PROPOSED MESSAGE TO THE CHINESE CONCERNING A POSSIBLE NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFENSIVE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01099A000100020004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 21, 2000
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 19, 1973
• Content Type: MF

.i - I 5ECRET/S NSmVE
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
19 November 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
SUBJECT ; Proposed Message to the Chinese Concerning
a Possible North Vietnamese Offensive
1. As you requested during our conversation on Saturday,
17 November, we have drafted the attached note which -- if you so
desire -- could be sent to the Chinese as an indication of our concern
about what the North Vietnamese are doing and what their behavior
suggests they may be planning.
25X1 B
AVE. Colby
Director
Attachment
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19 November 1973
DRAFT MESSAGE FROM DR. KISSINGER TO THE PEOPLE' S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA
1. The United States Government is deeply concerned over what
it sees as unmistakable signs of North Vietnamese preparations to resume
armed conflict on a large scale in South Vietnam. The United States
regards the present situation with the utmost seriousness, and cannot
stand idly by if North Vietnam continues its present activities.
2. The following evidence has convinced the United States Govern-
ment that North Vietnam is in fact preparing to launch a major offensive.
(On each point below, the evidence is strong and is fully accepted by us.)
(a) The North Vietnamese have sent more than 22, 000 military
personnel south since 1 September of this year to strengthen their armed
forces in South Vietnam and adjacent border areas. Since 1 January 1973
they have sent a total of over 75, 000 troops to the south.
(b) the North Vietnamese
are planning to send almost an equal number of additional troops into
various parts of South Vietnam during the 1973-1974 dry season -- starting
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in December 1973. We can see no reason why Hanoi would plan to dispatch
these additional troops to South Vietnam, in complete violation of the
Paris Agreement and Protocols, except to assemble the manpower and
reserves necessary to launch a major military offensive.
(c) The North Vietnamese have moved into South Vietnam and
adjacent border areas enough stocks of munitions and military equipment
to sustain heavy combat activity for at least eight months. (Some of these
stockpiles were already in position when the Paris Agreement was signed
last January, but they have been greatly expanded since that time.) They
are now preparing -- as the weather improves in. southern Laos -- to
bring still more munitions and military equipment into South Vietnam.
(d) As of mid-November, North Vietnamese Army units in
all of southern Laos were preparing to move large quantities of war
materiel further south. Such activity, as well as the very presence of
North Vietnamese military units in Laos, is a clear violation of the Paris
Agreement.
(e) The North Vietnamese have augmented their logistic
forces in northern South Vietnam by some 15, 000 men in recent months.
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They would not need these logistic forces unless they planned to expand
the support to their combat units in this area.
(f) The North Vietnamese are making major improvements
on roads in southern Laos, and have nearly completed a parallel road
from North Vietnam through western South Vietnam from the DMZ to South
Vietnam's Military Region 3. These two road nets have no discernible
civilian purpose but they obviously make it much easier for the North
Vietnamese to prepare for and support an offensive than was previously
the case.
(g) The measures which the North Vietnamese are now taking
can be compared with those they took in the months prior to March 1972,
when they launched their last offensive. North Vietnam's military capa-
bilities in the south are now at least as great as they were at the end of
March 1972, and in some areas they are greater. The South Vietnamese
government since that time has also improved its capabilities, and would
be in a better position to withstand a North Vietnamese offensive without
U. S. air support. Under a heavy North Vietnamese attack, however, U. S.
air support might again prove necessary.
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(h) It is impossible to read this North Vietnamese buildup
as prudential, as a response to South Vietnamese provocations, or
indeed as anything but preparation for major North Vietnamese offensive
action.
STATINTL
(i) Finally,
the North Vietnamese and the
so-called "Provisional Revolutionary Government" plan to begin a major
offensive within the next few months.
3. In addition to the evidence above, we have in recent months
received repeated reports that new artillery pieces, tanks and other armored
vehicles have been observed at various points inside North Vietnam along
the major rail lines from China. These reports are of great concern to us
because if true they would indicate that North Vietnam is receiving additional
military equipment from China and the Soviet Union.
4. [There should probably be a final paragraph indicating or
hinting that the U. S. might have to take certain actions in response to
the above-listed North Vietnamese activities .J
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