THE ELECTRON TUBE INDUSTRY IN THE SOVIET BLOC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 123
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 29, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

\ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-R&P149110O1.141.AS00100070002-0
?
1.eRsT_
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE ELECTRON TUBE INDUSTRY
IN THE SOVIET BLOC
CIA/RR 7
29 August 1952
U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
50X1
wtteRF.T,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
I I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
CONFIDCITPIAL
2 September 1952
?
Correction
To Holders or QI4Aut 7, 29 August. 1952:
The UCTE following the COZZI'S should read as faloweg
This report contains information available
to CIA as of 1 January. 1952.
CEk, niTZLLIGat E 'AG.=
orrice' of Research and Reports
COFIDETIAL
,s/NOMMISIZOLMIIMIOMMiltak
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
1. This copy of this publication is for the information and use
of the recipient designated on the front cover and of individuals under
the jurisdiction of the recipientts office who require the information
for the performance of their official duties. Further dissemination
elsewhere in the department to other offices which require the informa-
tion for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the
following:
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intel-
ligence, for the Department of State
b. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for the Department of
the Army
c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of
the Navy
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of
the Air Force
e. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the
Joint Staff
f. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination,
CIA, for any other Department or Agency.
2. This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in
accordance with applicable security regulations or returned to the
Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement with the Office of Collection
and Dissemination, CIA.
InE-Ni-E71
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REMIT
THE ELECTRON TUBE INDUSTRY IN THE SOVIET BLOC
CIA/RR. 7
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
a7B72-R-g71
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
CONTENTS
Page
Summary 3.
I. Introduction . 2
A. Nature and Uses 3
B. Importance of the Industry 4
C. History of the Industry 5
1, USSR 5
2, Hungary 6
3. East Germany 6
4, Czechoslovakia 7
5. Other Satellites 7
D. Technology 7
1. USSR
7
2. Hungary
9
3, East Germany
10
A. Czechoslovakia
11
5. Other Satellites
11
E.
Reliability
12
II.
Organization of the Industry
12
A.
USSR
12
B.
HOngary
13
C.
East Germany
15
D.
Czechoslovakia
17
III.
Supply .
18
A.
Production
18
1, Soviet Tube and Lamp Industry
19
a. Output
20
b. Productivity
20
2, Hungarian Tube and Lamp Industry
23
S-E-C-R-E=T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
IV.
Input Requirements
A. USSR
1, 1951 Input Requirements
2. Sources of Supply
B, Hungary
? Elam
38
38
38
39
41
1. 1951 Input Requirements
41
2. Sources of Supply
41
East Germany
42
1, 1951 Input Requirements
42
2. Sources of Supply
43
D. Czechoslovakia
45
1. 1951 Input Requirements
45
2. Sources of Supply
45
E. Soviet Bloc
47
1, 1951 Input Requirements
47
2. Sources of Supply
47
V.
Distribution of Supply
48
A. USSR
48
1. Consumption Pattern
48
2, Trends
49
3. Distribution of Output
50
4. Indications of Specific Programs
50
B. East Germany
'
51
1. Consumption Pattern
51
2, Trends
51
3. Distribution of Output
51
4. Indications of Specific Programs
51
C. Hungary
52
S
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
1. Consumption of Pattern
2. Trends
3. Distribution of Output
4. Indications of Specific Programs
Lao
52
53
53
53
D. Czechoslovakia
53
1. Consumption Pattern
53
2. Trends
54
3. Distribution of Output
54
4. Indications of Specific Programs
55
E. Soviet Bloc
55
VI. Summary Estimate for the Soviet Bloc: Capabilities,
Vulnerabilities, and Intentions
56
A. Capabilities
56
B. Vulnerabilities
62
C. Intentions
62
Appendixes
Appendix A. Table 18
63
Appendix. B. The Electronics Industry in the USSR ? ? ?
65
1. 1951 Output
65
2. Total Employees
66
3. Energy Requirements
66
4. Geographical Distribution
66
Appendix D.
Electron Tube and Electric Lamp Plants
in the Soviet Bloc
71
1.
USSR
71
2.
Hungary
85
3.
East Germany
86
4.
Czechoslovakia
93
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-L-C-R-E-T
Appendix F. Methodology 97
1. General 97
2. Methodology for Development of Input
Factors 97
3. Collected Input Coefficients 103
NOTE
This report contains information available
to CIA as of 1 January 1951.
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
CIA/RR 7
(RR Project 46-51)
SLECTRON TUBE WUSTRY IN THE SOVIET BLOC
ununarv
Production of electron tubes in the Soviet Bloc is the limiting factor
which determines the magnitude and breadth of the Soviet military elec-
tronics program. Although shortages of tubes are evident in some sectors
of the Bloc economy, the present output is believed to be adequate to
meet the current, rather austere civilian and military electronics require-
ments. The distribution-of-output pattern was heavily weighted toward
military applications in 1950 and 1951, indicating an acceleration in the
build-up of Soviet military electronics capabilities.
A serious vulnerability of the electron tube industry in the Soviet
Bloc results from its continuing dependence-upon Western sources for
specialized production materials. Manufacturing techniques for electron
tubes vary somewhat between the USSR and the Satellite industries. The
USSR tends to follow US practices, whereas the Satellite countries follow
Western European methods. Labor productivity in the Bloc industry is
appreciably lower than in the US, although much Improvement is indicated
for the USSR since 1947.
The value of the Soviet Bloc output of electron tubes in 1951 is esti-
mated at $52 million, including $24 million of transmitting and special
tubes. Most of the capacity of the Bloc electron tube industry is con-
centrated in nine major plants, five of which are in the USSR. Of the
total Bloc production, the USSR supplied about 75 percent in 1951. A
significant increase in output is anticipated through the use of planned
facility expansions and through improved skill of the labor force, and
the capacity of the industry is estimated to reach $71 million by 1953.
The value of the Bloc output of electric lamps, which are related to
electron tubes in the frequent use of common materials and facilities,
is estimated at $22 million in 1951.
A marked improvement in the technology of the electron tube industry
of the Soviet Bloc is evident, especially for the USSR, between 1947 and
1950. Primarily, this improvement has been due to more efficient tooling,
more new factory equipment in. use, and greater competence in the technical
staff. Of the several tube industries in the Bloc, that of Hungary is the
most efficient, and those of East Germany and Czechoslovakia are the least
efficient. For the output of tubes and lamps, average productivity during
1951 is measured at $1,800 per employee per year in Hungary, $1,450 in the
USSR and $750 in East Germany.
g7L72-11-K-1.
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S -1
Throughout the Soviet Bloc, electron tubes allocated to the consumer
market have remained at a low level. Civilian consumption is estimated
at 16 percent of the total, whereas 64 percent is devoted to the production
of military electronic equipment and its maintenance. The balance of the
Bloc output is used for essential services and for export to Soviet-
controlled areas. There are indications that over half of the entire
military share of the Bloc output of tubes is for radar systems, including
the quantity production of newer, improved types of radars. Although
supply is adequate for current needs, continuing expansion will be nec-
essary-if the heavier tube requirements of a general war are to be met,
particularly if a large-scale use of expendable devices is intended.
Except for parts of the East German and Czechoslovak electron tube
industries, there is no evidence of a shortage of technical and factory
personnel or of basic plant machinery in the Soviet Bloc. The weak
point at present, as well as the future, is the dependence of the Bloc
industry upon Western sources of critical materials, especially tungsten
and molybdenum metal products, diamond dies, and, to 'a lesser extent,
mica. If it were feasible, a .complete and effective embargo against the
shipment to the East of such items would reduce the Bloc capabilities by
as much as 50 percent, with a corresponding effect upon Soviet military
electronics programs. The concentration of the production of electron
tubes in a few major plants creates a serious military vulnerability,
although no single facility can be considered as an exclusive key
objective.
I. .1=21112112a. 1/*
The industrial development of the electron tube industry in the Soviet
Bloc has been closely related to that of the electric lamp industry. In
many cases, both products are made in the same plant. Some of the critical
production materials are similar in the two industries. Therefore,
although this report is devoted primarily to an analysis of the manu-
facture of electron tubes, data are included on the lamp industry, partic-
ularly as related to tube operations.
? - 2 -
27gta4-K-1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-Ga7E-T
A. Nature and Upes.
The electron tube is a device which provides the means for the
conduction of electricity through gases or in vacuum and which is intended.
for use in the detection, amplification, generation, or control of elec-
trical signals. Electron tubes comprise a wide variety of types* and
are required in large quantities for the operation of all electronic equip-
ment. (For a catalogue of electron tubes produced in the Soviet Bloc,
see the Annex to this report, issued separately.) In the US, for example,
net prices range from 35 cents to $2,500 for each tube. Although electron
tubes usually are described as a single product group, there are three
broad categories in which the facilities and methods are not interchange-
able: receiving tubes and allied types, produced in large numbers with
automatic equipment; transmitting and special tubes, produced in smaller
numbers, generally with less complex plant equipment; and cathode-ray
(GR) tubes, requiring special facilities and methods. In order to measure
output and input exactly and to evaluate the consumption pattern, a further
breakdown of categories is necessary (as indicated in Table 18, Appendix A).
The principal applications of electron tubes are as follows:
1. Production of radio and television receivers.
2. Replacements in existing services and receivers.
* Various types of electron tubes and related technical terms, as referred
to in this report, may be defined as follows:
Tqh, shrinkage, expressed in percent, is a measure of rejected tubes.
It is the ratio of tubes rejected at test and in processing to the total
number of internal structure assemblies (tube mounts) started.
NagneIr9ns, Xlvstrons, R bps, and pixer (silicon) crvstalp are
special tubes employed in microwave centimeter-wave) circuits, primarily
radar. These special tubes were developed for use during World War II.
The magndrpu is a self-excited magnetic-field oscillator, employed as
the transmitting output tube and circuit, especially in radars. The
klxgagn is a special form of velocity-modulated ultrahigh-frequency tube.
It may be either an oscillator or an amplifier, and a principal use is
as the low-power local oscillator in radar receivers. The IA DQX is a gas-
filled diode, used as an antenna switch, for duplexing in radars. The
mjaalgallszals, not strictly a vacuum tube, is a semiconductor
diode, employed as a detector at ultrahigh frequencies and as first detec-
tors in radar receivers.
Piniatur, tubeg define a structural shape for a line of receiving
tube, usually 5/8 inch in diameter. ;1:bminiature tubes define another
product category of special receiving tubes, shorter than miniatures,
3/8 inch in diameter or less.
- 3 -11-Efi-g-ii?1.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Z-E-g.-11-L-I
3. Production of military communications equipment.
4. Production of military radar and countermeasure equipment.
5. Special military devices such as missile controls and
VT (variable?time) fuses.
6. Professional broadcast, communications, and sound
equipment.
7. Industrial electronic equipment.
8. Military depot stocks and strategic stockpiling.
In an industrially advanced economy, electron tube requirements
usually occur largely inthe radio and television market, including
replacements. However, the consumption pattern of the Soviet Bloc is
devoted principally to military, industrial, and public?service end uses,
with a relatively small proportion of production available to the civilian
consumer.
B. Importance of the industrv.
Since 1935 the electronics industry has become an important factor
in the economies of industrial countries. For example, the 1951 output of
the US electronics industry is estimated at $3.3 billion, divided as
follows: military electronics, $1 billion; civilian radio and television,
$1.3 billion; civilian and commercial telephone and telegraph equipment,
$1 billion. The predictions for the output of the US electronics industry
in 1952.are $2.4 billion for military electronics, $1 billion for civilian
radio and television, $0.8 billion for civilian and commercial telephone
and telegraph equipment, or a total for the US electronics industry of $4.2
billion.
Of all component industries which comprise the electronics industry,
the manufacture of electron tubes represents the largest economic effort,
both in manpower and in plant facilities. In addition, a complete electronics
program, either civilian or military, results in heavy requirements for
special classes of tubes such as magnetrons and klystrons for radar, CR
tubes for indicators and television receivers, and subminiature tubes for
fuses. The pattern of electronics in the Soviet Bloc clearly indicates
lesser quantities and simpler devices than are considered to be necessary
in Western planning. The electron tube industry, however, represents a
major industrial effort for the Soviet economy.
Rigid security measures, high?priority attention given to tube
facilities, and the heavy postwar effort in the USSR to acquire plant and
technical assistance from occupied areas confirm the importance of the
electron tube industry to the USSR as well as to the Satellite countries.
The electron tube industry of the Soviet Bloc deserves primary consideration
- 4 -
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
as an intelligence objective, since this is the most important factor in
determining Soviet industrial capabilities for electronics, as well as
the best indicator, in both magnitude and kind, for the evaluation of the
military electronics program.
. C. jiisiorv of the Industry. .?./
As in the US and in Western Europe, the manufacture of electron
tubes in the Soviet Bloc areas has developed close affiliation with the
manufacture of electric lamps. The emergence of this latter industry in
Central and Eastern Europe occurred after World War I, largely through
the commercial effort of the AEG (Allgemeine Elektrische Gesellschaft AG)
and Siemens-Halske AG, with their Telefunken and Osram subsidiaries, of
Germany; the N.V. Philips Company, of the Netherlands; and the United
Incandescent Lamp Company -- Tungsram, commonly known as TrILCO "Tungsram,"
of Hungary. The highly specialized industry for the manufacture of tubes,
lamps, and parts was concentrated geographically in Berlin and Budapest,
with lesser facilities in Vienna, Prague, and Bratislava.
1. USSR.
In the USSR, German electrical combines had established
facilities in Leningrad, Riga, and Moscow before the Russian revolution.
The present Soviet tube and lamp industry was established on a small
scale by 1923. The foundation for the present Soviet electron tube
industry as an effective manufacturing program was established in 1935
under the direction of a section of the Ministry of Electrical Industry
dealing with communications equipment. This program was implemented by
technical assistance, manufacturing equipment, and production supplies
furnished under a contract with the US Radio Corporation of America
(RCA). By 1938, US-made facilities provided production capacity for
receiving tubes, transmitting tubes, and a limited number of CR tubes.
This expansion program provided for a theoretical capacity of 30 million
tubes a year, divided between the Svetlana Plant in Leningrad 50X1
and the Shchelkovo Plant near Moscow, but this output was never realized
from the 14 production units supplied. By 1940 the maximum annual produc-
tion rate attained was 8 million tubes. At that time Soviet manufacture
of lamps was concentrated at the Svetlana Plant in Leningrad and 50X1
the Electric Lamp Works in Moscow. 50X1
Early in World War II. it became necessary to evacuate farther
east a major portion of the tube facilities of the Leningrad and Moscow
area, principally to Novosibirsk and Tashkent, and much of the effective
tube-making capacity was lost. Most World War II requirements of the
USSR for Vacuum tubes and for the production of tube materials were
- 5 -
A-I-a-Di-E.-I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
supplied by the US. Some shipments of tube machinery, especially grid
lathes and stem machines, were made. Following World War II, tube
facilities were reestablished at Leningrad and Moscow. In addition,
manufacturing operations were maintained at the major evacuation plants
at Novosibirsk and Tashkent. Large amounts of manufacturing machinery
were removed from electron tube industries in Germany, Czechoslovakia,
and Hungary. To supplement this added plant equipment, a group of
several hundred German specialists was employed in the USSR from
October 1946 through the end of 1950. Major changes in the effective
ness of the Soviet electron tube industry were seen between 1948 and
1951, and by the end of 1950 the industry was operating at a scale larger
than anything previously planned. It is apparent that manufacturing
techniques and plant operations have improved to a point where the
Soviet tube industry currently can be considered both competent and
large according to European standards. (For further discussion of the
electronics industry in the USSR, see Appendix B.)
2. Runearv.
The tube and lamp industry in Hungary was not disrupted
during World War II. Although up to 90 percent of the manufacturing
machinery was removed early in the Soviet occupation, no key personnel
moved to the USSR. The industry was quickly reequiped and reorganized,
partly with new machinery and partly with machinery retained from the
Soviet dismantling. The Budapest industry is efficient and relatively
large. Before World War II, UILCO "Tungsram" was the third largest
European company in its field, exceeded only by Philips of the Nether-
lands and Osram of Germany. The Hungarian tube and lamp industry must
be considered currently as one of the major contributors to the Soviet
Bloc electronics industry.
3. East Germany.
In East Germany the present tube and lamp industry operates
in former facilities of the AEG, Telefunken, and Osram companies. Before
World War II the German electrotechnical industry was heavily concentrated
around Berlin, where it still is the largest manufacturing industry. Dur-
ing World War II, however, some operations were dispersed, especially to
eastern sections of Germany and to Czechoslovakia. With the Soviet
occupation, the East German electron tube industry became a primary target
for removal to the USSR, and most tube manufacturing equipment and a large
number of specialists were moved to the USSR, first in 1946 and again in
1948. As a result of this enforced displacement of men and materials and
of the separation from parent organizations in West Germany, the East
German tube industry was somewhat disorganized from 1945 to 1949. In
6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
particular, the industry suffered from a lack of skilled employees, spec-
ialized materials, and technical plant equipment. Considerable improve-
ment has been indicated since 1949, although the East German tube in-
dustry remains smaller and relatively less competent than its West German
counterpart.
4. Czechoslovakia.
The Czechoslovak tube and lamp industry before World War II
comprised branch plants of Philips and of UILCO "Tungsram" located in
Prague, Bratislava, and Vrchlabi. In the postwar period the manufacture
of tubes was continued at relatively low levels, and considerable dif-
ficulty has been reported in obtaining production materials and in
maintaining adequate plant efficiency. Starting in 1950, the tube
manufacturing operations were consolidated and scheduled for removal to
the town of Roznov pod Radhostem. A sizable manufacturing establishment
was planned as a result of this move, utilizing equipment and trained
manpower from other Czechoslovak areas as well as new equipment to be
imported from the Netherlands and the UK. Recently, this move was
reported as being complete, and in the future a significant contribu-
tion can be expected from the Czechoslovak electron tube industry. '
5. Other Satellites.
In other Satellite countries, prewar facilities for the manu-
facture of electron tubes and electric lamps generally were small and
were branch-plants of Philips, UILCO "TungsraM," or Osram. No signifi-
cant contribution is evident at this time from those plants which are
still in operation.
D. Technology. 2/
1. USSR.
In general, electron tube manufacturing methods in the USSR
are more similar to those of the US than they are to those of Germany.
Technical plant equipment reported to be in the Soviet electron tube
industry comprises a large amount of US prewar and Lend-Lease equipment
and dismantled German Telefunken equipment, supplemented by an increasing
quantity of postwar indigenous Soviet machinery. Most of the German
equipment is less productive than similar US equipment. For example,
German automatic exhaust machines produce 240 tubes an hour as compared
with 500 to 600 tubes an hour produced on the US-built sealex units
installed in the USSR. New tube machinery made in the USSR includes
- 7 -
S-EHQ7R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
sealex machines, stem and glass-sealing machines, filament winders, grid
lathes, and automatic glass-blowing machinery. These postwar Soviet units
probably are basically similar to modern US designs. In at least one
plant, native Soviet equipment is used generally for the manufacture of
large transmitting tubes.
Competent tooling for efficient, low-cost structural designs
is now evident. The Soviet tube and lamp plants make more of their
required parts and fabricated production materials than do US plants. It
is noted, in particular, that the major Soviet plants have their own
glass-making shops integrated with their tube and plant factories. Testing
of tubes in the USSR is reported to be generally in accordance with US
Army-Navy specifications.
Large transmitting tubes and some special tubes, such as klys-
trona, frequently are of Soviet design. Small transmitting tubes and
nearly all receiving tubes are essentially copies of US tube types. In
general, the variety of types manufactured in the USSR is restricted in
number, although the available Soviet tubes cover a full range of applica-
tions, both in power and in frequency. Soviet electric lamps manufactured
include an adequate variety of general-service lamps, miniature lamps, and
fluorescent lamps.
Changes are evident between the early postwar Soviet tube
technology and that of 1950. At present there is evidence of excellent
tooling, comparable to current US practice, and the quality of electron
tubes appears to be quite acceptable, with the exception of possible
heater trouble. Tube shrinkage, or the percentage of tubes rejected during
manufacture, appears to be reasonable, although somewhat higher than the
US average, probably ranging from 25 to 30 percent (higher on special
types). Production of metal receiving tubes is limited, with most of the
Soviet output composed of glass types, including sprayed shields where
required.
The status of Soviet industrial technology for the manufacture
of electron tubes is summarized as follows:
a. Tubes generally: follow US designs, with little
evidence of German influence.
b. Factory tooling is good.
c. Automatic plant equipment is available, including
US, German, and postwar Soviet units.
d. Tube shrinkage is at an acceptable level.
- 8 -
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
e. At the more important tube and lamp plants there
is evidence of a high degree of experience and
technical competence throughout the management,
supervisory, and top engineering personnel, and
new technicians have been trained in considerable
numbers.
f. If required, Soviet tube manufacturing operations
should be satisfactory and readily expandable.
2. Hungary.
The Hungarian engineering industry is well organized and com-
petent in its narrow areas of speciality'. Historically a major contrib-
utor to world markets in electrotechnical products and developments and -
little disturbed during World War II, the Hungarian electronics industry
enjoys a high level of technology. This industry is now producing
mostly European-type tubes, but there is increasing evidence of greater
production in US tube types. A wide range of general-service lamps and
fluorescent lamps is manufactured.
The manufacturing efficiency of the Hungarian electronics
industry is high, limited to some extent by shortages in the supply of
such specialized critical materials as molybdenum, tungsten, mica, and
pure nickel. Although plant efficiency is hampered by the occasional
need to use inferior materials and by overworked factory labor, there is
no evidence of reduced technological competence.
The Hungarian electronics industry has effectively and
completely replaced its prewar plant equipment, using equipment of domes-
tic design based upon the best features of US, Telefunken, and Osram
machinery features. For example, new plant equipment includes entirely
acceptable Ivanhoe glass bulb-blowing automatics and lamp-making machinery
operating at a speed of 1,200 units an hour, as compared with 1,250 an
hour for current US machines. It is possible that this new equipment
installed in the Budapest tube and lamp industry may outweigh the other
factors which detract from the efficiency of the industry.
In addition to its position as second in size within the
Soviet Bloc, the Hungarian tube and lamp industry very probably is the
most advanced in industrial technology and manufacturing efficiency.
- 9 -
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
3. at Germany.
The East German electron tube industry still is recovering
from two drawbacks -- its separation from West Germany and the effects
of Soviet postwar dismantling. The industry is noticeably less efficient
and less competent technically than would be normal for this sector of
the German engineering industry. Furthermore, German methods and plant
equipment in the electronics industry are notoriously wasteful of man-
power, and an analysis of recent East German tube structures indicates
the need for much hand labor.
One advantage of the East German tube designs is the greatly
simplified tooling required, consuming much less tooling effort than
that required in the US and the USSR. A second advantage is the general
tendency to provide better quality of tubes than would be feasible in
the US.
Although a wide variety of important materials for the produc-
tion of tubes and lamps is readily available from indigenous supplies
within East Germany, including excellent technical glass and electron
tube ceramics, the tube and lamp industry still is dependent upon West
German sources for a large number of more specialized materials. The
frequent failure to obtain these materials in sufficient quantities
and the need for substituting inferior items necessarily reduce the
capability of the industry.
The East German tube plants are reported to use generally
existing German types of technical plant equipment. Exhaust machines
are the Telefunken 48-head automatic rotary pumps, operated at 200 tubes
an hour. Although new 25-head units with Leyboldt diffusion pumps are
being constructed and will operate at 350 tubes an hour, none of these
units Was in use in mid-1951.
The output of the East German tube and lamp industrial tech-
nology still is restricted by lack of special materials and necessary
items of new plant equipment, and its labor productivity is relatively
low even by European standards. The quality of its products, however,
appears to be quite acceptable, and its rate of shrinkage appears to
be entirely reasonable. On the basis of its level of technology, the
East German tube and lamp industry ranks third within the Soviet Bloc.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
4. Czechoslovakia.
?
Never a leading supplier of electronics products in the past,
Czechoslovakia's present position in the tube and lamp industry is rather
weak. Most of the tube effort of the industry is devoted to standard
European types, such as Philips and Telefunken. It is reported that manu-
facturing was started on a few US types in late 1949 or early 1950.
Some new postwar plant machinery has been built, copied from
older Philips and Osram models, and additional machinery has been imported
from Western sources. Although the skill and efficiency in producing
blown and formed glass parts has been high, frequent reports have been
made of serious difficulties in glass-working at the tube plants. Pumping
techniques at the tube plants have not been satisfactory.
The Czechoslovak industrial technology for the manufacture of
electron tubes has been mediocre, With many instances of inferior methods,
and its shrinkage rate has been high. In general, plant equipment in
Czechoslovakia has been inefficient, being comprised of old prewar German
and Dutch machines, but this equipment is slowly being replaced. Improve-
ment in factory operations is to be expected at the new Roznov pod Radhostem
plant facility when full operations are reached. It is probable that the
Czechoslovak electron tube industry will continue for some time to be a
high-cost producer of limited capabilities.
5. Other Satellites.
In the other Satellites there are no significant electron tube
industries. Potential capabilities of these Satellites are not important,
and their technology for the manufacture of tubes and lamps is relatively
primitive. In Poland, where the electronics industry was almost entirely
destroyed during World War II, a limited level of tube manufacturing had
been reached by the end of 1950.
There is a relatively small production of electric lamps in
tube facilities in Rumania, but there are no indications of any work being
done on electron tubes.
In China a small tube and lamp industry has existed for some
time, producing low-grade miniature and general-service lamps. One tube
plant is known to exist, but its capabilities are extremely limited both
in scope of product and in size of output.
-11-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-CHg7E-1
E. Reliability of Estimates.
In order to indicate the degree of reliability of the quantitative
data in this report, the total quantity, content detail, and apparent
validity of the available information used to support the estimate of the
output of the Soviet Bloc electron tube industry in 1951 have been reviewed.
Four general conclusions may be made:
1. The accuracy of the estimate for output of the East
German electron industry is reasonably good. The estimate for the Soviet
industry is subject to wider tolerances than those for the Satellites.
2. The accuracy of the estimate for output of electric
lamps is better than that for electron tubes.
3. Of the various types of supporting information available,
the data for industry inputs are relatively more valid than are the data
for output.
4. Estimates of output of the several countries are more
accurate when expressed in terms of production value than they are when
expressed in units.
Iniview of the lack of recent substantive data for some of the
more important facilities, an estimate of the annual value of Soviet
Bloc production is necessarily subject to error. The estimate used
in this report -- $52 million -- is possibly too high or slightly low.
It is believed that the actual output for the Soviet Bloc in 1951 would
be no less than $35 million and no more than $60 million. For electric
lamps, estimated at a total output for the Bloc of $22.5 million, the
possible range is believed to be from $19 million to $26 million.
II. Organization of the Industry. L/
A. USSR.
Electronics production in the USSR is administered by the Ministry
of the Communications Equipment Industry, headed since May 1947 by
G.V. Aleksenko. Electron tubes are produced under this Ministry according
to a production plan determined by the Politburo and assigned by the
Ministry to various organizations within the industry.
Although some radar equipment, probably for use on ships of the
Red Fleet, is produced in plants under the Fourth Chief Directorate of the
- 12 -
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
LrEr-QrB-Z7T
Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry, no tubes are known to be produced
under this Ministry. It must be assumed, therefore, that electron
tubes for use in end equipment made under this Ministry are obtained
from plants under the Ministry of Communications Equipment Industry.
The Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry is headed by V.A. Malyshev.
Commercial activities are carried on for the plants by the Ministry of
Communications Equipment Industry, and this Ministry supplies many other
Ministries with tubes both for original use and for replacement use.
B. Hungary. 5./
The integration of the Hungarian economy in the Soviet Bloc is
well advanced, and Soviet-type controls are applied to the industrial
sectors. The Continued subservience to the USSR of top-level Hungarian
administrators, many of whom are Soviet-trained, reinforces the Soviet
economic hold on Hungary and promotes its increased dependence upon the
USSR.
The Hungarian tube and lamp industry consists of two enterprises.
The first and larger is the Egyesiilt Izzolsmpags Villamossggi R.-T.
(United Incandescent LampCompany), commonly known as UILCO "TuLgsram."
The second enterprise, much smaller, is the Hungarian Transmitting Tube
Factory, formerly the Hungarian Philips works. Both enterprises are
administered by the Ministry of Heavy industry. In matters relative to
foreign trade, both company activities are controlled by Elektroimpex,
an agency under the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Trade.
As a foreign-owned enterprise, the former Netherlands-owned
Philips Company was nationalized apparently late in 1950. Negotiations
toward a settlement of differences resulting from this nationalization
continued between the Dutch and the Hungarian governments through 1951.
an end of these discussions, with no
satisfactory agreement being reached.
Before the nationalization of Hungarian industry, UILCO "Tungsram"
of Hungary comprised the operations of Tungsram, the Hungarian Wolfram
Company (Orion), and the Remix Electrotechnical Works Company Limited
(Remix), together with several other smaller subsidiary plants in Hungary.
Nationalization of the parent enterprise UILCO "Tungsram" was scheduled
several years ago and probably was in effect for a very short time.
However, in order to avoid foreign legal difficulties with respect to
minority stockholders in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, and with
respect to Tungsram manufacturing and sales affiliates in foreign coun-
tries, the UILCO "Tungsram" combine in Hungary has been classified as a
50X1
-13-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
private company, although several of the smaller affiliated or subsidiary
operations appear to have become fully nationalized. Actually, this
maneuver is nothing more than a legal subterfuge, since well over 50 per-
cent of the corporate stock of this combine is owned by the Hungarian
government. In effect, its policies and operations are as fully govern-
ment-controlled as if the organization had been nationalized.
Foreign subsidiaries directly controlled by the Hungarian enter-
prise UILCO "Tungsram" include the Watt AG plants in Vienna and LaMbach,
Austria, and smaller subsidiaries in Argentina, Switzerland, and Sweden.
The several former UILCO "Tungsram" subsidiaries in the other Satellites
are not controlled by the Hungarian company, since all Of these have
become nationalized in their respective countries. Four former UILCO
"Tungsram" subsidiaries, exist in the UK, France, the Netherlands, and
Italy. At present, these four firms are neither owned nor controlled
directly by the Hungarian parent company. However, an apparently valid
long-term debt is owed to the Hungarian company by these' firms in Western
Europe, and it has been recently reported that an agreeMent reached in
Paris between representatives of the West European interests and officials
of the Hungarian Ministry of Finance provides for payment of this debt
through exports of critically needed production materials from France
to the Hungarian enterprise.
Therefore, although the major enterprise in the Hungarian tube
and lamp industry has not been officially nationalized, it is clear that
the entire tube and lamp industry of Hungary, together with its affiliated
subsidiary activities, is completely controlled by the Communist govern-
ment. The tube and lamp industry is completely staffed, operated, and
managed by Hungarian personnel, and there is little evidence to indicate
intimate association at the operational level between the Hungarians and
Soviet administrators. However, the postwar acquisition by the USSR of
a sizable block of UILCO "Tungsram" stock, together with the known joint
Soviet-Hungarian control over industrial policies, insures the complete
integration of this industry within the economic and military objectives
of the Soviet Bloc.
Furthermore, there is confirmed evidence of a continuing and
effective influence exerted by the parent Hungarian enterprise over the
affairs of its prior-affiliated subsidiaries in Western Europe, and it
must be concluded that these significant enterprises within the elec-
tronics industry of Western Europe are subject to pressures which encour-
age the movement of critical materials and technical information from the
West to the East.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
C. East Germany. .(2/
In East Germany, all of the plants engaged in the development and
production of electron tubes and electric lamps are either people-owned
enterprises or members of a Soviet-owned stock corporation. None of the
organizations is privately or locally owned.
A German Democratic Republic decree, issued in December 1950,
called for a reorganization of East German economic ministries. This
program was to modify effectively the previous structure of the Associa-
tion of People-owned Enterprises (Vereinigung .Vol)cseigene Betriebe, --
VVB) for engineering industries and was scheduled to be completed
1 April 1951. The newly formed Ministry for Machinery Construction had
its headquarters, after 1 May 1951, at the Knorrbremse Building,
Warschauerstrasse, Berlin. At present, it heads six main administrations
(Hilts), including the HV Elektrotechnik, which controls all VVB plants
and laboratories in East Germany which are concerned with either elec-
tronics or heavy electrical manufacturing.
This people-owned portion of the East German electrotechnical
industry represents from 70 to 75 percent of the total East German
effort in this industry. It is comprised of four groups divided as
follows: VVB-VEM, made up of 23 consolidated firms with about 15,000
employees and engaged in the development and manufacture of electrical
machinery; VVB-IKA, having 51 consolidated firms with about 20,000
employees and engaged in the production and supply of electrical fit-
tings, insulation, cables, batteries, and some radio parts; VVB-RFT,
with 39 consolidated firms having from 18,000 to 19,000 employees and
engaged in the development and manufacture of electronic and tele-
communications end equipment and component parts; and 17 key firms,
with about 35,000 employees, reporting directly to the HV Elektrotechnik
rather than through one of the VVB's (of these key firms, 10 are in the
electronics field with about 15,000 employees).
In addition to the East German electronics firms controlled by
the Ministry for Machinery Construction, there are 13 large and impor-
tant electrotechnical firms which are Soviet-owned and which are con-
trolled directly by Moscow through the Main Administration of Soviet
Corporations in Germany. For purposes of planning, payment, and
materials allocation, however, these 13 firms are affiliated with the
economic ministries of the German Democratic Republic. All of these
electrotechnical firms are organized under the Soviet-owned SAG (Soyietische
Aktien Gesellschaft) Kabel. Approximately from 30,000 to 35,000 employees
at the SAG Kabel are engaged in the development and manufacture of
-15-
27E7-Q787E71
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
.2.1r211-Fri
electronic equipment, instruments, tubes, wire and cable, motors, bat-
teries, graphite parts, and insulators.
Normally, it was intended that the entire output of the SAG
firms in East Germany should be delivered to the USSR outside of repara-
tions accounts. A significant portion of the SAG Kabel production,
nevertheless, had to be shipped for the reparations account, and the
SAG was reimbursed for these shipments by materials and component deliv-
eries from German people-owned sources. In addition, the SAG has had
to deliver certain items required by both the people-owned and the SAG
enterprises of the German electrical technical industry.
The East German tube and lamp industry has been completely
consolidated within this planned economic structure. There are four
tube factories in East Germany, three of which are of significant size,
the fourth being quite small. Of the three large firms, the first in
importance is a key subsidiary of the SAG Kabel; the other two are
people-owned firms which are administered directly as key enterprises
by the HV Elektrotechnik rather than being subsidiary to the VVB-RFT.
In addition to the tube plants, there are seven electric lamp
firms in East Germany, of which three are of significant size. These
three large plants are listed as key enterprises of the HV Elektro-
technik and, like the tube plants, do not report to the VVB-RFT.
In addition to the normal planning procedures which are estab-
lished by decree within the German Democratic Republic and which cover
matters of planned production schedules, investment, and material
allocations, a closer degree of cooperation between all interested ele-
ments of the East German tube and lamp industry is encouraged through
the operations of the Special Commission for Radio Tubes. This Commis-
sion includes members from the tube and lamp facilities, from key sup-
pliers of critical materials, from the SAG Kabel, from the Main Admin-
istration of the Ministry for Machinery Constructionvand from the State
Planning Ministry of the German Democratic Republic.
The organization of all the important facilities of the East
German tube and lamp industry as key firms of the Ministry or of the
Soviet-owned SAG, the obvious effort made to insure adequate supply
of materials both from indigenous and from Western sources, and the
establishment of a special commission to handle industry problems indi-
cate that a high degree of importance is attached to this industry in
East Germany.
-16-
Ark-278E71
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
D. Czechoslovakia. 2/
The latest reorganization of Czechoslovak industry brings produc-
tive resources under a system closely resembling the Soviet system.
There are at present several ministries such as the Ministry of Heavy
Engineering, the Ministry of Fuel and Power, the Ministry of Light
Industry, the Ministry of Building Construction, and several others. It
is thought that electrotechnical activities are under the administra-
tion of the, Ministry of Light Industry. All of the Ministries are under
the Chairman of the Party.
The Ministry of Light Industry is headed by Alois Malek. Under
him are four housekeeping bodies which supervise such matters as person-
nel, planning, social and political activities, and finance. Also under
the Ministry are several Central Managements which control the production
of the various categories of products manufactured by plants falling
under this Ministry.. The Central Management for Precision Machinery is
believed to have charge of the activities of the electronics industry.
Three organizations -7- the VTU; the KOVO Company Limited; and
Technospol -- are important in the administration of the Soviet electron
tube industry.
The VTU (Military Technical Aviation Institute) is a.govern-
mental organization engaged in development work for the armed forces,
including development in the electronics field. The VTU, which stands
in much the same relation to Tesla and the other electrotechnical plants
in Czechoslovakia as do the Army, Navy, and Air Force development activ-
ities to the electrotechnical companies in the US, is responsible for
the development of practically all military equipment in Czechoslovakia.
The KOVO Company Limited, is a national importing and exporting
organization under the administration of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.
This 'national Corporation is responsible for all of the importing and
exporting activity carried on in behalf of the industries which it serves,
one of which is the electronics industry. The chief of the KOVO Company
Limited, is charged with the negotiation on be Of of these industries
of trade instruments with foreign .nationa, with the carrying on of
exporting and importing as related to domestic production, and with the
furnishing of information for trading purposes, both to domestic and
forei!4? firms.
50X1
The address of the 50X1
division of KOVO which handles imports into the electronics and electrical
machinery industries is Karlovo Namesti 7, Prague 2, which also is the
address of the management of the Tesla State Enterprise.
-17-
Z-Zr.Q-11-.Fr1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
The large volume of business being carried on in 1951 by the KOVO
Company Limited, as one of the largest corporations in the world, forced
the division of the company into three independent licensed corporations.
The three new corporations are as follows: Investa, which is responsible
for trading in heavy machinery; KOVO, which handles trading in precision
and electrotechnical goods; and Motokov, which deals with the products
of light industry, including lamps. On 1 January 1951 the title of the
parent KCVO was changed to KOVO Limited, Metal and Engineering Products
and Raw Materials Trading Company, and the subsidiary, dealing in preci-
sion and electrotechnical goods, was changed officially to KOVO Limited,
Precision Engineering Products and Import and Export Company.
The government organization Technospol under the Ministry of
Foreign Trade is charged with the responsibility for obtaining and convey-
ing of patent rights from and to foreign nations. Technospol also pro-
vides production data and other information of interest to the scientific
and engineering industries.
The electron tube industry of Czechoslovakia is concerned princi-
pally with the supplying of domestic military requirements as well as of
tubes for use in domestically made broadcast receivers. Some end equip-
tent made in Czechoslovakia is sent to the USSR, but, except for some
exports which are sent to the rest of the Bloc and perhaps to the West,
tubes are utilized within the country itself. The industry concentrates
on European tube types, although some US types have been copied success?
fully. The production of magnetrons and klystrons is very unsatisfactory,
probably indicating an insignificant microwave radar program. In the CR
tube field, modifications of foreign types are carried on reasonably?
successfully, but there is no development of native designs.. Probably
the major Czechoslovak electron tube effort is directed toward. receiving
types for domestic and military communications equipment.
Czechoslovakia is attempting to increase its tube manufacturing
capacity, but there is a serious shortage of trained development, research,
and production personnel.
away. /1/
A. Production.
The USSR produces a limited number of different types of receiving
tubes, most of which are copies of US types. In general, the Soviets do
not produce a new type for each new function but try to utilize the types
already successfully in production for each new application encountered.
-18-
L7E721,7E7T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
a7g-q-E-E7I
The limitations of this practice, which often results in somewhat unsatis-
factory performance, have been admitted in Soviet technical publications.
Types of receiving tubes produced in the USSR include metal, glass,
metallized glass, miniatures, subminiatures, battery types, and small
transmitting tubes produced by receiving tube methods, generally copies
of US types.
The USSR produces the more conventional types, of transmitting
tubes, principally of Soviet design and with Soviet numberings. Also
produced are microwave generating tubes such as magnetrons, as well as
klystrons and lighthouse tubes, and CR tubes for direct-view television,
radar, and test equipment applications, principally with Soviet numberings,
indicating domestic design. 50X1 I
5UX1
The Production effort of electron tubes in the Satellite countries
Is oriented primarily toward supplying the Satellites with tubes for their
military needs. Thus the Satellites do not have a large output of US
receiving types, although some tubes are made in East Germany. More
common among the Satellites is the production of glass types, with a vari-
ety of bases common to the European tubes.
Power transmitting tubes of the more common types are produced in
the Satellite countries. Although there were facilities on hand in East
Germany for the manufacture of microwave tubes, it is thought that these
facilities have been moved to the USSR, so that at present there probably
Is little or no production of these types. There is some CR tube produc-
tion in the Satellites, principally for television and test equipment
applications.
1. Soviet Tube and Lamp Industrv. 3/
The most notable features of the postwar Soviet tube and lamp
industry have been the considerable expansion of facilities, adequate
training of both semiskilled and technical personnel, improvements in
methods and tooling, and reduction in production shrinkage. Although the
USSR still is partially dependent upon Western sources for a few spe-
cialized materials, shortages of materials have not been a limiting factor.
There are five principal tube and lamp manufacturing facili-
ties in'the USSR and at least seven lesser facilities. These major plants
operating in the USSR under a Directorate of the Ministry of the Communica-
tions Equipment Industr are the following: Electric Lam Works 50X1
Moscow; Svetlana Plant Leningrad; Institute Fryazino 50X11
-19-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
(Shchelkovo), Moscow Oblast; Electric Lamp Plant Novosibirsk;
and Electric Lamp Plant , Tashkent. By the end of 1950
the industry personnel totaled approximately 35,000, including 29,000
in these five major plants.
Other Soviet firms believed to be manufacturing either tubes
or lamps, or both, are the following: Vaists Elektrotechnika Fabrika
(VEF), Riga; Electric Lamp Plant, LIvov- Solch Lamp Plant, Tirga (Proko-
pyevsk); Ryazan Electric Lamp Plant Ryazan Oblast; and the
Radio Tube Plant, Tomsk.
a. Output.
Before the effective utilization of the extensive postwar
expansion the Soviet tube and lamp industry in general was operating
inefficiently and at relatively low levels. The total output of the
industry for the 3-year period of 1946 through 1948 is estimated to have
been 3 million tubes of all types and categories, valued at $36 million,
and 240 million lamps of all sizes and types, valued at $22 million.
The Soviet tube and lamp industry manufactures a complete line of products.
Tubes range from subminiature varieties up to water-cooled 250-kilowatt
transmitting tubes. The production during recent years of the Soviet
lamp and tube industry is summarized in Table 1.* (Production of elec-
tron tubes and electric lamps in the USSR is given by plant in Appendix D.)
Assuming that demand for its products continues to be high
and that the potential increase in the skill of the labor force which is
believed to be possible is attained, the Soviet tube and lamp industry
will continue to expand. Summarized in Table 2** is the estimated produc-
tion capacity believed to be possible by late 1952 or 1953.
b. Productivity.
The employment and production output data for the Soviet
tube and lamp industry indicate that average productivity is on the order
of $1,300 per employee per year. This measure of productivity is almost
exactly half-way between the values measured for Hungary and for East
Germany. The 1951 industry data for the USSR anticipate an increase in
this average productivity to $1,450 per employee per year. For purposes
of comparison, estimated productivity averaged six electric lamps per
employee per hour and 0.9 receiving tube per employee per hour. For these
* Table 1 follows on p. 21.
** Table 2 follows on p. 22.
-20-
2-L-g-11-rea
50X1
50X1
?
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 1
Production of the Soviet Tube and Lamp Industry
1949-51
Receiving Tubes Special Tubes All Tubes All Lamps
Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value
(Thousand (Thousan4 (Thousand (Thousan4 (Thousand (Thousan4 (Thousand (Thousand
Year Units) $ US) 2/ Units) $ US) 2/ Units) $ US) 2/ Units) $ US) 2/
1949
21,000
12,300
790
11,600
21,790
23,900
109,000
9,800
1950
29,000
18,500
1,015
15,200
30,015
33,700
120,000
10,800
1951
33,800.
21,400
1,283
18,800
35,083
40,200
125,000
11,200
a. Value data based upon current US f.o.'67-Faces for equivalent products.
-21-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 2
Estimated Production Capacity of the Soviet Tube and Lamp Industry
1952-53
Receiving TUbes Special Tubes
All Tubes An Lamps
Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value
(Thousand (Thousand (Thousand (Thousand (Thousand (Thousan4 (Thousand (Thousand
Units) $ US) 2/ Units) $ US) 2V Units) $ US) 2/ Units) $ US) 2/
44,500 27,800 1,700 24,200 46,200 52,000 142,000 12,500
a:- Value data based upon current US f.o.b. prices for equivalent products.
- 22 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070062-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
two categories the relative labor productivity of the Soviet industry
would appear to be about one-sixth that of the US.
Female personnel predominate in the Soviet electron tube
industry. Factory labor is reported as being well trained in the older
establishments. The relatively recent improvement in Soviet productivity
for this industry, as compared with its counterpart in East Germany, is
attributed to new plant equipment, improved employee training, and sat-
isfactory low-cost designs of products.
2. Bungarian Tube and TAMP Industry. 12/
The Hungarian tube and lamp industry is comprised of two
enterprises. The larger is the UILCO "Tungsram" combine at Vaciut 77,
Ujpest, and the Hungarian Transmitting Tube Factory, formerly Hungarian
Philips, at Vaciut 169, Budapest 13.
a. Output.
For 1951 the output of the Hungarian tube and lamp in-
dustry is estimated to have been 4.5 million tubes, including all types,
plus 41 million electric lamps, or a total value of $9.5 million. The
extent to which the Hungarian tube and lamp industry can be expanded
during the next 2 years appears to depend upon three factors: first, .
the availability of semiskilled labor in the Ujpest-Budapest metropolitan
area; second, the success which Elektroimpex of Hungary will meet in
obtaining specialized production materials from West European suppliers;
and, third, the demand for tubes and lamps, both within the Soviet Bloc
and from other world markets. At the present time there is no basis on
which to predict the probable future effective production capacity of the
Hungarian tube and lamp industry. Known expansions within Hungary for
the production of technical glass and rare gases and for reported plant
rearrangements indicate that the 1951 production level may be increased
by 25 to 35 percent by 1953. (Production of electron tubes and electric
lamps in Hungary is given by plant in Appendix D.)
b. Productivity.
An analysis of the 1951 data for the UILGO "Tungsram"
tube and lamp complex at Ujpest indicates an output of $1,800 per employee
per year as compared with the prewar output of $1,600 per employee per year.
The increase is attributed to the almost complete set of new equipment,
together with advances in processing methods. A further refinement in
this over-all figure for 1951 results in a productivity ratio of 9
-23-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
2-E-11.175-1
incandescent lamps per employee per hour and of 1.6 standard receiving
tubes per employee per hour. Statistically, this productivity for the
Hungarian industry is about midway between that of France and of the UK
for receiving tubes and is about equal to West European productivity
for electric lamps. For both product lines, in terms of units produced
per employee per hour, Hungarian productivity is very nearly one-quarter
of that of the US.
3. East German Tube and Lamp Industry.
Until early 1950, progress and development of the East German
tube and lamp industry were seriously hampered by lack of skilled labor,
by lack of engineers, and by recurring shortages in the supply of spe-
cialized production materials. More recently the materials problem has
been eased, in part through the establishment of the local fabricating
facilities and in part through increased imports. Recent information
indicates that this industry, as a result of improved plant efficiency,
was able in 1950 to increase total output over that of 1948 and 1949.
There are four principal facilities for the manufacture of
electron tubes in East Germany, and references have been made to four less
Important establishments. The four larger plants are Werk fuer Fernmelde-
vesen HF (Cow), Berlin-Oberschoeneweide, Ostendstrasse 1-5, a member plant
of the Soviet-owned SAG Kabel; Funkwerk Erfurt VEB, Rudolphstrasse, Erfurt,
Thuringia, formerly a VVIlaqq.FT plant, now controlled directly by the HV
Elektrotechnik of the Ministry for Machinery Construction; Roehrenwerk
Neuhaus VEB, 2 Waldstrasse, Neuhaus am Rennweg, Thuringia, formerly a VVB-
RFT plant, now controlled directly by the HV Elektrotechnik; and the RFT
Phonetika Radio VEB, Franz-Joseph Strasse 112, Berlin-Meissensee, a member
of the VVB4TT.
The less important establishments which have been referred to
are enumerated as follows. Roehrenwerk in Radeberg, a former Lorenz
factory and a postwar receiving tube plant which at one time had 120
employees, was dissolved in February 1949, the equipment and key personnel
being consolidated with Funkwerk Erfurt. RFT Roehrenwerk VEB Senftenberg,
10a Bahnhofstrasse, Senftenberg, Nieder Lausitz, was formerly a branch
plant of the German AEG RFO Factory (since Soviet control the OSW) and was
reported earlier as making 180,000 East Deutsche Mark (EDM) worth a month
of rectifiers and receiving tubes. It was not shown on the 1951 list of
RFT plants and presumably is not presently engaged in tube work. Fernmelde-
werk Arnstadt, 6 Bierweg, Arnstadt, Thuringia, engaged in television and
CR tube development and production before mid-1948, at present is directly
under the HV Elektrotechnik and is engaged in radio and apparatus construc-
tion only. Key personnel and all equipment relative to tubes have been
-24-
27L-Qra-E.71.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
2-E7g-E-E7I
removed to the Lenlbgrad area. Technische Physische Werkstatten, in
Thalheim, Gronsdorf, and in Zwoenitz, formerly the Erzyebirge complex
of AEG, was organized as a SAG firm until mid-1948 and did work on CR
tubes, electron optics, and oscillographs. It was dismantled and
removed to Leningrad, along with Fernmeldewerk Arnstadt. The plant with
the remaining employees was consolidated with the SAG Kabel member plant
Siemens-Halske, Zwoenitz, and is not now engaged in tube work.
There are seven electric lamp manufacturing facilities in
East Germany. The three largest of these firma, directly administered
by the HV Elektrotechnik, are Gluehlampenwerk VEB Dresden, Dresden N 23
(N52/F 29), 92 Grossenhainerstrasse; Gluehlampenwerk VEB Plauen,
Plauen/Vogtland (M51/K 12), 6 Dimitroffstrasse; and Berlin Gluehlampen-
werk VEB (BGW), Berlin 017 (N53/Z 75), 20/23 Rotherstrasse. The four
lesser lamp plants are Gluehlampenwerk VEB Zwickau, Zwickau, Saxony;
Gluehlampenwerk VEB Eisenach, Eisenach, Thuringia; Gluehlampenwerk VEB
Oberweinsbach, Oberweinsbach, Thuringia; and Gluehlampenwerk VEB Gross-
breitenbach, Grossbreitenbach, Thuringia.
a. Output of the Tube Indpatu. 21/
The 1949-51 production of the East German electron tube
industry is summarized in Table 3.* (Production of electron tubes and
electric lamps in East Germany is given by plant in Appendix D.)
, The East German tube industry, hampered greatly by short-
ages and lack of direction before 1949, was producing inefkiciently and
at a relatively low level. The total output for the 3-year period of
1946-48, including all classes of tubes, is estimated to have been
approximately 2.6 million tubes, having a factory sales value of $1.7
million.
Assuming that demand for tubes continues to be, high,
expansion of the East German tube industry will provide an effective
production capacity, by late 1952 or .1953, as indicated in Table 4.**
b. Outplit of the Lamp Industrv. la/
The East German producers of electric lamps were severely
' limited by materials shortages through 1949. Total industry production
of lampi is estimated in Table 5.*** Further expansion in output of lamps
* Table 3 follows on p. 26.
** Table 4 follows on p. 27.
*** Table 5 follows on p. 28.
- 25 -
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-EZ-R-E-T
Table 3
Production of the East ,German Electron Tube Industry
1949-51
Receiving Tubes Special Tubes
Cathode-ray Tubes All Tubes
Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value
(Thousand (Thousan4 (Thousand (Thousan4 (Thousand (Thousan4 (Thousand (Thousan4
Year Units) $ US) 2,/ Units) $ US) N Units) $ US) 2Y Units) $ us) Y
1949
1,570
890
56
300
o
0
1,626
1,290
1950
2,750
1,495
60
526
1
20
2,811
2,0141
1951
3,606
1,930
108
1,290
25
410
3,739
3,630
a, Value data based upon current US f.o.b. prices for equivalent products.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 4
Estimated Production Capacity of the East German Electron Tube 'Industry
1952-53
Special Tubes
Cathode-ray Tubes
All Tubes
Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value
(Thousand (Thousan4 (Thousand (Thousan4 (Thousand (Thousan4 (Thousand (Thousan4
Units) $ US) 2( Units) $ US) 2/ Units) $ US) 2/ Units) $ US) 2/
4,470 2,680 155 1,770 50 1,000 5,175 5,450
a. Value data based upon current US f.o.b. prices for equivalent products. '
- 27 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07 : CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S -E-C -11-E -T
Table 5
Production of the East German Electric Lamp Industry
1949-51
General-serviceImu Miniature Lamps
Volume Value Volume Value
(Thousand (Thousan4 (Thousand (Thousan4
Year Units) $ US) F./ Units) $ US) Y
1949
5,000
N.A.
1950
15,000
1,200
1951
2,800
2,300
3,000 N.A.
8,000 500
12,000 700
Special
Lamps
Volume
(Thousand
Units)
Value
(Thousand
$ US) Y
All Lamps
Volume
(Thousand
Units)
Value
(Thousand
$ US) y
100
N.A.
8,100
650
500
300
23,500
2,000
900
600
40,900
3,900
. Including fluorescent lamps.
b. Value data based upon current US f.o.b prices for equivalent products.
-28-
S-E-C-R,E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
is planned to attain five times the 1950 rate by 1955. In view of equip-
ment and materials problems, it is unlikely that this goal will be it.
An increase can be expected, however, probably reaching from 60 million
to 70 million lamps by the end of 1953.
c. productivity.
Employment and production output data for the East German
tube and lamp industry in 1951 indicate that the average productivity can
be closely measured at $750 per employee per year. This relatively low
(labor) productivity is illustrated by the 1950 and 1951 average outputs
of about 4.5 incandescent lamps per employee per hour. and. 0.45 receiving
tube per employee per hour.
These very low values for labor productivity, awreciably
less than any other European tube and lamp industry, can be attributed to
four factors: an inadequate number of key machines, frequent failures to
obtain required production materials and use of inferior materials, expen-
sive structural design and manufacturing methods, and the frequent tend-
ency to pad the payroll with unnecessary employees.
4. Czechoslovak Tube and Lamp Industry. Di
Before early 1950, all of the electron tubes made in Czecho-
slovakia were produced in plants of the Tesla =tine, principally in
the two Prague plants, Hloubetin I and Hloubetin II, formerly awned by
Philips of Eindhoven, the Netherlands, and in the Vrchlabi plant. formerly
owned by Lorenz of Berlin. a 50X1
proposed new plant was to be built in Roznov pod Radhostem. This plant,
under the Tesla management, was to be the principal site for the menu-
facture of electron tUbes. The Hloubetin and the Vrchlabi plants were to
be incorporated into the new Roznov plant. Since there is no direct report
on the productive facilities at this new Roznov plant, an estimate must
be made of the capacity and output of the new plant by referring to its
major constituents. It will be useful, therefore, to discuss the
Hloubetin and Vrchlabi plants, even though it is now probable that they
have been included in the Roznov plant.
Before World War II the two Hloubetin plants together produced
between 2 million and 3 million tubes a year. In 1950, under Tesla, these
plants were producing tubes at a yearly rate of 1.3 mdllion, but the
shrinkage rate was so high that the production of adequate tubes probably
did not exceed 800,000. There was a secret section of Hloubetin II Which
made radar and special transmitting tubes.
- 29 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
The Tesla plant at Vrchlabi was partially dismantled by the
Soviets after World War II. Equipment was removed in a careless fashion,
and the result was partial disruption of production. As this plant is
approximately one-half the size of the tube making facilities at Hioubetin,
a rough estimate of its 1950 production rate mould be 400,000 tubes of
acceptable quality. Both the HloUbetin and the Vtchlabi plants produced
receiving tubes, and both Hloubetin I and II are known to have produced
transmitting tubes.
The new Tesla plant at Roznov pod Radhostem was planned to be
a $10 million enterprise producing receiving and transmitting tubes.
Under this proposal, all the tube-making facilities in Czechoslovakia
were to be moved to Roznov, and additional machinery also was to be
procured. The completion date was expected to be late in 1950, and 4,000
workmen were to be required.
The Tesla plant was rumored to be under construction by the
Philips Company of the Netherlands, but to date this rumor has been
unsubstantiated, although there are indications that Philips is interested
in dealing with the Soviet Bloc.
It is
significant, however, that the prewar capacity of the Tesla properties
was between 2 million and 3 million tubes a year. The site for this
plant WAS chosen by the Soviets with security in mind. There is evidence
of the production of such special types of tubes as iconoscopes and radar.
Four other plants in Czechoslovakia are believed to be producing
tubes and lamps. At Elphya in Vilsnice a very small quantity of thyra-
trona is made at one plant, and in another the manufacture of US-type 10-
millimeter miniatures is planned but as yet unrealized. In Dolny nibin a
factory was to be set up, reportedly to manufacture miniature and radio
tubes, but as yet there is no report of output.
The Kavalier firm in Sazava was manufacturing a miniature or
subminiature tube in late 1948, but it is reported to have discontinued
production. The production of these types of tubes could conceivably .
have been an attempt to manufacture tubes for proximity fuses,
the manufacture of small shatterproof glass ampules at this plant.
-30-
50X-1
50X1
?
50X1
50X1
5UX1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S -E
a. Output.
As stated above, the total output of Czechoslovak elec-
tron tubes closely approximates the output of the Roznov plant, since all
or most of the tube making facilities of the country were supposed to be
concentrated there. On the basis of the production rates of Hloubetin
and Vrchlabi for 1950, plus planned additions to the new Roznov plant,
the output of electron tubes in Czechoslovakia was estimated to be
approximately 2 million units for 1950 and approximately 2.5 million for
1951, having an approximate value of $3.5 million. (Production of
electron tubes and electric lamps in Czechoslovakia is given by plant
in Appendix D.)
These estimates are partially confirmed by published
reports in Czechoslovakia and in the USSR. The published Plan for the
Czechoslovak tube and lamp industry for 1949 called for the manufacture
of 2.3 million tubes, and a Soviet magazine published in 1950 gave the
Czechoslovak output as 1,652,000 units for 1947 and 2,388,000 units for
1948. Since this 1948 figure probably is intended to show an improve-
ment caused by the change of regime in Czechoslovakia, it undoubtedly
is too high, but it does indicate the general range of possibilities.
The following figures give an indication of the growth
and planned growth in the Czechoslovak tube and lamp industry. In 1947
the value of the output of tubes and lamps in Czechoslovakia amounted
to 330 million crowns, and in 1948 this value was 506 million crowns.
The value of the planned output of the tube and lamp industry given in
the Five Year Plan covering the period 1949 through 1953, in millions
of crowns, was 574 for 1949, 610 for 1950, 670 for 1951, 718 for 1952,
and 722 for 1953.
The Czechoslovak electron tube industry is hampered by
a serious lack of capable engineers and technicians and by shortages
of modern machinery. Difficulties with production of CR tubes are
attributed to outmoded machinery. There also have been certain shortages
of materials, particularly of molybdenum and tungsten filaments in the
10- to 30-micron sizes. In general, this industry is suffering from
development and production problems, which will ndt be solved in the
very near future unless outside aid, primarily of a technical nature, is
procured. The new plant at Roznov, in all probability, was an attempt
to make a fresh start in this industry, but results cannot be expected
too quickly. Thus it is believed that the Czechoslovak electron tube
industry will not be capable of furnishing much more equipment to the
military and civilian sectors of the economy in the next 2 or 3 years
than it already is furnishing.
- 31
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
gra-c.17E-z
b. Productivity.
The Czechoslovak electron tube industry is characterized
by very low efficiency, the shrinkage rate for
receiving tubes is 60 percent, an alarmingly high rate in comparison
with the US rate of about 20 percent. Furthermore, even tubes which
are passed by the inspectors frequently are found to be defective or to
operate in a satisfactory manner for only a very short time. Typical
troubles are with microphonics and loss of vacuum. An attempt usually
is made to obtain foreign tubes when special applications arise. Thus
it is common for the Czechoslovak government to advertise for special
types to be obtained from any source, with no questions asked.
Inability to obtain certain inputs is another disrupting
factor in Czechoslovakia. Satisfactory cathode sleeves are hard to
obtain, as are molybdenum and tungsten wire. Another item difficult to
obtain is insulating material,'presumably.mica. Attempts are made to
substitute less scarce materials, and the result often is poor-quality
output. An example of this is the substitution of steel for molybdenum
in certain applications, with a resultant deterioration of the product.
The labor force involved in Czechoslovak production of
electron tubes consists mainly of young women -- a standard practice in
this industry elsewhere in the Bloc. The average rate of pay for
workers is 4,500 crowns a year; for specialists, 5,000 to 7,000 crowns
a year; and for engineers, 9,000 to 12,000 crowns a year.
On the basis of information on the Roinov plant the best
estimate of the labor force engaged in the production of electron tubes
in Czechoslovakia is 4,500 workers, including nonproduction workers.
4,000 workers at Roznov, plus a
figure of 500 to account for development and laboratory personnel engaged
In this field at other locations. There is no good evidence from which
to estimate the actual labor force engaged in lamp production in Czecho-
slovakia.*
There is evidence that Czechoslovak management does not
make the most efficient use of whatever good equipment it has on hand.
Some new equipment has been deteriorating in storage while
less effective machinery was In use. This situation may be caused by
* A figure of approximately 300 workers as the labor requirements in
this industry may be obtained through the use of the input coefficients
discussed in Appendix F.
-32-
50X1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
lack of personnel qualified to use the newer types of machinery.
The number of projects in the Czechoslovak electron tube
industry which have had to be discontinued, usually for failure to attain
good-quality output, is generally strong evidence of ineffective manage-
ment and inefficient engineering practices and techniques.
5. Tube and La= Industries of Poland, Rumania, and China. 14/
At the present time the manufacture of electron tubes is neg-
ligible in other areas under Soviet influence. A small tube plant is
operated in China, with very limited output, apparently concentrating on
a few simple types af tubes for communications systems. In Dzierzoniow,
Poland, a small tube plant previously established by the Germans continues
to produce a few simple types of receiving tubes at a low level, of output.
In Warsaw the former Philips-Wola tube and lamp factory, destroyed during
World War II, was rebuilt during 1950 and 1951 with technical aid and machin-
ery supplied by the Philips Company of the Netherlands. Although this plant
is scheduled to become a significant producer of tubes, it is not an impor-
tant factor at present. Incandescent lamps are produced in Poland and
Rumania, but the total annual output is relatively small, being estimated
at 30 million units, or under $3 million annually.*
B. Costs and Prices. 25/
1. Retail and F.0.13, Prices.
In the USSR, f.o.b. plant prices for receiving tubes and allied
products range from 5.5 to 20 rubles a tube. For the group of receiving
tubes most commonly used the average f.o.b. price is 7 rubles, and for this
same group of receiving tubes the average retail price on the domestic market
is reported to be about 12 rubles.
In East Germany the f.o.b. plant prices for receiving tubes and
allied products range from 5.5 to 50 East Deutsche Mark (EDM). For the
standard group of receiving tubes the average f.o.b. price is EDM 10. An
estimate for domestic retail prices for such tubes is EDM 25.
In Czechoslovakia, only data for retail prices have been reported.
These prices range from 40 to 290 crowns a tube, and the average retail
price on the domestic market for the common receiving tubes is about 240
* For summary estimates of Soviet Bloc tube and lamp production, see
Tables 16 and 17, following on pp. 59 and 60, and. p. 61, respectively.
- 33 -
a-E-C-E-E-i
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2013/08/07 : CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
2. Pricine_Methods.
crowns.
Pricing methods for electron tubes in the Soviet Bloc are in-
aicated by the pricing methods known to be in use in East Germany. In
relation to a measure of plant output, four sets of price data may be
available: the gross production at planned statistical values, the net
production at planned statistical values, the gross production at the
average sales price, and the net production at the average sales price.
Where available, value reported in terms of net plant production at the
average sales price is preferred for intelligence analysis. Although
variations between these four methods apparently are not great for a
total industry average figure, discrepancies may be quite appreciable
when the methods are applied to individual plants. In East Germany,
actual sales prices for products are fixed by directive of the Price
Office of the Ministry of Finance, Berlin. The current domestic selling
price is based on a flat 30-percent increase over the 1944 ceilings. ?
However, the price is modified by individual adjustments which are
determined by government-approved costs, with the result that the average
domestic f.o.b. selling price for the East German electron tube industry
is approximately 45 percent above the applicable 1944 ceilings. Since
current Soviet purchases for tubes, as well as other engineering industry
products, are made at the 1944 ceiling prices, the actual weighted f.o.b.
plant price for East German tubes will vary, depending upon the ratio of
domestic tube sales to the Soviets.
In East Germany the intent is to apply to tube products
statistical plan values which are a fair representation of actual weighted
f.o.b. sales prices. Although no similar data are available for the tube
industry in the USSR, it is believed that this same intent is applied in
the USSR: that is, the values used for plan estimates are indicative of
averaged f.o.b. prices.
3. Prices and Costs.
An analysis of both Soviet and East German data concerning the
electron tube industry indicates that f.o.b. prices reflect costs, within
practical limitations. In East Germany the output per employee per month
is EDM 875 for the receiving tube category, and the cost of wages and
salaries approximates 45 percent of net sales. In the USSR the output per
employee per month is 1,350 rubles for this same category, and wages and
salaries approximate 55 percent of net sales. This percentage is to be
compared with the US industry average of wages and salaries to net sales
- 34 -
2:-ZHa-a-ka
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
A-E-12.47E-1
of 52 percent. In the USSR, where such raw materials as glass and
tungsten metal products are fabricated to a greater extent within the
tube factories, the labor content should be higher than that of the US.
4. Aelative Prices.
In the electron tube industries of the USSR, East Germany,
and the US the ratio of wages and salaries to net sales decreases as
the product line is changed to include a higher proportion of large
special-purpose and transmitting tubes. The ruble is worth nearly EDM 2
when the comparison is based upon mass-produced receiving tubes which
require a high proportion of skilled direct labor supported by extensive
machinery and tooling. The Bloc-to-US price ratio decreases, however,
on the large specialized transmitting tubes which require expensive
materials but less labor and relatively less complex machinery. Table OF
gives a summary of averaged f.o.b. prices for electron tube categories,
comparing USSR, East German, and US values.
C. Itports and Exports of pubes. 16/
1. Imuorti from _pie West.
a. LIZ.
Since most of the electron tubes which the USSR might wish
to import are on various US export control lists and, to a lesser extent,
on the export control lists of other Western countries, it is necessary
for the USSR to resort to indireet means of obtaining these commodities.
Some European countries, which have export control lists that are not so
inclusive, ship directly to the USSR and especially to the Satellites.
In addition, there are possibilities for illegal shipments from these
countries, including particularly Italy, the Netherlands, West Germany,
the UK, and France.
Of greater potential importance are imports into the USSR
and the Soviet Bloc that are handled as transshipments. Goods produced
either in the US or in Western Europe are reaching the Soviet Bloc through
six principal channels as transshipments. These channels are across
* Table 6 follows on p. 36.
- 35 -
27E7k7E-1-1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
2HEC-17E-T
Table 6
Comparison of Net F.O.B. Unit Prices for Equivalent
Categories of Electron Tubes
Product
US ($)
USSR
(Rubles)
East Germany
(EDM)
Ratio of Ratio of
Rubles to $ EDM to $,
Standard Receiving
Tubes
0.54
7.0
13.3
13.2
25.0
Allied Types or
Small Transmitting
Tubes
1.50
16.5
N.A.
11.0
N.A.
Transmitting Tubes
(under 100 Watts)
10.00
N.A.
186.0
N.A.
18.6
Transmitting Tubes
(100 Watts to
1 Kilowatt)
35.00
N.A.
465.0
N.A.
13.3
Transmitting Tubes
(10 to al Kilowatts)
N.A.
3,250.0
N.A.
12.0
Ultrahigh-frequency
.270.00
Transmitting Tubes
15.00
150.0
N.A.
10.0
N.A.
Transmitting Tubes
(above 60 Kilowatts)
750.00
4,900.0
5,600.0
6.6
7.5
German interzonal borders, through Switzerland, Vienna, Sweden, and India
and possibly through Indonesia and South America. A typical transaction
involved the purchase by a Rumanian, for the Soviet account, of US sub-
miniature tubes purchased from a US manufacturer by a Stockholm dealer.
The volume of these transshipments is difficult to estab-
lish, but it is thought that in some lines where domestic production is
especially weak, great emphasis is placed on securing imports by these and
similar means.
b. Czechoslovakia.
Czechoslovakia imports a large percentage of all the elec-
tron tubes which it uses. These tubes are obtained largely from Sweden,
Switzerland, and Hungary and particularly from Philips in the Netherlands.
Types imported range from the more complicated receiving types to special
and large transmitting tubes. In general, Czechoslovakia tends to import
- 36 -
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
those tubes. which it is unable to produce for technical reasons.
c. east Germany.
East Germany's importations from the West probably are
very rarely for its own account but rather are for transshipment to the
USSR or perhaps to the Satellites.
d. Hungary, Ru4ania, and Poland.
Hungary, Rumania, and Poland have imported electron tubes
from Switzerland and from the Netherlands for their own account and prob-
ably for transshipment to the USSR.
2. Amorta to the West.
a. USSR.
It is not believed that the USSR exports many electron
tubes out of the Bloc, except perhaps in finished equipment such as civil-
ian radios which are exported to India and to other countries. These
exports are not of significant size. Small shipments of tubes have gone
to Finland.
b. Czechoslovakia.
Czechoslovakia, in spite of its own domestic difficulties
in the electron tube industry, does attempt to export tubes to the West,
sometimes on very favorable terms. For instance, US buyers have been
offered Czechoslovak miniatures through a Stockholm intermediary at prices
substantially below the best prevailing US prices for the game types. It
is thought that this effort is directed toward establishing a favorable
political environment for trading relations with the West in order to be
able to obtain needed types of tubes in exchange.
C. punzary.
Hungary's export of electron tubes to the West is of
significant proportion. Shipments go to Argentina, Switzerland, Egypt,
and other countries.
Historically, Hungary has been a large-scale exporter of
electrical equipment, including electron tubes. Before World War II a
large Hungarian sales force operated all over the world. This sales
force still is in operation, and the pattern of output in the Hungarian
- 37 -
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
electron tube industry reflects the needs of foreign buyers of electron
tubes. Extorts have continued to these buyers as a matter of estab-
lished trading relations.
These established trading relations have been helpful to
Hungary in its-attempt to secure critical input materials from the West.
For example, Hungary exports tubes to Argentina and is able to secure
strategic mica in return. It is also of some interest that the USSR
allows these exports of electron tubes outside the Bloc, for it is clear
that if the USSR were feverishly in need of these tubes, it would require
Hungarian production to be retained in the Bloc.
d. East Germany, Rumania, and Poland.
Available information indicates that East Germany, Rumania,
and Poland do not have significant export trade in electron tubes with the
West.
3. Inter-Bloc ShiRpents.
The USSR probably ships electron tubes to all of the Satellites
and reCeives in exchange 2 million or 3 million tubes in excess of exports.
The pattern consists of the Soviets' sending receiving tubes to all of the
Satellites for civilian use and sending some transmitting tubes and spe-
cial types for use in equipment made on the Soviet account. In return, the
Satellites export to the USSR certain special types, and also some tubes,
made domestically, which are incorporated into end equipment that is ex-
ported to the USSR. The favorable Soviet export balance possibly maybe
explained by the fact that exports are predominantly receiving types,
whereas imports tend to be larger types, such as transmitting tubes. The
balance probably is less favorable to the USSR on a valve basis than on a
unit basis, since receiving types are considerably less expensive than
transmitting and special types.
rv? IEW_J.tgakEtatEii*
A. USSR. .1.3/
1. 3.951 In2ut Recluirements.
Annual requirements for the critical production materials
consumed by the Soviet tube and lamp industry for operations during 1951
* The figures given in this section for input requirements have all been
computed by the use of the input coefficients discussed in Appendix P.
38 -
S-E-C-R-E.0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
are estimated in Table 7.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 7
Input Requirements of the Soviet Tube and Lamp Industry
1951
Material
Receiving Tubes
Special Tubes
Lamps
Total
Technical Glass (Tons)
1,700
200
6,300
8,200
Tungsten Wire (Million
Meters)
27
113
140
Molybdenum Rods and
Sheet (Lbs)
23,000
23,000
Grid Wire(May) Ni,
and Fe Alloys)
(Million Meters)
170
170
Nickel (Lbs)
270,000
270,000
Cathode Sleeves
(lUnions)
40
4o
Tungsten Rods (Lbs)
19,000
19,000
Mica (Raw Block,
Strategic quality)
(Lbs)
6100000
610,000
The annual consumption by the industry of other ipportant.metals,
including copper, steel, and aluminum, is relatively small.
2. Sources of Supply.
For the requirements of the tube and lamp industry, the USSR
is believed to be adequately supplied with nickel from indigenous sources.
The USSR is an exporter to the East German industry.
? 50X1
Domestic producers of technical glass for industry (including
bulbs and tubing and both soft and hard glasses) are the Svetlana Plant
Leningrad; Institute Fryazino (Shcheikovo), near Moscow; 50X1
the Electric Lamp Plant Tashkent; the new glass department 50X1
at the Electric Lamp Works ,Moscow; the Zaprudnya Electric Lamp 50X1
Works, Moscow Oblast; and the. "October" Glass Plant, Ealasbnikovo, Kalinin
Oblast. A glass plant also maybe included in the Electric Lamp Factory
-39-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C?R-E4
Novosibirsk. The combined raw glass-making capacity greatly
exceeds total requirements, and the geographical dispersion reduces the
vulnerability as compared with conditions in Western Europe and the US.
It is noted that in 1944 the US shipped to the USSR four glass furnaces
for bulb and tubing glass, having a combined maximum annual capacity of
20,000 tons.
Clear mica sheet and block are processed for the tube in-
dustry at two major plants -- the "8th of March" Mica Factory at
Petrozavoddk and the Mica Trust Fabricating Plant at Irkutsk -- and at
two smaller fabricating shops in Leningrad. Apparently the USSR imports
very little high-quality mica from India, nor does it export Soviet mica
to the electronics industries of the Satellites. It is concluded that
the USSR is just about self-sufficient for its awn domestic needs.
Sources of the raw block:mica are believed to be primarily the Siberian
nuscovite deposits in the Mama River area and good local deposits in the
Karelian area.
50X1
Tungsten, molybdenum and other refractory metal products
required by the tube and lamp industry are known to be fabricated in the
Svetlana and the Moscow lamp plants and possibly in 550X1
another metal plant in northeast Moscow. Although facility expansions
were reported in 1948 and 1950, the processing techniques are most dif-
ficult, and an extensive expansion takes a long time. At present the
domestic production of these specialized metal products falls far short
of meeting requirements.
In addition to the domestic production of glass parts and the
import?of some glass bulbs fram Finland, during 1950 and 1951 the USSR
imported glass bulbs from the Soviet-controlled Viennese firm Wiener
Glasshuetenwerk at a rate of about 5 million units a year. The import of
glass parts for the Soviet tube and lamp industry, however, is not
essential.
During 1950 and 1951, heavy imports by the USSR of tungsten
and molybdenum metal products, including fine wire, were reported. These
imports provided from 50 to 60 percent of the total Soviet tube and lamp
industry requirements for tungsten wire and about 30 percent of the
requirements for ingots, rod, and sheet. The principal supplier for the
wire is the Swedish firm Lumalampan AB, Stockholm, on direct contracts
with the USSR. Other large suppliers of tungsten and molybdenum metal
products are the Metalkwerk Plansee, Reutte, Austria; Osram GmbH, Berlin;
and the Vereinigte Drahtwerk, Nijmegen. These transactions generally are
accomplished through Swiss and East German intermediaries. Termination
-40-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
of West European shiptents of tungsten and molybdenum metal products into
the Soviet Bloc would severely limit the Soviet tube and lamp industry,
possibly reducing its present capabilities by one-half and thus would
have a far-reaching effect upon the Soviet military electronics program.
This effect would be aggravated by a similar termination of diamond-die
and die-stone shipments, since these items are required in the USSR for
wire-drawing.
B. Ronery. ly
1. 1951 Input Requirements.
The output of electron tubes and lamps in Hungary in 1951 was
as follows: receiving tubes, 4 million units; transmitting tubes i to the
value of $2.6 million; and all lamps, 41.2 million units. Table 8* shows
the amounts of certain critical materials required by in 1951 to
support this volume of output in these industries.
2. Sources of Supply.
Hungary has two major plants engaged in the production of tech-
nical glass. These plants are capable of satisfying all domestic require-
ments and provide a surplus for export. Hungary also has a plant, UTICO
"Tbmgsram," which is able to draw tungsten and molybdenum into wire for
electron tube and lamp manufacturing. Most of the imports in this line
are tungsten and molybdenum in the form of ore or in unfabricated shapes,
some of which are obtained through Italy and some through Austria. In
addition, the former Tungsram plant in Paris has agreed to ship to Hungary
$2 million worth of tungsten and molybdenum ore, ingots, wire, and various
rare gases in payment of an old debt.
Hungary imports from the West, particularly Austria, most of
its supplies of nickel getter wire, nickel cathode sleeves, nickel sheets
and plates and tubes, and nickel alloys for grid wire. Getter wire, from
Leyboldt and Philips, Vienna, and other nickel products are obtained under
a treaty arrangement with Austria. Hungary also has no domestic supplies
of mica. Under a treaty with Argentina it is expected that Hungary will
obtain the greater part of its requirements from that country.
It is evident that in some commodities, particularly nickel,
mica, and unfabricated tungsten and molybdenum shapes, Hungary is very
much dependent upon the West for its supplies. Although attempts to
* Table 8 follows on p. 42.
-41-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0_
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 8
Input Requirements of the Hungarian Mix and Lamp Industry
1951
Material
Receiving
Tubes
Transmitting
Tubes
Lamps
Total
Technical Glass (Lbs)
360,000
goo
3,893,490
4,254,300
Tungsten Wire and
Rods (Lbs)
680
2,418
1,831
4,929
Tungsten Wire (Meters)
3,200,000
32,960,000
36,16o,000
Molybdenum Rods and
Sheet (Lbs)
2,808
2,808
Grid Wire (Moly, Ni,
and Fe Alloys)
(Million Meters)
20
20
Nickel (including
Cathode Sleeves)
(Lbs)
40,000
11.0,000
Cathode Sleeves (Lbs)
1,200
1,200
Mica (Raw Block,
Strategic Quality)
(Lbs)
60,000
60,000
decrease this trade will hamper Hungary in its production efforts, most of
the requirements will be obtained through more or less illegal means --
that is, by transshipments through West Germany, Switzerland, and Austria.
The central direction of all importing activity in Hungary increases the
effectiveness of such illegal trading.
C. East Germav. 2.2/
1. 1951 Input Requirements.
The output of tubes and lamps for 1951 in East Germany was
as follows: receiving tubes, 3,606,000 units; transmitting tubes,
108,000 units; CR tubes, 25,000 units; lamps, including miniature lamps,
40 million units. On the basis of these estimates, Table 9* was con-
structed showing the requirements of certain critical materials in these
* Table 9 follows on p. 43.
-42-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 9
6 Input Requirements of the East German Tube and Lapp Industry
1951
?
Receiving Transmitting Cathode- Electric
Material Tubes Tubes ray lathes Lamps Total
Technical Glass
(Lbs) 324,540 9,720 200,000 3,780,000 4,314,260
Tungsten Wire
and Rods (Lbs) 613 3,780 1,777 6,170
Tungsten Wire
(Meters) 2,884,810 32,000,000 34,884,800
Molybdenum Rods
and Sheet (Lbs) 3,780 3,780
Grid Wire (Moly,
Ni, and Fe
Alloys)
(Meters) 18,030,000 18,030,000
Nickel (inclu
Cathode Sleeves
(Lbs) 36,060 36,060 '
Cathode Sleeves
(Lbs) 1,081 1,081
Mica (Raw Block,
Strategic Qual-
ity) (Lbs) 54,090 54,090
industries for the volume of output.
2. Sources of Supply.
East Germany is entirely self-sufficient as regards the actual
production of glass for tubes and lamps. A small amount of some raw mate-
rials for this production must be imported, but tube and lamp plants in
East Germany ate able to buy all their glass requirements domestically.
Because of a lead shortage in East Germany, an attempt has been made to
lower the lead content of all glass, in some cases substituting magnesium.
In one instance the premature adoption of a new composition was respon-
sible for the breakdown of several million lamps after a. very short time
in operation.
-43-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Tungsten and molybdenum are drawn into wire by the Werkfner
Fernmeldewesen HF (0SW), and by the Berliner Gluehlampenwerk, formerly
an Osram plant, Berlin. Metallic tungsten and molybdenum are obtained
from Austria and Denmark by means of transshipments through Switzerland
and Sweden. Atypical transaction may include an Austrian supplier
such as Metallwerk Plansee, Tyrol, Austria, shipping to East Germany
through an intermediary in Switzerland such as the B. & Ch. Elber firm,
Zurich. Elber also is agent for another very important supplier of
these materials, Heraeus in Hanau, West Germany.
Much nickel sheet is imported from the USSR. Nickel tubes
for the manufacture of seamless nickel cathode sleeves are obtained
from Heraeus in Hanau. It is necessary to import these tubes, since
East Germany is incapable of producing them with sufficient purity for
use in the fabrication of cathode sleeves.
Firms supplying East Germany with wire of various alloys are
Heraeus, Hanau; Stahlwerke Ergste AG, Schwerte, Ruhr; Deutsche Edelstahl-
werke AG, Stuttgart-Feuerbach; Stahlwerk Harkort-Eicken, Hagen, Westphalia;
C. Knhbier & Sohn, Dahlerbruedk, Westphalia; Siemens-Halske AG, Berlin;
and Osram GMbH, Berlin. "Dumet" is supplied by Heinrich rAhr, Mainz; by
Bruno Dietzel Coburg; and by Osram. Platinum-clad double netal wire is
furnished to East Germany by the Heraeusi Lahr, and Dietze firms.
East Germany has had to rely on the West for its supply of
mica. During World War II, when this supply was cut off, the use of
ceramic spacers was begun. This substitution is at present being renewed.
It is an expensive and difficult process, but there is an adequate supply
of the raw material in East Germany, and the saving in dollar exchange
is believed to justify the effort. East German firms engaged in produc-
tion of ceramics for this purpose are Steatit-Magnesia AG, Berlin;
Keramisches Werk Hescho-Kahla, Hermsdorf, Thuringia; and Electrotechnische
AG, Neuhaus, Thuringia.
Aside from raw materials, vacuum pumps are another item which
East Germany finds it necessary to import. Those built by the Holland-
Marten Company failed to stand up well under heavy-duty operation. Thus
it is necessary for East Germany to continue to use vacuum pumps supplied
by LeYboldt in Cologne.
The dependence of East Germany on the West for critical mate-
rials is manifest. The attempt to substitute less scarce materials has
resulted in an increase in the shrinkage rate, and lately resumption of
the use of the best materials has occurred. It may be assumed that efforts
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
of East Germany ttiobtain these critical materials from the West will
continue and that by legal or illegal means a large part of the require-
ments of these industries will be satisfied.
D. Czechoslovakia. 2Q/
1. 1.951 Input Requirements.
For the purpose of determining the input requirements of cer-
tain critical materials for the manufacture of electron tubes in Czecho-
slovakia, the rate of output for the year 1951 will be taken as 2.5 mil-
lion tubes. Although input requirements for a given number of tubes vary
as the product mix varies, calculations of Czechoslovak electron tube
input requirements will be made on the basis that all of the 2.5 million
tubes are receiving tubes. The reason for this position is twofold. On
the one hand, the production of CR tubes, magnetrons, klystrons, and
other special tubes is believed to be nominal. On the other hand, evidence
is available that the greater part of the output of transmitting tubes is
in the smaller types, no tubes of plate dissipatiol5ox1
in excess of 9 watts are being produced. Even by allowing for some error
in the report, it is clear that the error involved in assuming all produc-
tion to be receiving tubes for purposes of input calculation will be
relatively small.
The output of lamps is taken as being 20 million units for the
year 1951. It is believed that this production consists principally of
general-service incandescent lamps.
Table 10* gives the input requirements for 1951 in the Czecho-
slovak tube and lamp industry.
2. Sources of Supply.
Czechoslovakia is a prolific glass producer, and, in addition
to producing all the glass for its domestic needs in the electron tube
industry, it is able to export a very large amount both to the Satellites
and to the West.
Previous to the Communist coup, nickel alloy cathode sleeves
were obtained from the US, but afterward this material was difficult to
obtain from the US and was sought elsewhere, principally from France,
the UK, and Austria. Some attempt was made to fabricate these sleeves in
Czechoslovakia from imported alloy, but poor results have been caused by
* Table 10 follow on p. 46.
-45-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 10
Input Requirements in the Czechoslovak Tube and Lamp Industry
1951
Material
Receiving
Tubes
Lamps
Total
Glass Ming (Lbs)
54,116
130,000
184,166
Glass Bulbs (Lbs)
108,333
1,760,000
1,868,333
Tungsten Wire (Meters)
2,000,000
18,500,000
20,500,000
Grid Wire (Moly,
and Fe Alloys) (Meters)
12,500,000
12,500,000
Nickel (including Cathode
Sleeves) (Lbs)
25,000
7,500
32,500
Cathode Sleeves (Units)
2,750,000
2,750,000
Cathode Sleeves (Lbs)
7,500
7,500
Mica (Raw Block, Strategic
quality) (Lbs)
37,500
37,500
unsatisfactory machinery. Thus the supply of cathode sleeves is critically
short, since domestic production is insufficient and imports are difficult
to obtain.
Molybdenum and tungsten wire were originally obtained from the
US and Switzerland, but at the present time these materials are very scarce
in Czechoslovakia. Attempts have been made to draw this wire domestically,
but results have been unsatisfactory, particularly in the smaller sizes.
Attempts also have been made to substitute less scarce materials but have
led to lower-quality output. It is believed that some molybdenum wire is
obtained from England.
Mica and nickel sheet used in Czechoslovakia probably are not
domestically available. Most of the nickel sheet used in Czechoslovakia
is obtained from the Heraeus firm in Hanau, West Germany. One possible
source of supply of mica is India. A less likely source is the USSR. It
is known that insulating materials, presumably including mica, are in short
supply.
There is no doubt that the production of electron tubes in
Czechoslovakia is hampered seriously by shortages of materials. It is
difficult, however, to assess the exact damage caused by these shortages,
- 146..
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
?
S-E-C-R-E-T
since the situation is complicated by other lacks, particularly skilled
personnel and some important types of machinery. It is probable that the
principal bottleneck in lamp production is tungsten wire rather than
machinery or personnel, but this has not been definitely established.
E. Soviet Bloc.
1. 1,951 InRut Reguirements.
Annual requirements for the critical production materials
consumed by the Soviet Bloc tube and lamp industry during 1951 are esti-
mated as follows: technical glass, 15,000 metric tons; tungsten wire,
262 million meters; grid wire (molybdenum, nickel, and iron alloys),
225 million meters; tungsten rod, 30,000 pounds; molybdenum rod and
sheet, 30,000 pounds; raw block mica, strategic quality, 765,000 pounds;
nickel, 380,000 pounds; and cathode sleeves, 52 million. ?
2. Sources of Supply.
With six known producers of electrotechnical glass in the
USSR and two major plants each in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and
Hungary, the indigenous supply of technical glass of the Soviet Bloc is
adequate and geographically well distributed. The USSR produces radio-
grade nickel in sufficient quantity to supply its own needs, plus some
for the Satellites. The Satellite industry finds it necessary to import
from Western Europe additional radio nickel, as well as all of the spe-
cial nickel needed for cathode sleeves. The Soviet supply of strategic
mica is adequate only for its own industry. The production and fabrica-
tion of refractory metal products is limited, being available only from
two or three small facilities in the USSR and one each in East Germany
and Hungary.
The Soviet Bloc tube and lamp industry is dependent upon im-
ports for up to 50 percent of the USSR requirements for fine tungsten and
molybdenum wire, 30 percent of the USSR requirements for other tungAten
and molybdenum metals, and the entire Satellite industry requirements for
refractory metal raw materials. Primary suppliers are Lumalampen, Stock*
holm, Sweden; Osram GmbH, West Germany; Metallwerk Plansee, Reutte,
Austria; Tungsram, Paris, France; and branches of the Philips Company,
the Netherlands. Most of the shipments are made through Switzerland,
Sweden, and Berlin.
Mica for the Satellite industry is obtained from West European
suppliers and originates in India and South America. Special cathode nickel
tubing must be imported for the entire Satellite industry and is supplied
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
g7E-IDR-ErT
mostly by HeraeuS and the Philips subsidiary firm, Schoeller Werk AG.
Diamond dies and die-stones must be imported to supply the entire Bloc
requirements. The East German industry also is dependent upon West
German sources for a relatively long list of specialized materials,
including all forms of glass-sealing metals, tube getters, vacuum pumps,
and diffusion pumps.
At present, and for some time in the future, the greatest
vulnerability of the Soviet Bloc tube and lamp industry is in this
dependence upon the West for these specialized production materials and
for certain kinds of automatic machinery. It is estimated that a com-
plete and effective embargo against the export into the Bloc of a few
of the most important items would reduce the Bloc capabilities by as
much as 50 percent.
V. Distribution of Suorlv.
A. USSR. 21/
1. Consumrtion Pattern.
A knowledge, within reasonable limits, of 1950 schedules for
the Soviet manufacture of civilian radio and television receivers; partial
information on tube production by type at two Soviet plants; and spot
reports covering specific military electron tube programs permit a rough
analysis of the recent end use pattern for the Soviet electron tube industry.
As measured by product value, a large part of the output of the industry is
in transmitting and special tubes -- a condition normally inconsistent with
a heavy consumer-goods market. In those instances where schedules have
been reported by type of tube, the product distribution does not match the
types used in Soviet civilian radios. Tube types used in military communica-
tions sets, in altimeters, and in radar devices predominate. The output of
civilian radio equipment has been kept at a low level. Replacement tubes
still are not plentiful, even for such preferred services as some communica-
tions systems, wired radio, and Dosarm Club activities.
Soviet command communications equipment is far less complex and
varied than is that of the US, so that, although the Soviet armed forces
require large amounts of communications equipment for land, sea, and air
use, the number of electron tubes required for these purposes is consid-
erably smaller than for similar amounts of US equipment.
Radar and other electronic applications are produced in large
quantities in the USSR for military uses, but the tendency is to try to
-48-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
?
S-E-C-R-E-T
keep the number of kinds of equipment to a minimum. Certain forms of
radar, however, such as early warning and fire-control types, are held
to be essential, and the output of electron tubes reflects this need.
Wherever possible, the Soviets use and copy Western equipment.
The USSR relies heavily on radio communication for conducting
government business and for the management and administration of industry.
Short-wave networks are in use, and a series of decimeter relay nets is
being built, some of which already are in operation. The electron tubes
required for the short-wave networks are conventional transmitting and
receiving types that are made in large quantity. Ultra-high-frequency and
klystron tubeS are used for the relay networks., Since these types also
are of great importance in the radar program, there is a very large demand
for them.
The part of total Soviet production of electron tubes devoted
to tubes for civilian radio and television uses is very small in relation
to US and Western standards. The limited number of radios produced for
civilian use are very high in price, so that the number of owners of radios
is rather small. However, since the Soviet government considers radio
broadcasting of propaganda, news, and sociopolitical information to be of
extreme importance to the success of the regime, the device of the wired
radio has been developed. The output of_ one radio is wired to speakers in
many homes, thus avoiding duplication of most of the tubes and components
as well 82 controlling the listening habits of the populace. Electron
tubes for the program are principally conventional types, mostly copied
from US tubes, and the Soviets use types already in production rather than
undertake the development of new types. The wired radio system was held
inadequate in 1949, and plans were made for expanding it by 75 percent.
Television stations are telecasting only in the Moscow, Leningrad,
and Kiev areas, and the number of receivers is very small, most of the CR
tube production going to the armed forces.
Analysis of the consumption pattern of the Soviet electron tube
industry indicates a continuing large production of conventional military
communications equipment. There is good evidence of very heavy production
of electron tubes for radar reqpirements, whereas the production of tubes
for civilian consumer goods is relatively low.
2. Trends.
The Most apparent trend is continuing pressure for increased out-
put of the Soviet tube and lamp industry. There is no evidence of any plans
?49?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
for a significant increase in electron tubes for consumer use. There are
increasing indications of accelerated product ion of tubes required for
modern microwave radar.
3. Distribution of Output.
An estimated breakdown of the 1951 output of the Soviet elec-
tron tube industry is provided in Table 11.
Table U
Output Distribution (Product Value)
of the Soviet Electron Tube Industry
1951
End Use
Percent of Total
Civilian Radios, Television Sets, and Replacements
13
Essential Domestic Services and Industrial Uses
16
Military Radio, Maintenance
23
Military Radar, Maintenance
45
Commercial Export (Mostly within the Bloc)
3
4. Indications of Specific Programs.
Based upon reported work at Institute Fryazino
(Shcheikovo), the following specific military electronics programs in the
USSR are identified: ground and shipboard fire-control Vadat in the 5-
band wave lengths, SimilAr to US SCR-584, in quantity production; airborne
radar, probably in the XAaand as well as S-band wave lengths, also in
quantity production; possible production for controls or low-acceleration
proximity fuse devices for missiles.
Based upon reported work at the Svetlana Plant the
following electronics programs are identified: the manufacture of super
high-power transmitters for broadcast, communications, navigation or
jamming; production initiated of improved low-frequency (200-to-300-mega-
cycle) radar systems of much highPr power, for early warning or related
applications; and reported output powers of 2,500-kilowatt peak and 10-
microsecond pulse duration.
- 50 -
S -E -C -R -E -T
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
o
S-E-C-R-E-T
Work at Institute
of military television devices.
Leningrad, indicates some production50X1
B. East Germany. 23/
1. Consumption. Pattern.
Good reports that provide details of production for all four
manufacturers of electron tubes, plus frequent data on particuipr applica-
tions, permit a firm analysis of end use pattern for the East German
electron tube industry. As compared with the Soviet industry, a higher
proportion of the East German output is all6Cated to civilian radio and
television receivers -- all of the latter for export to the USSR. A
smaller but significant amount goes for domestic essential services,
industry, and police needs. Although exports of electron tubes to the
USSR are now less than in 1949, sizable shipments are still made, pri-
marily for military application. The productionof military electronic
equipment manufactured in East Germany to fill Soviet orders is large.
2. Trends.
Pressure for increased production of electron tubes still
continues. Apparently there is no large increase in tubes planned for
the local civilian market. Starting in 1951, the major factor in mod-
ifying the East German electron tube industry plan has been the scheduling
of the Soviet T-2 television receiver to be produced in East Germany
instead of in the USSR. Requirements for this program will continue to
absorb an increasing proportion of the output of tubes.
3. Distribution of Output.
reasonably accurate breakdown for the 1951 output of the
East German electron tube industry is provided in Table 12.*
4. Indications of Specific Programs.
Production of the T-2 television set started at Sachsenwerk
Radeberg in the first quarter of 1951. Production of fram 15,000 to
20,000 sets is probable for 1951, and 1952 production may exceed this
amount.
* Table 12 follows on p. 52.
-51-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
27E-t2E-B71
Table 12
Output Distribution (Product Value)
of the East German Electron Tube Industry
1951
End Use
Percent of Total
Civilian Radios and Replacements
30
Essential Domestic Services
10
T-2 Television Sets (for the USSR)
33
Military ElectronieEquipment
(Mostly for the USSR)
15
Military Tube Exports (to the USSR)
10
Other Commercial Exports
2
Two models of decimeter radio-relay systems for military use
were produced in quantity in 1950. Some production continued in 1951.
Quantity production of a low-frequency radar, or the trani=
mitter components thereof, commenced in 1949 and continued at higher
rates in 1950 and 1951, as indicated by the manufacture of 15-41 tubes
at OSW and FUnkwerk Erfurt.
The quantity manufacture of special high-pressure gas-dis-
charge lamps to fill Soviet orders indicates the possibility of a sizable
Soviet program for infrared systems requiring light sources.
Ci Pungary.
1. ponsumution Pattern.
Little information is available to indicate a detailed end use
pattern for the Hungarian electron tube industry. The proportion of output
electron tubes used for the domestic civilian radio market is not great,
and tubes are available for export, primarily to other Satellites and to
China, although some tubes are shipped to South America and Western Europe.
- 52 -
g.-Era-11-fri
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
2. Trends.
The most apparent trend in the Hungarian electron tube industry
is the plan to increase output.
3. Distribution of Output.
An estimated breakdown for the 1951 output of the Hungarian
electron tube industry is provided in Table 13.
Table 13
Output Distribution (Product Value)
of the Hungarian Electron Tube Industry
1951
End Use
Percent of Total
Civilian Radios and Replacements
12
Essential Domestic Services
6
Military Electronic Equipment
40
Commercial Exports
42
4. Indications of Specific Programs.
Evidence indicates production in Budapest of low-frequency
(possibly about 300-megacycle) radar using Tungsram pulsed triodes.
D. Czechoslovakia. 33/
1. Consumption Pattern.
In terms of both unite and value the greater part of the Czecho-
slovak output of electron tubes consists of receiving and small transmitting
types. The principal Customers for these types are the USSR, the Czecho-
slovak Army, and the makers of the Tesla radios for the domestic market and
for export.
While the Czechoslovak electron tube industry is trying very hard
to achieve competence in the production of radar and thus is trying to
-53-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
develop production of magnetrons and klystrons, there is no evidence of
any substantial production in radar and radar tube types. Similarly,
while CR tubes are in production, this production is small in numbers and
consists only of a few copies of German and US types that have been modi-
fied to fit Czechoslovak needs and capabilities. The main Czechoslovak
tube effort is in the manufacture of tithes for use in military communica-
tions equipment and for use and replacement use in civilian radios. The
share of this equipment going to the USSR maybe as high as 50 percent.
Large numbers of Tesla radios containing domestically constructed receiv-
ing tubes are known to have been sold to Egypt, India, and other countries.
2. Trends.
Evidence indicates that there will continue to be a growing
effort in Czechoslovakia to develop domestic radar and other military
electronic equipment. Attempts to manufacture successfully the necessary
special tubes maybe expected to continue. In this connection, the new
facilities at Roznov pod Radhostem should provide the basis for a fresh
approach to these problems, but the basic difficulties lying in the way
of really effective production of electron tubes will not have been
fundamentally eliminated. Thus, while some progress can be expected, it
is thought unlikely that Czechoslovakia will emerge as a quantity producer
of special types of radar and special transmitting tubes in the very near
future.
Generally speaking, the same conclusion also maybe applied to
receiving types of tubes. Some of the difficulties maybe slowly ironed
out, and production may be expected to rise gradually, but it is unlikely
that there will be any startling developments in this field in Czechoslovakia
in the near future.
Thus the pattern of consumption in Czechoslovakia may be ex-
pected to remain rougply what it is at present, with slow progress being
made toward increased production of special-type and larger transmitting
tubes.
3. Distribution of OutRut.
The distribution of effort between the civilian and military
sectors of the Czechoslovak economy does not, over a period of time, seem
to exhibit any consistency other than that the needs, presumably military,
of the USSR take precedence over domestic requirements when the occasion
demands. It is believed, however, that at present most of the Czecho-
slovak facilities are devoted to domestic projects.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07 : CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C7R -E-T
Although the Czechoslovak Army seems to have preference over
domestic civilian needs in the distribution of electronic equipment, it
is not clear how this equipment is allocated. A large part of the out-
put of electron tubes is known to go into civilian radios for domestic
use as well as for export. The attempts, mostly abortive, of the Czechs
to develop adequate radar tubes, or attempts to buy them abroad, indicate
a strong desire to be able to build domestic radar and other electronic
equipment in quantity. But it is believed that, since this desire is
currently frustrated by inadequate development and technical personnel,
there will not be much consumption of damesticp-lly produced tubes in the
production of more complicated electronic equipment, leaving the domes-
tic consumption of tubes to be divided between civilian radios and mili-
tary and civilian communications. A pattern is not evident. The best
estimate is that the distribution of consumption as between these two
general categories varies widely from year to year as the requirements
of the armed forces change. .
4. Indications of Specific Pro4Fams.
attempts to produce domestic radars
in Czechoslovakia, but it is believed that production of the necessary
electron tubes is low and unsatisfactory. An example is the attempted
proximity fuse project. The Tesla plant at Pardubice was attempting to
develop a radio-operated fuse for a bomb based on a US design which
appeared in a US periodical. TUbes made in the US were obtained for this
project from Switzerland and France. Although six proto-type fuses were
tested, only one fuse functioned at all, and that one prematurely. At
that point the project was discontinued. There is evidence that a Tesla
plant at Vilsnice intended to produce subminiatures, perhaps for this
same project, but no production has been reported.
Magnetrons have been obtained through Sweden, and other radar
tubes have been sought in the US and Switzerland. The Czechs have dem-
onstrated. their great interest in procuring these types by persist-
ence and, by the fact that they are prepared to be generous in their out-
lays of foreign exchange. Domestic production of some of these tubes is
at the very law rate of two a day.
E. Soviet Bloc.
Estimates based upon an analysis of the consumption pattern for
electron tubes show that the more important military electronics programs
of the Soviet Bloc appear to be concentrated primarily within the USSR.
The Satellite electron tube industries make a slgrificant contribution to
less sensitive projects and, in proportion, contribute more heavily to
-55-
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
the over-all Soviet Bloc civilian demand for tubes. Pressure continues
for increased output from the Bloc electron tube industry. Recent expan-
sions and plant rearrangements have been reported in the USSR, East
Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Although the total output of elec-
tron tubes was much higher in 1950 and in 1951 than for previous years,
there are no indications of any significant increase in the portion
allocated to Bloc requirements for civilian consumers.
Table 14 summarizes the over-all Soviet Bloc distribution in out-
put in 1951 for the electron tube industry.
Table 14
' Output Distribution (Product Value)
of the Soviet Bloc Electron Tube Industry
1951
End Use Percent of Total
Civilian Radios, Television Sets,
and Replacements 16
Essential Domestic Services and
Industrial Uses 13
Military Electronic Equipment
and Maintenance 64
Commercial Exports (Mostly
within the Bloc) 7
VI. Summary Estimate for the Soviet Bloc: Capabilities, Vulnerabilities,
and Intentions.
A. Capabilities.
The total output of electron tubes in the Soviet Bloc for 1951 is
estimated to be 46 million tubes of all types at an estimated value of
US $53 million. The production of electric lamps of all types is estimated
for 1951 at 251 million at a value of $22 million.
Table 15* compares the productivity in the tube and lamp industries
of the Soviet Bloc and of the US.
* Table 15 follows on p. 57.
- 56
I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
??????
S-Er-C4i-g71
Table 15
Productivity in he Tube and Lamp Industries
. of the Soviet Bloc and of the US
1951
Country
Value of Output Receiving Tubes
of Tubes and Lamps Produced per Lamps Produced
per Man-year ($ US) Man-hour per Man-hour
USSR
1,450
0.9
6.0
Hungary
1,800
1.6
9.0
East Germany
750
0.45
4.8
Czechoslovakia
620
US
4,512 A/
5.3
40.0
?
a. This figure is dollar output per man-year as of 1947 in the electron
tube industry only.
It is estimated that the Soviet Bloc should be able to increase
its output of tubes and lamps by January 1953 as follows: tubes of all
types to a total of 61 million units, valued at approximately $70.6 mil-
lion, and lamps of all types to a total of 307 million units, valued at
approximately $27.5 million. Tables 16 and 1/* give the production and
estimated capacity for 1951 and 1953 of the Bloc tube and lamp industry.
At the present levels of output the Soviet Bloc is able to furnish
its civilian population with a low but satisfactory level of broadcast
radio service. The armed forces of the Bloc are furnished with a comple-
ment of equipment which is considered to be inadequate by Western standards
but which seems to be satisfactory for the needs of the Bloc. This equip-
ment consists of a large amount of relatively simple communications equip-
ment; many kinds of radar, including relatively modern microwave types;
and special equipment, such as guided missile guidance systems and presum-
ably proximity fuses of certain kinds. Communications networks, especially
in the USSR, also are furnished with adequate supplies from the electron
tube industry.
* Table 16 follows on p. 59; Table 17, on p. 61.
-57-
A7Br-a-a-EnT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
At these levels of output the Soviet Bloc is forced to balance
its interests very carefully. Military and communications requirements,
however, are being fulfilled in terms of the Bloc's conception of its
needs.
With the increased production estimated for the Soviet Bloc, it
should be possible to increase to a significant degree the utilization
of electronics by the Bloc's armed forces. In particular, it is felt
that certain programs, such as the proximity fuse and other expendable
programs which at the present time can be undertaken only with a signif-
icant sacrifice in output of other end items, will be well within the
realm of feasibility, especially in the more important applications such
as antiaircraft. The increased output also should allow the Bloc to
increase the complexity of some of its types of equipment, but most types
probably will remain rudimentary by US standards, since the tendency has
been to increase equipment in terms of numbers rather than in terms of
.complexity. Certain devices, however, such as telemetering equipment
for guided missiles, are necessarily complex, and the added output of
electron tubes will make production of this relatively complex equipment
possible to a greater extent than at present.
There are two factors that limit the ability of the Soviet Bloc
to produce electron tubes and electric lamps. First, aside from further
efforts by the West to interdict the shipment of supplies of critical
materials to the Bloc, there already exist serious shortages that are
hampering efforts to increase production. It is necessary for the Bloc
to employ illegal means in order to obtain much vital input material,
with the result that, this material often is not available exactly when
and where it is needed and often is of inferior quality. Thus, without
any further attempts on the part of the West to stop the flow of critical
materials going to the Bloc, these materials already are in very limited
supply. The second limitation concerns the availability of skilled produc-
tion, design, and development engineers and of trained laborers. Although
this shortage of trained personnel is acute in Czechoslovakia, the rest
of the Soviet Bloc is steadily training such personnel, so that, though
at present there is some shortage, it is felt that it is diminishing and
in a few years should not be a serious limitation.
An allied problem exists in East Germany, where labor productivity
is low as compared with the West and with most of the Soviet Bloc. This
problem is caused more by the customs of the trade in East Germany than
by a low level of skill of the labor force, but the result is relatively
less production than would be possible from the same labor force if such
trade customs were dropped.
- 58 -
a-Fe-C-11-Fri
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Ngs
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 16
Production and Estimated Capacity of the Soviet Bloc Electron Tube Industry
1951 and 1953
1951
1953
Receiving Tubes
Other Tubes
All Tubes
Receiving Tubes
Other Tubes
All Tubes
Volume
(Thousand
Value
(Thousan0
Volume
(Thousand
Value
(Thousa4
Value
(Thousand
Volume
.(Thousand
Value
(Thousan0
Volume
(Thousand
Value
(Thousapyi
Value
(Thousalyi
Country and Plant
Units)
$ US) !Y
Units)
$ us) !I
$ US) 2/
Units)
$ US) .Y
Units)
$ US)!Y
$ 0B) !(
USSR
33,800
21,400
1,283
18,800
40,200
44,500
27,800
1,700
24,200
52,000
Institute. No. 160,
Fryazino (Shchelkovo)
9,000
6,500
73
1,000
7,500
15,000
10,500
120
1,700
12,200
Svetlana No. 211
7,000
3,800
750
4,400
8,200
8,000
4,300
1,000
6,000
10,300
Moscow No. 632
3,500
1,900
150
2,900
4,800
5,000
2,600
200
4,000
6,600
Novosibirsk No. 617
8,500
5,100
280
9,000
14,100
10,000
6,000
330
10,000
16,000
Tashkent No. 191 (390)
3,800
2,100
30
1,500
3,600
4,500
2,400
50
2,500
4,900
Others
2,000
2,000
.o
0
2,000
2,000
2,000
o
o
2,000
Hungary
4,000
2,200
510
2,600
4,800
5,000
2,750
638
3,250-
6,000
UILCO nTungsramte
4,000
2,200
500
2,100
4,300
5,000
2,750
625
2,625
5,375
Transmitting Tube Factory
o
o
lo
500
500 .
o
o
13
625
625
a. Value data based upon current US.f.o.b. prices for equivalent products.
- 59 -
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 16
Production and Estimated Capacity of the Soviet Bloc Electron Tube Industry
1951 and 1953
(contql)
1951
1953
Receiving Tubes
Other Tubes
All Tubes
Receiving Tubes
Other Tubes
All Tubes
Volume Value
(Thousand (Thousand
Volume
(Thousand
Value
(Thousand
Value
(Thousand
Volume
(Thousand
Value
(Thousand
Volume
(Thousand
Value
(Thousand
Value
(Thousand
Country and Plant
Units)
$ US) 2V
Units)
$ us) 2.1
$ us) fkl
Units)
$ US) 2/
Units)
$ US) 2/
$ US) 2/
East Germany
3,606
1,930
133
1,700.
3,630
14,470
2,680
205
2,770
5,45o
OSW
1,000
55o
105
1,160
1,710
1,500
830
170
2,100
2,950
Funkwerk Erfurt
1,400
750
28
540
1,290
2,000
1,080
35
670
1,750
Others
1,206
630
o
0
630
1470
770
0
0
770
Czechoslovakia
2,300
1,700
200
8002?00
.
2,760
2,040
240
960
3,000
Tesla
2,300
1,700
200
800
2,500
2,760
2,040
240
960
3,000
Total
143,700
27,200
-----
2,126
23,900
---
52,000
57,000
35,300,
2,783
,31.200
66,500
a. Value data based upon current US f.o.b. prices for equivalent products.
- 60 -
S-EC-R44
? a
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Table 17
Production and Estimated Capacity
of the Soviet Bloc Electric Lamp Industry
1951 and January 1953
Country and Plant
January 1953
Volume
(Thousand
Units)_
Value
(Thousand
$ US)
Volume
(Thousand
Units)
Value
(Thousand
$ USL.
12,500
Raz
125,000
11,200
142,000
Moscow No. 632
90,000
7,500
100,000
8,400
Svetlana No. 211
20,000
2,200
25,000
2,400
Tashkent No. 191 (390)
3,000
300
5,000
500
Others
12,000
1,200
12,000
1,200
\
ainguy
41,200
4,700
51,500
5,875
ITI100 "Tungsram"
41,200
4,700
51,500
5,875
gast Germany
40,900
3,900
66,500
6,330
Berlin Gluehlampenwerk
19,600
1,800
31,850
2,930
Others
21,300
2,100
34,650
3,400
Dss911221ovakia
15,000
1,340
20,000
1,790
Tesla
15,000
1,340
20,000
1,790
Others
30,000
3,000
30,000
.3,000
Total
251.000
22.500
107,000
27,50Q
-61-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
B. Vulnerabilities.
The electron tube industry in the Soviet Bloc is subject to two
principal vulnerabilities. First, and probably most important, the Bloc
is greatly dependent upon the West for certain critical materials, such
as refractory metals, in refined and fabricated forms, and diamond dies
for drawing fine wire. In addition, although the USSR has enough mica
for its Own uses, the Satellites must rely on imports of this material.
Roughly the same situation exists with regard to nickel, especially nickel
for cathode sleeves. The USSR exports some nickel to the Satellites, but
most of it must come from the West. The output of electric lamps also is
peculiarly vulnerable to this sort of interdiction, since tungsten wire,
largely obtained from the West, is essential to. this production. It is
believed that an effective embargo on these critical materials would
cause the Bloc output of electron tubes to drop by 50 percent. Such an
embargo, however, would be difficult to render completely effective,
since the Bloc already is adept at circumventing such embargoes.
The second vulnerability of the Soviet Bloc tube and lamp indus-
tries is found in the fact that a relatively small number of plants are
engaged in this line of activity. Although there is no one key plant,
as such, there are only nine major facilities in the entire Bloc producing
tubes: five in the USSR, two in East Germany, and one each in Hungary
and in Czechoslovakia. Although it is possible to evacuate these plants
if necessary, Soviet experience in World War II has shown that there is
a large loss of output whenever evacuation is necessary.
C. Intentions.
1. There is some indication that the pattern of use of electron
tubes by the Soviet Bloc is continuing along the lines of the past 5
years. The production of tubes in the Bloc has been heavily weighted in
favor of types for use in military applications, and there does not seem
to be a significant change in the pattern already established.
. 2. Examination of types of electron tubes commonly in military
use in the Soviet Bloc indicates that the production of microwave radar
is increasing.
3, There is some production of subminiature electron tubes in
the Soviet Bloc. This production indicates a potential capability to
deliver tubes required for proximity fuses and certain types of guided
missiles.
- 62 -
S-E,C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
APPENDIX A
TABLE. 18
Classification Codes of Electron/Tubes in the US and the UK, 1943;
in East Germany, 1950*
USW UK ki
Category of Tubes
1943
past Germany, 1950 2/
Mass-produced Receiving
Tubes and Related Types
01
01
36651000 (5 subcodes)
02
02
36654000 (3 subcodes)
51
03
36656000 (4 subcodes)
52
04
36657000 (3 subcodes)
53
06
36683000
54
07
55
08
PF
09
10
11
14
22
Total Classification
in Category
8
12
Large Transmitting and
Special Tubes
03
05
36661000 (2 subcodes)
04
51
36663000
05
52
36665000
06
53
36666000
07
13
36671000
08
15
36672000
Footnotes for TABLE 18 follow on p. 64. .
-63-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-E-E-T
TABLE 18
Classification Codes of Electron TUbes in the US and the UK, 1943;
in East Germany, 1950
(contld)
Categorv of Tubes
US Al
UK 12/
East Germany, 1950 9./
1943
Large Transmitting and
Special Tubes (cont'd)
09
16
36673000
subcodes)
10
17
36674000
(2 subcodes)
11
54
36675000
12
55
36685000
(3 subcodes)
13
19
36687000
14
20
36690000
15
21
16
23
17
30
18
56
19
Total Classification
in Category
1-2
Cathode-ray (CR) Tubes
41
12
36681000
(8 subcodes)
42
18
36686100
43
36686200
44
36686300
45
36681900
46
47
Total Classification
in Category
2
2
12
a. US War Production Board, 1943.
b. UK Ministry of Aircraft Production, 1943.
c. German Democratic Republic Ministry for Planning, 1950.
-64-
S-E-QHR-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-E-E-T
APPENDIX B
THE ELECTRONICS INDUZRY IN THE USSR
1. 1.925.1_1112021.
The broadest definition of electronic equipment is an apparatus which
employs electron tubes as functional component parts together with other
circuit elements. This definition implies that the total economic effort
devoted to the industry manufacturing electronic equipment is related to
the effort devoted to electron tubes. In practice the ratio of the total
output of the electronics industry to the output of electron tubes falls
Within a predictable range, as modified by the following considerations: -
a. The definition of the electronics industry frequently is such
as to encompass the manufacture of wire communications equipment.
b. The product mix of electronic equipment may at times include
a high proportion of items which are largely nonelectronic.
The relationship between the electronics industry and the electron tube
industry is illustrated by the statistics given in Table 19.
Table 19
Ratio of the Annual Output of the Electronics Industry
to the Annual Output of Electron Tubes:
US, 1944, 1947, and 1951; East Germany 1951
Total Output
(Million us)
Country
Year
Electronics Industry
Electron Tubes
Ratio of
Industry to Tubbs
US
1944
3,000
352.00
8.5
US
1947
1,200
125.00
9.6
US
1951
3,500
430.00
8.1
East
Germany
1951
35
3.63
9.6
-65?
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-c-a-E-T
The values for the total output of the electronics industry have been
adjusted to exclude wire communications. The lower ratio for the US in
1951 is probably due to the predominance of the production of television
sets, for which the value of tubes required is relatively high.
By extending this comparison to include the USSR and by employing as
a base the estimate of $40.2 million for the 1951 Soviet output of elec-
tron tubes, a total annual output of about $340 million is indicated for
the Soviet electronics industry. This figure is appreciably higher than
earlier estimates, which have been based largely upon information predating
1949.
A further detailed study of various sectors of the Soviet electronics
program is required to confirm or to amend this estimate of output. It is
believed that the estimate is consistent with conclusions outlined in the
text of this report, that the Soviet electronics industry is now operating
at a level higher than previously suspected, and that an extensive effort
is devoted to the military electronics program.
2. 7ota1 Epployees.
The total number of employees in the Soviet electronics industry may
be estimated in two ways: first, by relating this total to the employees
of electron tube plants and, second, by estimating the industry output
per employee, based upon the tube productivity. Both approaches indicate
a total employment in the industry of about 150,000.
3. Energy Reouirekents.
a. Electric power consumed during 1947 by the US electronics indxistry
was approximately 600 million kilowatt-hours (kwh). Factual data for the
Soviet electronics industry are lacking. The 1951 requirements for elec-
tric power are estimated to be about 90 million kwh.
b. Fuel requirements for the Soviet electronics industry are mainly
for coal. All plants using process gas (where information is available)
have gas generators consuming coal. A small amount of tar oil is consumed
at some glass furnaces. Total 1951 Soviet consumption of coal for the
production of electron tubes is estimated at 170,000 metric tons.
4. Ext2UJIWASHga.1111,71112112n.
A complete analysis for all sectors of the Soviet electronics industry
Is lacking, but the geographical distribution has been estimated through
- 66 -
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
the use of four types of data as follows: the distribution of the elec-
tron tube industry, the distribution of the related electrical machinery
industry, the location of 236 listed electronics plants, and the location
of 69 larger electronics plants. The estimated distribution of output
among the economic regions of the USSR is given in Table 20.* Derivative
estimates are also given for the distribution of manpower, electric power,
and fuel within the industry.
* Table 20 follows on p. 68.
-67-
S-E,C-R-E-I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Table 20
Geographical Distribution of the Soviet Electronics Industry
1951
Economic Region La/
Northwest (Ia)
Northern European USSR (Ib)
Baltic (ha)
Belorussia (IIID)
Ukraine (III)
Lower Don-North Caucasus
Transcaucasus (V)
Volga (VI)
Central European USSR (VII)
Urals (VIII)
West Siberia (IX)
Kazakh SSR (Xa)
Central Asia (M)
East Siberia (XI)
Far East (XII)
(Iv)
Total
Distribution
of Output
(Percent)
23.0
0
Small
0
8.0
Small.
2.0
5.0
35.0
7.0
15.0
0
5.0
Small
0
100.0
Manpower
(Thousands)
34.5
0
Small
0
12.0
Small
3.0
7.5
52.5
10.5
22.5
0
7.5
Small
150,0
Electric Power
Kilawatt-hours)
20.7
0
Small
0
7.2
Small
1.8
4.5
31.5
6.3
13.5
0
4.5
Small
0
Coal
(Thousand
Yetric Tons)
39.1
0
Small
0
13.6
Small
3.4
8.5
59.5
11.9
25.5
0
8.5
Small
;70.0
-68-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
R
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-R-E-I
APPENDIX D
1. USSR.
a. Electric Lamp Works
Moscow.Staliy Rayon. ail 50X1
Plant Moscow, a major Soviet producer of tubes and lamps 50X1
and one of the four divisions of the former Kuybyshev combine. It covers
an area of 30 acres and includes a number of four- and five-story brick
buildin s. Unlike other plants engaged in the manufacture of electronics,
Plant was not greatly dislocated during World War II and has been 50X1
an effective manufacturing enterprise since 1946. In 1945 the plant
established a receiving tube department with personnel and equipment which
were diverted from lamp production. Production of transmitting tubes was
begun in 1947, and production of CR tubes in late 1948. This factory has
been the major Soviet supplier of refractory metals for a number of years.
The Soviet capacity to produce hard metals (tungsten, molybdenum, and
tantalum) has been quite inadequate, and 1950 imports were heavy. Facili-
ties for increased production of these metals were added to Plant 50X1
in late 1949, and tantalum production was started in early 1948. A new
production building for glass manufacturing, added in 1947, should reduce
dependence on outside sources of glass parts. The factory complex uses
cit/power but is reported to have its own large emergency power system.
The program of Plant is concentrated primarily within the 50X1
following lines of activity: research and engineering related to electric
lamps, electron tubes, specialized lamp and tube materials, and certain
types of lamp-making machinery; large-scale manufacture of incandescent
electric lamps and fluorescent lamps; large-scale manufacture of standard
glass receiving tubes; production of CR tubes; and production of medium-
to-very-large transmitting tubes. Wire and metal products are shipped to
other lamp and tube producers.
Key personnel at Plant are reported to include the following 50X1
G.N. Tsvetkov, plant director; Roman Alekseyevich Nialander, chief engineer;
and Zinaida Kondroshova, head of the tube shop. Employees totaled from
6,000 to 7,000 in 1941, and were estimated to be 8,000 in 1950.
plant output and 50X1
performance and on more numerous data relating to inputs, the 1950 output
of Plant is estimated to have totaled 85 million electric lamps of 50X1
-71-
a-E-c-E-gra
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
all types and 3.1 million electron tubes of all types. Table 21,* out-
lining the volume and value of production for Plant for different
years, is consistent with all reported data.
b. Svetlana Plgnt Eneels Prosnekt an0 V. MurinskoRQ,
Zr3neld4-1.Ankgrk? 25/
Svetlana Plant the largest prewar Soviet electron tube
plant, as well as an important lamp producer, is located 5.5 kilometers
north of the Neva River, just to the right of the main Leningrad-to-
Viborg highway. Svetlana includes seven old and four postwar shops, plus
warehouses and an administration building. Its total floor space is
about 850,000 square feet. The original plant, built in 1908, was equipped
in 1937 and 1938 by RCA as a modern tube factory. All important equipment,
together with about 1,000 key personnel, was evacuated to the Novosibirsk
Factory in 1941, and about half of the major machines were lost in
the removal. Starting in 1945, Svetlana was reequipped with plant facili-
ties from Germany and the US. Prewar equipment remained at Novosibirsk,
although many of the personnel returned to Leningrad. After 1947 some
Soviet-made receiving tube and lamp machinery was installed; and plant
equipment for the manufacture of larger transmitting tubes is reported also
to be of Soviet design and manufacture. Svetlana Plant includes
a glass shop, capable of supplying the major part of the plant's require-
ments for tubes and lamps; and a refractory metal refining and wire-drawing
plant which supplies a smaller portion of the plant's needs for tungsten
and molybdenum metal products. Although electric power is purchased from
outside sources, Svetlana has its own powerhouse, rebuilt in 1947, appar-
ently for use as a supplementary and stand-by emergency system.
?
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
The plant director of Svetlana Plant is Galtdin. Employees 50X1
total about 5,000 and in the past included a number of German engineers and
scientists. Although there are indications that the labor supply in the
Leningrad area is limited, the plant appears to be adequately staffed with
direct labor, generally with sufficient experience, and with fairly compe-
tent technical and supervisory personnel. The principal product lines are
general-service incandescent lamps, airport and high-power lamps, fluor-
escent lamps, metal and glass receiving tubes and allied types of small
transmitting tubes, medium- and high-power transmitting tubes, special
tubes (including klystrons), and X-ray tubes. The evaluation in Table 22**
of the output of Svetlana Plant is based primarily on variously 50X1
reported output data in 1947 and 1948, on spot reports for specific
products in 1950, and on reported plant inputs of manpower and materials.
* Table 21 follows on p. 73.
** Table 22 follows on p. 74.
- 72 -
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Table 21
?
Tube and Lamp Production of Soviet Plant
1947, 1949-53
Moscow
Receiving Tubes
Transmitting ap.4
__apeDial Tubes 2/
lamps
All Tubes and Lamps
Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value Value
(Thousand (Thousan4 (Thousand (Thousang (Thousand (Thousap4 (Thousap4
Year Units) g US) 1/ Units) g US) 12/ Units). g US) Y
1947
1,500
800
5
100
63,000
5,300
6,200
1949
2,500
1,300
30
600
78,000
6,500
8,400
1950
3,000
1,600
loo
2,000
85,000
7,100
10,700
1951
3,500
1,900
150
2,900
90,000
7,500
12,300
1952-53
5,000
2,600
200
4,090
100,000
8,400
15,000
. Including cathode-ray tubes.
b. Based on current US f.o.b. prices for equivalent products.
73
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 22
Tube and Lamp Production of Soviet Plant
1947-48, 1950-53
Leningrad 50X1
??????.???...././.../M?
Transmitting and
Receiving Tubes Spial Tubes Lams All Tubes ancl_LNER2
Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value Value
(Thousand (Thousand (Thousand (Thousand (Thousand (Thousand (Thousand
Year Units) $ US) g/ Units) t US) g/ Units) , t US) .1L.& $ US) g/
1947
3,500
1,900
300
1,800
13,000
1,400
5,100
1948
4,000
2,200
400
2,400
17,0CC
1,800
6,400
1950
6,000
3,300 ?
600
3,600
20,000
2,200
9,100
1951
7,000
3,800
750
4,400
20,000
2,200
10,400
1952-53
8,000
4,300
1,000
6,000
25,000
2,400
12,700
a. Based on current US f.o.b. prices for equivalent products.
- 74 -
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-K-C-R-EZ
C. Institute Frvazino (Shchelkovo), Moscow Oblast. .2.Y 50X1
Information effective in late 1950 indicates that Institute
has become the most important, if not the largest, enterprise in the USSR
for the manufacture, design, and development of electron tubes. This fac-
tory complex, located in Fryazino, a village 4 miles north-northeast of the
center of Shchelkovo and 22 miles northeast of the center of Moscow, com-
prises three main multistoried factory buildings, a glass-making plant,
and eight smaller buildings. Three of these buildings are new and were
under construction in 1950. The reported total floor space, excluding
sheds, is approximately 620,000 square feet, including 250,000 square feet
in the tube production shop alone.
50X1
The original tube-making machinery, evacuated to Siberia during
World War II, was replaced with units obtained from the US under Lend
Lease and with others removed in 1945 and 1946 from German, Czechoslovak,
and Hungarian tube facilities. This postwar machinery was reported to
have included from 40 to 50 US-built grid-winding lathes. Since 1948 the
plant capacity has been further expanded through the addition of Soviet-
made tube machinery generally copied from US models., Special tube
machinery for Institute_______and other Soviet tube plants is produced 50X1
under the direction of asepara e design group and machine shop on the
Institute premises, apparently subcontracted for manufacturing 50X1
and assembly to several outside machinery factories.
Soviet personnel at Institute reported as 5,000 in 1941, 50X1
1,200 in 1945, and 2,000 in 1946, is said to have reached 5,000 by the
end of 1950, including 745 in the engineering and development departments.
Several reports agree that the technology at Institute and the 50X1
skill of its technical staff have improved greatly since 1946. The recent
departure of German specialists from this plant should have no ill effect
upon production capabilities. Key Soviet personnel are listed as including
Golzov, plant director, a capable manager with good US training; Sorokin,
chief engineer; Ratenberg, receiving-tube manager, an outstanding tube
specialist with good technical ability; Susmanowskiy, head of the magne-
tron department, the most capable scientist at the Institute; Shutak,
head of the CR tube department, transferred from the Ministry of Communica-
tions Equipment Industry, very capable and energetic; and Seebode, head
of the test department, an experienced and skilled engineer. Young
engineering graduates and technicians receive factory training at Institute
and are employed there and at other Soviet electron tube factories.50X1
S
-75-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Materials reported as limited in supply and of poor quality in
1946, were generally available in proper form and grade by 1950. Nickel
was very plentiful, although there was difficulty in obtaining seamless
cathode sleeves with adequate uniformity and purity of nickel melt Glass
tubing, and possibly the glass bulbs, are produced by Institute
for its own use. The Institute has its own thermal power plant, with a
turbogenerator possibly rated at 3,000 to 5,000 kilowatts. It is probable
that this is a stand-by supply to supplement a local outside system.
Institute has its own gas-generating plant for the process gas
.required In g -working and in tube manufacturing.
By 1950 the program at Institute comprised the following
activities; the design and development of receiving tubes, smaller trans-
mitting tubes, special tubes, and CR tubes; the coordination, and possibly
the direction, of tube engineering for some product lines at other Soviet
tube factories; central testing facilities for tubes under its cognizance;
the mass-production of receiving tubes and related types of small trans-
mitting tubes; model-shop production of magnetrons, klystrons, TR boxes,
silicon crystal diodes, and CR tubes; and, possibly, small-scale produc-
tion of a few larger transmitting tubes. NO lamp manufacturing is carried
on at this plant.
50X1
50X1
50X1
The following qualifying factors were considered in evaluating
the present and future capabilities of Institute as a manufacturing 50X*1
facility: (1) the organization is adequately staffed with experienced and
competent key personnel; (a) lower-echelon engineering personnel and
technicians have been made available in quantity, and these men were reported
to have good basic education, to be industrious, and to have received on-the-
job factory training; (3) good manufacturing equipment has been installed;
(4) from the analysis of receiving tubes made in 1950 the manufacturing
methods applied and the tooling for parts and subassemblies are generally on
a par with the best current US practices, are definitely much lower in cost
than counterparts made currently in East Germany, and should permit produc-
tion at a reasonable direct-labor input and at acceptable shrinkage rates;
and (5) critical tube production materials are available in sufficient quan-
tity and of good quality.
Since no data have been reported on total plant output, several
different types of information (primarily inputs, plus a knowledge of
product mix) were combined to provide an estimate of the rate of produc-
tion for Institute at the end of 1950 as shown in Tables 23 and 24.* 50X1
* Table 23 follows on p. 77; Table 24, on p. 78.
-76-
S -E-C -R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 23
Methods of Estimating Production of Receiving and Small Related Tubes
at Soviet Institute Fryazino (Shchelkovo)
1950
Type of Data
Floor Space
Square Feet, 1950
Employees 1950
Machinerx after 1946
Glass, 1947
Payroll, F.O.B. Price,
Costs, 1950
Sample Quantities,
Tested
Magnitudes
Shop, 250,000
Total, 620,000
4,000 in This
Product Group
7 to 10 Unit Groups
500 Tons a Year
800 Rubles per Month
Average; Payroll at
0.55 Net Sales;
Average Tube Price,
9 Rubles
2,250 to 6,500,
Tested per Week
Factor (Range)
100 Tubes per Square Foot
5 Tubes per Square Foot
0.3 to 2.5 Man-hours per
Tube; 1.0 Probable
2,000 to 10,000 per Day
per Unit
80 to 150 Lbs per 1,000
Tubes
JAN Quality Control Y
Millions of Tubes a Year
Minimum Probable Maximum
3.0 25.0
3.2 8.0 . 25.0
3.5 27.0
7.0 13.0
1.8
7.8
9.14
a. US Joint Army-Navy approved quality dontrol.
- 77 -
S-E-d-R-&.T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 24
Methods of Estimating Production of Special and Cathode-ray Tubes
at Soviet Institute Fryazino (Shchelkovo)
1950
Type of Tube
Employees
Space
Output per Year
Basis of Estimate
Units
Dollars
Magnetrons
75
41500 Earlier;
10,000, Late 1950
2,500
300,000
Early World War II Experience,
Model Shops
Klystrons
50
42000
3,000
100,000
About 1 Man-hour per Dollar
Silicon Crystal Diodes
15
1,500
50,000
100,000
Reported Production Rate by
Dec 1950
Cathode-ray Tubes
140
4,500
3,000
100,000
About 25 Man-hours per Tube
-78-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S -E -C-44 -E -T
Manufacturing at Institute was just being organized at the 50X1
end of 1945, the equipment was almost completely installed by. 1948, and
the plant was reported in full operation. Improvement in tooling, in level
of technology, and in rate of shrinkage was made by 1950, and further
improvement in labor productivity was expected after the end of 1950. An
estimate of electron tube production output at Institute for 50X1
different years is given in Table 25.*
Institute is reported as the sole Soviet producer of silicon 50X1
crystal diodes, but it acts rather in the capacity of a production-model
shop and design center for magnetrons, klystrons, and CR tubes. These 50X1
latter microwave radar tubes are manufactured in quantity at other Soviet
tube factories, possibly klystrons at Svetlana Plant CR tubes at .50K1
the Moscow Plant and magnetrons at the Tashkent Plant (390) 50X1
d. Electric LamnFlan
Krasnv Prosrekt, Novosibirsk. 22/ 50X1
Plant was established in the buildings of an educational 50X1
institution in Novosibirsk in late 1941 when not only machinery but also
1i000 key personnel were transferred from the Svetlana Plant in 50X1
Leningrad. By 1944 the plant employed several thousand people and produced
about 4 million tubes a year, including all major categories of receiving,
transmitting, and special tubes. Although many of the key personnel
returned to Leningrad at the end of the war, Plant in Novosibirsk 50X1
was maintained and expanded. In 1944 the buildings that were used were
temporary. It is reported that new factory buildings were in construction
during 1948 and 1949, including a four-story receiving tube shop, and
totaled about 160,000 square feet.
In 1949, Plant was reported to have three Telefunken as 50X1
well as several US-type automatic exhaust units. A practical production
rate for the German machines would total about 8,500 receiving tubes a
day, and by adding the greater capacity of the US machines a plant produc-
tion capacity of about 25,000 receiving tubes a day is indicated. The US
machines, two of the Telefunken machines, domestically produced exhaust
machines, sealing equipment, and other tube-making machinery were being
installed in the new four-story receiving tube shop. A considerable
increase in plant capacity was scheduled for the several years following
1949.
There is good evidence to indicate that the production program
of Plant No. 617 has been predominantly for Soviet military use. Trans-
mitting and special tubes are included in the output of this plant, and
the plant effort devoted to this
* Table 25 follows on p. 80.
? 79 ?
S-E-C-R-E-T
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 25
Electron Tube Production of Soviet Institute
1946, 1948, 1950-53
Fryazino (Shchelkovo)
50X1
Receiving. Tubes Magnetrons Klystrons Crystals Cathode-ray Tubes All Tubes
Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value
(Thousand (Thouseril (Thousand (Thousan4 (Thousand (Thousan4 (Thousand (Thousan4 (Thousand (Thousan4 (Thousand (Thousan4
Year Units) $ US) Units) $ US) 2V Units) $ US) N Units) $ US) 2Y Units) $ US) 5 Unita) : $ US) 2Y
1946
1948
1950
1951
1952-53
1,500
4,000
7,000
9,000
15,000
1,000
3,000121
5,200
6,500
10,500
2.5
5.0
10.0
300
600
1,200
33/.0
4. o
5.0
100
130
160
30
60
100
60
120
200
15)/
4
4
100
130
130
1,500
4,000
7,038
9,073
15,129
1,000
3,100
125
a. Based on current US f.o.b. prices for equivalent products.
b. Small number of units.
_8o-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
1.
latter category may- exceed that devoted to the manufacture of receiving
tubes.
The plant director is reported to be Dzhuk, who had RCA training
in the US in late 1930. The total number of employees has been variously
estimated at from 5,000 to 12,000. After 1946, German specialists were
sent to Novosibirsk, as were the German manufacturing data for centimeter-
frequency, metal-ceramic, and klystron tubes.
Although little information exists to permit a detailed analysis
of current production programs, Table 26* ?rovides a reasonable estimate
for the annual levels of output at Plant and includes data that
are entirely consistent with reported inputs to this factory.
e. glectric,Lamn Plant
Tashkent. zg/
10 Uzbekistanpka 111-4,
Plant was established in a number of miscellaneous
buildings during 1942-43 with lamp and tube e7i*eijwhich was evacuated
from Moscow, presumably mostly from Institute in Shchelkovo.
Wartime personnel of Plant were reported to be about 2,500,
and its products were primarily lamps and transmitting tubes. It was
reorganized in 1946-47, automatic machinery being added; In 1949 addi-
tional units of German receiving tube equipment were reported to have been
installed. There probably was also some consolidation of floor space.
Although recent details on facilities are not available, it appears
that there are actually two manufacturing units in Tashkent. The first
plant, at the above address, is commonly caned Plant and the
second factory, located several kilometers away, is commonly referred to
as Plant Together, about 150,000 square feet of factory space
are available in these plants. In 1950 the total number of employees at
both plants was estimated at 2,500.
Lamp production at Tashkent increased during and after 1947, but
there are indications that it has become of secondary importance. Produc-
tion of glass receiving tubes was begun in 1947, with a considerable
increase reported in 1949. Production of transmitting tubes has been
continued. In addition to conventional medium- and high-power transmitting
tubes, the transmitting tube department at Tashkent is reported to manu-
facture pulsed modulators and oscillators, probably including magnetrons.
It is known that Plant in Tashkent works closely with 50X1
Institute at Shchelkovo on engineering and production problems for 50)(1 -
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
* Table 26 follows on p. 82.
-81-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S7E-C-R-E-T
Table 26
Electron Tube Production of Soviet Plant
1946, 1949-53
Novosibirsk
___Ess2=E11112.91_
Transmitting and
SsItiaLattg All Tubes
Volume Value Volume Value Value
(Thousand (Thousan4 (Thousand (Thousand (Thousand
Year -1111I21.- _LILA_ _Units us)
u sii S. us)_
1946
3,500
2,300
85
2,500
4,800
1949
6,000
3,900
230
7,000
10,900
1950
7,500
4,500
260
8,000
12,500
1951
8,500
5,100
280
9,000
14,100
1952-53
10,000
6,000
330
10,000
16,000
a. Based on current US f.o.b. prices for equivalent products.
some classes of tubes.
Refractory metals and parts are obtainedfrom Plant in
Moscow and mica from the Mica Trust Fabricating Plant at Irkutsk. The
Tashkent plant has its own gas-generating plant using coal and is believed
to have its own glass-making plant, which provides a portion of its glass ?
requirements for tubes and lamps.
Based upon an analysis of the rather scanty information on both
output and input, Table 27* outlines the estimated production levels of
the Tashkent Electric Lamp-Works complex, factories for
specified years. '
f. Othssil_m_has_kij.etTu):te and Lamp Producers.
In addition to the five major plants listed,
tube and lamp operations at other locations. With the possible
exceptions of the plants listed under (1) and (2) following, about which
very little is reported, the total production of these lesser plants is
not great. Output for this remainder of the Soviet electron tube industry
* Table 27 follows on p. 83.
-82-
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07 : CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Table 27
Tube and Lamp Production of Soviet Plant
1947-48, 1950-53
Tashkent
Receiving Tubes Transmitting Tubes
Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value Value
(Thousand (Thousan4 (Thousand (Thousan4 (Thousand (Thousan4 (Thousan4
Yeaz Units) $ US )2i Units1 it US) Iv UnIts) g US) A' g US) 2/
1947
bi
5
250
1,500
150
400
1948
300
160 '
10
500
2,500
250
900
1950
3,500
1,900
20
1,000
3,000
300
.3,200
1951
3,800
2,100
30
1,500
3,000
300
3,900
1952."63
4,500
2,400 .
50
2,500
5,000
500
5,400
a. Based on current US f.o.b. prices for equivalent products.
b. Small number of units.
- 83 -
a 7B7a
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
is estimated for 1950 to be about 2 million tubes and 12 million lamps.
A list of such producers and their probable status follows:
(1) The Ryazan Electric Lamp Plant ul. Yanskaya,
Ryazan Oblast, was completed just before World War II. Since the war
it has produced bulbs, lamps, and glass ampules. Miniature radio (panel)
lamps were in production in 1949. The plant area was prohibited to
prisoners of war. Indications are that this is a sizable operation,
employing nearly 2,000 people. In March 1951, announcement was made that
this factory was producing 15 new types of miniature radio tubes. The
size of plant and the type of work indicate that Plant may become
a significant producer of small tubes, possibly including both miniature
and subminiature types.
50X1
50X1
(2) the existence of anew 50X1
and unidentified tube factory on the Volga River north of Stalingrad or
in the city of Saratov. Tube engineers and technicians trained at Institute
were said to have been assigned to this new factory. As a potential 50X1
producer of electron tubes, possibly for special applications rather than
for conventional radio equipment, this facility will bear close scrutiny -
in the future.
(3) Vaists Elektrotechnika Fabrika (VF), 19 Brivibas Gotve,
Riga, is located in two factories in Riga. This plant is a very large
producer of civilian radio equipment, telephones, and military communica-
tions equipment. One of the factories includes a department producing tubes
and lamps largely for local consumption. The total company personnel is
about 5,000.
(4) A radio tube factory which is not believed to be a large ,
producer is located in Tomsk. In view of plans for postwar rearrangement
at Novosibirsk Plant _ it is considered likely that sections of
No. 617 may have formed the base for the Tomsk plant.
(5) Electric Lamp Plant located in the small town of
Zaprudnya, in the Moscow Oblast, about 60 kilometers north-northwest of
Moscow, WA originally a producer of raw glass and glass parts for tubes
and lamps. Since the war it has been reported as a manufacturer of elec-
tric lamps in varied sizes and of some radio tubes, as well as of raw
,glass. This plant is not believed to be a large producer of lamps or
tubes.
(6) Two associated electric lamp plants at Lvov, started after
World War II, are engaged in producing lamps at an estimated rate of 1
million a year. There is no evidence of tube work as yet.
-84?
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
a7E-CR-E-T
(7) The Solch Lamp Plant in Tirga (Prokopyevsk) has 1,500
employees and produces special lamps for mines and transformers. No
tube work is undertaken,
(8) Additional research into information available from various
recent sources indicates at this time that tube manufacturing is not con-
ducted at the Frunze Radio Factory in Gorikiy or at tube plants in Sverd-
lovsk, Rybinsk, Ufa, or Tbilisi. Older information had reported these as
possible tube producers.
2. gunaarv.
a. UILCO "Tungsram." 2,5V
The plant and home office of Egyesiilt Izzolampaes Villamossagi
R.-T., commonly known as UILCO "Tungsram," is located in its own large
factory area in Ujpest, just outside of Budapest. The plant is comprised
of 18 buildings, including 6 major shops and laboratories. The total
plant floor space is somewhat more than 700,000 square feet. Plant
machinery is largely new, obtained or built in the postwar period to
replace those items removed by the Soviets. In 1947, UILCO "Tungsram" was
reported to have been equipped with nine automatic lamp machine groups
and two or three automatic tube units, and in mid-1949 four new complete
lamp groups were reported to have been under construction. This enter-
prise is capable of constructing all items of specialized technical plant
manufacturing equipment required for the production of lamps and tubes.
Employment at this plant was reported as 3,450 workers in early
1948, 4,000 in early 1949, and 5,000 by mid-1950. The latter two figures
include employees for the Orion apparatus assembly plant located on the
same premises at that time. By mid-1951 the employment at the UILCO
"Tungsram" tube and lamp complex was reported to have reached 5,000.
Because of requirements for increased floor space needed for apparatus
assembly, the Orion division was moved to new quarters in Budapest in
mid-1951, thus placing all of the plants at the .Ujpest location at the
disposal of UILCO "Tungsram" tube and lamp manufacturing operations.
All comments by postwar observers through mid-1951 indicate that
this enterprise is efficient in its operations, that it is Still staffed
at the engineering and production supervision level by old employees with
good experience, and that the quality of the product is as good as prewar.
Although difficulties, resulting primarily from material shortages, are
reported, it was estimated in 1949 that the new plant equipment had improved
operations to the point where productivity per man-hour had increased 20
percent over the prewar level. This high degree of manufacturing efficiency
- 8,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
is generally confirmed
?
S
The unfortunate lack of recent detailed statistics on this enter-
prise has made it necessary to base the estimate of tube and lamp output
given in Table 28* upon five sets of supporting data as follows: known
figures for prewar and 1947 production performance,
current enployment, competent estimates for relative
productivity, known key units of machinery installed by 1949, and reported
imports of specialized tube and lamp materials.
b. Hhngarian Transmitting Tube Factory. 22/
Although little recent detail is available on the Hungarian Trans-
mitting Tube Factory, a former Philips branch plant in Budapest, it is
known to be concentrating exclusively on the manufacture of large trans-
mitting,special, and X-ray tubes. Although a small plant, it is reported
to be both efficient and profitable. Its staff comprises several hundred
employees. A very approximate estimate for the 1951 output at the
Hungarian Transmitting Tube Factory is $500,000, comprising from 5,000 to
10,000 tubes.
3. East Germany.
a. Werk fuer Fernmeldewesen ((SW). 2?V
The leading electron tube manufacturing and development enterprise
in East Germany is the Werk fuer Fernmeldewesen ((SW). It is Soviet-owned
and controlled through the SAG Kabel. At present this enterprise is a
consolidation of the (SW tube facility and the NEF apparatus model shop in
the Ostendstrasse, Berlin-ober-Schoeneweide, location, plus the TEN commu
nications equipment production and development shop in the Knorrbremse
building, Berlin4lummelsberg. (SW is engaged in the production of receiving,
special, transmitting, and CR tubes, and specialized tube materials. It
also participates in tube development and research and in the development
and small lot production of microwave and other specialized test equipment.
Electron tube output of (SW has been reported in detail and is
summarized in Table 29.**
By 1951, 90 percent of the (SW receiving tube production was
reported to be types of tubes required for Soviet television receivers.
* Table 28 follows on p. 87.
** Table 29 follows on p. 88
-86-
S-E-C-R-E-T
50X-1
50X1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 28
Tube and Lamp Production of Hungarian Plant UILCO ?Tungsram,? Ujpest
1946-49, 1950-51
Receiving Tubes
Volume,
(Thousand
Year Units)
Value
(Thousand
$ vs) 2/
Transmitting Tubes
Volume
(Thousand
Units)
Value
(Thous an
$ us)
Incandescent Lamps
Volume
(Thousand
Value
(Thousand,
$ US) 2/
Fluorescent Lamps
Volume
(Thousand
Units)
Value
(Thousand
$ US) 2/
All Tubes
and Lamps
Value
(Thousan4
$ US) 2/
1946-49
7,300
/4,000
700
3,000
70,000
7,000
400
300
114,300
1950
3,500
1,900
400
1,600
30,000
3,000
1,000
600
.7,100
1951
4,000
2,200
500
2,100
140,000
14,000
1,200
700
9,000
a, Based on current US f.o.b, prices for equivalent products.
- 87 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E,C-R-E-T
c' Table 29
Electron Tube Production, 1949-51,and Planned Capacity of the East German OSW Plant, Berlin '
Transmitting and
Receiving Tubes Special Tubes
Cathode-ray Tubes An: Tubes
Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value
(Thousand (Thousand (Thousand (Thousand, (Thousand (Thousand, (Thousand (Thousand,
Year Units) $ US) 2/ Units) $ US) 2/ Units) $ US) 2/ Units) $ US) 2/
1949
200
110
40
320
260
430
1950
600
330
55
440
1
21
656
791
1951
1,000
55o
80
64o
25
520
1,102
1,710
Planned
Capacity
' 1,500
830
120
1,030
50
1,070
1,670
2,930
a. Based on current US f.o.b. prices for equivalent products.
- 88 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
a
2rE."2-1-E-1
and military electronics equipment. These types normally are not required
in the local East German economy except as needed, to produce apparatus for
the USSR. Eighty percent in value of the special tubes is reported in the
production of the TS-41 high-frequency-pulsed triode oscillator, the "IRK"
Soviet quartz ultraviolet lamp, the metal-ceramic decimeter tubes, and
metallurgical X-ray tubes. Most of the output of CR tubes comprised 9-inch
tubes for direct-view television receivers.
In October 1949, employees totaled 2,200, with 600 in research,
1,600 in production, and 350 in the administrative sections. In April
1950, employees totaled 2,400. By mid-1951, after consolidation of WW,
NEF, and TBN, total employees were reported at 4,400, with 2,200 in tube
production and 1,100 in the administrative sections.
Expansion was effected at CW during 1950 and 1951 through space
rearrangement and the addition of equipment, including refractory metal
facilities and automatic stem and exhaust machines. 50X1
Soviet instructions that OW plan for a 10-fold expansion in capacity? )UA]
The possibility of doing this was seriously doubted in 50X1
view of lack of technicians, of problems in acquiring technical machinery,
and of the need for new floor space. There is no indication to date that
any serious attempt has been initiated to implement such a plan, but there
is evidence that OSW is engaged in expanding tube capacity to approximately
double the capacity that was in effect at the end of 1950.
b. Funkwerk furt VES. 32/
Funkwerk Erfurt, second in size in the East German tube industry,
is a people-owned enterprise, directly controlled as a key firm by the
HV Elektrotechnik. The plant is divided into two works. The main build-
ing, a large four-story structure located on Rudolfstrasse, Erfurt, houses
the administration and central offices, the tube laboratory, and the
receiving tube and transmitting tube shops. The high-frequency equipment
department, engaged in the design and manufacture of apparatus and pre-
cision electronic measuring equipment, is housed in another building
located on the other side of Erfurt.
Funkwerk Erfurt is engaged primarily in the production of German
series E and series U receiving tubes and, to a lesser extent, in the
design (copy) and limited production of transmitting tubes, comprising
500-watt to 2-kilowatt medium-sized tubes and from 10-kilowatt to 30-
kilowatt standard German copper-anode types. The plant also produces,
against specific contracts, special tubes, including metal-ceramic
decimeter types for the USSR and the SAG Kabel plant Sachsenwerk Radeberg,
the TS-41 pulsed triode and 50-matt PA triodes, the design (copy) and
construction of special tube and lamp machinery as required in the German
-89-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
SE-CR-L-T
Democratic Republic, and electronic test equipment for Soviet military
use. The estimate of production data given in Table 30, for tubes only,
is not so accurate as that for OSW but is believed to be reasonably so.
Table 30
Electron Tube Production, 1949-51, and Planned Capacity
of the East German Plant, FUnkwerk Erfurt
Receiving Tubes
Transmitting and
Special Tubes All Tubes
Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value
(Thousand (Thousand (Thousand (Thousand (Thousand (Thousand
Year Units) EDM) Units) EDM Units) EDM)
1949
450
5,000
16
700
466
5,700
1950
1,100
12,300
5
2,200
1,105
14,500
1951
1,400
15,800
28
7,200
1,428
23,000
Planned
Capacity
2,000
22,500
35
9,500
,2,035
32,000
By the beginning of 1951 it is estimated that employees at Funkwerk
Erfurt totaled 2,500, divided as follows: receiving tubes, 1,100; special
tubes, 500 (divided between 400 administration and 1,200 direct labor);
RIT Leipzig laboratory, 150; instrument shop, 450; machinery and maintenance
shop. 300.
Although there is a research laboratory attached to Funkwerk
Erfurt, apparently the tasks are assigned by the Ministry for Machinery
Construction independently of Funkwerk Erfurt management, and most effort
is not devoted to tube problems. The engineering capabilities of Funkwerk
Erfurt appear to be quite limited in the tube field, and it does not seem
that this establishment can be considered much of a research and develop-
ment factor for electron tubes and their applications.
The FUnkwerk Erfurt, established by Telefunken as a new plant just
before World War II, suffered dismantling by the Soviets only to the extent
of selected items of metal-tube machinery. Since 1946 a few additional
- 90 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
items of equipment have been installed to round out the facilities.
Present operations are built around three 48-head automatic Telefunken
exhaust machines, three automatic button-stem machines, and two stem
machines for large disk stems such as those used in metal-ceramic
tubes and CR tubes. Undoubtedly the large increase in special-tube
production scheduled for 1951 requires supplementing exhaust and test
units, but the main problem would appear to be an adequate supply of
special materials and of experienced technical help. No major plant
expansion has been indicated, but the 1955 goal of 3 million tubes would
require both additional space and additional key machinery.
c. Roehrenwk Neuhaus VEB. 33/
Roehrenwerk Neuhaus, the third largest tube plant in the German
Democratic Republic, was formerly a Telefunken factory and is now a
people-awned enterprise, directly controlled as a key firm by the HV
Elektrotechnik. All reports indicate that this plant produces only
receiving tubes of the German series A, series E, and series U, plus a
small number Of inactive receiving types. There is no evidence of any
significant production of special and transmitting tubes or of any
significant effort in vacuum-tube research and development. Roehrenwerk
Neuhaus does produce certain tube materials for sale, in addition to
finished tubes, and supplies CSW and Funkwerk Erfurt with cathodes (re-
drawn from Heraeus, Hanau, nickel tubing), with some alloy grid wire,
and with getters.
For 1947, planned production was 589,000 receiving tubes, valued
at EDM 4,600,000, and production worth EDM 1,100,000 was realized in the
first quarter. In mid-1948, actual monthly production was reported as
90,000 tubes, only 5,000 less than the planned total of 95,000. At the
beginning of 1951, Roehrenwerk Neuhaus employed a total of 1,200 people
and was scheduled to produce 1 million radio tubes.
d. AFT Phonetika Radio VEB (since June 1951 Known as Stern-Radio),
Franz-Joseph qtrasee 112, Berlin4leissensee. 3A/
Phonetika Radio, a small postwar enterprise, was reorganized in
1950 to produce limited quantities of receiving tubes and radio receivers
and was incorporated into the VVBRFT as of 1 April 1951.
The firm was founded by a few former employees of the Askania
Werk AG in the buildings of an Askania World War II branch factory, and
it obtained some plant equipment formerly owned by the Loewe-Opta-Radio
AG. The firm has been under public administration since 1947,
-91-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Production is confined to the assembly of the model RFT-1 Ull
radio receiver, plus the manufacture of seven types of Telefunken type
receiving tubes, primarily rectifiers and simple pentodes. No evidence
of plans for the manufacture of special or transmitting tubes or for any
significant effort in tube reception and development has been discovered.
For 1951, planned production was 206,000 tubes, valued at EDM
2,400,000, or about $100,000. It is believed that this schedule could be
met, and that a 30 percent increase for 1952 is probable.
As of May 1951, Phonetika Radio had 480 persons employed in tube
manufacture and radio assembly. For its size, this plant is reported to
possess a large number of machine tools and key units of tube machinery,
including automatic presses, coil winders, grid lathes, and automatic
sealing machines. Tube exhaust and test facilities appear to be primi-
tive and limited in extent, although good results are obtained.
e. Phoenix Roentgenroehren.
The Phoenix Roentgenroehren plant in Rudolstadt, Thuringia, is
engaged in the manufacture of 1G-ray tubes, possibly special types of
lamps, and transmitting tubes of special types, the transmitting tubes
using much of the same equipment as is used in the manufacture of the
other products. The X-ray tubes produced are apparently not of a conven-
tional kind, and X-ray tube production appears to be a special develop-
ment and expediting effort that involves visits of Soviet civilians and
very strict security precautions.
Formerly the Seimens Reineger Werke and now employing 400 workers,
Phoenix Roentgenroehren is divided into several sections, including A tube
evacuation section and a section in which the special gases are pumped in-
to the tubes. In 1948 most of the output went to Koch and Sterzel in
Berlin and Dresden, while in a report dated 1950 mention is made of exports
to Eastern and Southeastern European countries. The plant receives molyb-
denum rods and tungsten wire from Switzerland, but in general it is having
difficulty importing rare metals, liquid air, and liquid oxygen.
In the same city as the Phoenix Roentgenroehren plant is the Otto
Kiesewetter X-ray tube plant, which is engaged in similar activities.
-92?
S-EX-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
90
S-E-C-R-E-T
4, Czechoslovakia.
a. Tesla Hloubetin,
The Tesla Hloubetin facilities consist of the two former Philips
plants in Prague, called Hloubetin I and Hloubetin II. It is difficult
from available evidence to separate their operations. Therefore, descrip-
tion will be based on both plants, taken together and referred to as one
plant.
Tesla Hloubetin makes tubes, civilian radios, transmitters, and
electronic equipment in general. In 1949 there were approximately 2.000
workers operating on one shift, 6 days a week,
the labor force as 1,400 to 1,600, mostly young women. The
decline in the labor force may be explained either on the basis of poor
information or because of the shutting down of certain operations which
are known not to have been successfully undertaken. On the other hand,
since it is known that the tube-making facilities were to be moved to
Roznov pod Radhostem in late 1950, it is possible that this decline in
number of workers reflects that shift. Since the above-mentioned 1950
report giving a reduced labor force for the plant also gives figures on
tube production, it is conceivable that the tube manufacturing equipment
was moved to Roznov pod Radhostem gradually, thus accounting for the
conflicting information.
Under Philips before World War II, this plant produced between
2 million and 3 million tubes a year, depending on the market. The Philips
management was very competent, and the plant had all automatic equipment.
Since the plant was taken over by Tesla, however, the production rate has
been reduced by the low level of technical and engineering talent available
and by shortages of materials which have resulted in unsatisfactory sub-
stitutions, such as steel for molybdenum in certain applications. The
result has been a very high rate of rejects and a reluctance to use domes-
tic tubes if foreign tubes are available.
Production includes receiving tubes and small transmitting tubes.
the plant is devoted to the production of 50X1
special transmitting tubes and radar tubes.
50X1
50X1
b. Tesla Vrchlabi.
The amount of information on the Tesla Vrchlabi plant, formerly
owned by Lorenz of Berlin, is much less than that on the Hloubetin plant.
It is known that tubes are manufactured here and that before World War II
this plant made tubes, radios, and aeronautical instruments.
-93?
S -R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
The labor force, as of 1950, is thought to have been between 500
and 600 workers on a single shift day, 6 days a week. It is largely on
the basis of this information that the production of this plant was esti-
mated as compared with the production of the Hloubetin plant.
c. Roznov pod Radhostem.
The Hloubetin and the Vrchlabi plants were scheduled to be moved
to Roznov pod Radhostem where a new tube-noking facility was to have been
completed by late 1950. the 50X1
production of certain standard types at Roznov pod Radhostem as of July
1950. These types were previously made at Hloubetin.
The former manager of Vrchlabi is believed to be the present head
of the Roznov plant. The plant was intended to make miniatures, CR tubes,
radar tubes, amplifying tubes, and ultra-high-frequency types. A work
force of 4000 was planned. Transmitting tubes and all tube-caking machin-
ery are to be made, the former according to techniques learned from the
Mhrconi firm in the UK. The site for the plant was chosen by the Soviets,
presumably for its remoteness, as a security precaution.
There is some indication that the firm of Philips in Eindhoven,
the Netherlands, may be aiding in the construction and operations of the
Roznov pod Radhostem plant. Since Philips has extensive trading relations
with the Satellites and Since Czechoslovakia is in need of technical and
material assistance, this indication is probably correct.
- 94 -
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
R
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-E-E-I
?
APPENDIX F
?
iNIETH OD OLOGY
41.
1. General.
In view of the wide scope in subject matter and geographical area cov-
ered, various methods have been employed in this report. In general, it
has been necessary to depend on a combination of the following methods,
the effectiveness of which has varied according to the adequacy of avail-
able information and the requirements of the subject material:
a. Analysis of statistical reports dealing with plans and industry
performance.
c. The determination, within reasonable limits, of the magnitudes of
key inputs consumed by the industry sectors and by the principal manu-
facturing enterprises.
d. A detailed analysis of the important input factors, including key
machinery, manpower, and critical materials, as an indication of product
mix, level of output, and industrial technology.
e. An engineering review of general electron tube technology and its
application to an estimate of Soviet Bloc methods, productivity (including
labor productivity), and pattern of uses.
2. Me-IbpAglzm forDer__y2Lomeipy__A. of In t Factors.
a. Estimating Output by Mew of Ingyt Coefficients.
The volume of production of an economic unit is a function of, or
depends upon, the quantities of the various inputs used in the production
process. An input coefficient is defined as the quantity of that input
necessary to produce one unit of product. If A produces a product P, then
a is the input coefficient of A in the production of P. If B is also
required to produce P, then .5= b is the input coefficient of B in the
production of P.
- 97 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Input coefficients are calculated from the input-output rela-
tions existing in economic units for which this information is available.
By means of these coefficients the outputs of other economic units may be
estimated from the quantities of inputs used by them.
For example, if it is known that 50 units of input A are required
to produce one unit of product Fp and then if it is known that 500 units
of A are used by a given economic unit, the estimate of the output of
this unit will be 10 units of P. If it is also known that this unit uses'
40 units of input B, and if 4 units of B are required to produce one unit
of P, then it is possible to make a second, independent estimate of the
output of the economic unit.
Two basic conditions must be satisfied in order that input coeffi-
cients may be employed in this fashion. Input coefficients must be (1) sta-
ble through time (intertemporal stability) and (2) stable from one economic
unit to another or from one geographic region to another (interspatial
stability). The likelihood that these two conditions are satisfied will
be considered in this section.
In the production of any given product the values taken by the
Input coefficients depend upon the particular production methods employed.
The criterion used as a guide by an economic unit in the choice of a
production method is, in general, related to the relative costs of alter-
native methods. An economic unit desires to minimize cost for a given
level of output and will choose accordingly the method requiring the least-
cost combination of inputs. The enterpriser of course, does not have com-
plete freedom in its choice of method, for the area of its choice is bounded
by technical conditions unique to the particular product produced.
Any change in the price of one input relative to that of another
introduces an important incentive for the economic unit to substitute more
of the cheaper input for the dearer input, subject, of course, to technical
restrictions. Thus intertemporal stability of input coefficients will
depend in part upon the stability of the relative prices of the various
types of inputs Used, relative to their technical substitutability in the
- 98 -
27E-Q-11-1-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
production process.*
Further variations arise from the differential time periods
required for adjustments arising from changes in resource supplies and
in levels of output. These differentials are so pronounced that inputs
are frequently classified as fixed and variable inputs, according to
the length of the time periods required for adjustments to be made. It
is implied in this distinction that at least some of the coefficients
will tend to vary with the level of output.
There is also a considerable amount of variation in input
coefficients among economic units producing similar products in different
geographical locations. The chief cause for this variation is that dif-
ferent regions, both international and intranational, possess resources
in varying proportions. Given this unequal distribution of resources,
the least-cost combinations of inputs, or production methods, will vary
with respect to geographical areas. It follows that substantial error
may result from incautious application of input coefficients calculated
in the US as a basis for estimating input coefficients for other areas
of the world. However, these variations will be smaller as the degree
of technical substitutability of processes and inputs is more limited.
The making of electrolytic copper, for example, requires a fixed amount
of electricity per unit of copper wherever it may be produced.
Methods of collecting input coefficients so as to avoid most of
these potential difficulties are suggested below. It is clear, however,
that all input coefficients will not be equally stable. When applying
them, it is important, where choice is possible, to place the greatest
reliance upon those input coefficients that are the more stable.
* In a free-market decentralized economy where prices are flexible, price
changes result from two possible sources: (1) given the total amount of
the resources available, changes occur in the amounts of the resource
desired for employment in alternative uses; or (2) given the types of
alternative uses and the respective quantities used, a change in the over-
all quantity of the resource available occurs. The solution of this
resource allocation problem in a decentralized economy is achieved through
adjustments in the proportions in which the inputs are employed, on the
level of the individual enterprise. In a planned economy, where the
allocation of resources is determined by a central planning board, a
similar result is accomplished by an entirely different means. Both types
of economy are subject, of course, to the same constraints: that it is
not possible to use more of a resource than is available and that it is
undesirable for resources to be unemployed.
-99-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
a7K-24-E-1
(1) Choice of the Economic UnAt tp Be Pip:lied.
The choice of the economic unit to be studied depends upon
the nature of the problem to be solved. The desirable economic unit is
an operation or a department within a plant performing a single opera-
tion. The focus on such a narrow category facilitates the comparison
of input coefficients among economic units. However, inasmuch as
information on inputs sufficiently detailed to permit a departmental
breakdown is seldom available, a workable compromise is to concentrate
on the plant level. Extreme care must be taken in a study made at this
level that the input coefficient used to estimate output be obtained
from an economic unit performing a comparable number of operations. For
example, if a labor input coefficient is used to estimate the volume of
output of a plant which makes all of its own parts, the input coefficient
must not be taken from a plant which purchases all of its parts and
performs an assembling operation only.
(2) Information Reauired.
The use of input coefficients to estimate output requires two
types of information in addition to the values of the coefficients. This
additional information may be classified as (a) information concerning the
quantities of inputs used and (b) information concerning the product mixes.
Frequently, when study is focused on the departmental level,
and almost always, when focused on the level of an entire plant, it will
be found that many different products have common inputs but differing
requirements per unit. In this case, given the quantities of the inputs
used, the absolute volume of Output will be a function of the proportions
In which the various products are produced, or the product mix. Where
information is known concerning inputs which are not common to more than
one product, this problem will not occur. Otherwise, it will be necessary
to have independent information on the proportions in which the products
are produced in order to estimate the volume of output by the application
of input coefficients to input quantity data.
(3) Conclusions.
An important feature of estimating output by means of input
coefficients is the mechanical and explicit manner in which the estimates
are derived. It may appear that at times intuition would be a more use-
ful, or more reliable, method, producing more reasonable results. This,
however, is not the case. Intuition and judgment enter into the construc-
tion and choice of the mechanical devices employed. But once these
devices have been selected, use of them should be made in a completely
-100-
27Erc-B7E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
explicit Manner. Such explicit use makes possible a check of the estimate
by other persons and will facilitate a reestimation at a later date by the
same analyst in the light of additional or improved information.
b. Calculation of Input Coefficients.
(1) Choice of a Product Definition.
Two procedures of defining products for purposes of calculating
input coefficients have frequently been followed. They outline two possible
extremes. In one, input coefficients have been calculated for single
narrowly defined products. In the other procedure, products have been
aggregated into commodity classifications, dividing an entire economy into
from 50 to 450 commodity categories.
For most purposes related to intelligence research, a compro-
mise between these two procedures is indicated. Many of the products of
interest to intelligence research would be completely buried in the 450
industry approach. Oft the other hand, inasmuch as there are thousands of
individual products -- and the possibilities of further narrowing the
definitions are almost infinite -- it is necessary to combine products to
some extent.
The appropriate method for combining groups of products for
the purpose of calculating input coefficients is based on some one ele-
ment, or unit of measure, common to all. This common element may be an
exterior characteristic, a principal input, or, in cases where the products
are exceedingly heterogenous, money values. It is desirable that this
common element, if not an input itself, be proportional In amountto the
amounts of the principal raw materials inputs. For example, the combina-
tion of Many types of electric motors by kilowatt capacities is useful
when, as one moves from motors of lesser kilowatt capacities to motors of
greater kilowatt capacities, the amounts of the inputs required to produce
them increase proportionately. In this fashion, one may speak unallibig-
uously of the amount of copper, for instance, required to produce electric
motors per kilowatt. If the relation is not proportional. or does not even
approach proportionality, it is always necessary to specify the composi-
tion of the particular product category (or product mix) on which such a
figure is based, in terms of the types and quantities included. The
resultant input coefficients will be applicable only in cases where the
composition of product is identical.
Because of the necessity of making international comparisons,
it is more useful to use physical units rather than value as a unit of
measure. The calculation of "purchasing power parity" conversion factors
-101-
arE-C-R-E-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
a-E7a-a-ki
for detailed product types is difficult and time consuming. In many cases,
where proportionality does not hold because of the heterogeneity of the
product mix, it is possible to break down the definition of the product
only slightly in order to approximate this proportionality.
(2) Dealing with Intersnatial Instahility.
Because of the possibility of substantial variations in input
coefficients as a result of differing production methods, little reliance
should be placed upon coefficients calculated on the basis of the produc-
tion method employed in a single plant. It is highly desirable that as
many separate calculations as possible be made of the same input coeffi-
cient in order to check the spread of the coefficients. It is likely
that the spreads of the coefficients will not be the same for different
types of inputs. There will be little or no spread between enterprises
of some coefficients, because of the limited technical possibilities for
substitution. On the other hand, for some'coefficients the spread is
likely to be great. Because these variations will not be due significantly
to errors of measurement but to variations of circumstance, the taking
of an arithmetic mean of the coefficients is meaningless. These varia-
tions can serve to indicate the degree of reliance which may be placed
upon their application to other plants.
In general, it is to be expected that the coefficients relating
to raw materials and semifabricated products will show the smallest amount
of spread, whereas the coefficients related to energy, "capital," and
especially labor, will show the greatest amount of spread because of the
greater technicaltreedom for substitutions.
(3) Dealing with Intertemnoral Instability.
This class of problems is probably the most difficult to be
encountered. Again the coefficients derived from raw materials and semi-
fabricated inputs will show the greatest stability. Significant shifts
in the proportions in which these inputs are employed usually are accom-
plished only very slowly and painfully. On the other hand, coefficients
of energy, "capital," and labor are likely to prove highly unstable. In
response to changes in the over-all availability of the inputs, rather
large substitutions can frequently be made.
Capital, energy, and labor input coefficients will also vary
importantly with the level of output. Capital, defined here as buildings,
moving and fixed machinery, and such, measured in terms of either value
or of physical units such as number of machines, horsepower of prime
movers, or square feet of floor space, is ordinarily not variable with
-102-
S-E-C-B7E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
g7E-c-g-Etz
respect to short-run fluctuations in output. The greater the capacity
utilization at the time of the calculation of the input coefficient, the
smaller the value of the coefficient will be. The same is true of
energy, although to a lesser extentl because a certain proportion of
energy purchased will fluctuate with the volume of output. On the other
hand, the labor coefficient will decline up to a certain point at
capacity utilization is increased.
It is desirable that the calculations of input coefficients
for a given product at a given plant be made for varying levels of out-
put, with an explicit effort made to obtain the measures at or near the
level of designed or "normal" capacity utilization. The spreads of the
values of the coefficients between differing levels of output will again
suggest the reliability of the coefficients between differing levels of
output and will indicate the reliability of the coefficients for applica-
tion to other plants.
In the absence of fairly detailed information on such matters
as the history of resource supplies and technological change there is no
criterion which may be applied to limit the length of the time period
which may be permitted to elapse between the calculation of the input
coefficients and their employment for estimating output in other plants.
3. Coglected Input Coeffipients.
The input coefficients as used in this report do not fulfill in all
cases the requirements outlined above. The following is an attempt to
evaluate them in the light of the criteria presented above and to present
those which are believed to be the most useful.
a. Electron Tubes. 31/
On the basis of the criteria established in the earlier section,
the most useful classification of electron tubes for the calculation and
the use of input coefficients is as follows:
(1) Receiving and allied tubes. This category includes all
classes of small transmitting tubes (such as types 807, P50, etc.),
special subminiature tubes, and standard receiving tubes.
(2) Large transmitting. and special tubes.
(3) Cathode-ray tubes.
- 103 -
A7E7gHE-E-I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
. The input coefficients for electron tubes found to be the most use-
ful for this report and believed to be the most useful for future research
are given in Table 31.
Table 31
Input Coefficients for Receiving and Allied Electron Tubes*
Inuut
Quantity per Thousand Tubes
Labor
yan-hours
US Method (Assembly Only, All
Parts Bought) p/**
150
US Method (Integrated Tube Manu-
facture) 2/
240
UK Method 2/
600
French Method ki
700
German Method
2,500
Material
All Receiving and Allied Tubes
Mica (Raw Block before Punching) p/
Tungsten Wire fil
Grid Wire (Including Moly, Ni, or
Fe Alloys) 2/
Glass (Distributed about 1/3 as
Tubing and 2/3 as Bulbs Excluding
Metal Types) gi
Pounds
15.00
0.17 (or 750-800 Meters)***
1.2 (or 5,000 Meters)***
90.0 (Glass Tube Types)
40.0 (Miniature Types)
18.0 (Metal Types
* These figures are based upon those presented in Table 35 but have been
adjusted for plant integration, year, and country.
** Footnotes in lower-case letters refer to those for Table 35.
*** Weight varies substantially with product mix -- length does not; so
length is the preferred input coefficient.
-104-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
The material input coefficients for subminiature tubes, included in
Table 31 with all receiving and allied electron tubes, are presented
separately in Table 31-A.
Table 31-A
Material Input Coefficients for Subminiature Tubes
Quantity per Thousand Tubes
Input Pounds
Glass Tubing 15
Mica (Raw Block,
Strategic Quality) 4
Dumet Sealing Wire 7
All input requirements for large transmitting and special tubes will
vary widely with differing product mixes. When the small, mass-produced
types are eliminated from this category, the ranges of input coefficients
are as given in Tables 32 and 33.*
. The glass for the glass envelope appears to be the only input co-
efficient for CR tubes which has a reasonably stable relation to the volume
of output. The coefficient must be estimated in each case, taking account
of the sizes of CR tubes in production.,
Labor requirements will vary widely with the design of the CR tube
produced. Current US methods of producing television tubes are not believed
to be applicable to foreign estimates, because of the extremely low labor
content. An estimate for European labor requirements of 10,000 to 40,000
total man-hours per 1,000 tubes is suggested.
b. XlectrIc Lamvs. 36./
The input coefficients for electric lamps found to be the most use-
ful are given in Table 34.**
* Tables 32 and 33 follow on p.
** Table 34 follows on p.
-105-
A7E-2-17E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
27E-C -E-E-I
Table 32
Input Coefficients for Large Transmitting and Special Tubes*
Input Quantity
Per Thousand $ US
ot.Tubes Per Thousand Tubes
Labor an-hours gip e
US 180
Europe 800-2,000**
General 4,000-251000
yeterial Pounds
Tungsten Rod and Heavy
Wire (Lbs) IV 1.0 15-35
Molybdenum Rod and
Sheet (Lbs) g/ 1.2 15-35
Table 33
Input Coefficients for Medium and Small Radar Magnetrons***
Input Quantity Der Thousand Tubes
Material Pounds
OFHC**** Copper Rods, Bars,
Tubes, and Heavy Sheet 5,000
Kovar Sealing Metal 100
Molybdenum 6
Footnotes in lower-case letters refer to those for Table 35.
** Depending upon the amount of automatic equipment used, the degree
of employment padding, and other factors.
*** See footnote j for Table 35.
**** Oxygen-free high-conductivity.
-106-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Table 34
Input Coefficients for Electric Lamps
Quantity-per Thousand
Input General-service tamps**
Paterial
Glass Bulbs (Lbs) b/* 88.0
Glass Tubing (Lbs) b/ 6.5
Tungsten Wire (Meters) c/ 800.0*** - 1,050.0****
Labor input coefficients vary with the use of automatic equipment
and with the proportion of parts made within the plant. The labor input
coefficient for a US plant making extensive use of automatic equipment
and making all parts except glass bulbs and tubing is 25 man-hours per
1,000 lama (general-service). For European plants the range is from 250
to 100 man-hours per 1,000 lamps, depending on the amount of automatic
equipment used. For plants purchasing parts rather than making them them-
selves, while the same spread occurs, depending on the degree of utiliza-
tion of automatic equipment, the labor input coefficients will be about
half of those above.
The data in Tables 35 and 36***** appear to be generally applicable
to all classes of lamps for the typical product mix.
Footnotes in lower-case letters refer to those for Table 35.
Good lamps only.
For 120v lamps.
For 220v lamps.
Table 35 follows on p. ; Table 36, on p.
-107-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E?C-R-E-T
Table 35
Input Requirements for Electron Tubes*
Per Thousand Tubes
Item
Molybdenum,
Tungsten Molybdenum Tungsten Rod and
Total Man, Direct Man- Wire Wire Rod Glass Mica I)/ Gas Power Nickel Sheet
hours 2/ hourslY (Lbs) '(the) (Lbs) (Lbs7 (Cu. Ft.) (kWh) (Lbs) (Lbs)
All Tubes, US, 19442/
Receiving and Allied Tubes Si
Receiving and Allied Tubes, US,
1944500
Receiving and Allied Tubes, UK,
1944
Receivingand Allied Tubes,
France, 1949700
Receiving and Allied Tubes, US,
1951 1/
Receiving Tubes Only, US, 1947
Receiving Tubes Only, US, 1944
Receiving Tubes Only, UK, 1944 3/
Receiving and Allied Tubes,
East German Plant, 1.953. y
Receiving and Allied Tubes,
East German Plant, 1951 2/
Receiving and Allied Tubes,
East German Plant, 1951 e
Small Transmitting Tubes, US,
1944 2/
Subminiature Tubes, US, 1944 e
704
189
400
769
2,500
2,000
3,200
1,190
602
500
0.13
0.17
0.044
0.57
0.30
0.62
0.72
2,500
280
14.81
Notes to Table 35 follow on p.
- 108 -
S -E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 35
Input Requirements for Electron Tubes
(centld)
Per Thousand. Tubes 11
Item
Total Mail- Direct Man-
hours SY hours d/
Tungsten Molybdenum
Wire Wire
(Lbs) (Lbs)
Tungsten
Rod
(Lbs)
Glass
Mica b/
(LbiT
Gas
(Cu. Ft.)
Power
(kwh)
Molybdenum,
Rod and
Nickel Sheet
(Lbs) (Lbs)
Receiving and Allied Tubes f/ (cont'd)
Receiving Tubes Only, US Plants,
,(Lbs),
1951 s/
154
83
Receiving Tubes Only, US Plant,
1951 t
189
150
Receiving Tubes Only, US Plant,
1951
109
77
330
150
Receiving Tubes, Typical Types,
US Plants, 1951 .v../
T9
0.095
84
14.70
T-51 Miniatures
0.046
37
5.93
Subminiatures
3.67
Large Transmitting and Special Tubes
Transmitting Tubes US, 1947 2/
Transmitting Tubes US, 1944 x/
2,326
3,400
3140
31,000
3,600
15.7
Transmitting Tubes UK, 3.9447il
31.3
48.5
Transmitting Tubes, France,
1949 _V
9,000
5,000
- 109
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
SfE-C-R-E-T
Table 35
Input Requirements for Electron Tubes
(cont'd)
Per Thousand Tubes
Molybdenum,
Tungsten Molybdenum Tungsten Rod and
Total MEI- Direct 110.. Vara Wire Rod Glass Mica3/ Gas Power Nickel Sheet
Item hours 2/ hours 2/ (Lbs) (Lbs) (Lbs) (Lbe), (Lbs (Cu. Ft.) ,(kWh) (Lbs) (Lb,)
Transmitting Tubes, East Germany,
1951 22/
Transmitting Tubes ly
8011 (Br VT 90)
813
Br VT98
Br CV 92
VU 504
Cathode-ray Tubes
25,000
6,150
2,100
25,000
10,300
5,600
US, 1947 cc 11,363
US, 1944 286
East Genii-ail Plant, 1951 22/ 62,000
US, 1944 II/
5spi 920
5F27 3,160
- 110 -
S-E,C-14..E-T
150,000 17,200
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07 : CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 35
Input Requirements for Electron Tubes
(cont'd)
a. Good tubes only.
b. Raw block mica.
c. Includes all employees.
d. Includes only those employees engaged in
actual production work.
d. WPB (war Production Board), Radio and
Radar Division, official records and reports.
f. The category "Receiving and Allied Tubes"
includes standard receiving tubes, small
transmitting tubes, and special subminiature
tubes, unless otherwise indicated.
g. Includes receiving tubes and small trans-
mitting tubes made in the same facilities of
plants with varying degrees of vertical
integration. Source: WPB.
h. Data comparable to the preceding US
figure. Two major differences between US
and British methods are evident. British
methods require substantially more man-hours
per unit of receiving and allied tubes, and
also more molybdenum wire per unit (this
latter difference is attributed to the rela-
tively greater US use of other alloy grid
wire as a substitute). Source: WPB.
i. Syndicate National de L'Industrie Radio -
electrique, official data for the French elec-
tron tube industry for 1949. Figures include
plants of varying degrees of vertical integra-
tion.
j. Excluding subminiature tubes. Product mix
for receiving tubes as follows: miniature
tubes, 57 percent; glass tubes, 37 percent;
metal and loctal tubes, 12 percent.
Critical materials per $1,000 of trans-
mitting, special, and microwave tubes are as
follows: tungsten, 0.93 lbs.; molybdenum,
1.08 lbs.; nickel, 3.75 lbs.; kovar, 4.30 lbs.;
OFHC copper, 46.00 lbs.
Input requirements for magnetrons per 1,000
tubes are as follows:
Input Requirements for Magnetrons
Pounds per Thousand Tubes
Item
Small Magnetrons
Medium Magnetrons
Large Magnetrons
OFHC Molyb-
Copper Kovar denum
1,800 ---46
16,000 150 3
72,300 6,150 4,600
- 111 -
S-E-C-RI-E.T
Source: National Production Authority, Elec-
tronics Division, data for the fourth quarter,
1951.
k. US Census of Manufactures, 1947. Inputs were
distributed among the various categories of tubes
on the basis of value of gross shipments. Figure
includes plants of varying degrees of vertical
integration.
1. WPB figures. Data includes plants of varying
degrees of vertical integration.
m. WPB data.
n. Data from an East German plant for mid-1950.
Man-hours were allocated among the various cate-
gories of tubes on the basis of their production
values. Degree of vertical integration not given.
o. Data from an East German plant for late 1950.
The plant used three 48-head Telefunken exhaust
Machines, with an input requirement of 5 hours per
machine per 1,000 tubes. Degree of vertical in-
tegration not stated.
p. Data from an East German plant for late 1950.
While the degree of vertical integration of the
three East German plants is not stated precisely,
it is believed that they are comparable with
respect to this variable.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
a-E-C-RZ-T
Table 35
Input Requirements for Electron Tubes
(cont'd)
q. Source: WPB data, 1944. Includes plants
with varying degrees of vertical integration.
r. Source: WPB data, 1944. Includes plants
with varying degrees of vertical integration.
s. Source: US manufacturer, 1951. Data
refers to the entire receiving tube produc-
tion division of the firm.
t. Source: US manufacturer, 1951. Data
refers to a fully integrated plant where
parts and machines are constructed. US
sealex exhaust machine input requirements
for this plant are 0.8 hours per exhaust unit
per 1,000 receiving tubes.
u. Source: US manufacturer, 1951. Data
refers to a nonintegrated plant assembling
receiving tubes. US sealex exhaust machine
input requirements for this plant are 1.3
hours per exhaust machine per 1,000 receiving
tubes. For a third plant of the same firm,
making subminiature tubes only, input require-
ments are 1.19 hours per exhaust unit per
1,000 tubes.
Gross inputs of selected materials, based upon
a weighted product mix in pounds per 1,000 tubes,
are as follows:
Input Requirements for Certain Tubes
Pounds per Thousand Tubes
Material
T9
Receiving
Tubes
Sub-
miniature
Tubes
T-51-
Miniatures
Nickel
8.41
3.25
4.00
CR Radio Steel
9.8
0.22
9.76
Copper
1.25
0.31
Tungsten Fila-
ment Wire
0.095
0.046
Raw Block Mica
14.7
3.67
5.93
Bulb Glass
57.0
25.0
Glass Tubing
27.0
15.0
12.0
Dumet Lead Wire
0.31
6.51
0.10
112 -
S-ErC-11-E.T
For oxide-coating emission mix, average
usage for all plants is 180 grams per 1,000
tubes.
v. Source: US manufacturer, 1951.
w. Source: US Census of Manufactures, 1947.
Includes special tubes. See footnote k.
x. Source: Includes special tubes. See foot-
note e.
y. Source: Includes special tubes. See foot-
note e.
z. Source: See footnote i.
aa. Source: See footnote n.
bb. WPB data, 1944.
cc. Source: See footnote k.
dd. Source: See footnote e.
ee. Source: See footnote n.
ff. Source: See footnote e.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 36
Input Requirements for Electric Lamps*
Per Thousand L
Item
Total Man-hours
Direct Man-hours
Glass Bulbs
(Lbs)
Glass Tubing
(Lbs)
Tungsten Wire
(Meters)
Process Gas
(Cu. Ft.)
Power
(kwh)
Molybdenum
Wire
(Meters)
All Lamps, US, 1947 a/
29
Large Incandescent a7
29
880
63
Automotive 2/
24
750
52
Miniatures 2/
10
310
21
Fluorescent Lamps,
Hot C 2/
133
4,250
295
Incandescent Lampss GS,
25w to 200w b/
10
5
88
6.5
520
23
Incandescent Tamps, GS,
120v to 220v c/
800 . 1,050
Incandescent amps, GS,
All Sizes
103
1,020
119
.s.1/
Incandescent Lamps, GS,
All Sizes
233
;/
Incandescent Lamps, OS,
All Sizes f/
208
Incandescent Lamps, GS,
All Sizes g/ "
182
Incandescent Lamps, GS,
All Sizes h/ 91
* Footnotes to Table 36 follow on p.
- 113 -
S-E-C,R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 36
Input Requirements for Electric Lamps
(cont'd)
a. Data obtained from US Census of Manufacturers, 1947. Direct man-hours refers to Census category "production workers." Product mix of
the lamp industry for 1947 is as follows:
Item
Volume
(Million Units)
Gross Value of Shipments
(Million $ US)
All Lamps
1,786.0
194.4
Large Incandescent
946.6
103.1
Automotive
272.8
24.3
Other Miniatures
203.8
8.1
Christmas Tree
223.5
9.7
Hot C Fluorescent
83.8
42.5
The input coefficients were calculated by distributing inputs among the lamp categories on the basis of shipment values, after adding
the inputs from plants supplying lamp components but not included in the "lamp" industry by the Census.
b. Data obtained from a US manufacturer for the month of December 1951. The plant made 25-watt to 200-watt incandescent lamps only, buying
all parts. Process gas per 1,000 lamps used was 640 cubic feet in winter, including space heating.
c. For the same firm as in b, making all parts except glass bulbs and tubing.
d. Data from an East German plant, 1951.
e. Data from an East German plant for the first quarter, 1951. This plant makes all of its parts. except glass bulbs and tubing.
requirements per 1,000 lamps for mid-1950 were 270.
f. Data derived from the total lamp production of three major German plants for early 1951. These plants make all parts except glass bulbs
and tubing.
g. Data from the Osram Company, West Zone, Berlin, 1950. The plant does not make all of its own parts.
h. Data from the UILCO "Tungsram" plant, Budapest, Hungary, 1950. The plant makes all parts except glass bulbs and tubing.
Man-hour
- 114 -
S -E -C -R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
R
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0
*.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/07: CIA-RDP79R01141A000100070002-0