PROSPECTUS FOR PAPER ON SPANISH POLITICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01099A002100020001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 4, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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Prospectus for Paper on Spanish Politics
The forty year old Portuguese dictatorship recently fell quickly,
easily and unexpectedly. Political institutions disappeared almost
overnight. Rightist groups associated with the old Salazar-Caetano
regime proved unable to govern. The population, no longer dormant,
kept escalating its political demands, and failed to form political:
groups which could work toward consensus and a new order. The only.
disciplined force to emerge was the Communist party, whose leaders
were therefore in a position to cultivate and influence the military
officers who now rule in Lisbon.
The question is, will there be a similar scenario in. Spain, as
Franco's health fails and antagonistic groups compete for political
power? The key to the answer lies in the actions and strategies of
Spain's major political groupings. The groups are, roughly: the
official bureaucracy, military and political associations, the clergy,
business and laboring classes. By examining each group for its relative
stmngths and weaknesses, personalities, internal differences and view-
points, one can derive a picture of potential political alliances along
the conventional spectrum of right-center-left. A study would be
organized along the following lines-
-- Background: a very brief analysis of the collapse of the
Caetano regime for comparRPn and contrast with current conditions
in Spain..
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-- Institutions: a short description of the constitutional
structure created by Franco, and a judgment about its viability during
a period of transition.
-- Political Croups: the heart of the analysis, along the lines
suggested above;
-- The Right: the Falange, and. all other conservative elements
from varying groups, treated in terms of their ability to cooperate..
-- The Center: the important sectors from. all groups likely to
hold a moderate position, and an assessment of their ability to organize
together.
-- The Left : the Comrmm.ist Party of Spain along with the radical.
portions of the working classes, clergy and intellectuals considered in
terms of a possibly viable alliance.
The study would conclude by trying to predict which groups wall
come out on top in the context of Spanish economic and social change,
and the implications for US policy.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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4 December 1974
X1
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, OPR
SUBJECT The Spanish Succession Question
1. Attached are the Director's comments about
3. In any case would you,
recent, study. Like others, he found it interesting and informative
but was rather more startled than most would be over the possibility
of real troubles of the post-Franco era. The way Portugal surprised
us all. no doubt. is a factor. In any case, he wants some form of
interagency consideration of this question as you will note.
2. I don't have any firm ideas about how to proceed. I know
that neither INR nor OCI has anybody capable of writing an estimate
on this subject, and it looks like Dave would be the logical choice.
An NIE or interagency memorandum could be fairly readily adapted from
this text, possibly deleting some of the detail, accelerating the
pace of some of the prose so it reads faster, and expanding key judg-
ments with a few more specifics on likely scenarios in the short,
medium, and longer terms.
II
give this some thought and let's then consult on procedures.
25X1
25X1
25X1
National Intelligence Officer
for Western Europe
I- ~"
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20 September 1974
X1
SUBJECT The Spanish Succession: Strains
in the Post-Franco Era
Thanks for sending me the draft of piece on
Spain.
I think it is a thoughtful and interesting treatment and will
be glad to see it published. The subject is of considerable inter-
est in town now and will presumably get more interesting. A few
comments -- all of them quite minor:
-- I would suggest some other phrase than "as presently
constituted" in making the estimate that Franco's designed system
cannot endure. For one thing the phrase is ambiguous as to whether
it means what's in existence now or what his blueprint calls for;
and for another thing, no new system, following three decades of
what Spain has had, can help but show some significant changes,
Hence this judgment is hardly news (the phrase occurs on page 1 and
again later in the text).
-- On page 5, I myself would qualify the proposition that
the "economic miracle" has dampened discontent or wedded people to
the system; I am sure this proposition has truth in it, yet the
notion that prosperity allays discontent instead of creating more
appetite has been proven wrong so many times that I think it should
be approached with caution. I think what more often happens is
that people do get a stake in the system, then develop appetite for
more, and then if in any way that stake is threatened they tend to
think of drastic solutions. But this, of course, differs case by
case.
-- On page 10, I am not sure that "praetorian" is pre-
cisely he right term here. It means different things to different
people; my dictionary suggests corruption as part of the meaning,
which I don't think is intended here. In any case,`if used, it
should be defined. On the same page, I think the system is "finely"
rather than "finally" tuned. (Franco may have tried the latter!)
N io (Al
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25X1
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X1
OCI will know more about this.
-- On page 23, I have the impression that there is more
opposition to US bases and close US defense ties than i s suggested
in this section. It seems to me I have seen reference to a number
of moderates and some conservatives (possibly including Juan Carlos)
who oppose or have misgivings about these facilities. in
-- I would suggest some consideration be given to Europe -
especially the magnetic attraction of European social democracy to
many Spaniards, Spain's desire to get into Europe, and general Euro-
pean attitudes as a factor in Spanish attitudes.
Again, a very nice job. I presume you and Dave will be showing
this to the OCI people;j _j has been at work on a piece the
DCI asked for about groups likely to figure in the Spanish succession.
National Intelligence Officer
for Western Europe
25X1
25X1
25X1
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For Official Use Only
THE SPANISH SUCCESSION.-
Strains in the Post-Franco Authoritarian System
OPR-402
November 1974
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE OF POLITICAL RESEARCH
THE SPANISH SUCCESSION: STRAINS IN THE
POST-FRANCO AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEM
Page
FOREWORD
KEY JUDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
THE DISCUSSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I. The Franco Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
II. The Post-Franco Scene . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
III. The Ultimate Arbiter . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
IV. The Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
V. Implications for the United States . . . . . . 23
ANNEX: Some Preliminary Observations and Conclusions
About Authoritarianism and Militarism
Organization of the Spanish Government (chart) . . . face l0
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TAT
This paper was prepared as part of an OPR
research project, "Authoritarianism and Militarism
in Southern Europe," scheduled for publication early
in 1975. The aim of the project is to develop a
better understanding of the separate but often over-
lapping phenomena of authoritarian rule and direct
military involvement in political affairs and to
probe the implications of both in a region of con-
siderable strategic importance to the United States.
This paper is being published separately at this
time because of the growing interest in prospects
for Spain after Franco. The appraisal of Franco's
blueprint for succession, and what its defects may
portend for Madrid and Washington, reflects the
author's preliminary observations and conclusions
about authoritarianism and militarism, some of
which are set forth in the Annex.
The subject matter of this study was dis-
cussed with representatives of other offices in
both CIA and Department of State, but no attempt
at formal coordination was made. Comments and
queries are welcome. Please call
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THE SPANISH SUCCESSION: STRAINS IN THE
POST-FRANCO AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEM
-- Spanish experience demonstrates that authori-
tarianism can be a relatively stable and effective
system of government. Nevertheless, Franco has
failed to establish the tried and trusted political
institutions needed to perpetuate his system after
his departure.
-- Pressures for liberalization in Spain are certain
to escalate once Franco leaves the scene. Neither
the governmental structure that he has designed
for his heirs nor the current balance of forces
in Spanish society favor an orderly evolution
toward effective democratic rule. But the issue
of whether or not to liberalize the country's
authoritarian system is an open one.
-- In any event, the outlook is for a lengthy period
of instability caused by contention not only
between the forces for and against liberalizing
change, but among the different power elements
in Franco's complex succession scheme as well.
-- Though divided over the issues of further societal
reforms and direct involvement in political affairs,
the Spanish military establishment will almost
certainly intervene in the event of a serious and
prolonged breakdown of domestic order.
-- While Franco's successors will want to maintain
the benefits of reasonably cordial relations with
the US, they will be tempted to employ zealous
appeals to nationalism (at the expense of US in-
terests) in order to strengthen their position at
home.
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THE DISCUSSION
After 35 years of personal dictatorship under
Generalissimo Francisco Franco, Spain is on the verge
of transition to a far more complex form of authori-
tarian rule. Despite the likely imminence of this
change, the current system of getting things done
cannot simply be dismissed as no longer relevant.
Indeed, some understanding of current practices and
problems is essential to gauging the implications of
the redistribution of power and corresponding, insti-
tutional role changes which will follow Franco's
departure.
Spanish experience underscores the linkages
between modernizing change, political decay, military
intervention, and authoritarian rule. It also demon-
strates that authoritarianism can be a relatively
stable and effective system of government -- even in
a country which has passed well beyond the initial
stages of political, social, and economic development.*
* Despite its many variants, modern-day authoritarianism can be
categorized as a distinctive system of rule -- one in essence
neither totalitarian nor democratic, and one in which the mili-
tary establishment generally plays a significant political role.
For a further discussion of authoritarianism and militarism, see
the Annex.
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Some formal components of Franco's highly personalized
variant of authoritarian rule are flawed. Others are
rusty from disuse. But, until recently at least, his
overall system has worked remarkably well.
I. The Franco Era
The Franco regime has been supported from its
inception by a conservative coalition composed of the
military establishment; business, financial, and land-
owning interests; the National Movement (a pseudo-party
which some years ago superseded the Falange Espanola
TradieionaZista as Spain's sole legal political organiza-
tion); a varied array of monarchists; and, until recently,
most of the Spanish hierarchy of the Roman Catholic
Church. The privileged political position of these
groups has long been institutionalized in the carefully
balanced corporatist structure of Spain's principal
governmental organs and councils. But although these
elites are united in support of the overall political
system, they frequently differ among themselves over
specific policy issues. Thus, when necessary, Franco
has been able to play one group off against another
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and thereby insure that none become strong enough to
challenge his position as supreme arbiter.
During the early days of Franco's rule coer-
cive force was widely and ruthlessly applied. And
although the systemic role of repression has since
declined, Madrid's efficient internal security forces
have continued to make anti-regime activity a high
risk occupation. Many, if not most, of Franco's
active opponents have been jailed or forced to flee
the country.
But the weak and fragmented state of oppo-
sitionist forces within Spain is only partially
attributable to police action. Franco has not simply
cowed the population. On the contrary, the remarkable
balance of his system has long depended upon the
positive -- if passive - acceptance of the majority
of his countrymen. This critical element of consent
can be traced to the following factors:
--The weight of Spain's hierarchical,
elitist, and corporatist traditions.
--The legendary aura surrounding Franco
-3-
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--A two-fold legacy of the 1936-1939 civil
war and its chaotic prelude: (1) the
desire of all but a radical fringe to
avoid triggering another bloody fratri-
cidal conflict, and (2) a general
hostility toward Franco's most militant
opponents, the Communists.
--The "economic miracle" of the 1960's
and early 1970's which, by sharply
raising living standards, has dampened
discontent and given more and more
people a genuine if fragile stake in
the system.
--A modest and gradual political liberaliza-
tion (apertura) highlighted by the 1967
law granting heads of household the right
to elect about one-fifth of the members
of Spain's unicameral parliament (Cortes
Espanolas) and by current reforms pro-
viding for (1) the indirect election of
most of Spain's urban mayors and (2) the
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formation of distinctive political
"associations" within the National
Movement.
Unfortunately for Franco's successors, some
of these factors (e.g., morbid concern about renewed
civil war) have declined in force over time, and
one -- Franco's personal stature -- is non-transferable.
Moreover, economic contentment is a notoriously un-
stable political currency. Even under the best of
conditions, Madrid might find it difficult to satisfy
popular appetites whetted by a decade of increasing
living standards. As it is, Spain's economic prospects
have recently been clouded by mounting inflationary
pressures, the increased cost of petroleum, and the
general deterioration of the economic picture in
Western Europe.*
In addition, Franco has failed to establish
the effective and respected political institutions
Europe's economic woes have already found reflection in shrinking
earnings from Spain's important tourist industry and in a decline
in job opportunities for -- and hard currency remittances from --
nearly one million Spanish emigrant workers.
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needed to perpetuate his system once he has left the
scene. Of all the institutions he has created, only
the cabinet (which has benefited from Franco's will-
ingness to delegate authority over significant areas
of administration to hand-picked subordinates) has
developed any vitality. The rest have simply lain
dormant pending the succession or have been dis-
credited as compliant appendages of dictatorial rule.
Indeed, Franco's continued reluctance to grant these
institutions any sort of independent life lies at the
heart of the most pressing problems he will bequeath
to his successors -- mounting labor unrest, a polariza-
tion of the political scene along liberal and
conservative lines,* continued agitation for Basque
and Catalonian autonomy, and overall, a distinct
potential for a return to chronic instability.
The terms conservative and liberal take on distinctive mean-
ings when applied to Spanish politics. Far from simply evincing
a cautious attitude toward change, Spanish conservatives feel
uncomfortable with Franco's modest apertura and would resist, by
force if necessary, any significant shift in the balance of
political power toward populism. Thus, the whole political
spectrum is skewed to the right, and many Spaniards who might
be classified as liberals by outside observers would be con-
sidered centrists in a more democratic society.
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Labor unrest -- aggravated by inflation and
the prospect of increasing unemployment -- quite
possibly poses the most immediate threat to the
stability of post-Franco Spain. The inadequacy of
the official Syndical Organization in dealing with
workers' problems gave rise to a parallel clandestine
labor movement, the Workers' Commissions, in the early
1960's. Initiated largely by young Catholic activists,
but now in many cases dominated by Communists, these
commissions have survived both internal infighting
and repeated government crackdowns to achieve nation-
wide compass and international support. And although
the movement has so far fallen short of its goal of
effecting a general strike, it has become increasingly
successful in fomenting and organizing labor disputes
at the local plant level.
The liberal-conservative split over how to
respond to the pressures of modernizing change has to
some degree affected all the groups which have tradi-
tionally supported the Franco regime, including the
military establishment, the business-technocratic
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elite, and the National Movement. On balance, most
of them have so far remained conservative in outlook.
But mounting dismay over the inapility or unwillingness
of official organs to alleviate what it perceives as
social injustice recently drove Spain's Roman Catholic
establishment from the ranks of solidly pro-regime
forces. Moderate and liberal bishops gained control
of the hierarchy in 1972, and since then, the Church
has taken a prominent role in the campaign for social
and political reforms. This, in turn, has strengthened
the convictions of those forces which believe that
political liberalization has already gone too far,
and thus made it more difficult than ever to strike
a happy balance.
Similarly, the failure of Franco's political
institutions to accommodate or ameliorate pressures
for regional autonomy led to a split in the illegal
but moderate Basque Nationalist Party and to the birth
in 1960 of a small terrorist group dedicated to the
complete independence of the four Basque provinces.
This is the group that is believed to have been re-
sponsible for the assassination of Prime Minister
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Carrero Blanco in December 1973. Further actions of
this type might not only seriously disrupt the post-
Franco political environment, but could inspire
emulation among Catalonian nationalists as well.
In short, despite the beneficial effects of
Franco's apertura, Spanish political development has
not kept pace with the changes of social structure
and outlook generated by the vigorous economic growth
of the 1960's and increasing exposure to foreign in-
fluences. As the result, Franco's once finely tuned
system has been thrown out of kilter. By and large,
his personal authority and prestige have offset this
growing imbalance. But now, in a climate further un-
settled by recent events in Portugal, Spanish politics
are threatening to reacquire a praetorian character.*
W78 used here, the a 'ective praetorian denotes a condition
characterized by the politicization of all significant social
groupings and the Zack of political institutions strong enough
to mediate, refine, and moderate their interaction. Under these
circumstances, contending groups increasingly resort to direct
political action (e.g., bribery, coercion, terrorism, work
stoppages, and demonstrations), and the military establishment
is inexorably drawn toward the center of the political stage.
For a pioneering and comprehensive discussion of praetorianism
see Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 79-82 and 192-263.
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And while Franco's system is not yet beyond salvation,
the ability of his successors to halt its erosion
will be severely impaired by the complexity of the
largely untested governmental structure they will
inherit (see chart).
II. The Post-Franco Scene
Franco's passing will mark the end of one-man
rule* and the restoration in fact (rather than just in
principle) of Spanish monarchy. Theoretically, the
Caudillo's designee for future King, 36 year-old
Prince Juan Carlos de Borbon, will occupy the key
positions -- Chief of State, Generalissimo of the
Armed Forces, and Chief of the National Movement.
But, according to Franco's plan, the Prime Minister
will control the government machinery and act for the
King in exercising leadership of the National Movement.
In addition, either the Prime Minister or the minister
concerned will have to approve every decision taken by
the King as Chief of State,
Although Franco chose to implement constitutional arrangements
for dual succession in mid-1973 by giving up the post of Prime
Minister, this action in no way diluted his personal power.
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CORTES
Parliament
Organization of a Spanis vernment
COUNCIL OF
THE REGENCY
COUNCIL OF \ CHIEF OF STATE
NATIONAL
COUNCIL
Leader
National
Movement
Genera-
lissimo
PRIME MINISTER* NATIONAL
(President of Government) _ECONOMIC COUNCIL
HIGH
COURT OF
GENERAL STAFF
NATIONAL
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS
(three)
EXCHEQUER
COUNCIL
DEFENSE BOARD
COUNCIL OF
OF STATE
MINISTERS
(Cabinet)
Agriculture
Housing
Navy
Air
Industry
Planning & Development
Army
Information & Tourism
Public Workers
Commerce
Justice
Office of the
Education & Science
Labor
Prime Minister
Finance
National Movement
Syndical Relations
Foreign Affairs
I
Provincial Council - Governor
N
MAYOR
Educational, cultural, and
professional institutions
Appointmen
Representation
From three names presented by Council of the REALM
(Franco for life,
then monarch)
ch)
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The incumbent Prime Minister, Carlos Arias -
who is expected to retain his present position at
least initially when Juan Carlos takes office -
seems to share the young Prince's views on the need
for further political and social reforms. Even so,
the checks and balances that Franco has built into his
succession arrangements provide ample ammunition for
a multi-faceted power struggle once he is gone.
Significantly, the title of Caudillo and the
extraordinary constitutional powers which rendered
Franco "responsible only to God and history" will die
with him. Juan Carlos will be legally empowered to
resolve disputes between the Cabinet, the Cortes, and
the judiciary, but Franco's role of supreme arbiter
will have passed elsewhere -- to the previously som-
nolent Council of the Realm. In effect, there will
have been a triple, rather than a dual, succession.*
* The Council of the Realm has 17 members: 7 ex officio (the
President of the Cartes, the senior prelate among the members of
the Cartes, the senior military officer on active duty, the Chief
of the High General Staff, and the Presidents of the Supreme
Court, Council of State, and Institute of Spain) and 10 elected
from among the groups represented in the Cortes.
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The law limits the individuals whom Juan Carlos
may appoint as Prime Minister, President of the Cortes,
or President of the Supreme Court to nominees (in
each case, three) proposed by the Council of the
Realm. Similarly, he may not dismiss these officials
before the end of their appointed terms without the
Council's approval. He must also secure the Council's
agreement whenever he wishes to veto a law passed by
the Cortes, hold an extraordinary referendum, adopt
measures allowing for decree rule, extend a session of
the Cortes, or ask the Cortes to perform some particularly
sensitive act -- such as declaring war or ratifying a
treaty that may affect Spanish sovereignty. In addition,
the Council of the Realm is charged with ruling on
claims referred from the Cortes or the National Council
alleging that a given law or government action is con-
trary to either constitutional law or the Fundamental
Principles of the National Movement.
These are grave responsibilities to place on
a collegiate body composed of representatives of
disparate groups. In fact, given the growing rift
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between liberal and conservative forces in Spain,
Franco's whole succession scheme seems close to un-
workable. Effective power is spread too widely among
contending elites. Neither Juan Carlos nor Carlos
Arias possesses the enormous personal prestige which
helped Franco to command the unswerving loyalty of
the military establishment, hold his checkered
governing coalition together, and mute popular dis-
content.
Indeed, despite constitutional sanction and
personal anointment by Franco, Juan Carlos is likely
to encounter widespread skepticism about the legitimacy
of his position. There are not too many ardent monar-
chists left in Spain. Of these, more than a few would
prefer to see someone other than Juan Carlos on the
throne. Others feel that the oath of fealty to
Franco's system which Juan Carlos was required to
take in 1969 has demeaned the restoration. Finally,
for many Spanish citizens who would otherwise greet
the resurrection of Kingly office with resounding
indifference, the thought that the considerable powers
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accorded to Spain's Chief of State will henceforth
be passed on through primogeniture is appalling.
There will be other constraints on Juan Carlos'
effectiveness as well. He will, for example, be
restrained by both constitutional law and the afore-
mentioned personal oath from taking any action contrary
to the "permanent and unalterable" Principles of the
National Movement -- principles which, while subject
to differing interpretation, establish Spain as a
Catholic, corporatist, syndical, and one-party state.
Moreover, major changes in the laws which currently
comprise Spain's "open constitution" require approval
by both the Cortes and popular referendum and thus are
likely to be difficult to engineer in the post-Franco
environment.
In short, even if Juan Carlos and Carlos Arias
could reach full agreement on some innovative course
of action, they might well lack the clout to implement
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controversial change. What's more, should the two for
any reason come to a parting of the ways, Juan Carlos
could easily end up with a Prime Minister less amenable
to political reform. Of the half dozen men currently
considered to be leading contenders for the job, only
one, Manuel Fraga Iribarne, seems to be as interested
as the present Prime Minister in liberalizing the
system.
Bold departures are, therefore, unlikely in
the immediate post-Franco period. But, unless a
dramatic failure of Portugal's newly-launched experi-
ment with liberalization greatly discourages Spain's
evermore numerous proponents of change, cautious
adherence to past policies will only exacerbate the
polarization of Spanish society and thus lead to greater
instability.
In the absence of healthy political institu-
tions, Franco's successors will be hard pressed to
contain either inter-elite disputes over the issue of
reform or growing popular discontent. Most importantly,
perhaps, they will lack a strong and broadly based
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political party capable of co-opting moderate oppo-
sition leaders and of giving their views some
representation in the Cortes and top advisory councils.
(Despite recent efforts at reform, the introverted
and elitist National Movement still falls far short
of this mark.) Currently threatening economic problems
could easily compound these woes. And if domestic
turbulence reaches serious proportions, Spain's mili-
tary establishment can be expected to emerge from the
political wings and attempt to impose its own solution.
The Ultimate Arbiter
Not only is the military still the most power-
ful institution in Spain, but it could claim full
constitutional authority for such intervention. The
1967 Organic Law of the State specifically charges
the armed forces with the duty of guaranteeing the
defense of the institutional system. Moreover, an
organizational vehicle for the exercise of this
political mandate already exists in the National
Defense Board (Junta de Defensa NacionaZ), a council
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which normally advises the Prime Minister on security
and national defense policy.*
Nevertheless, a decision as to when and how
to intervene is unlikely to be easily reached. Like
other Spanish institutions, the military establishment
is divided over how much political reform is desirable
in the post-Franco era. It is also divided over the
question of what political role the armed forces should
play.
A small but growing liberal minority, in-
corporating officers of all ages and ranks, favors
faster and more meaningful political and social reform.
Exhibiting both a professional and political distaste
for internal policing functions, these officers are
convinced that widespread domestic disorder would
oblige the military to take at least some direct
responsibility for policy making in order to curb the
causes for unrest. Although their mentor, Lieutenant
General Manuel Diez-Alegria, was unceremoniously removed
Appropriately enough, this board bears the same name as the
first governing body established by the Nationalists during the
Spanish Civil War.
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from his post as Chief of the High General Staff in
June 1974, he is still looked to by some as a poten-
tial Spanish Spinola.*
At the other end of the spectrum, a somewhat
more outspoken group opposes any relaxation of authori-
tarian rule and vigorously maintains that the military
should and must assume active responsibility for
Spain's political future. Most senior officers,
however, would seem to prefer to avoid a more active
political role. Although conservatively inclined, they
would probably support any regime -- including a ,mildly
liberal one -- so long as it seemed reasonably capable
of maintaining order, preserved the essential features
of Franco's system, and did not threaten military
prerogatives.
As a group, the junior officers appear to be
less tolerant than most of their superiors with respect
For a brief but t oughtful analysis of Lt. Gen. Diez-AZegria's
published views, see K. Medhurst, "The Politics of the Spanish
Army, " Government and Opposition, Volume 9, Number 2, Spring
1974, pp. 227-235.
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to the maneuvers and foibles of civilian politicians.
For one thing, they have more cause for grievance
over current pay and promotion policies. For another,
they have a better feel for the impact of tight
budgetary restrictions and societal pressures for
change on the morale and efficiency of the troops
they command. But they too entertain a variety of
conflicting views on Spain's political future. Al-
though some junior officers clearly sympathize with
the goals and behavior of the Armed Forces Movement
in Portugal, many more appear far less concerned over
civil liberties than with the need to maintain domestic
order and to enhance the prestige and capabilities of
the military establishment. Some may even be inclined
to favor intervention in behalf of a radical authori-
tarianism of the right.
The absence of more widespread disenchantment
with the basic features of Franco's system stems in
part from the fact that, unlike their Portuguese
counterparts, Spain's young officers have not suffered
the frustrations of seemingly pointless and endless
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colonial wars. Perhaps equally important, however,
has been the gradual broadening of the social base
of the Spanish Army's officer corps.* It was once
drawn largely from the sons of officers, but in re-
cent years, these stalwarts increasingly have either
joined other services or followed their middle cl-ass
contemporaries into regular universities in pursuit
of non-military careers. Their place in the Army's
commissioned ranks has been taken by representatives
of lower social strata, primarily by the sons of NCOs.
Such ambitious but economically insecure officers
tend to be especially zealous guardians of military
privilege and prestige.
Whatever their other differences, it is clear
from the above that most Spanish officers agree that
the military has the right and duty to intervene in
the event of a serious and prolonged breakdown of
domestic order. Thus, a relatively small shift in
the current balance of forces within the military
K. Medhurst, _?p. eit., p. 231.
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establishment could significantly affect the political
outlook for Spain in the years just ahead.
No duplication of recent events in Portugal is
likely. If Spain's military liberals and moderates
gain ascendancy, they are more apt to attempt to work
through and to improve the existing system than to pro-
mote rapid democratization. But in the event that such
men felt obliged to intervene directly, some readjust-
ment of the power structure would almost certainly
ensue -- perhaps a constitutional upgrading of the
Prime Minister and the National Defense Board at the
expense of the King and the Council of the Realm. And
if accompanied by efforts to revitalize other key
institutions -- particularly the Cortes, the Syndical
Organization, and the National Movement -- such changes
might restore Spain's authoritarian system to something
near its early equilibrium.
Should hardline military elements prevail,
however, Spain's prospects would be gloomy. Men of
that stripe might either seek to install a military
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dictatorship or simply to veto all further liberalizing
change. In either case, dissent would be forcefully
repressed. The overall climate would probably foster
additional economic difficulties. Latent instability
would constantly threaten to erupt into open crisis.
IV. The Outlook
Fanned in part by the magnetic attraction of
European social democracy and a growing desire to
strengthen Madrid's economic and political links with
Western Europe, pressures for internal liberalization
in Spain are certain to escalate once Franco leaves
the scene. But neither the governmental structure
that the Caudillo has designed for his heirs nor the
current balance of forces in Spanish society favor an
orderly evolution toward a significantly more liberal
form of rule. Indeed, whatever the intentions of
Juan Carlos and his designated Prime Minister, conflict
and crisis will probably govern the actual course of
political developments in Madrid in the immediate post-
Franco era.
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Just when and how Franco's political legacy
is altered will depend on too many internal and ex-
ternal variables to permit confident prediction.
Change may be precipitated early, or Spain's contending
elites and restless population may give the new regime
a fairly long grace period. Either way, the outlook
is for a fairly lengthy period of instability -- one
which could be considerably prolonged if hardline
conservative forces win the upper hand.
V. Implications for the United States
It is this potential for long-term instability,
not the likelihood of hostility on the part of any of
Spain's principal contending factions, that poses the
greatest threat to US interests. Indeed, if left to
its own devices, almost any post-Franco governing coali-
tion would probably try to maintain reasonably warm ties
with Washington out of sheer self-interest. But if, as
seems likely, it is under challenge in an unstable
political environment, that same self-interest may
dictate adoption of an assertive nationalism -- a
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development which, together with the increased threat
to life and property arising from sporadic outbreaks
of domestic violence, could cause headaches both in
Washington and in several other NATO capitals.
The US interests which might be affected are
considerable. In large part, of course, they derive
from Spain's strategic location. Under a series of
three executive agreements concluded since 1953 (the
latest of which is due to expire in September 1975),
Madrid has granted the US a military presence at one
naval base, three airfields, and a number of smaller
support facilities. Presumably, America's defense
strategists would like to retain relatively unrestricted
access to, and use of, most of these installations for
at least a few more years. For its part, the Spanish
Government has already introduced-the spectre of
growing popular misgivings over the extent and nature
of these defense arrangements as a bargaining counter
in negotiations with the US.
But base rights are not Washington's only con-
cern. Spain's burgeoning economy has attracted over
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900 million dollars in private American investment.
Despite the distorting effects of Madrid's trade
preference agreement with the European Economic
Community, the Spanish market currently absorbs over
two billion dollars worth of American exports annually.
On the international plane, any exacerbation of Madrid's
long-standing dispute with London over Gibraltar or
hardening of Spain's already outspoken opposition to
the right of "free transit" through the Gibraltar
Strait would be unwelcome.
All told, some relatively enlightened form of
authoritarian rule would seem to offer the greatest
hope for Spanish stability (and therefore the fewest
problems for the US) in the decade ahead. Given
Spain's current stage of social and economic develop-
ment, a rigid right-wing dictatorship -?- particularly
a military one -- would quite likely lead to a
situation similar to that which prevailed in Greece
earlier this year. On the other hand, the Spanish
political scene would still seem to be too vulnerable
to the disruptive impact of modernizing change to give
root to stable democracy any time soon.
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SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
ABOUT AUTHORITARIANISM AND MILITARISM
In an authoritarian regime, predominant power
is exercised by a single leader or narrow autocratic
elite neither responsible to the general public nor
fully subject to legal restraints. At the same time,
however, a limited number of relatively autonomous
special interest groups can and do influence the
political process. Indeed, despite the fact that
the :Leadership of an authoritarian regime effectively
stands above the law, its freedom of action is re-
stricted in often predictable ways by the constant
need to manage and manipulate interest group pressures
and conflict.*
The factors favoring authoritarianism and
military intervention in politics are similar, and
The author owes the concept of a distinctive authoritarian
system of rule and his understanding of many of authoritarianism's
characteristic features to Professor Juan J. Linz. Linz's
earliest and most complete statement of his model is presented
in his "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," in Cleavages, Ideologies,
and Party Systems, ed. Erik AZZardt and Yrjo Littunen (Helsinki:
Westermark Society, 1964), pp. 291-342.
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these factors tend to be especially prevalent and
potent in developing countries. In fact, most of
them arise from -- or impact on -- the process of
modernization. Not only does the modernization
process itself favor efforts to centralize and ex-
pand political authority, but its attendant strains
can overtax and erode weakly-rooted or obsolescent
political institutions. Political anemia or decay,
in turn, breeds domestic disorder and thus invites
imposition (or reimposition) of authoritarian rule.
Authoritarianism places far less arduous
demands on a society than either totalitarianism or
representative democracy. In addition, it is adaptable
to a wide range of local conditions. For many nations
it is, in effect, the only feasible system of rule.
For many more -- particularly for those with long-
standing authoritarian traditions - it offers an
easy way out when the going gets rough.
Thus, for much of the world today, authoritarian
rule and military intervention in politics should be
considered as norms rather than aberrations. Moreover,
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the increasing problems and tensions generated by
the processes of development and modernization in
this era of technological revolution and world wide
economic strains will by themselves operate to
perpetuate these two phenomena -- and perhaps to
spread them still further.
The record shows that under certain circum-
stances, at least, authoritarianism can be a relatively
effective form of rule. Nevertheless, the key in-
ternal balances and trade-offs upon which the
successful operation and stability of authoritarian
rule depend are easily upset. Hence, authoritarianism
is prone to repeated crisis and resort to political
violence (both government-sponsored and oppositionist).
Sometimes such turbulence serves as a catalyst for
evolutionary change. More often it results in
paralysis and the emergence of still another ineffec-
tive authoritarian regime.
In aggregate
military regimes tend to fare
no better and no worse than their authoritarian
civilian counterparts. Indeed, militarism is a
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highly variable phenomenon. Although the process of
modernization has increasingly affected both military
motives and capabilities with respect to direct in-
volvement in political affairs, no national military
establishment -- no matter what its size or degree
of professionalization -- is a monolithic institution.
On the contrary, each tends to reflect the currents
and divisions affecting the country at large. Thus,
while it is possible to catalog the conditions which
invite military intervention, the form and direction
that such intervention takes, in any given case, will
in large part depend on which military faction seizes
the initiative and which domestic allies it chooses
to court or support.
Finally, whether military or civilian,
authoritarian regimes in countries approaching a
middle stage of social and economic development are
subject to a particularly broad range of destabilizing
pressures. And while such regimes tend to be in the
best position to create the preconditions for possible
transition to a more democratic form of rule, their
errors and failures also carry the greatest risk of
spawning a radical dictatorship of either the left or
right.
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