VIETNAM: A NET MILITARY ASSESSMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01099A001100050009-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 78
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: March 6, 1974
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
6 March 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: I
SUBJECT Vietnam: A Net Military Assessment
1. Attached is the draft of "Vietnam: A Net Military
Assessment."
2. A clean-up meeting on this draft is scheduled for
0930 hours on Friday, 8 March, in Room 6F19, CIA Headquarters.
3. Please call , by COB Thursday,
7 March, with the names of your representatives.
National Intelligence Officer
for Southeast Asia
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DRAFT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SUBJECT: VIETNAM: A NET MILITARY ASSESSMENT*
1. This memorandum assesses the relative capabilities
of the two sides in South Vietnam by GVN Military Region
(MR), as of early March 1974. A detailed discussion of
the strengths and weaknesses of the North and South Viet-
namese manpower, logistic, and firepower positions is at
Annex A.
Overview
2. Since the cease-fire in January 1973, both the
Communists and the South Vietnamese have upgraded their
respective military capabilities. The North Vietnamese
have increased their combat forces, improved their firepower
position, and made extensive improvements to their logistic
This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and
he Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department
of State.
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system. The South VIetnamese-, for their part, have also
strengthened their combat forces and have assumed responsi-
bility for most of their logistic operations. As a result
of the large inflow of equipment into South Vietnam in the
last weeks before 27 January 1973, the South Vietnamese now
have more tanks, artillery, and aircraft than ever before.
3. On the manpower side, Communist regular combat
forces physically located inside South Vietnam have grown
from 157,000 in February 1973 to an estimated 187,000 at
the beginning of March 1974. Since the cease-fire, this
force has markedly changed its orientation. Hanoi has
withdrawn three infantry divisions* call from northern
MR 1 and has augmented its air defense forces by 12 regiments.
Nevertheless, owing to continuing infiltration and unit
deployments, there also are about 10,000 more NVA combat
infantry troops in. South Vietnam now than in February 1973
1
The North Vietnamese have also reinforced their controlled
areas with a large number of tanks and field artillery,
establishing a peak firepower capability in the absence of
In terms of combat infantry alone, the North Vietnamese
currently have 12 infantry divisions deployed in South
Vietnam --- two of which have only one subordinate regiment
instead of the normal three -- compared to 15 divisions of
three regiments each before the cease-fire. They could,
however, move additional divisions across the DMZ and back
into northern MR 1 on short notice.
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US air support. They are clearly intent both on establishing
a capability to protect those areas of South Vietnam which
they now control and on maintaining an option to resume large-
scale offensive action at some future time of their own
choosing.
4. On the South Vietnamese side, the GVN regular ground
combat forces are now some 52,000 men stronger than they were
in February 1973, having increased from 320,000 to about
372,000 men, supported by a more proficient air force (VNAF).
Higher manning levels within South Vietnam's 13 infantry
divisions account for 45,000 of the 52,000-man increase. The
remaining growth results from the upgrading of some Popular
Forces (PF) and local self-defense forces into the regular
combat structure.* The following table compares GVN and
Communist regular combat forces by military region and shows
that the nationwide force ratio between the opposing armies
is unchanged from a year ago -- although it has deteriorated
(from the GVN point of view) in MR 2 and MR 3, while improving
in MR 4.
We do not count the upgrading of Regional forces (RE) battalions
here because RE, battalions are already included in our estimates
of GV.N regular combat forces.
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COMPARISON OF GVN AND CO1MUNIST
REGULAR COMBAT FORCES BY MILITARY REGION*
February 1974
GVN
103,000
78,000
94,000
97,000 37
2,000
VC/NVA
87,000
37,000
39,000
24,000 18
7,000
RATIO
1.2
2.1
2.4
4.0
2.0
February 1973
GVN
89,000
68,000
75,000
88,000 32
0,000
VC/NVA
79,000
26,000
25,000
27,000 15
7,000
RATIO
1.1
2.6
3.0
3.3
2.0
Communist regular combat forces include personnel in. combat,
combat support, and air defense units and local force
companies and platoons. In early March 1974 there are 140,000
Communist infantry troops. and 25,000 air defense personnel
.compared with about 130,000 and 15,000 in February 1973.. GVN
regular combat forces include assigned personnel in ARVN/VNMC
ground combat and combat support units and regional force
battalions.
5. Barring major redeployments from North Vietnam,
the current balance of forces will remain fairly stable
throughout the remainder of the dry season. The relationship
could be altered'quickly, however, if Hanoi decides to deploy
some of its strategic reserve divisions in North Vietnam*, in
conjunction with those elements of the 968th Infantry Division
remaining in Laos, into GVN MR 1 or MR 2. In the southern
half of the country, however -- unlike March 1972 -- there is
not VC/NVA reserve force in Cambodia available for deployment
North Vietnam's strategic reserve consists of six divisions,
totalling some 40,000-50,000 men.
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.into MR 3 or MR 4, and the Communists could only shift forces
among MRs to alter the balance. The Communists' deployment
potential in southern South Vietnam is similar to that of
the South Vietnamese on a country-wide basis. The ARVN at
present has no strategic reserve since all of its units
currently are committed and any shifting of forces to one
region can only be accomplished by reducing the force structure
in another.
6. While strengthening their combat posture in South
Vietnam, the Communists also have achieved significant
improvements in their logistic system. Following the cease-
fire, Military Region 559 -- North Vietnam's logistic and sup-
port structure in southern North Vietnam, southern Laos,
northeastern Cambodia., and the western reaches of South Viet-
nam itself -- was further reorganized to permit a more efficient,
speedier transport of supplies in a bomb-free environment. At
the same time, the Communists undertook a major road and POL
pipeline construction and improvement program in Laos and South
Vietnam which will permit year-round deliveries to South Vietnam
and greatly enhances access to portions of the coastal region.
This ambitious construction program was not carried out at the
expense of current shipments to Communist forces in the South,
because such shipments have been maintained, for the most part,
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at a heavy pace. The improvements to the MR 559 logistic system
in the past year, including the dispatch of 26,500 infiltrators
to the area, have given the Communists a stronger supply or-
ganization and transportation network from North Vietnam to
the south than they have ever previously had.
7. The South Vietnamese logistic command also has improved
steadily in the post cease-fire period. Moving from almost
complete dependence on the US for support of its forces, ARVN now
has total responsibility for the in-country distribution and
storage of supplies. In general, the performance of the ARVN
logistic system at the present fairly low level of hostilities
has been good. Current supply stockpiles, particularly of
military equipment and replacement parts, are more than adequate
for current consumption rates. Should major countrywide fighting
resume, however, the South Vietnamese logistic system would be
stretched to the limit and would probably be unable to distribute
effectively the large amounts of material required to support the
GVN's combat forces. Even at the present modest level of combat,
there is a problem of getting the proper mix of supplies to GVN
forces on a timely basis. Moreover, inter-regional distribution
of supplies is hampered by virtual autonomy of each MR commander,
and ARVN still remains dependent on US civilian contractors for
aircraft maintenance and port management.
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. As a fighting force, the Communists are generally
tough, disciplined, tenacious fighters. The cadre are politi-
cally reliable and, for the most part, dedicated to the Com-
munist cause. Until recently, the Communists used tactics
that emphasized infantry and sapper attacks, supported by
rockets and mortars. Since 1971, however, the Communists have
committed themselves to a doctrine which stresses conventional
warfare, in which infantry, artillery, and armor are used
together.
7b. In the heavy fighting in South Vietnam in 1972, the
Communists failed to use these forces effectively. Armor,
artillery, infantry, and air defense forces did not coordinate
their actions against government positions. Part of the prob-
lem was due to the way these various forces were organized --
orders did not come down from a single tactical authority,
but the major cause of the problems appears to have been the
relative lack of experience in using the various forces in
7c.. North Vietnamese propaganda indicates the Communists
are aware of this shortcoming, and they have taken aggressive
action to correct it. Training programs in the North and in
the South have been expanded and now concentrate on preparing
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troops and cadre to fight a. conventional war with mixed forces.
in last year's fighting in Quang Duc and Pleiku provinces,
the Communists used infantry, armor, artillery and air de-
fens: forces effectively, suggesting that they are making
progress in this area.
7d. The 1972 Offensive also exposed other deficiencies in
the Communist armed forces. Troop discipline was weak, with
several Communist units refusing to fight. In addition, Com-
munist leadership was frequently poor. The long war took a
heavy toll of cadre and forced the Communists to promote troops
up through the ranks to leadership positions. While these
cadre possessed combat experience, they generally lacked for-
mal military training; this resulted, in cadre not knowing how
to react to rapidly changing battlefield situations.
7e. According to North Vietnamese military journals,
Hanoi has reorganized its military training programs, making
them broader and more comprehensive, in an attempt to cure
these shortcomings. If the programs are successful, the Com-
munist armed forces could well develop into a tougher, more ef-
fective fighting force,.
(DID. section on RVNAF will go here.)
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Scenarios for the Remainder of the Dry Season
. Non-general offensive scenario. According to reliable
agent reporting, the North Vietnamese do not plan to launch a
major offensive in South Vietnam during the remainder of the
1973-1974 dry season. These sources indicate that Communist
combat activity will. be confined to the defense of their territory
against any GVN offensive forays, and limited offensive operations
against selected targets. Similarly, GVN tactical plans through
the dry season will consist of a similar mix of defense and.
offense. Under these circumstances, neither side is likely to
achieve substantial, permanent territorial gains in the next few
months.
9. Under this scenario, the outlook for Military Region 1,
where defensive lines have stabilized, is. for a continued absence
of heavy combat activity. In Military Region 2, combat activity
probably will intensify in the central highlands as both sides
contest territory along strategic LOCs. Neither side, however,
has a decisive edge, since ARVN's numerical superiority in the
highlands is partly offset by NVA firepower assets. The tactical
situation in Military Region 3, where many units on both sides are
deployed near major population centers, probably will generate
some high points of activity, but most will be confined to sapper
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attacks, attacks-by-fire and LOC interdiction efforts. To the
south in Military Region 4, Communist combat activity will be
handicapped by sorely understrength units and a relatively weak
logistic system.
10. General Offensive Scenario. What would be the result
if large-scale hostilities broke out again in South. Vietnam in
the next six months? Both the GVN and the North Vietnamese would
find it difficult to launch and sustain a major offensive in the
immediate future. Should the Communists, however decide to
launch a major offensive, they would have the capability of doing
so by the end of April 1974 if they committed new divisions from
outside South Vietnam and substantially increased the current
rate of infiltration. Since they would be the aggressors and
could achieve local manpower or firepower superiority in chosen
areas, the unfavorable (to the Communists) nationwide ratio of
forces would not 4ecessarily be a critical factor in their
decision. (In none of their earlier offensives have the
Communists had a favorable nationwide ratio of forces.)
:L1. Under an offensive scenario, the North Vietnamese
would launch a countrywide operations some time after in-
creasing infiltration and redeploying several infantry
divisions from the strategic reserve to GVN MR 1. If
this scenario developed -- and US support were not pro-
vided ---- the North Vietnamese forces in northern Military
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Region l would regain control of Quang Tri City, and might
even capture Hue. In the southern part of the region, the
GVN might be forced to give up some territory, possibly in-
cluding a provincial capital. In Military Region 2, one
or both provincial capitals of Pleiku or Kontum could con-
ceivably fall into Communist hands, although the fighting
would be fairly even. North and northwest of Saigon,
in Military Region 3, the Communists would probably gain
additional territory, including several district capitals.
GVN forces, on the other hand, probably would not yield
any substantial ground in coastal Military Region 2 or in
Military Region 4.
12. In sum, if the Communists launched a general offensive,
we believe that they would make significant and permanent terri-
torial gains in some areas. There would be some risk that the
military and psychological impact of such developments would set
in train an unravialling of the GVN's will to persist. In this
event, the situation could arise where the GVN would be unable
to stay the course without the US providing large-scale logis-
tical assistance and air and naval support.
II. MILITARY REGION 4SSESSMENT
Military Region 1
Manpower Capabilities
13. Since the cease-fire there has been a low level of
combat activity in MR 1, with both sides engaged in restructuring
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their forces. Consistent with the tactical situation, the Com-
munists recently reduced their ground combat capability by with-
drawing a third infantry division; two left earlier in 1973,
one just prior to the cease-fire. They now have five infantry
divisions -- one operating with only one regiment -- compared
to.eight divisions just prior to the cease-fire. The North Viet-
namese, however have been augmenting their air defenses by de-
ploying additional antiaircraft artillery regiments into the
region. As a result of these changes, Communist forces in MR 1
now total 87,000 troops, of which 21,000 are air defense person-
nel (see the Military Region 1 Map).
14. At the same time, the combat strength of the South
Vietnamese regular ground forces has increased significantly.
This has resulted from upgrading territorial forces into the
regular combat force structure and increasing the manning levels
of existing units. Thus, South Vietnamese regular combat forces
in MR 1 currently total some 103,000 troops.
15. The largest share of both combat force structures is
concentrated in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. The Com-
munists have roughly 66,000 men -- including 33,000 infantry
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troops -- or about 75 percent of their total MR 1 regular combat
forces located in the two provinces. Two NVA infantry divi-
sions (the 304th and 325th) supported by 20 air defense, one
armor, three infantry, and five artillery regiments are deployed
north and west of Quang Tri City. One NVA infantry division
(the 324th), supported by two artillery, one armor, and two
:infantry regiments, is deployed west and south of Hue City.
Arrayed against the Communists are 64,000 GVN troops -- including
46,000 infantry troops -- which are deployed near Quang Tri
and Hue cities. Three. GVN divisions -- the Marine, Airborne,
and 1st -- supported by a ranger group, an armor brigade, and
fifteen regional force battalions form a defense line pro-
tecting major GVN lines of communication and population cen-
ters.
16. In southern MR 1, South Vietnamese regular combat
forces are about double the number of Communist forces. GVN
forces number about 39,000 men in two infantry divisions --
the 2nd and 3rd -- three ranger groups, and 35 Regional Force
battalions, compared to the Communists' 21,000 men in two in-
fantry divisions -- the 711th and 2nd -- supported by elements
of infantry, armor, artillery, sapper, and air defense units.
The 711th Division is deployed in Quang Nam/Quang Tin Provinces
and is targeted against the coastal lowlands, whereas the 2nd
Division's only regiment is operating in Quang Ngai.
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17. Qualitatively, most Communist and South Vietnamese
combat forces are well rested and are at or near full strength,
owing to the extensive lull in combat activity. Both sides
could launch multi-regimental attacks against selected targets.
The present North Vietnamese infantry force structure, how-
ever, although having an enhanced firepower and air defense
complement, is not now large enough to seize major population
centers in MR 1. ARVN forces are in a maximum defensive posture
with their forces committed to the defense of major cities
LOCs. Thus, despite their capabilities for larger-scale
actions, both sides now appear to be planning to initiate
only light combat activity in MR 1 for the remainder of the
dry season.
Logistic Capabilities
18. The Communists in MR 1 have continued to improve and
expand an already strong logistics base, under the auspices of
Military Region 559 -- the North Vietnamese command authority
responsible for the movement of men and supplies through southern
Laos and northern South Vietnam. Numerous roads feed into the
region through the DMZ, some of them now passable year round.
Several east-west corridors connect the roadnet with Laos,
including Route 9 which also links the extensive logistic fa-
cilities established at Khe Sanh, Cam Lo, and Dong Ha. To
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supplement the overland system, the Communists have also refur-
bished a large land-water transshipment facility on the Cua
Viet River just outside of Dong Ha. The logistic complex, now
in operation for nearly one year, primarily handles cargo
transshipped from anchorages in the North Vietnamese Panhandle.
19. The new western corridor in MR 1 will ease the move-
ment of supplies into the southern part of the region. The
major exit corridors from Laos -- Routes 922 and 966 -- have
been little used since the last dry season. Supplies will be
shipped down the corridor directly from Quang Tri. Province
and either stored along the route, sent on south into northern
Kontum Province, or moved eastward along one of the four major
arteries leading toward the MR 1 coastal lowlands.
20. These arteries are all either newly constructed or
considerably improved over the past year. They include Route
547 and Gorman' s'Road leading from the abundant storage depots
of the A Shau Valley to units of the NVA 324B Division just west
of Hue, Route 534 running to the Que Son Valley and the NVA
711th Division, and Communist-designated Route 105 (GVN Route
1404) extending from Nham Duc on the western supply corridor
southeastward through Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces. As
a result of new Communist construction since October 1973, this
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last route now extends more than 100 miles and is motorable
into Binh Dinh Province in coastal MR 2.
21. In addition to the roadnet, the Communists have con-
structed large truck parks and numerous service and support
facilities, including some 1,800 structures in northern MR 1
alone -- capable of holding several hundred thousand tons.
They have extended their DMZ POL pipeline southward from Cam
Lo to Ba Long and the A Shau Valley, and established extensive
POT, storage and distribution facilities in these areas. These
facilities, together with the pipeline, are supported by an
inventory of some 2,000 trucks in South Vietnam's MR 1, which
is several times the number available to them in early 1972.
22. Supply activity along the western corridor has gen-
erally been light in MR 1 in the past few months, probably
as a result of the monsoon rains which sweep the area from
September throug4 February. Similarly, seasonally wet weather
has restricted transport activity along lateral roads feeding
the interior of the region. Despite this relatively low level
of new supply deliveries into the region, most of the large
amounts of ordnance delivered last spring and summer probably
are still on hand, as Communist expenditure rates have been low.
Thus, the NVA probably have sufficient stocks on hand to sup-
port a sustained offensive for at least one year.
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23. On the GVN's side, logistics are not much of a con-
straint to ARVN forces so long as they maintain control of the
urban areas and well-traveled arteries in the coastal lowlands.
.Movement along parts of this network, however, is likely to
be impaired by concentrated Communist interdiction efforts.
During an offensive, Route 1 linking Quang Tri City, Hue,
and Danang would be a prime target for such efforts. Should
the ARVN.lose the free use of this route, it would be forced
to depend upon resupply by air and sea. If this occurred,
ARVN's capability to meet fully its resupply requirements in
northern MR 1 would be doubtful because of the GVN's limited
air and naval lift capability. As ARVN stockpiles were con-
sumed., a supply shortfall -- particularly of POL and ammunition --
could occur and might reach serious proportions within a month
or so, especially if there were a high level of fighting else-.
where in the country.
24. If Hanoi launches a major offensive, the North Viet-
namese would probably deploy several infantry divisions from
their strategic reserve and infiltrate sufficient personnel
to replace losses. Two divisions might be sent to Quang Tri
and Thua Thien Provinces and a third to southern MR 1. These
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divisions could move into place near key GVN strongholds
with relative ease because North Vietnamese air defense forces
would prevent VNAF from interdicting Communist infiltration
routes. Moreover, the commitment of North Vietnamese air as-
sets during the offensive probably would temporarily demoralize
some GVN combat units and give the Communists the necessary of-
fensive momentum to move deep into GVN controlled territory.*
25. The offensive scenario might unfold as follows: Five
NVA infantry divisions supported by air defense, heavy artil-
lery, armor, and air power would attack Hue from the north and
west with the mission. of destroying the GVN's three best com-
bat units -- Marine, Airborne, and First ARVN Divisions. To
the south, two divisions supported by artillery, armor, and
some air support would move into the populated lowlands of 'Quang Tin
Province and isolate Danang. Communist troops,'including local
forces, would attempt to tie down the 2nd ARVN Division near
Quang Ngai City.
26. If the above happens, the GVN plans to immediately
abandon Quang Tri City and withdraw the Marine, Airborne, and
First ARVN Divisions from forward outposts to preplanned de-
fensive sectors around Hue. Successful implementation of
See Joint DIA-INR-CIA Memorandum, "The Consequences of the
Use of North Vietnamese Airpower in South Vietnam's Military
Region 1", 4 March 1974, SECRET SPOKE.
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this plan requires the divisions to minimize their combat
casualties and for ARVN artillery units and VNAF to provide
adequate firepower protection for withdrawal. As attacking
North Vietnamese units becomes more exposed to GVN firepower
in.the lowlands, their advance could be slowed somewhat.
However, without US air assets and logistical assistance --
which were available in 1972 -- the GVN would be hard pressed
to defend Hue for more than a few weeks. Indeed, the GVN's
internal distribution problems coupled with possible short-
ages of key military supplies such as POL and small arms am-
munition could seriously limit ARVN's ability to meet the
Communist offensive throughout MR 1.
27. In the southern provinces, the 3rd ARVN Division,
which is currently defending the coastal lowlands, is likely
to withdraw to Dnang. In such an event, Tam Ky City would
probably fall. The 2nd ARVN Division would defend Quang
Ngai City and attempt to-send reinforcements to Danang.
Unless the Communist forces in Quang Ngai are reinforced,
ARVN probably will be able to prevent them from making any
significant territorial gains there.
28. On balance, the success or failure of a Communist
offensive in MR 1 would be determined in large part by the
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NVA's ability to prevent ARVN from resupplying its major combat
forces, particularly in Thua Thien Province. This could be a
touch and go situation since ARVN is basically dependent on
land LOCs for its supplies; its air and naval assets probably could
not take up the slack if the major road arteries were inter-
dicted. If this occurred -- and the US did not provide the
necessary support to keep ARVN functioning effectively -- the
Communists would not only capture Quang Tri City but also Hue
and probably one or two provincial capitals in southern MR 1.
Under these circumstances, the GVN position in Danang could
easily become critical.
Military Region 2
Manpower Capabilities
29. In contrast to MR 1, the tactical situation in MR 2
for some time ha-% been marked by periods of intense combat
activity -- mainly as a result of GVN attacks to prevent the
Communists from securing areas along strategic Route 14 -- and
main force unit deployments have been common occurrences. Last
summer, for example, the GVN began multiregional
operations
into Communist areas of Kontum and Pleiku Provinces. These
operations have been only marginally successful and have resulted
in heavy casualties for both sides.
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30. The Communists, on the other hand, opened another
military front in Quang Duc Province and have reinforced the
western highlands. From September to December, the North
Vietnamese deployed from GVN MR 3 nearly 5,000 men in three
regiments -- the 271B and 205th Independent Infantry, and the
174th of the 5th Division -- and sapper and armor elements of
the 429th Sapper and 203rd Armor Commands. The 174th Regiment
with some 1,000 men, however, returned to MR 3 in late February.
The Communists reinforced the Kontum/Pleiku Province area in
January by deploying from southern Laos the 232nd NVA AAA
Regiment, the 9th NVA Infantry Regiment of the 968th Infantry
Division, and infiltrating an armor group to the central high-
lands. The GVN reacted in September by deploying the 22nd
ARVN Division from Binh Dinh to Kontum Province and the 23rd
ARVN Division and a ranger group moved to Quang Duc Province
in November.
31. With the increased deployment of Communist and GVN
forces to MR 2, regular combat strength of both sides has risen
since the beginning of the dry season. Communist combat forces
have increased from 31,000 to 37,000 in three understrength
infantry divisions --,the 320th, 10th, and 3rd -- six indepen-
dent infantry, one artillery, and three air defense regiments
supported by elements of sapper and armor units. South
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Vietnamese combat strength now totals 78,000 -- up 8,000 in two infantry divisions, the 22nd and 23rd, 7 ranger
groups, one armor brigade, and 82 Regional :'Force.bat-
talions.
32. The current disposition of GVN and Communist combat
forces focuses on Kontum/Pleiku, Quang Duc, and Binh Dinh
Provinces (see Military Region 2 map).
33. Combat force disposition in the Kontum/Pleiku area
gives the GVN a numerical edge, 32,000 against 20,000 NVA
troops. The 10th NVA Division, an artillery, an independent
infantry, and two air defense regiments supported by armor
forces are targeting Kontum City which is defended by a regi-
ment of the 22nd ARVN Division and a ranger group. The 320th
NVA Division, an air defense, and two independent infantry
regiments supported by armor forces oppose three regiments of
the 22nd ARVN Division, three ranger groups, and an armor bri-
gade near Pleiku City.
34. In Quang Duc/Darlac Provinces, there are about 13,000
GVN combat troops of the 23rd ARVN Division, a ranger group,
and three Regional Force battalions. This compares to the
Communists' 4,000 combat troops in two infantry regiments
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supported by armor and sapper elements. Communist forces
are deployed near the Cambodian border with the mission of
protecting the North Vietnamese road network linking the cen-
tral highlands with northern Military Region 3. The Commu-
nists have forced the GVN to reduce its force structure in
the provinces of Kontum and Pleiku, but they have also reduced
their own threat to Saigon by withdrawing two regiments from
MR 3. The opposing forces in Quang Duc are in a defensive
posture, although the GVN is attempting to interdict Communist
Route 14 in southern Darlac Province.
35. In Binh Dinh Province, the balance of Communist and
GVN combat forces is about even. The 3rd NVA Infantry Divi-
sion supported by armor, heavy artillery and other infantry
forces, numbers about 6,000 men compared to the GVN's 8,000-
man force of two ranger groups and 16 Regional Force bat-
talions. The 3rd.Division -- with two of its three regiments
understrength -- is now only capable of conducting limited at-
tacks against GVN outposts and temporarily interdicting GVN
supply lines.
36. The ARVN manpower edge in MR 2 is at least partly
offset by the Communist use of their firepower assets in MR 2.
The three North Vietnamese air defense regiments, plus armor
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and 130mm and 122mm field guns, now deployed in the central
highlands constitutes the largest firepower commitment of the
war to this area. The presence of North Vietnamese air de-
fense units is forcing some VNAF LOC interdiction missions to
fly as high as 20,000 feet, restricting their effectiveness.
Moreover, Communist 130mm and 122mm field guns have been ef-
fective in slowing the advance of GVN combat units into Com-
munist areas west of Kontum City.
37. On balance, although combat activity in the central
highlands probably will intensify, neither side has a decisive
military edge in the area. Such activity probably will in-
clude Communist efforts to occupy additional territory near
Kontum City while defending strategic NVA Route 14 and inter-
dicting ARVN supply lines in Kontum and Pleiku Provinces. ARVN
will continue to launch forays into NVA held areas, but prob-
ably will not have much success.
Logistic Capabilities
38. From a logistic perspective, the Communists are
strongest in the highland provinces bordering Laos and Cambodia
and in coastal Binh Dinh Province. Recent road construction
leading into both areas and through much of the highlands has
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considerably improved their access to main forces. Also,
COMINT and photography have revealed large supply shipments
and heavy vehicle traffic -- the first since last spring --
into Kontum Province. These goods can be moved quickly down
the dual lane road extending through western Pleiku and Darlac
and into Quang Duc Province.
39. As in MR 1 -- although to a lesser extent -- the
Communists in MR 2 have augmented their rear services forces
and inventory of transport vehicles along the dual lane supply
route, and expanded storage and other facilities in western
Kontum and Pleiku Provinces. As the dry season supply effort
continues, the Communists will replace stocks expended during
the fighting, enhancing their ability to launch and sustain
heavy tactical activity in all four highlands provinces in MR 2.
In addition, because main force units in the highlands are
:Located close to the new dual lane or other roads, forward
supply distribution and tactical troop deployments can be ac-
complished much more easily and quickly than previously.
40. Communist forces in Binh Dinh Province reportedly
have had a substantial part of their supply stockpiles damaged
by severe storms which hit the northern coast of South Vietnam
last fall. No serious shortages have been reported, however,
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perhaps because no significant fighting is taking place. In
any case, NVA Route 105 through southern MR 1 now provides
the Communists' first motorable link between Binh Dinh Prov-
ince and the primary infiltration corridors from North Viet-
nam. Should they decide to use'Route 105 during the dry season
they could build a logistic capability for sustained offensive
action by the NVA 3rd Division.
41. Logistics will become a serious problem for ARVN forces
in the MR 2 highlands if the Communists sharply escalate the
fighting and attempt to capture the province capitals. Al-
though ARVN now has approximately three weeks of stocks -- at
peak offensive levels -- in place in the highland provinces,
it relies heavily upon only two major arteries to resupply
these areas. These arteries -- Route 19 feeding Pleiku City
from the coast, and Route 14 linking Kontum and Pleiku Cities,
are vulnerable to'Communist interdiction. The cutting. of these
routes would make resupply of the cities entirely dependent on
airlifts, which in turn are vulnerable to Communist AAA fire.
Offensive Scenario
42. If Hanoi were to launch a major offensive in MR 2, at
least 20,000 infiltrators would be needed to augment understrength
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combat units and to create an initial manpower reserve. Ad-
ditional infiltration, however, would be required to replace
losses as the fighting continued. Furthermore, the North
Vietnamese probably would shift the two remaining infantry
regiments of the 968th Division now in southern Laos to the
western highlands. Once this was accomplished, the Communists
would attempt. to isolate Kontum and Pleiku Cities by inter-
dicting Routes 14 and 19. The 10th and 968th Divisions supported,
by armor, heavy artillery, and air defense forces would attack
Kontum City, while the 320th Division would attempt to tie
down GVN forces near Pleiku City.
43. The GVN's response to a major Communist offensive
calls for the deployment of the 23rd ARVN Division now in Quang
Duc Province and possibly another ranger group from Binh Dinh
Province to Pleiku City. These.forces combined with the 22nd
ARVN Division an(~four ranger groups supported by VNAF would
have to keep Route 14 and 19 open to ensure resupply -- if
Kontum and Pleiku Cities are to be successfully defended. If
the North Vietnamese, however, deploy their air defense and heavy
artillery weapons near GVN installations and LOCs and success-
fully interdict Routes 14 and 19, one or both of the province
capitals might well fall to the Communists.
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44. On the coast, a strengthened 'rd NVA Division would
move rather quickly into the lowlands of northern Binh Dinh
Province and capture one or two district capitals as they did
in 1972. In the southern coastal provinces, the Communists
would be limited to harassing attacks and LOC interdiction
activity.
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Military Region 3
Manpower Capabilities
45. Within MR 3 both sides have been resting and rebuilding
their combat forces and consolidating their respective geographic
positions. Communist regular combat forces are now closer to
the populated areas north of Saigon than in 1972, when they ini-
tiated their attacks from the border areas of Cambodia. Thus,
their proximity poses a greater threat to GVN lines of communications
and installations surrounding Saigon. In. terms of numbers, however, the
Communist threat to this area has been reduced since October 1973
by some 4,000 troops with the deployment of infantry, sappers,
artillery, armor to Quang Due Province in MR 2.
46. Currently there are about 39,000 Communist regular
combat forces in MR 3 -- some 14,000 more than at the time of the
cease-fire Major units include an artillery, an antiaircraft,
and three infantry divisions plus nine infantry, sapper, and
armor regiments (See Military Region 3 map). The infiltration of
armor, antiaircraft artillery, and field artillery into the
provinces north of Saigon last year provides the Communists with
more firepower in the region than ever before. The creation in
early 1973 of an air defense division in Binh Long Province, with
the continued availability of the SA-7 missile, poses a threat
to South Vietnamese air operations in this area of MR 3, although
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the overall threat is less than in northern MR 1 and the western
highlands.
47. Opposing the Communists in MR 3 are some 94,000 South
Vietnamese troops in three infantry divisions, one armor brigade,
four ranger groups, and supporting artillery and regional
forces units. The government force increased by about 2 , 000
men in, the past year, and now is roughly 2 1/2 times that of the
Communists. .Moreover, it possesses an. enhanced armor and artillery
capability. The GVN forces, however, are spread throughout the
region in defense of government-held territory.. This defensive
posture permits the Communists to concentrate their forces for
selected thrusts against key targets.
48. Available evidence suggests that the Communists in MR 3
will be content this dry season with some intensified but generally
limited military activity. This probably will include ground
actions by infantry and sapper units -- targeted against such
facilities as POL and ammunition depots -- as well as attacks-by-
fire against GVN military facilities and LOCs. Such action is most
likely to occur in the northern and eastern parts of the region.
49. The Communists are likely to concentrate their activity
in the provinces north and northwest of the capital. In Tay
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Ninh Province, the Communists have the NVA 5th Infantry Division*
along with one regiment each of infantry, sapper, and antiaircraft.
The ARVN 25th Infantry Division and a regiment of the ARVN 18th
Infantry Division are responsible for defending the provinces of
Tay Ninh and Hau Nghia and maintaining secure LOCs to Saigon. :Mov-
ing east, the NVA 7th. and 9th Infantry Divisions, supported by a
total of seven regiments. of antiaircraft, armor, artillery, sapper,
and independent infantry, are targeted against Binh Duong and
Binh Long Provinces. The ARVN 5th Infantry Division, two reg-
iments of the 18th Division, and two ranger groups are the
principal GVJN forces in these provinces. Another threat area lies
east of Saigon where smaller Communist infantry, artillery, and
sapper units have required the positioning of two ranger groups.
Logistics Capabilities
50. The Communists in MR 3 have not expended the large
quantities of ordnance amassed by the end of last dry season and
remain in a strong supply position, capable of supporting heavy
fighting. Although large-scale shipments to this region from
Laos and North Vietnam have not yet been detected, the supplies
Tenuous evidence indicates that at least one regiment of
the 5th Division is redeploying from northwestern Tay
Ninh Province to Dinh Tuong Province in northern MR 4,
where the division operated from mid-1972 to April 1973.
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may currently be moving south from Kontum Province along NVA
Route 14. Moreover, a new motorable road in extreme southeastern
Cambodia has just been completed, connecting the Communists'
existing route structure in southern Cambodia with the dual lane
corridor in western MR 2. The road, although sufficient for
current Communist needs, would be complemented by additional
routes prior to any Communist offensive.
51. Inside MR 3 the Communists have considerably improved
their resupply system over the past year. Storage, communications,
and other logistics facilities have been constructed, and a number
.of roads have been either built or upgraded. The key roads
include one leading from Loc Ninh, two crossing the Tay Ninh-
Binh Long Province border, and another extending southward
from southern Binh Long Province to Binh Duong Province, only
about thirty miles, north of Saigon. These roads will allow the
Communists to move their armor and artillery effectively, ease
troop and resupply movements, and lessen constraints on
mobility posed by the wet season, should fighting continue beyond
May.
F
52. Seven COSVN Rear Services Groups (RSGs) operate the
transportation corridors in northern MR 3. Most of these RSGs
were activated in early 1972, and since the January 1973 cease-fire
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have extended their areas of operation from rear bases in Cambodia
deeper into MR 3. They are now much closer to tactical forces
in the region, which with an improved transport network, add
considerably to the Communists' capability to support further
fighting.
53. For the most part, GVN forces in MR 3 enjoy the use of
the.extensive transportation infrastructure built initially for
commercial purposes. Logistics will pose no problem in and around
the urban areas the government now firmly controls. However,
ARVN's resupply links with outlying towns and outposts in Phuoc
Long, Binh Long, and Tay Ninh Provinces are tenuous, and very
likely many would prove impossible to defend should the Communists
initiate heavy offensive activity.
Offensive Scenario
54. If the Communists should decide to launch a major offensive,
they would need to infiltrate some 20,000 personnel in order to
increase combat units strengths and establish an initial manpower
pool. This could be accomplished in April, if current infiltration
levels to COSVN are maintained. So far this dry season, 20,000
infiltrators have already been dispatched to the southern half of
South Vietnam; they will arrive in country by the end of March
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55..During the initial stages of the offensive the Communists
probably would make significant tactical gains because their units
are in forward positions close to GVN population centers and
installations. The present deployments reduce Communist command
and control problems while affording the South Vietnamese less
reaction time than in 1972. Communist combat units probably would
first exert heavy pressure on one or more of the district capitals
in Binh Duong Province and against the province capital of Tay
Ninh City. This would initially tie down ARVN troops in those
areas and prevent their use as reinforcements against the main
offensive thrust south by the NVA 7th and 9th Divisions in Binh
Duong Province along the northern approaches to Saigon.
56. Once the Communists penetrate the densely populated
GVN-controlled areas of Tay.Ninh, Binh Duong and Bien Hoa
Provinces, they would meet increasingly strong resistance from ARVN
regular and regional forces. The GVN would have to alter its
current deployment of forces within the region and redeploy the
ARVN 9th Division from MR 4. Although the GVN could prevent
the capture of Saigon,,it would be forced temporarily to give up
additional territory to the Communists north of the capital. The
South Vietnamese, however, could be expected to further reinforce
the area to the extent required to recapture those populated
a _eas which they consider politically vital.
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Military Region 4
Manpower Capabilities
57. The balance of forces in MR 4 weighs heavily in
favor of the GVMV. For the remainder of the dry season, the
Communists' capability for offensive activity there is quite
limited. Major Communist combat forces number 24,000 men
in one artillery and twelve infantry regiments and numerous
local force units. (See the Military Region 4 map).*
Communist units in MR 4 are sorely understrength when compared
with 1972 levels, and more than 10,000 replacement personnel
are needed to rebuild existing forces. Furthermore, there
has been no significant improvement in the Communist firepower
position over 1972 levels. Some of the tanks and long-range
artillery that deployed to the COSVN area a year ago could
move into MR 4, but their effectiveness would be extremely
limited by the open terrain and numerous canals which criss-
A
cross the delta.
58. By comparison, the GVN has some 97,000 men in three
infantry divisions and one armor brigade, with supporting
artillery and a large number of regional force battalions.
Moreover, ARVN has continued to perform well in the delta and
has not. only contained but reduced the Communist threat there.
This is an agreed DIA-CIA estimate. There are however, some
analysts within CIA who believe that the total number of
Communist combat forces in MR 4 is considerably less than 24,000.
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'!'he three division force -- the 7th, 9th and 21st -- committed
to the delta is currently in good shape, and.neither manpower
shortages nor the quality of units appear to pose any
significant restraint on ARVN capabilities there. In addition,
these forces are supported by an air force that historically
has provided effective close air support in this area.
59. In the northern delta, the Communists have concentrated
five infantry regiments in Dinh Tuong, Kien Phong, and Kien Tuong
Provinces. These forces are opposed by the ARVN 7th Infantry
Division and a regiment of the ARVN 9th Infantry Division,
supported by regional forces, that have succeeded in preventing
the Communists from infiltrating the more populated areas. Another
large concentration of Communist combat forces is in Chuong Thien
Province, where an artillery, a sapper and five infantry reg-
iments confront the ARVN 21st Infantry Division and a regiment
of the ARVN 9th Division.
r
60. Until recently a third threat area existed in Kien Giang
and Chau Doc Provinces along the Cambodian border, where the
understrength North Vietnamese lst Infantry Division operates.
Two of the division's regiments have apparently been dissolved
e
and their personnel assigned to reinforce the one remaining
regiment of the unit. This has reduced the Communist threat to
GVN forces in the area consisting of one regiment of the ARVN
9th Division and regional forces.
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6l, The Communists, however, still are capable of launching
understrength, regimental-size attacks in several areas, notably
in Dinh Tuong and Chuong Thien and in the provinces adjacent to
the Cambodian border. They could overrun isolated district towns
and outposts as well as temporarily interdict GVN lines of
communication, but would not achieve any major permanent gains.
Logistics Capabilities
62. Logistically, the Communists also are in. a much weaker
position in MR 5 than in the northern three regions. Although
relatively secure rear base areas have been established across
the boarder in southern Cambodia, few shipments have been detected
entering the delta over the past several months. Moreover,
the Communists' supply lines into the region are neither motorized
nor secure from ARVN interdiction efforts during periods of
increased hostilities. Such traditional means of transportation
as sampans and porters are still relied upon heavily. Large
fishing vessels reportedly have been used to deliver arms and
ammunition to Communist-controlled coastal areas over the past
year, but only in small quantities.
6:3. The Communists in MR 4 are strongest logistically
near the Cambodian border, Base Area 470 in western Dinh Tuong
Province, and the U Minh Forest on the western coast. Sufficient
stocks are on hand in these traditional strongholds to support a
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continuation of the level of fighting which has prevailed over
the past several months and periodic highpoints, but not much
more.
64. The ARVN in MR 4 has the advantage of better supply
lines, but this factor is not as important in the delta as it
might be elsewhere in South Vietnam. Heavy sustained combat,
requiring large amounts of supplies for both sides, is less common
than in the other MRs. The protracted warfare style in MR 4
mitigates the positive effect ARVN's logistics advantage may have
on the overall balance of forces.
Offensive Scenario
65. There appears to be little likelihood of any major
offensive activity in MR 4 this dry season. If large-scale
military activity is initiated in the other military regions --
Particularly MR 3,-- the Communists would attempt to tie down
the three ARVN divisions in MR 4, probably unsuccessfully. The
transfer of the ARVN 9th Division from the delta -- as provided
for in contingency planning -- would permit the Communists to
make some territorial gains in the rural areas. There is little
reason to suspect, however, that they would achieve any greater
success than they did in the 1972 offensive, when they were
unable to capture any major population centers.
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Manpower Overview
North Vietnam
1,. The North Vietnamese Armed Forces (NVNAF) total about
660,00( men of which 285,000 are located out-of-country in South
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Hanoi's forces have continued to
grow despite the heavy losses suffered it the 1972 offensive,
increasing by an estimated 55,000 since the cease-fire.
The majority of the increase occurred in the expansion of the
combat and rear services structures and the remainder was from
rebuilding of the Communist force structure. There also has
been qualitative growth in the South through the increased
deployment of longer range offensive and defensive weapons
as well as better military equipment, leading to a dramatic in-
crease in North Vietnamese firepower.
2. The personnel increase in the NVNAF and the replacement
of most of the losses suffered in 1972 were drawn from a population
base of more than 20 million, containing a manpower pool of an
estimated 1.3 million physically fit males between the ages of
There is~ some recently ava Zable evidence which suggests that the
North Vietnamese population may total about 26 million. If so,
all of the manpower figures in this paragraph would be higher.
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15-39. Within the aggregate manpower pool there are an estimated
360,000 men in the prime age group of 17-25. Hanoi probably
could induct 100,000 per year without any drain on the aggregate
reserve, and thus has the ability to further increase its armed
forces while maintaining a regular flow of infiltration to
South Vietnam.
Induction
3. North Vietnamese induction since the cease-fire has featured
two distinct trends. In the first six months following the
signing of the agreement induction was particularly light, as the
Communists skipped their annual spring recruiting drive. In
August, however, the North Vietnamese launched a substantial
recruiting effort, traditional for the August-September period.
The second intensified recruiting effort of the post cease-fire
period started in late January -- following an increase in
induction earlier in the month.
4. The induction effort this dry season is probably
designed to maintain a sufficient pool of trained manpower to
support planned infiltration while strengthening units which have
redeployed to North Vietnam. New inductees are probably ready
for infiltration in four to five months; thus, those inducted
in the current drive would be unlikely to come south before late
spring.
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Infiltration
5. Since 1 September 1973, Hanoi has sent about 54,500
troops to the southern war zones, some 24,000 fewer than
during the comparable period in the 1972/1973 dry season.
Nearly 60 percent of the total, 32,000 troops, have travelled
to Communist combat units in South Vietnam, while the remainder --
mostly rear services personnel -- have been sent to southern
Laos and contiguous border areas. As shown in the table below,
total troop infiltration to major Communist regions in South
Vietnam thus far in the 1973/1974 dry season is substantially
less than last year, but infiltration to southern Laos and
adjacent areas is more than twice as great.
Starts of Troops
from North Vietnam, by Destination
1 September - 27 February
Total It
MR Tri-Thien
MR 5
B-3 Front
COSVN
Southern Laos/MR. 559
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78,500 54,500
19,500 2,000
9,000 3,500
14,000 6,500
25,000 20,000
11,000 22,500
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6. The dispatch of a large number of infiltrators to the
Military Region 559 area early in the dry season reflects North
Vietnamese emphasis on logistic activities and further refinements
to the transport system. Hanoi did not begin significant combat
troop infiltration to South Vietnam until mid-December -- more
than a month later than usual. This shift in the timing of the
departures from North Vietnam may reflect both the sharply reduced
travel time for infiltrators enroute to South Vietnam and an
apparent lack of urgency in completing the rebuilding of under-
strength combat units.
7. During the remainder of the regular infiltration cycle,
North Vietnam probably will continue to send troops to the B-3
Front and COSVNN areas, where units are still understrength. A
suggested that between 55,000 and 68,000
troops would be sent to these areas. If true, this would be more
than sufficient to rebuild understrength units and establish a
reserve manpower pool by late spring.
8. Infiltration, however, probably will not be confined
to the southern half of South Vietnam. The recent resumption
of infiltration to VC MR 5 suggests that Hanoi is beginning to
dispatch troops to northern South Vietnam where the dry season is
now beginning.
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9. Since the cease-fire, the Communists have sent a
substantial number of personnel from the south to North Vietnam.
During 1973, some 45,000 exfiltrators were detected moving through
the Vinh area in North Vietnam, and thus far in 1974, the rate
of northward moving personnel has been increased. Most of this
year's exfiltrators have been sick and wounded, although others
such as escort cadre who previously accompanied infiltrators
south and personnel being sent to North Vietnam for training
also have been observed. The large proportion of sick and wounded
probably results from the improved road system and the Communists'
lowering of the medical criteria necessary for a soldier to
return home, allowing a higher number of marginally sick and
wounded. to return to the north.
South Vietnam
10. .The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) has a
current strength of some one million men and -- like the NVNAF --
its regular combat forces have continued to grow despite battlefield
losses. In the last year or so, the South Vietnamese have consoli-
dated their combat structure. The assigned strength of regular
combat forces has risen to 372,000, compared to 320,000 in February
1973, resulting primarily from a change in the strength of
ARVN/VNMC combat units from 194,000 to 239,000 in the last quarter
of 1973. Although now operating without US air and advisor
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support, RVNAF capability has been enhanced by the addition of
large numbers of aircraft, tanks, and artillery pieces.
11. On the population side, the manpower base for South
Vietnam -- 19 million -- is roughly comparable to that of North
Vietnam. South Vietnam has an estimated manpower pool of about
2 1/2 million in the 18-39 age group and we believe that an
additional 175,000-225,000 young men reach age 18 each year.
This is more than sufficient to meet the GVN's annual induction
needs
Unit Deployments
North Vietnam
12. Since the start of the current dry season, the North
Vietnamese have reinforced their combat forces in South Vietnam
with some 9,000 troops in eight regiments -- five antiaircraft
artillery (AAA), an infantry, an artillery, and a sapper regiment.
Only three of the units -- the artillery and two AAA regiments --
deployed directly into South Vietnam from the north; the remainder
relocated into the country from southern Laos and Cambodia. The
five AAA regiments and the infantry regiment deployed into the
western part of South Vietnam as part of a continuing effort to
enhance North Vietnamese defensive positions against South
Vietnamese air and ground operations along the Communists'
logistic corridor. These AAA regiments increased total post cease-
fire air defense deployments to 12 AAA regiments, totaling some
10,000 men.
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13. These aumentations, however, were offset by the withdrawal
from northern South Vietnam in late 1973 of the 320B Infantry
Division and an independent infantry regiment. The return north
of some 8,000 troops has continued the trend in northern MR 1
noted since the cease-fire of a reduction in infantry forces.
Earlier in 1973 two other infantry divisions -- the 308th and
312th --- redeployed to North Vietnam.
South Vietnam
14. South Vietnamese unit deployments in recent months have
been aimed at reinforcing the central highlands of MR
2. During August and September, the 22nd ARVN Division with
roughly 13,000 troops deployed from Binh Dinh to Kontum and
Pleiku provinces in order to support 23rd ARVN Division operations
into Communist territory west of Kontum and Pleiku cities. In
November and December, the 23rd ARVN Division with some 10,000
men deployed to Quant Duc Province to counter the growing
Communist threat. In addition, a reorganization of the Ranger
Command was completed in January and six ranger battalions in
Military Region 4 were deployed to the MR 2 coastal lowlands.
Strategic Reserves
15. Within North Vietnam there are a total of 10 infantry
and training divisions, the same number that was there prior to
the 1972 offensive. Four of these -- the 250-th, 330th, 338th,
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and 350th -- in the past have always been committed to a home
defense and training role. The remaining six divisions, with
some 40,000 to 50,000 troops, comprise Hanoi's strategic
reserves which can readily deploy out of country (See Strategic
Reserve Map). During 1972, for example, Hanoi committed seven
strategic reserve divisions to South Vietnam, four of which
are still there. This sizeable drawdown in its reserves led
to the creation of one new infantry division, the 308B in mid-
1972, and the regeneration of an old division -- the 341st --
in early 1973.
16. Hanoi also established a major new tactical headquarters
in Thanh Hoa Province in 1973. The new headquarters has three
identified subordinate infantry divisions -- the 308th, 312th,
and 320B, all withdrew from South Vietnam last year -- plus
artillery, armor, and engineer elements. The new headquarters
consolidates and improves the command and control over some of
Hanoi's strategic reserve forces in North Vietnam. It would also
facilitate multi-divisional redeployment to South Vietnam if Hanoi
decides to resume major military action. A redeployment to
northern MR 1 could be 'accomplished with little advance warning.
17. The South Vietnamese strategic reserves consist of
an airborne and marine division, plus three ranger groups,
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totalling some 35,000 troops. These "reserves", however, are
all committed -- the airborne and marines to MR 1 and the rangers
to MRs 2 and 3. In an offensive, the South Vietnamese would be
forced to redeploy their reserves or other forces* to the critical
areas.
NVA and ARVN Command and Control
18. Besides rebuilding their combat forces numerically,
the Communists and South Vietnamese each have continued to improve
their command and control structures to meet the changing
priorities of a cease-fire environment. Above the division level,
there are few close similarities between the North and South
Vietnamese Armies. In both cases, however, formal lines of
control. run from a high command directly to the military regions
(MR). The South Vietnamese MR commander normally exercises
tactical control over all ground forces within his region. The
Communist MR commander has the same authority but in some cases
there are separate front headquarters within the Communist MR which
are directly subordinate to the high command. In this case, the front
headquarters supercedes the MR commander's tactical authority over
a given area within the MR.
ARVN contingency plans, for example, call for the redeployment
of the 9th Division from MR 4 in the event of a major offensive
in MR 3.
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19. At the division level and below, however, North and
South Vietnamese command and control organizations. are similar.
Within a division, they both have support battalions attached to
the division headquarters and three infantry regiments with three
maneuver battalions each. In addition, according to Table of
Organization both have an artillery regiment or equivalent as
.an organic part of the division. While the South Vietnamese
division has an organic armored cavalry squadron, the Communists
divisions do not. In the past, North Vietnamese armor has been
attached only temporarily to a division for a specific mission.
Logistics Overview - North Vietnam
'Military Imports
20. During 1973, the North Vietnamese apparently continued
to receive Soviet and Chinese military imports, possibly in
substantial quantities. Photography shows that artillery and
J
armor have been shipped into North Vietnam during the past year.
For example, photography of 30 September showed about 40 tanks
parked between storage sheds at the Vinh Yen Armor Training
Center northwest of Hanoi which had not been there in early August
as well as the addition of at least 100 pieces of artillery to
a storage area southwest of Hanoi. Mid-October photography
showed 80 possible light antiaircraft and field artillery
pieces less than 10 miles from the Chinese border. Finally, on
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8 November photography showed 230 light antiaircraft artillery
pieces stored on one of the main rail lines between the Chinese
border and Hanoi.
21. In addition to the above items, the North Vietnamese
have also received some additional SA-3 equipment from the Soviet
Union since the cease-fire.- With the exception of the SA-3
missile system, however, North Vietnam is not known to have added
any major weapons systems to its arsenal in recent years.2
22. The absence of regular photographic coverage -- the
primary source in identifying recent military import -- has
made it impossible to determine if the such imports have increased
or decreased since the onset of the Communist dry season logistics
push. But some imports are clearly continuing to be received
by Hanoi, and these should be sufficient to replenish, at least
partially, the drawdown in stockpiles from supplies sent by
Communist Construction Activities
23. The Communist-controlled areas of South Vietnam have
changed radically owing to post cease-fire construction activity.
1 Soviet SA-3 equipment was first identified in North Vietnam on
7 January 1973. This equipment was observed in transit in mid-
December and some of the equipment may have arrived in North
Vietnam during Zate December 1972.
2 Possible DIA footnote,
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They are linked to North Vietnam by a greatly improved logistic
system. The "liberated" areas are just remote bases hidden
under .jungle canopy and served by foot and bicycle paths. They
have become a series of strongholds united by a net of new
motorable roads, and some of them supported by new petroleum
pipelines, coastal transshipment points and at least one SAM-
defended airfield.
24. In order to consolidate territorial gains, the North
Vietnamese moved swiftly after the January cease-fire to upgrade
their transport system in southern Laos and "liberated" areas of
South Vietnam. A system of interconnecting roads tying the
scattered enclaves together to permit rapid development and a
buildup of heavy weapon defenses was the most important development.
By early summer 1973, the first phase of this access roadnet
was completed. Communist vehicles can now move with relative
impunity from depots in North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia to front
lines in Military Regions 1, 2, and 3. The keystone of this de-
veloping road system is the ongoing construction of two separate
parallel north-south truck routes, one leading along the western
GVN border (Communist Route 14) and another extending through
southern Laos.
'--Construction methods to build these two roads are much different
than those used to build during the bombing period. The align-
meats are mostly dual Zane to permit two way traffic and passing.
Segments are straight, grades are Zess steep, the roadbeds are
well drained, and in a number of areas have been graveled or
oil covered. Consequently the roads recover quickly from the
effects of monsoon rains.
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25. The two separate north-south road systems, located on
either side of the Annamite Mountains bordering Laos and South
Vietnam, apparently were built to mitigate the effects of the
varying monsoon rainy seasons, and to permit more dependable
vehicle access between major Communist base areas and North
Vietnam. During the summer monsoon season in Laos, for example,
vehicles could shift to the route through western South Vietnam,
and then during the fall and early winter months transfer back
to the Laos system.
26. The onset of the 1973-1974 dry season caused a seasonal
and expected shift in Communist construction activity. An
accelerated tempo developed on the new dual lane system in southern
Laos, and work slackened on LOCs and facilities in northern and
central portions of South Vietnam where wet weather prevailed.
27. Free from US air attack, the North Vietnamese concen-
trated their construction efforts on building a high speed supply
corridor through the Laos Panhandle while abandoning other routes.
For example, photography as recent as mid-February shows that with
the exception of Route 9, which leads into the Khe Sanh military
complex,, all former major roads leading through southern Laos
28. The North Vietnamese resumed heavy truck traffic in
southern Laos during late November accompanied by a surge of
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construction activity on the dual-lane road. This road now
extends into the western highlands and joins Communist Route 14
in Kontum Province. The Laotian pipeline System has also
rapidly extended along the path of the new roadbed; by early
1974, it had reached the tri-border area.
29. There were two major developments associated with the Route
14 system extending along the western GVN border. A new major
road in southwestern North Vietnam is to extend about 95 miles
from Mu Gia Pass southward through Quang Binh Province to a
juncture with Communist Route 14 near the DMZ. Also, Communist
road gangs probably have completed a Route 14 bypass road around
an ARVN strongpoint at Duc Lap in Duang Duc Province. This by-
pass leaves the dual-lane system 10 miles north of Duc Lap and
extends southwest for some 30 miles through the corner of Mondolkiri
Province, Cambodia-before joining Cambodian Route 14. Completion
of this bypass road closes the last link needed to complete a
500-mile through-truck route from the North Vietnam border through
Laos and the GVN western highlands to the COSVN area.
19 73-19 74 Dry Season Supply Effort
30. The Communists' 1973-1974 dry season supply effort is
now in full swing and is similar in scope and intensity to that of
previous years. As in the past, it is a major effort which is
more than adequate to replace the supplies consumed by Communist
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forces. Since early November, for example, Communist units
in the Vinh area have handled about 10,000 tons of all types of
ordnance. In addition, Communist supply shipments into Laos
from southern North Vietnam this dry season have been supplemented
by cargo deliveries along Route 9 in northern South Vietnam,
primarily from Dong Ha.
31. Deliveries from these areas into Laos have resulted in
heavy traffic along the Communists' dual lane road. Since mid-
November, almost daily aerial reconnaissance of the main north-
south supply corridor in Laos has shown an average of several
hundred trucks moving south. Unlike past years, North Vietnam has
been able to ship supplies the length of the Laos Panhandle
without having to shuttle supplies because of the threat of aerial
interdiction.
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34. Beyond February rear services units probably will continue
to move supplies through southern Laos into South Vietnam for
delivery to the B-3 Front and COSVN areas via NVA Route 14. In
addition, the North Vietnamese can be expected to resume heavy
supply shipments into northern South Vietnam on the DMZ routes,
once the dry season takes hold in that area. By June, the
Communists' resupply efforts will have placed NVA forces in an
even stronger supply situation.
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RVNAF Logistics
35. Since the cease-fire, the RVNAF logistics system has
made significant progress -- moving from complete dependence
upon the US military toward self-reliance in the allocation,
transportation, and stockpiling of supplies. A computerized
system for handling overall supply requisitioning is now
nearing completion and will further improve the receipt and
allocation of military equipment. A large number of South
Vietnamese technicians have been trained to replace the US
military personnel who departed shortly after the cease-fire.
VNAF airlift operations, which play an essential role in South
Vietnam's supply distribution system, are currently providing
sufficient supplies to about 30 ARVN outposts that are inacces-
sible by land LOCs. The RVNAF still remains dependent upon
the approximately 5,000 US contract personnel for aircraft
maintenance and the operation of port facilities.
36. Adequate supplies are available to South Vietnam to
continue meeting RVNAF's logistic requirements at current
consumption rates. Because of US budget constraints over the
past year, however, ammunition and other military goods have
not been replaced on the one-for-one basis permitted by the
cease-fire agreement. As a result, stocks are being drawn
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down from their January 1973 level. Supplies of ground
ammunition -- currently at 66 percent of the quantity available
at the time of the cease-fire -- are equivalent to 7 1/2 month's
supply at current expenditure rates, but only 1 1/2 month's
supply at rates expended during the 1972 offensive. Air
munitions stocks are more plentiful, equal to 16 month's supply
at current expenditure rates and 5 month's supply at 1972 offen-
sive levels. Current gross POL inventory is about 33 days of
supply at the consumption rate of 25,000 barrels daily, the
amount required to combat an NVA offensive. The POL, however,
is provided on a contract basis, which would allow sufficient
POL during an offensive, but which must be paid by US funding
projected to run out on 1 March.
37. RVNAF supplies of weapons and other military equipment
are adequate for its force structure. The RVNAF currently has
more and better aircraft, armor, and artillery to combat a North
Vietnamese offensive than they did in 1972. Sufficient amounts
of equipment, however, would not be hard to replace heavy
combat losses unless US stocks were made available. Stocks of
in-country repair parts are adequate in most cases for six
month's supply at present consumption rates.
38. Although the RVNAF logistics system is capable of
coping with the present level of tactical activity, a North
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Vietnamese countrywide offensive would present major problems.
It is doubtful that the system could handle the infusion and
distribution of large quantities of ammunition and equipment
.necessary to replace expenditures and combat losses. Supply
shortages, particularly in POL and ammunition, would soon occur.
39. RVNAF depends largely on trucks and other vehicles to
transport troops and supplies, and its transportation units have
performed well in the past year. The country has an extensive
roadnet, but many key routes are vulnerable to Communist
interdiction.
. 40. In an offensive, VNAF's air supply capabilities would
be deficient. At the current low operational rate of cargo
aircraft, VNAF could not carry out an airlift comparable to
the 1.972 effort without US support. Moreover, only 16 of 32
C-130 aircraft are normally operational at any one time. VNAF,
in fact, will bapressed if required to take on many more than
the 30 or so areas currently needing continual air resupply.
41. An offensive would also surface shortcomings in the
RVNAF? sealift capability. The VNN now possesses only six
landing ship tanks (LSTs) and other vessels which are inadequate
to perform such multiple tasks as relocating major ARVN units
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and evacuating large numbers of refugees along the coastline of
northern South Vietnam. Efforts are underway, however, to
.increase the VNN's inventory of LSTs.
42. other problems may arise from ARVN's failure to develop
an effective system of inter-military regional cooperation in'the
reallocation of scarce supplies. This failure prevents the rapid
transport of critically needed supplies from one MR to another,
even when the distance is very short. Finally, it is also
uncertain if US civilians now supporting RVNAF in several key
areas would remain if heavy fighting developed.
Firepower Balance
43. The South Vietnamese still hold an edge in firepower
assets over the Communists on a countrywide basis. However,
the withdrawal of US airpower coupled with the North Vietnamese
buildup of armor, artillery, and air defense forces, has caused
a major shift in'the firepower balance toward the Communists.
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44. Hanoi's substantial commitment of tanks and artillery
in South Vietnam last year raised inventories to the highest
level ever. The 130mm field gun gives the Communists the
advantage in long-range artillery in Northern MR 1 and in some
of the other areas where these weapons are concentrated. Moreover,
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the sizeable buildup of North Vietnamese air defense units,
coupled with the general availability of the SA-7 missile, have
served to at least partially compensate for the GVN dominance
in the air.
45. The Communists and South Vietnamese are estimated to
have roughly the same number of tanks -- about 600. The Communists
have the edge in MR 1 and the central highlands. However, poor
armor tactics on the part of the NVA, coupled with the effective
use by the South Vietnamese of numerous antitank weapons, could
offset this advantage as occurred in 1972.
46. The South Vietnamese artillery units, among RVNAF's
best combat forces, have a large numerical edge in artillery with
more than 1,600 155mm and 105mm artillery howitzers plus 74 175mm
field guns. The use of their howitzers gives RVNAF effective close
ground support, although during an NVA offensive they could be
handicapped by resupply constraints. The North Vietnamese are
estimated to have some 350 122mm and 130mm artillery pieces with
fewer supply constraints. Because they have fewer howitzers than
the GVN, however, the Communists must rely more on mortars and
rockets for their ground support..
47. There are several factors which at least partly offsets
the RVNAF's numerical artillery advantage. For example, the
Communists have more long-range artillery than the GVN; and
the 122mm and 130mm field guns are superior to the 175mm with
respect to accuracy, rate of fire, and maintenance requirements.
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In addition, many of the North Vietnamese AAA forces, particularly
in northern MR 1, are also trained to use their guns in a ground
support role. South Vietnamese combat units are located in fixed
positions on key terrain features which would give Communist.
artillerymen the opportunity to concentrate their long-range
field guns on these positions. Such a concentration of firepower
might permit the North Vietnamese to initially achieve significant
tactical and territorial gains.
48. The South Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) is capable of
significantly augmenting GVN ground firepower in many areas of
the country. Currently, VNAF has attack aircraft with jet
and propeller aircraft -- which can be used for tactical
support. These planes are capable of flying about two-thirds
of the monthly number of close air support sorties flown by
the US and South Vietnamese during the 1972 offensive.
49. To counter this advantage in the air, the North
Vietnamese have built up within South Vietnam their most
:formidable air defense structure of the war. This structure
currently consists of 26 regiments (25 AAA and one SAM) and
25,000 men. There are 21 regiments in MR 1, at least three
in western MR 2, and two in northern MR 3. The AAA weapons
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provided to these regiments range up to 100mm in. caliber. This
force represents a serious threat to VNAF which has been reluctant
to operate near concentrated North Vietnamese air defense positions.
50. North Vietnam also has the ability to conduct air
operations in MR 1 to achieve air superiority there. Currently,
Hanoi has some 200 jet fighters capable of such operations, although
only about one-fifth of these could be committed on a sustained
basis. These planes could be staged from any of the five air-
fields currently capable of handling jet aircraft in the North
Vietnamese Panhandle.* Aircraft flown from the southernmost
airfield at Dong Hoi in Quang Binh Province, North Vietnam,
however, would greatly reduce the South Vietnamese warning and
reaction times and give the North Vietnamese aircraft maximum
time over target.
51. In the event Hanoi did commit its aircraft to the South,
the North Vietnamese air force would be particularly strong in
air-to-air combat. They have experienced pilots, along with
high quality radar and air controllers. In terms of providing
close air support, however, the North Vietnamese pilots are
The' airfield at Khe' Sanh in western Quang Tri Province, South
Vietnam, could be made available as an emergency recovery base,
but it is not presently capable of sustaining jet aircraft
operations.
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inexperienced, and probably would encounter problems coordinating
attack operations with ground units.
52. In contrast, the South Vietnamese pilots are highly
qualified in close air support operations but have no air-to-air
combat experience. VNAF has had no combat experience in ground
control intercept operations and its skill at actual intercept
operations is probably marginal. VNAF also would have difficulty
in a ground attack role in Northern MR 1, given the proliferation
of AAA weapons and SA-2 missiles there. Except for the AC-119
gunship, VNAF aircraft are not equipped with radar homing and
warning equipment and have no jamming capability against
electronically-controlled AAA guns and SA-2 missiles.
53. VNAF air-to-air capabilities, however, will be improved
somewhat this spring. In March, the first shipments of the
higher performance F5E jet aircraft will begin to arrive as
replacements for the F5A, and the first squadron of F5Es will
be activated in May. The F5E is a faster, more-maneuverable
aircraft than the FSA, with improved electronics equipment and
greater range or bomb load capacity. VNAF's main problems,
however, will continue to be the lack of trained, combat-
experienced pilots, plus the lack of sufficient ground support
equipment.
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STATUS OF NORTH VIETNAMESE AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE
INFANTRY DIVISIONS
North Vietnamese Infantry Divisions
NVA First Division
1. The division has operated along the Cambodian border
in the provinces of Chau Doc and Kien Giang of Military Region
(MR) 4 since the 1972 offensive. Its primary mission is to
secure infiltration corridors leading into the Delta from
Cambodia. In 1973, however, two of its three regiments
apparently were disbanded. The remaining regiment continues
to operate in Kien Giang Province. The division no longer
represents a serious threat to GVN forces as only one regiment
is considered combat effective.
NVA Second Division
2. The operating area of the division has been Quang Ngai
:Province of MR 1 since mid-1972. The division last summer
resubordinated a regiment to the 711th Division in Quang Tin
Province and another regiment to the 3rd NVA Division in MR 2.
The 2nd division is now combat ineffective and has only one
regiment which operates south of Quang Ngai City.
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NVA Third Division
3. Binh Dinh Province of MR 2 has been the division's
traditional. operating area. Because of heavy combat losses
during the 1972 offensive, a regiment of the division was
disbanded in mid-1973 and replaced by a regiment from the 2nd
NVA Division in MR 1. The division is now resting and refitting
its three understrength regiments in northwest Binh Dinh Province
and is reported. to be having serious morale problems.
NVA Fifth Division
4. The division which has historically operated in MR 3
moved to Dinh Tuong Province of MR 4 where it operated from
mid-1972 to April 1973 before before returning to Tay Ninh
Province in MR 3. Since that time it has been resting and
refitting, and at the same time, attempting to secure Communist
territory in southern Tay Ninh Province. The division poses a
threat to Tay Ninh City and GVN-controlled areas near Routes 1
and 22. There are tenuous indications that some units of the
division may be returning to Dinh Tuong Province. The current
strength of the division; is about 70 percent of peak 1972 levels
.and it will require additional replacement personnel before it
is capable of major offensive activity.
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NVA Seventh Division
5. The 7th Division has been resting and refitting in
Northern MR 3 since the cease-fire and its units are estimated
to be about 90 percent of peak 1972 levels. The mission of the
division is to protect Communist-controlled territory near Route
13 in Binh Duong Province, and attack targets in GVN areas. Since
the cease-fire, heavy artillery weapons and tanks have been
dispatched from North Vietnam to the division's operating area
providing its units with greater firepower support than in 1972.
The division represents a major threat to GVN forces and positions
north of the capital. The division should be capable of conducting
major sustained offensive activity by April.
NVA Ninth Division
6. The division currently operates in western Binh Duong
Province in MR 3, and like the 5th and 7th, has not seen major
combat activity,for more than a year. It was refitted in 1973
and its combat strength is now near peak offensive levels and
represents a major threat to the northern approaches to Saigon.
The division's combat capability also has been enhanced by the
deployment of additional armor and heavy artillery to its area
of operations in 1973.
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NVA Tenth Division
7. The 10th Division was organized in late 1972 in
Kontum Province of MR 2 from formerly independent combat
regiments operating under the NVA B-3 Front. The division
has successfully countered GVN thrusts into Communist territory
north of Kontum City since August and September. It is now
only about 60 percent of normal strength levels, and it has
been conducting training to upgrade the quality of its personnel.
8. This division has a long history of combat in South
Vietnam and is currently deployed in western Quang Tri Province
of MR 1. It has not seen combat since November 1972. Its
primary mission is to maintain control of Communist-occupied
territory north'of the Thach Han River to include Khe Sanh
airfield and North Vietnamese logistics facilities along Route 9.
Combat units of the division have conducted extensive training
for the past year and are now probably at full strength.
addition, the problems of poor leadership and morale -- which
were common in late 1972 -- have probably been alleviated as a
result of the division's extended respite from combat.
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NVA 320th Division
9. The 320th Division is located in western Pleiku Province
of MR 2 and is threatening GVN forces near Pleiku City. In
recent months major elements of the division have been defending
against GVN operations into western Pleiku Province. The division
is combat-effective, but its regiments are understrength. In
1972 the division was not effective in the battle for Kontum City
because of poor command and control procedures within combat units
and inexperienced cadre at the company level. Since the cease-fire
the division has conducted extensive training in its base area near
the Laos/Cambodia border and the quality of cadre leadership
and unit morale has probably improved.
10. The 324B Division is one of the most combat-experienced
divisions in the'North Vietnamese Army. The division experienced
r
continuous combat for a period of seven months in 1972 while
attacking GVN military positions west of Hue City. Since the cease-
fire, the division has been resting and refitting in western
Thua Thien Province and is now estimated to be at full strength.
Concurrently it has been conducting an extensive reconnaissance
of GVN military installations in the coastal lowlands of the
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province. The division now controls two artillery and five
infantry regiments in Thua Thien Province -- the largest combat
force of the war west of Hue. Its mission in recent months has
been to secure Communist-controlled territory in western Thua
Thien Province and open infiltration routes into the coastal
lowlands.
11, The 325th Division is located in northeastern Quang
Tri Province of MR 1. The division's mission is to provide
security for Dong Ha City, the Cua Viet logistics complex, and
maintain an active reconnaissance of GVN military activity near
Quang Tri City. The division has not experienced combat activity
for more than a year and is at full strength. The 325th Division
successfully defended the Cua Viet and Thach Han river lines
against heavy attacks by the elite airborne and marine divisions
in late 1972. A
NVA 711th Division
12. The division -- near full strength -- operates in Quang
Tin Province of MR 1 with the mission of protecting Communist
logistics facilities and infiltration routes southwest of Danang
City. In early 1973, units of the division were suffering from
personnel shortages, morale, and leadership problems. Consequently,
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one regiment was deactivated and a regiment of the 2nd NVA
Division was resubordinated to the division in mid-1973. The
division has been resting, refitting, and conducting extensive
training for more than a year, and is now considered combat-
effective.
South Vietnamese Infantry Divisions
ARVN First Division
13. The division is primarily responsible for defending
GVN--controlled territory west of Hue City. Although the division
is considered combat-effective, two of its four infantry regiments
have experienced high manpower losses in recent months because of
malaria and some combat activity. The current shortage of
experienced leadership in the division is being corrected by the
implementation of battalion and company level refresher training
programs. The ist Division is one of the best ARVN divisions.
14. The current mission of the division is to maintain
security in GVN-conttolled areas of Quang Tin and Quang Ngai
Provinces and to deny the Communists access to Quang Ngai City.
Territorial forces and ranger units have been upgraded to operate
with the division's infantry regiments improving the defense of
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the populated lowlands. Since the cease-fire, the division has
eliminated pockets of Communist resistance in the lowlands and
some resettlement of the population has taken place. Concur-
rently, infantry battalions have been rotated for refresher
training and the division is considered combat-effective.
15. The division has largely recovered from its April 1972
debacle in Quang Tri Province of MR 1. In the fall of 1972 it
successfully recaptured from the Communists extensive territory
in the populated lowlands of Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces.
The division's current task is to provide security for major
population centers near Danang City and to protect principal
ARVN installations and supply lines. For more than a year,
combat activity has been exceptionally low, contributing to
high morale among division personnel and a significant improve-
ment in the strength of combat units.
ARVN Fifth Division
16. The division is only marginally combat-effective. It
has sustai.necz Heavy combat losses in attempting to reopen Routes
13 and 1A in Binh Duong Province of MR 3 last summer and serious
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morale problems continue. Currently, the 5th Division commander
is attempting to reorganize understrength units and improve the
division?s combat effectiveness. The division is in a defensive
posture and deployed in base camps astride Routes 13 and 1A.
March the division will be withdrawn to Saigon for rest and will
be replaced by the ARVN 18th Division.
ARV2V Seventh Division
17. The 7th Division is deployed in Dinh Tuong Province of
MR 4 with the mission of protecting GVN installations and popu-
lated areas along Route 4 between My Tho and Sa Dec.cities. In
recent months, the division has successfully executed several
combat operations near traditional Communist infiltration routes
and base areas in Dinh Tuong and Kien Tuong Provinces. The
division is well led, highly mobile, and is the most effective
combat unit in MR 4. However, the constant combat of recent
months has caused a desertion problem in the division.
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18. The 9th Division is primarily responsible for interdicting
Communist infiltration routes from Cambodia through the delta
provinces of Chau Doc, Kien Giang, and Chuong Tien. The
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division is now slightly understrength because of desertions
.and personnel replacement problems. The Joint General Staff
has designated the division as part of the General Reserve which
will move to MR 3 if the Communists launch an offensive.
ARVN 18th Division
19. The 18th Division has developed into the best MR 3
unit. It has primary responsibility for defending populated
areas and GVN lines of communication north of Saigon.. In March
the division will replace the ARVN 5th Division in Binh Duong
Province and have the mission of opening Route 13 to Binh Long
Province. Morale is high in the division and its units are
known to have a good rapport with the local population. Moreover,
the division is overstrength and recently was ordered to discon-
tinue recruiting. There has been an increase in security
because of its aggressive combat operations in conjunction with
territorial forces. The division possesses good leadership and
conducts regular rotational training of all combat units.
ARVN 21st Division
20. The division is deployed in Chuong Thien Province of
SCR 4 with the mission of protecting populated areas in the
southern delta. Although its operating area has been reduced and
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reinforced by territorial forces, the division continues to be
the weakest of the three GVN divisions in MR 4. It has not
made significant progress in opening new territory for resettlement
or closing Communist supply and infiltration routes. The division
continues to be characterized by poor leadership at all levels
of command.
21. The traditional area of operation for the division is
in Binh Dinh Province where it was soundly defeated by the 3rd
NVA Division in the opening phase of the 1972 offensive. The
division recovered, however, and by the time of the cease-fire
it had recaptured most of its lost territory. The division is
now deployed in Kontum and Pleiku Provinces where it has primary
responsibility for defending the provincial capitals. For the
past few months, the division, reinforced by rangers and
territorial forces, has been unsuccessful in its operations into
Communist base areas in the two provinces. The operations have
been costly in terms of manpower losses: two regiments are now
considered only marginally combat-effective.
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22. The division is now operating in Quang Duc and
Darlac Provinces of MR 2 and has the mission of conducting
operations against Communist base areas along the Cambodia/
South Vietnam border. The former operating area of the division
was Kontum and Pleiku Provinces where it successfully recaptured
Trung Nghia in the fall of 1973. Its overall combat performance
since the cease-fire, however, has been marginally effective
because of continuous combat and a high number of desertions.
ARVN 25th Division
23. The division is currently at full strength and has
the mission of defending Tay Ninh City and protecting Routes 22
and 1 to Saigon. The 25th Division is augmented by territorial.
forces and this combined force proved to be highly effective
during the 1972 offensive. The division is now undergoing
extensive training to improve the quality of its personnel and
to overcome its poor reputation in the field.
Airborne Division
24. The Airborne Division is regarded as one of the GVN's
most effective divisions. Although the division has been deployed
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in MR 1 since April 1972, it continues to be part of the JGS
General Reserve. Since the cease-fire Airborne units have
assumed a static defensive posture in Thua Thien Province. The
division has some morale problems because of economic hardships
faced by families of division personnel living in the distant
Saigon-Bien Hoa area. This situation has been alleviated somewhat
by rotating division personnel to Saigon, thereby providing
troops with an opportunity to see their families. Individual
and unit refresher training is conducted on a regular basis and
unit manning levels are 98 percent manned.
Marine Division
25. The Marine Division has distinguished itself as a
highly motivated, well-disciplined, and aggressively-led combat
unit. Although still part of the JGS General Reserve, the
division represents the GVN's main line of defense in Quang Tri
Province of MR 1. Combat units of the division, supported by
territorial forces, are defending Quang Tri City and the coastal
lowlands of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. Despite its
defensive mission, the division has maintained excellent troop
morale because of refresher training programs, frequent rotation
of units to Saigon, and effective civic action programs within
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populated areas. Current manning levels have surpassed
authorized levels and recruiting has been temporarily suspended.
Ranger Command
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26. A two-phase plan for the reorganization of ranger units
was completed in January. The Ranger Command now has 15 ranger
groups, 12 groups are permanently assigned to operate in MRs 1,
2, and 3 while the 3 remaining groups have been designated part
of the JGS General Reserve. They augment GVN forces in the
military regions and have the specific mission of operating
on the fringes of GVN-controlled areas where they attempt to
interdict Communist infiltration routes. The combat performance
of many ranger units has been less than satisfactory because of
a lack of equipment and poor training. To alleviate these problems,
a concerted effort is underway to improve individual and unit
training.
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