YUGOSLAVIA: AN INTELLIGENCE APPRAISAL (IN RESPONSE TO NSSM 129)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01095A001300010009-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 94
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: July 27, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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YUGOSLA VIA:
An Intelligence Appraisal
(In Response to NSSM 129)
Prepared by the Office of National Estimates, CIA,
Representatives of the Intelligence Community
Concurring in its Major Judgments
27 July 1971
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CONTENTS
PAGE
PRINCIPAL OBSERVATIONS ?,,,,,OepO ?
I. INTRODUCTION..,.
II. THE-YUGOSLAV SYSTEM ON',THE THRESHOLD OF THE SUCCESSION
The Political System.. ,,?o?, 3
Economic Policy and Problems ........... ..... 7
Foreign Policy ................... .. ... . 10
Defense Policy ................... ?..?.... 20
III. PRINCIPAL INTERNAL FACTORS WHICH WILL AFFECT FUTURE
DEVELOPMENTS......, ......o ........ .......?.?.....,.. 25
The Nationalities Problem,,,,,,,,,,,,, 25
The Economy..,.... ,,,,,,,,,, ,,,?..,. ..... 31
The Army and the Party...,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 34
Dissident Elements,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 37
IV. MAJOR EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,Q,,,,,,,,, 39
The USSR... .m . ........ ...... .............. ?? 39
The Communist Countries ....... ......... 50
Western . Europe..,... ............................. 53
V. THE FUTURE, SOME ALTERNATIVES, AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS,.. 59
Key Variables.. ? OP....
Domestic Alternatives,,,,,,,,,,,,,
59
62
A. A United, Independent, and Non-Aligned Yugoslavia.. 63
B. A Divided, Independent, Non-Aligned Yugoslavia..... 65
C. A Disintegrating Yugoslavia: A Military Coup...,.. 67
Contingency 1: Rapid Takeover,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 67
Contingency 2: A Difficult Takeover,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 69
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CONTENTS
(continued)
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D. A Disintegrating Yugoslavia: Collapse .............. 70
Contingency l: Contested Secession ................. 70
Contingency 2: Total Disintegration ................ 71
ANNEX A: YUGOSLAV MILITARY CAPABILITIES
ANNEX B: SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES VIS-A-VIS YUGOSLAVIA
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27 July 1971
YUGOSLAVIA: AN INTELLIGENCE APPRAISAL
PRINCIPAL OBSERVATIONS
A. Yugoslavia has moved deep into a difficult transition. Its
politics, responding to the passage from a closed to an almost-open
system, have begun to shift into new patterns. Its economy, still
moving away from bureaucratic Socialist controls and toward a radical
decentralization of authority, faces an accumulation of problems. Its
foreign policies, once firmly non-aligned but ideologically sympathetic
to the East, are moving toward greater contact with the West. And its
leadership, completely and overwhelmingly dominated by Tito since the
mid-1940s, is now anxiously trying to prepare -- under his tutelage for the day when he will no longer be there.
B. The principal question is, can Yugoslavia survive as a single
state without Tito? Bitter national antagonisms -- between Serb and
Croat, between Serb and Albanian, and so forth -- and strong regional
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rivalries and resentments -- between, for example, rich Slovenia and
poor Macedonia -- are once again vigorously expressing themselves.
Inflation, foreign trade deficits, unemployment, and economic disagree-
ments between individual republics are all on the rise. And, in the
face of these problems, the principal national power centers, the top
command of the Communist Party (LCY) and the federal government in
Belgrade, sometimes appear to be indecisive. The future of Yugoslavia
without Tito thus appears, at the least, to be uncertain.
C. Still, there is a strength and a national will in Yugoslavia
which held the state together in the past and which promises much for
the future. And Tito is currently using all his awesome moral authority
in his efforts to preserve the peculiar Yugoslav system. He is trying
to anchor the system in law, in institutions, and in traditions. He is
pushing the development of a constitutional structure of political con-
trol and of an orderly transition to it, even before his departure. He
is seeking means to encourage the lawful expression of regional and
republican interests and to reinforce a pattern of political and economic
compromise. He is trying to persuade the army, as a truly national
institution, to play an implicitly restraining role in domestic politics
and to serve, if necessary, as the ultimate guarantor of federal integrity.
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And he is attempting to set the country on an international course which
will help to ensure national unity at home and preserve national security
abroad.
D. In the minds of most Yugoslavs, it is still the Soviet Union
which constitutes the most menacing threat to that security. And, in
Tito's mind, it is still this threat which provides Yugoslavia with its
greatest incentive for remaining a single, cohesive state. This was not
the case a few years ago, when Tito -- alarmed by a number of developments
in the Middle East and elsewhere -- perceived a growing threat from the
West and sought to maintain especially good relations with Moscow. But
the USSR's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 seems to have ended with
finality Tito,'s long-cherished desire for a reconciliation with the USSR.
Gone, apparently, are the old hopes for enlightened Soviet behavior and
for an eventual union of Soviet and Titoist doctrine on essentially
Yugoslav terms. Largely gone too, apparently, are the old fears and
suspicions of Western Europe (ever more Yugoslavia's major trading part-
ner) and of-the United States.
E. In consequence of this -- and because Moscow characteristically
persists in meddling in Yugoslav affairs -- Soviet-Yugoslav relations
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are strained. The Soviets have not, however, reverted to harsh or hostile
.policies, in part perhaps because the Brezhnev leadership realizes that,
at least so long as Tito is active, Yugoslavia cannot be intimidated (or
seduced) into a return to the Bloc., There are, of course, many reasons
why Moscow would greatly welcome such a return. But there are also many
constraints on its willingness and ability to bring it'about: Yugoslavia
no longer represents a vital Soviet national concern (as, for example,
the other East European Communist states still do); the means available
to the Soviets to further their interests in Yugoslavia are in any case
quite limited; the use of military pressures would be likely only to
strengthen Yugoslav national unity and resolve; the actual employment of
military force would in all likelihood encounter Yugoslav armed resist-
ance, which might endure in guerrilla actions for quite some time; and
an invasion of Yugoslavia, even if successful, would severely damage a
wide variety of Soviet interests elsewhere -- vis-a-vis both the United
States and China and in Western Europe.
F. It does not seem likely, then, that the Soviets will move
militarily against Yugoslavia. But the threat of this will no doubt
continue, and it could become acute if post-Tito Yugoslavia were to be
engulfed by internal disorder. The Yugoslav system will, in fact, remain
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unsettled and threats of serious. disruptions will persist into the
indefinite future. But there is a good chance that over the long term
a sense of common purpose, buttressed by a sense of common peril, will
enable the hybrid Yugoslav system to survive essentially intact, even
without Tito.
G. There is, however, a great array of variables which will bear
on the course of Yugoslav national development, some international,
others domestic. It is thus possible to construct a variety of futures
for Yugoslavia, in addition to the one perceived above as the most likely.
The country could begin to disintegrate and be saved only by a military
coup; or it could fall apart and descend into civil war; or it could
split into two or more parts, each seeking support, including military
support, from abroad. These and other contingencies are discussed in
Section V of this paper. But whatever the eventuality, it is clear that
the West and.the United States will have a critical role to play in
Yugoslavia's future. Belgrade's economic ties are now predominantly
with the West, its political and cultural views are increasingly shaped
by Western concepts, and its national security is at least indirectly
dependent on Western strength and resolve vis-a-vis the USSR.
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I. INTRODUCTION
1. Yugoslavia is a country with a painful history and a troubled
present. Its society is diverse, its economy backward, its location un-
fortunate. Its political system lacks tradition, rejects the precepts
of both East and West, and moves in uncertain directions. And now time
is running out for Tito, the one remarkable man who has held the country
together for the past 26 years.
2. But it is not all a litany of woe. Yugoslavia has, in fact,
achieved a certain strength through adversity. The Tito regime has sur-
vived great external pressures and much domestic disarray. It has moved
into new areas of political action and social thought, has substantially
improved the economic well-being of most of the population, and has al-
most entirely abandoned fear and repression as instruments of rule.
Finally, it has won for Yugoslavia a position of international influence
and respect and even security far greater than its size and place in the
world would seem to justify.
3. But what of the uncertain future? Some deep-seated and bitter
national antagonisms are once again emerging and finding ways to express
themselves on the political scene. Relations with the Soviet Bloc are
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becoming increasingly uneasy. Will a sense of common purpose and of
common peril endure without Tito? Will Yugoslavia unity and courage
persist in the event of renewed threats from the Soviet Union? Will,
in fact, Yugoslavia outlive Tito?
II. THE YUGOSLAV SYSTEM ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE SUCCESSION PERIOD
4. For more than 20 years the Yugoslavs have been feeling their
way toward the establishment of a truly federal decentralized Socialist
state, gradually discarding some of the more doctrinaire tenets of
communism in favor of a freer, more open system. The process has re-
cently been accelerated by an awareness that the succession process
must be institutionalized and the major features of the reforms enshrined
in constitutional law if chaos is to be avoided when Tito leaves the
scene.
5. The social system which Belgrade has been building -- and
which it has labeled "self-management" -- is incredibly complex. Many
of its features -- including those still in the planning stage -- have
no parallel or historical precedent in political or economic practice
anywhere else in the world. The Yugoslavs themselves do not seem to
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have any very clear idea of where they are heading. The room for confusion
and error is thus great, and judgments concerning the evolution and viability
of the Yugoslav experiment must thus be conditional.
The Political System
6. Decentralization is the key feature of the Yugoslav political
system. The country is moving toward a loose federation of nearly auton-
omous republics with the authority of the central government restricted
mainly to conducting foreign policy, providing for national defense, regu-
lating and maintaining a "unified national market", channeling funds from
the richer to the poorer areas, and arbitrating regional disputes. All
other functions and responsibilities -- together with control of the bulk
of the nation's material resources -- will be surrendered.
7. Decentralization -- and a parallel increase in the authority of
elective organs of government -- goes far beyond a flat transfer of power
from Belgrade to the republican capitals. Tito's blueprint also requires
the exercise of considerable autonomy -- backed by adequate independent
financial resources -- at the local level, i.e., at the level of the munic-
ipality (opstina) and of the individual economic enterprise or institution.
Increased efficiency is not the only objective. Belgrade clearly hopes
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that the proliferation of decisionmaking centers -- and their interplay
within and across republican boundaries -- will dilute the power of the
republics and blur current regional and national disputes.
8. Organized pluralism -- the participation of regional organs,
federal bodies, and various interest groups (youth, labor, professional,
and economic) in the process of government -- was introduced as an indis-
pensable element in the self-management system in the early 1950s. This
development has been accompanied by and contributed to a liberalization
of the political climate in Yugoslavia, including a remarkable expansion
of freedom of speech and of the press and a distinct curtailment of
police powers. Yugoslav pluralism is still subject to many shortcomings
-- such as inadequate representation of peasant interests -- and still
functions under clear restraints. But the trend has gathered considerable
momentum and -- short of major political upheavals in the wake of Tito's
passing -- seems unlikely to be reversed. The long-term consequences of
this cannot be finely calculated, in Belgrade or elsewhere, though cer-
tainly it is safe to say that the passage from a conventionally totali-
tarian Communist system to a hybrid form of Socialist pluralism will not
be an easy one. At a minimum, the central authorities will continue to
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be taxed with the problem of accommodating powerful divergent interests
without, in the process, allowing the expression of these interests to
intensify regional animosities and threaten the very existence of the
federal system.
9. Tito is of course aware of this sort of problem, recognizes
that the greatest test of the system may occur in the aftermath of his
departure, and thus is determined to prevent a crisis of succession.
He has effected sweeping organizational changes and has provided for
the devolution of his enormous personal power to collective bodies com-
posed of highly qualified republican leaders who seem to be dedicated
to Yugoslavia's current course. By bringing the "barons" to Belgrade
and by bolstering the power of the collective presidency in relation to
Yugoslavia's increasingly free-wheeling Parliament, he hopes to mute the
inter-republican squabbling which reached such alarming proportions
during the opening months of 1971. To supplement these moves, he has
sought enactment of an array of additional statutory safeguards designed
both to restrain personal ambitions and to contain regional rivalries.
The key elements in this program include strict limitations of tenure
in high office, equal representation for the republics in certain impor-
tant bodies, and an almost check-and-balance division of authority both
within and outside the governmental structure.
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10. Obviously Tito's personal commitment to the current political
program has been crucial. Few people in or outside the country doubt
Tito's singular ability to decree important domestic political changes,
And standing well above the diverse ethnic groups as a kind of living
national monument, Tito can suggest, or enforce, key personnel transfers
or other modifications without rousing widespread suspicion that his
ideas are prompted by any consideration other than the common good. But
Tito's will be an extraordinary hard act to follow. His prior endorse-
ment of the emerging succession arrangements will surely carry some weight
even after he is gone. But precisely how much, and in what practical
detail, cannot now be said.
11. Even now, decentralization and the beginnings of a constitutionally-
grounded rule of law have raised major problems with respect to the role
and internal dynamics of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY),
which has remained the locus of power in Yugoslavia. In conformity with
the spirit of the times, the LCY has become something approaching a fed-
eration of nine relatively autonomous party organizations: six republi-
can plus -- on a slightly lower plane -- two provincial and the military.
On the other hand, while the LCY has long since renounced a "commanding
role" in Yugoslav society, Belgrade firmly intends to have it exercise a
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central "guiding role" for a long time to come. This, in turn, will
require the central authorities to set the line on broad policy issues
and exercise sufficient authority over regional party organizations to
insure that independent behavior does not undermine the League's ability
to function as a badly-needed national unifying force. Clarification
of the limits of republican and provincial party autonomy awaits discus-
sion at a National Party Conference this fall.
Economic Policy and Problems
12. Belgrade's efforts to reform the Yugoslav economy, stalled off
and on during the 1960s, are again moving in high gear. The system
described as workers' self-management remains the core of the Yugoslav
With a per capita gross national product (GNP) estimated at about $860
in 1970, Yugoslavia has one of the Least developed European economies
-- about on a par with Greece, considerably Less than that of Romania
($1,140) and Bulgaria ($1,300), and about one-half that of Italy.
Yugoslavia's six republics and two autonomous provinces present sharp
contrasts in Level of development. The per capita GNP in Slovenia,
the richest republic, is about $1,550 -- i.e., five times higher than
that in the autonomous province of Kosovo, the most backward area.
Industrial output increased at an annual average of 8.7 percent be-
tween 1950 and 1968 while GNP -- held back by the erratic year-to-year
performance of agriculture -- grew at a rate of about 5.5 percent.
Yugoslavia's economic reforms have gradually oriented the country
toward Western markets. Last year, about 57 percent of Yugoslav trade
was conducted with Western Europe and another 6 percent with the United
States. The share of the Soviet Bloc was a little less than 25 percent.
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program. This system is bewilderingly complex, but, as in the political
field, decentralization is the key element. By giving local administra-
tions and individual firms and -- through the Workers' Councils -- the
labor forces greater authority over their own affairs, and providing
them with a growing opportunity to reap the rewards of their own enter-
prise, the regime hopes to promote efficiency, modernization, and long-
term growth. It also hopes to make Yugoslav products competitive in
world markets.
13. In the period from 1965 to 1967, Yugoslavia restructured and
liberalized its price and foreign trade systems, increased the invest-
ment role of enterprises and banks, and became the first Communist coun-
try to permit foreign investment. These measures stimulated the play
of market forces and. helped to shift Yugoslavia's pattern of trade far-
ther away from clearing account transactions with members of the Soviet
Bloc and toward the West. For the next three years, however, progress
in liberalizing the system had to be postponed because of growing infla-
tionary pressures and other difficulties.
14. Reform talk began again in the fall of 1970. The government
decided to make further changes in the economic system a part of the
proposed package of Constitutional Amendments affecting the organization
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and powers of the federal government. Now adopted after lengthy debate,
the new provisions are designed to move Yugoslavia farther toward a
Socialist market economy. The direct economic role of the federal govern-
ment has been further reduced in favor of the republics and local govern-
ments. Federal funds -- and taxation powers -- have been sharply curtailed.
The central authorities will continue to channel money to the under-
developed regions, but direct federal investment is to be phased out
completely. In addition, the new reforms specifically provide for the
protection and gradual expansion of the private sector of the economy.
All told, these changes have created a much freer system -- and one that
is much harder to control.
15. This latter point is important, for the Yugoslavs are still
in the midst of one of their recurrent bouts with inflation, and with
the balance of payments problem -- both the result of efforts to sus-
tain rapid rates of growth, and unemployment. In 1970, the cost of
living rose by 11 percent, and the hard currency trade deficit climbed
to a record $1.1 billion. The balance of payments deficit reached $388
million despite an unexpected increase of nearly $300 million in remit-
tances from Yugoslavs in other countries, Total unemployment stood at
9 percent even though more than 750 thousand workers were working abroad.
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And the situation did not improve during the opening months of 1971.
By the end of May, the cost of living was rising at an annual rate of
13 percent and the hard currency deficit was running at nearly twice
the 1970 level.
16. Although living standards throughout Yugoslavia have continued
to rise, the gap between the richer northwestern regions and the poorer
southeastern areas has tended to widen. While some improvement has
been recorded over the past two years, the per capita national income
of the less developed republics and provinces -- Macedonia, Montenegro,
Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Kosovo -- fell from two-thirds that of the more
developed parts of the country in 1947 to little more than half in 1968.
There is also a gross disparity in regional unemployment rates.
Unemployment in Kosovo in mid-1970, for example, was 26.7 percent, or
about eight times that in Slovenia. Partly as a result of the revival
of old nationalistic stirrings, the poorer republics have become increas-
ingly aware of their backwardness and bitter about progress in the north.
Foreign Policy
17. In an uncertain fight for survival with the East, yet deeply
suspicious of Western intentions and hostile to Western ideology, Tito
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and his colleagues began in 1949 to forge a peculiar Yugoslav approach
to foreign policy. By the mid-1950s, they had rejected passive neutral-
ity, of the kind practiced by the Swiss, and were seeking instead to
play a leading international role. At the same time, they refused to
associate themselves formally with any of the great powers. Thus
Yugoslavia, while it would not align itself with any one state, would
pursue "active coexistence" with all. And thus Yugoslvaia, a small,
backward, and vulnerable country, lying between two great hostile camps
-- and following domestic economic and political practices disliked by
both -- would stress certain elevated principles of international con-
duct: the obligations of the rich countries toward the poor; the
sovereignty and equality of all states; the right of each state to con-
duct its own affairs without interference from abroad; and the inadmis-
sibility of the use of force in interstate relations.
18. In time, as the Yugoslavs, with Western help, overcame threats
to their survival and began to develop specific lines of foreign policy,
Tito discovered common cause with the leaders of other non-aligned states
and entered upon a career as a distinguished senior statesman. By the
mid-1950s, Yugoslavia found itself courted by both East and West, admired
by most of the Third World, and accepted by the world at large as an
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influential member of the international community. The Yugoslavs (and
Tito) were immensely pleased by all this and were inclined to view it
as vindication of their views and, perhaps, as confirmation of their
superior moral stature as well. In any case, Yugoslavia's effective
emphasis on Third World politics and on independence vis-a-vis both the
USSR and the United States unquestionably promoted a sense of national
pride and cohesion. This was especially useful to the regime in the
early 1960s because the primary spur to unity -- fear of the USSR --
was then fast receding.
19. There have of course been elements of delusion in Yugoslav
policies and, when the issues get close to home and affect important
national interests, the Yugoslavs are probably no more prone to act out
of lofty principle than most peoples. On the whole, however, Yugoslav
policies have been consistent with the professed objectives of non-
alignment. There were many times when Belgrade's positions on one or
another international issue were very close to Moscow's, and there were
periods -- most notably the early 1960s, before the removal of Khrushchev
-- when Soviet-Yugoslav relations were quite close. Tito apparently
still identified himself more or less with the broad sweep of Soviet
ideology; was reasonably optimistic that the Soviets would one day
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recognize the virtues, for themselves, of a Titoist course; and was
willing on occasion (e.g., after the Hungarian revolution of 1956 and
after the Soviets unilaterally broke the moratorium on above-ground
nuclear testing in 1961) to give the USSR the benefit of the doubt.
20. Still, even during the height of the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochment,
the Yugoslavs maintained an independent view. When Yugoslav policies
resembled Soviet, this was almost always the consequence of their own
particular appraisals, not the results of efforts to accommodate Soviet
positions. Improvements in relations with the USSR, moreover, were
usually prompted by Soviet overtures and changes in Soviet, not Yugoslav,
attitudes. And on some matters of special importance to Moscow, including
its policies in Eastern Europe, the Yugoslavs often stood in open
opposition.
21. Though it bears Tito's personal stamp, non-alignment has become
an accepted feature of the Yugoslav system. It is seen in Belgrade as
the correct and perhaps only feasible course for an independent Yugoslavia.
It is thought-to provide great flexibility and bargaining. power and, under
conditions short of military confrontations, an acceptable degree of secu-
rity vis-a-vis both East and West. It is seen as a means to enhance
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national prestige and as a way to gain access and influence in the Third
World. And, finally, insofar as it reflects continued independence from
Moscow, it is thought.to be an important model .and inspirational factor
for all of Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe.
22. It would appear, then, that only the gravest threat to national
security would convince Belgrade to abandon non-alignment. But it is
also true that in recent years, ever since the Warsaw Pact invasion of
Czechoslovakia, fear of Soviet intentions has been one of the major fac-
tors conditioning Yugoslav behavior. In fact, it would seem that nowhere
outside of Prague itself did the events of August 1968 have greater or
more lasting impact than in Belgrade.
23. The change in Belgrade's attitudes is all the more striking
because, throughout 1967 and the opening months of 1968, Yugoslav appre-
hensions had been centered on Western intentions. Continuing squabbles
with the USSR -- over the question of an international Communist confer-
ence and over Yugoslav efforts to rally "progressive" forces in the
Mediterranean area -- had little effect on a warming trend in Soviet-
Yugoslav relations. On the other hand, a deterioration in Yugoslav
relations with Italy, the coup in Greece, and -- most of all -- the
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Arab-Israeli war were all interpreted by Tito as evidence of an American-
led conspiracy against Yugoslavia and against all "progressive" non-Bloc
States.
24. But this peculiar view -- which may not have been entirely
shared by Tito's lieutenants -- did not survive Czechoslovakia and its
aftermath. Yugoslav hopes that the USSR would tolerate the Czechoslovak
experiment (thought in Belgrade to be akin to Titoism) and that this
might signify a generally benevolent turn in Soviet attitudes were
crushed overnight. Fear that Yugoslavia (and Romania) might be next on
the list for invasion raced through top levels of the regime and among
the people at large. Once again, then, the USSR loomed as the prime
enemy and national survival seemed at stake. And, in the midst of this
emotional hour, Tito's friends in the Third World -- the UAR and India --
refused to denounce the Soviets and rebuffed Tito's hint that a third
non-aligned summit be convened to consider the problem.
25. All this served to move Yugoslavia's political interests
farther to the West. (Economically, the shift had begun in 1965 as a
consequence of Yugoslavia's growing dependence on Western markets and
technology.) There was no dramatic break with the USSR, partly because
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the Soviets did not care to respond vigorously to the Yugoslav condemnation
of the invasion, and there was no sudden wrench in Belgrade's relations
with the Third World, But clearly, priority was assigned at that time
to efforts to strengthen and expand relations with the West -- princi-
pally with Italy and the other major Common Market states, with Austria,
and with the United States. At the same time, Belgrade sought, for the
most part successfully, to improve its relations with its Balkan neigh-
bors, Romania, Albania, Greece, and Turkey.
26. There has been a striking improvement in the United States-
Yugoslav relations since 1968, and particularly since President Nixon's
visit last year. The Yugoslavs have become open and friendly, reluctant
to raise contentious issues, and anxious to develop closer ties. Much
of this can be attributed to renewed concern about Soviet intentions.
But, in addition, Belgrade seems to have reassessed the entire course
of its post-1948 relations with Washington and concluded that American
sympathy and support for Yugoslav independence is genuine -- not just
an artificial and inherently temporary adjunct of the United States-
Soviet relationship.
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27. Indeed, the whole of Yugoslavia's recent westward shift in
orientation would seem to be qualitatively different from the outwardly
comparable situation in the early 1950s. Twenty years ago, the Soviet
factor provided almost the only grounds for cooperation, and Tito, intel-
lectually and ideologically, still conceived of Yugoslavia as a member
of the Communist community; the Soviets and their allies were the here-
tics, not the Titoists. But this time, the relationship with the West
is much more broadly based. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia
seemed to shock Tito out of his residual identification with Soviet doc-
trine and probably terminated any lingering hope he may have had that
the USSR could be converted to the Titoist enlightenment. In any event,
politically, economically, culturally, and even ideologically, Yugoslavia
has over the years grown much closer to the West and farther apart from
the USSR. And this process seems likely to persist in the post-Tito
era. Whether, ultimately, something uniquely Yugoslav will survive all
this or -- as many Yugoslavs fear -- the country will in effect simply
be absorbed into the mainstream of Western Europe can only be, of course,
a matter for conjecture.
28. While the Yugoslavs will continue to reject any affiliation
with NATO, Belgrade is making it clear that it hopes soon to develop
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unobtrusive but relatively extensive military cooperation with Western
Europe, particularly with Italy, Its interest in the strength of NATO
-- and of its old Balkan Pact allies -- has even led it to overcome its
strong reservations about the current regime in Athens and to urge Bonn
to sell weapons to Greece and Turkey.
29. Relations with the USSR have remained correct though strained
throughout this period. But, not surprisingly, the Kremlin has become
increasingly annoyed with Belgrade's domestic and foreign policies and
has been willing to say so, though with some restraint. For their part,
the Yugoslavs remain dismayed by what they believe to be a regressive
trend of developments in the Warsaw Pact and are disturbed by evidence
of Soviet attempts to aggravate and exploit their internal difficulties.
Their commentaries on these matters have recently increased a great deal
in volume and acidity -- if they continue at current levels, correct
relations will be difficult to maintain. It is possible that Belgrade,
seeking to maximize the unifying effect on the Yugoslav population of
Washington has also been approached. Assistant Defense Minister
DoZnicar has submitted a limited shopping list and expressed in-
terest in training YugosZav officers in the United States military
schools as well as in a variety of other exchanges and arrangements.
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fear of Soviet intentions, may now even intend to allow an open
deterioration of its relations with Moscow.
30. Attitudes Toward the Middle East. Yugoslavia conceives of
itself as an important political power in the Mediterranean world and
has over the years actively concerned itself with the struggles of Arab
states to remove the Western colonial presence. It was an ardent sup-
porter of the National Liberation Front (FLN) during the French-Algerian
war, it was among Egypt's earliest and most vocal supporters, it declared
itself wholly on the side of the Arabs during and after the June war,
and it has more often than not found itself opposing the views and activ-
ities of the United States in the area. Thus, while the Yugoslavs have
sometimes urged the militant Arabs to proceed with moderation and warned
them of the dangers of overdependence on the USSR, they have followed
policies in the area which have frequently complemented or coincided with
those of the USSR.
31. Of late, however, the Yugoslavs have begun to re-examine their
interests. They have not by any means become supporters of the United
States. But they have become increasingly fearful that renewed Arab-
Israeli hostilities might provoke a United States-Soviet clash; they
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have become somewhat disillusioned by Arab disunity; and they have grown
more and more apprehensive that the USSR will acquire too powerful a
position in the area. Most of all, the Yugoslavs would now like to see
the great powers withdraw from the Mediterranean, fleets and all. Short
of that, however, they seem to be primarily interested in encouraging
some form of rapprochement between the West and the Arab states, and
they have suggested to Cairo that it would be in the Egyptian interest
to work for this.
Defense Policy
32. The projection of an image of military strength and the
determination to use it has played an important role in Yugoslav defense
strategy. Thus Belgrade has traditionally sought to give the impression
that an invading force, no matter how strong or from what quarter, would
meet with fierce resistance and -- even if initially successful -- would
encounter prolonged and costly partisan warfare.
33. In keeping with this -- and with a desire to bring the conduct
of military affairs into closer harmony with the concept of decentraliza-
tion -- Belgrade began in 1967 to consider plans for the development of
* For a more detailed discussion of Yugoslav military strength, see Annex B.
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sizeable territorial forces and for increased emphasis on guerrilla
warfare. This work was undertaken at a time when, as indicated, the
Yugoslavs were on relatively good terms with the Soviets but were quite
nervous about developments in Greece, Italy, and the Middle East. Thus,
while no particular urgency seems to have been attached to the restruc-
turing program, initial planning assumed that Yugoslav defenses should
be directed primarily against a possible attack from the, West, But the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 reversed this orienta-
tion and advanced Belgrade's timetable. By early November, the govern-
ment had refined its views and incorporated them into a draft bill for
consideration by the National Assembly. And on 11 February 1969,
Yugoslavia's new Nationwide (or "all-Peoples") Defense Law was officially
adopted.
34. Under the new law, Yugoslavia has established a two-tiered,
defense system composed of the regular armed forces (presently totaling
about 228,000 men, and collectively designated as the Yugoslav National
Army -- JNA) and territorial defense units. Only the latter force and
the complementary civil defense organization are decentralized, with
republican, local, and factory authorities given primary responsibility
for the levy, training, funding, and activation of the component
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units. Regional planning, supervision, and coordination falls to the
republics, but overall strategy and control remains in the hands of the
Presidency and designated military organs in Belgrade.
35. Yugoslav strategy is now more clearly and openly based than
ever before on the practical and deterrent aspects of the concept of a
"nation in arms". Almost everyone between the ages of 16 and 65 is re-
quired to undergo training in military tactics, first aid, use of weapons,
and the strategy of collective defense. Of these, men from 17 to 60 and
women from 19 to 50 may be assigned to armed units.' If attack comes,
plans call for temporary forward defense by the centrally-controlled
1 The federal defense budget is basically confined to the needs of the
regular armed forces. Federal military spending has been increasing,
but if expressed as a percentage of gross national product (GNP), it
has remained fairly constant at a little more than 5 percent since
1965. See Annex A, page A-7.
1 While maneuvers and exercises involving both regular and territorial
forces have been held at fairly frequent intervals over the past two
years, a much more ambitious test of the new system is planned for
this fall when mechanized units of the JNA will play the role of
"the invader" in what promises to be the largest Yugoslav military
exercise since World War II. Full use of territorial units (now
said to embrace nearly one million citizens under arms backed by
another two million in civil defense organizations) will be made
in the defense.
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and more heavily armed operational forces (assisted, where possible by
the activities of local territoral units), followed by the orderly and
fighting retreat of these forces into the mountains. Theoretically,
enough time will be gained to transport necessary government personnel
and records into mountain redoubts to mobilize many of the country's
more than two million reservists and to activate additional territorial
partisan units. And once settled in the mountains, the retreating oper-
ational army would cooperate with partisan units in continued operations
against the invader.
36. Implementation of the new defense law has not been without its
problems, but Belgrade has demonstrated its determination to strengthen
the effectiveness of the nation-wide system. It has donated military
equipment worth more than $40 million to the program. It has rearranged
its military districts to align their borders more closely with repub-
lican boundaries and has encouraged local JNA commanders to work closely
with their counterparts in the territorial forces. In addition, language
has been included in the latest Constitutional Amendments which declares
that no one has the right to sign or recognize the surrender -- or occu-
pation -- of all or any part of Yugoslavia or to prevent Yugoslav citizens
from taking up arms against an invader. Such acts would be punishable
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as treason. And the Croats have gone one step farther in their
recently-adopted republican defense law by stating that no one has the
right to invite the enemy's armed forces into the country or to collab-
orate with the enemy in any way.
37. Belgrade has also moved to revamp the traditionally aloof
regular military establishment and to bring it directly into the main-
stream of developments in Yugoslav society. To this end, recent changes
have rid the military establishment of its more conservative officers,
restructured and rejuvenated its Party organization, and given it broader
representation in policymaking councils. All this has been reflected
in a marked change in the general attitude prevailing in top military
circles. Initial qualms about the territorial militia seem largely to
have disappeared. A new interest in the resolution of political, social,
and economic problems affecting national unity (and thus bearing on
military capabilities) has emerged. And while the military establish-
ment's general loyalty to Tito has never seriously been questioned,
ranking military officials now seem to be taking pains to stress that
this loyalty extends to Tito's system as well.
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III. PRINCIPAL INTERNAL FACTORS WHICH WILL AFFECT FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
The Nationalities Problem
38. Yugoslavia has the most complex ethnic composition of any
country in Europe. There are five main Slav "nations" -- Serbs, Croats,
Slovenes, Macedonians, and Montenegrins* -- and a number of substantial
non-Slav minorities or "national groups", of which the Albanians and
the Hungarians are the largest. Together, the facts of a difficult
geography.and many centuries of occupation by the Austrians, Hungarians,
and Turks have given these nationalities widely varying cultures and
religions, great disparities in economic development, and a distrust of
central authority. Different languages, and even different alphabets
in which to write common languages, have hindered communication between
the nationalities and become a political issue in their own right.
39. Historically, political assassination and civil war have
suggested that no regime in Belgrade can long maintain effective national
unity solely through authoritarian means. But current efforts to solve
*
Yugoslavia's total population is about 20.8 million, of which 41
percent are Serb, 22 percent Croat, 9 percent Slovene, 8 percent
Macedonian, 3 percent Montenegrin, 5 percent Albanian, 3 percent
Hungarian, and 9 percent miscellaneous.
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the country's problems through decentralization of authority and the
creation of a relatively open society are by no means assured of success
either. National self-assertiveness is rising and old feuds and suspic-
ions are combining with new regional grievances. Party and government
leaders sometimes seem unable to cope with these problems or are swept
up in them and become partisans on one side or the other.
40. The three most volatile elements in all this are the traditional
animosity between Serb and Croat, the struggle of the Albanians in Kosovo
to free themselves of Serb domination, and the conflicting interests of
the poorer and richer regions. Problems of this character will surely
plague Yugoslavia for years to come. The process of decentralization
will proceed partly at the expense of Serbian authority and status and
the Serbs are not likely to enjoy this; the Croats will remain especially
sensitive to national slights, real or imagined, and will be anxious to
make conspicuous displays of their growing independence; the Albanians
will continue to regard themselves as a repressed minority and may again
(as they did in 1968) resort to large-scale disorders; and most of the
more backward areas will still feel themselves the victims of inequities
and will still seek larger subsidies from the northern regions, which
will probably become increasingly reluctant to provide them.
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41. It is also true, however, that much of the surfacing of internal
antagonisms in Yugoslavia is a natural by-product of progress toward a
freer and more decentralized society. Thus, to some degree at least,
the recent upsurge in open conflicts between various group and regional
interests can be viewed as a healthy development. Radical departures
from the present system -- such as a separatist solution -- do not now
seem to hold much appeal for either the public or the practicing politi-
cians. No single ethnic group seems at all certain that it could make
it in the world as a separate sovereign state.
42. Indeed, even in the midst of forceful expressions of regional
interests, a new willingness to compromise has begun to emerge. The
Croats have recently begun to show a new awareness of the dangers of
nationalistic outbursts and have quieted down somewhat. The Slovenian
Party, which has long been openly dissatisfied with aspects of national
policy -- especially the diversion of Slovenia"s wealth to poorer areas
-- seems to be having second thoughts and recently committed itself
formally to the principle that Yugoslav security interests override those
of the individual republic.
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43. Even the Serbs seem to be developing more flexible attitudes.
Although long accustomed to dominating the federal scene through con-
trol of key posts and organs in Belgrade, they have lately emerged as
champions of self-management. They now seem to accept the notion that
Serbian interests must be defended and advanced in regulated competition
with the other republics, This is not to say that Serbian nationalism
has simply faded away. But it is beginning to find an outlet in aggres-
sive exploitation of the opportunities offered by a decentralized system
and in vigorous defense of the ground rules against any weakening or
"distortion" which would work to the advantage of the northern republics,
44. In the economic field, where decentralization has gone the
farthest, Tito has been trying to promote commercial and financial links
-- including mergers -- across republican borders, Although the results
so far are modest, such arrangements at least represent a step toward
dislodging isolated local interests.
45. The new constitutional amendments have been designed in large
part to deal with the nationalities problem in the decentralized, post-
Tito state. Painstakingly tailored to allow for almost every conceivable
ethnic and regional sensitivity, they seek to establish a reassuring rule
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of law and remove some of the uncertainties which have exercised national
passions in recent months. Politically, the most significant innovation
is the establishment of a collective Presidency (temporarily modified to
allow Tito to continue to serve as President of the Republic as long as
he is physically able to do so). The new Presidency consists (in addi-
tion to Tito) of three members from each of the six republics and two
members from each of the two autonomous provinces. These representatives
are elected for a five-year term by their respective regional Parliaments.
Elaborate rules prohibit the members from holding any other federal or
regional office and govern the annual election of the body's president
and vice president in a manner intended to ensure that no republic can
secure a dominating position. A similar formula for equal representation
has been in force and is prescribed for the Federal Executive Council
(cabinet), while a system of proportional representation is to be applied
to the dNA officer corps, senior military positions, and portions of
the civil service. Finally, the revised rights and obligations of the
federation, the republics, and the autonomous provinces are spelled out
in considerable detail.
46. Still, the new system has inherent weaknesses which, in the
absence of a leader of Tito's stature (one whose influence would far
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exceed his Constitutional prerogatives), could prove fatal. A 22 man
collective Presidency may prove to be unworkable. At a minimum, if it
functions according to the letter of the law, it will be extremely
unwieldy and hamstrung by the rigidity of its own rules. The Constitutional
Amendments are very specific about what it can and cannot do under both
ordinary and extraordinary circumstances. They also spell out procedures
for resolving differences with and among federal and regional organs of
government. But they are silent on how a Presidency of this size, repre-
senting so many diverse interests, and bound by time-consuming rules of
procedure, is to avoid costly delays and perhaps deadlocks in the decision-
making process. (Perhaps because of problems like this the Presidency may
in time come to be dominated by a small segment of its membership which
would be able to function with some flexibility.)
47. The way in which the collective Presidency evolves will bear
heavily on how serious another potential flaw in the latest reforms
proves to be -- viz. the degree of which,d6centr?dlization limits-the
central government's ability to cope with national problems. The rela-
tionship between federal and republican powers has been spelled out but
not as yet worked out through normal political processes. There are
numerous provisions for overriding normal procedures and abridging local
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prerogatives if the federal authorities determine that such action is
required in the interests of national security or in order to avoid
"significant damage to the social community". But such provisions will
have little or no effect unless there is agreement within the federal
government on a necessary course of action and the courage to proceed
with it.
48. Finally, there is the question of what will be the long-term
effects of the new rules concerning regional representation at the cen-
ter on the level of competence of federal officials. The right man for
the right job -- in the cabinet, i.n.the army, in the foreign service --
could be denied appointment because of his ethnic origin. By the same
token, the wrong man might receive an important position only because
he is an available Serb, or Slovene, or whatever. The rules will no
doubt be bent from time to time, but the politics of bending could in
themselves become quite delicate.
The Economy
49. In theory, the central government still possesses sufficient
tolls to manage the economy effectively. It retains statutory authority
over the monetary system, foreign trade, foreign exchange transactions,
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and customs duties; it can channel funds to the poorer regions through
levies and mandatory loans; and it can regulate republican fiscal activ-
ity and promulgate binding laws over republican objections. But the
mere existence of these powers does not guarantee that they will be used.
The central government's current efforts to control inflationary pres-
sures, for example, have been indecisive and unsuccessful. A price freeze
enacted last November was never enforced; a wage control bill was watered
down in the face of trade union pressure; legal limits on republic and
local spending in 1971 were grossly exceeded in the first half of the
year; and the belated devaluation in January had already been undermined
by domestic price increases and a self-defeating open debate last fall
on whether or not to devalue. Decentralization has unquestionably made
it more difficult for Belgrade to control the economy and to act effec-
tively even when it is legally empowered to do so.
50. Parallel with the decentralization of political and economic
authority, conflicts of interest arising from regional economic dis-
parities have increasingly assumed the character of inter-republic dis-
putes and have made agreement on appropriate national policies extremely
difficult to achieve. Sometimes termed "dinar..nationalism", divergent
interests. fi nd..refl ection today in such. things as the reluctance-of the
northern republics to share their wealth -- and particularly their
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hard currency earnings -- with the rest of the nation, and the espousal
by republican officials of economic projects promising special benefits
for their own area. Prolonged or severe economic difficulty could easily
exacerbate these inter-republican conflicts to the point of political
crisis. The force of economic nationalism has been.difficult for even
a Tito to rein; the outlook for its being controlled after Tito's departure
is bleak.
51. The basic problems of inflationary pressures, foreign trade
deficits, and unemployment are likely in any event to persist, and this
will mean continuing dependence on help from the West. The Yugoslavs
are currently seeking $600 million in various forms of financial assis-
tance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United States, and
a number of West European countries; this amount is to tide them over
through 1972. In the normal course of events, further requests for
assistance can be expected. If Belgrade's dispute with Moscow resulted
in a sharp curtailment of Yugoslav trade with the Soviet Bloc, or if
economic developments in Western Europe prompted the sudden return of
large numbers of emigre workers, such requests would probably be very
substantial.`
CEMA countries presently account for a little less than 25 percent of
Yugoslavia's total foreign trade. But a complete cutoff of trade --
or a selective reduction in the more important items exchanged -- would
have highly disruptive effects on Yugoslavia's machine building, metal-
Zurgical, shipbuilding, chemical, and textile industries.
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The Army and the Party
52. Following the ouster of Vice President Rankovic in 1966,
decentralization and reforms sharply reduced the powers and political
significance of the Yugoslav State Security Service (SDB). The impor-
tance of the Party and the military establishment increased accordingly.
These institutions are, of course, closely linked. Nearly all JNA of-
ficers and three-quarters of the NCOs are Party members. And reforms
undertaken since 1968 have given the military's Party apparatus broader
and more direct association with the LCY Presidium and with republic
and local Party organizations in the areas in which JNA units are located.
53. JNA remains a highly-centralized organization, the only true
national institution left in Yugoslavia. While none of its leaders seem
to entertain independent political ambitions, its behavior in the event
of a post-Tito crisis will be critical. But the military establishment
would be reluctant to intervene. independently in the political process
unless it were convinced that the integrity of the state was in serious
jeopardy. For one thing, a consensus on the proper course of action
would be difficult to achieve in a muddled situation. Further, the mili-
tary leaders are aware that the JNA no longer possesses a monopoly of
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organized armed force.. New territorial forces could in extreme
circumstances elect to support their own republican authorities rather
than the JNA command in Belgrade.
54. Belgrade's efforts to encourage the military to play a greater
role in domestic affairs seem to be meeting with some success. It is
Tito's hope that the military will be able to exert some restraining in-
fluence on fractious local Party and government leaders. There is, of
course, a certain risk involved in giving the military a greater. hand in
civilian affairs. But, on the whole, the army seems to be loyal both to
Tito and to his system. There are no signs of the existence of any sig-
nificant group of officers who would be willing to serve Soviet purposes;
nor do there seem to be cliques of officers who owe their primary loyal-
ties to one or the other republic rather than to the Yugoslav state as
such. (At the NCO and company officer level, Serbs and Montenegrins are
still strongly over-represented, but Belgrade has long sought to eliminate
regional prejudices by assigning these ranks to posts outside their native
republics.) And Belgrade has now given its campaign to establish a pro-
portional ballance of nationalities in the military hierarchy the force
of constitutional law.
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55. In contrast to the military establishment, the LCY has been
in considerable disarray. Tito has in recent months managed to restore
some order -- principally through invocation of the Soviet threat -- but
the fundamental problem of defining and enforcing the limits of regional
Party autonomy remains to be resolved. Until it is, the effectiveness
of the LCY as a force for national unity and stability will be severely
limited.
56. Tito has exhibited considerable impatience with the present
state of affairs, emphasizing his belief that there can be no boundaries
for the LCY -- "republican, local, or any other". He has stated that
the Party Conference in October will be the occasion for a major reor-
ganization of the LCY. And he has threatened to purge the more outspoken
regional mavericks.
57. Tito may attempt to do just that, but it seems more likely
that some of his tougher pronouncements have been made largely for effect.
Most regional Party leaders now probably recognize the need for setting
some sort of ground rules for harmonizing the activities of the component
elements of the LCY. But none are likely to be willing to accept a re-
turn to a centralized supranational Party of the type Tito sometimes
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seems to have in mind. Furthermore, it seems doubtful that, at this
delicate stage in Yugoslavia's political evolution, Tito would be will-
ing to risk turmoil by carrying out a sweeping purge of regional Party
leaders.
58. A compromise may eventually emerge which would leave the
regional organizations free to manage their own affairs but which would
bind them to honor certain general guidelines laid down by the central
Party organs. Such a solution might require the restructuring of the
Executive Bureau and the expansion of its authority. This would be
likely to generate considerable controversy, but the alternatives would
seem to be continued and hazardous inaction or reversion to greater
centralization, a course which almost no one now desires.
Dissident Elements
59. Belgrade has for the past year or so clearly exaggerated the
seriousness of internal dissidence. It has emphasized the threat posed
by domestic and externally inspired enemies as a means to quiet inter-
republic squabbling and as an excuse for curbing the free expression of
extreme views. Nevertheless,..hostile elements -- including former
political prisoners (mostly so-called Cominformists), purged Party
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apparatchiks, and national militants -- do exist in Yugoslavia. Their
numbers are unknown, but some have links with emigre groups abroad and
others may have ties with foreign intelligence services.
60. Though they could in certain circumstnaces aggravate existing
national divisions and political rivalries, in and of themselves, these
individuals and groups would pose little threat to the Yugoslav system.
They disseminate propaganda, engage in scattered terrorist acts, and
within their limited capabilities, collect intelligence information. But
as the labels -- Cominformists, Rankovicites, Ustasi, and Chetniks -- sug-
gest, their past associations and beliefs have little relevance to pres-
ent day Yugoslavia. Most are probably known to the authorities and could
probably be rounded up quickly in the event of crisis. The necessary
laws are on the books.
61. Yugoslavia has its share of outspoken and discontented students.
There have been strikes and si.t-ins and fiery debates. Nationalistic
passions have at time run high -- particularly among the Croats. But
the students are not in opposition. While critical of certain provisions
in the new constitutional reforms, most of Yugoslavia's young support
them in principal. Small extremist groups exist -- including some of
Maoist orientation -- but their appeal and influence is very limited.
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IV. MAJOR EXTERNAL INFLUENCES
The USSR
62. The Soviet Union has had nearly a quarter of a century in
which to learn to live with an independent socialist Yugoslavia. But
the adjustment has been difficult. The Cominform break of 1948 still
rankles; Belgrade's assertion of absolute sovereignty still enrages;
and Tito's eccentric road to socialism still bewilders and dismays.
Moscow knows full well that Titoist Yugoslavia is there. But it has
never lost hope that someday, somehow, it will go away.
63. Various Soviet leaders have sought in various ways over the
years to solve the Yugoslav problem. Stalin, outraged by Ti:to's defiance,
and perceiving a threat to Soviet dominance elsewhere in Eastern Europe,
did his best, short of military intervention, to bring down the Tito
regime. Khrushchev, apologizing for Stalin's behavior, offered Tito
Russian aid and friendship, and then tried to push or pull Yugoslavia
back into the fold. The present Soviet leaders, the victims, perhaps,
of collective inertia, have tried more or less to do the same sort of
thing for the same purpose.
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64. The Brezhnev regime, however, has not approached the
Yugoslav problem with much visible enthusiasm. It seems, in effect,
to be less interested in Yugoslavia than either Stalin or Khrushchev,
less given to extravagant gestures of enmity or good will, less in-
clined to engage in polemics or to deliver exhortations. It seems to
understand, in a way that its predecessors did not, that at least so
long as Tito is in command, Yugoslavia cannot be intimidated or seduced
into a return to the Bloc.
65. This is not to say that the present Soviet regime has given
up hope of future successes. All of the current leaders were mature
men and many of them occupied senior positions when the Cominform
break occurred. They perhaps did not approve of Stalin's subsequent
policies toward Yugoslavia, and could not have been much impressed
with his accomplishments, but there is very little chance that this
made Tito and his actions any more appealing to them. On the contrary,
Tito's departure from the Soviet bloc and his subsequent departure
from Soviet doctrine must still be remembered in Moscow as a painful
ideological and political shock.
66. If, for one reason or another, post-Tito Yugoslavia should
come to re-embrace the USSR, Moscow's pain would be greatly eased. The
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validity of its view of the "socialist world" would be enhanced and
reaffirmed; its political position elsewhere in Eastern Europe would
be strengthened, perhaps especially so in the case of Romania; its
strategic posture -- particularly vis-a-vis Italy and the Mediterranean
-- would be improved; and its long, frustrating, and debilitating
quarrel with a major heretic would at long last have ended in triumph,
not only for the USSR but also for those Soviet leaders who could
claim to have brought it about. The whole Titoist episode could then
be dismissed as a temporary aberration -- as was the Stalinist era
within the USSR -- the fault not of the Soviet Party and the Soviet
system but of one evil or mistaken old man, Josef Broz Tito.
67. But if there are many reasons why the Soviets might devoutly
wish for Belgrade's return, there are also many constraints on Moscow's
willingness and ability to bring it about:
-- Important as it is in the Soviet view, Yugoslavia has not
occupied a place.of high priority in the Soviet scheme of things
since the mid or late 1950s. Over time, Moscow has recognized
that the Yugoslav problem has become, in effect, a problem of
foreign policy, still intertwined with but distinct from the
problem of intra-bloc affairs. What happens inside Yugoslavia
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and what Yugoslavia does for itself internationally are not
(as they are, for example, in the case of Czechoslovakia) vital
concerns of the USSR. Thus there are major self-imposed restric-
tions on the risks the USSR would be willing to run and the costs
it would be ready to pay for the accomplishment of its objectives
in Yugoslavia.
-- The means available to Moscow to further these objectives
are in any event quite limited. As a great and nearby power, one
which, moreover, professes a similar ideology and in a number of
areas similar international objectives, the USSR exercises some
political leverage in Belgrade. But Soviet influence is by no
means compelling and does not seem as a rule to exceed that of
the United States and of the West European states. Moscow does
not seem to have any particular assets within the Yugoslav
establishment and cannot count on any substantial body of opinion
even vaguely sympathetic to the USSR or to the Soviet variety of
communism. Soviet economic leverage is not great -- especially
in view of the probable Western willingness to help in times of
Yugoslav need -- and Moscow has often found it to be an ineffective
instrument of pressure in any case.
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-- The Soviets could of course seek to apply military pressure
against Yugoslavia, but the risks of backfire here are substantial.
The Yugoslavs would almost certainly unite in resisting such
pressures, and they would turn to the West for political support
and material aid. This of course is what happened in response
to such pressures during the Stalin era. In most circumstances,
if the Soviets invaded Yugoslavia, they would encounter organized
and irregular armed opposition. Moscow is almost certainly aware
of this probability; it would, at a mimimum, have to allow for the
possibility. (See Annex B for a discussion of Soviet capabilities
against Yugoslav forces.) It would also have to allow for the
possibility of strong Western reactions.
-- Even if Soviet military operations against Yugoslavia proceeded
successfully, and without Western military reactions, an invasion
of Yugoslavia would severely, perhaps irreparably, damage Soviet
interests in a variety of fields and a number of areas. It would
greatly complicate United States-Soviet and Sino-Soviet relations,
hurt the Soviet image in the Third World, and risk serious in-
stability in Eastern Europe. Moreover, closer to home, it would
instantly jeopardize Moscow's large investment in its current
policies in Europe -- its drive. for a kind of rapprochement, its
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wooing of West Germany, its desire for trade relations embracing
much-needed imports of technology, and, above all, its efforts
to reduce the continental presence of the United States. West
European hopes that the USSR was becoming a responsible, even
benign power, survived the invasion of Czechoslovakia, partly
because that campaign was rapidly executed and bloodless and
because Moscow was acting within its own sphere of influence.
An invasion of Yugoslavia might not be quick, would probably
be bloody, and would certainly take Soviet troops far beyond
the boundaries of Sovietized Europe.
68. The USSR's current policies toward Yugoslavia reflect a
curious mix of these objectives and these constraints. Moscow main-
tains generally cordial relations, encourages reasonably extensive
economic and trade ties, keeps ideological disputes fairly subdued,
and permits Party contacts -- though these are infrequent and restrained.
Moscow presumably hopes through these means to retain some degree of
influence in Belgrade, to thwart the influence there of the Western
powers, to keep its options open during the succession period, and to
avoid the uncertainties and problems which would flow from a sharp
deterioration in relations.
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69. At the same time, the Soviets persist in petty subversion,
engage in unfriendly semi-covert diplomatic activities, and dissemi-
nate gray propaganda against the Tito regime. They presumably hope
in this way to keep their hand in internal Yugoslav politics, to
encourage pro-Soviet sentiments among discontented elements of the
population, to create difficulties between Belgrade and the West,
and to be in a position to exploit any new opportunities which might
open for them during the succession period.
70. The extent and effectiveness of Moscow's espionage and
covert action efforts against Yugoslavia are difficult to determine.
The Yugoslavs imply publicly that these efforts are massive and claim
privately that the Soviets were involved in the Kosovo riots of 1968
and have collaborated with hostile emigre groups of all colorations.
Such charges, which have also included allegations that Moscow has
been busy trying to recruit supporters in military and student
circles, have generally lacked specific details and are probably
exaggerated. We lack evidence to sustain them.
71. There is, however, clear evidence that the Soviets have
engaged in various informational activities which have angered or
distressed the Yugoslavs:
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-- In January 1970, Tito and Soviet Ambassador Benediktov had
a heated exchange over the behavior of Soviet Embassy repre-
sentatives who were offering assistance to Yugoslav enterprises
in financial trouble. Apparently a large number of firms --
primarily in remote areas -- had been so approached. And the
Soviet officials involved had been combining offers of money and
technical assistance with considerable commentary on the advantages
of the Soviet way of doing things.
-- Soviet and Soviet-sponsored "informational activity" in
Yugoslavia had grown to such proportions by early 1970
The Soviets have persisted
in their efforts to reach even the remotest villages with their
books, films, and other propaganda materials, and they have con-
tinued to reject the suggestion that they scale down this program
to match Belgrade's modest effort in the Soviet Union. In June
of this year, the Yugoslavs publicly warned that the maintenance
of Soviet information and cultural centers in Yugoslavia is in-
consistent with the principle of reciprocity.
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-- In material intended for both domestic and foreign consumption
(including broadcasts beamed to Yugoslavia), the Soviets have
combined general criticism of Belgrade's heretical practices
with emphasis on Yugoslavia's current political and economic ills.
They have made liberal use of carefully selected quotations from
significant Yugoslav documents and pronouncements -- including
some of Tito's speeches -- to illustrate how black things really
are. And, according to a public Yugoslav protest, the Kremlin
is now employing the services of disgruntled Yugoslav emigres
to confirm its derogatory assessment of the Yugoslav scene before
Soviet audiences.
-- Finally, some Yugoslav journalists and politicians have openly
asserted that Moscow's campaign to blacken the Titoist system and
to draw certain parallels between developments in Yugoslavia
and pre-invasion Czechoslovakia are intended to create a psy-
chological atmosphere in the USSR and Eastern Europe favorable for
military intervention.
72. Soviet involvement with hostile emigre groups -- groups
which can work among the more than half million Yugoslavs living abroad
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-- is a matter of the gravest concern in Belgrade. Yugoslav accusations
that Moscow has encouraged the revival of Cominformist exile activity
would seem to have some substance. So too would charges that the Soviets
are working with various ultra-conservative and fascist Yugoslav emigre
groups in the West. Specifically, the Soviets apparently collaborated
with a Ustashi unit based in West Berlin early this year in floating
rumors and surfacing circumstantial evidence of links between top
Croatian officials and Ustashi elements. Bloc diplomats in Belgrade
are reported to have been active in spreading such "gossip". Zagreb
openly accused the "Serb-dominated" federal security apparatus of
complicity in a conspiracy directed against the Croatian leadership.
In the end, Tito had to intervene to calm things down.
73. Partly because of their genuine concern and irritation over
Soviet meddling of this character, and partly because their suspicions
of ultimate Soviet intentions are likely to grow as the succession
period draws near, Belgrade is likely at a minimum to keep the USSR
at arms length. It may be, in addition, that for their own good reasons,
independently of whatever actions are taken by the Soviet Union, the
Yugoslavs will make it very difficult for Moscow to maintain cordial
relations. Belgrade has already raised the spectre of Soviet
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intervention this year to help dampen domestic controversy and may be
increasingly tempted to do so as time goes by.
74. The Soviets have so far managed to curb any impulse to
respond vigorously to this sort of thing -- strong denials might
only feed Yugoslav suspicions. But they could not turn their cheek
indefinitely to a major Yugoslav campaign stressing malign Soviet
intentions. At the same time, it may become more and more difficult
for Moscow to overl.odk. the implications of Yugoslavia's current quest
for military assistance in the West. Thus, while the Soviets probably
hope to be able to maintain the present pattern of their relations
with Yugoslavia, at least until Tito goes, Belgrade may make it
increasingly difficult for them to do so.
75. The Soviets will in any event wish sooner or later to adjust
their policies toward Yugoslavia to take account of Tito's departure.
They will wish to exploit any opportunities offered by the succession
period and may loolk. for candidates to support. They may, in addition,
seek to add to any confusion in Belgrade in the hope that a fluid
political situation would work to their advantage., (Certainly the
stability imposed by Tito has not.) But, initially at least, the Soviets
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are much more likely to react to specific events in Belgrade than to
participate in them. Thus the general outlines of present Soviet
policy are likely to be preserved until Moscow has some notion of just
what the new circumstances in Yugoslavia are. A clear trend toward
internal anarchy might provide the Soviets with a highly tempting
opportunity to intervene directly on the political level. And the
outbreak of civil war might prompt them to intervene militarily as
well.
The Communist Countries
76. It is an article of faith in Belgrade that Yugoslavia is
showing the way for all the Communist states of Eastern Europe. It
is true that the Yugoslav socialist experience has from time to time
had a bearing on events in several of these countries (Hungary, Poland,
and Czechoslovakia) and that Yugoslav independence has served to
encourage those East Europeans who seek their own sovereignty (most
notably, Romania). Because of this, and because Belgrade's. diplomacy
is directed toward the quiet encouragement of East European nationalism
when and wherever possible, Yugoslav-East European relations have
developed a special character, a distinct flavor all their own. In
some capitals, they are treated more or less as members of the family,
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Raw,
as eccentric cousins, perhaps; but in others, they are regarded as
black sheep and are thus shunned and despised.
77. Romania is, of course, a case apart. The Yugoslavs are
treated in Bucharest as brothers, Ceausescu has reservations about
Belgrade's domestic policy, but he recognizes. that Yugoslavia's
survival as a united and independent state may be critical to the
preservation of his own nationalist course. Thus he can be expected
to continue to foster his country's special relationship with Yugoslavia
and to do what he can to impede or weaken Bloc pressures on Belgrade.
Hungary has made an effort to maintain good relations with the Tito
regime and has displayed a restrained but sympathetic interest in
the general thrust of Belgrade's reformist course. Kadar is no doubt
aware that any dramatic Soviet moves against Yugoslavia might seriously
reduce his own freedom of maneuver. Poland has also sought to expand
its relations with Belgrade. Although this trend seems to have begun
during the final two months of Gomulka's rule, it has clearly accelerated
since his fall. East Germany has been much less friendly, more openly
critical of Yugoslav "revisionism". Pankow's representatives in
Yugoslavia apparently have sought, moreover, to influence Yugoslav
journalists and officials with bribes and gifts, to develop contacts
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and sympathizers among Yugoslav workers bound for West Germany, and
to distribute films not cleared by Yugoslav censors.
78. The key factor affecting Yugoslav relations with Bulgaria
is the Macedonian issue. Belgrade looks on Sofia's refusal to re-
cognize the existence of a separate Macedonian nationality as a
potential threat to its territorial integrity. It is clear that the
Bulgarian leadership will be alert to any opportunity to loosen
Belgrade's hold on the region in the post-Tito period. Indeed, the
Yugoslavs claim that top Bulgarian leaders have said as much. And
Belgrade has drawn attention?to the fact that Bulgarian pressures in
Macedonia -- including subversion and espionage as well as propaganda
-- have tended to peak when tensions have been unusually high between
Belgrade and Moscow.
79. For years, Sino-Yugoslav hostility proved useful to Moscow
(inter alia assisting in the isolation of Albania), but there has been
a great improvement in relations between Belgrade and Peking since the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Yugoslavs view this development
with cautious enthusiasm. They surely hope that in the event of major
Soviet pressures Peking, would seek to aid Yugoslavia, at least by issuing
the kind of bellicose statements which might give the Soviets pause.
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In any case, improved Sino-Yugoslav relations have brought an increase
in trade and in transportation revenues. But China is far away and,
as demonstrated during Foreign Minister Tepevac's recent visit to Peking,
neither the Chinese nor the Yugoslavs yet seem certain of the nature
and the limits of the relationship.
80. The recent restoration of diplomatic relations between Albania
and Yugoslavia may have been encouraged by Peking, But Yugoslav-
Albanian friendship is still fragile, resting primarily on a common
fear of Soviet intentions. Ideological differences remain as sharp
as ever, and it is likely to take some time before expanding trade,
tourism, and cultural exchanges establish a broader community of interest
and temper old suspicions. In the meantime, developments in Yugoslavia's
ethnically predominantly Albanian province of Kosovo will continue to
constitute potential sources of friction between the two countries. At
the same time Yugoslavia's more liberal attitude toward this minority
will help to contain the friction.
Western Europe
81. The NATO Powers. While still sometimes disturbed by vestiges
of problems dating from wartime, Belgrade's relations with the NATO
states and with most of the other developed nations of the West are
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now at a high level of cordiality -- and they are based on a solid
foundation of mutual interest with a substantial economic content.*
In a sense, there are ideological ties as well -- and not only with
like-minded Communist groups. In its quest for friends in the dark
days of the late 1940s and early 1950s (when all detachments of the
Communist movement were openly hostile), Belgrade sought out and
cultivated socialist and socialist-oriented political parties through-
out Western Europe. Personal and organizational ties thus established
have been continued, extended into the trade union field, and carefully
nourished. And they have contributed to official and popular sympathy
for Yugoslavia in many countries -- particularly in the Scandinavian
states, Britain, and West Germany.
The present state of these relations, and the importance which
Belgrade attaches to them, is reflected in Tito's recent travels.
Prior to last fall, the Yugoslav President had visited only four
countries in Western Europe -- and these trips were widely
separated in time. But Last October, hard on the heels of hosting
President Nixon, Tito toured five West European countries -- all
members of NATO and the Common Market. A visit to Italy, scheduled
for December but postponed because of an untimely resurfacing of
the Trieste issue, finally materialized in March. And on the
29th of that month -- the day that other Communist leaders were
gathering in Moscow for the 24th Soviet Party Congress -- Tito
met with Pope Paul VI for almost an hour and a half.
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82. Thus, at this juncture in Yugoslavia's post-war evolution,
the overall Western attitude can be characterized as one of friendly
concern. It is generally agreed that while not ideal, Belgrade's
established posture and policies are advantageous to Western interests.
Conversely, it is accepted that these interests would be gravely
threatened if Yugoslavia's current course were reversed or Belgrade
were again to fall under Soviet domination.
83. Individually and collectively, the NATO powers dispose of
a number of potentially effective means for exerting a positive in-
fluence on the course of developments in Yugoslavia. They range from
economic assistance and political support to vague hints that NATO
would not countenance an extension of Soviet power to the shores of
the Adriatic. Loans have been extended. Payments have been rescheduled.
Yugoslavia has been included under the provisions of the Common Market's
preferential tariffs for developing countries. In one way or another,
all the NATO powers have pitched in. But because of the special nature
of their relations with Belgrade, Bonn and Rome merit individual discussion.
84. West Germany is Belgrade's foremost trading partner. Each
summer, ever increasing hordes of West German tourists travel south
to Yugoslavia. Some 425,000 Yugoslav workers are now employed in West
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Germany, their rights and social benefits protected by official protocol.
Last October, Tito became the first Communist Chief of State to visit
Bonn. In view of the bitter heritage of World War II and the break
in diplomatic relations in 1957 -- restored in January 1968 -- the
current scope and warmth of Yugoslav-West German relations is remark-
able. And now Belgrade's appreciation of West German economic potential
has been supplemented by its favorable assessment of the Brandt regime.
85. The FRG's interest in Yugoslavia as its first -- and for a
long time, only -- foothold in Eastern Europe has been sustained and
reinforced by a growing economic stake in the country and hopes con-
cerning the potential broader ramifications of Belgrade's independent
and reformist course. But at least one potentially troublesome problem
remains -- Yugoslavia's claims for indemnification of the victims of
Nazi concentration camps and medical experiments. Negotiations on
this subject were begun in May, but the two sides are still far apart.
In itself, this would be of little significance -- it took 25
years to get to the talking stage. But the issue has spilled over into
another and more pressing matter. For the West Germans, in an effort
to get Belgrade to scale down its demands, have made their counter-
proposal part of the stabilization assistance package which they are
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offering the Yugoslavs. The pressure on Belgrade to yield is great,
but both sides seem to be standing fast and the ultimate outcome is
uncertain.
86. Since accommodation on Trieste in 1954, Yugoslavia has had
no serious dispute with Italy. Relations have gradually become warmer
and more extensive. For some years, the Italians were Yugoslavia's
most important trading partners, and while recently surpassed in this
regard by the West Germans, they still hold second place. Tito has
proclaimed that the Italian-Yugoslav border "is the most open in the
world". And, even more than in the case of the West German-Yugoslav
relationship, both sides have shown a growing determination to strengthen
cooperation in all fields, including military affairs, since the invasion
of Czechoslovakia.
87. But there were temporary setbacks in Yugoslav-Italian
relations in 1967 and the winter of 1970 when Belgrade took umbrage at
what it construed as signs that Rome still coveted lost territory in
Yugoslavia. And since rightist elements seem to be becoming more
active on the Italian political scene, it is possible that irredentist
stirrings may again cause difficulties in the future.
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88. The Neutral European States: Belgrade has long sought to
develop a special "kindred spirit" relationship with the Scandinavians.
But since 1955, when the State Treaty established Austrian independence
and neutrality, Yugoslavia's northern neighbor has occupied first
place among European non-bloc states in Belgrade's order of foreign
policy priorities. Recent highlights in the evolution of Yugoslav-
Austrian relations include the state visits exchanged by Presidents
Tito (1967) and Jonas (September-October 1.968), their meeting at border
ceremonies in October 1969, and a flurry of defense consultations which
began shortly after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Yugoslav interest
in Austria has declined, however, as the prospects for military co-
operation with Italy and other NATO powers have improved.
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--1 40
V. THE FUTURE, SOME ALTERNATIVES, AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
Key Variables
89. Change and disarray will continue to confront the Yugoslav
leadership with a variety of serious problems. The destination of the
Yugoslav regime, said to be a new and superior kind of "socialism", is
vague and uncertain, and the route toward it uncharted. None of the
forces released by the Titoist reformation is likely to prevail without
a struggle. Separatist sentiments are likely to weaken the federation;
various considerations will probably operate to diminish the power of
the LCY; and economic forces, increasingly decentralized, will almost
certainly encourage non-Party institutions to play a larger role in
shaping national policy. Thus the Yugoslav system will remain unsettled
and chances of serious disruptions will persist into the indefinite
future.
90. But beyond these rather gloomy near certainties, the Yugoslav
future remains indistinct. There is a great array of variables which
will bear on the course of Yugoslav national development, especially
during times of trouble. Not the least of these will be international
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circumstances -- the attitudes and actions of external parties, and the
ways in which the Yugoslavs perceive them.
-- Yugoslavia is a part of the European heartland, standing
between East and West, between Central Europe and the Balkans,
and facing both the Alps and the Mediterranean. Historically,
events in and affecting Yugoslavia have touched Europe as a
whole. And, especially over the past quarter of a century or
so, the status of Yugoslavia has come to involve the stability
and security of the continent as a whole.
-- Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact have invested heavily in
Yugoslavia, though it belongs to neither, and both sides have
come to understand that the current balance in Europe would be
changed if Belgrade were to adhere to one Bloc or the other.
Further, it is almost certainly recognized in Moscow that for
these reasons, among others, direct Soviet intervention in
Yugoslavia would be viewed in the West as a matter of grave
concern.
* Indeed, NATO has in effect so warned. The Communique of the NATO
Ministerial Meeting of November 1968 ('oZZaw2ng the Soviet invasion
of Czechoslovakia) urged the USSR to 'refrain from using force and
interferin in the affairs of other states", asserted that NATO mem-
bers couldgnot remain indifferent to "any development which endangers
their seeuiity", and warned that "any Soviet intervention directly
or indirectly affecting the situation in Europe or in the Mediterranean
would create an international crisis with grave consequences". It was
perfectly clear at the time that the United States and others were ad-
dressing themselves to the problem of so-called gray areas in Europe,
and that they were greatly concerned, about the future security of
Yugoslavia and Austria, and, in a somewhat different context, Romania
as well.
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-- The West European members of NATO would in fact almost
certainly regard direct Soviet intervention in Yugoslavia
as a threat to their own security. They would conceive of
the problem in NATO terms, even though the fortunes of a
NATO member were not formally involved, and they could not
imagine an effective response without full United States
participation. They would thus see in the. Soviet move both
a test of their own resolve and a test of the United States
commitment to European security as a whole.
-- A Soviet move against Yugoslavia would have unsettling
implications for the remainder of Eastern Europe and the
Soviets are presumably aware of this. All of the USSR's
allies in Eastern Europe, except perhaps Bulgaria and East
Germany, would be reluctant to see this development occur.
Romania, in particular, would. interpret any Soviet action
against Yugoslavia as a threat to their own interests.
Romania would refuse to cooperate with a Soviet military
operation against Yugoslavia and could be forced to only if
it were itself invaded. The Hungarians and Poles would try
to avoid participation, though their willingness to resist
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strong Soviet pressures would probably be quite limited. The
Bulgarians, for their part, might participate with some enthusi-
asm, particularly if they were allowed to move into Macedonia.
In the short term, assuming Soviet successes, most of the East
European countries would be cowed by a Soviet invasion of
Yugoslavia. But the history of the area suggests that acts of
this character do not intimidate indefinitely,. that, in fact,
the sources of discontent are in the longer term magnified.
-- Of lesser moment to the Soviets, though still an element
in their calculations, would be the reactions in the Third
World. Here, responses would no doubt vary widely, depending
on individual assessments of self-interest, But even if
there were no general outpouring of concern and regret,
suspicions of Soviet intentions would surely be strengthened
and the policies of states which were truly uncommitted
might be affected in subtle but substantial ways.
91. Aside from international variables of the sort discussed above,
there are any number of somber eventualities within Yugoslavia itself and,
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within these, an endless array of variations. Four possibilities,
intended to serve only as plausible illustrations, are examined below.
The first reflects our estimate of the most likely of several possibil-
ities. The others, in varying degrees, all carry more disturbing impli-
cations for Western interests. They are, we think, less likely, but at
least in their rough outline are by no means out of the question.
Contingencies of a more optimistic nature -- such as Yugoslav achieve-
ment of a high degree of internal unity and stability, or open alignment
with the West not occasioned by imminent attack from the East -- are not
considered here.
A. A United, Independent, and Non-Aligned Yugoslavia
92. Yugoslavia is troubled today and will sorely miss Tito tomorrow.
But the Yugoslav system as a whole has withstood the attacks of party
factions, the stresses of economic crisis, and the importunities of
separatists. The army continues to provide support for national unity,
and so, inadvertently, does the USSR. While Tito cannot lay out a fixed
path for asuccessor regime to follow, he may have established a pattern
and style, a reliance on the empiric and the experimental, which his
successors would probably want to imitate and which, in any case, they
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would find difficult to abandon. Over the long term, then, the principal
accomplishments of the Yugoslav system seem fairly secure; Yugoslavia,
even without Tito, has a good chance of surviving essentially intact as
a hybrid system.
93. This alternative, then, is essentially a linear projection of
the current Yugoslav situation, complete with some degree of internal
disarray. Nationality frictions and economic difficulties persist and
sometimes flare. But with some adjustment, the present division of
authority among the federation, republics, and municipalities proves
workable, and timely economic assistance is forthcoming from.the West.
The post-Tito collective leadership manages to overcome its organiza-
tional shortcomings, limit its internal differences, and govern the
country relatively effectively. Fear of Soviet intervention continues
to condition the attitudes and behavior of the leadership and popula-
tion alike. In this atmosphere, potentially pro-Soviet forces remain
marginal and isolated. Additional reforms move the economy farther
toward market socialism. And, unless the Soviet threat becomes so acute
that Belgrade is forced to seek alliances in the West, Yugoslavia main-
tains its present posture of non-alignment.
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94. Soviet Reaction. While hardly a "worst case" situation, Moscow
finds this outcome frustrating. Despite Soviet hopes,.and.macli.nations,.a
Titoist succession leadership has passed its initial test. Thus the
Kremlin faces the indefinite continuation -- and perhaps aggravation of the problems long posed by Yugoslav behavior. The basic Soviet attitude
becomes increasingly hostile and impatient. Armed intervention remains
unlikely, but. the Soviets intensify pressures on Belgrade across the
board. They step up efforts to exploit Yugoslavia's internal difficul-
ties, stall in economic negotiations, delay certain deliveries of goods,
and refuse new aid. They maintain or intensify gray and black propaganda
and continue their cultivation and support of Yugoslav dissidents at
home and abroad. They encourage Bulgaria's claims to Macedonia, increase
pressure on Romania to withdraw from close association with Belgrade,
and try to stir up Yugoslavia's lingering territorial, minority, and
political differences with Western countri.es.
B. A Divided, Independent, Non-Aligned Yugoslavia
95. This situation could emerge quite rapidly after Tito's departure
or could develop as a consequence of gradual deterioration. Ethnic and
regional conflicts mount to a point where national level::policymaking
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breaks down in many areas. The weakening center is unable to agree on
remedies. While the integrity of the state and its Western-oriented non-
alignment are not called into question, the federation is radically
deprived of many of its remaining functions -- and these accrue to the
republics, which pursue their own economic policies and even begin to
act in the area of foreign policies.
96. Contending republican elements begin to seek political and
moral support in the West, vying for favor in Washington and various
West European capitals. Extensive economic aid is also sought as the
economy begins to suffer the consequences of division and disruptive
internal competition. The Western states find themselves faced with
confused and conflicting requests, are hard put to respond effectively,
and are not least tempted to proceed unilaterally.
97. Soviet Reaction. The Soviets are generally encouraged by this
turn of events, seeing new opportunities for themselves, new problems
for the West, and perhaps fewer problems for themselves in Eastern
Europe. They are thus anxious.to insure that the liberal-minded Belgrade
regime does not succeed in restoring its nation-wide authority. They
pursue the kinds of policies discussed above, but with some major excep-
tions: they adopt a more friendly overt posture, offer sympathetic
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commentary (instead of polemics), and extend impressive offers of economic
and technical assistance. They hope in this way to reduce fear of Soviet
intentions as a unifying force and to persuade substantial numbers of
Yugoslav citizens to favor closer cooperation with the Soviet Union.
They step up efforts to cultivate party and state officials and work
harder to blunt or turn back Western involvement. But they avoid choosing
sides (as, for example, between contending republics) unless forced by
events to do so. Soviet military intervention remains unlikely.
C. A Disintegrating Yugoslavia: A Military Coup
Contingency 1: Rapid Takeover
98. The situation described above (paragraph 95) deteriorates over
time. Serious disorders, including clashes between ethnic groups, erupt.
Civil war threatens. The central political leadership is unable to reach
agreement on how to handle the situation. Displaying considerable resolve
and unity, the JNA -- perhaps with the complicity of some Party leaders
-- seizes power in Belgrade, the republican capitals, and other major
cities and succeeds in restoring order relatively rapidly. Martial law
is established, but the junta preserves the decentralized character of
the economy and effectively pursues a Western-oriented (but still officially
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non-aligned) foreign policy. The shock of fratricidal bloodshed exercises
a sobering effect on the Yugoslav political climate, but disenchantment
with centralized military government grows. The West maintains its ties
but urges the formation of a liberal, non-military regime. The junta
presses preparations for the restoration of civilian government along pre-
coup lines and steps down.
99. Soviet Reaction. Moscow views the unfolding situation with
mixed emotions. The Soviets hope that the logic of martial rule will
spell the end of Belgrade's liberal heresies -- and that their long-
standing efforts to cultivate friends in the JNA will now pay off in
an eastward shift in Yugoslavia's foreign policy orientation. On the
other hand, they recognize that neither of these developments may come
to pass. Thus, Moscow waits the situation out and attempts to woo
Yugoslavia's new leaders with offers of assistance. Once the junta's
Titoist domestic and foreign policy intentions become clear, the Soviets
adopt an openly hostile attitude, but continue to eschew military
intervention.
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Contingency 2: A Difficult Takeover
100. Acting under the conditions outlined above, the JNA seizes
power quickly throughout most of the country and seeks to impose harsh
central rule, perhaps in collaboration with elements of the Party. But
it meets with determined resistance in Croatia. Martial law is declared
and Belgrade seeks to impose federal control over the entire economy.
The junta mounts scattered small-scale military operations against the
Croats. It assumes a xenophobic attitude and declares its determination
to resist external intervention from any quarter. But it also calls
for badly needed economic and military assistance from both East and
West. Some West European states, alienated by the character of the
junta and profoundly distressed by the prospect of major bloodshed urge
Western disengagement. Others, fearing Soviet involvement, favor con-
tinued support of the Belgrade regime. After several bloody incidents
the Croatian leadership comes to terms and nation-wide order is restored.
101. Soviet Reaction. Moscow is encouraged by the early moves of
the new regime. It decides that disunity within NATO minimizes the
chance of Western intervention. It adopts an openly friendly attitude
toward the junta, declares its opposition to the Croat separatists, and
advises Belgrade of its willingness to provide extensive economic and
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military assistance. The.Soviets follow up promptly when such aid is
requested and take advantage of the opportunity thus presented to sig-
nificantly increase their presence in Belgrade. They avoid overplaying
their hand, counsel rather than command, and try over time to ease
Yugoslavia into dependent status.
D. A Disintegrating Yugoslavia: Collapse
Contingency 1: Contested Secession
102. Croatia goes through all the formal motions of secession,
proclaims its independence, and announces its intention to become, in
effect, a member of the Western community. Slovenia provides moral sup-
port but does not formally declare itself an ally. Belgrade refuses to
recognize Zagreb`s action, but federal forces seeking to march on Zagreb
are turned back and suffer severe losses. Both the government and the
military establishment suffer from severe internal divisions. Believing
that little or no help for subduing the Croats will be forthcoming from
the West -- which has been generally sympathetic to the Croatian cause --
and taking advantage of their majority position in the truncated collec-
tive federal Presidency, Serbia, Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro appeal
for direct Soviet assistance in the name of the Federation.
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103? Soviet Reaction. Moscow decides that in these circumstances
the informal Western commitment to Yugoslavia no longer exists, that the
West will be divided over what options remain, that the invitation from
the rump Yugoslav Government is legitimate, and that in general the op-
portunities are too promising to pass up. Some Soviet troops are sent
to the Belgrade area, and these then move north with elements of the JNAO
Once battle is joined with the Croats, the main body of the Soviet con-
tingent sweeps in from its staging areas in Hungary and seizes the major
population centers. These are garrisoned by the Soviets. Mop-up opera-
tions and maritime patrols are left to the JNA0
Contingency 2: Total Disintegration
104. Regional and ethnic conflicts lead to clashes between the
territorial defense units of adjacent republics. The fighting spreads
and leads to a state of civil war. Both the central government and the
military establishment are too divided to restore order. As the situa-
tion worsens, some JNA units desert and join up with republican forces.
Others mutiny and refuse to fight. Yugoslavia ceases to exist. Serbia
and Montenegro suffer reverses at the hands of the northern republics
and appeal to the Soviet Union for assistance. This action prompts
Croatia and Slovenia to turn to the West for help.
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105. Soviet Reaction, Moscow wishes both to exploit the passing
of the Yugoslav Federation and to bring an early end to fighting near
Warsaw Pact borders. Taking note of the fact that entry of their troops
into Serbia and Montenegro would be unopposed and therefore swift, the
Soviets determine that NATO would not try to counter such a move mili-
tarily. However, hoping to minimize risks, Moscow quietly lets NATO
know that it would be interested in a trade-off: Croatia and Slovenia
under Western influence in exchange for the remainder of what was once
Yugoslavia under Soviet influence. In line with this approach, the
Soviet military response to the Serbian and Montenegrin appeals is meas-
ured, tailored to meet the minimum defensive requirements of Moscow's
new clients without overly exercising Western concerns.
106. It is clear in all the alternatives discussed above that the
West and the United States may have a critical role to play in Yugoslavia's
future. Belgrade's economic ties are now predominantly with the West,
its political and cultural views are increasingly shaped by Western con-
cepts, and its national security is at least indirectly dependent on
Western strength and resolve vis-a-vis the USSR. Belgrade, while firmly
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committed to a policy of non-alignment, recognizes that Western
(especially United States) political support and economic and
military assistance were crucial to Yugoslav survival in the late
1940s and early 1950s, and it is well aware today that such aid
could become vital once again. Belgrade feels reasonably confident
that such aid would be forthcoming, that the West is in fact morally
bound to provide it, and that it is, in any case, in the West's
own interest to help preserve an independent and united Yugoslavia.
It also fears, however, that NATO might be slow to move in a crisis
and that there is no Western commitment, moral or otherwise, to
defend Yugoslavia in the event of a Soviet attack.
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ANNEX A
YUGOSLAV MILITARY CAPABILITIES
1. Yugoslav military personnel currently on active duty total
about 230,000 of which some 20,000 are naval, 20,000 air force and
190,000 ground forces. (There arealso about 15,000 frontier guards.)
The Yugoslav military establishment is second only to the Polish in
size among East European forces.
2. The Yugoslav ground forces are organized into 1 armored and
9 infantry divisions, and a number of independent brigades and regiments
equivalent to about 10 more divisions. Yugoslav ground force units
are generally deployed near the land borders, and normally are main-
tained at about 50-60 percent of their authorized strength. It would
take up to a week to bring them to wartime strength, at which time
they would number about 350,000. Since total ground force reserves
are estimated at about 2 million, substantial numbers of reservists
would be available to replace losses in existing units, to form new
active duty units, or to serve with activated territorial and civil
defense forces (already said by the Yugoslavs to number some 3 million).
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3. Sufficient equipment is available for all existing ground
force units. Tanks are of both Western and Soviet manufacture, but
the more modern ones are all Soviet, including small numbers of the
newest tank currently in the Soviet inventory, the T-62. The Yugoslavs
themselves produce trucks, light and medium artillery, chemical war-
fare material, signal equipment, and a small number of armored personnel
carriers.
4. The Yugoslav Air Force consists primarily of interceptor and
ground attack aircraft. Of the approximately 120 fighter interceptors
in the inventory, more than 40 are late model Mig-21 all-weather
interceptors and the remainder are day fighter Mig-21s and F-86 Sabre
jets. The ground attack force contains about 70 F-84 Thunderjets and
some 100 indigenously produced jet and propeller-driven aircraft.
Ground-based air defense forces include eight SA-2 surface-to-air
missile (SAM) sites:plus anti-ai'rcraft'artillery.(AAA). Replacement parts
for both Soviet and United States aircraft are limited. (By way of
comparison, Bulgaria alone has a larger and generally more modern
combat air force, and a more extensive SAM system. Soviet tactical
air forces in the Carpathian, Kiev, and Odessa Military'Districts and
in the Southern Group of Forces alone number some 830'combat aircraft.)
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5. The navy consists of one one operational destroyer, 5
submarines, 120 coastal patrol ships -- including 10 OSA-class large
guided missile patrol boats -- and numerous other patrol, mine war-
fare, amphibious, and service craft. The emphasis placed by the
Yugoslavs on large numbers of small ships seems appropriate in view
of Yugoslavia's highly irregular coastline. There are believed to
be some 30,000 or more naval_,,:reservists. The Yugoslavs now build
small submarines and units up to patrol boat size and are capable of
constructing larger conventional submarines and even destroyers. But
the Yugoslavs remain dependent on the USSR for sophisticated electronics
gear, sonar, steam power plants, and optical equipment. The Yugoslav Navy
would be unable to cope with the Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean
which currently average 11 submarines, 18 combatants, and 20 support
ships.
6. Although Yugoslavia has received about two-thirds of its
post-World War II arms from the West, the USSR has been its dominant
supplier of military equipment during the 1960s. The Soviet Union
has sold at least $365 million of arms to Yugoslavia, accounting for
most of Belgrade's arms purchases since 1961 and for its major modern
weapons systems. The most recent arms agreement with the USSR was
reached in 1965 and expired in 1970. Since early 1970, Belgrade has
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4FC,R F.T ANNEX A
sought to reduce its dependence on the USSR for military equipment,
and has opened arms negotiations with Britain, France, Sweden, West
Germany, and Norway. French helicopters and Swedish torpedo boats
have already been acquired and the Yugoslavs may be seeking Mirage
aircraft from the French. The Yugoslavs have expressed little interest,
however, in acquiring Western tanks, which suggests that Belgrade will
continue to seek such items from the USSR, or, perhaps, approach the
Chinese.
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SFC;RFT ANNEX A
Major Military Equipment Delivered to Yugoslavia
1952-1970
Units
Equipment
Soviet Western
Manufacture Manufacture
Tanks
420
945
Armored personnel carriers
25
0
Artillery and heavy mortars
2,830
2,103
Self-propelled guns
115
56
Naval ships
Destroyers 0
2
Large guided missile patrol boats 10
0
Patrol boats
4
8
Minesweepers
0
8
Aircraft
Propeller bombers
0
88
Jet fighters
58
422
Propeller fighters
0
126
Transports
2
27
Helicopters
45
44
Others
0
130
Guided missile systems
Surface-to-surface,
antitank
Some
0
Surface-to-surface,
antiship
Some
0
Surface-to-air
8 battalions
0
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SECRET. ANNEX A
7. Morale and training apparently are good at all levels
throughout the Yugoslav Armed Forces.: Much progress seems to have been
made in subduing ethnic animosities, partly through political indoctri-
nation.conducted before and after conscripts are called to active duty.
The average male in service is physically tough and has the capacity to
remain effective without, by Western standards, adequate food and equip-
ment. Western military observers believe that the Yugoslav soldier
adapts readily to military discipline, is adept at improvisation, and
handles weapons efficiently. His military training program has a dual
objective -- to prepare him for defensive guerrilla-type combat and
for conventional defensive warfare. Training for both objectives
appears to be intensive and thorough.
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Yugoslav Defense Budget
Federal
Defense Budget
Defense Budget
as a Percent
Defense Budget
as a Percent
Year
(Million US $)
of Federal Budget of Social Product
1965
343.4
1966
405.6
58.2
5.1
1967
430.5
53.9
5.2
1968
512.5
5904
1969
548.8
6101
1970/
606.0
55.4
N. A.
1 Estimated.
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SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES VIS-A-VIS YUGOSLAVIA
Soviet Requirements and Considerations
1. A full-scale invasion of Yugoslavia would be a much more
difficult undertaking for the USSR than the Czechoslovak intervention
of 1968? In that instance, Soviet and allied forces surrounded the
victim on three sides and were backed up. by short, secure supply lines.
They invaded with overwhelming strength, quickly occupied the entire
country, and successfully forestalled any resistance on the part of
the Czech Army.
2. None of these factors would hold true for operations against
Yugoslavia. The Soviets probably would be confined to only two major
land routes -- one from Hungary toward Belgrade and Zagreb, the second
from Bulgaria toward Nis and Skopje. (They could not count on coopera-
tion from Romania.) They would have little hope of surprising their
enemy; there are no large, ready Soviet forces adjacent to Yugoslavia
(as there were near Czechoslovakia). Moreover, Moscow would have to
allow for stout Yugoslav resistance, both from the armed forces and
a large portion of the population.
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A%e
3. Deployments for the Czech 1invasion.resulted'in a forward
shift of Soviet forces from primary reinforcement areas in the western
USSR and thus a more favorable position opposite the critical NATO
Central Region. Conversely, an invasion of Yugoslavia would require a
significant southward shift of Soviet forces from the western USSR
and thus would weaken the over all posture vis-a-vis the NATO Central
Region. And prolonged resistance could force the Soviets to maintain
large forces in Yugoslavia for some time.
4. For the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the ratio of Soviet and
allied divisions over combat-effective Czechoslovak divisions was more
than 3 to 1. Assuming that the Yugoslavs would have enough warning to
bring most of their own regular ground forces to full strength, the
Soviets would have to assemble an invasion force of some 50 divisions
or more in order to,achieve the same ratio. The Soviet planners might
settle for a smaller ratio by allowing for the superior mobility and
firepower of their own forces and the ability of the Pact to achieve
air supremacy over Yugoslav territory. Even so, the Soviets probably
would have to commit the four divisions of the Southern Group of Forces,
20 to 25 divisions from the Carpathian, Kiev, and Odessa MDs (many of
which would have to be augmented by reserve personnel and additional
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,FCR FT ,4W 1 ANNEX B
equipment, such as general purpose vehicles drawn from the civilian
economy), and one or two airborne divisions (to be used mainly to
block the retreat of Yugoslav forces into the mountains).
5. In addition, the Soviets blight press into service 2-4 Hungarian
divisions and 3-6 Bulgarian divisions, making a total Warsaw Pact
force of 30-40 divisions.
Yugoslav Strategy
6. Yugoslav strategy appears to call initially for conventional
resistance beginning near the border along a continuous front. The
Yugoslav ground forces would conduct large-scale rear guard actions
(with the aid of territorial and partisan units behind enemy lines)
to enable major government and territorial defense forces to regroup
in the more inaccessible parts of the country.
7. There can be no doubt in Belgrade's mind that the Soviets could
commit sufficient forces to take the major urban areas of Yugoslavia,
But such success would still offer considerable scope for Yugoslav
armed resistance, particularly if the regular forces retreated sub-
stantially intact to the mountains, where they would be supplemented
by large partisan forces. The Yugoslavs publicly claim that 2 million
foreign troops would be needed to completely "pacify" the country.
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SECRET ANNEX B
8. The Soviets would have to take account of possible foreign
military reactions, particularly if Yugoslav resistance were prolonged.
The greatest chance of a. confrontation with NATO forces might come
in the Mediterranean if the Soviets instituted a blockade of the
Yugoslav coast to prevent arms deliveries.
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