THE EFFECTS OF MIGRATION INTO AND OUT OF EAST GERMANY ON THE LABOR SITUATIONS IN EAST AND WEST GERMANY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01141A000300030001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 71
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 9, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 15, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE EFFECTS OF MIGRATIONS INTO AND OUT
OF EAST GERMANY ON THE LABOR SITUATIONS
IN EAST AND WEST GERMANY
CIA/RR 30
15 March 1954
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
SECRET
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE EEFECTS OF MIGRATIONS INTO AND OUT OF EAST GERMANY
ON THE LABOR SITUATIONS IN EAST AND WEST GERMANY
CIA/RR 30
(ORR Project 45.267)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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CONTENTS
Page
Sammary
1
I. Migrations between East Germany and West Germany
4
A. Definition and Status of East German Refugees
'5
B. Reasons for Migrations
7
1. From East Germany to West Germany
7
2. From West Germany to East Germany
9
C.
Magnitude of Migrations
10
D.
Characteristics of Migrants
16
1. Sex
16
2. Age
17
3. Occupation
20
II.
Migrations between Soviet-Occupied- Germany and Other
Soviet Bloc Countries
29
A.
Reasons for Migrations
29
1. From Soviet-Occupied Germany to the Satellites and
the USSR
29
2. From the Satellites and the USSR to Soviet-
Occupied Germany
30
B.
Magnitude of Migrations
30
III.
Effects of Migrations on Manpower
32
A.
East German Manpower Situation
32
1. General Situation
32
2. Effects of Migrations
34
B. West German Manpower Situation ? ? ? ? 4o
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Page
1. General Situation 4o
2. Effects of Migrations 42
Appendix A. Methodology
Appendixes
1. Estimate of Total Postwar Net Migration of
Refugees from East Germany and East Berlin
to West Germany and West Berlin
1+7
47
2. Estimate of the Occupational Characteristics
of Refugees before Migration 56
Tables
1. Population of West Germany and West Berlin in 1946 and 1950
by Place of Residence on 1 September 1939
12
2. Number of Migrants Registering at the Emergency Reception
Camps at Berlin, Giessen, and Uelzen, 1949-53 12
3. Number of Migrants between West Germany and East Germany,
between West Berlin and East Germany, and between West
Berlin and East Berlin by Time Period, 1948-52
4. Number of Migrants from West Germany and West Berlin to
East Germany and East Berlin by Sex, 1950-52 17
5. Number of Migrants Passing Through the Emergency Acceptance
Procedure in West Berlin by Age and Sex, January 1952-
June 1953
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6. Number of Migrants from East Germany to West Germany by
Age and Sex, 1950
7. Number of Migrants Passing Through the Emergency Acceptance
Procedure in West Berlin by Major Occupational Group,
January 1952-June 1953
Page
19
21
8. Number of Migrants to West Germany and West Berlin from
East Germany and East Berlin by Major Occupational Group,
Selected Time Periods, 1949-53 22
9. Net Migration to West Germany and West Berlin from East
Germany and East Berlin by Major Occupational Group,
End of War through March 1953 24
10. Number of Migrants from West Berlin to East Berlin by
Major Occupational Group and Sex, 1950 28
11. West German Manpower, 1950-53 41
12. Assumptions and Computations Used in Deriving the Number
of Migrants from East Germany to West Germany, and from
East Germany to West Berlin, End of War through March
1953 48
13. Comparative Occupational Distribution of Migrants, Based
on Table 8 59
14. Comparative Occupational Distribution of the Economically
Active Population: Total East German Refugees, Nine
Subgroups of East German Refugees, East Germany (1946),
and West Germany (1950) 61
15. Estimated Number of East German Refugees Who Have
Specific Occupations or Who Work in Specific Industries . 62
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(ORE Project )+5.267)
THE EFFECTS OF MIGRATIONS INIO AND OUT OF EAST GERMANY
ON THE LABOR SITUATIONS IN EAST AND WEST GERMANY
Summary
The area of Germany at present occupied by the USSR has been the
scene of lsrge population movements which are still continuing.
Numerous persons have been moving out of this area to both the West
and the East, and a substantial number of people have been moving
into it from the West and the East. The total number of refugees
who by the end of 1953 had moved into West Germany and West Berlin
and had not returned to East Germany may be estimated to have been
roughly 2.1 million. Between 1950 and 1952 a total of 110,464
persons, including a large percentage of returning refugees, moved
from West to East Germany. Adequate data on the West-East migration
prior to 1950 are not available, but it is conceivable that it was
as large as twice the number of migrants between 1950 and 1952 or
even larger.
In most of the postwar years, migration out of East Germany has
been largely male. Moreover, the proportion of people belonging to
age groups representing the most productive periods of life has been
'large. In recent times the flow of refugees has been made up in-
creasingly of young people. It can be assumed that little more than
37 percent of the total net migrants to West Germany came from the
economically inactive part of the East German population. In the
economically active part of the East German refugees the largest
occupational group consists of persons who, prior to defection, were
active in industry and handicraft (nearly 22 percent). The next
groups in order of size are refugees belonging to occupations in the
fields of commerce and transportation (approximately 17 percent),
and agriculture, forestry, and husbandry (almost 9 percent). Members
of intellectual and artistic and of technical occupations form the
smallest groups (about 2.5 percent each).
The majority of migrants from West Germany to East Germany have
been females. Although adequate and detailed information on the
occupational composition of the West-East migrants is not available,
it can be assumed that the majority of at least the male migrants
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent
the best judgment of the responsible analyst as of 1 January 1954.
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have been either employed persons who were dissatisfied with their
jobs or persons able and willing to work who could not find
employment.
Movements from East Germany to other cOuntries of the Soviet Bloc
have been due to the deportation of large numbers of specialists to
the USSR, "voluntary" recruitment of such persons for work in the
USSR, transfer of prisoners to the USSR, and possibly repatriations
to Satellite countries. Persons moving into East Germany from other
Satellite countries have been primarily expellees or prisoners of
war, deportees, and contract workers returning from the USSR. The
latter two categories have consisted of scientists, technical ex-
perts, highly skilled workers, and family members.
In 1950, 4,442,318 expellees resided in East Germany: 1,874,736
male and 2,567,582 female. Only a few expellees have entered in
subsequent years. Although the previous occupations of these
expellees are not precisely known, there can be little doubt that
they were a cross section of all kinds of occupations,with a large
percentage representing farm families.
No statistical data are available regarding the total number of
deportees, repatriates, or contract workers who have left East
Germany or regarding the total number of deportees and contract
workers who have returned. The net manpower loss caused by forced
and "voluntary" out-movements obviously has been large. According
to some estimates, it was as high as 50,000 persons in 1947 and
1948 alone. Available information indicates that considerably
fewer people have returned than have been taken to the USSR.
. Despite the influx of about 4.5 million expellees shortly after
the end of hostilities, the various movements into and out of East
Germany have resulted in a large net loss in manpower for East Germany
and East Berlin. The in-migration of the expellees did not much
more than make up for the great manpower loss of the region during
World War II. Without it, the Soviet area would have entered into
its postwar era with a substantially smaller population. The net
loss suffered during this era consists primarily of the roughly
2.1 million refugees who did not return, plus uncounted large
numbers of deportees and contract worker's who are still in the USSR,
minus perhaps 50,000 to 100,000 in-migrating regular citizens of
West Germany. This bloodletting hs led to a generally tight man-
power situation which is making the accomplishment of East German
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economic plans with the available East German labor force difficult
but as yet not impossible.
Movements out of East Germany, however, have not only reduced .
the total number of available workers. Simultaneous defections,
deportations, and moves of "voluntary" contract workers to the USSR
have also intensified the shortages of specialized and skilled
personnel. The scarcity of scientists, specialists, and trained
workers has made it difficult to expand the technical and scientific
labor force to. the extent and with the speed necessary to fulfill
East Germany's ambitious economic plans. In addition, these short-
ages have impeded the achievement of intended improvements in the
volume and quality of output. The quantitative and qualitative
deficiencies in scientific and expert manpower hamper the execution
of economic plans more seriously than does the general labor
shortage.
At the moment, East German manpower difficulties are great, but
not really critical. Should defections, however, increase again
from their present low of less than half the rate which prevailed
in the first half of 1953, East German officials looking for
additional civilian and military manpower may soon scrape the bottom
of the barrel. If in the future, many mbre specialized and skilled
persons leave the area than can be replaced by returning deportees,
prisoners of war, and people graduating from the vocational schools
and the numerous training courses, the breaking point may therefore
be reached. If this crisis materializes and the over-all planners
in Moscow so desire, the worst, however, could be avoided by the
transfer of common labor or badly needed specialists from other
parts of the Soviet Bloc.
? Manpower difficulties in East Germany necessarily affect the
Soviet economy as a whole, but these effects have been relatively
slight, and, even in the event of a further deterioration of the
East German labor situation, would probably be embarrassing but
hardly critical.
As contrasted with the effects upon East Germany, Soviet Zone
transborder movements have led to a large manpower increase in
West Germany and West Berlin. Although possibly between 50,000 and
100,000 regular citizens of West Germany have moved to East Germany,
more than 1.8 million refugees from East Germany and East Berlin now
reside in West Germany. In the first postwar years the refugees,
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entering West Germany in the wake of the mass in-migration of ex-
pellees, were a large economic and social burden. Even after the
"currency reform of 3_948, when demand for labor of various types
gradually increased, they still continued to be, by and large, an
economic liability rather than an asset. Because of the large ex-
pansion of the West German economy in recent years, 'however, about
35 percent of the expellees and refugees may now be considered to
be economically integrated, and approximately 45 percent to be
employed though not fully integrated. About 20 percent are still
either partially or totally unemployed. This is largely because
so mPny of them were sent on their arrival to predominantly
agricultural regions of West Germany, where demand for additional
labor has been rather limited. Moreover, a large-scale transfer
to industrial districts with riding demand for labor has as yet
proved impossible because of the continuing housing shortage in
these areas. Lack of living accommodations in industrial areas
rather than insufficient demand for labor is thus becoming more and
more the principal factor obstructing the exploitation of the ref-
ugee labor pool. Accordingly, it will probably take much more
time to integrate all refugees economically. As the economy Con-
tinues to expand and total unemployment to decline and as the
extensive housing programs go forward, refugee manpower probably
will, however, be increasingly needed and used by West German in-
dustry and other branches of the economy.
I. Migrations between East Germany and West Germany.*
Migration out of East Germany has surpassed in-migration, at .
least in recent years. Although a sizable number of out-migrants
* In conformity with current usage, the terms "East Germany" will
be used in this report to designate the Soviet Zone of Occupation;
"West Germany," the German Federal Republic; and "West Berlin," the
US, British, and French Sectors of Berlin. .The term "East Berlin,"
which is used interchangeably with "Soviet Sector of Berlin," will
be treated as a separate entity and will not be considered for
statistical purposes a part of East Germany unless so specifically
designated.
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have gone to Scandinavian or other non-Soviet countries, the chief
areas to which residents of Soviet-occupied Germany have moved --
or have been moved, respectively -- have been West Germany, West
Berlin, and the USSR. East Germany virtually sealed its western
borders in mid-1952 ahd imposed new security measures along the
Baltic coast, with the result that Berlin became the chief point
of exit for refugees to non-Soviet countries. Before the
tightening of the border controls, approximately 50 percent of the
total refugee stream from East Germany crossed the zonal borders
at many other points and were received in West German reception
centers at Uelzen and Giessen. Until the second half of 1953,
only a small trickle (about 10 percent of the total) still managed
to seep through the zonal borders at points other than Berlin.
Registration of refugees in Uelzen and Giessen did not go up
ngain until July-August 1953. This recent increase has been
attributed to a more generous issuance of regular interzonal passes
and the use of these passes as a means of fleeing from the Soviet-
dominated area of the country.
A. Definition and Status of East German Refugees.
The term East German refugees as used in this report is
applied to former residents of East Germany or the Soviet Sector
of Berlin who moved to West Germany or West Berlin after the war,
including expellees* who had been "settled" in East Germany or the
Soviet Sector of Berlin after the war and who came into West
Germany or West Berlin after October 1946.
The legal status of East German refugees has been regulated
by the Law Pertaining to the Emergency Acceptance of Germans in the
Federal Territory, dated 22 August 1950 2/; the Order for the
EXecution of the Law Pertaining to the Fmergency Acceptance of
Germans in the Federal Territory, dated 11 June 1951 .3./; and the
* German nationals or ethnic Germans who, as a direct or indirect
consequence of World War II, were expelled from the territories east
of the Oder-Neisse line or from territories outside the borders of
the former Reich as they existed on 31 December 1937. According to
Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1/ about 400,000 persons who, before
World War II, lived in Western Germany or east of the Oder-Neisse
line or in foreign countries migrated from East Germany and East
Perlin to West Germany between 1946 and 1950.
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Order Pertaining to the Provisional Accommodation of Refugees from
the Soviet Zone of Occupation and the Soviet Sector of Berlin, dated
12 August 1952. 4/ These enactments of the Federal Republic have
been applicable In West Berlin since February 1952. On 24 April
1953 the Bundesrat approved the Law on Matters Pertaining to Ex-
pellees and Refugees (Federal Expellee Law), 2/ which is to
supersede the divergent pertinent statutes of the Lands (states)
and to adjust Federal legislation on the subject.
The 1953 law grants special rights and privileges to persons
recognized as East German refugees in order to integrate them into
the West German economy. Only those German nationals and ethnic
Germans are eligible for recognition who have or did have their .
residence in East Germany or East Berlin and who were compelled to
flee from there to escape from a special pressure situation
attributable exclusively to the political conditions, and who, further-
more, did not violate the principles of humanity or rule of law.
The law recognizes as a special pressure situation, above all,
immediate danger to life and limb or to personal liberty. Persons
who fled for purely economic reasons are not eligible for recognition
as East German refugees. The most important measures to aid refugees
provided by the Federal Expellee Law are as follows: fair and
reasonable distribution over the Lands of West Germany and West
Berlin; integration of farmers into agriculture by allocating farm-
land and by granting financial assistance for rural settlement;
preferential treatment with respect to the granting of permits to
carry on certain trades, professions, or handicrafts; financial
and other assistance to self-employed persons; preferential treat-
ment of manual and white-collar workers by the public employment
service; and preferential allocation of living accommodations. Apart
from such special privileges, recognized refugees have been legally
accepted on a par with regular citizens of West Germany. The numerous
German nationals and ethnic Germans not considered eligible for rec-
ognition under the law have, in practice, been permitted to remain
in West Germany or West Berlin on a quasi-illegal basis. They are
not eligible for the special assistance provided by the refugee
legislation but may obtain housing or employment by their own action.
In case of dire need they receive benefits under general public
assistance systems. Non-German refugees have the legal status of
foreigners. Although the immediate postwar period was marked by the
presence in West Germany of large numbers of displaced persons of
many nationalities, the number of non-Germans among the migrants
coming out of East Germany under duress has steadily decreased. Few
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refugees from other Iron Curtain countries have been able recently
to flee through East Germany to reach West Berlin or West Germany.
Moreover, many non-German in-migrants have been going from West
Germany to other countries.
B. Reasons for Migrations.
1. From East Germany to West Germany.
It is difficult and sometimes even impossible to draw a
clear line of demarcation between cases of flight from the Soviet
area because of direct danger to life and limb or personal liberty,
and other cases. Moreover, not only non-Communists but also active
Communists have sought and found refuge in West Germany, and the
number of Communists among the refugees, including high East German
politicians and civil servants, has been increasing in recent months.
In most cases the only basis available for appraising the reasons
for the flight from East to West Germany has been the refugee's own
statements. A number of the escapees, unquestionably, migrated to
the West because they felt that they could no longer live in the
political atmosphere of East Germany. Others fled because they
were persecuted on account of their political attitude. According
to many statements of.refugees, differences with Communists,
imminent arrest for alleged economic offenses or espionage, re-
fusal to act as informer, former membership in the Social Democratic
Party, or involvement in political purges were the motives for
leaving Soviet-occupied territory. During the period of marked
anti-Jewish policy in the beginning of 1953, substantial numbers of
refugees also declared that they felt in danger because they were
Jews. Among the refugees who fled for what might be called .
political reasons have also been Communist and non-Communist poli-
ticians, judges, state attorneys, other civil servants, and public
employees who had trouble or were afraid of potential trouble with
the East German regime. Relatively few, however, of the persons
who have escaped from East Germany or East Berlin have come to the
West for genuinely political reasons. Despite liberal interpreta-
tion of the legal provisions, probably not more than about 1 out of
every 3 applicants was granted official recognition as a refugee
between 1949 and 1952. g
Interrogation of "non-political" refugees indicates that
many left East Germany or the Soviet Sector of Berlin because they
hoped for higher wages and living standards in the West, or because
they were eliminated as independent businessmen, or because they
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were classified as socially non-productive, or for other economic
reasons. In this category also may be counted the farmers who
stated that they fled because they feared prosecution or confisca-
tion of their farms for not having met crop production or delivery
quotas, or that they wanted to avoid collectivization or prosecution
for opposing it, or that they lost their farms through land reform
or the creation of a no man's land along the izonal border, or that
they faced liability for shortcomings in their capacity as officers
of rural cooperatives.
A considerable number of refugees did not leave their
homes for either political or economic reasons. Some, for example,
emigrated because close relatives were leaving or because they
wished to join family members in West Germany. Others gave up
their residence in a spirit of opportunism or merely in quest of
adventure. In many recent cases the motive was fear that the Berlin
border -- the "only hole in the Iron Curtain" left open -- would be
closed in the near future. These latter motives apply especially to
the rising number of young refugees. In 1952, 17.2 percent of the
registered refugees (19,523) were boys between 14 and 24 years of
age, and 9.8 percent (11,123) were girls of the same age group.
A large number of these juveniles obviously were not motivated by
the desire to move to the West because of its liberal political
system or primarily because of its more favorable economic con-
ditions. Most of them declared that they wished to avoid being
placed under contract in the uranium mines or that they wanted to
evade service in the People's Police, the Free German Youth, the
Service for Germany, or the new army. Among these young people were
a number of girls who stated that they did not want to be subjected
to the military training planned for the girls' units in the Free
German Youth. A substantial portion of the young refugees were
members of the People's Police, deserting, according to their state-
ments, because they had been forced to enlist against their will or
because they disliked their assignments, the long hours of political
indoctrination, the poor living conditions, the strict discipline,
the excessive rank privileges, or merely the Soviet-type uniform.
Between the beginning of 1949 and the end of May 1953, 9,366 members
of the People's Police applied for recognition under the Emergency
Acceptance Law.
Information obtained through the refugee screening pro-
cess therefore indicates that the mass movement from East Germany
and East Berlin to West Germany and West Berlin has been primarily
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because of economic or personal reasons and that opposition to the
Soviet system as such has played a relatively minor role. These
facts warrant the conclusion that the relative economic situation
of the two parts of Germany has been the main factor determining
the scope of transborder movements and that it probably will con-
tinue to be the chief determinant if, and as long as, it is
possible to cross the border. Improvements in East German or
deterioration of West German economic conditions will tend to re-
duce flights and, unless the zonal border is hermetically sealed,
improvements in West German and deterioration of East German
economic conditions will tend to increase them. In either case,
the difference between the basic social, ideological, and
political systems of the two parts of Germany will be less
significant.
2. From West Germany to East Germany.
Movements from West to East Germany have also been due
preponderantly to economic reasons. West Berlin officials have
announced, for example, that nearly one-fourth of the numerous
people who registered as refugees in January and February 1953 did
not formally apply for asylum. In the opinion of the officials,
most of these people returned to East Germany, preferring life
,under Soviet rule to the uncertainties of life as refugees. This
high estimate of the number of returning refugees apparently was
based on the fact that only 1 out of every 3 of these persons
qualified for economic aid under the refugee legislation and for
transportation to West Germany. 2/ Announcement in mid-1953 of a
new policy of moderation by the East German authorities coupled
with promises to give position and property back to returnees, as
well as the belief that the June 1953 upheaval was an indication
of the imminent collapse of the Soviet regime, have also in recent
months caused a number of refugees to return to their homes.
Most of the indigenous West Germans who have moved to
East Germany have apparently been people who were either unable to
find employment in their accustomed occupations or unable to find
any employment at all, and who believed reports that their Chances
for suitable employment would be better in East Germany. Among
them, possibly, were trained doctors and engineers who, though not
Comtunists, migrated because they had lost their savings and could
get only jobs which they considered dnferior. 22/ To stimulate
immigration of persons of this occupational type, the Soviet regime
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recently established a comprehensive program for the recruitment of
West German scientists, physicians, specialists, and skilled workers
for employment in East Germany. 11/
C. Magnitude of Migrations.
To appraise the significance of the movements between the
Soviet and non-Soviet parts of Germany in regard to the manpower
situation in the two areas it is necessary to know, above all, the
number of persons involved. Neither the East German nor the West
German authorities, however, have published total figures of
migrants in either direction. There is every reason to believe that
these figures are unknown and that, owing to the uncontrolled and
irregular manner in which people have moved, they cannot be computed
accurately.*
The same factors that make precise computation impossible
render the making of an estimate difficult. However, while adequate
East German data on migration to or from West Germany and West Berlin
are not available, West German authorities have published statistical
information regarding migration into and out of the non-Soviet areas
of Germany which can be used to get some picture of the magnitude of
the movements in both directions. The East German government has
vehemently denied the accuracy of the West German and West Berlin
data and has maintained that the figures on refugees are too high
and the figures on migrants to the Soviet area too low.** No
comprehensive East German figures have been published, however, to
support the denials or to prove the alleged inaccuracy of pertinent
West German statistics. The latter, accordingly, form the only
available basis for estimates.
* No information, for example, is available as to how many persons
of East German or East Berlin origin in addition to those who can be
tabulated have remained in West Germany or West Berlin as rejected
refugees working "black" and making no claim for social welfare pay-
ments or as persons who have never applied for recognition as'ref-
ugees.
** Ex2mination of the few comparable data on movements from West
Germany and West Berlin to RRst Germany and East Berlin published in
the two sections of the country shows that the East German figures
are not inconsiderably higher. According to East German information,
the number of persons moving from West Germany and West Berlin to the
Soviet area between 1 January 1951 and 30 June 1952, for example,
amounted to 38,832, while it was only 34,000.according to the West
German government.
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Data obtained from the West German censuses of October 1946
and September 1950 can be used to determine the number of persons
living in West Germany and West Berlin whose residence on 1 September
1939 was in the Soviet Zone and Berlin. The census results are
presented in Table 1.* They do not, however, furnish the informa-
tion needed for the purposes of this report, since the data, on the
one hand, include persons who came from West Berlin, persons who
migrated during the war, and the natural increase of the refugee
population and, on the other hand, exclude the expellees who were
originally resettled in East Germany and East Berlin and subsequently
migrated to West Germany and West Berlin. Police and reception
center registration data, another available source of information,
do not cover the whole postwar period, nor do they include the un-
known but substantial number of refugees who have entered non-Soviet
Germany and remained there without completing registration at a
reception center or the police, and similar cases. Tables 2** and
3*** present the existing data on migrants who did register at the
proper places. They show the deficiencies in information as to
time and area covered. Data on the number of refugees who have
been registering at the emergency reception camps at Berlin, Giessen,
and Uelzen are available only for the period beginning in 1949, when
these camps were first established. Figures on migration based on
the general, compulsory police registration cover only the time
peripd beginning in 1949 for migration between East and West Germany,
from 1948 for migration between East Germany and West Berlin, and from
1950 for migration between East and West Berlin.
By using both existing registration and census figures on
migration between East and West Germany as a basis, and by filling
gaps in available information by a number of assumptions which are
explained in Appendix A, the total number of refugees who, by the
end of March 1953, had moved into West Germany and had not returned
to East Germany may be estimated to have been approximately 1.9 mil-
lion.**** A number of these refugees, after staying for some time,
Table 1 follows on p.
** Table 2 follows on p. 12.
Table 3 follows on p. 14.
Data received after this report was prepared indicate that
the number of refugees who arrived during the last 9 months of 1953
may be estimated to have been roughly 220,000, so that the total
number of refugee-residents amounted to about 2,120,000 by 31 Decem-
ber 1953.
X X X*
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Table 1
Population of West Germany and West Berlin in 1946
and 1950 by Place of Residence on 1 September 1939
Residence on 1 September 1939
Residence of Indicated Date
Berlin
East Germany
West Germany 1.2j
29 October 1946
439,000
582,000
13 September 1950
518,000
1,037,000
West Berlin 13_/
29 October 1946
1,879,000
36,000
13 September 1950
1,888,000
80,000
Table 2
Number of Migrants Registering at the Emergency Reception Camps
at Berlin, Giessen, and Uelzen.11Y
1949-53
Time Period
Berlin
Giessen
Uelzen
Total
1949
70,000
2/*
22,487
36,758
129,245
2/
1950
60,397
60,518
78,583
199,498
1951
59,269
12/
45,621
60,758
165,648
12/
1952
1st Quarter
9,641
12/
5,534
9,392
24,567
12/
2d Quarter
16,189
8,092
8,697
32,978
3d Quarter
41,657
6,533
6,589
54,779
* Footnotes for Table 2 follow on
p? 13.
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Table 2
Number of Migrants Registering at the Emergency Reception Camps
at Berlin, Giessen, and Uelzen 14/
1949-53
(Continued)
Time Period Berlin Giessen Uelzen Total
4th Quarter 45,924 3,246 3,750 52,920
Total 1952 113,411 b/ 23,05 28,428 l65,244 12/
1953
1st Quarter 109,338 1,340 1,936 112,614
a. Approximate.
b. the January figure for Berlin is included
with the 1951 total. The 1951 total is, therefore, too high
by this unknown number, and the 1952 total and the 1952 first
quarter are too low by the same number.
moved to other Western countries. Migrants from West Germany in
the calendar year 1952, for example, included 6,914 East German
refugees moving to new homes in the free world: 3,488 males and
3,426 females. 22/ Statistical data on the total number of such
migrants from West Germany are, however, not available for earlier
years. Taking the migration of former refugees to other Western
areas into consideration, the total number of refugees still re-
siding in West Germany and West Berlin early in 1953 may be estimated
to have amounted to approximately 1,810,000.*
* This estimate, though arrived at by independent methods, is close
to the estimate of 1.8 million made by Federal Refugee Minister
Lukaschek on 10 September 1952, 16/ and an unpublished estimate of
1.8 million made on 23 January 1953 by the official of the Federal
Statistical Office in charge Of refugee statistics, the estimate of
1.86 million made by Professor Hans Harmsen in Staedtehygiene,
and the German DPA estimate of 1,857,100 published on 11 February
1953. lf,./ Us reports repeatedly haye estimated the number of refugees
from the Soviet Zone to be 2 million. 19/
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Table 3
Number of Migrants between West Germany and East Germany, between West Berlin and East Germany,
and between West Berlin and East Berlin by Time Period n/*42/
1948-52
Number of Persons Migrating
Number of Persons Migrating
Number of Persons Migrating
Time Period
Net Migration to
West Germany
from East Germany
To
West Germany
from East
Germany
From
West Germany
to East
Germany
Net Migration to
West Berlin
from Bast Germany
To
West Berlin
from East
Germany
From
West Berlin
to East
Germany
Net Migration to
West Berlin-
from East Berlin
To
West Berlin
from East
Berlin
From
West Berlin
to East
Berlin
1948
March
2d Quarter
3d Quarter
4th Quarter
_Total
' (March-
December)
1949
1st Quarter
2d Quarter
3d Quarter
4th Quarter
Total
1950
1st Quarter
2d Quarter
3d Quarter
4th Quarter
Total
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1,351
6,011
3,751
5,359
16.472
2,539
9,829
7,264
8,329
27 961
1,188
3,818
3,513
2,970
11,489
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
220,000
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
255,000
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
35,000
4,255
7,287
8,795
12,742
33,079
7,074
9,696
11,292
15,049
43,111
2,819
2,409
2,497
2,307
10,032
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
--_
41,943
48,344
57,781 y
65,779 2/
214,704 1/
49,740
56,848
65,287 y
73,849 Ei
246,792 1/
7,797
8,504
7,526 Y
8,070 2/
32,088 1/
9,552
11,911
12,141
12,181
45,785
11,689
13,771
14,270
13,835
53,565
2,137
1,860
2,129
1,654
7,780
2,810
3,272
3,865
4,402
14,349
5,095
5,467
6,041
6,653
23,256
2,285
2,195
2,176
2,251
8 907
- 4---
* Footnotes for Table 3 follow on p.15.
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Table 3
Number of Migrants between West Germany and East Germany, between West Berlin and East Germany,
and between West Berlin and East Berlin by Time Period a/* a2/
1948-52
(Continued)
Time Period
1951
Net Migration to
West Germany
from East Germany
1st Quarter 44,934
2d Quarter 40,445
3d Quarter 44,449
4th Quarter 42,046
Total 171,8714
1952
1st Quarter 25,447
2d Quarter 27,426
3d Quarter 24,828
4th Quarter 20,529
Total 98,224
Number of Persons Migrating
To From
West Germany West Germany
from East to East
Germany Germany
49,902 4,968
45,976 5,531
51,748 7,299
47,761 5,715
195,387 23,513
30,009 4,562
32,047 4,621
27,765 2,937
22,864 2,341
112.Z.82 114,1461
--
Number of Persons Migrating
To
Net Migration to West Berlin
West Berlin from East
from East Germany Germany
9,605
12,233
13,873
13,476
149,187
8,398
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
714,218
From
West Berlin
to East
Germany
11,068 1,463
13,547 1,314
15,575 1,702
14,804 1,328
54,994 5 827
9,980
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1,582
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
81,132 6,914
Net Migration to
West Berlin
from East Berlin
1,054
5,109
4,458
3,727
14,348
2,794
2,509
3,323
4,732
13,358
Number .df Persons Migrating
To.
West Berlin
from East
Berlin
5,918
6,159
5,507
4,548 ,
From
West Berlin
to East
Berlin
4,864
a,o46
1,049
821
22,128 7,780
3,628
3,260
4,134
5,550
834
751
811
818
16,572 3 214
a. Based on arrivals and departures.
b. Period from 1 July to 13 September 1950.
4 A 4,,,m lb Q.,+.mln., ql np,cab,=r 1950
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Table 4* indicates that, excluding migrants from West Germany
to East Berlin, a total of 110,464 persons migrated from the non-
Soviet to the Soviet area in 1950, 1951, and 1952. This figure in-
cludes returning East German refugees, other people coming originally
from Berlin and areas now occupied by Eastern armies, people who were
originally expellees, and indigenous West Germans. A statistical
breakdown of West-East migrants is available only with respect to
migration from West Germany to the Soviet area in 1952 and in terms
of expellees and others (Zugewanderte). Eli It indicates that, in
that year, about 30 percent of these migrants probably were West
Germans of long standing. Whether or not this percentage distribution
can be applied to the 110,464 migrants included in Table 4 -- which
would give as a result that about 33,000 indigenous West Germans
migrated to the Soviet area during the period -- is doubtful.
Adequate data on total migration from the non-Soviet to the
Soviet area of Germany prior to 1950 are not available. It is con-
ceivable that the total number of postwar migrants of this kind may
have been as large as twice the number. of migrants between 1950 and
1952, or even larger.**
D. Characteristics of Migrants.
1. Sex.
In most of the postwar years, migration out of Soviet-
occupied Germany has been largely male. The proportion of males
among the refugees has been estimated to have been 55 percent prior
* Table 4 follows on p. 17.
** reception
camps for migrants into East Germany coming from non-Soviet Germany --
for example, in the provinces of Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt, Saxony,
Thuringia, Mecklenburg, and other places. The existence of such
camps has been interpreted as indicating that the number of returning
refugees and other in-migrants from the West must have been sub-
stantial. Data on the total number of camps are, however, not
available, and it appears that they have been established and closed
according to the real or anticipated requirements of the moment. No
permanent system seems to exist which would be comparable to the West
German reception centers./
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Table Ii-
Number of Migrants from West Germany and West Berlin
to East Germany and East Berlin by Sex La/
1950-52 12/
Number of Migrants
Percent Distribution
Year
Male
Female
Both Sexes
Male
Female
1950
24,019
24,756
48,775
49.2
50.8
1951
17,578
19,522
37,100
47.4
52.6
1952
12,181
12,408
24,589
49.5
50.5
Total
53,77.8
56,686
110 464
48.7
51.3
a. Based on arrivals and departures.
b. EXcludes migrants from West Germany to East Berlin. Data
are available for these persons only for 1952, during which
time there were 671 migrants, of whom 363 were males.
to 1950, 24/ and it may be assumed that it was not much smaller than
50 percent in 1950 and 1951.* ,As shown in Table 5,** the percentage
of males among the persons passing through the emergency acceptance
procedure in West Berlin was a little higher than 55 in 1952 and
nearly 50 in the first half of 1953.
2. Age.
The proportion of people of working age has been rel-
atively large. According to West German estimates, nearly
64 percent of the arrivals prior to 1950 belonged to the age group
20 to 44. 22/ Table 6-*** indicates that in 1950, also, a high
percentage of the refugees probably fell into age groups representing
the most productive periods of life. As indicated in Table 5, persons
between 14 and 45 years of age amounted to more than 58 percent of
* See Appendix A, Methodology.
** Table 5 follows on p. 18.
XX Table 6 follows on p. 19.
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Table 5
Number of Migrants Passing Through the Emergency Acceptance Procedure in West Berlin by Age and Sex
January 1952-June 1953 2L/
Age Groups
1952
1953 1st Quarter.
April 1953
May 1953
June 1953
Total
Percent
Male
Total
Percent
Male
Total
Percent
Male
Total
Percent
Male
Total
Percent
Male
Under 6
9,356
8.2
4,813
10,138
9.3
5,206
3,104
8.8
1,601
3,401
9.9
1,761
3,655
9.4
1,911
6 through 13
14,633
12.9
7,519
16,346
15.0
8,425
5,107
14.5
2,631
4,943
14.5
2,541
4,900
12.6
2,526
14 through 17
10,479
9.2
6,650
10,408
9.5
6,055
3,999
11.4
2,292
3,883
11.4
2,147
5,050
12.9
3,017
18 through 20
10,981
9.7
7,333
7,318
6.7
4,049
2,503
7.1
1,411
2,366
6.9
1,307
3,300
8.5
1,982
21 through 24
9,186
8.1
5,540
6,203
5.7
3,163
2,024
5.8
1,007
2,036
6.01,015
2,610
6.7
.1,427
25 through 45
35,622
31.4
17,801
33,357
30.5
14,145
10,431
29.6
4,463
9,927
29.1
4,373
11,302
29.0
5,187
45 through 64
21,41
18.9
12,390
22,999
21.0
11,147
7,146
20.3
3,593
6,769
19.8
3,410
7,320
18.8
3,797
65 and.over
1,751
1.6
957
2,569
2.3
1,215
873
2.5
425
819
2.4
405
832
2.1
397
All Ages
113,419
100.0
63,003
109,338
100.0
53,403
35,187
100.0
17,423,
34,144
100.0
16,959
38,969
100.0
20,244
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Table 6
Number of Migrants from East Germany to West Germany by Age and Sex 2/
1950 Ei
Age in Years 12/
Total
Males
Females
Percentage Distribution
Total
Males
? Females
Under 5
10,027
3,590
6,437
4.7
4.0
5.2
5 through 9
14,280
5,155
9,125
6.7
5.7
7.3
10 through 14
12,976
4,998
7,978
6.1
5.5
6.4
15 through 19
16,528
7,546
8,982
7.7
8.4
- 7.2
20 through 24
22,081.
11,614
10,467
10.3
12.9
8.4
25 through 29
24,479
11,374
13,105
11.4
12.6
10.5
30 through 34
14,392
6,940
7,452
6.7
7.7
6.0
35 through 39
19,812
9,710
10,102
9.2
10.8
8.1
40 through 44
18,254
8,419
9,835
8.5
9.3
7.9
45 through 49
15,302
6,274
9,028
7.1
6.9
7.3
50 through 54
13,177,
4,843
8,334
6.1
5.4
6.7
55 through 59
10,327
3,371
6,956
4.8
3.7
5.6
60 through 64
8,233
2,338
5,895
3.8
2.6
4.7
65 and over
14,836
4,046
10,790
6.9
4.5
8.7
All Ages
214,304
20,218
124,486
100.0
100.0
100.0
a. Reported net migration from East Germany by sex, distributed by the year of birth reported
for net migration from all areas. These figures exclude illegal migrants who did not report
their arrival or departure to the police.
b. This report shows the distribution of the net migration from East Germany, assuming the
same distribution as for all migrants. The actual age distribution of the net migrants from
East Germany may have differed in some degree, inasmuch as the 53,000 returned prisoners of
war were almost certainly concentrated in the younger ages and the 67,000 displaced persons
who came under German authority during the year were probably concentrated in the older ages.
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all refugees processed in Berlin in 1952 and they amounted to between
52 and 57 percent of all refugees in the first half of 1953, the
bulk being in the age group of 25 to 45. These age groups represent
only about 45 percent of the population of West Germany. The per-
centage of refugees over 65 years, on the other hand, was only
1.6 in 1952 and between 2.1 and 2.5 in the first half of 1953,
while it is almost 10 in the fixed population of West Germany. .2)/
In recent times the flow of refugees has been made up
increasingly of young people. Mounting pressure to join the East
German armed forces, the Service for Germany, and similar para-
military organizations probably accounted largely for the sudden rise
in the number of juveniles fleeing to West Berlin in 1952. The
number of refugees between 16 and 24 years of age grew from a monthly
average of 825 between January and May to 1,490 in June, was 3,407 in
August and 3,139 in September of 1952. 29/ Almost 25 percent of the
total recognized refugees processed during the first 6 months of 1952
were unaccompanied youths aged 14 to 24. Although their percentage
dropped somewhat in July and August, it ?increased in September to
more than 25 percent. _Li
3. Occupation.
The occupational composition of the refugees has not
necessarily been the same in each postwar month and year. It has
tended to change as the Soviet regime increased or decreased economic,
social, or political pressure upon individual groups. Comparable
and detailed data on the occupational distribution of the refugees
-are, however, not available for each period. Tables 7,* 8,** and
9*** shed some light on the situation. Table 7 shows, for example,
the occupational grouping prior to migration of the refugees who
passed through the emergency acceptance procedure in West Berlin be-
tween the beginning of 1952 and mid-1953. Industrial workers and
artisans formed the largest group during the whole period." The 1953
peak for this group was reached in June and reflects the rising pressure
on its. members which in the same month led to riots against the Soviet
regime. The rise in 1953 in the number of refugees with unspecified
occupations to approximately 11 percent in June also would seem to
mirror this pressure. The size of the second largest group, persons
* Table 7 follows on p. 21.
*if Table 8 follows on p. 22.
xxx Table 9 follows on p. 24.
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Table 7
Number of Migrants Passing Through the Emergency Acceptance Procedure in West Berlin by Major Occupational Group 32/
January 1952-June 1953
Major Occupational Group
1952
19531st.Quarter
April 1953
May 1953
June 1953
Total
Percent
Total
Percent
Total
Percent
Total
Percent
Total
Percent
Agriculture, Forestry, Horticulture, Animal Husbandry
8,097
7.1
17,163
15.7
5,126
14.6
4,960
14.5
5,156
13.2
(of these, Agriculture)
(3,998)
(3.5)
(11,499)
(10.5)
(3,010
(8.6)
(3,762)
(11.0)
(3,726)
(9'.6)
Industry, Handicraft
20,157
17.8
12,778
11.7
4,518
12.8
4,493
13.2
6,215
16.0
Technical Occupations
1,409
1.2
1,379
1.3
414
1.2
589
1.7
689
1.8
Commerce, Transportation
16,549
14.6
12,231
11.2
3,931
11.2
4,065
11.9
4,528
11.6
Health Service, Social Welfare
4,986
4.4
5,658
5,2
1,931
5.5
4,405
4.1
1,648
4.2
Public Administration, Administration of Justice
3,639
3.2
2,183
2;0
707
2.0
461
1.4
601
1.6
'0.9
Intellectual and-Artistic Professions
2,129
1.9
1,591
1.4
475
1.3
394
1.2
363
Occupation Unspecified
10,,236
9.0
8,042
7.3
3,442
9.8
3,231
9.5
4,212
10.8
Unemployed
2,604
2.3
3,388
3.1
933
2.6
469
1.4
389
1.0
Total Members of the Labor Force
69,806
61,5
64,413
58.9
21,477
61.0
20,067
58.9
23,801
61.1
Pensioners and Annuitants
1,883
1.7
3,403
, 3.1
1,156
3.3
2,037
3.0
1,260
3.2
Housewives
15,296
13.5
14,105
12.9
4,343
12.4
4,250
12.4 .
4,532
11.6
Children
26,434
23.3
27,417
25.1
8,211
23.3
8,790
25.7
9,376
.24.1
Total Persons
113,419
100.0
10.4138
100.0
1224
allaill.
100.0
3...24269
100.0
,12,227
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Table 8
Number of Migrants to West Germany and West Berlin from East Germany and East Berlin by Major Occupational Group hi*
Selected Time Periods, 1949-53 L/
Major Occupational Group
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Refugees in
Nordrhein-
Westfalen ,
March 1949 12/
To West Berlin
from East
Berlin dt3ring
1950 cI
To West Berlin,
Giessen, and
Uelzen 1st
Half 1952
To West Berlin
To Giessen
Total
Columns 1-9
2d Half
1952
January
1953
February
1953
March
1953
January
1953
February
1953
Economically Active
Agriculture, Forestry, Husbandry
1,167
99
4,446
6,628
2,517
5,882
8,764
37
48
29,588
Industry, Handicraft
4,033
3,180
12,963
14,670
2,709
3,713
6,356
159
167
47,950
Technical Occupations
940
604
1,572
968
277
389
713
20
17
5,500
Trade, Transportation
3,016
3,779
9,045
11,663
2,227
3,378
6,626
153
183
40,070
Household, Health, Welfare
698
871
2,725
3,994
1,091
1,607
2,960
70
59
14,075
Administration, Justice
2,263
2,249
1,715
2,577
380
561
1,242
6
3
10,996
Intellectual and Artistic Occupa-
tions.
747
626
1,362
1,415
356
419
816
6
13
5,760
Unknown -
1,507
652
8,26h
8,112
1,922
2,093
4,027
360
229
32,892
Unemployed
di
di
d/
2,338
605
713
2,070
1/
Total EconOmically Active
14,371
12,060
42,092
52,365
12,084
18,755
33,574
811
719
186,831
Not Economically Active
Independent, Retired
N.A.
1,397
N.A.11
489
938
1,976
39
46
N.A.
Housewives
N.A.
9,286
N.A.
1 2,83,345
2,907
7,853
186
165
N.A.
Children
N.A.
513
N.A.
21,250 5,523
8,058
13,836
139
153
N.A.
Unknown
N.A. -
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Total Not Economically Active
8,391 2/
11,196
20,054
35,216
9,357
11,903
23,665
364
364
120,510
Total Population
22,762 2/
23,256
64,146
87,581
21,1211.
30,658
57,239
1,175
1,083
307,341
* Footnotes for Table 8 follow on
P. 23.
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Table 8
Number of Migrants to West Germany and West Berlin from East Germany and East Berlin by Major Occupational Group 2/
Selected Time Periods, 1949-53 2g/ ?
(COntinued)
?
Percent Distribution of the
Economically Active Population
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Refugees in
Nordrhein-
Westfalen/
March 1949 12/
To West Berlin
from East
BerlinjdurOg
1950 SL/
To West Berlin,
Giessen, and
Uelzen31st
Half 1952
To West Berlin
To Giessen
Total
Columns 1-9
2d Half
1952
January
1953
February
. 1953
March
1953
January
1953
February
1953
Agriculture, Forestry, Husbandry
8
1
11
13
21.
31
26
4
7
16
Industry, Handicraft
28
26
31
27
23
20
19
20
23
26
Technical Occupations
7
5
4
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
Trade, Transportation
21
32
21
22
18
18
20
19
25
21
Household, Health, Welfare
5
7
6
8
9
9
9
9
8
7
Administration, Justice
16
19
4
5
3
3
4
1
1
6
Intellectual and Artistic Occupa-
tions
5
5
3
3
3
2
2
1
2
3
Unknown
10
5
20
15
16
11
12
44
32
18
Unemployed
1/
1/
1/
5
5
4
6
a. Except for columns 1 and 2, these data were collected at the emergency reception camp in West Berlin, and at Giessen and Uelzen in West
Germany.
b. Classification of refugees from East Germany and East Berlin by occupational or industrial group prior to migration.
c. Based .on police registration of arrivals from East Berlin. Since the source classifies the total immigrants into two groups -- (1) those from
East Berlin, and (2) those from all other areas -- it appears that this distribution represents persons whose permanent residence was in East Berlin
prior to migration.
d. No breakdown is given for the unknowns and the unemployed. The number of unemployed is included in the figure for the unknown.
e. Assumes the same ratio of economically active population to total population as in columns 3 and 4 combined: that is, 94,457: 149,727
14,371: x.
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Table 9
Net Migration to West Germany and West Berlin from East Germany and East Berlin by Major Occupational Group
End of War through March 1953 LI/
Major Occupational Group
Migrants From
East Berlin
End of War to
1 April 1952
Migrants to
West Germany
1 January 1953 to
31 March 1953
Migrants to
West Berlin
1 April 1952 to
31 March 1953
Migrants to
West Germany
1 January 1952 to
31 December 1952
Other
Migrants
Total
Migrants
Economically Active
Agriculture:, Forestry, Husbandry
505
183
25,996
9,660
130,239
166,583
Industry, Handicraft
14,645
705
37,248
24,150
336,825
413,573
Technical Occupations
2,727
81
3,686
2,205
37,425
46,124
Trade, Transportation
17,372
723
30,458
18,165
252,993
319,711
Household, Health, Welfare
4,040
280
11,446
5,880
79,341
100,987
Administration, Justice
10,302
21
6,014
3,780
70,359
90,47(
Intelledtual and Artistic
Occupations
2,828
42
4,074
2,415
37,425
46,784
Total Economically Active
52,1119
2,035
118,922
66,255
944607
1,184,238
Total Not Economically Active
48,581
965
75,078
38,745
552,393
715,762
Total Population
101,000
3,000
194,000
105,000
1,497,000
1,900,000
a. This table was derived from Table 4 by distributing
the distributions in the manner discussed in the text.
the unemployed and unknowns proportionately to the remaining categories and combining
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Table 9
Net Migration to West Germany and West Berlin from East Germany and East Berlin by Major Occupational Group
End of War through March 1953 a/
(Continued)
?? ?
Percent Distribution
Major Occupational Group
Economically Active
Migrants From Migrants to Migrants to Migrants to
East Berlin ? West Germany West Berlin West Germany
End of War to 1 January 1953 to 1 April 1953 to 1 January 1952 to Other Total
1 April 1952 31 March 1953 31 March 1953 31 December 1952 ' Migrants Migrants
Agriculture, Forestry, Husbandry=
?0.5
6.1
13.4
9.2
8.7
8.8
Industry, Handicraft
14.5
23.5
19.2
23.0
22.5
21.8
Technical Occupations
2.7
2.7
1.9
2.1
2.5
2.4
Trade, Transportations
17.2
24.1
15.7
17.3
16.9
16.8
Household, Health, Welfare
4.0
9.3
5.9
5.6
5.3
5.3
Administration, Justice
10.2
0.7
3.1
3.6
4.7
4.7
Intellectual and Artistic
Occupations
2.8
1.4
2.1
2.3
2.5
2.5
Total Economically Active
51.9
67.8
61.3
63.1
63.1
62.3
Total Not Economically Active
48.1
32.2
38.7
36.9
36.9
37.7
a. This table Was ieriyed from Table it by distributing the unemployed and unknowns proportionately to the remaining categories and combining
the distributions in the manner discussed in the text.
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who had been active in commerce and transportation, changed rel-
atively little over the period, indicating the steady pressure
especially on merchants. The relatively large proportion of civil
servants (health services, social welfare, public administration,
administration of justice) and attorneys also reflects measures
initiated by the Soviet regime. Especially striking is the hectic
rise in the percentage of farmers, foresters, horticulturists, and
cattle breeders, which, awing to the rapid decline in their economic
situation, increased from an average of 7.1. percent in 1952 to
between 13.2 (June 1953) and 19.2 percent (February 1953).
For the purposes of this report, it is, however, more
important to know the occupational pre-migration distribution of
the total of postwar refugees than to ascertain the occupational
composition of groups arriving during any one period of time.
Such a.statistical breakdown, covering all the refugees, is not
available. Two main sources of data exist which may be used to
estimate their distribution at least among the major occupational
and industrial grcups: (a) police registration of migrants over
the borders of the Lands of West Germany and over the boundary of
West Berlin and (b) statistics gathered at the emergency reception
camps. For reasons explained in Appendix Al the data available on
refugees applying for admission to the three emergency reception
camps at West Berlin, Giessen, and Uelzen must be considered the
more reliable ones, although they still leave much to be desired
with respect to coverage (only 317,000 refugees, or 17 percent of
the estimated total) and although they may riot be representative
of the total number. It appears, therefore, that the best method of
arriving at an estimate of the total occupational distribution is:
to select certain of the nine refugee groups, whose occupational
distributions are shown in Table 8, to represent various subgroups;
and to find the distribution of all refugees by adding the distribu-
tions for the subgroups, distributing simultaneously the unemployed
and persons of unknown occupation to the other occupational
categories. The result Of this calculation is presented in Table 9.
It represents the estimate of the occupational characteristics of
the five groups of migrants which were differentiated and the
occupational characteristics of the total postwar refugee group as
well.
According to this estimnte, a little more than 37 percent
of the total number of refugees cane from the economically inactive
Soviet German population. Among the economically active refugees
the largest occupational group consists of persons who were engaged
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in industry and handicraft (nearly 22 percent)/. The next groups, in
order of size, are refugees belonging to occuplations in the fields
of commerce and transportation (approximately/l7 percent), and of
agriculture, forestry, and husbandry (almost 9 percent). Members of
intellectual and artistic and of technical occupations form the
smallest groups (about 2.5 percent each).
As mentioned above, most migrants from West Germany and
West Berlin to East Germany and East Berlin probably did not originally
reside in the area which is now non-Soviet Germany. Only a minority
have been West Germans of long standing. Table 4, above, indicates
that, unlike the migration from East to West, the majority of the
migrants from West to East have been females.
Adequate and detailed information on the occupational com-
position of the West to East migrants is not available.* It can be
assumed, however, that the vast majority of at least the male migrants
have been either dissatisfied employed persons or persons able and
willing to work who could not find employment in West Germany. The
relatively large percentage of females among the migrants, on the
other hand, would seem to indicate that the number of family members
and individuals moving for personal reasons has not been small.
Table 10** shows the distribution, according to major
occupational groups, of migrants who moved from West Berlin to East
Berlin in 1950. Inasmuch as this distribution, however, was probably
due to the particular situation in Berlin at that time, it does not
appear advisable to draw conclusions from it concerning the occupa-
tional distribution of Migrants moving in other years or from or to
other areas.
* Data on the occupational distribution of migrants, published by
West Germany, include all persons who migrate across the borders of
the individual West German states. Because migrants from one state
to another within West Germany form the bulk of the migrants, the
data cannot be used to estimate the occupational distribution of
persons who migrate from West Germany to East Germany.
** Table 10 follows on ID. 28.
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Table 10,
Number of Migrants from West Berlin to East Berlin
by Major Occupational Group and Sex 2,/ 22/
1950
Major Occupational Group
Male
Female
Total
Economically Active
Agriculture
29
7
36
Industry and Handicraft
651
239
890
Technical Occupations
213
29
242
Commerce and Transportation
676
255
931
Household, Health, and Welfare
80
234
314
Public Administration and Law
668
433
1,101
Religion and Culture
255
173
428
Not Specified
191
129
320
Total Economically Active
2,763
1 499
4 262
No Occupation and Dependents
1,289
3,050
4,339
Not Reported
166
140
306
Total
ILLE18
1,689
8i22.1
Percent Distribution
Economically Active
Agriculture 0.7 0.2 o.4
Industry and Handicraft 15.4 5.1 10.0
Technical Occupations 5.1 0.6 2.7
Commerce and Transportation 16.0 5.4 10.5
Household, Health, and Welfare 1.9 5.0 3.5
Public Administration and Law 15.8 9.2 12.4
Religion and Culture 6.1 3.7 4.8
Not Specified 4.5 2.8 3.6
Total Economically Active 65.5 32.0 47.9
No Occupation and Dependents 30.6 65.0 48.7
Not Reported 3.9 3'.o 3.4
a. Based on
arrivals and departures.
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II. Migrations between Soviet-Occupied Germany and Other Soviet
Bloc Countries.
A. Reasons for Migrations.
1. From Soviet-Occupied Germany to the Satellites and the
USSR.
Few of the Germans who, during the postwar period, went
from Soviet-occupied Germany to the USSR and the Satellites did so
of their awn free will. A relatively large number of specialists,
such as scientists, technicians, mechanics, and experts, and of other
useful members of the labor force were deported to the USSR,
especially during the initial period of the occupation. Many
political and criminal prisoners were taken to the USSR from jails
and camps: In addition to these deportees, a sizable number of
specialists, mostly scientists and technicians, went to the USSR
under contracts to work there for a specified time. Many of these
contracts were signed under duress, and in many cases it is doubtful
whether the persons concerned were deported or contracted. A large
number of deportees are still in the USSR, and not all the scientists
and technicians who left the East Zone "voluntarily" have returned
after the expiration of their original contracts.
additional 50X1
East German skilled workers, technicians, and mechanics, who shortly
after the war were expelled from Poland, the Polish-occupied
territories, Czechoslovakia, and possibly also Hungary and Rumania,
are being repatriated to their former countries of residence.
such returns of ethnic Germans to 50X1
Satellite countries have in most cases taken place under direct or
the return 50X1
of these ethnic Germans has been opposed by both the East German
government and the other countries affected but that the USSR has
insisted on carrying out the repatriations in order to relieve labor
shortages in economies engaged in supplying the Soviet Bloc with
essential materials. 11/
indirect pressure.
In contrast to the migration from East Germany to the
West, migration from East Germany to the USSR and the Satellites has
thus been due primarily to outright deportation or decisions forced
upon the persons concerned. Considerations of personal-economic
advantage or ideological convictions appear to have been the guiding
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motive for migration in only relatively few cases. The chief factor,
therefore, determining the scope of migration to other areas behind
the Iron Curtain has been, and probably will continue to be, the
population and, manpower policy of East Germany and the USSR.
2. From the Satellites and the USSR to Soviet-Occupied
Germany.
Persons moving into East Germany and East Berlin from
countries of the Soviet Bloc have been primarily expellees or
prisoners of war, deportees, and contract workers returning from the
USSR. Expellees, called "resettlers," streared into East Germany in
great numbers/ especially,in the first postwar years. Although no
data showing their, previous occupations are available, it can be
assumed that they represented a cross section of all kinds of
occupations with a large percentage of farm families. 22/ Most re-
ports agree that nearly all resettlers who were able to work were
integrated into the expanding East German economy.
The persons returning from deportation and contract
work were scientists, technical experts, highly skilled workers,
and the members of their families. They were sent back probably
because the exploitation of their knowledge and "know-how" was
completed and because the Soviet authorities believed that better
use could now be made of them in the restoration and expansion of
the German sector of the Soviet Bloc economy, where they would some-
what alleviate the scarcity of scientific and technical manpower
and also be helpful in the application of Soviet methods of production.
B. Magnitude of Migrations.
According to East German statistics, 4,442,318 expellees
resided in East Germany in 1950: 1,874,736 male and 2,567,582
female. lY They therefore constituted roughly one-quarter of the'
population of East Germany, which at that time totaled 17,635,000. E/
Relatively few have entered in subsequent years. These figures
show again that, although migration out of East Germany was
preponderantly male, migration into the country was preponderantly
female. The composition of the incoming expellees according to sex
was about as abnormal as that of the total population of the Zone.*
* See III, A, 2, p. 35.
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Statistical data are not available either on the total number
of deportees, repatriates, or contract workers who have left East
Germany or on the total number of deportees and contract workers who
have returned. The only estimates available concern certain groups
of migrants. The names of 3,070 East German specialists (men with
technical skills) are known. These men were moved either forcibly
or With their consent to the USSR between 1945 and 1952. About
200 more such specialists went to the USSR during the same period,
probably under contract. To these figures might be added 1,071
specialists about whom sufficient information does not exist to
determine whether they were taken to the USSR on contract after .1945
or as prisoners of war before the end of hostilities. 2/ There is
no doubt, however, that many more specialists and skilled workers
whose names are not available moved, or were moved, to the USSR. An
inkling of the true size of the total number of East Germans who were
deported may be gained from the 1946 East German census figuresjwhich
show that, although 3,640,000 expellees had migrated into East Germany
by 1946, the total increase in population was only 2,150,000. 22/
Even though, according to the same census, 581,687 refugees already
had left East Germany by that time, these figures indicate a con-
siderable loss of manpower by deportation (in addition to the known
war losses). To these losses must also be added the loss through
forced and "voluntary" out-movements in subsequent years which,
according to some estimates, was as high as 50,000 persons in 1947
and 1948 alone.
sizable number of deportees and contractees have returned
to East Germany. It is impossible to determine the total number of
the returning deportees and prisoners of war or the total number of
people in these categories who chose to move on to West Germany.
Names are known of only 1,412 returned contractee specialists and
793 additional specialists whose contract status is undetermined. )22/
considerably fewer people
have returned from the USSR than were taken to the USSR and that the
percentage of released prisoners of war who moved on to West Germany
has been large.
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III. Effects of Migrations on Manpower.
A. East German Manpower Situation.
1. General Situation.
According to documents allegedly based on East German
census data and records in the State Planning Commission, LE/ the
population of Soviet-occupied Germany in 1950 was as follows:
Male
Female
Total
Soviet Zone
7,885,000
9,750,000
17,6351000
East Berlin
503,000
676,000
1,179,000
Total
8,388,000
10,426l000
18,814,000
According to a running count kept by the East German Ministry of Labor,
the population of East Germany, exclusive of East Berlin, amounted in
May 1952 to 17,345,000. The population has been declining since 1950.
The distribution according to age and sex groups was as follows:
Male
Female
Total
Up to 14 Tears
2,115,000
1,980,000
4,095,000
14 to 65
5,258,000
7,126,000
12,384,000
Over 65
1,015,000
1,320,000
2,335,000
Total
8,388,000
10,426,000
18,814,000
Persons gainfully employed in East Germany,- exclusive of
East Berlin, on 1 February 1952 totaled 7,855,000 persons, of whom
1.5 million were self-employed including family helpers. Thus
6,355,000 people were active in the "People's Economy' (Volkswirtschaft).
because according to general Soviet planning terminology, self-employed
persons and members of their families who are helping them are not
included in the People's Economy. The distribution of persons active
in the People's Economy according to economic branches is as follows:
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February 1952 1955 Plan
Male Female Total Male Female Total
Industry 1,525,000 928,000 2,453,000 1,685,000 1,185,000 2,870,000
Building
Trade 211,000 143,000 354,000 245,000 180,000 425,000
Agriculture
and
Forestry W11106,000 1,018,000 2,124,000 1,200,000 1,100,000 2,300,000
Transporta-
tion
431,000
104,000
535,000
450,000
130,000
580,000
Public and
Private
Employees
714,000.
175,000
889,000
750,000
175,000
925,000
Total
3,987,000
2,368,000
6,355,000
4,330,000
2,770,000
7/100,000
a. Probably includes farmers and agricultural workers.
The current Five Year Plan122/ sets as its goal for 1955
the employment of 13 percent more workers than in 1950 in the People's
Economy, a total of 7.1 million persons. Of these, 2,770,000 will be
women and 4,330,000, men. To reach this goal, the Plan calls for the
addition of 797,400 new workers during the 5-year period.
The total number of wage and salary earners rose from
6,032,000 in the beginning of 1950122/ to 6,355,000 early in
1952,li2/ an increase of 323,000 persons. In the first half of 1952,
therefore, total employment in the People's Economy was still
745,000 persons short of the Plan goal for 1955.
271,500 persons were
still officially unemployed in May 1952 in the whole of Soviet-occupied
Germany, including the Soviet Sector of Berlin. Ly To the number of
"officially" unemployed, however, must be added the number of those un-
employed individuals whom the East German authorities do not recognize
as unemployed because they refused to accept jobs that were offered to
them. There must be a sizable number of such persons since many job-
seekers have refused to accept employment in such occupations as the
People's Police and uranium mining.
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According to East German criteria, large labor reserves
are available, in addition to the unemployed, which may be used in
efforts to reach the manpower goal of the current Five Year Plan.
In February 1952, 10,650,000 persons, 5,195,000 men and 5,455,000
women, were registered under the regulation requiring the registra-
tion of persons between ages 14 and 65 who are able to work, whether
or not they are gainfully employea.111/
Because only 6,355,000 of these registrants were at
that time active in the People's Economy (employed as wage or salary
earners), the manpower balance sheet showed an official reserve of
4,295,000 persons who, according to East German standards, were
available to make additions, to the labor force of the People's
Economy. This labor reserve included, apart from the existing 1.5
million self-employed, mostly women and unskilled persons.
2. Effects of Migrations.
The above estimates show that about 4.5 million expellees;
plus probably more than 220,000 persons migrating from or returning
from West Germany; plus several thousand deportees, contract workers,
and prisoners of war returning from the USSR may have moved into East
Germany since the end of World War II. On the other hand, about
2 million refugees left for West Germany. In addition, substantially
more deportees and contract workers moved out of East Germany than
cathe in during the same period.
In this report, expellees are treated as a special
category. Without them., East Germany entered the postwar era with a
substantially smaller population because of severe losses of manpower
in World War II. The influx of expellees (and returning prisoners of
war) did not much more than make up for this loss. It therefore
appears advisable to use the 1946 population of 18,355,000, which
already included the vast majority of the in-migrating expellees,/
as the point of departure in evaluating the effects of the postwar
movements. In doing so, we find that, according to the above estimates,
East Germany suffered a very large net loss, consisting primarily of
the roughly 2,100,000 refugees who did not return to East Germany from
West Germany, plus uncounted, large numbers of deportees and contract
workers. This gradual loss, in addition to the excess of deaths over
births, explains why the population of the area increased only slightly
from 18,355,000 in 1946 to around 18.8 million in 1950, and then
dropped to approximately 18.5 million in May 1952,112/End probably to
approximately 18.2 million in January 1953. 22/
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The large loss in population, obviously, has deprived
East Germany of a relatively large portion of its existing and
potential labor force. This is especially true because a large
number of the out-migrants belonged to the most productive age
groups. Nevertheless, the existence of a labor reserve of oficially
more than 4 million potential workers as late as 1952 still makes it
appear not impossible that, barring fundamental changes in the
present situation, the East German regime might be able to achieve
the addition of 745,000 East Germans to the labor force as planned
for 1955. Even in purely numerical respects, however, the East
German manpower situation must be regarded as very tight, because
only a fraction of this labor pool will actually be available to
eliminate the gap between present employment and the 1955 goal of
the Plan. Many of the potential workers fled to West Germany after
February 1952. A substantial number of the remaining potential
workers are probably unemployable or frictionally unemployed.
The achievement of the 1955 goal will depend, moreover,
upon developments of the next 2 years. The prospects of trans-
ferring self-employed persons to the labor pool of the People's
Economy will be limited as long as the present "new course" of more
moderatecopvietization is maintained by East Germany. Continued
recruitment for the national army and police forces constitutes
a drain on manpower reserves sufficiently severe to strain the
East German economy to the breaking point if the armed forces were
expanded beyond 300,000 men. a/ Last but not least, if defections
increase again from their present low of less than one-half the
rate which prevailed earlier in 1953, East German officials
looking for additional manpower may soon scrape the bottom of the
barrel. They are already compelled to make increasing use of con-
vict labor and to allow prisoners to work off their sentences in
certain critical industries. 2g/
The postwar movements have also aggravated unfavorable
demographic features of East Germany which have greatly contributed
to its manpower difficulties, such as the abnormal ratio of females
to males which had increased from 103.4:100 in 1939 to 134.6:100
in 1946. The fact that migration out of-the area has been
preponderantly male and in-migration preponderantly female has not
improved the situaiion. According to the 1950 census, there were
still about 2 million more women than men in East Germany. The
authors of the Five Year Plan therefore gave increased employment
of women (addition of 2,770,000 female workers) la prominent place
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among the means of achieving the planned expansion of the labor force
of the People's Economy, despite the fact that the percentage of
women employed in East Germany was already considerably above the
percentage employed in West Germany. Although women do form a large
part of the official labor reserve, however, their recruitment is
likely to become more and more difficult since their increased
employment in industry has been meeting with ever-growing opposition
because it runs counter to social and cultural custom. This opposi-
tion and the obstacles encountered in recruiting additional male
labor apparently account for the increasing stress that has been
laid on raising labor productivity as a means of meeting production
targets under the Plan.
The efforts to bring about a rapid increase in labor pro-
ductivity through high-pressure methods, however, have irritated
labor to such a degree that defections and general unrest increased
so much as to force the regime in mid-1953 somewhat to modify its
pertinent policies. Should the subsequent lull in defections come
to an end and people again migrate to West Germany at the previous
rate, the East German manpower situation would deteriorate even more.
Not only have migrations out of East Germany reduced the
number of available workers, but also they have intensified existing
undersupply of specialized and highly skilled personnel -- a short-
coming which is continuing to hamper the execution of economic
plans in the most critical segments of industry and science. East
German authorities attribute this scarcity in part to fast in-
dustrial expansion and in part to previous inadequate vocational
education of young people ready to enter the labor force. It is
for this reason that the Five Year Plan is stressing expansion of
present facilities and creation of new facilities for technical
vocational schools and training. The relatively, large number of
defections of scientists, specialists, and other badly needed
trained individuals, however, is likely to hinder seriously the
suceessful execution of this program because these defections have
reduced the number of available instructors and students. In
addition, the numerous escapes have in some measure offset the re-
sults of the intensified training programs. These defections
and escapes have thus not only rendered it more difficult to in-
crease the size ?of the technical and scientific labor force,
but they have also impeded the achievement of such qualitative
objectives as the improvement of labor productivity and of
quality of output because the fleeing members of this section of
the labor force, although constituting only a relatively
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small portion of the total refugees, have included (and still do
include) a high percentage of the most expert and experienced
scientists and technicians, while the remaining labor reserve is
composed chiefly of unskilled workers and women. The same, of
course, applies to the deportees and contract workers who have been
sent to the USSR. In many instances, research and development
personnel have been removed together with the research and develop-
ment apparatus in captured German institutions, and sometimes not
only the key personnel but the whole staff of important establish-
ments has been taken to the USSR. These more or less compulsory
out-movements, occurring simultaneously with the numerous defections
of experienced and professionally outstanding individuals to the
West, have aggravated the existing shortage of all grades of
technical personnel such as scientists, engineers, managers, fore-
men, and skilled workers. The number of such persons returning
from work in the USSR, Obviously, has not been large enough to
remedy the damage caused by the deportations and other out-move-
ments under duress.
Owing to the unprecedented growth of the refugee
movement during 1952 and the first part of 1953, manpower
difficulties also have arisen in occupational fields which in earlier
years had not been appreciably affected. As examples may be cited,
the legal and administrative occupations and, above all, agriculture.
The number of defecting agriculturists rose sharply betWeen.January?
1952 and June 1953 and reached a total of nearly 26,000 during this
period. This development caused increasing trouble in East German
agriculture, and in turn has seriously affected the food situation.
The White Book, published by the West Berlin Senate early in 1953,
reported that at that time 652,344 acres of land lay fallow in
East Germany LI/ because there was no one to cultivate them. This
meant that probably more than 5 percent of the total cultivated
land (roughly about 12 million acres 2.1.1/) had been abandoned.
cattle on
deserted farms could not be looked after, that cows and other
animals had to be slaughtered, that milk deliveries declined, and
harvest difficulties were greatly aggravated.
That the movements to West Germany have had the serious
effects here discussed is also borne out by the development of East
German public policy regarding escapees. For a long time the
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'regime's reaction to the defections was surprisingly restrained,
obviously for general political reasons. Apparently it relied
heavily on counterpropaganda. During 1952, however, the loss of
manpower began to hurt the East German economy to such a degree
that the taking of more drastic countermeasures obviously was con-
sidered imperative, political risks notwithstanding. In the
middle of the year the western borders were virtually sealed. In
Berlin, too, many crossing points were closed and other measures
taken to make the crossing for would-be refugees more difficult.
The control of passenger traffic to West Berlin was intensified.
Moreover, new decrees were issued which provided for severe
punishment of defectors, would-be defectors, and persons supporting
escapes; for confiscation of all property of persons who have left
East Germany since the end of the war without having cleared their
departure with the police; and even for reprisals against relatives
of refugees who stayed behind.
When it was realized, however, that these harsh measures
increased rather than curbed the flow of defectors, the regime
modified its policies in several important respects. Although
maintaining strict control of all borders and other protective
measures, it turned to new propaganda and legislative tactics de-
signed to prevent more escapes, especially of members of the labor
force, and to induce persons with scarce skills to return to or
migrate to East Germany. Propaganda campaigns against defections
were initiated, especially in the factories, and new decrees issued
which promise returning escapees freedom from punishment, return of
property, reinstatement in the economic and social life according
to special qualification, restoration of civil rights, and the
right to take up residence again without being first processed
through returnee camps. 22/
Returning farmers, in particular, have been promised
that they would get their holdings back. A subsequent limitation of
this provision to farmers returning by 15 October 1953 shows clearly
how badly they are needed. Great efforts also have been made to
prevent further defections of scientists and technicians, to induce
those who left the country to come back, and, beyond that, to lure
additional West German workers in these categories to East Germany.
The enactment of a series of statutes in 1952, providing for in-
creases in the remuneration of scientists, engineers, technicians,
masters, and qualified workers, as well as the initiation of a new
program designed to improve the professional and social, status of
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the "technical intelligentsia," were doubtless a part of the
implementation of this policy. Another approach to the problem has
been the establishment of a new, comprehensive plan for the recruit-
ment of West German scientists, physicians, specialists, and skilled
workers for employment in East Germany. 2g Continuing features of
this campaign to reduce critical manpower shortages have been the
granting of especially good housing facilities and other privileges
to new immigrants andreturnees from the East and West, and the
prompt placement of these persons in suitable employment.
It is thus evident that the migrations out of East
Germany, and especially the defections to West Germany, have de-
prived East Germany of a large number of actual and potential
workers. In addition, they have led to a-shortage in scientific,
engineering, and skilled industrial and agricultural manpower. The
loss in numbers of workers available has hampered East German
economic efforts considerably, but it has not been catastrophic:
If there were a resumption of the now relatively small refugee
movement that would bring the situation nearer to the breaking
point, the over-all planners in Moscow, if they so desire, still
could avoid the worst by seeing to it that labor is imported from
other parts of the Soviet Bloc. The quantitative and qualitative
deficiency in scientific and expert manpower, however, is already
hampering the execution of economic plans more seriously than the
general shortage of workers. Yet, harmful as this deficiency
there is no cogent reason at present to believe tEat it mut
necessarily lead to a collapse of East German industries, unless
in the future many more workers of this type leave the area than
can be replaced by returning deportees, prisoners of war, and people
graduating from the vocational schools and the numerous training
courses.
The effects of movements out of East Germany and East
Berlin upon East Germany's capacity to produce are also of potential
significance for the economy of the Soviet Bloc. East Germany con- .
tains a large concentration of essential industries and, together
with Czechoslovakia, accounts, in particular, for a large part of
the Bloc's capacity to produce steel, electric power, machine tools,
and.antifriction bearings. Moreover,, the decline in agricultural
production, because of the defection of many farmers within a rel-
atively short period, has compelled the USSR and other Bloc
countries to ship to East Germany substantial quantities of food
and other consumer goods that are scarce in their own areas. All
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this shows that manpower difficulties in East Germany necessarily
affect the economy of the Soviet Bloc as a whole. These effects
so far, however, have been relatively slight and, even in the event
of a further deterioration of the East German labor situation, would
probably at most be embarrassing but hardly critical. As already
mentioned, the manpower pool of the Soviet Bloc is large enough to
eliminate, in case of need, general labor shortages in East Germany
and, if the East German supply of certain badly needed skills ever
reaches the danger point, it can, under present circumstances, be
assumed that ensuing difficulties for the Bloc economy likewise
could be.minimized by the over-all planners in Moscow.
B. West German Manpower Situation.
1. General Situation..
The manpower development in West Germany, as shown in
.Table 11,* was characterized from 1949 to 1953 by a considerable
increase in the economically active population as well as in the
number of employed persons. The economically active population in-
creased at a higher rate than the total population. Between 1949
and 1953, the economically active population grew by 2,260,000
(yearly average) while the total population increased by 2,140,000.
The number of dependently employed persons rose substantially,
especially in industry. According to official statements, the
total number of working places newly created during the period by
far exceeds 2 million. 2// The number of unemployed was greatly
reduced despite the increasing population and the influx of refugees.
In spite of the continued existence of unemployment, the
government of West Germany has complained about a lack of skilled
workers of the 30-through-40 age group, especially in the metallur-
gical and building occupationslamd about the advanced age of most
foremen and chief operators. Although large-scale measures are
being taken to reduce these shortcomings by improving vocational
education and training and by retraining workers, for skilled
work, fear has been expressed that the expected further in-
creases in demand for industrial labor and manpower contributions
to a European army may exhaust existing labor reserves
* Table 11 follows on p. 41. ?
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Table 11
West German Manpower 181
1950-53
Population
West Germany
West Berlin
Total Population
1950 2/
1951 2/
1952 21
1953 12/
47,848,000
21155,000
50,003,000
48,306,000
2,172,000
50,478,000
48,708,000
2,187,000
50,895,000
48,994,000
2,228,000
51,222,000
Dependent Labor Force
West Germany
15,853,064
16,236,847
16,641,005
16,879,099
. West Berlin
1,024,016
1,034,685
1,018,250
1,002,498
Total Labor Force
16,877,080
17,271,532
17,659,255
171881,597
Employed Workers
West Germany
14,163,075
141583,294
141953,286
15,805,827
West Berlin
737,544
757,236
750,334
753,569
Total Employed
14,900,619
15,340,530
15,703,620
16,559,396
Unemployed Workers
West Germany
1,689,989
1,653,553
1,687,719
1,073,272
West Berlin
286,472
277,449
267,916
238,929
Total Unemployed
1,976,461
1,931,002
11955,635
1,312,201 '
a. December.
b. June.
c. Includes roughly same categories of workers as "People's Economy"
in East Germany (all workers except self-employed and their families).
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and aggravate the problem of spot labor shortages as well as the
problem of skilled labor. 22/*
2. Effects of Migrations.
West German authorities as well as numerous private
citizens have tended to regard the millions of refugees who entered
the country in the wake of the mass influx of expellees as an
economic liability. Many leading statesmen even have been firmly
convinced that the Communists have been stimulating the movement to
create additional difficulties for the West in addition to getting
rid of undesired elements. The government of West Germany has,
therefore, refused at all times to encourage defections. It has
repeatedly issued appeals to the East Germans to refrain from
leaving their homes except in cases of real emergency and has con-
sidered various plans designed to reduce the number of refugee-
residents. The policy of granting asylum to any refugee, whether
officially recognized as such or not, has been due entirely to
noneconomic considerations.
In the first postwar years, when West Germany was
politically, financially, and economically extremely weak, and when
more than.a quarter of its housing facilities were still totally
or partially destroyed, the large number of in-migrants did indeed
constitute a great economic and social burden, the more so because
most of the migrants were destitute. It is true that a number of?
refugees were, at least temporarily, welcome hands on German farms
because most of them were accommodated in rural areas at a time
when the numerous foreign agricultural workers had left and many
German farm workers were still in prisoner-of-war camps. It is
equally true that refugees also were more willing than the
average West German to accept low-paid jobs, especially in the
building construction and mining industries. The bulk of them,
however, were not needed in the labor market. When, after the
currency reform of 1948, demand for labor of many types gradually
increased, the chances of refugees in the labor market also began
to improve somewhat, although they still did not become an
important factor in West Germany's economic restoration.
West Berlin's great economic and social difficulties
resulting from its position as an isolated Western enclave in East
Germany have at all times been considerably aggravated by the
influx of refugees. The latter have continuously increased the
* The statements'of the West German government regarding the adequacy
of the general labor supply have been regarded as overpessimistic by
MBA observers. LI
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number of job-seeking wage and salary earners and thus have prevented
any major change in the local unemployment situation. The concentra-
tion of the refugee movement on the city after the virtual closing of
all other parts of the East-West boundary threatened to make con-
ditions in Berlin truly critical. A variety of emergency measures
taken by the Berlin Senate, the West German government, and US
agencies have, however, made it possible to maintain and develop the
economic life of the city state. It was, of course, impossible to
provide housing and employment to all the numerous persons fleeing
to West Berlin between mid-1952 and mid-1953 in addition to those who
had already come in; therefore an air lift program was initiated
under which recognized refugees are flown to West Germany. The
lull in the refugee movement after the middle of 1953 offered
a much needed opportunity to move out large parts of the backlog of
in-migrants waiting for transportation to the West.
In the territory of West Germany proper, efforts have
been made to further the integration of expellees and refugees into
the economy by retraining programs, resettlement in industrial areas,
and similar methods. Circumstances such as the steady decline in
the number of refugees until mid-1952, a sharp drop in the net
gain in immigration, and above all, the great expansion of production
in recent years have afforded some advantages for the execution of
these programs. The refugees have, in particular, had their share
in the more than 22 percent increase of the total number of employed
persons. By mid-1953, approximately 35 percent of the refugees could
be considered to be economically integrated and 45 percent to be
employed though not fully integrated. Among the latter Must be
counted the numerous persons who cannot make full use of their
previous training and experience and the large numbers of former
professionals or self-employed who are forced to make .a living as
manual workers. The sharp increase in refugees, which set in toward
the end of 1952, threatened to interfere seriously with this process
of growing integration; but the subsequent drop in defections,
beginning in mid-1953, saved the situation.
About 20 percent of the expellees and refugees are still
either partially or totally unemployed even though their place in
the total number of unemployed persons fell from 37 percent to about
29.5 percent between 1948 and 1952 and was down to 28.7 percent
by June 1953. 62/ This situation is largely due to the continuation
of structural unemployment in the eastern and northern agricultural
regions of West Germany, where so many expellees and refugees have
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been placed that the job-seekers far outnumber available working
places. Fast) large-scale transfer of the in-migrants to the in-
dustrial areas where demand for labor has been increasing, however,
has as yet been prevented by the continuing housing shortage in
West Germany. Accordingly, structural unemployment among the in-
migrants, with an average quota of 20 percent, still amounts to
more than twice the annual unemployment of the total West German
area, which in 1952-53 was only 8.3 percent. LV Despite the ex-
tensive housing programs of the past few years, the housing shortage
in industrial areas, rather than insufficient demand for workers,
has become the chief factor Obstructing full use of the large
refugee labor pool which could otherwise satisfy growing manpower
requirements of the expanding West German economy. It has in-
creasingly led to situations in which employees have been needed
but in which suitable expellees and refugees could not be brought
in because of the lack of living accommodations in the localities
concerned. HICOG, accordingly, has considered housing the
principal key to the solution of the refugee and unemployment
problem in West Germany. 64/
In view of these circumstances, full economic integration
of the refugees probably will take much more time. The economy is
continuing to expand and total unemployment to decline, however, and,
as more housing space is becoming available in the industrial areas,
refugee manpower probably will be increasingly needed and made use of
by the West German industrial machine and other branches of the
economy. The refugee labor pool will become more and more useful in
efforts to prevent spot shortates which have already appeared.
Although it may be anticipated, therefore, that economic
developments in the next few years will bring about regular employ-
ment of many more refugees whose training and willingness to work
are not yet exploited in the most expedient manner, it is also
likely that the demand for the skills of some classes of refugees
will remain relatively small in the future. Farmers and
agricultural workers may be cited as an example. As mentioned
above, their mass exodus in the beginning of 1953 has had very
harmful effects upon conditions in East Germany. Their chances,
however, of finding a place in West German agriculture are
apparently very limited. Only 35,000 refugee families reportedly
have settled on farms since 1949. Over 90 percent of them were
placed on heirless farms and the remainder on reclaimed land or
land divided under land reform. Most of these farms are inefficient
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and part-time and provide only a temporary solution.
about 130,000 settlement applications for farm
families were still unsatisfied in March 1953 and the authorities
estimated that active interest still existed in about 90,000 of
them. 65/ Chancellor Adenauer, in trying to explain to Secretary
of State Dulles during recent discussions in Bonn that the refugee
problem. could not be solved by German efforts alone, maintained that,
even before the increased influx, 250,000 refugee farmers had not yet
been integrated into the economy of West Germany. 66/ Even if, as
the West German Minister of Labor stated at about the same time,
42,000 vacancies on farms could not be filled in 1952, 67/
it is still unlikely that the refugee agriculturists can be
absorbed by the West German agriculture. It may be true that this
fact is indeed inducing a substantial number of farmers to return
to East Germany, as asserted by the East German authorities. Unless
the much debated plans to .stimulate migration to other free
-countries materialize, the transformation of these farmers into
industrial workers appears to be the only solution.
With the industrial _specialists the situation is
different. Shortages of labor exist in certain skilled categories
in many West German industries such as the iron and steel,
the chemical, and the building construction industries. Moreover,
as mentioned above, there is a considerable demand 'for younger
specialists who are qualified to replace, when the need arises,
the considerable number of foremen and chief operators of advanced
age. Finally, the .shortage of miners in the coal districts of the
Ruhr has long plagued German authorities. There are undoubtedly
a number of refugees who because of their skills will be used to
fill such gaps once the housing shortage is sufficiently reduced
to make their resettlement in industrial areas possible.
Defections to West Germany of highly qualified
specialists with certain rare skills have been considered beneficial
to the West because they are depriving East Germany of precisely the
types of manpower which she needs especially badly, and because they
are satisfying important economic requirements not only of West
Germany but also of other Western countries.
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APPENDIX A
METHODOLOGY
1. Estimate of Total Postwar Net Migration of Refugees from East
Germany and East Berlin to West Germany and West Berlin.
As explained in the text, both registration and census figures
have been used. This approach made it necessary to make a number
of assumptions, some of which necessarily were rather arbitrary or
had to be based on rather poor evidence. Examples of the latter kind
?are (a) the estimate of the number of persons in West Germany and
West Berlin at the end of thetwar who had been evacuated during the
war from the area which is now the Soviet Zone and East Berlin,
(b) the estimate of the number of expellees who migrated from East
Germany between the 1946 and 1950 censuses, and (c) the estimate of
the number of migrants who have not registered either with the police
authorities or with the emergency reception camps.
The method by which the figure of 1.9 million postwar refugees
was arrived at is outlined in Table 12.*
It is difficultto tell how accurate this estimate of 1.9 mil-
lion refugees is. The fact that it is quite close to the estimates
prepared by Dr. Harmsen of the University of Hamburg and by
Dr. Reichling of the Federal Statistical Office indicates that the
reliability of the estimate is rather high.
Dr. Harmsen estimated that the net migration from East Germany
and East Berlin between the end of the war and the end of 1952
numbered 2 million. In line with our definition of a refugee,
however, 330,000 returning West Germans who were evacuated to
East Germany during the war must be subtracted from the total.
Since the estimate presented here is for net refugee migration and
not net migration per se, a revision is necessary in order to
approximate Harmsen's definition. This revised estimate is
1,810,000. A downward adjustment of this estimate by 95,000 to
allow for net migration during the first quarter of 1953 results
in an estimate of 1,715,000 net migrants by the end of 1952 -- a
figure only 45,000 higher than Harmsen's equivalent figure of
1,670,000.
* Table 12 follows on p.48.
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Table 12
Assumptions and Computations Used in Deriving the Number of Migrants
from East Germany to West Germany, and from East Germany
to West Berlin
End of War through March 1953
From East Germany to West Germany
1. Persons whose 1939 residence was
Berlin, enumerated in West Germany
on 29 October 1946
2. Persons whose 1939 residence was
East Berlin, enumerated in West
Germany on 29 October 1946
3. Of persons listed in 2, above
who were evacuees during the war
14. Of persons listed in 2, above,
those who were not evacuees
during the war, that is, net
migrants between the end of the
war and 29 October 1946 (line 2
minus line 3)
5. Persons whose 1939 residence was
East Germany, enumerated in West
Germany on 29 October 1946
6. Of persons listed in 5, above,
those who were evacuees during
the war
* Footnotes for Table 12 follow on p. 50.
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Intermediate
Number
439,000 2/*
163,000 12/
143,000 2/
582,000 1/
512,000 2/
Migrants
20,000
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Table 12
Assumptions and CoMputations Used in Deriving the Number of Migrants
from East Germany to West Germany, and from East Germany
to West Berlin
End of War through March 1953
(Continued)
Intermediate
From East Germany to West Germany Number Migrants
7. Of persons listed in 5, above,
those who were not evacuees during
the war, that is, net migrants
between the end of the war and
29 October 1946 (line 5 minus
line 6) 70,000
8. In-migration from East Germany,
29 October 1946 to 13 September
1950 752,000 2/
9. Net migration from East Berlin,
29 October 1946 to 13 September
1950 0 f/
10. Net migration from East Germany,
13 September 1950 through end of
1952 359,000 g/
11. Net migration from East Germany,
1st quarter 1953 3,00012/
12. Number of unregistered refugees
(Fluechtlinge), March 1953 100,000 1/
From East Germany to West Berlin
13. Net migration from East Germany,
end of war to 29 October 1946 36,000 1/
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Table 12
Assumptions and Computations Used in Deriving the Number of Migrants
from East Germany to West Germany, and from East Germany
to West Berlin
Prid of War through March 1953
(Continued)
From East Germany to West Germany
14. Net migration from East Germany,
29 October 1946 through 1st
quarter 1952
15. Net migration from East Betlin,
end of war through 1st quarter
1952
Intermediate
Number
1 ? In-migration from East Germany and
East Berlin, 1 April 1952 through
1st quarter.1953 213,000 2/
17; Out-migration from West Berlin to
West Germany, 1 April 1952
through 1st quarter 1953
18. Net migration (line 16 minus line
17)
? 19. Number of unregistered refugees
(Fluechtlinge), March 1953
19,000 E./
Migrants
199,000 .11/
67,000 2/
194,000
100,000 2/
a. See Table 1, p. 12, above.
b. It is assumed that 37 percent of the residents of Berlin
enumerated were from East Berlin (the percentage that the population
of East Berlin was of the population of Greater Berlin in 1939). 2/
c. It is assumed that of the 439,000 listed in line 1 and of the
582,000 listed in line 5, 900,000 were evacuees during the war. This
was the estimated number present as of 1 April 1947, as determined by
a survey of West Germany by the Statistisch-Sozialogische
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Table 12
Assumptions and Computations Used in Deriving the Number of Migrants
from East Germany to West Germany, and from East Germany
to West Berlin
End of War through March 1953
(Continued)
Arbeitsgruppe der Landesfluechtlings-Verwaltung (the Statistical and
Sociological Working Group of the Administration for Refugees). L2/
This estimate was also used by Dr. Kurt Horstmann in his book, Die
Wanderung im Bundesgebiet, 1950. I2/ In order to determine how many of
these 900,000 war evacuees came from East Berlin and how many came from
East Germany, it is assumed.that the percentage of the total persons
enumerated who were war evacuees (048 percent) would apply equally to
the separate categories of persons from East Germany and East Berlin.
The calculation is as follows:
(1) Number present in West Germany in 1946 whose 1939
residence was in Berlin or East Germany
(2) War evacuees
(3)
(4)
Difference (line (2) from line (1))
Percentage of evacuees (line (2) as percent of
line (1))
(5) War evacuees from East Berlin (88 percent of
163,000)
(6) War evacuees from East Germany (88 percent of
582,000)
1,021,000
900,000
121,000
---
88 percent
143,000 :
512,000
d. See Table 1.
e. It is known from the censuses of 29 October 1946 and 13 September
1950 that the number of persons whose residence in 1939 was in East
Germany increased from 582,000 at the earlier date to 1,037,000 at the
later date, or an increase of 455,000 (Table 1): Assuming that the
rate of natural increase for the "refugee" population was the same as
for the West German population, about 16,000 of this increase was due
to natural increase, and 439,000 was due to net migration.
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Table 12
Assumptions and Computations Used in Deriving the Number of Migrants
from East Germany to West Germany, and from East Germany
to West Berlin
End of War through March 1953
(Continued)
This was not the total migration during the intercensal period,
however, because it does not account for the movement of expellees
who had "settled" in East Germany. During 1950 there were 62.4 per-
cent as many expellee migrants to West Germany from East Germany as
there were other migrants. During 1951 the proportion had declined
to 50.7 percent. 22/ Although these data are very limited, they seem
to indicate that the earlier the period, the larger the proportion of
net migrants from East Germany who were expellee migrants. If it is
assumed that the increase of 11.7 percentage points in the ratio of
expellee to other migrants can be carried back to 1948, the middle
point of the intercensal period, at one half this increase per year
(5.9 + 62.4 = 68.3 percent for 1949; 3.0 + 68.3 = 71.3 percent for
1948), and, assuming that the volume of migration was the same for
each year, then the expellees who migrated during this period con-
stituted a group about 71 percent as large as the 439,000 migrants
whose 1939 residence was in East Germany, or 313,000. The total
migration from East Germany for the intercensal period, therefore,
may be estimated at 752,000.
It should be noted that an official of the Federal Statistical
Office in charge of refugee statistics (see source .12/) assumed that
: 400,000 expellees migrated from East Germany between the end of 1946
and the end of 1951. In view of the fact that 83,000 expellees
migrated in the period from the 13 September 1950 census to the end
of 1951, 12/ 317,000 people must have migrated in the intercensal
period, a figure close to that estimated above.
f. It is assumed that all migrants from East Berlin since 29 October
1946 entered West Germany by way of West Berlin. The number of
migrants is therefore estimated more accurately when West Berlin is
considered as the receiving area (see entries for West Berlin).
g. See Table 3, p.14, above. It is assumed that half of the
migrants from West Germany to East Germany were returnees. This
assumption is based on data for 1952 which indicated that during
that year, 45 percent of the West to East migrants were refugees
(Zugewanderte), and 24 percent were expellees. It is probable that
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Table 12
Assumptions and Computations Used in Deriving the Number of Migrants
from East Germany to West Germany, and from East Germany
to West Berlin
End of War through March 1953
(Continued)
part of these expellees entered West Germany after October 1946 and
should be counted as refugees in the sense that the term is used here.
h. See Table 2, p. 12, above. It is assIrmed (1) that all migrants
from East Germany during the period registered at the reception camps
at Giessen and Uelzen, and (2) that all migrants who registered at
these camps were from East Germany. It is further assumed that the
total return migration was the same proportion of in-migration as it
was during the period September 1950 to December 1952 -- 12 percent
or 393 persons. Return migration of refugees was assumed to be only
half this number, or 196 persons.
i. It is assumed that this number is approximately the same as the
estimated number of unregistered refugees in West Berlin as of 1952.
(See e, above.)
j. See Table 1, p.22, above. It is assumed that all persons
enumerated in West Berlin on 29 October 1946 whose 1939 residence
was in East Germany migrated after the end of the war.
k. See Table 3, ID? 14, above. Direct data are available for this
migration only since the beginning of 1948. It is necessary, there-
fore, to estimate the in- and out-migration for the 14 months before
the beginning of 1948. In estimating this earlier migration, it is
assumed that the rate of migration of persons to and from East
Germany and West Berlin was the same as during 1948. On this assump-
tion, in-migration amounted to about 33,000 and out-migration, about
13,000. The further assumption that half of the out-migrants during
the 14 months were refugees leads to an .estimate of 27,000 net
migration of refugees. For periods for which data are available (see
Table 3), it is assumed that half of the out-migrants were refugees.
1. See Table 3, p. 14, above. It is assumed that there were no
East Berlin war\evacuees present in West Berlin at the end of the
war. Data on net migration between East Berlin and West Berlin must
be estimated for the period between the end of the war and the ?
beginning of 1950. In making the estimate for this time period, it
is assumed that the in-migration from East Berlin was about 44 per-
cent as great as the in-migration from East Germany during the same
period. This was the same proportion as during 1950. The rate of
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Table 12
Assumptions and Computations Used in Deriving the Number of Migrants
from East Germany to West Germany, and from East Germany
to West Berlin
Etla of War through March 1953
(Continued)
out-migration was assumed to have been tho same as it was for out-
migration to East Germany during the period October 1946 to December
1949. Details of the calculation follow:
In-Migration Out-Migration
(1) Migration from East Germany
(a) October 1946 to December
1947 33,000 13,000
(b) 1948 and 1949 (Table 3) 71,000 22,000
(c) Total 104 000- 35,000
(2) Assume 44 percent of 104,000 45,000
(3) Assume 100 percent of 35,000 35,000
()4-) Migration: 1950, 1951, 1st
quarter of 1952 (Table 3) 49,000 18,000
Total West Berlin net migra-
tion 94,000 53,000
Since, however, it was assumed that all in-migrants and half of the out-
migrants were refugees, the net migration of refugees is estimated to
be 67,000.
m. See Table 2, p.12, above. It is assumed (1) that all migrants
during the period registered at the emergency reception camp, and (2)
that all migrants who registered at this camp were from East Germany
or East Berlin.
n. It is assumed that the proportion that return migration to East
Germany and East Berlin was of in-migration from these areas remained
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Table 12
Assumptions and Computations Used in Deriving the Number of Migrants
from East Germany to West Germany, and from East Germany
to West Berlin
FUn of War through March 1953
(Continued)
the same as it was during the last three quarters of 1952 for
migration to and from East Berlin. This proportion was 18 percent,
and the total return migration for the period was therefore 18 per-
cent of 213,000, or 38,000. It is assumed, however, that only half
of these returnees were refugees, and these persons, therefore,
numbered. about 19,000.
o. As reported by US High Commissioner for Germany. Di
Dr. Reichling, in his estimate prepared in January 1953, states
that from 1 January 1945 to 31 December 1951 there were 1.8 million
in-migrants from East Germany-and East Berlin. Of these, there were
300,000 returning West Germans (excluded in this report) and 700,000
expellees. Of the latter*group, 300,000 entered West Germany before
October 1946 (also excluded in this report on the premise that they
had not been "settled"). Reichling's estimate of the population in
which we are interested is, therefore, 1.2 million.
Reichling estimated in-migration in two steps: from 1 January
1945 to 31 December 1946, and from 1 January 1947 to 31 December
1951. For the former period he uses essentially the method used
in this report. The estimated 900,000 evacuees from East Germany
and East Berlin were subtracted from the nutter present as of the
1946 census whose 1939 residence was in East Germany and East
Berlin. For the latter period, Reichling estimated that 700,000
former residents of East Germany and East Berlin ard 400,000 ex-
pellees who had settled in these areas migrated to West Germany.
The only statement given as to the method used in making this
estimate is that "a sample of the available statistics on the former
residence of the in-migrants was used to determine the migration
statistics for these years."
By adjusting the estimate to cover the period from the end df
the war to the end of 1951, to change "net migration" to "in-
migration," and to eliminate migration of refugees to West Berlin
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who remained there, this report yields an equivalent figure of about
1.2 million. Although it is not possible to determine exactly how
Reichling's estimate was made, his methods and ,the methods of this
report are probably sufficiently independent that it may be
concluded that our estimate has been verified by Reichling.
2. Estimate of the Occupational Characteristics of Refugees
before Migration.
There are two main sources of data which may form the
basis of estimating the occupational distribution of refugees prior
to migration: (a) police registration of migrants over the Land (state)
borders of West Germany and over the boundary of West Berlin, and
(b) statistics gathered at the emergency reception camps.
An estimate based solely on police registration would be a
very poor one because, in the case of West Germany, internal migrants
form the bulk of the group for which data are presented, and, in the
case of West Berlin, in-migrants from areas other than East Germany
and East Berlin are included. Internal migrants and migrants from
places other than East Germany and East Berlin probably would have
a different occupational structure from those coming from the two
areas relevant to this report, and the extent of this difference
cannot be evaluated. EXcept for migrants from East Berlin to West
Berlin during 1950 (column 2 of Table 8, p. 22, above), police reg-
istration statistics, therefore, were not used.
Much greater use was made of data on. refugees registering
.at the three emergency reception camps at West Berlin, Giessen, and
Ualzen. Although the available data of this type, presented in
Table 4 (p.17, above), form a more reliable basis for estimating the
occupational characteristics of all refugees, they still leave much .
to be desired as far as coverage and representativeness are concerned.
Coverage is limited to 317,000 refugees, or 17 percent of the total
number. The main difficulty, however, is not the size but the
representativeness of the sample. The validity of the estimate shown
in Table 9 (p.24 , above) is largely determined by the degree of
similarity of the occupational structure of refugees- migrating in 1952
to those migrating before the year. Certain inconclusive evidence
is available'which indicates that these groups are sufficiently similar
to allow this inductive leap. This evidence, is the occupational dis-
tribution, before migration, of refugees living in Nordrhein-
Westfalen in 1949 (column 1 of Table 8).
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It is noted that, occupation-wise, these refugees were not much
dissimilar to those applying at emergency reception camps during
1952.
To estimate the occupational structure of the 1.9 million
refugees, many choices are open. One could take any one or a
combination of the distributions shown in Table 8 and assume that
it represents the distribution for all refugees. On the other
hand, one could consider that the distribution for all refugees
for which data are available (column 10) represents all refugees.
These approaches do not seem valid, however, because of the
dissimilarity of the distributions. In-migrants from East Berlin
to West Berlin during 1950, for example, had a distribution
different from that of any of the other eight subgroups of
refugees. Also, the occupational structure of the migrants after
1952 appears to have shifted to a larger proportion in agricultural,
household, health, and welfare occupations, and to a smaller
proportion in the other occupation-industry groups. It would
appear, therefore, that the best estimate for the 1.9 million
refugees would be obtained if one selected certain of the nine
distributions to represent different subgroups. One could then
arrive at a distribution for the total by adding the distributions
for the subgroups. This was the procedure adopted in this report.
The basic decisions that had to be made as to which distribution
In Table 8 should represent which subgroup of refugees are discussed
below:
a. The distribution of refugees from East Berlin to West
Berlin during 1950, shown in column 2, was used to represent
the distribution for all migrants from East Berlin to West
Berlin and West Germany until April 1952. The size of this
group is estimated at 101,000, which number was arrived at as
follows:
(1) Refugees listed in items 4 and 15 of Table 12
totaled 87,000.
(2) The number of the unregistered refugees who were
from East Berlin is estimated to be 14,000. This
estimate was derived as follows:
(a) Of the 194,000 net migrants to West Berlin
from East Berlin and East Germany from 1 April 1952
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to 31 March 1953 (line 18 of Table 12), 19 per-
cent', or 37,000, were assumed to have come from
East Berlin. This was the same percentage that
East Berliners were of all applicants to the
emergency reception camp in West Berlin during
1952 and the first quarter of 1953. /11/
(b) If 37,000 is added to the 87,000 in
(1), above, the result is in an estimate of
124,000 refugees from East Berlin. This number
amounts to 7 percent of the total of 1.7 mil-
lion refugees after the estimated 200,000 un-
registered refugees are excluded. Assuming
that the proportion of unregistered refugees
from East Berlin was the same as East Berliners
were of the total refugee population, 7 per-
cent of the 200,000 unregistered refugees, or
14,000, were from East Berlin. (It should be
noted that the 37,000 East Berliners referred
to above are included in the distribution in
columns 3 through 7 (Table 8), and, therefore,
column 2 (Table 8) is not used to distribute
them.)
b. The distributions of refugees registered at the Giessen
camp in January and February 1953 (columns 8 and 9 of Table 8)
were taken to represent the estimated 3,000 migrants to West
Germany during the first quarter of 1953 (line 11 of Table 12).
c. The occupation-industry distributions of those who regis-
tered at the camps at Giessen; Uelzen, and West Berlin during
the first half of 1952, and of those who registered at the
camp at West Berlin during the second half of 1952 and the
first quarter of 1953 (columns 3 through 7 of Table 8) were used
to distribute the estimated 194,000 net migrants to West Berlin
during the period from 1 April 1952 to 31 March 1953 (line 18
of Table 12).
d. Of the 359,000 met migrants to West Germany from September
1950 through the end of 1952, listed on line 10 of Table 12,
105,000 were added to the population during 1952 (see Table 3).
The occupation-industry distribution of these refugees was assumed
to have been represented by columns 3 and 4 of Table 8.
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e. The occupational distribution prior to migration
of refugees present in Nordrhein-Westfalen in 1949 (column
f of Table 8), and the distribution of those who migrated
during 1952 (columns 3 and 4 of Table 8) were employed in
Table 13 to distribute the remaining 1,497,000 refugees.
Table 13
Comparative Occupational Distribution of Migrants
Based on Table 8
Percent
Occupation-Industry G;oup
Cblumns
1,3) and 4
Columns
3 and 4
Agriculture, Forestry, Husbandry
8,7
9.2
Industry, Handicraft
22.5
23.1
Technical Occupations
2.5
2.1
Trade, Transportation
16.9
17.2
Household, Health, Welfare
5.3
5.6
Administration, Justice
4.7
3.6
Intellectual, Artistic
2.5
2.3
Total Economically Active
63.1
63.1
Not Economically Active
36.9
36.9
Total Population
100.0
100.0
This large group includes: (1) those who migrated from East
Germany to West Germany from the end of the war until the
end of 1951, (2) those who Migrated from East Germany to
West Berlin until the second quarter of 1952, and (3) the
estimated 186,000 unregistered refugees who migrated from
East Germany. The distribution shown in column 1 of
Table 8 was used in combination with columns 3 and 4 be-
cause it was assumed that it better represented the actual
occupation-industry characteristics of the earlier migrants
than did the distribution of this characteristic for persons
who migrated during 1952. Because of the relatively heavy
weights of the 1952 distributions, it makes only a small
diffprence if column 1 is excluded from the weighted average
of the distributions shown in columns 3 and 4, as may be
noted in Table 13.
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_ _ _ _ _
Without information regarding. the occupational characteristics
of refugees who migrated before 1952, it is not known, of
course, whether or not, in Table 8, column I should have been
included with columns 3 and 4. It is also not known to what
extent columns 1, 3, ?or 4 are representative of this large'
migrant group. .The largest amount of data available has been
used in the hope that they do in fact represent what it is -
assumed that they represent.
Table 9 presents the estimate of the .occupational characteristics
of the five groups of migrants which were differentiated, as well as
of the total refugee group. Of the total group, 1.2 million were
economically active at the time of their migration and 700,000 were
dependents. The largest group consisted of those who had been working
in industry and handicraft (21.8 percent), followed by those in trade
and transportation (16.8 percent), and agriculture, forestry, and
husbandry (8.8 percent). The data do not permit us to allot the
dependent population to the occupation-industry group on which they
were dependent. It should be noted that the distribution for the
total refugee population is very close to that for the large sub-
group of 1,497,000, indicating the tremendous weight this subgroup
had in the final figures.
A comparison of the occupational distribution of the economically
active segment of the total refugee group with the range of the nine
subgroups shown in Table 8, and with the economically active popula-
tion in East Germany in 1946 and in West Germany in 1950 is shown
in Table 14.* The comparison in Table 13 indicates that each cell
of the estimated distribution for the total refugee group lies
fairly close to the middle of the range of the nine subgroups of
refugees for which information is availale. This was due to the
fact that the distributions shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 8,
which formed the main basis of the estimate, generally were not at
the extreme of the nine distributions.
An unavoidable shortcoming of the estimate is the lack of detail
within the seven occupation-industry groups. Only a few of the dis-
tributions shown in Table 4 were given in more detail in the sources.
The most important among these breakdowns is that given for the
* Table 14 follows on p. 61.
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Table 14
Comparative Occupational Distribution
of the Economically Active Population:
Total East German Refugees, Nine Subgroups of East German Refugees,
East Germany (1946), and West Germany (1950) 15./
Percent
Range of East West
Total Nine Subgroups Germany Germany
Major Occupational Group Refugees of Refugees 2/ 1946 1950
Agriculture, Forestry,
Husbandry 14 1 to 36 31 26
Industry, Handicraft 35 23 to 39 37 38
Technical Occupations 4 2 to 8 2 3
Trade, Transportation 27 21 to 37 14 18
Household, Health,
Welfare 8 5 to 16 7 6
Administration, Justice 8 1 to 20 7 7
Intellectual, Artistic 4 2 to 5 2 2
Total Economically Active 100 100 100
a. The percentage distribution of the economically active population
for each subgroup in Table 8 was adjusted to eliminate the unknowns and
the unemployed.
42,000 economically active refugees registering at the 3 emergency
reception camps during the first half of 1952 (column 3 of Table 8).
A rough estimate of more detailed occupation-industry characteristics
of the total refugee group may be made if one assumes that the
proportion of workers within a major occupation group belonging to a
specific occupation or industry group was the same as it was for
refugees during the first 6 months of 1952. The details of the extrap-
olation, and the estimate of a more detailed occupation-industry
breakdown of the total refugee group are tabulated in Table 15.*
* Table 15 follows on p. 62.
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Table 15
Estimated Number of East German Refugees Who Have Specific Occupations
or Who Work in Specific Industries 1,61
Major Occupational
Group
1
2
3
4
Persons
Registering
at Camps, 1st
Half of 1952
Distribution
after
Adjusting
for Unknowns
in Column 1
Percent That
Each Subgroup
Is of Major Total
Group Refugees
Agriculture, Forestry,
Husbandry
Independent Farmers
1,410
1,754
31.7
52,800
Gardeners
214
266
4.8
8,000
Total
4 446
5,532
166,600
Industry, Handicraft
Mining
1,040
1,294
8.0
33,100
Construction
3,360
4,181
25.9
107,100
Metal Production
and Processing
4,972
6,187
38.4
158,800
. Textile Production
and Processing.
2,040
2,538
15.7
64,900
Food and Stimulants
1,551
1,930
12.0
49,60o
Total
12,963
16,130
1+13,600
Technical Occupations
1,572
1,956
1+6,100
Trade, Transportation
Clerical, Sales,
Total
etc.
4,553
9,045
5,665
112.211
50.3
160,800
319,700
Household, Health,
Welfare
Physicians
57
71
2.1
2,000
Dentists
38
47
1.4
1,40o
Footnote for Table 15 follows on p. 63.
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Table 15
Estimated Number of East German Refugees Who Have Specific
or Who Work in Specific Industries 1Y
(Continued)
Occupations
1
2
3
Persons
Registering
Major Occupational at Camps, let
Group Half of 1952
Distribution
after
Adjusting
for Unknowns
in Column 1
Percent That
Each Subgroup
Is of Major' Total
Group Refugees
Household, Health,
Welfare
(Continued)
Veterinarians
14
17
0.5
500
Pharmacists
41
51
1.5
1,500
Total
2,725
3,391
101,000
---
Administration,
Justice
Judges
7
9
0.4
l[oo
Lawyers
41
51
2.4
2,200
Total
1,715
2,134
90 500
Intellectual, Artistic
1, 362
1,695
46800
Unknown
8,264
Total Economically
Active
42,092
1+2,092
1,184,300
a. In making this adjustment, it is assumed that the unknown had the same
occupation-industry distribution as had those whose occupations were known.
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It would appear that the 3 largest groups among the refu-
gees were made up of clerical and sales persons (161,000), persons
who worked in metal production and processing (159,000), and con-
struction workers (107,000). Textile workers (65,000), farmers
(53,000), those working in the food and stimulants group (50,000),
and miners (33,000) composed other large groups which have migrated
to the West since the end of the war. Among the migrants who
practiced professions are j.ncluded about 2,000 medical doctors and
2,000 lawyers.
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