SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS WEDNESDAY - 6 MARCH 1974 10:30 A.M. ROOM 1223, DIRKSEN OFFICE BUILDING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01099A002200010020-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: March 6, 1974
• Content Type: BRIEF

me CLOul-o N
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MAIL
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
Wednesday - 6 March 1974
10:30 a. m.
Room 1223, Dirksen Office Building
John L. McClellan (D., Ark.), Chairman
John C. Stennis (D., Miss.) Milton R. Young (R., N. Dak.)
John O. Pastore (D., R. I.) Roman L. Hruska (R., Neb.)
Staff Members
James R. Calloway
Guy McConnell
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
W. E. Colby
George L. Cary
Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science
and Technology
Deputy Director, Office of
Current Intelligence
Office of Current Intelligence
Legislative Counsel
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MAR 1 f
DCI CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING FOR
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
10:00 A.M., 6 MARCH 1974
Room 1223 NEW SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
Soviet Strategic Forces
Soviet ICBMs
ICBM Test Programs
ICBM Characteristics
New Silo Construction
Ballistic Missile Submarines
Antisubmarine Warfare
Strategic Bombers
ABM Defenses
SALT and MBFR Verification
New Soviet Aircraft Carrier
Soviet Reconnaissance Sattelites
Soviet Defense Expenditures
China
Chinese Military Developments
The Middle East
The Oil Situation
Indochina
Thailand
Latin America
Cuba
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DCI CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING FOR
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
6 March 1974
I. Mr. Chairman, before discussing Soviet strategic
weapons, I would like to say a few words about
the Soviet foreign policy developments we have
come to call detente. The Russians are still
holding to this policy, which is increasingly
identified with General Secretary Brezhnev.
When we speak of their policy of detente,
however, a careful definition is in order.
A. Detente does not mean a change of heart. Nor
does it mean that Moscow has abandoned its
basic objectives.
1. We see continuity most clearly in the
strategic field, as will become evident.
when I discuss weapons development.
B. Detente does mean that the Soviets are seek-
ing advantages in their relationships with
the West through a new tactic, to which they
have committed considerable effort, and prestige.
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II. This new tactic reflects their realization that
they are falling behind in the technological
race. They have acknowledged to themselves
that, if they are to begin closing the gap be-
tween themselves and the Wes"t, they need to
import and absorb large amounts of Western
technology.
A. They are trying to do this in a number of
ways. One is normal trade... Another is the
project method, in which a Western firm
contracts to build and bring into operation
an entire plant.. A third is the exchange
of technological data with individual
Western companies.
B. As one measure of this effort, Soviet
orders for Western machinery and equipment
hit $2..5 billion last year--a 60 percent
increase over 1972. The US is a major
recipient of such orders, but we by no
means monopolize the field. Only some
$435 million of that $2.5 billion was
placed with American firms.
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C. A second factor in Moscow's new tactic is
that it sees China as holding a single-minded
hostility toward the USSR:
1. Peking has rebuffed .all Soviet. overtures
for an improvement of Sino-Soviet rela-
tions, and the border negotiations remain
at square one.
2. China devotes the energies of its new
diplomacy to countering Soviet policy in
every area of international politics.
3. Moscow realizes that this attitude is not
just a peculiarity of Mao's personality,
which will disappear when he does,
III. Both the economic factor and the Chinese factor
are thus fairly long-term ones, and both work in
the same direction on Soviet foreign policy.
A. Obviously, normal and amicable relations with
the West are necessary .if the Soviets are to
promote their economic objectives. Major
confrontations over Berlin, or Cuba, or the
Middle East would undermine the chances for
technological gain.
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B. Tense relations with the West would also expose
the USSR to the risk of pressure on two fronts:
Western and Eastern So long as China remains
actively hostile, the Soviets have a strong
interest in keeping relations with the West
on an even keel..
1. In particular, they want to give as little
encouragement as possible to cooperation
between China and the US--which appears to
them as collusion against the Soviet Union.
C. There are positive political incentives as
well. Detente provides a useful climate for
the extension of Soviet influence in Western
Europe. It also promotes the concept of So-
viet equality with the US and Moscow's claim
of its right to be involved in all interna-
tional questions, such as the Middle East.
IV. These current priorities have some impact on re-
lations with the US. Moscow is no longer so ac-
tive and automatic in opposing US policy in every
corner of the globe.
A. This has helped, for example, to get a Viet-
nam settlement and to bring about negotiations
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in the Middle East. It has not, of course,
solved major problems in either area, nor
do the Soviets intend to do that.
B. Brezhnev's personal prestige is commited to
detente. Last year he made his biggest gains
with his trips to Bonn and Washington.
1. All Brezhnev's politburo colleagues now
acknowledge his preeminent position but
he is aware he cannot get too far ahead
of them, and must show some fruits of
detente.
2. Coping with Solzhenitsyn and other dissi-
dents poses a continuing dilemma of how
to square the needs of domestic discipline
with foreign policy considerations.
comeback from a dismal 1972 showing, but Mos-
cow's goal o overtaking the US remains as dis-
tant as ever. The still produces only
about half as much as the US with aYabor
he economy ~We a
A
force 50 percent larger.
V. Logically, detente should also lead to a further
easing of the arms race. But this has not happened
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21 January 1974
DCI CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING
SOVIET DEFENSE EXPENDITURES
I. I would like to conclude this overview of the So-
viet military effort with a brief discussion of a
subject that this committee is familiar with--the
costs of military programs. Our evidence indicates
that the Soviet leaders, too, pay close attention
to their defense spending. They apparently be-
lieve, however, that their economy is capable of
sustaining or even accelerating the pace of defense
spending.
A. Our calculations of the absolute values of So-
viet defense costs contain uncertainties, but
we can depict overall trends in defense spend-
ing with some confidence. Since 1960, the
trend has been generally upward, increasing
at an average annual rate of about 3 percent.
1. For the last few years, however, ruble
spending has remained at essentially the
same level, reflecting the fact that the
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USSR is between major strategic procure-
ment cycles.
a. Procurement of weapon systems developed
in the 1960s, and now deployed, was
largely completed by the end of 1970,
and wi- of the strategic sys-
tems now under development has not
yet begun.
2. The USSR recently announced that defense
spending would decline by about one per-
cent in 1974. We regard this announced
cut as largely a political gesture, rather
than an indicator of actual spending.
3. Our estimates of Soviet spending for 1974--
which are based on observed and projected
changes in military and space programs and
forces--show a slight increase in total
defense outlays.
4. Moreover, we expect to see--if not a spend-
ing splurge--at least a substantial upswing
in Soviet expenditures for procurement in
1975 and 1976. By then, production of the
new strategic systems now under development
should begin.
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5. The share of total defense funds allo-
cated to military R&D and space has
grown steadily over the last five years.
In fact, outlays for.these purposes have
been the fastest rising element of de-
fense spending and now account for about
one-third of the total. We expect growth
in military R&D to moderate over the next
few years, however, as the USSR begins
procurement of new strategic systems.
6. As for manpower, the Soviets devote about
37 percent of their ruble defense spend-
ing to active military, retirEd military,
and civilians--as opposed to about 51 per-
cent for the United States for these items.
The shares for active duty pay and al-
lowances alone are much closer. Never-
theless, the Soviets are able to keep 65
percent more men under arms--simply by
paying their conscripts relatively much
less than we pay our soldiers./ (Thfr mp-
troller in DoD is using
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DCI CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING
CHINA
I. One can hardly mention the Soviet Union without
thinking of China. I would like to bring you up
to date on the internal political situation, for-
eign policy trends, the progress the Chinese are
making toward a nuclear deterrent, and chances of
hostilities with the Soviet Union.
The Domestic Scene
II. As you know, the Tenth Party Congress took place
last August, and it has given us a new basis for
assessing the domestic political scene.
A. The congress was the shortest since the Com-
munists gained power in 1949, suggesting that
the leadership wanted to avoid a full discus-
sion of many controversial policy issues.
B. The meeting focused on reconstructing the top
organs of the party after the disruptions of
the Lin Piao affair and the earlier Cultural
Revolution.
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1. The congress adopted a revised party con-
stitution, which deleted a specific refer-
ence in the previous version to Lin as
Mao's designated successor but did not
name a new heir.
C. The new Politburo, like its predecessor, had--
until very recently--21 full members and four
alternates. It is a mix of moderate officials,
radical ideologues, military men and elder
statesmen--a coalition of divergent interests
that seems roughly balanced between moderates
and ultraleftists.
1. All of the active members of the previous
Politburo retained their positions, and
nine new faces appeared.
2. Earlier this year, one more name was added.
Teng Hsiao-ping, a former secretary-
general of the party who was purged
during the Cultural Revolution and then
rehabilitated last year, regained the
seat he used to have on the Politburo.
a. His reinstatement is an indication
that other rehabilitated party and
CHINA-2
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government officials who were vic-
tims of the Cultural Revolution will
again be given positions of respon-
sibility.
D. Chou En-lai is clearly the number two man in
China, but he is only one of five vice chair-
men elected at the congress.
1. The others are two military men, an aging
radical who is largely inactive, and the
rising young official from Shanghai, Wang
Hung-wen. Wang is only in his mid-thirties,
and was a radical during the Cultural Revo-
lution. His. elevation is the leadership's
acknowledgement that there must be new blood
in the highest councils.
2. This group presumably will serve as a col-
lective leadership when Mao dies, although
the revised party constitution did not so
stipulate.
III. The army's role in politics has been a controver-
sial issue.
A. Army leaders were thrust into politics simply
because the party and civil administrations
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were shattered by the Cultural Revolution. As
soon as the dust of that phenomenon began to
settle, and particularly after the Lin Piao
affair, the civilian authorities started to
reassert their control over the military.
B. On New Year's Day Peking revealed a massive
reshuffle, affecting the commanders of seven
of the 11 military regions and the head of
the army's General Political Department.
1. The transfers separated the leaders from
their provincial power bases in which all
but one had concurrently headed the pro-
vincial party committee.
C. The reinstatement of Teng Hsiao-ping also is
important to this move as he has been assigned,
even though a civilian, to the party's Mili-
tary Commission.
IV. Let me, finally, say a few words about "Confucius."
A. In August 1973 Peking's major propaganda out-
lets began to feature articles attacking the
ancient sage Confucius (around 550 B.C.) and
his followers. They were depicted as conser-
vative, tradition-bound forces who were
1A 0
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successfully opposed at crucial periods of
Chinese history by more progressive elements.
1. It is clear that this campaign has direct
relevance to what is going on today in
China, and that "Confucius" is some actual
person. There is much speculation among
China specialists--and among the Chinese
themselves--about the purpose of the
whole affair.
2. Some observers see the campaign as an
attempt to reinvigorate the populace with
the "revolutionary" spirit so dear to Mao.
3. Another view holds that the campaign is
part of a bitter feud between radical
and moderate forces in the party's top
leadership. The radicals--led by Madame
Mao--are said to be attacking Chou En-lai
in an effort to protect the leftist poli-
cies of the Cultural Revolution.
4. Our analysts see the campaign as the open-
ing round in the succession struggle. They
believe Chou En-lai and Madame Mao differ
sharply over the conduct of foreign and
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domestic policy, and see the campaign as
Chou's effort to keep Chinese policy on
the moderate course that he was able to
set--with Mao's support--after the Cul-
tural Revolution.
5. Madame Mao has limited political power
of her own, but is apparently the rally-
ing point for disaffected elements in
the power structure, especially those
military leaders who are unhappy over
their diminishing political power.
B. The campaign is of major political importance, and
could well result in a purge, but we do not
believe it will escalate into the chaos of another
Cultural Revolution.
1. The Chinese leadership has taken steps to
keep the campaign under strict party control.
a. In January the Central Committee issued a
series of directives, including one that
set clear limitations on the conduct of the
campaign, such as a ban on attacks on
specific individuals.
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b. On February 20, an authoritative editorial
in People's Daily warned that the cam-
paign must stay on the "correct course"
and must not become "entangled" with "other
problems."
2. Chou En-lai, moreover, is in the strongest
position of his long career, and he is
firmly opposed to excessive measures. At
the age of 75, however, Chou will not be
around indefinitely. In the meantime, he
reportedly is attempting to ease the crushing
burden of work he has borne by transferring
some functions to Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping.
Chinese Foreign Policy
V. Despite the heating up of the internal situation,
China's foreign policy remains on course. Major
departures from the pattern of the past few years
are unlikely.
A. In the last week or two, the Chinese have gone to
considerable lengths to indicate officially and
unofficially that no such changes are contemplated
and that the new relationship with the United
States remains intact.
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B. Chou En-lai in a recent speech sought to
damp down Western press speculation that major
policy shifts were imminent by emphasizing the
controlled nature of the anti-Confucius campaign.
C. Despite this speculation, we think it likely that the
campaign will ultimately reaffirm and reinforce
Peking's current foreign policy stance.
1. In the immediate future, however, the Chinese
will probably concentrate more oft internal
than external affairs.
VI. In any case, Chou En-lai's main concern is to
counter Soviet efforts to isolate China. One of
his and Mao's main weapons is "detente" with the
United States.
A. Secretary Kissinger's visit last autumn
gave Peking an opportunity to demonstrate
the importance it attaches to detente.
B. Mao's long meeting with the Secretary--
nearly two hours--set the seal of high-
est authority on the policy of continuing--
and improving--relations with Washington.
C. The Chinese also seem anxious to forestall
any significant improvement of relations be-
tween Japan and the Soviet Union.
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1. Peking would like to limit possible So-
viet-Japanese cooperation in exploiting
economic resources in Siberia.
D. In Indochina, Peking seems to be trying to
reduce the potential for friction with the US.
1. It is taking a constructive line in Laos,
encouraging the formation of a coalition
government.
2. The Chinese--as I shall discuss later--
have also begun to scale down their
military presence in North Laos.
E. US actions and attitudes during the ammemst
Mideast fighting seem to have favorably im-
pressed the Chinese.
F. Peking was clearly concerned earlier this winter
over the possible effects of the embargo on
Western Europe. The Chinese do not want to see
this area weakened as a counterweight to the
Soviet Union.
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DCI CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING
THE MIDDLE EAST
I. Turning now to the Middle East, you all know that
the Israeli-Egyptian disengagement agreement was
successfully concluded on March 4, 24 hours ahead
of schedule.
A. The entire 40-day disengagement period pro-
ceeded smoothly, with only minor and mostly
accidental violations. Both sides seemed to
take particular care to follow both the letter
and the spirit of the agreement.
B. The Egyptians now have control of both banks
of the Suez Canal for the first time in almost
seven years, and they have been proceeding at
a smart pace to begin clearing the waterway
and rebuilding the devastated cities along it.
C. The Israelis are now situated some 15-20 kilom-
eters from the Canal, where they retain con-
trol of the strategic Mitla and Gidi passes.
A UN buffer force of about 2,000 men has been
interposed between the Egyptian and Israeli
forces on the east bank.
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Vietnam
I. Turning to Indochina, Mr:, Chairman, we see that
the war in South Vietnam still sputters more than
a year after the Paris accord was signed.
A. It is worth noting, however, that the level
of fighting has dropped since the signing of
the accord.
1. Casualties in 1973, for example, while
still high, were down significantly
compared with the previous year.
a. On the Communist, side, they declined
from over 160,000 to about 41,000.
b. Government losses dropped from 36,000
killed to around 15,000,
B. Significant fighting continues, however, and
engagements are sometimes intense.
1. Two of the peak periods last year were
just after the cease-fire was signed on
January 28th, and just before the second
agreement on June .15th that was intended
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to tighten up the ceasefire.
2. In both periods, the fighting resulted
largely from last-minute Communist ef-
forts to grab additional territory that
they hoped to keep permanently if the
cease-fire proved effective.
3. In most cases, however, the South Viet-
namese were able to push the Communists
back, and Saigon probably controls more
territory today than it did when the cease-
fire agreement was signed.
C. The larger battles have been fought primarily
over remote government outposts in areas the
Communists use for supply movement.
II. The question remains whether the North Vietnamese
will launch a major offensive in the current dry
season, which ends in May,,
A. Hanoi's intention to gain control of the South,
by military force if necessary, remains unchanged.
B. Late last year we concluded, after a thorough
examination, that it was a close choice whether
an offensive would occur this dry season.
C. Since then, although analysts still differ,
there is general agreement that the chances
of an offensive have declined0
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D. Our evidence over the past several months has
had many conflicting strands.
1. On the one hand, Hanoi has moved large
quantities of war materiel into South
Vietnam. It also has more troops in the
South than it did at the start of the 1972
offensive.
2. On the other hand, infiltration of replace-
ments for anticipated losses--which in previ-
ous years has been one of our most depend-
able indicators of Communist intentions--
has been less this dry season than we
might have expected,,
a. So far only about 35,000 regular com-
bat troops have set out for South Viet-
nam--mostly for the central highlands
and the southern part of the country.
b. Infiltration rates have fluctuated
greatly in earlier years, but this
is an unusually low rate by the
standards of the last five years.
c. Moreover, it appears that the mili-
tary conscription effort in the North
was smaller in 1973.
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Hanoi could still. move enough infiltrators
south to sustain an offensive this
dry season. In any major push it
probably would also use the three
infantry divisions now in garrison in
the North,
Inside South Vietnam, Communist briefers
have recently asserted that no offensive
is planned this spring.
a. One of our best sources, for example,
says he was told that while
the Communists will intensify the level
of fighting in an effort to prevent
government inroads and expand their
own holdings, there will. not be a
major offensive.
b. Our source added that the Communists
intend to emphasize political subversion,
rough activities such as recruiting,
propagandizing, and terrorism.
III. There is likely to be sporadic fighting, some of
it quite heavy, as both sides probe for weaknesses
along the ill-defined lines that separate them.
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A. Early this year, for instance, heavy action
occurred in the central highlands, where the
Communists sparred with Saigon's forces over
several communications routes and key outposts.
B. More recently the focus has shifted to the
populous delta, where government forces are
trying to move into Communist base areas.
C. Fighting could increase in the provinces north
of Saigon, and there also is always the
possibility of heavy fighting in the far north
of the country--the only area where Communist
combat forces could quickly be reinforced for
a major offensive.
IV. Talks on a political settlement between the Thieu
government and the Viet Cong have made little
headway.
A. Both sides have been mainly concerned with
gaining propaganda advantage, and have shown
little inclination to compromise their positions.
V. The Thieu government has improved its position
vis-a-vis its Communist and non-Communist opponents
during the past year.
A. Senate elections last summer gave Thieu firm
control over both houses of the legislature
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for the first time.,
B. The President has continued to develop his
Democracy Party to strengthen his political
apparatus throughout the country.
C. A presidential decree on political parties
early last year has served to further weaken
the already factionalized opposition parties.
D. The government is implementing a broad program
of administrative reforms to improve its per-
formance and standing in rural areas, although
the program is behind schedule and its scope
has been reduced.
VI. The most serious problem is in the country's
economy.
A. South Vietnam still depends heavily on foreign
economic aid, although it has been trying to
diversify its sources of aid through agreements
with countries such as Japan and France.
B. Inflation is a chronic problem,jnd prices rose
some 67 percent last year.
C. The government, however, staved off the most
severe threat of serious rice shortages late
last year.
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Cambodia
VII. in Cambodia, the Lon Nol government continues to
bear up fairly well under Khmer Communist military
pressure. The Cambodian Army has pushed back
all recent Communist attacks in the Phnom Penh
area.
A. The Communists have had only limited success in
carrying out plans for coordinated attacks
around the capital that were to began around
February 25.
1. They have mounted light attacks against
army outposts southeast of Phnom Penh and
on the Mekong River's east bank just
upstream from the capital.
2. Northwest and south of Phnom Penh, however,
the Communists have been forced to surrender
most of the gains they made early in t]e
present dry season.
3, The Communists' withdrawal in the south
has taken them out of artillery range of
Phnom Penh in that area.
4. Although the Communists have interdicted
key overland supply routes, they have
failed to block vital resupply convoys on
the Mekong.
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B. The Communists' performance in the past few
weeks suggests that they may not be able to
launch another major offensive against Phnom
Penh in the near future.
1. It may take them some time to offset the
effects of steady casualties, sickness, and
desertions.
2. Communist offensive plans may also be
affected by the need to stockpile new
munitions near the front lines. (Hanoi,
incidentally, still supplies arms and
ammunition.)
3. In addition, their tactical coordination
continues to be weak.
C. The Communists have also been suffering some
slippage in the countryside.
1. Their hold over the population in some rural
areas has been weakened by the dispatch
of provincial security forces to the
Phnom Penh front.
2. There are also signs of growing villager
unrest over harsh Communist control measures.
3. Local government forces are beginning to
exploit this situation by running aggressive
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operations into some of the affected areas.
4. In one such area, 22,000 villagers recently
rallied to the government.
D. Despite these encouraging developments, the
Lon Nol government is still not out of the
woods. But it now appears that it may emerge
from the dry season in somewhat better military
shape than the Communists.
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Laos
VIII. In Laos, Prime Minister Souvanna failed in his effort
to form a new coalition government by the first
anniversary of the Laos peace agreement, on February 21,
but he still hopes to do it soon,
A. Souvanna has made significant progress in
resolving disputes over the proper procedure
for the coalition's investiture--a key sticking
point in the protracted negotiations.
1. The King has finally agreed to invest the
government even it it is not presented to the
legislature for approval.
2. This is in line with the Lao Communists"
view that only royal approval of the govern-
ment is required.
3. Dissident rightist political elements in
the legislature appear willing to go along
with this procedure.
B. Souvanna now expects a senior Pathet. Lao official
to come to Vientiane "very soon" with a definitive
list of the Communist ministers for the new
cabinet
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1. He then expects to meet with Lao Communist
leader Souphanouvong to approve all
nominees for the new government.
C. Thus, the next moves clearly are up to the
Communists.
1. The chief Pathet Lao negotiator left
Vientiane on February 27 to report the
results of his recent talks with Souvanna to
Pathet Lao leaders in Sam Neua.
3. He also showed concern over some lingering
procedural difficulties associated with the
neutralization of the twin capitals of Luang
Prabang and Vientiane,
4. If his superiors uphold these concerns, there
will be still more delay in forming the new
government.
IX. Hanoi has withdrawn some of its forces since the
cease-fire went into effect.
As many as four North Vietnamese combat
regiments have redeployed from southern
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Laos--at least one has gone back to North
Vietnam, and another to the western
highlands of South. Vietnam?
2. We have also noted the first significant
withdrawals of North Vietnamese combat
units from northern Laos. Major elements
of the North Vietnamese 316th Division went
home in December.
3. However, an estimated 55,000-60,000 North
Vietnamese troops are still in Laos.
X. The Chinese have also begun to scale down their military
presence in northern. Laos.
A. Since last fall, virtually all of their air
defense forces--as well as the two infantry
regiments which deployed to Laos in late 1971 and
early 1972 have returned to China.
1. Despite these departures, however, the
Chinese are still rotating engineer units
in and out, of Laos..
2. These road construction and maintenance forces
presently constitute the bulk of the estimated
25,000 Chinese personnel in north Laos.
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5 March 1974
BACKUP FOR DCI CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING
LATIN AMERICA
I. Most of the governments represented at the Latin
American and Caribbean foreign ministers' meeting
with Secretary Kissinger in Mexico City last month
regard the conference as a promising starting point
for a healthy new dialogue with the US.
25X1
The two issues that produced the deepest
cleavage were the US suggestion that a new
"hemispheric community" be formed, and the
Cuban question, which arose informally.
1. Some of the more nationalistic governments
reject "community" as a possible new vehicle
for US domination
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BACKUP FOR DCI CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING
CUBA
I. The Castro government is beginning its 16th year
in power in the midst of a major restructuring
of its party and government bureaucracies. This
process was begun in 1970 at least partly as a
result of Soviet pressure.
A. The Cuban Communist Party has been undergoing
a reorganization to increase its influence
in the formulation and execution of the
regime's policies.
13. The sweeping reorganization of the upper
levels of government in November 1972
freed the top leaders from active involve-
ment in routine matters, and enabled them
to concentrate on long-range policy for-
mulation.
C. These changes are primarily designed to
reduce the economic stagnation and admin-
istrative chaos caused by the Castro regime's
spontaneous style of decision-making.
T(~CCUBA-1
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II. Cuba is expanding its ties with other Latin
American governments. At the same time, Cuban
involvement in subversive activities is at an
all-time low.
A. Cuba now has diplomatic relations with
Argentina, Mexico, Peru, Guyana, Jamaica,
Barbados, and Trinidad.
B. Venezuela, Honduras, and Panama are trading
with Cuba but formal relations do not appear
imminent.
C. Last fall Cuba's national airline inaugurated
a new air route linking Havana to Barbados,
Trinidad, and Guyana.
III. Relations with the USSR reflect Cuba's almost
complete dependence on Soviet military and
economic support.
A. There are some signs that Castro is not
entirely happy with the situation, but he
knows his options are limited.
B. During Brezhnev's recent visit, Castro gave
his first public endorsement to detente.
1. The Soviet leader apparently convinced him
that Moscow's pursuit of detente would not
lead to compromise of Cuban interests.
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