IMPORTANCE OF THE CHILEAN SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT IN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01099A001500040001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 13, 1974
• Content Type: MF

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SUBJECT Importance of the Chilean
Solidarity Movement in Europe
25X1
25X1
1. You recently asked that we look into the importance f the
Chilean Solidarity Movement (CSM) in Europe
I The question arose when suggeste that it
constituted a serious vulnerability for the US which should be
countered by US moves to cut off aid to Chile and otherwise clearly
disavow the junta. The Congress may have already ameliorated the
problem by the House move this week to cut off aid to Chile, but the
problem will not thereby disappear.
2. In response to your request:
a. I asked u to prepare a wrapup of the facts
about the CSM in rope (copy attached).
convened a session of DDI analysts, together with
I lof DDO, to discuss the problem in the light of the
paper.
3. The discussion led to the following conclusions:
a. The Chile question is popular journalistic stuff all
over Europe and it is true enough to say that it has replaced
Vietnam as a convenient means of focusing anti-US sentiment.
It offers a common ground for communists, socialists and left-
to-moderate Christians and liberals to come together on an
issue -- when they can agree on little else.
b. It is also an embarrassment to our friends in public
and official quarters, and there is no respectable voice,
public or official, actively willing to defend.
c. Whether measured as a rallying point for disparate
groups, or as a public impact issue, it is most significant in
Portugal, Greece, Italy and Sweden; least so in Britain and
West Germany; France is in between.
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d. But measurements of impact are very imprecise. It
should be noted that:
-- Except for Sweden, no European government has
shown itself actively exercised about US policy
toward Chile,-and certainly none has exerted
any strong or recurrent pressure on the US to
do anything.
-- In all cases, it is local considerations that
determine whethr the communists, socialists
and others come together or stay apart. Con-
sidered as a platform for building a broad
anti-US coalition, the Chile issue is unique
and marginal in that it does not have impact
much beyond the issue itself.
-- Offsetting the near-universal disapproval of
US policy toward Chile, but much less publi-
cised, is the lesson drawn in some quarters that
Chile shows the folly of communists pushing too
far or too fast for control. The Chilean lesson
is central to the PCI's current "historic com-
promise" and "soft opposition" strategy, and is
no doubt reflected in the USSR's general line
of advising European communists to go slow and
avoid risks.
-- In Greece and especially in Portugal, fears that
Chile shows what the US might do to them are no
doubt sharpened by the CSM's activities, but
would also no doubt be there if the CSM did not
exist. They are the result of circumstances
having nothing to do with Chile, and will grow
or diminish for reasons having nothing to do
with Chile.
4. These caveats should not be read as arguments against the
US doing what it can to limit damage in Europe over Chile. Congres-
sional action this week will help, though the credit will not go to
the Administration. Apart from the aid question, there seems no
reason why the US should not come on strop er in deploring any bru
ttalities of which the junta is guilty. 25X1
5. But one should not hold out hope that the CSM would cease
anti-US attacks or go away. The historical record -- including
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distortions and exaggerations -- is there, and an ostentatious
switch on this issue, given what has been publicly said by the Pres-
ident and the Secretary, would probably not persuade those disposed
to believe the worst. It would certainly not end the CSM's propa-
ganda efforts. It would, however, help our friends to defend us
better in public and private, and would remove an irritant with the
neutrals, most notably the Swedes.
6. It would be marginal in its impact, case by cas.e, compared
to what the US can do on far more critical issues with key countries.
al,
Thus an ounce of help to Greece o4.-Cyprus, or of aid to Portug
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would no doubt be worth a pound of gestures over the Chile issue in
the country concerned.
25X1
8. If you agree with the argument herein, it would be easy to
adapt this memorandum to become a note to HAK from you. I suggest
that nothing short of that level would do any good.
25X1
National Intelligence Officer
for Western Europe
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BEST COPY
A VAILIBLE
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U,;,R1 1_
SUBJECT: Ramifications of Chilean Solidarity Movement
in Western Europe
SS ar
The Chilean solidarity question-has replaced the Vietnamese
solidarity question as the principle rallying poin_ i `.Western
Europe for leftist forces bent up.cn denigrating the United States
and reducing its influence in Europe. In the "cur,-a_-n. months
since the September 1973 coup d'etat, an extensive or:ar_iz at onal
network. has been built up in Europe, supported and cc loth by
the CoF-T-,yni cr rn;.n_r i?^ the ' SS . Eas Qr'' any an,i a a.re the
major supporters) and by Western organizations. z_-Jo. centers
of exile activity are in Paris and Rome with support _ elements
in Helsinki and London. Because of the strong emotional under-
currents connected with the Chilean issue and the extensive and
intensive propaganda campaign which has been mounted to capitalize
on them, there is practically no voice raised in Europe in defense
of the Chilean Junta or in defense of the role the United States
is said to have played in Chile in the recent past. The Chilean
"example" is being cited to create a climate in Portugal, for
instance, in which. U.S. initiatives are immediately suspect.
The Chilean. 'ca-_Da' Is also being used as the ne es c- anJ.su
through :tihich European non-communists are being brought into
continuing cooperation. with, communist parties and fret cganizations
in efforts which are basically anti-American and are intended to
cast doubts on the United States' reliability,-probity, and dedi
cation to democratic principles. End Summary
The Socialist and Social Democratic parties in Western
Europe rallied immediately to the cause of the Chilean exiles
in late 1973. Early initiatives were taken in several European
countries to ensure :virtually free entry of Chilean refugees and 25X1
rtu, tia.
6-4 --- ~c Cr. anion ' sr Germany, and
:1an1- U,1 1_1 ` w ' io 1n c 17 - Gam) .L L
Europe have subsequently moved to Western Europe. Christian Demo-
crats -- while not as initially vociferous as their Social Demo-
? it co::ntr' acts we_e also i rcu t a first In
attempts at poi- t a ctions cn beha?f of :the Chileans.
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Another very ear_y e_:- .:Y le o= such co-
operation occurred in Austria, where a "CHile So! i..1arity Front"
was for--ed in 'November 1973 by sore 12 local groups, ranging
fro= the communist youth, through the Socialist ;:out^_, to the
Catholic workers Youth and the "Tr:orT fing Group Criz:-cai Christianity. if
Financial assistance to the Chilean solidarity =ove=eat.has
been s: Lstantial
to the new nove_eat. Western European funds were not far behind
1 Early in 1974, when Beatriz Allende visited Sweden, for e -an.ple,
Prize Minister =alme presented her with $110,000 to be used for
the Chilean "resistance no 'ement . T'
was be - =ado available to the Chilean resistance.) In September
The Uruguan Tupa-
meros announced that $3 zillion obtained from a kidnap rar!som
Several European governments have been pressured by their
political parties to cut off aid and support to Chile, and the
West Cer-an and Belgium governments have announced t ?at they
25;X1
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were doing so. Labor union calls for boycotts of shipping to
Chile have thus far had less effect.
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in shor` } the Chilean ? SSUC has struck a responsive chord
-c-Cam. -the- ^r_cf-renter. :; ~,~.c?eans have
es
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responded strongly in terms of financial and material support.
For a number of reasons, not the least of which is publicity
from 1:.S. media sources :which is replayed. and distorted ex-
tensively throughout =:urope, the United States (and the Central
1n telligence Agency) has been coupled in European thinking with
the overthrow of the Allende government and continued support of
the Junta, including its most repressive undemocratic measures.
The Eurcpean Com^unists and the Soviet bloc have seized upon this
issue to replace Vietnam in themr_dual campaign to reduce U.S.
influence, prestige, and creditability in Europe and to encourage
and facilitate broad non-Communist - Communist collaboration.
Despite s -e sett cks ari si_rg from of r rarn'layirsr the Corar.unis= hand
in some forums and from fractionalization within-the, Chilea-a exile
movement itself, the campaign appears to have bean quite su_cess-
ful to date; certainly it is well funded and highly o _ ganiz _d .
The "Chilean exa=ple" is being used with success by Communists
and leftists to undermine the U.S position in such places as
Portugal, where an unstable internal situation lends itself to
drawing parallels, however inexact, with Chile.
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