A SOVIET LAND-MOBILE ICBM: EVIDENCE OF DEVELOPMENT AND CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING A DECISION ON DEPLOYMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01099A001600080003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 1, 1974
• Content Type: IR

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Interagency
Intelligence
Report
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A Soviet Land-Mobile ICBM Evidence of
Development and Considerations Affecting
a Decision on Deployment
MORI # 283824.
Top Secret
1 I
October 1974
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A SOVIET LAND-MOBILE ICBM:
EVIDENCE OF DEVELOPMENT
AND CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING
A DECISION ON DEPLOYMENT
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CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE 1
SUMMARY 2
INTRODUCTION 4
CANDIDATES FOR LAND-MOBILE ICBM DEVELOPMENT 5
SS-X-16 FLIGHT TEST PROGRAM 5
EVIDENCE OF A MOBILE VERSION OF THE SS-X-16 6
Planned Production 7
Development of Equipment for a Mobile ICBM 8
Activity at Plesetsk 10
Heavy Investment in the SS-X-16 Program 16
SALT STATEMENTS 17
SCC Statements 17
POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT MODES 18
Road-Mobile and Off-Road Mobile Concepts 19
Shelter-Based and Rail-Mobile Concepts 19
FACTORS AFFECTING THE SOVIET DECISION TO DEPLOY A
19
Incentives for Deployment 22
Considerations Militating Against Deployment 22
POSSIBLE SIZE OF THE FORCE 24
LAND-MOBILE ICBM
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ANNEX A
ANNEX B
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Page
25
27
ANNEX C: GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS FFECTING DEPLOYMENT
OF LAND-MOBILE ICBM 'YSTEMS 29
FIGURES
1. Map of USSR: Test Centers, Assembly
Complex
2. SS-X-16 Flight Test Program
3. Plesetsk: Map of Launch Sites Related
Facility and SS-13 Launch
to SS-X-16 Program .
Ja
Page
5
6
7
5. Plesetsk: Unusual SS-X-16 Railcars
6. Artist's Concept of Mobile ICBM Unit
11
12
3. USSR: Population Density and Transportation .... t011OWS s.A.1
14. USSR: Areas Suitable for Off-Road Deployment of Land-Mobile
ICBMs follows 30
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A SOVIET LAND-MOBILE ICBM:
EVIDENCE OF DEVELOPMENT
AND CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING
A DECISION ON DEPLOYMENT
PREFACE
This Interagency Intelligence Report was prepared by the Central
Intelligence Agency with the ,collaboration of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organiza-
tions of the Departments of State, Air Force, Navy, and Army.
The report was prepared at the request of the National Intelligence
Officer for Strategic Programs. The analytical and drafting responsibili-
ties were carried out by an interagency working group under the chair-
manship of CIA.
The study presents and analyzes the evidence that points to the
development of a Soviet land-mobile ICBM, and examines the con-
siderations that seem likely to affect a decision on deployment of such
a system. The report is based on information available as of October
1, 1974.
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SUMMARY
We believe that the Soviets are d ve]loping a new land-mobile ICBM
and that the best candidate is the s lid-propellant SS-X-16. This judg-
ment is based on the following ma or areas of evidence:
? Planned production of large n mbers of SS-X-16 ICI3Ms.
? Development of equipment fo the SS-X-16 similar to that used
by previous land-mobile syste s.
? Association of launch sites at lesetsk, previously used with mo-
bile systems, with the SS-X-1 program and a ground support
equipment ( GSE ) test prografn at Plesetsk that employs exten-
sive concealment.
? Expenditure of considerable resources to fund a new missile de-
velopment program?a seemingly illogical commitment if the
missile were just to replace the 60 missiles in the SS-? 13 force.
Test-
mg ui we 3-A-1.0 to icAsM range from a mobile launch platform may
not yet have occurred, although testing of associated ground support
equipment appears to be under way. If testing of a mobile version
begins in the near future, the Soviets probably would have their first
mobile SS-X-16 units ready for deployment by 1977.
The Soviets may have decided to
as a mobile ICBM to have ready fo
Interim Agreement expires. Wheth
ICBM probably hinges on the nego
cess of the missile program.
Assuming the Soviets do decide t
SS-X-16, they could easily deploy
have 120 in the field by 1980. in a m
ment, they might begin deployment a
25 launchers and could build up the
about 1980.
evelop a version of the SS-X-16
deployment by 1977, when the
r the Soviets deploy a mobile
ations at SALT and on the suc-
deploy a mobile version of the
bout 30 launchers in 1977 and
re threatening strategic environ-
year earlier, in 1_976, with about
force to some 275 launchers by
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A land-mobile ICBM could be deployed in any of several possible
modes, but the activity at the test range suggests the Soviets are con-
sidering both road- and off-road-mobile concepts for the SS-X-16.
Mobile units could be rotated among various presurveyed fixed-field
sites or unprepared positions, perhaps as far as 50 miles from a support
base. Existing Strategic Rocket Force or possibly Ground Force installa-
tions could be used as support bases.
The Soviets probably see development of a mobile ICBM as a hedge
against a possible lapse of the Interim Agreement, as a potential bar-
gaining chip for future agreements, and as a prudent move to offset
the effect of the increased accuracy of US missiles. Deployment of a
mobile ICBM would increase the survivability of the Soviet ICBM
force.
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INTRODUCTION
1. The Soviets have been interested in land-
mobile strategic ballistic missiles since the
1950s, but they have yet to deploy such a sys-
tem. Of the four land-mobile missiles tested,
only the SS-1 tactical short-range liquid-pro-
pellant missile received wide deployment. The
SS-12 SRBM was deployed in smaller num-
bers, and programs for two longer-range mis-
siles, the SS-14 MRBM and the SS-X-15, ended
in early 1970 prior to deployment.
2. During the mid-1960s, when the SS-13,
SS-14, and SS-X-15 were under development,
the Soviets made numerous references in
their military press to land-mobile missiles,
frequently hinting that mobile medium- and
intercontinental-range ballistic missiles were
already deployed with the Strategic Rock et
Forces ( SRF). The press articles consistently
emphasized that Soviet land-mobile missiles
would be:
? fueled by solid propellants, which would
give them quick reaction time;
? comparatively small; and
? practically invulnerable, because they
would be highly maneuverable, would
change position frequently, and could
be easily camouflaged.
3. In 1966 and again in 1968, Marshal N. I.
Ktylov, then commander in chief of the SRF,
said that the attention of Soviet science was
being concentrated on the development of
mobile missiles. In his 1968 statement, Krylov
also said that the Soviets had solved this prob-
lem. In general, statements made by SRF
officers tended to suggest that mobile missiles
were being deployed, while statements made
by non-SRF officers tended to emphasize the
development of mobile missiles.
4. In other articles, the Soviets wrote about
a three-stage, solid-propellant ICBM (pre-
sumably the SS-13) that could be fired both
from silos and from mobile launch platforms.
Such statements declined in frequency after
1968, although as recently as 1971 General
S. S. Maryakhin, then chief of Rear Services
for the Soviet Armed Forces, claimed that the
SRF was becoming increasingly mobile and
invulnerable.
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5. Our judgment is that the Soviets now
ave a new land-mobile ICBM under develop-
ent.
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CANDIDATES FOR LAND-MOBILE ICBM
DEVELOPMENT
6. There is, at present, one good candidate
for a land-mobile ICBM?the SS-X-16. This
missile is a three-stage ICBM, one version of
which almost certainly is intended to replace
the SS-13 ICBM force, which is deployed in
60 silos at the Yoshkar-Ola ICBM complex
( see Figure 1 for map of place names). The
SS-X-16 is undergoing flight testing at the
Plesetsk missile and space center. It uses
solid propellants and has a post-boost vehicle
suitable for dispensing MIRVs. To date the
SS-X-16 has been tested only with a single RV.
7, The Soviets also have under develop-
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sug-
gests that it is an IRBM and not an ICBM.
Its intended deployment mode and maximum
range are unknown.
SS-X-16 FLIGHT TEST PROGRAM
8. Since the first launch from Plesetsk in
March 1972, the SS-X-16 has been test flown
20 times, 15 times successfully ( see Figure 2).
The last ten launches were conducted at night,
suggesting that the Soviets wanted to prevent
the US from observing launch activity. After
only four test flights in 1972 there was an
Plesetsk
Test Center
Moscow
A
Votkinsk
Assembly Facility
Yoshkar-Ola
SS-13 Complex
? Kapustin Yar
Test Center
Tyuratam
Test Center
USSR
._.,?...?7?.1
MONGOL IA
CHINA
500
NA,r1 I U.
igure 1. Test Centers, Assembly Facility and SS-13 Launch Complex
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1972
1973
1974 ,
ciD
ill?
M
?
00,
????
?
MO
Il?
0
??
1
2
3
4
2
1
2
3
4 :
III SUCCESS 0 FAILURE
Ficfure 2. SS-X-16 Fli
eight month hiatus in the Drogram
indicates
the Soviets modified the missile during this
period. Moreover,
ign bureaus, and compo-
revealed significant qual-
ity control problems.
9. The missile was flight tested only six
times in 1973. The pace of the SS-X-16 test
program has accelerated in 1974with
launches as of October 1.
ht Test Program
A silo-based version of the SS-X-16
with a single RV could be ready for deploy-
ment in 1975.
10. We have no firm evidence that the SS-
X-16 has been launched from a mobile plat-
form. We believe that the majority of SS-X-16
launches have come from SS-13 s'l
*The first seven tests of the SS-13 were short-
range firings from Kapustin Yar.
Thus we cannot rule out
:he possibility that some of the SS-X-16 tests
were for the mobile mode option.
11. We would expect a full series of tests?
erhaps for one to two years?to check out the
obile o tion before the s st
loyed.
VIDENCE OF A MOBILE VERSION
F THE SS-X-16
12. Evidence to support the existence of a
obile option in the SS-X-16 program falls
;
i to four major areas:
-- Planned production of large numbers of
SS-X-16 ICBMs.
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Rail-to-road transfer point
27
El East support
latititx
Admipistration Missile receiving
and ihousing and inspection
area
facility
4 SS-X-16 Related Site
? Missile and space launch site
o Dummy launch site
Railroad
-- Road
0 KILOMETERS 15
Plesetsk
Figure 3. Plesetsk: Launch Sites Related to SS-X-16 Progrim
? Development of equipment for the SS-
X-16 similar to that used by previous
mobile systems.
? Association of launch sites at Plesetsk,
previously used with mobile systems,
with the SS-X-16 program and a ground
support equipment ( GSE ) test program
at Plesetsk that employs extensive con-
cealment.
? Expenditure of considerable resources to
fund a new missile development pro-
gram?a seemingly illogical commitment
if the missile were just to replace the
SS-13 force.
Planned Production
we believe that the bulk of evidence indicates
that production beyond that needed to replace
the SS-13 was destined for a mobile version
of the system.
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18. The SS-X-16 is assembled at a plant
near Votkinsk,
in
1971, the Soviets constructed an additional
missile assembly building in the SS-X-16 por-
tion of the plant. The increased SS-X-16 as-
sembly capacity indicates that space for a
force larger than that needed to replace the
SS-13 was planned and is available if they
choose to go ahead with mobile deployment.
25X1 19. the
Soviets have erected permanent shelters over
some 835 feet of railroad track at the Votkinsk
missile assembly facility ( see Fimire
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Development of Equipment for a Mobile
ICBM
20. The same types of equipment associated
with the mobile SS-14 MRBM are also asso-
ciated with the SS-X-16. If the SS-X-16 were
intended only to replace the SS-13, much of
this equipment would not be needed. The
Soviets have designed a fiberglass canister, a
dolly to move the canister, and a rail flatcar
to transport it.
21. A launch Canister probably would be
needed to fire the SS-X-16 from a mobile plat-
form. The ss-x-lp canister is similar in size
to the canister for the SS-X-15 seen rinrina
its test program.
missile. The contAiner
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prona Ply will be used for both transporting
and launching the missile,. Since the SS-X-16
probably does not require a launch canister
when installed in the SS-13 silo, we believe
that the canister was designed to permit
launching from a mobile platform.
22. A key component of a mobile system is
the dolly, which is needed to move the missile
from the road transporter to the transporter-
erector-launcher ( TEL ). A dolly for the SS-
X-16 was available in limited numbers in Au-
gust 1972 and was still being modified as late
as December 1972. Shortly thereafter, in early
1973, SS-X-16 GSE testing at Plesetsk was
intensified.
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25X1 1--IUnusual railcars ( see Figure 5) and
a flatcar carrying a canister have been seen
at the SS-X-16 assembly and checkout area
at Plesetsk. Flatcars were used as one method
of transporting the SS-14. The railcars for the
SS-X-16 might be used to transport the mobile
version of the missile and its ground support
equipment.
24. The key element of a mobile-launch
unit that has not yet been positively identified
at Plesetsk is the TEL for the SS-X-16. Ve-
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The TEL would
be the most important piece of GSE being
tested there.
Activity at Plesetsk
25. Activity at Plesetsk strongly suggests
that a covert program is under way to de-
velop a land-mobile ICBM. The observed ac-
tivity suggests that the Soviets are checking
out ground support equipment associated with
a mobile version of the SS-X-16.
I None of this
activity would be required for the development
of a silo-based version of the SS-X-16. it
would, however, be consistent with a program
to conceal ground support equipment for a
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mobile missile s stem
n ar I s concep o a sep oye
mobile ICBM unit appears in Figure 6.
29. The initial phase of checking out ground
upport equipment for a mobile system at
lesetsk probabl sccurred durin late 1972.
30. The next phase of the program appal.-
ntly started in the spring of 1973 and prob-
bly involved the testing and evaluation of
h uncher-related equipment?TELs and re-
upply vehicles?on secondar roads.
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CANVAS
COVERING
CANVAS
COVERING
This is an artist's concept of some of the unusual SS-X-16 railcars seen at the Plesetsk Missile Handling Facility.
These railcars were specially developed for the SS-X-16
Figure 5. Plesetsk: Unusual SS-X-16 Railcars
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1, TEL
2. RESUPPLY VEHICLE,
3. MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS VAN
4. SUPPORT VEHICLE ,
5. ARMORED PERSONNEL CARR ER
1
This is an artist's concept of how a mobile ICBM um might be deployed in the field. Such a unit probably
would include: a TEL, resupply vehicles, mobile co munications vans, support vehicles and armored 25X1
personnel carriers.
Figure 6. Artist's Concept 4f Mobile ICBM Unit
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31. The current phase of the GSE program
began in mid-1974 and probably involves test-
ing the sunnort ercitinmpnt- acinn
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Heavy Investment in the SS-X-16
Program
33. The Soviets have invested heavily in the
SS-X-16 program, a commitment that seems
excessive merely to fill the 60 SS-13 silos at
the Yoshkar-Ola complex. If they wanted only
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Figure 10. Plesetsk: C mcuflaged Vehicles
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to replace the SS-13s with an improved mis-
sile, it would seem less expensive to install
one of the other new ICBMs currently under
development, rather than to fund a separate
MD program.
SALT STATEMENTS
34. Throughout the SAL negotiations, the
Soviets consistently have opposed US attempts
to ban deployment of land-mobile strategic
systems. In 1970 Vladimir Semenov, head of
the Soviet SALT delegation, stated:
Land-based ICBM launchers include both
fixed and mobile launchers . . . and must
be included in the overall aggregate level
of strategic offensive armaments on an
equal basis with fixed launchers. Estab-
lishment of any kind of additional limita-
tions or prohibitions . . . is superfluous.
. . . These launchers are but a variety
of mobile systems which include subma-
rines and nuclear-capable aircraft. Verifi-
cation of land-mobile ICBM launchers ...
would obviously not be any more difficult
than, say, verification of submarines and
their ballistic missile launchers.
Therefore, justification of a ban on land-
mobile ICBM launchers on the grounds
of difficulties of verification by national
means appears artificial to the Soviet side.
36. A change in policy indeed seemed pos-
sible at the Moscow Summit. During pre-
liminary discussions at the final negotiations
that ended with the signing of the Interim
Agreement in May 1972, CPSU General Sec-
retary Brezhnev reversed the position taken
by the Soviet SALT delegation and agreed
to ban mobile ICBMs. Shortly thereafter,
however, the Soviets retracted Brezhnev's pre-
liminary agreement on this issue. Whether
Brezhnev was ill-informed about the Soviet
position and simply had made an error, or
whether the Soviet military refused to nego-
tiate away a promising program cannot be
determined.
37. Failing to limit land-mobile missiles in
the negotiations, the US unilaterally stated
that it
. . . would consider the deployment of
operational land-mobile ICBM launchers
during the period of the Interim Agree-
ment as inconsistent with the objectives
of that Agreement.
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39. In June 1974, after months of discus-
sion, a preliminary agreement was signed
stating that
. . . facilities remaining at ( deactivated)
ICBM launch sites shall not be used for
storage, support, or launch of ICBMs but
may, at the discretion of the parties, be
used for purposes not inconsistent with
the provisions of the Interim Agreement
and the Protocol thereto.
40. Whatever the relationship between So-
viet public statements and reality, the record
shows that Soviet military leaders have long
been aware of the contribution that an effec-
tive land-mobile missile force could make to
the survivability of their strategic deterrent.
The exaggerated quality of their statements
during the 1960s suggests that the Soviets
also may have expected to reap political bene-
fits from possession of even a marginally effec-
tive mobile missile force. They frequently em-
phasized that only they had such a weapon,
that development of a mobile missile was a
echnological "first' for the Soviet Union.
41. In this connection, the Soviets implied
n public statements made during the 1960s
that the SS-13 was intended for a mobile
hole. Although there is no supporting evi-
dence, the statements suggest that a require-
Iment existed?and may still exist?for both
a mobile ICBM and a mobile MR/IRBM.
42. At SALT, Soviet unwillingness to nego-
tiate a ban strongly suggests that they are
keeping open an option to develop and deploy
mobile ICBMs. This may have been a pre-
condition to military?especially SRF?sup-
port for an arms agreement.
43. he Soviets have taken a 25X1
position that would not preclude the use of
deactivated ICBM sites ts support bases for
mobile MR/ IRBMs. Furthermore, the pre-
liminary agreement does not cover deacti-
vated Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 MR/IRBM sites.
These sites, which have as many support fa-
cilities as SS-7 or $S-8 ICBM sites and which,
in any case, have presurveyed, fixed field
sites, could be used to supporta mobile ICBM.
Some MR/IRBM complexes are being used to
support the mobile SS-12 Scaleboard, a tac-
tical ballistic missile, which is deployed at
isolated field sites.
POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT MODES
44. A land-mobile ICBM could be deployed
in various modes including road-mobile, off-
road mobile, shelter-based, and rail-mobile.
There is evidence that suggests the Soviets
are considering both the road-mobile and off-
road mobile concepts but no clear evidence
to suggest that shelter-based or rail-mobile
systems are under development.
45. We believe that the Soviets would elect
to use existing SRF installations as support
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bases for a mobile version of the SS-X-16. For
example, deactivated SS-4 and SS-5 sites,
ICBM complex support facilities, and SRF
regional storage facilities, all of which are rail-
served, could be used. There are numerous
areas around SRF installations which are suit-
able for mobile ICBM deployment ( see An-
nex C). Support bases used by tactical mobile
missiles also might be employed.
Road-Mobile and Off-Road Mobile
Concepts
46. The evidence at Plesetsk indicates that
the Soviets are investigating both of these op-
erational concepts for a mobile ICBM. One
deployment mode probably under considera-
tion is the use of presurveyed, fixed-launch
sites and a main support base. Any SRF instal-
lation with adequate support facilities could
serve as a support base for a mobile system.
The use of site 5?a former SS-7 soft site?
at Plesetsk as a support area suggests this
possibility. Missile units could be rotated
among various presurveyed fixed field sites,
perhaps as far as 50 miles from the support
base. The revetments near site 16 at Plesetsk
suggest that the Soviets are considering the
use of fixed-field sites for the mobile version
of the SS-X-16 ( see Figure 11).
47. Another deployment possibility is the
use of any unprepared, presurveyed area, such
as a road intersection, for a launch point.
There are many unimproved road networks,
especially in the forest regions of the Soviet
Union. Some of these areas are rail-served,
and support bases could be established there.
48. The Soviets have used both prepare
and unprepared areas as launch points for the
SS-12 Scaleboard. Initially the TELs were
used on concrete pads within the permanent
facilities. Later operations shifted to isolated
field positions and now the permanent sites
apparently are being utilized as support bases,
rather than primary launch areas ( see Fig-
ure 12).
Shelter-Based and Rail-Mobile Concepts
49. The US has considered a shelter-based
mobile system, but there is no clear evidence
to indicate Soviet interest in such a system.
This concept involves the use of hundreds of
shelters among which a smaller number of
mobile ICBMs would be constantly rotated.
The "shell game" approach is intended to
enhance the survivability of a mobile ICBM
force.
50. There also is no clear evidence to sug-
gest that the Soviets are considering a rail-
mobile concept.1
FACTORS AFFECTING THE SOVIET
DECISION TO DEPLOY A LAND-
MOBILE ICBM
51. The deployment of a mobile ICBM
would be consistent with the USSR's effort to
modernize its strategic missile force and to
make it less vulnerable to attack. Such deploy-
ment would complicate US targeting and
monitoring programs. The Soviets probably
realize that a mobile ICBM force of several
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hundred launchers would not significantly
alter the strategic balance; however, they
would view such a force as adding to their
deterrent capabilities.
52. Even if the mobile ICBM development
program is successful, there are other factors
the Soviets would consider before making a
decision on deployment. They certainly would
weigh the benefits against the costs?politi-
cal, operational, technical and economic.
Incentives for Deployment
53. The principal incentive for deploying
a strategic missile system in a mobile mode is
to increase its survivability. Because a mobile
system can move to and occupy any launch
position within its radius of operation in a
random fashion, its location at any given time
would be difficult for an opponent to predict
for targeting purposes. Extensive real-time
satellite reconnaissance coverage would help
to monitor the movements of a mobile missile
force, but surreptitious movement could be
accomplished at night, under cloud cover, or
by the use of camouflage. In view of US in-
terest in improving its capabilities against
hardened targets, deployment of a mobile
ICBM might be attractive to the Soviets as a
supplement to other measures to increase the
survivability of their ICBM force.
54. The Soviets may also view deployment
of a mobile ICBM as a hedge against the pos-
sible lapse of the Interim Agreement in 1977.
The development of a mobile system would
provide them with a survivable force avail-
able for deployment in the event of lapse or
abrogation of the agreement.
55 Institutional momentum may have con-
tributed to the development of the SS-X-16
in a mobile version and may also militate for
its deployment. The missile was under devel-
opment several years prior to the signing of
the Interim Agreement and its advanced stage
of development undoubtedly was a considera-
tion in the Soviet refusal to ban mobile
ICBMs. Institutional considerations might in-
fluence the Soviet decision on deployment of a
mobile ICBM, especially the momentum gen-
erated in the military and in various ministries
responsible for developing and producing the
missile.
56. Finally, the Soviets may see the poten-
tial deployment of a mobile ICBM as a bar-
gaining chip in SAL negotiations to break US
intransigence over issues they deem crucial.
Considerations Militating Against
Deployment
57. The key negative consideration in the
Soviet deliberations seems clear: how would
deployment of a land-mobile ICBM affect the
SALT agreements and detente? Because the
Interim Offensive Agreement was predicated
upon a freeze in the number of fixed land-
based ICBM launchers in the period mid-1972
to October 1977, the Soviets might believe
that to field a mobile system before 1977
would risk US withdrawal from ?the arms
agreement. As noted earlier, on May 20, 1972
the US made a unilateral statement against
land-mobile ICBM deployment. The Soviets
probably believe that this statement is still
operative, although publicity that the US
might be considering a mobile ICBM could
cause the Soviets to question the firmness of
the US position.
58. The prospect of technical problems and
operational considerations also might work
against a decision to deploy a mobile ICBM
system. Reliability and accuracy are more
difficult to achieve in a mobile missile sys-
tem than in one that is fixed. At best a mo-
bile SS-X-16 would be effective only against
soft targets.
59. Only a portion of a mobile missile
Iforee would be available for launch at any
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given time, except during periods of crisis,
because part of the force would be undergo-
ing maintenance or moving to new positions.
60. Mobile systems require more mainte-
nance than fixed systems because movement,
vibration, and exposure to the elements cause
more frequent equipment failures. Logistic
support might be a problem because of the
distances involved and dispersion of support
units.
61. Because of their size and weight, mo-
bile ICBMs could present other operational
problems in moving about the countryside.
The solid-propellant SS-X-16, for example, is
in the 40 metric ton weight class ( not includ-
ing the TEL or resupply vehicle). The stand-
ard weight limitation for vehicles on Soviet
road networks as a whole is six metric tons per
single axle. The tactical Scaleboard trans-
porter-launcher, which has four axles and an
estimated gross weight?with the missile?
of 31 metric tons, exceeds this limit by about
30 percent. On roads with a "capital" surface
( such as cement or asphalt concrete) the
single-axle limit is 10 metric tons, but these
roads are located in areas of high population
density and are heavily traveled?conditions
that a missile unit would want to avoid. Oper-
ation on unimproved roads would be limited
by the load capacity of the bridges. Most of
the bridges on Soviet country roads have load
limits of from 5 to 7 metric tons. Snow and
rain on unimproved roads and launch posi-
tions also could present formidable obstacles
for movement to assigned launch positions
( see Annex C).
62. Physical security is more difficult to
maintain with mobile missile units than with
fixed-based deployment. Countering this prob-
lem requires additional personnel for security
purposes and places additional demands on
operating crews.
63. Strategic Rocket Forces command and
control procedures emphasize positive con-
trol to prevent accidental or unauthorized
use of nuclear weapons while maintaining
a capability for quick strikes. Deployment of
a mobile missile poses special command and
control problems not experienced with fixed
missile systems. It is difficult, for example,
to make mobile communications systems as
reliable, secure, and redundant as fixed sys-
tems and to ensure uninterrupted control of
mobile launchers by higher echelons of com-
mand. Above all, the command and control
system must guard against the possible loss
of contact with any portion of the mobile
force at a critical moment. Mobile missiles
must rely on dispersal and concealment?not
hardness or quick reaction?for survivability.
Thus, mating warheads to mobile launch ve-
hicles can be ( and normally is) delayed until
a final decision to employ them has been
made, without degrading their capability to
retaliate.
64. Finally, if the Soviets were faced with
a choice between large numbers of mobile or
fixed ICBMs, they would have to consider
the comparative costs of the systems. Invest-
ment costs for a mobile system?the cost
of the missile, launcher set, and related fa-
cilities?would not be much higher than those
for the fixed-deployment mode. Operating
costs for a mobile system, however, would
probably be three to four times those for a
fixed system. The higher operating cost stems
primarily from the need for increased main-
tenance on both the missile and launcher
set and the greater personnel requirements.
Other items contributing to the higher cost
are increased requirements for transportation,
command and control, training, security, and
support.
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POSSIBLE SIZE OF THE FORCE
05. A mobile version of the SS-X-16 could
attain initial operational capability in 1977.
If the Soviets maximized their development
efforts, however, they could deploy their first
mobile SS-X-16 units in 1976. They probably
would hasten the program only if they saw
a more threatening strategic environment and
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little chance for a follow-on to the Interim
Offensive Agreement.
66. Assuming the Soviets do decide to de-
ploy a mobile version of the SS-X-16, we
believe that they would deploy about 30
launchers in 1977 and have some 120 in the
field by 1980. If the Soviets were to maximize
their efforts, they might deploy about 25
launchers in 1976 and have about 275 by 1980.
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ANNEX C
GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS AFFECTING DEPLOYMENT OF
LAND-MOBILE ICBM SYSTEMS
1. About one-fourth of the USSR, or over 2
million square miles, is considered suitable
for deployment of land-mobile ICBMs. Most
Soviet railways and all-weather roads are
located in this area, which comprises the
European USSR, the North Caucasus, the
Ural Mountains, western Siberia, and Ka-
zakhstan ( see Figure 13). Also concentrated
in this area are most MR/IRBM and ICBM
complexes and regional nuclear storage facil-
ities?installations that are dependent on the
transportation network.
2. Deployment along main roads and rail-
roads, however, has some drawbacks: the
agricultural regions of the southwestern USSR
and Soviet Central Asia, are densely popu-
lated, posing a security problem. The trans-
portation network tapers off toward the cen-
tral part of the USSR and becomes only a
narrow band along the Trans-Siberian rail-
road in eastern Siberia.
3. In addition to the principal all-weather
roads there are many fair-weather country
roads, especially in agricultural and logging
areas, that could serve a land-mobile system.
These roads and even good trails are suitable
for movement of land-mobile systems if the
terrain is fairly level. Wherever these roads
intersect streams, however, the weight capa-
city of bridges might become a restrictive
factor. Moreover, Soviet country roads are
usually little more than graded earth and
become virtually impassable during periods
of rain, snow or thaw. The agricultural regions
in the Ukraine, in Belorussia, in the Baltic
states and south of Moscow, with their net-
work of main and secondary roads, would be
suitable for on-road or roadside mobile de-
ployment.
4. Off-road mobile ICBM units also could
be deployed away from the main transporta-
tion network ( see Figure 14 for areas con-
sidered suitable). Depending on terrain,
areas for off-road deployment are character-
ized as either good-to-fair or poor.* In good-
to-fair areas, cross-country movement up to 50
nautical miles (nm) from the main transpor-
tation network is considered feasible. If these
areas also contain an SRF facility, they are
considered well suited for mobile deployment.
The total area in the good-to-fair category
covers about one million square miles. In areas
rated poor, a mobile missile unit probably
would not move beyond 5 nm from the trans-
portation network or from an SRF facility.
5. Much of the remaining portion of the
USSR is considered entirely unsuitable for
*Good-to-fair areas are those with fairly level ter-
rain, sparse forests, and a minimum of streams,
ravines, swamps and loose sand. Areas rated poor in
the western USSR are generally dissected by streams
and ravines, and characterized by patches of dense
forest and occasional swamps. Travel in "poor" areas
of Soviet Central Asia would be restricted by loose
sand and dunes.
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cross-country movement of mobile ICBMs.
Large low areas around the Valday Hills, \vest
and north of Moscow, and in the western
Ukraine are swampy. Other formidable nat-
ural obstacles include loose sand and dunes
in Soviet Central Asia; mountains in the south-
ern Ukraine, in the Caucasus, in eastern Sibe-
ria, and along the southern border with China
and Afghanistan; and the dense forest ( taiga )
stretching along the entire northern part of
the country. Even in these areas, however,
deployment off but near the main roads would
be possible in places. In addition, deep snow
and permafrost make most of eastern Siberia
and the northwestern USSR unsuitable for
deployment of mobile ICBMs. In the spring
and summer this area becomes a quagmire
when the surface layers thaw and the under-
lying permafrost prevents drainage. Much of
this area also has snow accumulating over one
foot deep and lasting three to six months of
the year.
6. Despite the limitations of climate and
terrain, the SS-X-16, with its estimated range
of 5,500 nm (see Figure 14), could reach
most of the US and all of China from its
potential launch sites.
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