other procedures. Postwar estimates
of the production of military end items can be developed from price
and procurement data and can be checked against the results of estimates
derived from study of individual items. Similarly, the capacity out-
puts estimated for individual munitions items can be checked against
the aggregate capacity estimates developed in this report.
B. Munitions-Production Estimates.
Comprehensive estimates have been made of the postwar output
of military end items in the USSR. It is apparent that if ruble
prices for these output estimates were available,, an estimate of the
total ruble value of munitions produced could be developed. This
estimate could then be compared to the procurement total derived from
-budgetary data. Alternatively, the same principle could be applied in
a slightly different fashion. If the dollar cost of the Soviet
munitions output program could be developed, the same type of com-
parison could be marie if the ruble procurement figures could be con-
verted into dollars. The latter procedure serves the same purpose as
the former, since there is a correspondence between the relative prices
of various types of munitions in the US and in the USSR. The implicit
ruble:dollar conversion ratio is, as explained in Section III, an
artificial construct that can be used only within the framework of
this report.
The munitions price data in Section III do not apply to
munitions produced during the entire postwar period. The prices really
apply to only two periods -- the World War II period when the wartime
models were being produced on a large scale and the current period
during which the new models are presumably being produced under
relatively efficient conditions. Sufficiently detailed information
from which prices applicable to the years between these two periods
can be developed is not available. Therefore, only the period in the
neighborhood of 1952 and 1953 can be tested by means of the procedure
described above.* Even here, the check is subject to a sizable and
* For a table presenting an index based on dollar costs for the two
periods and estimated quantities of output from 1949-53, see Appendix F,
Table 51.
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indeterminate margin of error, due both to possible inaccuracies in
the price data and to insufficient detail concerning the composition
of the current Soviet procurement effort. Information concerning the
magnitude of such things as the guided missile and electronics pro-
grams is very sketchy. As indicated in Table 16, it is necessary to
make a rough guess as to the probable expenditure on these and similar
programs where detailed information is lacking. Table 16 shows the
estimated dollar cost of the 1952 and 1953 Soviet munitions production
effort.
Table 16
Soviet Munitions Production by Classes a/
1952-53
Munitions
Class
1952
1953
Number
of Items
(Units)
1945
Dollar
Cost
(Millions)
Percent
of Total
Cost
Number
of Items
(Units)
1945
Dollar
Cost
(Millions)
Percent
of Total
Cost
Aircraft
11,606
1,568
27.0
12,742
1,708
28.9
Armored
Vehicles
10,950
1,371
23.6
10,644
1,321
22.3
Artillery
12,800
273
4.7
12,800
273
4.6
Small Arms
317,500
11
0.2
317,500
11
ob2
Mortars
16,200
44
0.8
16,200
44
0.7
Naval
Vessels
184
596
10.3
184
596
10.1
Ammunition
(Tons)
316,000
360
6.2
316,000
360
6.1
Trucks
and Jeeps
50,000
127
2.2
50,000
127
2.2
All Other
0
1,450
25.0
1,480
25.0
Total
5;801
100.0
5,921
100.0
a. Data from Appendix F, Tables 49 and 50.
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The "all other" category in Table 16 is intended to cover such
categories as communications and electronic equipment, engineering
equipment, signal corps equipment, and any weapons not specifically
listed in the detailed breakdown. A somewhat smaller category for the
US, one that excludes weapons completely, is expected to be about 26
percent of total procurement during the 3-year period 1952-53. Spare
parts are included in the itemized expenditure for each weapon class.
The dollar totals shown in Table 16 can be compared with the
dollar totals derived from the procurement index. Estimates are made
in Section III of the total dollar expenditure during 1944 by the USSR.
An index of munitions output is constructed in Section II. Combining
these two, an estimate of Soviet munitions expenditures in dollars can
be obtained during any desired postwar year. The latter figure can
then be compared to the dollar totals developed in Table 16.
The data in Table 17 indicate that the two estimates agree
remarkably well, in view of the very crude nature of the calculation
contained in both estimates.
Table 17
Comparison of Estimated Aggregate Value
of Postwar Munitions Output in the USSR
Munitions a/
Implied Value
b/ Computed Value c/
Output
of Output
of Output Estimates
Index
(Million
(Million
Percentage
Year
(1940 = 100)
1945 Dollars)
1945 Dollars)
Difference
1944
370
10,659
10,659
1952
182
5,240
5,801
411
1953
190
5,480
5,921
t 8
a. Data from Section II, Table ,6.
b. 1944 value from Section IV, Table 11. Other values derived from
index in column one.
c. Data from Section V, Table 16.
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If it can be assumed that both the munitions output index and
the relative dollar prices are exact, then it would follow that
physical output estimates for munitions are about 10 percent too high
during 1952 and 1953. Even if these assumptions were correct, it
would still be impossible to say which output estimates were too high,
since this procedure can only be used to indicate that the individual
estimates are or are not consistent with the aggregate limitations
imposed by the total.
However, the evidence does not warrant any conclusions being
drawn concerning the consistency of these two sets of data. The two
sets of data are not completely independent, since production estimates
were used from 1940-48. The price index used to deflate the budgetary
procurement data (see Section II) is very rough and cannot be relied
upon at this stage. Thus the output index derived from the procurement
data is equally rough, and could certainly be in error by as much as
the 10-percent difference observed above. It is worth noting, however,
that the ruble price index is more likely to be biased downward than
upward, implying that the real procurement index is likely to be biased
in the opposite direction. If this were the case the real discrepancy
between the two estimates would be greater than calculated above.
Similarly, it is more likely that the prices used to build up the
aggregate total from the physical output estimates are biased downward
than upward, since the prices are meant to apply to a period when all
items are being produced in an efficient, large-scale manner. It is
probable that such was not the case for all military end items during
1952 and 1953. In that event, the total value of output would be
understated, and the proper correction would again tend to increase the
difference observed above. On balance, it does seem likely that the
data indicate that current estimates of Soviet munitions output are
overstated by an indeterminate amount.
C. Munitions-Producing Capacity Estimates.
Intelligence estimates of capacity production for specific items
of Soviet munitions have in recent years been made from time to time
for numerous reasons. It is almost always true that these estimates are
made with reference to one limiting factor only, such as plant capacity.
It has not been possible, in general, to take account of the production
of the other items of munitions or other goods. Thus, each item has
been examined in isolation without regard to the concurrent demands on
manpower, raw materials, sub-contracted parts and other demands.
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It has, of course, been clear that accurate estimates could
not be made by these procedures, but no alternative has been available.
The weakness of the capacity-by-individual-item procedure can perhaps
best be illustrated by a single example. At any period of time it is
usually true that an economy has what could be called excess plant
capacity. Most productive establishments work only on a one-shift
basis although presumably they could work on a multiple-shift basis
if necessary, subject to somewhat higher maintenance costs. But it is
perfectly clear that the capacity of the economy cannot be calculated
as the sum of the capacities for each productive unit, since this
would imply that the total output of the economy could be from, say,
50 to 100 percent higher than it actually is. Yet, provided that
unemployment is not substantial, the total output of the economy cannot
be increased very greatly over its current level, even though the out-
put of anyparticular item could be expanded very substantially, if need
be.
The notion of capacity developed in this report is that of an
aggregate of resources that could be utilized for the production of
munitions. No estimate of capacity for individual items can be obtained
via this procedure, since extensive substitutability of items for each
other is assumed. (See Appendix G). However, a rough check can be
made as to the mutual compatability of the individual capacity estimates.
Estimated capacity for each item is multiplied by the dollar price per
item. The sum of these prices multiplied by quantity is really a
measure of the total assumed amount of resources that would be required
to produce all items simultaneously at capacity levels. This total may
be compared with the total amount of resources estimated actually to be
available for munitions production, that is, with the aggregate poten-
tial of the Soviet economy to produce munitions. Table 18* shows
these calculations.
Table 19** indicates that the USSR, if all munitions were
produced simultaneously at capacity rates, would require an aggregate
amount of resources valued from 36 to 42 billion dollars. Estimates
of the total amount of resources (in 1945 dollars) that the USSR would
be able to devote to munitions production during a period of mobili-
zation can be obtained from Sections II and IV. Section II shows an
index of growth in munitions-producing potential. and Section IV shows
the magnitude of the 1944 Soviet munitions effort.
Table 18 follows on p. 4o.
** Table 19 follows on p. 42.
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Table 18
Capacity Estimates and Dollar Costs
for Soviet Munitions al*
Munitions Class
Estimated
Capacity
Output
1945 Dollar
Cost
(Dollars)
Total
1945
Dollar Value
(Millions)
Aircraft (Units)
Fighter
20,000
90,000
1,800,000
Ground Attack
2,000
117,000
234,000
Bombers
6,000
417,000
2,502,000
Transport
3,000
72,000
216,000
Trainer
5,000
14,000
70,000
Other
7,000
10,000
70,000
Total
43,000
4,892,000
Armored Vehicles (Units)
Medium
45,000
89,000
4,005,000
Heavy
15,000
135,000
2,025,000
Total
60,000
3,200
6,030,000
Artillery (Units)
Light (20-75-mm)
4,000
3,200
12,800
Medium (76-100-mm)
45,00o
10,600
477,000
Heavy (122-mm and up)
25,500
15,14.00
392,700
Antiaircraft
31,000
48,000
1,488,00o
Total
105,500
2,371,000
Small Arms (Units)
10,000,000
35
350,000
Mortars (Units)
200,000
2,700
540,00o
The footnote for Table
18 follows on p. 41.
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Table 18
Capacity Estimates and Dollar Costs
for Soviet Munitions a/
(Continued) ?
Munitions Class
Naval Vessels (Units)
Cruisers
Destroyers
Submarines
Other
Total
Ammunition (Tons)
Trucks and Jeeps (Units
Other Munitions
(25-35 percent)
Total
Estimated
Capacity
Output
1945 Dollar
Cost
(Dollars)
18 30,000,000
68 10,600,000
170 2,500,000
N.A. N.A.
13,000,000
200,000
820
2,200
9,096,000
36,382,000
Total
1945
Dollar Value
(Millions)
540,00o
720,800
425,000
758,600
2,444,000
10,660,000
44o,000
14,693,000
41,980,000
a. Data from Appendix F, Table 52.
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Table 19
Comparison of Amounts of Resources Available in the USSR
to Produce Munitions with Amounts Required
to Produce All Munitions at Estimated Capacity Levels
Index a/ Value of Maximum b/
of Munitions Munitions Effort
Year. Potential, (Million 19)4.5 Dollars)
Resources Required c/
for Simultaneous Capacity
(Million 19)4-5 Dollars)
1944
100
10,659
1953
203
21,600
1954
224
23,900
1955
242
25,800
1956
? 264
28,100
36,382 to 41,980
1957
286
30,500
a. Data from Section II, Table 8.
b. Data from Section IV, Table 12, combined with column 1.
c. Data from Table 18, above.
Table 19 indicates that it would require from 30 to 50 percent
more resources than the USSR would have if all military end items were
produced at estimated capacity rates which are assumed to apply to
1956. Or, put in another way, the USSR would not be able to produce
more than 65 to 80 percent, on the average, of the estimated capacity
rates for all items. It would not follOw,:of course, that each -
capacity estimate was too high. Estimates for some classes of munitions
may be quite reasonable; others may be several hundred percent too high.
It can only be concluded that in the aggregate the capacity estimates
are from 30 to 50 percent too high.
It is apparent that there is a serious discrepancy between the
sum of the individual estimates and the aggregate estimate developed
in this report. Either the individual estimates are too high
collectively or the aggregate estimate understates potential. Exami-
nation of the nature of the aggregate estimate, however, does not
support the latter hypothesis. In the first place, the index of
munitions-producing potential is likely to overstate, if anything.
Of several other alternatives examined in Section II all but one
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showed a lower growth rate than the index used above, and the exception
was less than 5 percent higher. If the index is not biased downward,
the only other valid explanation is that the dollar prices presented in
Section III tend to cause either understatement of aggregate potential
or overstatement of resource requirement for achievement of capacity
output levels. Either situation would be possible if the prices
developed for World War II munitions were low relative to those developed
for current items. But the same procedure was used to develop all the
prices involved, so that it becomes difficult to see how a systematic
bias could enter in this direction. The last possibility is that the
comparison of US and Soviet items was such as to overstate the increase
in complexity for Soviet munitions between the World War II period and
the present.* A large element of indetermination shows up here. It
can only be said that considerable care was taken in developing the
comparisons and that no known bias exists. In any event, it is hard
to believe that a systematic bias of the order of 30 to 50 percent
'could have been accounted for.
* Some might object that Soviet munitions are much less complex
relative to US munitions, so that comparisons would inevitably tend
to give an upward bias. But the essential comparison being made is
not between US and Soviet weapons directly, but between changes in
US weapons and changes in Soviet weapons. While it is perfectly true
that US weapons are more costly and complex, it is also true that
this has always been the case, and certainly was during the World
War II period.
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APEENDIX A
AGGREGATE INCREASE IN SOVIET MUNITIONS-PRODUCING POTENTIAL
Several indicators that might be used to measure changes in Soviet
potential to produce combat armaments were discussed in Section II.
A measure of the munitions-producing potential of the USSR is needed
that can be estimated for both World War II and for future years, so
that the difference between the World Wax II year and the future year
can be quantified as a ratio. It is evident that such magnitudes as
the level of industrial output, capital goods output, or total output
(National Income) would all give a rough indication of armament-
producing potential; the problem is to select the one that seems most
reliable. The selection problem can be decided on analytical grounds,
that is, which measure ought, in principle, to be better, or on
empirical grounds, that is, which measure has worked better than others
in the past. It may turn out that all of the possible measures yield
results so similar to each other that the selection problem ceases to
be significant.
Since it is desired to measure this change so that Soviet potential
in the future can be compared with potential during World War II, any
index that is used must be based on some World War II year. The use
of this period raises several difficult problems. The level of
armament output achieved by the USSR during World War II does not
bear a clear-cut relationship to either prewar or wartime Soviet
aggregate measures. The USSR was invaded by Germany in the middle of
1941 and did not recover all overrun territory until late in 1944.
Thus the prewar potential was never fully exploited on this account.*
* The index of Soviet industrial output during the period illustrates
this fact. Based on 1940 = 100, the index ran about as follows:
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
Industrial Production 100 88 78 93 99 88
As is indicated, the index never reached the prewar level, although
it would undoubtedly have far exceeded the prewar level in the absence
of invasion.
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On the other hand, the USSR received a sizable amount of unilateral
Lend-Lease assistance from the Western Allies during the course of the
war. Thus the potential indicated by the size of the internal wartime
economy was augmented by outside assistance, which in itself tends to
cause overstatement. The same is true of the effects of Lend Lease on
prewar measures. Since the problem is to find that Soviet economic
aggregate which best measures armament-producing potential during
World War II, it will be necessary to adjust both the prewar and war-
time aggregates to reflect the influence of the invasion and of Lend-
Lease aid.
A. Indexes of Potential Based on Prewar Magnitudes.
The difficulties inherent in the use of prewar data as a base for
comparing World War II potential with potential in later years can be
handled, in principle, by proper manipulation of the pre-World War II
base year. The Lend-Lease assistance problem could be handled in
similar fashion. The advantage of using a prewar base period is that
aggregate measures of output during peacetime tend to be inherently
more reliable than aggregate wartime measures. Accurate measurement
is difficult during periods of drastic shifts in the pattern of out-
put.
In comparing aggregates before World War II to aggregates before
a hypothetical mobilization year, it will be assumed that the 1940
Soviet GNP (gross national product) should be reduced by 25 percent
in order to obtain a figure consistent with the 1944 munitions
potential.* This estimate was derived in the following manner.
* This adjustment is intended to account for two kinds of differences:
the difference between the 1940 GNP that would have been required to
produce the 1944 military effort in the USSR in the absence of invasion,
as compared to the actual 1940 GNP; and, the difference between the
1944 munitions effort that the USSR could have achieved in the absence
of Lend-Lease aid and the munitions effort that they did infact,
achieve. These differences are opposite in direction, that is, 1940
GNP overstates 1944 munitions-producing potential because of the
invasion and understates it because of Lend-Lease aid.
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The actual Soviet GNP index over this period was as follows:
GNP Index (1940 = 100)* Year
1940 l914.
100 87
This index, if the USSR had not been invaded, might have increased
at 5 percent per year, which would have given:
Hypothetical GNP Index 1940 1944
100 121
Since GNP might have been expected to increase by some 21 percent
between 1940 and 1944, it would follow that the 1940 level of GNP
that best indicates 1944 potential would be 83 percent of achieved
1944 GNP. This hypothetical level turns out to be roughly 70 percent
of realized 1940 GNP. This hypothetical GNP level, however, does not
reflect the role of Lend Lease in increasing the World War II
munitions output above the level implied by the prewar data. Since
part of the Lend-Lease aid may be reflected in the achieved wartime
GNP and thus in the hypothetical 1940 GNP, an upward adjustment of
5 percentage points (about 7 percent) seems to be reasonable.**
Similarly, for comparing the prewar magnitudes of industrial out-
put and capital goods output With those before years of hypothetical
mobilization, it has been assumed that the 1940 output for both of
these aggregates should be reduced by 20 percent in estimating 1944
potential. These estimates are based on a procedure similar to that
described above, supplemented with the fact that the reduction in
industrial output and capital goods output resulting from invasion
* Data from Table 20.
** Lend Lease is estimated to be about 10 percent of Soviet domestic
GNP. Some of these supplies undoubtedly entered into our GNP indexes,
for example, steel and nonferrous metal supplies enabled the USSR to
achieve a more favorable distribution of output. Thus the allocation
of resources was better than it would otherwise have been, and total
output, even assuming that the steel itself is not counted as output,
would be somewhat higher. The specific adjustment used is purely
arbitrary.
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was less than the reduction in GNP. The differential reduction in
these aggregates was due partly to more intensive reconstruction
efforts and partly to the wholesale evacuation of industrial equip-
ment that took place during the early part of the invasion.
The results of the manipulations described above are summarized
in Table 20 below. Both unadjusted and adjusted indexes are presented.
The adjusted index is interpreted as being that level of prewar GNP,
industrial output, and capital goods output that would have made the
actual 1944 munitions effort possible, provided that no invasion had
taken place and that Lend-Lease aid had not been supplied.
Table 20
Indexes of Soviet GNP, Industrial Output,
and Producer Goods Output
1940 =
100
Index
194o
1944
GNP a/
100
87
Adjusted GNP
75
87
Industrial Output b/
100
99
Adjusted Industrial
Output
80
99
Capital Goods Output c/
100
54
Adjusted Capital
Goods Output
80
54
a. Data from Table 28.
b. Data from Table 25.
c. Data from Table 26, and Appendix.B,
Table 36.
Indicators of munitions potential based on these three aggregate
measures can be constructed by comparing the above 1940 adjusted
indexes with similar indexes calculated for a period several years
earlier than the future year during which full mobilization is being
assumed. That is, we estimate the increase in munitions-producing
potential between. 1944 and 1955, say, by comparing the increase in
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GNP between 1940 as adjusted above, and 1953, these years being
regarded as the base of the respective full mobilization years.
Table 21 shows these comparisons and is to be interpreted in the
manner described above.
Table 21
Indicators of Munitions-Producing Potential,
Comparing Pre-World War II Base Years
with Pre-Hypothetical-Mobilization-Years Base
Full
Mobili-GNP a/ Industrial b/
Base zation Index Output Index
Year Year (1948 = 100) (1951 = 100)
Munitions-
Potential d/
Indexes ,
Adjusted (19)44 = 100)
Producer c/ Based
Goods Index on Column
(1951 = 100) 3 4 5
(1) (2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
S.
1940 1944
74
50
46 100
100
100
1951 1953
134
100
100 181
200
219
1952 1954
144
110
111 194
220
243
1953 1955
153
118
120 207
236
263
1954 1956
162
129
131 219
258
287
1955 1957
171
139
142 231
278
311
a. Data from Table
28,
modified for
1940
as
indicated above.
b. Data from Table
25,
modified for
1940
as
indicated above.
c. Data from Table
26,
modified for
1940
as
indicated above.
The adjusted rather than the unadjusted capital goods index is Used
because the sum of producer goods output plus defense.procurement presents
a more accurate picture during peacetime years of the size of the pro-
ducer goods industries.
d. Derived from columns three, four, and five, respectively.
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B. Indexes of Potential Based on Wartime Magnitudes.
As pointed out above, the increase in Soviet munitions-producing
potential can be obtained by comparing aggregate magnitudes during
years when full mobilization is assumed to exist, rather than during
!years when the level of output constitutes the peacetime base for future
mobilization programs. The main problems involved are (1) the weakness
of aggregate measures during historical full mobilization years,
(2) the existence of Lend-Lease assistance during World War II, which
causes the aggregates to overstate the achieved munitions effort, and
'(3) the fact that differences exist between the level of output under
mobilization conditions and under cold-war conditions, so that Soviet
aggregates for future years of hypothetical full-mobilization are too
low if projected under cold-war assumption (which they are, of course).
The second and third of these factors tend to cancel out, and it will
be assumed that these do cancel out.*
One further adjustment Will be made in constructing these indexes.
Since the indexes are being used as measures of change in munitions-
producing potential, it is clearly desirable that any components that
do not contribute directly to increasing the potential should be
excluded. Both the GNP and industrial output index contain sizable
components of consumer goods output. Some of the resources used in
producing consumer items would be transferred to either the capital
goods or munitions-producing sectors in the event of mobilization. Some
minimum amount of resources would have to remain in the consumer sector.
In the following computations, it has been assumed that the 1944 per
capita level of resource usage in the consumer sectors of both
industrial output and GNP would have to be retained, with the remainder
being available for direct or indirect military production. These
minimum consumption requirements have been projected forward on the
basis of population changes. The resulting munitions-potential indexes
are shown in Table 22.*
* The assumption is not unreasonable. The Soviet aggregates for the
World War II period understate potential by approximately 10 percent.'
The difference between cold-war output and hot-war output in, say, 1955
or 1956, could not be too much different from 10 percent. The Soviet
economy is presently at forced draft. A more intensive use of resources
would probably not add very much to the achievable level of output,
though some increase in output would certainly be possible. Since there
seems to be no strong indication of bias in one direction or the other,
an assumption that the biases will cancel out seems as good as any.
** Table 22 follows on p. 51.
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Table 22
Indicators of Munitions-Producing Potential for the USSR,
Comparing Changes in Amounts of Resources Available
Over and Above Minimum Consumption Requirements
Full-
Mobili- Adjustea a/
zation GNP Index
Year (1948 = 100)
1944
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
79
187
201
216
231
246
Munitions-
Producing
Potential b/
Index
(1944 = 100)
100
237
254
273
292
311
Industrial Output Cl
Index
(1951 = 100)
59
120
132
143
156
169
Munitions-
Producing
Potential d/
Index
(194)4. = 100)
100
203
224
242
264
286
a.
b.
c.
a.
Data from Table 28.
Derived from first column.
Data from Table 25.
Derived from third column.
C. Summary and Conclusions.
Five indicators of munitions-producing potential have now been con-
structed; three based on a comparison of peacetime pre-Mobilization
year aggregates, and the other two based on a comparison of wartime
full-mobilization year aggregates. Both types of comparisons involve
heroic manipulations of data and can be taken to indicate orders of
magnitude only. The peacetime year comparisons are especially dubious
because of the difficulties mentioned above. It is thought that the
last index shown, adjusted industrial output under conditions of full
mobilization, is probably the best suited from a purely analytical
point of view. The following table presents all five indexes:
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Table 23
Indexes of Munitions-Producing Potential
1944
= 100
Type of Index
Year of Full Mobilization
Peacetime Base a/
1944
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
GNP
100
181
194
207
219
231
Industrial Output
100
200
220
236
58
278
Capital Goods Output
100
219
243
263
287
311
Wartime Base b/
GNP
100
237
254
273
292
311
Industrial Output
100
203
224
242
264
286
a. Data from Table 21. The year for which the index is computed
is different from the full mobilization year shown above, since
we are comparing the size of mobilization base years.
b. Data from Table 22.
The amount of variation shown by the several indexes is not overly
large considering the very crude nature of the adjustments and the
unreliability of the basic data.* The lack of wide divergence can be
* The divergence between the estimates of aggregate potential based on
peacetime years and those based on wartime years is not encouraging,
since it is not possible to select one kind of comparison as being
inherently more reliable. Both kinds of comparisons have one especially
weak aspect. The pre-mobilization year comparison rests on an estimate
of the amount of reduction in the 1940 aggregates that would produce
an estimate consistent with both the reduction of potential due to
invasion and the increment of potential due to Lend Lease. The full
mobilization year comparisons rest on estimates of 1944 aggregate out-
put levels; these estimates are highly tenuous due to the nature of
wartime product mix.
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explained partly by "inbreeding," since all of these 'estimates use the
same data in part. The capital goods index is one of the major com-
ponents of the industrial output index, which, in turn, is one of the
major components of the GNP index. Similarly, the GNP index was
adjusted to take account of the relatively larger fraction of postwar
GNP that could be used for munitions production as compared to prewar.
Since industrial output and capital goods output have increased at a
more rapid pace than GNP, this adjustment tends to cause more of a
cluster in the estimates.
It has already been indicated that the data on which these
estimates are based contain a considerable margin of error. In view
of the function to be served by the estimate, it is probable that
the adjusted industrial output index is the most reasonable one to use.
This particular combination .of sectors in the economy is more closely
geared to munitions-producing activities than any of the sectors
covered by our alternative indexes. In addition, the procedure being
developed here is inherently bound to indicate an upper limit. to
Soviet potential.* Since the industrial output index shows one of
the largest increases in potential of any of our indexes, it is certain
that a reasonably firm upper limit will be obtained if industrial out-
put is used as the indicator of increase in aggregate potential to
produce combat armaments.
. Other kinds of data are available as a means for verifying the
rough magnitudes calculated above. One might expect that the output
of basic metals and energy should increase by something of the same
magnitude as the increase in aggregate potential, although there is no
reason why the output increase for any one item should be the same as
the aggregate increase. Table 24** tabulates these data for the
relevant time period.
The increases in output of basic materials seem to be of roughly
similar magnitudes to the estimated increase in aggregate munitions-
producing capabilities. The commodity figures themselves need some
qualifications. Data on commodity supply during the war years is un-
usually weak, since it is necessary to combine estimates of domestic
* The methodology is such that a completely flexible economy must be
assumed. It is known that no economy does conform to this ideal, and
that, in fact, shortages and rigidities will tend to make actual per-
formance fall somewhat short of the performance level indicated by the
complete flexibility assumption. See Appendix G.
** Table 24 follows on p. 54.
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Table 24
Comparison of the Estimated Increase
in Munitions-Producing Potential
with Increases of Selected Basic Materials
for the USSR
1944,
1953-57
. Year
. Index
1944
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
Aggregate Munitions-
Producing Potential b/
loo
203
224
242
264
286
Steel Output c/
loo
335
370
400
430
460
Copper Output c/
100
go
loo
105
115
120
Aluminum Output c/
100
110
125
140
155
170
All Metals c/
100
260
280
310
330
355
Electric Power c/
loo
330
370
425
470
515
Coal c/
loo
275
295
310
330
350
POL
loo
255
265
280
295
310
All Fuels d/
loo
290
315
345
370
400
a. Data rounded to nearest five percentage points.
b. See Table 23, above. .
C. Commodity output estimates
an adjustment for Lend-Lease supplies 11/ to the USSR.
used to derive the commodity indexes were as follows:
with
The data
Commodity
Unit
1944
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
Ingot
Steel
Copper
Million Metric
Tons
Thousand Metric
10.6 aa/
35.6
39.5
42.6
45.6
49.0
Tons
345 bb/
310
335
365
395
425
Primary
Thousand Metric
Aluminum
Tons
255 cc/
280
320
366
400
440
POL
Million Metric
Tons
18.6 dd/
47.5
49.5
525
55
58
Coal
Million Metric
Tons
85
235
250
265
280
296
Electric
Billion Kilo-
Power
watt-Hours
11.0
131
148
170
188
206
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Table 24
Comparison of the Estimated Increase
in Munitions-Producing Potential
with Increases of Selected Basic Materials
for the USSR a/
1944, 1953-5T
(Continued)
aa. Includes an estimated 0.7
supplies in 1944.
bb. Includes an estimated 195
supplies in 1944.
cc.. Includes an estimated 172
supplies in 1944.
dd. Includes an estimated 0.1
supplies in 1944.
d. Energy index
made for Lend Lease in supplies
magnitude was too small to make
million metric tons of Lend-Lease
thousand metric tons of Lend-Lease
thousand metric tons of Lend-Lease
million metric tons of Lend-Lease
No adjustment was
during the war period because the
a noticeable difference. The Metals
Index was with a crude adjustment for
the effect of wartime Lend-Lease aid. The nonferrous component of
the 1943 and 1944 metals indexes was doubled to reflect the Lend-
Lease Shipments; the ferrous component was left unchanged.
Soviet production during a period of industrial relocation and rapid
shifts in industrial output patterns with estimates of the metal con-
tent of Lend-Lease Shipments. The resulting supply figures are rough
approximations at best. On the other hand, no amount of conjecture
about the reliability of war-period data can obscure the fact of an
almost four-fold increase in the supply of both basic metals and
energy resources between the period 1944 to 1957.*
* An increase of (X) percent between 2 periods in the supply of a
commodity such as steel does not necessarily indicate that the amount
of steel available for the production of munitions (or armaments) has
increased in a like proportion. Under some circumstances the increase
in the total will be proportionately greater than the increase in the
amount available for military purposes. Under most circumstances the
reverse would be true. See Appendix G.
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Table 25
Industrial Production Indexes
Selected Years, 1940-57
(1951 = 100)
Year
Industrial a/
Production Index
Adjusted b/
Index
194o
63
6o
1943
59
54
1944
63
59
1948
64
59
1950
89
87
1951
loo
loo
1952
110
111
1953
118
120
1954
129
132
1955
139
143
1956
150
156
1957
162
169
a. Data from Appendix 13; Table 36.
b. Adjustments made by removing from the industrial
production index that amount of consumer goods output
estimated to be the minimum civilian requirement.
Thus, the adjusted index grows more rapidly than the
Original index since consumer goods output is estimated
to grow more rapidly under cold-war conditions than
the minimum consumer goods requirements for hot-war
conditions.
consumer
Goods aa
Year w51 x Q1
Minimum
Require-
ment Producer
Consumer Goods aa
Goods W51 x Q1
Defense
Goods aa
0 W51 x
1940
2,431
1,170
3, 008
1943
1,355
1,170
1,393
1944
1,170
1,170
1,615
1948
2,187
1,201
3,565
Total
0 (1-2+3+4) Index
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938
5,207
60
3,109
4,687
54
3,471
5,o86
59
616
5,167
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Table 25
Industrial Production Indexes
Selected Years, 1940-57
(Continued)
Minimum
Require-
Consumer ment Producer Defense
Goods aa Consumer Goods aa Goods aa Total
Year W51 x Q1 0 Goods W51 x Q
0 W51 x Q1 (1-24344) Index
1950
2,834
1,269
5,069
951
7,585
87
1951
3,080
1,299
5,570
1,340
8,691
100
1952
3,296
1,313
5,960
1,702
9,645
111
1953
3,511
1,336
6,517
1,782
10,474
120
1954
3,788
1,357
7,185
1,876
11,492
132
1955
4,096
1,379
7,854
1,970
12,541
143
1956
4,404
1,404
8,522
2,064
13,586
156
1957
4,743
1,444
9,246
2,171
14,716
169
aa. Data from Appendix B Table 36. The 1951 weight (W51) is the
percentage of total value added attributable to each sector. The Qi/Q0
ratio is the quantity relative based on 1951 = 100.
Table 26
Capital Goods Production for the USSR
(1951 . 100)
Year
Producer
Goods Index
Adjusted Index
1940
54
57
1948
64
61
1950
91
87
1951
loo
loo
1952
107
111
1953
117
120
* Footnotes for Table 26 follow on p.58.
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Table 26
Capital Goods Production for the USSR ?
(Continued)
(1951 m 100)
Producer
Year Goods Index al Adjusted Index_b/
1954
129
131
1955
141
142
1956
153
153
1957
166
166
. Data from Appendix B, Table 3..
b. The capital goods index was adjusted to
include defense industry output for peacetime
years only. No index is given for wartime
years since the purpose of this comparison
is to indicate the growth of the capital
goods industries that form the base for
munitions production during a mobilization
period.
Producer aa/ Defense aa/
Goods Goods
Year W51 x Q1/440. W51 x Q1/40
Total
of
Columns 1 and 2 Index
1940
1948
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
3,008
3,565
5,069
5,570
5,960
6,517
7,185
7,854
8,522
9,246
938
616
951
1,340
1,702
1,782
1,876
1,970
2,064
2,171
3,946
4,181
6,020
6,910
7;662
8,299
9,061
9,824
10,586
11,417
57
61
87
100
111
120
131
142
153
166
aa. Data from Appendix B, Table 36. The 1951 weight
(1451) is the percentage of total value added attributable
to each sector. The Qi/Q0 ratio is the quantity relative
based on 1951 7 100.
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Table 27
Gross National Product Indexes for the USSR
(1948
= 100)
Sector
Weight
1940
?
1943
1944
1948
1951
1957
Industry a/
Agriculture b/
Construction c/
Transportation Cl
Communication c7
Trade c/
Services c/
GNP d/
36.2
23.4
5.6
8.3
1.0
3.6
21.8
100.0
98
114
91
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
99
92
85
65
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
77
98 -
85
77
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
84
100
loo
loo
100
100
100
100
loo
157
116
137
149
132
105
112
134
254
144
190
202
203
117
136
189
a. Data from Table 25, recomputed to a 1948 base.
b. Data from
c. Data from 1940 to 1948 estimated from total labor force employed
by these industries plus manpower in military services. An arbitrary
productivity adjustment was made, as indicated. Data for years after
1948 taken from
Output
Labor Force aa/ Productivity bb/ Index
Year (Millions)-- Index (1948 = 100)
1940
22.1
-100
91
1943
22.3
71
65
1944
24.6
77
77
1948
24.4
loo
loo
aa. Military services manpower estimated as follows:
1940, 4.0 million; 1943 and 1944, 12.0 million; and 1948,
3.5 million.
bb. Data based
on following reasoning 12/:
(1) productivity rose by
9 percent per year during the war years, (2) productivity was
about equal in 1940 and 1948, and (3) productivity fell from
1945 to 1946 due to reconversion. In order to make all these
statements reasonably consistent, it is necessary that pro-
ductivity should have fallen about 4o percent from 1940 to
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Table 27
Gross National Product Indexes for the USSR
(Continued)
1941. These statements refer to industrial productivity. It is
assumed here that productivity in the service industries moved in the
same way.
d. The GNP calculations are as follows:
Sector
Weight aa/
1940
1943
1944
1948
1951
1957
Industry
36.2
354
333
354
362
568
919
Agriculture
23.4
267
199
199
234
271
337
Construction
5.6
367
262
310
56
77
106
Transportation
8.3
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
83
124
168
Communication
1.0
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
10
13
20
Trade
3.6
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
36
38
42
Services
21.8
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
218
244
296
GNP
100.0 98.8 79.4 86.3 100.0 133.5 188.8
Interpolation between 1951 and 1957 are as follows, using straight
line basis:
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956
GNP 141 150 159 168 177
aa. The weights are the
USSR
estimated distribution of value added in the
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Table 28
Gross National Product Index
(19)4.8 = 100)
Year
GNP Index a/
Adjusted GNP Index b/
1940
99
102
1943
79
67
1944
86
79
1948
loo
loo
1950
122
136
1951
134
155
1952
144
172
1953
153
187
1954
162
201
1955
171
216
1956
180
231
1957
189
246
a. Data from Table 27. Data for 1951-57
interpolated on a constant increment basis.
b. Consumption in 1944 taken as necessary
minimum, assumed to be 50 percent of total
GNP. 13/ This minimum was projected on the
basis of population changes, assuming per
capita consumption would be reduced to the 1944
level. The calculations are shown below.
Total
GNP Minimum of
Year W48 x Qi/Q0 Consumption Columns 1 and 2 Index
1940
9,880
4,175
5,705
102
1943
7,940
4,175
3,765
67
1944
8,630
4,175
4,455
79
1948
10,000
4,384
5,616
loo
1950
12,200
4,550
7,650
136
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Table 28
Gross National Product Index
(Continued)
Year
GN R ,
W14-8 x '41/40
Minimum
Consumption
Total
of
Columns 1 and 2
Index
1951
13,350
4,634
8,716
155
1952
14,350
4,697
9,653
172
1953
15,250
4,772
10,478
187
1954
16,150
4,847
11,303
201
1955 ?
17,060
4,922
12,138
216
1956
17,970
5,001
12,969
231
1957
18,880
5,076
13,804
246
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APPENDIX B
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEXES FOR THE USSR
A. Introduction.
A recent series of ORE projects 14/ -- have examined the structure
and growth of industrial output in the USSR. These studies have con-
centrated primarily on the late postwar period from 1947 on, and have
paid only cursory attention to the 1940-47 period. For purposes of
this report it will be necessary to examine the prewar and wartime
period more intensively, since this period forms the basis for many
calculations. Particular attention will be paid to the defense com-
ponent of industrial output, again because of its importance during
the wartime period.
B. Defense Output Index.
An index of military end-item output can be calculated in either
of two ways. The value of munitions procurement data in current rubles
can be estimated, and a price deflator constructed in order to isolate
changes in real output. Alternatively, the physical output data can
be aggregated into an index of munitions production, provided that
adequate weights can be obtained for the individual items. Both
procedures are used in this section. Good price deflators for the
procurement series are not obtainable for the 1940-47 period; the
physical output data from the year 1948 on are unreliable because of
changes in the characteristics and complexity of the end items.
Estimates of the value of munitions procurement have been obtained
from published Soviet defense budgets, 15/ as shown in Table 3.*
In order to make a comparison in real terms of munitions procurement
in one year relative to others, it is necessary to correct this series
for changes in the level of munitions prices. Two such price indexes
are shown in Table 29**, one estimated by CIA and the other derived
from UN estimates.
* P. 10, above.
** Table 29 follows on p. 64.
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Table 29
Indexes of Price Changes and Changes
in Soviet Expenditures for Munitions
1940 and 1944-53
Alternatiive Price
Indexes for
Capital Equipment
Current
CIA a/ Adjusted 16 Munitions b/
Year Index UN Index (Billion Rubles)
Munitions
Index with
CIA Price
Index
Munitions
Index with
UN Price
Index
1940
loo
32.5
100
loo
1944
82
64.9
243
1945
91
57.7
195
1946
94
22.0
72
1947
99
18.3
57
1948
104
104 c/
21.7
64
64
1949
135
135 --
33.0
75
75
1950
115
127
37.1
99
90
'WM
1951
109
116
48.9
138
130
1952
1953
106 d/
104 a/
113 d/
111 ay
6o.6
62.2
176
184
165
172
a. This index is an index computed by CIA from a comparison of official
figures for capital equipment investment in real and ruble prices.
b. Data from Table 3.
c. Interpolated value.
d. CIA estimates.
Since a reliable munitions output index covering the entire 1940-53
period is needed, physical output data must be utilized. Soviet munitions
production by model and class during World Wax II has been estimated
from published Soviet data.
Physical output estimates for the postwar period have been made by CIA
. These estimates may be combined into
an index of change in real munitions output by weighting with unit
prices, as shown in Table 30.*
* Table 30 follows on p. 65.
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Table 30
Units,
1945 Dollar Value, and Index of Munitions Output in the USSR
1940 to 1948
Class of Munitions
1945 Dollar
cost EV*
. 17/
Production --
1940
1941
,1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
Aircraft
Fighter (Units)
64,200
5,760
8,930
18,000
26,860*
29,000
24,000
3,276
2,863
2,175
Bomber (Units)
127,000
3,000
3,597
3,900
4,800
5,200
4,000
1,162
1,449
1,860
Transport (Units)
48,000
240
190
120
1,000
1,000
800
600
772
1,183
Other (Units)
9,000
3,000
2,079
3,600
4,600
4,800
3,200
4,211
5,097
4,460
Cost (Thousand US $)
789,300
1,058,000
1,689,100
2,423,400
2,613,400
2,116,000
424,600
450,600
472,800
Armored Vehicles
Light (Units)
24,970
3,200
4,500
5,050
4,250
9,110
1,460
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Medium (Units)
50,200
1,200
2,850
? 9,000
16,770
17,420
13,848
6,275
5,457
4,872
Heavy (Units)
90,940
200
50
500
970
2,400
2,810
1,941
2,324
3,419
Cost (Thousand US $)
158,300
260,000
623,400
1,036,200
1,320,200
987,200
491,500
485,300
555,500
Artillery
Under 76-mm (Units)
2,150
1,260
2,300
28,000
28,000
17,500
9,500
2,100
1,000
500
76-mm and Above (Units)
3,550
8,960
16,160
36,250
38,100
47,600
18,400
11,058
9,781
9,107
Antiaircraft (Units)
6,340
3,780
6,800
16,600
19,300
22,000
11,200
5,000
4,000
4,7oo
Cost (Thousand US $)
58,500
105,400
294,100
317,800
346,100
156,800
75,500
62,200
63,400
* Footnotes for Table 30 follow on
p? 67.
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Table 30
Units, 1945 Dollar Value, and Index of Munitions Output in the USSR
1940 to 1948
(Continued)
1945 Dollar
. 17/
Production --
Class of Munitions
Cost/
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948.
Small Arms
Small Arms (Units)
60
2,040,000
2,040,000
3,16o,000
6,320,000
6,,?8o,000
6,444,000
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Cost (Thousand US $)
122,400
122,400
189,600
379,200
418,800
386,400
143,000 2/
112,000 c
128,000 2/
Mortars
Mortars (Units)
910
9,000
9,000
46,000
91,000
100,000
93,000
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Cost (Thousand US $)
8,200
8,200
41,900
82,800
91,000
84,600
31,000 2/
25,000 2/
28,000 2/
Naval Vessels
Cruisers (Units)
17,100,000
1
4
N.A.
1
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Destroyers (Units)
6,500,000
13
10
N.A.
3
1
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Submarines (Units)
2,900,000
28
25
11
7
7
3
4
8
12
Cost (Thousand US $)
182,800
205,900
31,900
56,900
26,800
8,700
11,600
23,200
34,800
Ammunition
Small Arms (Tons)
Morr (Tons)
ta
1,460
1,500
N.A.120,000
854,000
5o,000
110,00o
380,000
180,000
670,000
200,000
730,000
170,000
490,000
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Artillery (Tons)
? 950
N.A.
650,000
1,300,000
2,250,000
2,500,000
1,400,000
Other (Tons)
1,200
65,000
120,000
225,000
250,000
140,000
Cost (Thousand US $)
913,800
933,500
2,136,200
3,674,800
4,062,000
2,4 81,200
300,000
240,000
270,000 1/
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Table 30
Units, 1945 Dollar Value, and Index of Munitions Output in the USSR
1940 to 1948
(Continued)
1945 Dollar
Production 11/
Class of Munitions
Cost 2/
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
Trucks
Trucks (Units)
1,200
157,500
91,000
41,400
51,900
79,400
20,000
25,000
30,000
40,000
Cost (Thousand US $)
189,000
109,200
49,700
62,300
95,300
24,000
30,000
36,000
48,000
Total .(Thousand
2,422,300
2,002,600
5,055,900'
8,033,400
8,973,600
6,244,900
1_217.222.
1,434,300
1,600,5oo
. us $)
Index 100 116 209 . 332 .370 258 62 59 66
a. Average 1945 dollar costs per unit from Appendix C. Dollar costs per displacement ton for naval vessels are multiplied by estimated average
tonnage of 8,545 tons for cruisers, 1,850 tons for destroyers, and 850 tons for submarines.
b. The ammunition figures in tons are from, the following units of output in thousands of rounds:
Year
1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
Output (thousand rounds)
Small Arms 1,700,000 4,600,000 6,700,000 7,400,000 6,200,000
56,000 110,009
Mortar 17,000 100,000 87,000
Artillery 35,000 70,000 120,000 130,000 60,000
For purposes of constructing the index, 1940 small arms and mortar output was assumed equal to 1941 output.
The figures on trucks ror 1945-48 are about 20 percent of total truck production in these years.
c. The dollarvalues of small arms and mortar output were projected from 1945 to 1948 by use of the index of munitions output in Table 4, Section II.
d. The dollar value and tonnage figures for ammunition were assumed to be 10 percent of munitions procurement as computed from Table 4, Section II.
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The two indexes of munitions output, one derived from procurement
data and the other from production data, are combined in Table 6.*
C. Consumption and Producer Goods Indexes.
The defense industry index can now be integrated into the
industrial output indexes calculated . Adjustments
must first be made in the weighting system used to combine the com-
ponents of this index. The weighting system previously consisted of
1941 Plan value added weights, assumed to be equivalent to 1948 value
added weights. It is now felt that this assumption was not valid,
since the output pattern planned for 1941 consisted of a very heavy
concentration -- for a semi-peacetime year -- on munitions. In
addition, it is probably true that the relative importance of different
industries in the producer goods sector changed between the 1941 and
1948 Plans. It was thus thought desirable to work out a completely
new set of weights for a different base year or base years.
With this objective in mind, estimates of value added weights for
industrial sectors were made for both 1940 and 1951. No one set of
.weights can be thought of as the proper weights, particularly since
the output index extends over a 17-year period. Ideally, it is
az!sirable to make fairly frequent changes in the base year and the
weighting year. Scarcity relationships and price relationshps may
be expected to change drastically in any rapidly growing economy.
This fact alone will usually mean that a set of weights taken from an
early year would overstate the rate of growth in later years. Con-
versely, a set of weights taken from a late year Yould tend to
understate the relationship of output in early years to output in
late years. Both of these statements rest on the presumption that
changes in relative prices will be negatively correlated, that is,
that the most rapidly growing industrial sectors should be
expected to show price declines relative to less rapidly growing
sectors.
Two sets of industrial value added weights were thus estimated
for 1940 and 1951. The weights were derived by multiplying estimates
of the industrial labor force in each sector for these two years,
multiplying the labor force estimates by the 1941 Plan average wage
rate per industrial sector, and adjusting these wage bill estimates to
account for the costs of using capital in each sector. The capital
cost adjustment was arbitrary, consisting of a doubling of the 1941
Plan depreciation allowance for each sector in deriving in 1940 weights,
* P.14, above.
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and a quadrupling of the 1941 Plan depreciation allowance for each
sector in deriving the 1951 weights. Since 1941 Plan wage rates
were used to derive both sets of weights, it is likely that the
estimated 1940 weights are a closer approximation to the "real" 1940
weights than would be the 1951 weights in respect to their "real"
counterpart. The reason is that there is no account for any changes
in the structure of relative wages that might have taken place
between 1941 and the respective weight base years. Such changes are
not likely to have been significant between 1940 and 1941; they may
well have been significant between 1941 and 1951. Tables 31 and
32* show the estimated value added weights for 1940 and 1951.
Table 31
Estimated 1940 Value Added Weights
for Industrial Sectors 18/ a/**
Sector
Weights
Total
Producer
Gbods
Consumer
Goods
Electric Power
2.0
0.4
2.4
Coal
6.4
o
6.4
POL
2.3
0.3
2.6
Ferrous
8.8
o
8.8
Nonferrous
3.6
0
3.6
Fabricated Metal
14.2
2.9
17.1
Defense
15.0
0
15.0
Wood
3.3
1.0
4.3
Paper
0
0
0
Chemicals
3.2
0
3.2
Textiles
0
7.8
7.8
Light
0
4.1
4.1
Food
0
10.1
10.1
Construction Materials
2.0
1.1
3.1
Other
4.6
6.8
11.4
Total
65.5
34.5
100.0 b/
Table 32 follows on p. 70.
** Footnotes for Table.31 follow on p. 70.
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Table 31
Estimated 1940 Value Added Weights
for Industrial Sectors 18/ a/
(Continued) --
a. Data derived by multiplying 1940 labor force
per industrial sector by 1941 plan average wage
rates. Depreciation allowances per sector (1941
plan) were doubled and added to the wage bill;
the total value added was then reduced to the
above percentage contribution.
b. Rounding error of 0.1.
Table 32
Estimated 1951 Value Added Weights
for Industrial Sectors a/*
Sector
Weights
Total
Producer
Goods
Consumer
Goods
Electric Power
2.9
0.6
3.5
Coal
9.6
0
9.6
POL
3.6
o.4
4.o
Ferrous
8.9
0
8.9
Nonferrous
3.4
0
3.4
Fabricated Metal
16.7
3.4
20.1
Defense
13.4
0
13.4
Wood
2.7
0.9
3.6
Paper
0
0
0
Chemicals
3.4
0
3.4
Textiles
0
5.5
5.5
Light
0
3.4
3.4
Food
0
9.3
9.3
Construction Material
1.7
0.8
2.5
Other
2.9
6.5
9.4
Total
69.2
30.8
100.0 b/
Footnotes for Table 32 follow on p. 71.
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Table 32
Estimated 1951 Value Added Weights
for Industrial Sector's a/
(Continued)
a. Data derived by multiplying 1951 labor force in each
industrial sector by 1941 plan average wage rates. Depre-
ciation allowances per sector (19)-i-1 plan) were quadrupled
and added to the wage bill; the total value added was then
reduced to the above percentage contributions. The dis-
tribution between producer goods and consumer goods was
assumed to be approximately the same as the 1940 distri-
bution for those sectors that contribute to both producer
and consumer goods output.
b. Rounding error of 0.1.
The industrial output indexes were then recomputed using both
revised sets of weights and the revised defense index. One other
minor change was made in the basic data. The chemical industry out-
put index was revised for the 1940-46 period. The revision was
based on the fact that incomplete product coverage during the war-
time years was originally treated by assuming that products not
covered were not produced at all. This assumption does not seem
plausible ,and therefore the alternative assumption was made that
products not covered during this period moved in the same way as the
four products that were covered. The original chemical industry
index and the revised index are shown in Table 33,*
Recomputation of the consumer and producer goods sector indexes
with the two sets of weights indicates that divergencies are not
overly serious for the 1940-46 period. After the latter date, however,
the very rapid growth of Soviet industrial output begins to result in
serious discrepancies. As might be anticipated, the index based on
1940 weights begins to outrun the index based on 1951. The indexes
again move in tandem after 1952, since all changes after 1952 were
based on the most recent growth estimates by CIA. 19/ The results
of the sector index recomputations are shown in Table 34-.**
* Table 33 follows on p. 72.
** Table 34 follows on p. 72.
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Table 33
Original and Revised Indexes of Output
in the Chemical Industry
1940-46
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
Original Index 20/
Revised Index a7?
80
80
14
40
9
40
15
45
16
48
25
52
61
61
a. Estimated on the basis of movements from 1940-46 in the following
items: reclaimed rubber, nitric acid, synthetic ammonia, and caustic
soda. Rule of thumb adjustments were made on the basis of the 1940
and 1946 outputs of other products that were not reported or estimated
during the wartime period.
Table 34
Consumer and Producer Goods Indexes Recomputed
with 1940 and 1951
Value Added Weights 21/
194o = loo
Year
Consumer Goods Indexes
Producer Goods Indexes
1940 Weights
1951 Weights
1940 Weights
1951 Weights
1940
100
100
100
100
1941
88
91
75
78
1942
66
70
43
44
1943
54
58
44
46
1944
47
50
51
54
1945
50
51
62
65
1946
65
66
77
78
1947
78
76
100
94
1948
98
93
130
118
1949
116
109
160
142
1950
132
121
194
168
1951
143
132
213
185
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Table 34
Consumer and Producer Goods Indexes Recomputed
with 1940 and 1951
Value Added Weights 21/
(Continued) ?
1940 = 100
Year
Consumer Goods Indexes
Producer Goods Indexes
1940 Weights
1951 Weights
1940 Weights
1951 Weights
1952
153
141
228
198
1953
163
150
249
216
1954
175
162
275
239
1955
190
175
300
261
1956
204
188
326
283
1957
219
203
354
307
It can be readily observed from Table 34 that the use of different
weights makes a substantial difference only during the period 1947-51.
The wartime period is not much different and the period from 1952
upward cannot show any divergence due to the manner in which the
figures were derived. It is likely that the 1951 weights give a more
accurate picture of the real rate of growth during the 1947-51 period,
since the 1951 data would certainly show a more accurate picture of
postwar scarcity relationships than the 1940 data.
D. Industrial Output Index.
The three major sector indexes -- consumer goods, producer goods,
and defense -- are combined into an index of industrial output in
Table 35.*
The major changes in the industrial production index stemming from
the recalculation are concentrated in the 1940-47 period. The con-
sumer and producer goods indexes have not been altered very greatly,
although the long-term growth rate has probably showed some slight
increase. This is due to the fact that use of 1951 weights tends to
* Table 35 follows on p. 74.
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Table 35
Soviet Index of Industrial Output
1951 Weights
Year
Sector 1. 1 = 100)
Industrial Output
Consumer
(30.8 Percent
of Sector)
Producer
(55.7 Percent
of Sector)
Defense
(13.4 Percent
of Sector)
1951 =
100 1940 = 100
1940
76
54
70
63
100
1941
69
42
81
56
88
1942
53
24
146
49
78
1943
44
25
232
59
93
1944
38
29
259
63
99
1945
39
35
180
56
88
1946
50
42
43
1.4.5
71
1947
58
51
41
52
82
1948
71
64
46
64
101
1949
83
77
54
76
120
1950
92
91
71
89
141
1951
100
100
100
100
T59
1952
107
107
127
110
175
1953
114
117
133
118
187
1954
123
129
140
129
205
1955
133
141
147
139
221
1956
143
153
154
150
238
1957
154
166
162
162
257
depress the prewar and wartime levels of output relative to postwar. On
the other hand, the revision of the defense index has occasioned major
changes, particularly during the wartime period. The rate of increase in
Soviet munitions during World War II is now estimated to be much higher
than previously, and the postwar reduction is estimated to be somewhat
greater. The rate of growth in the late postwar period is about the same.
The net result of these changes is to raise the wartime period relative
to both postwar and prewar, and depress the entire postwar Period
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relative to prewar. The reduction in the postwar relative to the
prewar period caused by adjustment of the defense index balances the
increase caused by the adjustment of the consumer and producer goods
indexes. On balance, therefore, the main result has been a raising
of the wartime period relative to all other years.
Table 36 shows the index of industrial output calculated with
1940 weights. As pointed out, the main difference from the 1951
weight index shows up during the early postwar period, when the
rate of growth was extremely high.
Table 36
Soviet Index of Industrial Output
1940 Weights a/
Year
Sector (1940 = 100)
Iddustrial Output
Consumer
(34.5 Percent
of Sector)
Producer
(50.5 Percent
of Sector)
Defense
(15..0 Percent
of Sector)
1951 =
100 1940 = 100
1940
loo
loo
loo
56
loo
1941
88
75
116
48
86
1942
66
43
209
43
76
1943
54
11.11.
332
51
91
1944
47
51
370
54
97
1945
50
62
258
49
87
1946
65
77
62
40
71
1947
78
loo
59
48
86
1948
98
130
66
61
109
1949
116
160
77
75
133
1950
132
194
102
89
159
1951
143
213
143
100
178
1952
153
228
182
110
195
1953
163
249
190
118
210
1954
175
275
200
129
229
1955
190
300
210
140
249
1956
204
326
220
150
268
1957
219
354
231
162
289
a. Data from Tables 6 and 34.
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APPENDIX C
DOLLAR COST ESTIMATES OF SOVIET ITEMS OF MUNITIONS
The estimates of dollar costs for Soviet items of munitions used
in the analysis are made by two methods: (1) on the basis of dollar
cost per unit weight determined from counterpart US munitions items,
and (2) on the basis of dollar cost per unit weight determined from
counterpart US munitions items with adjustments for differences in
quantity and quality of attached and accompanying equipment such as
electronics. The latter method was used for aircraft and anti-
aircraft artillery, the former for all other major items. The US
and Soviet counterpart models were selected on the basis of: (1) func-
tion, (2) physical attributes, and (3) rate of production of US model.
The first two criteria were most important. Often it was discovered
that two or three US models could be compared with a particular Soviet
model. In such a case the third criterion was applied, and the item
with the highest rate of production in the US was used. Models with
low production rates are often experimental models for which the cost
does not reflect the real costs of production for standard models.
Dollar cost estimates are made for World War II type equipment and
for current models. All prices are expressed in 1945 dollars.
The cost estimates for all Soviet World War II items except air-
craft and ships are shown in Table 37.*
* Table 37 follows on p. 78.
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Table 37
Estimated 1945 Dollar Costs of Major World War II Items
of Soviet Munitions Excluding Aircraft and Naval Vessels
Units
Unit
Cost per Thousand
1945
Weight 22/
Pounds ,*
Dollar Cost
Item
(Pound T
(US $ 1945) 21
per Item
Tanks and Assault Guns
Light Assault Guns (33)
24/b/ 24,000
1,040
24,970
Medium Tanks and Assault
Guns (59)
62,750
800
50,200
Heavy Tanks and Assault
Guns (8)
96,740
911.0
90,940
Trucks
Light (GAZ-MM) (8)
4,000
260
1,o4o
Heavy (ZIS-5) (2)
6,840
265
1,810
Average Cost
1,200
Artillery
45-mm Antitank (54)
1,245
1,170
1,450
57-mm Antitank (46)
2,535
1,170
2,970
Average Cost
2,150
76-mm Gun (72)
2,460
1,170
2,880
76-mm Howitzer (12)
1,323
1,170
1,550
85-mm Gun (1)
3,748
1,170
4,390
100-mm Gun (1) .
7,628
1,170
8,930
122-mm Howitzer (15)
4,960
1,170
5,800
Average Cost
3,260
* Footnotes for Table 37 follow on p. 80.
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Table 37
Estimated 1945 Dollar Costs of Major World War II Items
of Soviet Munitions Excluding Aircraft and Naval Vessels
(Continued)
Units
Item
Artillery (Continued)
152-mm Howitzer and Gun
Unit Cost per Thousand 1945
Weight 22/ Pounds / Dollar Cost
(Pound77 (US $ 1945) 2"-/ per Item
Howitzer c/ (87)
11,830
1,050
12,420
203-mm Howitzer (13)
39,021
1,240
48,390
Average Cost
17,100
37-mm Antiaircraft d/ (82)
4,630
820
3,800
85-mm Antiaircraft IcT/ (18)
9,480
1,890
17,920
Average Cost
6,340
Small Aims
Rifle and Carbine (30)
8.8
7,000
60
Submachine Gun (20)
6.6
2,200
15
Machine Gun (6)
107
2,070
220
Average Cost 60
Mortars
82-mm (6)
128
1,885
240
120-mm (2)
606
1,885
1,140
160-mm (1)
2,381
1,885
4,490
Average Cost
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Table 37
Estimated 1945 Dollar Costs of Major World War II Items
of Soviet Munitions Excluding Aircraft and Naval Vessels
(Continued)
Units
Unit
Cost per Thousand
1945
Weight 22/
Pounds /
Dollar Cost
Item
(Pound7
(US $ 19)45) 21
per Item
Ammunition (Tons)
Small Arms
0.054
730 e/
N.A. f/
Light Artillery
( 45 -57 -ilim) (2)
13.7)
710 e/
N.A.
Medium Artillery
2 ?
(76-122-mm) (250)
23.2)
510 .e../
N.A.
Heavy Artillery
(152-mm and up) (1)
117.0)
180 e/
N.A.
Average Artillery Cost
23.0
475
Mortar 7 750 e/
Bombs 444 180 e/
a. The weights in parentheses and price per unit weight are rounded from
unit production figures and prices per unit weight with more significant
digits than shown. This procedure accounts for small arithmetical errors.
Price per unit weight was determined for similar US items from US publi-
cations. 23/ The selection of the counterpart items was contingent
on physical characteristics and quantity of output during World War II.
Given two or more US items as probable counterpart items, the one
produced most was selected. The prices are mostly in 1945 dollars,
although a few are for the last date of production prior to 1945.
b. Figures in parentheses are used to determine the average prices
of the last column.
c. The gun and gun-howitzer are combined in a one-to-one ratio
d. The counterpart antiaircraft models selected were the simplest
models of similar caliber.
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Table 37
Estimated 1945 Dollar Costs of Major World War II Items
of Soviet Munitions Excluding Aircraft and Naval Vessels
(Continued)
e. The ammunition prices per unit weight are the prices of the most com-
mon types of ammunition averaged by estimated type proportions for each
class.
f. .Not applicable.
The dollar cost estimates for the Soviet World War II equipment
given in Table 37 are probably minimum estimates. In short, unit
costs figured in the above manner) which presupposes efficient levels
of production are lower than unit costs for new models or for models
produced in small quantities.
Dollar costs for current Soviet munitions except aircraft and
naval vessels are given in Table 38.
Table 38
Estimated 1945 Dollar Costs of Major Current Items
of Soviet Munitions Excluding Aircraft and Naval Vessels
Item
Tanks and Assault Guns
Cost per Cost Cost
Unit Thousand per per
Weight a/* Pounds 27/ b/ Unit Unit /
(Pounds T (U$ $ 1953T 1953 1945 21
Medium Tanks and Assault Guns
81,950
1,880
154,loo
89,4o0
Heavy Tanks and Assault Guns
101,200
2,300
232,800
135,100
* Footnotes for Table 38 follow on p. 8)-i-.
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Table 38
Estimated 1945 Dollar Costs of Major Current Items
of Soviet Munitions Excluding Aircraft and Naval Vessels
(Continued)
Cost per Cost Cost
Unit Thousand per per
Weight a/ Pounds 27/ b/ Unit Unit /
Item (Pounds) (US $ 1953T 1953 19)#5 2./
Trucks and Jeeps d/
ZIS-151 (3) N.A. N.A. N.A. 2,500
ZIS-150 (32) N.A. N.A. 5,500 3,200
GAZ-51 (5)4.) N.A. N.A. 3,200 1,850
GAZ-63 (3) N.A. N.A. N.A. 1,850
bAZ-67 (b) (Jeep) (8) N.A. N.A. N.A. 1,050
Average Cost 2,200
Artillery
57-mm Antitank 2,535 2,495 6,320 3,220
Average Cost 6,320 3,220
85-mm Gun (4) e/ 3,748 3,660 13,720 6,990
100-Ima Gun (4) 7,628 3,660 27,920 14,230
122-mm Howitzer (8) 4,960 3,660 18,150 9,250
Average Cost 19,490 9,930
152-mm Howitzer and Gun
Howitzer (15) 11,830 3,570 42,230 21,520
203-mm Howitzer (1) 39,021 3,280 127,990 65,240
Average Cost 47,590 24,260
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Table 38
Estimated 1945 Dollar Costs of Major Current Items
of Soviet Munitions Excluding Aircraft and Naval Vessels
(Continued)
Item
Unit
Weight a
(Pounds)
Cost per
Thousand
Pounds 27/ b/
(US $ 1953T
Cost
per
Unit
1953
Cost
per
Unit /
1945 2./
.57-mm Antiaircraft
Gun (1)
N.A.
N.A.
150,000
76,500
100-thin Antiaircraft
Gun (2)
15,000
4,370
65,500
33,400
Average Cost
93,670
47,700
Small Arms
Rifle and Carbine (7)#)
8.8
8,000
70
36
'
Submachine Guns (22)
6.6
5,000 f/
33
17
Machine Gun ()-t-)
39.3
5,500
216
110
Average Cost
35
Mortars
82-mm (1)
128
5,730
730
370
120-mm (2)
606
5,730
3,470
1,770
160-mm (1)
2,381
5,730
13,640
6,950
Average Cost
2,700
Ammunition
?
Small Arms (5.5)
.054
2,160
N.A.
1,100 per 1,000 lbs
Light Artillery
(57-mm ) (10)
14
1,600
N.A.
815 per 1,000 lbs
Medium Artillery
(76-122-mm) (57)
38
830
N.A.
420 per 1,000 lbs
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Table 38
Estimated 1945 Dollar Costs of Major Current Items
of Soviet Munitions Excluding Aircraft and Naval Vessels
(Continued)
Cost per
Cost
Cost
Unit
Thousand
per
per
Weight a/
Pounds 27/ b/
Unit
Unit
Item
(PoundiT.
(US $ 1953)
1953
19452/
Ammunition (Continued)
Heavy Artillery
(152-mm and up) (8)
110
600
N.A.
310 per 1,000 lbs
Mortars (12.0)
25
1,430
N.A.
730 per 1,000 lbs
Grenades, Lana Mines,
and Rockets (2.5)
15.5
N.A.
N.A.
600 per 1,000 lbs
Average Cost
570 per 1,000 lbs
a. Unit Weights are from Table 37 except for 100-mm antiaircraft, machine
guns, and artillery and mortar ammunition. The 100-mm antiaircraft gun
weight is estimated from the weight of the US 90-mm antiaircraft. Machine
gun weight is the average weight of machine guns. 25/ The artillery and
mortar ammunition weights are average weights. 2J
b. The 57-mm antiaircraft artillery price was determined from the estimated
quantity production price of $250,000 for the 75-mm US "Skysweeper." 28/
Total costs include $190,000 for fire control equipment and $60,000 for the
gun. It was assumed that the Soviet fire control equipment would be
les.s complex and could be made for about $95,000. This amount in
addition to $60,000 for the gun gives the estimated icund figure of
$150,000. The ammunition prices per unit weight by class are prices
per unit weight by type of ammunition. 29/
c. The 1953 dollar cOsts, except for armored vehicles, were convertea to
1945 dollar costs by means of the following Department of Labor price index
for metal and metal products:.
Metal and Metal Products
Year
1945
1953
1947-49 = loo
65.9
129.3
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1945 = 100
100
196.2
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Table 38
Estimated 1945 Dollar Costs of Major Current Items
of Soviet Munitions Excluding Aircraft and Naval Vessels
(Continued)
The index for converting the prices of armored vehicles was the
Department of Labor index for Machinery and Motive as follows:
Year
191[5
1953
Machinery and Motive
1947-49 = 100
71.6
123.4
1945 = 100
100
172.3
d. Proportions among truck models are estimated from current production.
The proportions of jeeps to trucks are estimates based on Order of Battle.
e. The figures in parentheses are used to compute average prices. 30/
f. The price of counterpart US submachine gun was judged too high. The
cost per 1,000 pounds was $11,000, a figure which would give a real cost
increase of about 100 percent over 1945. There have been no changes in
the Soviet counterpart model to justify such an increase. The cost per
unit weight is an estimate.
The dollar costs for the current Soviet models of munitions
excluding aircraft were computed from the most reliable current prices
for US weapons. 31/ It may be assumed that the prices for the current
models are prices for relatively high levels of production, because
counterpart models were selected from those with the highest production
rates. The prices for the Soviet equipment may be assumed to hold for
production, once conversion to economic mobilization has taken place
and the initial organizational problems overcome, that is, probably
during part of the second year of mobilization and all of the third year.
After the second year there may be a tendency for prices to decline,
although the decline might be offset by the introduction of new and more
expensive models.
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Implicit in some of the computations of dollar cost of current
Soviet models is an assumption concerning changes in the quality of
munitions. For artillery, small arms, and ammunition, there is little
data on the latest Soviet models. As counterpart US models, the most
recent models in quantity production have been selected. Thus, it
has been assumed that the USSR has introduced changes in the quality
of these particular weapons as rapidly as the US has. For all other
items counterpart models have been selected( as carefully as possible
on the basis of physical similarity. Hence, technological improve-
ments have been taken into account directly.
Dollar cost estimates for Soviet aircraft were made from com-
parisons with US aircraft. A list of Soviet aircraft, including
World War II and current models, was drawn up and matched as closely
as possible with respect to function and physical characteristics
with US aircraft. The cost for the counterpart US aircraft was
divided among airframe, engine, electronics and communications, and
government-furnished equipment including armament. The cost of the
airframe and the engine was divided by the empty weight (the weight
of the airframe and engine) to obtain cost per unit of empty weight.
This cost per unit weight was multiplied by the empty weight of the
Soviet aircraft to.obtain the cost of the Soviet airframe and engine.
Generally, Soviet aircraft are equipped with less complex types of
communications and electronics and other accessories than US aircraft.
In order to make adjustments for these differences,
estimates of the value of such equipmedt carried on Soviet aircraft
relative to the value carried on counterpart US aircraft. These per-
centages were applied to the cost for communications and electronics
and government-furnished equipment including armament on the counter-
part US aircraft to obtain the dollar costs of equipment for Soviet
aircraft. The sum of all costs is the estimated dollar cost for
Soviet aircraft.
Cost estimates are presented in Tables 39 and 4o.* Table 40 gives
the estimates for World War II Soviet models. Table 4o gives the
estimates for current models.
* Tables 39 and 4o follow on pp. 87 and 90, respectively.
?
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Table 39
Estimated 1945 Dollar Cost of Soviet World War II Aircraft 12/
Compari s9n
Number 2../*
US Model
Aircraft
Soviet Model
Aircraft
Empty
Weight
(Pounds)
Airframe
Cost
(Dollars)
Engine
Cost '
(Dollars)
Airframe
and
Engine
Cost 12/
(Dollars)
Elec -
tronics
Cost
(Dollars)
GFAE
Cost 2/
(Dollars)
Total Cost
(Dollars
and
Year Priced)
Total Cost 2/
1
2
2'
3
4
5
6
C-47
C-45
C-45
Ryan St- 4
P-11.0
PT-17
P-51
Li-2
Yak-6
Yak-8
UT-2
Yak-7
P0-2
Yak-7, 9, 3
17,865
17,629
5,850
3,200
5,850
3,860
1,235
1,360
5,590
4,679
1,960
1,750
6,551
4,678
39,900
35,400
35,400
5,9oo
29,900
5,700
22,500
20,100
10,800
10,800
2,800
13,800
2,700
21,300
60,000
60,000
46,200
25;270
46,200
30,490
8,700
9,580
43,700
36,600
8,400
7,560
43,800
31,30o.
8,400
1,680 2/
2,600
780 f/
2,600
780o 1/
Negligible
Negligible
2,900
580
loo
100 11/
2,000
1,80o i/
5,700
3,990 2/
3,900
2,340 f/
3,900
e,340 1/
Negligible
Negligible
3,300
2,640 g/
600
600 12/
4,400
3,5oo 1/
74,100 (1943)
65,670 (1943)
52,700 p_944)
28,390 1944)
52,700 (1944)
33,600 (1944)
8,700 (1942)
9,580 (1942)
Ig110) (1Z
9,100 (1942)
8,260 (1942)
50,200 (1901)
35,60o (1!)101)
66,200
28,600
:964:
40,100
8,310
35,900
* Footnotes for Table 39 follow on p. 88.
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Table 39
Estimated 1945 Dollar Cost of Soviet World War II Aircraft 2/
(Continued)
Comparison
Number 2/
US Model
Aircraft
Soviet Model
Aircraft
Empty
Weight
(Pounds)
Airframe
Cost
(Dollars)
Engine
Cost
(Dollars)
Airframe
and
Engine
Cost b/
(Doll2Lal
Elec-
tronics
.- Cost
(Dollars)
GFAE
Cost E/
(Dollars)
Total Cost
(Dollars
and
Year Priced)
Total Cost 2/
7
P-47
1?9.5, 7
11,017
6,000
50,900
27,900
78,800
43,000
2,600
500 1/
8,700
7,000 ?1/
90,100
50,500
(1944)
(1944)
_ 50,910
P-40
5,590
29,900
13,800
43,700
2,900
3,300
49,900
(1942)
IL-2
8,180
63,4o0
600 h/
2,600 h/ ?
66,600
(1942)
67,00o
9
B-25
16,769
83,300
34,900
118,200
10,400
39)700
168,300
(1941)
TU-2
14,639
103,000
4,200 1/
29,800 1/
137,200
(1941)
143,00o
9
P-25
16,769
83,300
34,900
118,200
10,400
39,700
168,300
(1941)
PE-2
12,788
90,130
4,200 1/
29,800 1/
124,140
(1941)
129,800
10
B-17
27,650
97,600
57,700
155,300
17,000
62,800
235,100
(1942)
PE-8
45,000
253,000
15,300W
34,500 EL/
302,800
(1942)
305,100
11
DC-2
IL-4
11,300
110,000
110,000
(1945)
(1945)
110,000 a/
a. Each model is numbered to facilitate comparison with aircraft that have superseded these earlier models. Newer types are listed in Table 40.
b. The costs of Soviet engines and airframes are equal per unit of aircraft empty weight to the US counterpart.
c. GFAE includes government-furnished equipment and armament.
d. The price index for converting prices to 1945 dollars is the Department of Labor index for machinery and motive. It is as below:
Year
1937
Machinery and Motive.
(1947-49 = 100)
66.2
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92.5
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Table 39
Estimated 1945 Dollar Cost of Soviet World War II Aircraft 12/
(Continued)
Year
Machinery and Motive
(1947-49 = 100)
1945 = 100
1940 66.2 92.5
1941 68.6 95.8
1942 71.2 99.4
1943 71.0 99.2
1944 71.0 99.2
1945 71.6 100
e. The' respective Soviet proportions of US costs for electronics and communications, and GFAE, are 20 percent and 70 percent.
f. The respective proportions are 30 percent and 60 percent.
g. The respective proportions are 20 percent and 80 percent.
h. Both proportions are 100 percent.
i. The respective proportions are 90 percent and 80 percent.
j. CIA estimated respective proportions are 20 percent and 80 percent.
k. The respective proportions are 20 percent and 80 percent.
1. The respective proportions are 40 percent and 75 percent.
in. The respective proportions are 90 percent and 55 percent.
n. No breakdown of components of the DC-2 is possible. The IL-4 is similar enough to the DC-2 to allow the price of the latter to be used for its
cost.
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Table 40
Estimated 1945 Dollar Costs of Current Soviet Aircraft
2/*
Comparison
Number b
US Model
Aircraft
Soviet Model
Aircraft
Empty
Weight
(Pounds)
Airframe
Cost
(Dollars)
Engine
Cost
(Dollars)
Airframe
and
Engine
Cost
(Dollars)
Elec-
tronics
Cost
(Dollars)
GFAE
Cost
(Dollars)
Total Cost
(Dollars
and
Year Priced)
Total Cost 2/
1
C-54
IL-18
38,656
38,800
231,900
63,300
295,200
295,200
6,000
3,600 2/
11,500
9,200 1/
312,700
308,000
(1945)
(1945)
308,000
2
T-29
29,840
400,000
100,000
500,000
65,000
90,000
655,000
(1953)
IL-12
23,190
388,600
39,000 2/
54,000 2/
481,600
(1953)
279,500
3
AT-6
3,800
12,900
7,000
19,900
1,300
3,600
24,800
(1943)
Yak.-11
3,819
19,900
390 1/
3,240 1/
23,530
(1943)
23,700
4
T-33
8,084
75,000
19,000
94,000
7,200
12,735
113,935
1953)
U-Yak-17 .
6,495
75,500
2,200 5/
7,600 5/
85,300
1953)
49,500
5
Ryan St-4
1,235
5,900
2,800
8,700
Negligible
Negligible
8,700
(1942)
yak-18
1,595
11,240
Negligible
Negligible
11,220
(1942)
11,300
6
7-8o
8,084
75,000
19,000
94,000
7,200
12,735
113,935
(1953)
46,800
Yak-23
6,100
.70,900
2,200 h/
7,600 h/
80,700
(1953)
7
7-84-7
MIG-l5
13,420
7,536
185,000
75,000
260,000
146,000
13,000 . ,
5,200 2/
50,000
35,00c i/
323,000
186,200
(1953)
(1953)
108,000
7
7-86
NIG-15
10,434
7,536
90,000
40,000
130,000
93,900
9,500
3,800 _11
32,000
22,400 .1/
171,500
120,100
(1953)
(1953)
69,700
* Footnotes for Table 40 follow on p. 91.
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Table 11.0.
Estimated 1945 Dollar Costs of Current Soviet Aircraft 131 2/
(Continued)
Comparison
Number 12./
US Model
Aircraft
Soviet Model
Aircraft
Empty
Weight
(Pounds)
Airframe
Cost
(Dollars)
Engine
Cost
(Dollars)
Airframe
and
Engine
Cost
(Dollars)
Elec-
tronics
Cost
(Dollars)
GFAE
Cost
(Dollars)
Total Cost
(Dollars
and
Year Priced)
Total Cost E/
8
9
lo
11
12
F-811--D
B-57
B-29
B-57
B-47
IL-10
Type-35
Tu-4
IL-28
EF-150
9,933
10,327
24,290
25,312
71,500
70,194
24,290
23,62o
77,950
66,400
14 o,000
375,000
399,500
375,00o
1,144,00b
32,000
150,000
108,500
150,00o
271,000
172,00o
178,800
525,000
547,00o
508,000
499,000
525,000
510,00o
1,415,000
1,205,000
6,000
2,400 Y
75,000
60,000 2/
34,700
28,000 1/
75,000
6o,000 2/
102,000
82,000 12/
36,000
20,300 11/
53,000
48,00o 2/
98,900
94,000 1/
'53,000
48,000 2/
430,000
366,000 12/
214,000
201,500
653,000
655,000
641,600
621,000
653,000
618,000
1,947,000
1,653,000
(1953)
(1953)
(1953)
(1953)
(1945)
(1945)
(1953)
(1953)
(1953)
(1953)
117,000
380,00o
621,000
359,000
959,000
a. Costs of Soviet airframe and engine are figured as the same cost per unit of empty weight applicable to the US aircraft. Electronics and com-
munications, and GFAE, goVernment-furnished equipment including armament, of Soviet aircraft are determined as ?spedific proportions of such equipment
on US aircraft: ?
b. Each model in this table is numbered to indicate the aircraft it has replaced as indicated in Table 39.
c. Costs were converted to 1945 dollars by means of the Department of Labor index of machinery and motive. It is as follows:
fear
1937
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1950
1951
1952
1953
1947-40 . loo
66.2
66.2
68.6
71.2
71.0
71.0
71.6
108.6
118.0
121.5
123.4
1945 r loo
92.5
92.5
95.8
99.4
99.2
99.2
loo
151.7
164.8
169.7
172.3
d. The respective proportions are 60 percent and 80 percent.
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I lir JC?,...1CG I
Table 4o
Estimated 1945 Dollar Costs of Current Soviet Aircraft 3../ 2/
(Continued)
e. The respective proportions are 60 percent and 60 percent.
f. The respective proportions are 30 percent and 90 percent.
g. The respective proportions are 30 percent and 60 percent.
h. The respective proportions are 30 percent and 60 percent.
i. The respective proportions are 11Q percent and 70 percent.
j. The respective proportions are +0 percent and 70 percent.
k. The respective proportions are 80 percent and 90 percent.
1. The respective proPortions are 80 percent and 95 percent.
m. The respective proportions are 80 percent and 90 percent.
n. The respective proportions are 80 percent and 85 percent.
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? Each US and Soviet comparison of aircraft is given a number in
Tables 39 and 40. These numbers indicate the succeeding models of
Soviet aircraft. Number 1, in both tables indicates that the Soviet
aircraft IL-18 has replaced the Li-2, World War II model. A com-
parison of the 1945 dollar cost of the ]1-18 to the Li-2 shows a ratio
of more than 4.5 to 1. This ratio is a measure of the increase in
cost due to changes in complexity of aircraft performing similar
functions. Complexity ratios may be determined for each model. They
will be found to vary from a little more than 1 to 1 for the U-Yak-17,
to nearly 10 to 1 for I1-12 to the Yak-6.*
When noting changes in complexity of the MIG-15 relative to the
La-5 and La-7, two comparisons are possible. If the La-5 and La-7
are compared to the P-47, the MIG-15 should be compared to the F-84-F.,
But when the MIG-15 is compared to the F-86, the La-5 and La-7 should
be compared to the P-36, not shown in Table 40. The cost of the P-36,
in 1945 dollars is about $110,000. 34/
The cost for the US aircraft are costs at relatively highs levels.
of output, 5,000 units per year for fighter aircraft and 1,000 units
for other aircraft. 35/ The resulting cost estimates are therefore
comparable to the costs estimates for other munitions and may be
expected to apply for the second year of mobilization.
Average dollar costs of Soviet World War II aircraft by category
are given in Table 41.**
* The IL-12 may also be compared to the Yak-8, as noted in Table 39,
in which case the ratio is a little more than 8 to a. .
** Table 41 follows on p. 94. '
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Table 41
Average Costs of World War II Soviet Aircraft by Category
Cost Total b/ Average c/
Model per Unit a/* Ratio of Type Cost US ?
and Category (US $ 1945) to Class ____ (Thousand US $) Dollar Cost
Fighter
Yak-3, 7, 9
La-5, 7
Lagg-3
Total
Ground Attack
36,000
51,000
51,000 d/
875
270
400
1545
31,500
13,770
220,400
65,670
42,000
1L-2
67,000
620
41,540
EL-10
117,000
300
35,100
Total
92o
76,6140
83,000
Bomber
PE-2
130,000
190
24,700
PE-8
305,000
15
4,580
110,000
210
23,100
TU-2
143,000
30
4,290
Total
445
56,670
127,000
Transport
Li-2
66,000
60
3,960
Yak-6
29,000
55 e/
1,595
Total
115
5,555
48,000
* Footnotes for Table 41 follow on p. 95.
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Table 41
Average Costs of World War II Soviet Aircraft by Category
(Continued)
Cost Total b/ Average c/
Model per Unit a/* Ratio of Tp p Cost US
and Category (US $ 19)-i-5) to Class _32/ (Thousand US $) Dollar Cost
Trainer
UT-2 10,000 150 1,500
P0-2 8,000 300 2,400
Total 450 3,900 9,000
a. Dollar costs from Table 39.
b. Total cost is the product of the two preceding columns.
c. Average cost is the quotient of total cost divided by the total number
of aircraft of the second column.
d. The Lagg-3 is estimated to cost the same as the La-5 and La-7.
e. There are 35 Schcha-2 included in this figure.
Average dollar costs of current Soviet aircraft by category are
given in Table 42.
Table 42 a/*
Average Costs of Current Soviet Aircraft by Category
Model
and Category
Ratio of Type Cost
to Class 12/ 1945 US $
Fighter
MIG-15 100 90,000 (91,000) c/
Ground Attack
117,000
IL-10 100
Footnotes for Table 42 follow on p. 96.
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Table 42 a/
Average Costs of Current Soviet Aircraft by Category
(Continued)
Model
and Category
Ratio of Type
to Class
8
34
54
4
Cost
1945 US $
Bomber
Tu-4
11-28
Type 35
EF-150
Average Cost
621,000
359,000
380,000
960,000
417,000
Transport
IL-12
15
279,000
Li-2
8
66,000
An-2, Yak-6
35
29,000
Yak-8, Yak-14,
Yak-16
42
34,000
Average Cost
72,000
Trainer
Yak-11
8
23,700
Yak-18
82
11,300
Average Cost
14,00o
Other
10,000 d/
a. Based on Table 40 Appendix C.
b, Proportions are estimated from current estimates and
estimated mobilization requirements.
q. Estimated price when Type 38 is included.
d. Estimated figure.
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The production of naval craft in 1944 was insignificant. Hence,
dollar cost estimates have been made for current models only.
The rate of technological advance, insofar as costs are concerned,
has been less rapid in the design of naval craft than it has for most
other items of munitions. Therefore, dollar costs per unit weight
for US World War II ships have been used to make dollar cost estimates
of current Soviet models.* The estimated costs by category are given
in Table 43. The cost per displacement ton is the figure most
frequently used in the text.
Table 43
Estimated Costs of Current Soviet Naval Craft by Class
Vessel
Class
Average Vessel 37/
Displacement
(Tons)
Cost 38/ a/
per Ton
(US $ 19)4-5)
Cost b/
per Vessel
(Thousand US $)
?
Cruiser
15,000
2,000
30,000
Destroyer
3,000
3,540
10,600
Submarine-
Long Range
1,500
3,460
5,200
Submarine-
Coastal
400
3,46o
1,400
Patrol Craft
300
2,900
900
Anti-Submarine
24o
4,34o
1,000
Mine Craft
600
2,650
1,600
PT Boats
4o
5,630
200
a. Dollar costs per displacement ton are computed costs per ton for
similar US vessels.
b. These costs per vessel are the products of the preceding two columns.
* Bureau of Ships estimated costs per displacement ton for many different
US models in 1947 are generally consistent when adjusted for price
changes with the 1945 costs per ton used to compute the costs of Soviet
ships. The few discrepancies between the two can be explained on the
basis of scale of output.
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APPENDIX D
lECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND THE COST OF MUNITIONS
In order to project the index of munitions output to 1957, given
assumptions concerning inventories, it is necessary to know the
relationship of technological advancement in weapons design to changes
in real cost. Table 44* gives the dollar cost of World War II and
current models of Soviet munitions as computed in Appendix C. The
ratios of costs for the two types of munitions are given in the third
column. The World War II types of munitions are separated from the
current models by about 10 years of research and development and a
constant rate of advancement in munitions design is assumed. The
rates of increase (decrease), compounded annually, that indicate the
actual cost changes by class are given in the fourth column. The
final column shows the value of each class of munitions relative to
the total value of the munitions represented in the table. These
relative values are used to weight the rates of cost change to obtain
the average annual cost change for the items listed. These relative
values, from 1953 estimated munitions output, yield the average rate
of increase in costs of 9 percent a year for the items shown. The
items of the table represent about 60 percent of the estimated munitions
output for 1953. It may be assumed that the items accounted for are
the items for which technological advancement is positively correlated
with real cost increases. The remaining 40 percent, primarily non-
combat equdpment, undoubtedly includes items which have undergone
simplification and cost decreases with advances in design. In sum, it
is assumed there are no changes in real cost for the remaining 40 per-
cent. Hence, the 9 percent increase for 60 percent of munitions
output is equal to 5 percent increase for 100 percent of munitions,
the last figure in Table 44. With the assumption that current pro-
duction is sufficient only to restock inventories with the most
advanced equipment, it follows that munitions production will continue
to increase at a rate of 5 percent per year.
Table 44 follows on p. 100.
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Table 44
Cost Ratios of Current and World War II Items of Munitions
and Average Annual Compound Rates of Cost Increase
Cost
of
Cost
Ratio
World
of
of
Class
War II
Current a/
Cost
of
Model a/*
Model
in Two
Munitions
(US $ 045)
(US $ 1945)
Periods
Aircraft
KUnits)
_I
Annual.
Compound
Rate of
Cost c/
(Increase
or
Decrease)
Percentage
of Items
Represented 1/
Fighter
Bomber
Trans-
42,00o
127,000
91,000
417,000
2.17
3.28
8
13
16.3
20.5
port
48,000
72,000
1.50
11.
3.2
Trainer
9,000
14,00o
1.56
11.
.7
Armored
Vehicles
(Units)
Medium
50,20Q
89,40o
1.78
6
17.9
Heavy .
90,940
135,100
1.49
12.4
Artillery
(Units)
Medium.-
(b-
122-mm)
3,260
9,930
3.05
?
12
1.8
Heavy
(152-mm
and up)
17,100
24,260
1.42
3
1.5
Antiair-
craft
6,34o
47,700
7.52
22
3.3
* Footnotes
for Table
44 follow on p. 102.
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Table 44
Cost Ratios of Current and World War II Items of Munitions
and Average Annual Compound Rates of Cost Increase
(Continued)
Cost
Annual
Compound
of
Cost
Ratio
Rate of
World
of
of
Cost c/
Class
Wax II
Current a/
Cost
(Increase
Percentage
of
Model a/
Model
in two
or
of Items
Munitions
(US $ 194.5)
(US $ 1945)
Periods b
Decrease)
Represented d/
Artillery
(Units)
(Con-
-Untied)
Small
Arms 6o
Mortars 910
35
2,700
.58
2.97
12
1.2
Naval
Vessels
(Units)
Cruiser 17,100,000
30,000,000
1.75
4.7
Destroyer 6,500,000
10,000,000
1.63
5.2
Ammunition
(Tons)
Small
Arms 1,46o
2,200
1.51
4
1.1
Mortar 1,500
1,460
.97
Negligible
1.5
Artillery 800
930
1.16
1
6.1
Trucks
(Units) 1,200
2,350
1.96
7
2.3
?,
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Table 44
Cost Ratios of Current and World War II Items of Munitions
aand Average Annual Compound Rates of Cost Increase
(Continued)
Annual
Cost
Compound
of
Cost
Ratio
Rate of
World
of
of
Cost c/
Class
War II
Current a/
Cost
(Increase
Percentage
of
Model a/
Model
in two
Or
of Items
Munitions
(US $ 195)
(us $ 19)45)
Periods 13/
Decrease)
Represented d/
Average Annual Compound
Represented. e/
Rate for Items
Average Annual Compound Rate for all
Munitions. f/
9
5
100.0
a. See Appendix C.
b. The second column divided by the first column.
c. The period for the changes in models and resulting costs is about 10
years. The rates of this column are the average compound rates, to the
nearest percent, of increase for the 10-year period.
d. These proportions are from the proportions among major classes, adjusted
to 100 percent base, in 1953. See Table 50, Appendix F.
e. Average annual compound rate is the average of compound rates by class
weighted by percentage of total (last column).
f. The items of the table represent about 6o percent of munitions produced
in 1953. The 9 percent increase for 60 percent of total munitions is
equal to 5 percent for total munitions, assuming no cost increases for the
other 40 percent.
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APPENDIX E
AN ESTIMATE OF SOVIET WARTIME REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNITIONS
estimated Soviet Bloc wartime requirements for a war
beginning in mid-1954. From these requirements, the requirements on
the USSR alone are computed as annual averages for a 3-,.year period
and given in Table 45.
Table 45
Soviet Munition Requirements by Major Class
for a Future Mobilization Period
Class of Munitions
First4
Wax Year 21
Subsequent/
War Year 21
Three-Ye
Average 5.
dr*
Aircraft c/ (Units)
Fighter
13,872
13,872
13,870
Ground Attack
721
721
720
Bomber
3,739
3,739
3,740
Transport
2,798
2,798
2,800
Trainer
4,028
4,028
4,030
Other
2,200
2,200
2,200
Armored Vehicles (Units)
Medium Tanks and Assault
Guns d/
29,314
34,248
32,600
Heavy Tanks and Assault Guns
4,377
4,992
4,800
Artillery
Light (57-mm)
15,948
33,408
27,600
Medium (85-100-mm)
7,570
9,576
8,900
Heavy (122-mm and up)
2,792
3,324
3,100
Antiaircraft
5,160
5,160
5,200
Footnotes for Table 45 follow on p. 104.
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50X1
50X1
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Table 45
Soviet Munition Requirements by Major Class
? for a Future Mobilization Period
(Continued)
Class of Munitions
First ,
War Year a/
Subsequent,
War Year a/
Three-Yeal,.
Average b/
Small Arms (Units)
2,555,705
3,058,34
2,891,000
Mortars (Units)
28,360
32,412
31,000
Naval Vessels c/
Cruiser (15,000 Tons)
9
9
9
Destroyer ,(2,700 Tons)
34
34
34
Submarines (1,500 Tons)
38
38
38
Patrol Craft (225 Tons)
290
290
290
PT Boats (40 Tons)
202
202
202
Mine Craft (600 Tons)
263
263
263
Other (120 Tons)
363
363
363
Ammunitions (Tons) 11,162,500 12,706,500 12,192,000
Automotive Vehicles 174,462 144,84o 154,700
a. Computed from total Soviet Bloc requirements. 39/
b. The average for three years of mobilization is the average of the
first column plus the second column doubled.
c. Aircraft and ship requirements are total Soviet Bloc estimates for the
first year of a war beginning in mid-1954.
d. A small number of light assault guns are included in this category.
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The wartime requirements of Table 45 are expressed in dollar
amounts in Table 46.
Table 46
Relative Magnitudes of Soviet Wartime Munitions Requirements
Class of Munitions
Annual
Wartime
Requirer*
mentsla-1
Cost b/
(US $ 0)-i-51
Value
(Thousand
US $ 19)4.5)
Percentage
. , of
Total
Aircraft c/ (Units)
_ .
Fighter
13,870
90,000
1,248;300
Ground Attack
720
-117,000
84,24o
Bomber
3,740
417,000
1,559,580
Transport
2,800
72,000
201,600
Trainer
4,030
14,000
56,420
Other
2,200
10,000
22,000
Spares d/
_
475,800
Total
3,647,900
13.3
Armored Vehicles (Units)
Medium Tanks
and Assault Guns
32,600
89,000
2,901,400
Heavy Tanks
and Assault Guns
4,800
135,000
648,000
Spares d/
709,900
Total
4,259,300
15.5
Artillery (Units)
Light (57-mm)
27,600
3,200
88,320
Medium (85100-mm)
8,900
10,600
94,340
* Footnotes for Table 46 follow on p. 107.
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Table 46
Relative Magnitudes of Soviet Wartime Munitions Requirements
(Continued)
Class of Munitions
Artillery (Units)
(Continued)
Annual
Wartime Value Percentage
Require7 Cost b/ (Thousand of
ments I (US $.0).i.5) US $ 1945) Total
Heavy (122-mm and up)
3,100
15,400
47,740
Antiaircraft
5,200
48,000
249,600
Fire Control d/
34,56o
Spares d/
24,00o
Total
538,600
2.0
Small Arms (Units)
2,891,000
35
101,190
Total
101,200
.4
Mortars (Units)
31,000
2,700
83,700
Total
83,700
.3
Naval Vessels
Cruisers (15,000 Tons)
9
30,000,000
270,000
Destroyers (2,700 Tons)
34
9,560,000
325,o4o
Submarines (1,500 Tons)
38
5,200,000
197,600
Patrol Craft (225 Tons)
290
650,000
188,500
PT Boats (40 Tons)
202
200,000
40,400
Mine Craft (600 Tons)
263
1,600,000
420,80o
Other (120 Tons)
363
360,000
130,680
Total
1,573,000
5.7
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Table 46
Relative Magnitudes of Soviet Wartime Munitions Requirements
(Continued)
Annual
Wartime Value Percentage
Require- Cost b/ (Thousand of
Class of Munitions ments2i (US $ 045) US $ 1945) Total
Ammunitions (Tons) e/ 12,192,000 820 9,997,400
Total 9,997,000 36.3
Automotive Vehicles
Trucks and Jeeps
Spares d/
Total
Other f/
Grand Total
154,700 2,200
340,340
102,100
442 400
6,880,900
27,524,000
1.6
25.0
a. Data from Table 45.
b. Data from Table 47, AppendixE.
c. Average aircraft prices are unit prices from Appendix C weighted as
follows:
Percentage of Class Average Price US,$ U945)
Fighter
MIG-15 100 90,000
Ground Attack
I1-10 100 117,000
Bomber
TU-4 8 621,000
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Table 46
Relative Magnitudes of Soviet Wartime Munitions Requirements
,(Continued)
Percentage of Class Average Price US $ (1945)
Bomber
(Continued)
I1-28 34 359,000
Type 35 54 380,000
EF-150 Li. 960,000
Total 417,000 .
Transport
I1-12 15 279,000
Li-2 8 66,00o
An-2, Yak-6 35 29,000
Yak-8, Yak-14,
Yak-16 42 34,000
Total 72,000
Trainer
Yak-11
Yak-18
Total
Other
8 23,700
82 11,300
14,000
estimated 10,000
The weights for bombers are from requirements by type. 4o/
d. Except for fire control, assumed to be 15 percent of weapons cost,
these categories are the same as in 1944. See Table 48, Appendix F.
e. The average price for ammunition is computed from the prices in
Appendix C, and prices for other items from the same sources weighted
as follows:
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Table 46
Relative Magnitudes of Soviet Wartime Munitions Requirements
(Continued)
Ammunition Class
Percentage
of Total
Cost per Ton (US $ 1945)
Bombs (Conventional) 15.7 360
Small Arms 3.4 2,200
Mortar 7.6 1,460
Light Artillery (37-57-mm)
(Including Aircraft
Ammunition) 7.1 1,630
Medium Artillery-(76-100-mm) 13.7 84o
Heavy Artillery (120-152-mm) 49.9 620
3-inch Naval or smaller .1 3,000
3-inch Naval or larger .5 1,500
Torpedoes .2 8,200
Naval Mines 1.8 750
Average Cost per Ton 820
f. It is assumed that 25 percent of total munitions procurement consists
of communications and electronic equipment, engineering equipment, guided
missiles, nuclear energy outlays, androther items. This proportion is
considerably higher than the assumed World War II proportion. The many
new developments in armament and war technology having no World War II
counterparts are included in this category.
The proportions of major munitions classes in Table 46 when compared
to the proportions in 1944 seem probable except for ammunition and air-
craft. The ammunition figure, which does not include guided missiles or
atomic or hydrogen bombs, seems high when it is noted that technological
advancement has been greater for most other major classes of munitions
resulting in more expensive items of munitions. Aircraft, the major class
with the greatest rate of technological development,, has declined
relatively when compared to 1944. The war conditions 50X1
may have been responsible for this result. In part, the low 5UX1
a,
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value of aircraft is due to the assumption of Table 46 that there
would be no increase in aircraft production in the second and third
war years. In any case, these two categories do not seem reasonable,
nor does the small value for artillery, which probably reflects the
fact that the initial requirements were not included. Hence, a down-
ward adjustment of the relative value of ammunition is made, and the
resulting increment is divided between aircraft and artillery* to
give the mix of Table 47.
Table 47
A Probable Distribution of Major Classes of Soviet
Munitions in a Future War
Major Class of Munitions
Percentage of Total a/
Aircraft
20
Armored Vehicles
15
Artillery
5
Small Arms and Mortars
1
Naval Vessels
6
Ammunition
26
Automotive Vehicles
2
Other.
25
Total
100
a. Values are from Table 46 except for rounding and
a decrease of 10 percent of total munitions for
ammunition, an increase of 7 percent for aircraft,
and 3 percent for artillery.
* As a result of the downward adjustment in the relative magnitude of
ammunition, the annual wartime expenditure of ammunition excluding
bombs, assuming the same total amount of munitions required, would be
about 7.4 million tons. This compares to 3 million tons of ammunition
estimated by CIA to have been expended in 1944.
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APPENDIX .F
REFERENCE TABLES
Table 48
Dollar Value and Percentage Distribution
of Soviet Munitions Production in 1944
Class of Munitions
(Units)
Aircraft
Total
Value
1944 /4_ Cost b/ (Thousand Percentage
Productional- (US $ 1-945) US S 19)--5) of Total
Fighter 17,300 42,000 726,600 6.82
Ground Attack 11,700 83,000 971,100 9.11
Bomber 5,200 127,000 660,400 6.20
Transport 1,000 48,000 48,000 .45
Other (Including
Trainers) 4,800 9,000 43,200 .41
Spares c/ 367,000 3.44
Total 2,816,300 26.42
Armored Vehicles
Light Assault Guns
Medium Tanks and
Assault Guns
Heavy Tanks and
Assault Guns
Spares d/
_
Total
9,710 24,970
17,420 50,200
2,400 90,960
* Footnotes for Table 48 follow on p. 114.
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242,500 2.27
874,500 8.20
218,300 2.05
267,000 2.50
1,602,300 15.03
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Table 48
Dollar Value and Percentage Distribution
of Soviet Munitions Production in 1944-
(Continued)
Class of Munitions
(Units)
1944
Production ?
Cost b/
(US $ 1-9-45)
Total
Value
(Thousand
US $ 19)4-5)
Percentage
of Total
Artillery
Light (45-57-tm),
17,500
2,150
37,600
.35
Medium (76-122-mm)
46,6o0
3,260
151,900
1.42
Heavy (152-mm up)
1,000
17,100
17,100
.16
Antiaircraft
22,000
6,340
139,500
1.31
Antiaircraft Fire
Control 2/
22,300
.21
Other Fire Control
16,500
.15
Spares 5./
17,300
.16
Total
402,200
3.77
Small Arms
Machine Guns
580,000
220
127,600
1.20
Submachine Guns
2,600,000
15
39,000
.37
Rifles
3,800,000
60
228,000
2.14
Total
394,600
3.70
Mortars
100,000
910
91,000
.85
Naval Vessels
Destroyer
1
6,500,000
6,500
.06
Submarines
7
2,900,000
20,300
.19
Total
26,800
.25
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Table 48
Dollar Value and Percentage Distribution
of Soviet Munitions -Production in 1944
(Continued)
Class of Munitions
(Units)
Ammunition
Total
Value
1944. / cost b/ (Thousand Percentage
Production (US(US $ 05)4-) US $ 1945) :of Total
Small Arms (Tons)
200,000
1,460
292,000
2.74
Mortar (Tons)
730,000
1,500
1,095,000
10.27
Artillery (Tons)
2,500,000
950
_2,375,000
22.28
Other (Tons)
.250,000
1,200
3O0,000
2.81
Total
4,062,000
38.11
Trucks
GAZ -MM
63,500
1,040
66,000
.62
ZIS-5
15,900
1,810
28,800
.27
Spares h/
28,400
.27
Total
123,200
1.16
Communications and
Electronics i/
285,000
2.67
_
Engineering Equip-
ment i/
190,000
1.78
_
Transportation
Equipment i/
190,000
1.78
Other (including
Bombs) i/ 476,000 4.47
Total
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10,659,400 loom
(6)4-,900 Million Rubles)
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Table 48
Dollar Value and Percentage Distribution
of Soviet Munitions Production in 1944
(Continued) -
a. Table 11, p. 25, and references.
b. Section II.
c. Spares are estimated at 15 percent of' the value of the aircraft or
about 60 Percent of the US figure in 1945./1E/ .
d. Spares are estimated at 20 percent of the cost of the vehicles.
e. Fire control equipment for antiaircraft artillery is estimated to
cost 16 percent of the artillery, or about one-half the US ratio.
f. Fire control equipment for other artillery is estimated to cost 8 per-
cent of the artillery pieces or about three-fourths the US relative cost.
g. Spares are estimated to be 5 percent of the cost of the artillery pieces.
h. Spares are estimated to be 30 percent of the cost of the trucks. ,
i. These amounts were. estimated percentages of each category to the total
of munitions excluding these items from US proportions in 1944. They are
as follows:
Percentages of Particular Classes of Munitions Relative
to Other Munitions
1944
Percent
Class of Munitions
Communications and Electronics
Engineering Equipment
Transportation Equipment
..Other (Including Repair
and Testing'Equipment for the
Air Forces),
US Soviet
7.9 3
5.8 2
3.2 2
4.6 ? 5
The last category for other items includes bombs for the USSR. The
amount may be as much as $250 million. This estimate is based on the
average weightand price of Appendix C and production of 3.2 million
bombs. 43/
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Table 49
Production of Munitions in the USSR
in 1952 and the%Relatiye Significance
of Classes a/*
Class of Munitions
(Units)
Average
Cost
(US $ 19)45)
Estimated
Production
Total
- Value
Percentage
of Total -
Aircraft
Fighter
91,000
5,277
480,207
Bomber
417,000
1,926
803,142
Transport
72,000
403
29,016
Trainer
14,000
3,000
42,000
Other
10,000
1,000
10,000
Spares b/
203,835
Total
1,568,200
27.0
Armored Vehicles
Medium
89,000
7,300
649,700
Heavy
135,000
3,650
492,750
Spares b/
228,450
Total
1,370,900
23.6
Artillery
Light (57-mm)
3,200
500
1,600
Medium (76-100-mm)
10,600
6,200
65,720
Heavy (122-mm and up)
15,400
3,600
55,440
Antiaircraft
48,000
2,500
120,000
Fire Control
18,400
Spares
12,100
Total
273,300
?
*: Footnotes for Table 49 follow on p, 116.
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Table 49
Production of Munitions in the USSR
in 1952 and the Relative Significance
of Classes a/
(ContinuedT
Class of Munitions
(Units)
Average
Cost
(US $ 1945)
Estimated
Production
Total
Value
Percentage
of Total
Small Arms
35
317,500
11,100
0.2
Mortars
2,700
16,200
43,700
0.8
Naval Vessels
Cruisers
30,000,000
5.7
171,000
Destroyer
10,600,000
18
190,800
Submarines
Long Range
5,200,000
20
104,000
Coastal
1,400,000
30
42,000
Other
800,000
88,000
Total
595,800
10.3
Ammunition
(Tons)
360,000
6.2
Trucks and Jeeps
Trucks
2,350
35,000
82,750
Jeeps
1,050
15,000
15,750
Spares 12/
29,400
Total
127,400
2.2
Other
1,450,100
25.0
Total
5,800,500
100.0
a. Data from Table 51, p. 121.
b. Spares are as follows: aircraft, 13 percent of category not including
spares; armored vehicles, 17 percent; and trucks and jeeps, 23 percent.
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Table 50
Production of Munitions in the USSR
and Relative Significance of Classes
1953
Class of Munitions
(Units)
Average
Cost a/*
(us $ i945)
Estimated 44/
Production
1953
Total
Value
of Class
(Thousand
us $)
Percentage
of Total
Aircraft
Fighter
91,000
6,471
588,860
Bomber
417,000
1,788
745,600
Transport
72,000
1,599
115,130
Trainer
14,000
1,728
24,190
Other
10,000
1,156
11,560
Spares b/
222,800
Total
1,708,100
28.85
Armored Vehicles
Medium
89,000
7,300
649,700
Heavy
135,000
3,344
451,440
Spares b/
220,200
Total
1,321,300
22.32
Artillery
Light (57-mm)
3,200
500
1,600
Medium (76-100-mm)
10,600
6,200
65,720
Heavy (122-mm
and up)
15,400
3,600
55,440
Antiaircraft
48,000
2,500
120,000
* Footnotes for Table 50 follow on p. 119.
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Table 50
Production of Munitions in the USSR
and Relative Significance of Classes
1953
(Continued)
Class of Munitions
(Units)
Average
Cost a/
(us $ 0)5)
Estimated 44/
Production
1953
Total
Value
of Class
(Thousand
us $)
Percentage
of Total
Artillery (Continued
Fire Control b/
18,400
Spares b/
12,100
Total
273,300
4.62
Small Arms
35
317,500
11,100
.19
Mortars
2,700
16,200
43,700
.74
Naval Vessels
Cruisers (15,000
Tons)
30,000,000
5.7
171,000
Destroyers
(3,000 Tons)
10,600,000
18
190,800
Submarines
(Long Range)
5,200,000
20
104,000
(1,500 Tons)
Submarines (Coastal)
(400 Tons)
1,400,000
30
42,000
Other (250 Tons)
($2,300 per Ton)
800,000
110
88,000
Total
595,800
10.06
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Table 50
Production of Munition's in the USSR
and Relative Significance of Classes
1953
(Continued)
Class of Munitions
(Units)
Average
Cost -a/
(us $ 045)
Estimated 44/
Production
1953
Ammunition
Small Arms
2,200
17,500
Mortar
1,460
37,800
Artillery
930
237,100
Grenades, Land
Mines and Rockets
1,200 2/
23,900
Other d/
_
Total
Trucks and Jeeps 46/
Trucks
2,350
35,000 e/
Jeeps
1,050
15,000
Spares b/
Total
Communications
and Electronics
Engineering Equipment
Other
Total
Total
Value
of Class
(Thousand Percentage
us $) of Total
38,500
55,190
220,500
28,680
17,100
360,000 6.08
82,250
15,750
29,400
127,400 2.15
1,480,300 25.00
5,921,000 100.00
a. Average prices are computed from prices by item in Table 48 weighted
by production estimated by model.
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Table 50
Production of Munitions in the USSR
and Relative Significance of Classes
1953
(Continued)
b. Spares and fire control are proportions from Appendix A.
c. Average price per ton for grenades, land mines, and bombs, is com-
puted from estimated production by item multiplied by price per unit
weight. 45/
d. Other ammunition including conventional bombs estimated at 5 per-
cent of total ammunition.
?The truck figure differs from that of Table 51, because 20 percent
of total production was assumed to represent truck production in the
early postwar years. Hence, for reasons of consistency, the same pro-
portion was used to determine the index of munitions production from
1949-53.
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Table 51
Production of Munitions in the USSR in Units and Dollars
1949-53
- Class. of Munitions
Cost
per Unit a/*
(US $ 1945)
Production ITYbJ
1949.
1950
1951
1952
1953
Aircraft (Thousand US $)
860,200
582,800
1,095,600
1,352,400
1,478,400
:Fighter (Units)..
91,000
1,732
2,987
4,747
-5;277
6,471
Bomber (Units)
417,000
1,478
609
1,433
1,926
1,788
Transport (Units)
72,000
681
364
515
403
1,599
Other (Units)
10,000
3,723
2,478
2,994
4,000
2,884
Armored Vehicles (Thousand US $)
1,125,500
1,088,900
1,142,500
1,142,500
1,101,100
Medium (Units)
89,000
7,109
6,698
7,300
7,300
7,300
Heavy1(Units)
135,000
3,650
3,650
3,650
3,650
3,650
Artillery (Thousand US $)
328,800
303,600
252,900
252,900
252,900
Under 76-mm (Units)
3,200
' 500
500
500
....__
500
500
76-mm and up ,(Units)
13,400
9,371
9,997
9,800
9,800
9,800
AntidirCraft'(UnitS.)
48,000
4,200
3,500
- 2,500
2,500'
2,500
Small Arms (Thousand US $)
11,100
11,100
111,100
11,100
11,100
Small Arms (Units)
35
317,500
317,500
317,500
317,500
.317,500
Mortars (Thousand US $)
16,200:
16,200
16,200
16,200
16,200
Mortars (Units)
2,700
6,000
6,000
.6,000
6,000
6,000
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`be, ???
Table 51
Production of Munitions in the USSR in Units and Dollars
1949-53
(Continued)
Cost
per Unit a/*
Production 12/
12/
Class of Munitions
(US $ 1945)
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
Naval Vessels (Thousand US $)
117,800
205,600
325,900
468,080
468,080
Cruiser (Units)
30,000,000
11
2
4
5 7
5.7
Destroyer (Units)
9,560,000
55
lo
15
18
18
Submarine (Units)
2,500,000
16
20
25
50
50
Ammunition (Thousand US $)
314,200
314,200
314,200
314,200
314,200
Small Arms (Tons)
2,200
17,500
17,500
17,500
17,500
17,500
Mortars (Tons)
1,460
37,800
37,800
37,800
37,800
37,800
Artillery (Tons)
930
237,100
237,100
237,100
237,100
237,100
Trucks (Thousand US $)
101,100
141,000
155,100
159,800
164,500
Trucks (Units)
2,350
4 3,000
6o,000
66,000
68,000
70,000
Total (Thousand US $)
2,874,900
2,874 i900
2,633,4 0
4
3,313,500
3,717,180
3,806,480
Index (1940 = 100)
119
109
127
153
157
Adjusted Index (1940 = 100)
2./
87
109
131
153
157
a. Estimated 1945 dollar costs are from Appendix C. Average artillery prices are based on proportions from CIA. 47/ The
price for Submarines is for average weight of coastal and long range submarines. Artillery ammunition prices are from the
following proportions, similar to the proportions for 1952:.
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Table 51
Production of Munitions in the USSR in Units and Dollars
1949-53
(Continued)
Ammunition
Proportion Dollar Price per Ton
Light artillery ammunition (23-57-mm) 33 1,630
Medium artillery ammunition (76-100-mm) 181 840
Heavy artillery ammunition (122-mm and up) 23 620
Average cost per ton 930
b. Conversion to tons is as follows:
Ammunition Average Weight (Pounds) Rounds (Thousand) Total Weight (Tons)
Light Artillery((23-57-mm)
1.4
48,340
32,733
Medium Artillery (76-100-mm)
36.3
10,000
181?.300
Heavy Artillery (100-mm and up)
76.3
605,000
23,070
Total
237,000
Mortar
25.2
35000
37,800
Small Arms
.07
500,000
17,500
Trucks are estimated at 20 percent Of Soviet truck production. Truck production for each year is estimated by CIA as follows:
1949
212,700
1950
301,000
1951
330,000
1952
- 342,000
1953
350,000
c. The 1949 to 1951 values are interpolations using 1948 = 66 from Appendix A.
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Table 52
Capacity Estimates and Dollar Values
of Soviet Items' and Munitions a/* 49/
Class of Munitions
(Units)
Cost
per Unit
(US $ 1945)
Capacity
Production
(Units)
Total
Value
(Thousand
us $)
Aircraft
Fighter
90,000
20,000
1,800,000
Ground Attack
117,000
2,000
234,000
Bombers
417,000
6,000
2,502,000
Transport
72,000
3,000
216,000
Trainer
14,000
5,000
70,000
Other
10,000
7,000
70,000
Total
4,892,000
Armored Vehicles
Medium
89,000
45,000
4,005,000
Heavy
135,000
15,000
2,025,000'
Total
6,030,000
Artillery
Light (20-75-mm)
3,200
4,0Qo
12,800
Medium (76-100-mm)
10,600
45,000
477,000
Heavy (122-mm and up)15,400
25,500
392,700
Antiaircraft
48,000
31,000
1,488,000
Total
2,371,000
Small Arms
35
10,000,000
350,000
* Footnotes for Table 52 follow on p. 125.
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Table 52
Capacity Estimates and Dollar Values
of Soviet Items and Munitions a/ 49/
_
(Continued)
Class of Munitions
(Units)
Cost
per Unit
(US $ 1945)
Capacity
Production
(Units)
Total
Value
(Thousand
us $)
Mortars
2,700
200,000
511.0,000
Naval Vessels
Cruisers
30,000,000
18
540,000
Destroyers
10,600,000
68
720,800
Submarines
2,500,000
170
425,000
Other
N.A.
N.A.
758,600 c/
Total
2 444,000
Ammunition (Tons)
820
13,000,000
10,660,000
Trucks and Jeeps
2,200
200,000
11.11.0,000
Other Munitions b/
(9,096,00o
to
1)+,693,000)
Total
(36,382,000
to
41,980,000
a. Estimates are assumed to apply to 1956.
b. Other munitions are 25 to 35 percent of total.
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APPENDIX G
METHODOLOGY
This appendix sets forth the conceptual aspects of munitions-
producing potential and outlines the specific method employed. to obtain
estimates given in the text. Alternative methods for estimating
munitions-producing potential that have been used in the past are also
discussed.
Munitions-producing potential is one important element of a
nation's war potential. Unfortunately, the literature on the deter-
minants and different aspects of munitions-producing potential is
wholly inadequate for present purposes., Studies of war economics or
economics of war potential are generally concerned with such problems
as monetary and fiscal policies, military manpower and other demo-
graphic factors, the availability of certain materials, capital goods,
minerals and fuels, and institutional problems. All of these factors
are related to a nation's war effort. They must, however, be ordered
and evaluated in some fashion if magnitudes representing the various
components of war production are to be determined.
Munitions-producing potential may be defined as the maximum
quantity of military hard goods a particular country could produce
during a specific period of time if the state of mobilization readiness,
the type of war expected to be fought, and the location and duration of
the conflict were properly anticipated. In order to proceed directly to
a measure of potential, assumptions are necessary with respect to each
of these variables. Such a process would yield a series of values
representing the maximum amount and optimum distribution,of munitions
output during the relevant years; the sum of this series, appropriately
discounted,* would represent the munitions-producing potential of the
nation for the given period.of time.
* By discounting is meant taking cognizance of the fact that the
military value of munitions will vary with when they -
come into use, that is, a tank has a greater value if produced during
the first year of war than if produced shortly before the war is over.
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Such a procedure would involve an incredibly complex calculation
even if all relevant data could be assembled. Among other things, it
would involve complete knowledge of the opposing strategyl,or at least
a probability estimate of strategy, complete knowledge of the uses and
costs of all weapons that might be involved in the conflict, and
enough information covering the structure and size of the economy to
permit accurate prediction of potential levels of output under the
posited strategic parameter.* An attempt is made in this report to
take one part of this problem and produce a quantitative estimate of
its magnitude.
Specifically, an attempt is made to estimate maximum annual
munitions output in the USSR during a select future year when full
mobilization has been reached. No account is taken of potential
munitions output during the period when the economy is being adjusted
from a cold war status to full mobilization.** None but the crudeft
sort of account is taken of the impact of new weapons on munitions
potential. It is assumed that the strategy of the opposing forces is
known sufficiently well to enable the USSR to plan a definite munitions
mix.
The following is a brief sketch of the procedure used to obtain an
estimate of the maximum quantity of munitions that the USSR could
produce during a future period such as is described above. Ideally,
this estimate should consist of a specific number of different kinds
of weapons, the total of which represents a maximum effort. The
following steps are taken in order to arrive at this estimate.
1. An estimate Of the relationship between the amount of resources
used for munitions production during 1944 and the amount of
resources that could be utilized for the sane purpose during
1956 is Obtained by means of an adjusted index of industrial
The importance of knowing strategy lies not only in deciding which
composition of weapons should be produced for maximum military effective-
ness; it is equally important in determining the distribution of
munitions output between present and future and between near future and
distant future.
** By abstracting from the mobilization period, the more difficult
problems connected with the distribution of munitions output between
present and future are circumvented. Although this makes the problem
manageable, given existing data and techniques, it has the obvious
defect of disregarding the most interesting (and perhaps important)
part of the war potential problem.
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prodUction. Since 1944 was in fact a year of maximum munitions
production, given the magnitude of the 1944 economy, the
relationship is thus a measure of the change in aggregate
munitions-producing potential between 1944 and 1956.
2. An estimate of the aggregate value of the 1944 Soviet munitions
effort is obtained by combining estimates of US $ 1945 prices
for Soviet munitions with estimates of 1944 Soviet munitions
output by types. This yields a US $ 1945 value for the Soviet
1944 munitions effort.
3. From the ratio in part 1 and the dollar value in part 2 an
estimate is obtained of the quantity of resources -- in US $
1945 -- that would be available to the USSR for munitions
production during 1956 (or during any other future full
mobilization year).
4. Estimates of the US $ 1945 costs per unit for current Soviet
munitions (those that wOUld be produced during full mobili-
zation) are made.
5. Given the costs per unit from part 4 and the aggregate quantity
of resources available for munitions production from part 3
(both in terms of US $ 1945) estimates of alternative bundles
of munitions that could be produced during 1956 are obtained.
It is clearly not possible via this procedure to estimate what
quantities of munitions would be produced; it is possible only
to indicate the magnitude of alternative sets of munitions, any
of which could be produced if the USSR chose to do so. The
aggregate limitation is the only constraint imposed.
The above five steps outline, in skeleton form, the procedure
carried out in this report. For the reader who desires a more precise
statement, an algebraic presentation is given below. This part may be
passed over without loss of continuity.
Definitions:
1. E = Value of industrial output (aggregate value of final industrial
products).
2. M = Value of munitions output.
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3. K = Value of capital goods output.
4. c = Value of consumer goods output.
So defined that Ei = N1 + Ki + Ci, where i is any time period.
x1x2 xn = number of units of output of World War II munitions
xlx2 xn.
I t
6. xl, x2, xn = number of units of output of current munitions
x' x' x'
1, 2 ... n.
x x x
7. Pl, P2 ... Pn = prices of munitions 1, 2, ... n.
8. Pi P2 P7 x' x' x'
n = prices of munitions 1, 2 -.. n.
0,
9. a .= x1P1, b - x2P2, c = xJpJ, ???? n = xnPn = relative value
M44 M44 M44 M44 of class to
tOtal munitions.
xrpt x,p, X,pj x,p,
10. al = 1 1, lot = 2_2, cl n = n n = relative value
N56 N56M56 M56 of class to
total munitions.
Procedure:
From definitions 1 through 4.
1.1 E44 = m44 K44 c44, and
1.2 E56 = M56 + K56 + C56
Neither E44 nor E56 is known; their ratio, E56, is taken to be
E44
simply the index of industrial production with 1944 as a base
designated as a. No assumptions are involved in the use of this index
to determine the E50 c ratio, since the index itself purports to be a
E44
net output index weighted by value added in each sector.
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1.3 E56 1,456 K56 4. c56 a
E44 M44 + K44 + C44
From equations 1.1 and 1.2
2.1 E44 - =
44 M44 -1- K44
2.2 E56 - C56 M56 + K56
The left hand values of equation 2.1 and 2.2 are reformulated as:
2.3 E44 c44 E44 (1 - c44)
E44
? 2.4 E56 - C56 = E56 (1 - C56)
E56
The ratio C44/E44 and C56/E56 are the proportions of industrial"
output necessary for consumption purposes in the two years.
at is defined as being equal to E56 (1 - C56)
E56,
E44 (1 - C44)
E44
thus, from the above definition and equation 2.3 and 2.4
3.1 at = E56 (1 - C56)
E44 E56 m56 K
+
_ 56
(1 - c44) M44 + K44
E44
The at expression is simply an adjusted industrial output index
with 1944 as base, adjusted for the fact that the share of consumer
goods output in industrial output would be proportionately lower
during 1956 than it was during 1944.
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It is clear from equation 3.1 that if
c56 c44 then a' . 1' = a
E56 E44, E44
Similarly, if C56
C44 then a' 56_
E56 E44, E44
In order to eliminate the "K" term from equation 3.1, it is assumed
that the proportion of capital goods output to total industrial out-
put less consumer requirements is equal for the two years, that is:
4.1 K44 _ 56
E44 (1 - sad E56 (1 - C50
E44 E56
combining 3.1 and 4.1,
4.2
K56 = M56 K56
K44 M44 + K44
KM KK MK KK
56 44 + 56 )44 = 56 44 + 56 44
K56 = m
K44 m56/ 44
Combining 4.1 and 4.2,
5.1 M56 =
m44
E56 (1 - C56)
E56
E (1 - C )
44 44
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All terms on the right hand side of equation 5.1 can be estimated.
The ratio E56 is known. The ratio C56 and c44 are estimated as shown
E44
in Appendix A. The ratio M
56
44
From the definitions.
E56
E
is thus determined.
6.1 m44 = xipi x2p2 x3p3 Xnpn
2=
6.2 56 Xipi x? xpinn
M =
In equation 6.1 only the "x" terms are known. Ruble prices are not
obtainable, hence dollar prices for the "X" munitions are estimated.
M44 becomes an estimate of the number of dollars required to produce
the Soviet 1944 munitions program. Given m44 in dollars, me
given in dollars since the ratio m56 is known. Prices of t e
PEE
munitions are estimated in dollars using
"x" munitions. Thus, M56 in dollars and
xt XI Xf
are obtained. The values 1, 2, 3
Equation 6.2 gives
1456 =2: xiPi
x'p' x'p'
+33... nn
The munitions mix is indicated by
is
"x"
the same procedue as for the
Pi, P2, P3 ... Pn in dollars
xt
n are variables.
at = xiPi, b' = x2P2, m' = xnP;I:
I I 7-67 I t PVT- ,
x1p1 x2p2 x3pj xnpn =
it follows
since, from equation 6.2
M3g-- PST? M56 M56
at +b' +c' n' = 1.
that
The a' b, c terms are simply proportions indicating the share of X1,
X X X X
2, 3 kinds of weapons in total munitions output. Thus, 1, 2,
X3 ....Xn are determined when a, b, c n are determined. The only
constraint is that a + b + c n = 1.
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Rubles prices can be obtained indirectly from the dollar price
,r ,d
estimates if desirable. Define 1-1 as ruble prices and 1-1 as dollar
prices. Assume that
r r r
P1 = P2 = p3
d ?
P1 PI
to dollar prices.
that is, that ruble prices
Equation 6.1 states that M44 = 2: x1131
If the prices are dollar prices, M
rubles and the ratio of Pl: P2:
can be derived. Given from dollar
are proportional
x2p2 x3p3
4 is in dollars.
If M44
3: Pn is in dollars, rubles prices
prices and quantities,
xnpn
is in
a = xlPl, b = x2P2, c = x3p3 n = xnpn
M44
M44
m14.4
M44
44 is expressed in dollars and a, b, c n are ratios. An estimate
Rf M44 in rubles may be obtained from the Soviet defense budge, since
44 is simply the total value of munition procurement. Given '44 in
rubles and the ratio a, b, c n, ruble prices are obtained provided
that the proportions a, b, c n are the same in rubles is in dollars,
that is, provided that ruble prices are proportional to dollar prices.
A similar procedure can be carried out to obtain ruble prices for the
"x'" (current) Soviet munitions.
The procedure described above will yield reasonably accurate
answers to the problem posed provided that three conditions are met.
First, the adjusted index of industrial production must serve as an
accurate indicator of growth in munitions-producing potential.
Inaccuracies in the index are translated directly into inaccuracies
in the estimate of potential munitions output. Secondly, the
relative costs of Soviet munitions in dollars must be similar to
their relative costs in rubles. It must be noted that the dollar ?
prices have no influence on the results -- they serve the functions
of a numeraire only. If dollar prices are all too low or too high the
results are not affected in any way, as can be seen from the preceding
algebraic section. If some dollar prices are too high relative to
others, then bias is introduced, although the magnitude of the error
is difficult to determine. Some observations may be made along this
line. If dollar costs for Soviet World War II munitions are low
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relative to costs of current munitions, the result will be under-
statement of potential output.* Similarly, if dollar costs for
current Soviet munitions are too low relative to World War II costs,
the estimate of potential output would be high. In-between cases,
where some 1944 costs are relatively low and some relatively high,
would result in offsetting errors and an indeterminate bias.
The third major source of error is concealed in the estimate of
the amount of resources used up by the n.e.c. categories. The
reader will note that the dollar total of 1944 munitions output is
greater than the sum of all specifically identified munitions
multiplied by their prices. A considerable number of items, such
as spare parts, transportation equipment, signal corps equipment,
and others were produced by the USSR during 1944. An attempt has
been made to estimate the amount of resources absorbed by these
activities, largely on the basis of US experience. Similar problems
were faced in making up the composition of the 1956 munitions effort.
Again, some generalizations can be made. If the estimate of resources
used in the n.e.c. category during 1944 is low relative to the estimate
of what would be used during 1956, then the specific output estimates
for 1956 will be understated.** Similarly, if the 1956 usage of
resources in n.e.c. is low relative to 1944, then the estimates of
potential output are overstated.
Of the problems discussed above, the most complex analytically
is the use of an adjusted industrial output index to measure changes
in aggregate munitions-producing potential. At least two kinds of
* This would be caused in the following manner: relatively low 1944
dollar prices would mean a relatively low dollar total for the 1944
aggregate. This would mean a relatively low dollar for the 1956
aggregate, since the growth index is not affected. Having a relatively
low 1956 dollar total and relatively high 1956 dollar costs for
munitions would result in too low a quantity of munitions estimated
for 1956.
** This may be illustrated as follows: suppose that the n.e.c
category had been estimated as being 20 percent of the 1944 total
whereas it really was 25 percent. In that event, the 1944 dollar
total is lower than it should be, and the 1956 dollar total is
similarly lower than it should be. Thus, if the proportion of resource
used in n.e.c. during 1956 is accurate, a too low dollar total for
categories other than n.e.c., is obtained, and the potential output
estimates will come out to be understated.
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problems arise here. Initially, the question is whether this indus-
trial output index itself is the best general measure of growth for the
purpose; in addition, it is necessary to consider adjustments in the
index, both the one that was carried out and others that might have
been made. With regard to the first point the reader is referred to
Appendix A. With regard to the adjustments, the following comments
seem appropriate.
In the first place, it is clear that in general the higher the level
of total output in an economy the higher proportion of that total
becomes available for military purposes. While it is undoubtedly true
that minimum consumer requirements for goods and services are not
necessarily based on physical subsistence levels, it is equally true
that consumption standards in the USSR were drastically reduced during
World War II with no apparent ill effects on productivity. What was
done during World War II could and would be done during a future war.
On the other hand, there is no particular reason why cuts in the con-
sumption of industrial output should follow the same pattern as cuts
in total consumption. The numerical adjustment made involved an
assumption of this nature which cannot really be justified. It does
not seem reasonable, however, that serious error could have been
introduced in either direction, because the magnitude of industrial
consumption compared to total industrial output is small in any case.
Any moderate adjustment of the consumption percentage would not make
very much difference in the size of the remaining position of indus-
trial output.*
The other problem that arises here is one of possible omission.
Should some adjustment have been made for the fact that a greater or
smaller proportion of industrial resources might be used for capital
goods production in 1956 than was the case during 1944? The assumption
actually used was that the resources proportion used for the purpose
would be the same during both years; the index was therefore un-
affected.** This assumption posits, in effect, that roughly three
times as many resources will be needed for capital goods production in
a future full mobilization program than was the case during 1944, since
* To illustrate: if it had been assumed that no resources now being
used for consumer goods production in industry could be transferred
to other industrial sectors, the munitions-potential index for 1956
would have been about 10 percent less than the current estimate.
** See equation 4.1 above.
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we have the same proportion of a total the magnitude of which has
tripled. Considering the facts that (1) the USSR has a considerably
larger capital stock that must be maintained, (2) modern munitions
programs may well require more rapid technological changes in the.
characteristics of weapons, and (3) the USSR will have to break their,
own production bottleneck during a future war because Lend-Lease aid
will obviously not be forthcoming, this assumption does not appear to
be unreasonable. The most compelling argument in favor of this
assumption is perhaps that no alternative seems to be available.
The second source of difficulty, use of dollar price relative as
an approximation to ruble price relatives will probably have to be
accepted on faith. Research is continuing in this area and some
future dividends may be expected to accrue. It should be noted that
this assumption is made only in regard to reasonably homogeneous
area of production, namely, the munitions sector. The other factor
to be noted is that the results will be seriously biased only if
there is a persistent tendency for all World War II dollar prices
to be relatively high or low compared to all current dollar prices.
If the errors are randomly distributed in both directions, some bias
is still present but probably not a serious cause for. concern.*
The last problem discussed above, that of the magnitude of the ,
residual categories, is purely a data problem. It is not believed
that the numbers actually used are very far from the mark, but there
is no way of demonstrating the proposition. It is sufficient to
note again that in order for errors in these estimates to bias the
result, they must be errors in the 1944 residual relative to the 1956
residual. If both are proportionally high or low, the results are not
affected in the least.
One further comment as to the nature of this estimate. It has
been pointed out above that it is possible only to make estimates
of alternative sets of munitions, each set representing a possible
* One possible source of difficulty for the reader should be pointed
out. It may well be true that dollar prices for current Soviet
models are understated because, the, models themselves are not the
latest ones or the ones that would be produced during mobilization.
The only remedy for that s,ituation.is,to.obtain different dollar
prices for the models that are actually relevant. This presents
no problems conceptually and would require only a simple recalcu-
lation of the data.
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composition of a maximum effort.* The assumption involved here is that
the composition of the mix is adequately foreseen by the Soviet planners,
that is, that they have sufficient time during mobilization to.plan a
program designed to produce a particular mix when completed. The
assumption has the effect of making the estimate an upper limit, one
that would probably never be achieved in practice.** The particular
set of munitions calculated in this paper is not completely arbitrary.
Some rough notion of the probable limits to the munitions mix can be
Obtained from two sources: (1) distribution in the past and (2) esti-
mated requirements for a future war fought under certain conditions.
Data from both of these sources are shown in Appendix E. The future
war requirements data are estimated for one of an infinite number of
possible strategic circumstances. Data for the past war cannot be
expected to apply to a future period without alteration. Within limits,
the distributions of the two sets of data are similar. These limits
are used as a basis for rough guide setting up the distribution of
munitions among classes.
It would be useful to discuss briefly other procedures that have
been used or that could be used to develop estimates similar to those
contained in this report.
The simplest and most commonly used procedure is based on plant
capacity estimates. Data on plant capacity for specific types of
munitions can be assembled in various ways. What is usually meant by
capacity in this context is the maximum output of plants that are,
have been, or could be used to produce the particular munitions in
question.*** In fact, of course, the capacity of the economy to
* This amounts to saying that the size of the aggregate munitions
program is independent of its composition, implying simply that
munitions may be substituted for each other at their price ratios.
A further assumption of complete flexibility within the industrial
section of the economy is thus involved. This assumption is valid if
sufficient time for adjustment is allowed; it is obviously not valid
in shorter periods of time. ,
** If it is assumed that the data are accurate.
*** Serious problems arise even at this level:
a. The extent to which assembly plants have been or are now
being built.
b. The extent to which plants can be converted from producing
non-munitions to producing munitions, and the speed of such
conversion.
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produce munitions may be considerably larger or smallei than the sum
of the capacities of particular munitions plants -- or potential
ones -- known to exist. Most of the resources needed to produce, say
the T-54 tank, are absorbed in the manufacture of the coal, iron ore,
steel, electronic equipment, and engines that comprise the "raw"
materials used by the munitions plant to produce a finished tank.
It may be asked why the USSR would have munitions plants totaling
greater capacity than their economy would sustain simultaneously. Part
of the answer is that a plant capable of building finished munitions
does not necessarily have to be so engaged and is for more than one
purpose. When new and modernized.facilities are constructed, the older
ones are still in existence and continue to be counted although they
may be converted to different uses. In addition, it is quite possible
that deliberate excess capacity is encouraged (as it is in the US to
some extent) to prevent plant losses through enemy attacks from causing
several temporary stoppages in production during wartime.
The difficulties involved in use of this procedure can perhaps be
best illustrated in the following manner. An economy is composed of
thousands of interrelated producing units, some making products that
do not undergo additional processing, such as clothes, food, tanks,
and wartime tools, but most producing items that require additional
processing before going to final users. The plant capacity procedure
concentrates primarily on these plants that turn out finished munitions,
and exclude from consideration the underlying layers of supporting
processing industries. Since many more plants are physically capable
of being used as end-item producing units than could ever be actually
used in this fashion, there may be a persistent and substantial bias
toward overstatement inherent in the process.* Broadly speaking, it
is probably reasonable to assume that the rate of build-up in the
output of particular military goods will depend heavily upon present
c. The relationship between the capacity of a plant to produce
World War II type munitions and their capacity to produce
the more complicated current munitions, and/or future
munitions.
* This situation makes such estimating particularly hazardous during
peacetime, since it is necessary to estimate the number and capacity
of plants that could be used for munitions production in a future
wartime period. The process is simpler and more accurate during war-
time itself, since information can usually be obtained as to which
plants are actually producing finished items, which parts, and other
information.
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capacity to produce these munitions, while the achievable rate of
production for.particular military products depends upon more
generalized factors.
Another possible procedure involves the analysis of inter-industry
relationships for the USSR. Such a structure (matrix) woula classify
all Soviet economic activities into an exhaustive list of "industries"
that produce an output, distribute this output to other industries and
to final consumers? and consume inputs from other industries. ? The
output (activity) levels for each industry, and the final "bill of
goods" for the economy, consisting of all final or end products
produced by the economy, could be determined. In this fashion: a com-
prehensive structural picture of each Soviet industry for some given
year is built up. The level of output, the distribution Of that output
among consuming industries, and the amounts of inputs required from
other industries as well as the bill of goods, the set of final outputs
available to the economy are known. After setting up this structural
picture of a peacetime Soviet economy, the bill of goods could be varied
in accordance with assumptions as to what activity levels might be
desired in the munitions-producing industries and what cuts could be
made in the nonmilitary goods sectors, in the event of mobilization.
At the same time, adjustment could be made in the input structure of
industries where a less scarce input could be completely or partially
substituted for a more scarce input. After having made all the adjust-
ments that are thought plausible in terms of the inter-industry
t?trUctUre and the final demand output of nonmunitions-producing
industries, a hypothetical activity level for each industry can be
generated. This would be the activity level that must be reached in.
every industry if the desired output levels in the munitions industries
are to be attained.
The answer that would be obtained from this procedure is either a
"yes" or a "no" for each industry in the input-output matrix. That is,
the activity levels that would be needed in every industry in order to
attain the desired military bill of goods either are or are not reason-
able. The set of answers would usually consist of some "yes" and some
"no," in terms of the generated activity level being plausible. As
long as some answers come out "no," it would be necessary to go back
and make more adjustments in the bill of goods, cutting back still
further the output of the nonmunitions-producing industry, until
finally a system that provides all "yes" answers results. It would
then be necessary to inspect the resulting bill of goods and decide if
the final outputs in the nonmunitions sectors are sufficient to maintain
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civilian consumption and industrial capital at their minimum levels.
It may be that the assumed munitions program is too large; it requires
more resources than the economy can spare. It would then be necessary
to go back and scale down the program until it was consistent with the
size of the economy and the magnitude of competing demands.
One big advantage of this system is that the indirect repercussions
of increasing output in one economic sector and decreasing it in another
are explicitly brought out into the open. It identifies sectors where
the peacetime output level is much too low to support a heavy munitions
program, and shows by what amount output would have to be increased if
this munitions program is to be feasible.
The deficiencies of the procedure are serious, however. A vast
amount of data is required to obtain an answer by use of this method.
These data have to be exhaustive in the sense that all economic
activities must be estimated quantitatively either directly or by some
imputation process. Data of this kind for the USSR are simply not
available. In addition, a large amount of quantitative information must
be available as to the possibilities of changing the peacetime input
pattern so that output levels in some industries can be maintained or
increased without the necessity of using as much or any of those in-
puts likely to be especially scarce in wartime. The difficulty here
is that the peacetime input structure for an economy reflects the
peacetime demand for the product and the relative prices of resources
that can be combined to produce the product. A wartime situation
results in a drastic change in the demand for all products, with
military goods having relatively increased demand and nonmilitary
goods relatively decreased demand. This change in demand will mean
that the relative prices of resources will also change, with those
resources more readily adaptable to making military products rising in
price, and those more adaptable to nonmilitary products not rising as
rapidly or even falling in price. Thus the most efficient wartime
method of producing a commodity may be quite different from the most
efficient peacetime method, and the input structure of industries may
change radically.* It is, of course, possible to predict some of these
changes and make allowances for them.
* The above description refers to what should happen in a competitive
economy during wartime. In a planned economy, the same end result,
that is, a shift in the input pattern away from relatively scarce
resources,might come about due to changes in the physical allocation
plan rather than from changes in the official prices. Either method
would accomplish the same general results, although one or the other
might be more efficient.
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Generally speaking, this procedure is, in principle, the most
promising available for making estimates of this nature. The data
required for its successful application simply are not obtainable at
present.
Several other procedures could be used, all similar in principle
to the one Used in this report. All require exhaustive and accurate
Soviet price data for munitions, which is not obtainable. The first
of these methods takes the gross national product as a starting point.
The value of output required for civilian consumption and for invest-
ment is subtracted out, leaving a residual available for military
purposes. An estimate of the portion of the residual that could con-
sist of munitions procurement is then made (the procurement estimate
would correspond conceptually to the estimate of the total value of
resources available for munitions production). The aggregate is'then
broken down into specific types of munitions by means of prices and
proportions of total resources used by different munitions classes,
as was done above.
Alternatively, attention could be concentrated on industrial out-
put instead of on GNP. An estimate could be made of the totalpvalue
added" in the durable goods sector of industry for all years of a
mobilization period. This value added total may be calculated by
estimating the quantity of labor that could be employed by the durable
goods industries for each year of this period, and then estimating the
industrial "value added" for each employee. An estimated maximum
output of military hardware can be derived from this estimated total
value of durable goods output. The simplest answer is that the two
magnitudes are equal, that is, all durable goods produced are military
goods. The total value of durable goods output is the munitions-
producing capability. The total value estimate can then be split up
into alternative sets of specific items, such as tanks and aircraft,
by means of a set of prices for military end items and an estimate of
the proportions in which different military goods are to be produced.
A number of alternative sets of munitions that could be produced are
thus derived.
A more sophisticated version of the latter procedure involves
setting up a relationship between the total durable goods capacity in
years X, X + 1, ... X + n, the quantity of military hardware produced
in the same years, and the nonmilitary durable goods output of each
year. Estimates could be made of the increase that would have taken
place in the capacity of the durable goods industry between years X
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and X } 1 due to some part of year X's durable goods output consisting
of capital goods rather than munitions. In addition, estimates could
be made of the decrease in the output of durables for years X 1 to
X } n if no capital goods were ever produced and worn out equipment
were not replaced. In general terms a set of equations would be
obtained relating the munitions-producing capacity of year X 4- 2,
3, ... n to the amounts of munitions produced in the preceding years.
The same procedure as before could be used to break down the aggregate
value of munitions into specific military items, that is, use of prices
to derive alternative sets of munitions that could be produced.
The last two procedures work under the assumption that the sole
factor limiting munitions output is aggregate capacity in the durable
goods industries. The procedure used in this report involves a
similar but slightly broader assumption. As noted, the only reason
for not using any of the last three methods is that the required price
data is almost totally lacking.
The attention of this Appendix has been directed mainly to the
problem of measuring munitions-producing potential in quantitative
terms, and particularly, of measuring this potential for a time
period when full mobilization is assumed to exist. It is unfortunately
the case that this sort of estimate is of limited usefulness for
intelligence purposes. Estimates of potential munitions output would
be of maximum value if they could be obtained for the period just after
the outbreak of hostilities and the start of mobilization, that is,
during the period of transition from cold war to hot war activity.
This problem is not amenable to solution via the procedures developed
in this report. Further, even if the procedure could be developed
sufficiently well to handle the transition period problem, it would
still be true that the validity of the estimate would depend upon the
adequacy of assumptions relating to the strategic circumstances of the
war, the development of and costs associated with new weapons, and
immeasurable but important political, sociological, and chance factors.
In fine, the measurement of munitions-producing potential in a
thoroughly realistic sense would have to include factors that defy
quantitative analysis; measurement of these aspects of the problem that
are susceptible to quantification may lend an aura of precision that is
wholly unjustified.
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