STAFF CONTRIBUTION TO PPB ASSUMPTIONS FOR PLANNING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01095A001200010002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 31, 1971
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Estimates Staff
Latin America
Latin America is likely to become even more worrisome
to the US in the 1970's than it has been in recent years. Poli-
tical instability, social tension, rapid population growth, mal-
distribution of income, and uneven economic performance will
continue to afflict most Latin American countries. We expect
the frustration level to rise -- for the general population and
for such diverse groups as the military, reformers in the Church,
the business community, and intellectuals. Though traditional
political crises and unscheduled changes of government will con-
tinue to attract major attention, the old order will come under
increasing pressure from groups seeking solutions to mounting
social problems. There may in some cases be revolutionary shifts
in political leadership and basic institutions. In other cases
where the old order ceases to cope, no effective new order will
emerge; instead, chronic instability and turmoil will continue
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to keep things turbulent and confused. In a number of states
the tendency will be towards more authoritarian, centralized
control, under military auspices either to contain the growing
social disorder or to carry out social reforms.
2. Nationalism will make further gains as the dominant
force in the region. Over the long term nationalism may serve
as an energizing force to speed modernization. In the short run,
however, it is likely to hasten the collapse of the old order
without providing any new basis for development. In the search
for new solutions, many countries are likely to turn attention
from domestic shortcomings by disrupting important relationships
with the US.
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4. But other Latin American governments will deliberately
seek "confrontations" with the US through expropriations of US
investments and harassment of US personnel. In some cases, acute
bilateral tensions will arise as Latin governments and interest
groups seek, at US expense, to redress outstanding grievances or
promote what they consider as legitimate national goals. The
forces for change, such as the reformist elements of the military
and the Church and students and intellectual groups, will become
increasingly critical of the US, insofat as US policies are be-
lieved to perpetuate the statue quo in their countries and to
impinge on national independence.
Radical or Communist Influences
5. There will probably be a growing effort by Latin Ameri-
cans to reduce US influence in such organizations as the CAS and
to organize regional forums that exclude the US. Castro seems un-
likely to return strongly to the export of revolution. Chile and
others are likely to push for a relaxation of the OAS ban against
Cuban membership in the OAS, and a growing number of American
states will resume economic and even political ties with Cuba,
following the example of Chile. Latin American relations with
the USSR and other Communist countries will continue to expand.
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Because nationalism is and will be the main motivating force in
foreign relations, the Latin countries will diversify their con-
tacts with other nations, in order to give meaning to their de-
clared intentions of reducing dependence on the US. Yet, most
Latin countries will retain a healthy fear of internal interfer-
ence from Cuba and the USSR. Political,economic, and military
arrangements with Western Europe and Japan are likely to be more
substantial than those with Communist countries.
6. Political radicalism and extremism will increase in
most countries as more groups, especially urban youth, reject the
old ways as ineffectual and irrelevant. Political violence will
continue to afflict a number of countries. This could cause
grave personal security problems for US personnel (e.g., kid-
nappings). In most cases, however, the radicals will not be
able to overthrow the old order through direct confrontation,
though they will add to the government's burdens and the general
tensions. In same cases, Communists will be able to take advan-
tage of this tension, and gain influence in movements that threaten
the old order. But most radical groups will have a substantial
nationalistic base, and though they may accept Communist assis-
tance, they will be wary of Communist efforts to dominate their
causes.
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7. The USSR, for its part, almost certainly sees the
task of challenging the US position in Latin America as a gradual
and long-term process. The Soviets have more urgent foreign
policy objectives closer to home, and are aware that an erosion
of the US position already is underway without much effort on
their part. We doubt that the Soviets would be anxious to expend
scarce resources on a grand scale or take great risks for the sake
of dramatic and immediate gains in the Western Hemisphere. They
will continue to concentrate on expanding their diplomatic, com-
mercial, and military presence in ways which they hope will enhance
their respectability and influence. In the process, they will also
increase the number of intelligence agents in Latin America and
this will probably enhance their ability to manipulate revolution-
ary groups and expand their range of political contacts generally.
The Soviets are also likely to expand their naval operations to
include more on-station time in the Caribbean, and to seek more
civil air routes and aviation arrangements in Latin America. In
all these and perhaps other ways, the Soviet presence will continue
to grow, but is unlikely to alter significantly the US preponder-
ance in the Western Hemisphere in the 1970's.
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Chile
8. The coming to power of a Marxist-dominated coalition
in Chile, headed by Socialist Salvador Allende, creates a deli-
cate situation for the US, and poses both opportunities and risks
for the USSR. Allende's electoral mandate runs through 1976,
but he may have some difficulty merely holding together the
alliance of Communists, Socialists, non-Marxist radicals, and
lesser members. Aside from his declared intentions of making
Chile a Marxist-Socialist state, we have only a few clues to
his plans. He claims to be an adherent of constitutional pro-
cesses, and is likely to move fairly methodically and legally,
but many of his followers will press for faster changes, and he
may feel obliged to speed up socializing programs. Many of his
actions will be intensely displeasing to the US, If he seems
to be achieving something in Chile, other reformers and oppor-
tunists in Latin America may try to emulate him. This would
compound the difficulties for the US in dealing with the area.
If, on the other hand, the Allende regime falters and other
Latin Americans come to believe that the US is to blame, the
erosion of US influence in the area will be rapid and severe.
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11. Castro's economic troubles are likely to continue well
into the coming decade. Even an economic disaster of greater pro-
portions than the current mess would probably not force Castro out
of office, but it would reinforce his tendency to pay more atten-
tion to domestic affairs and less to fomenting revolutions else-
where. As these troubles persist, however, Castro is likely to
become increasingly dependent upon Soviet support. It is difficult
to judge at this stage how much influence he would allow the
Russians to exert in Cuban domestic affairs. If Fidel were, by
accident or otherwise, removed from the scene, his brother Raul
would probably take over, and follow roughly similar policies, but
in a more orderly fashion.
Certain Other Countries
12. A reasonable degree of political stability will probably
continue in the Dominican Republic for the next year or two. But
we think it as likely as not there will be a resurgence of poli-
tical instability as the end of President Balaguer's present term
draws near in 1974. The post-1974 term may be marked either by
another conservative, authoritarian civilian regime backed by the
military, or by an attempt by a radical leftist regime to gain
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power. In the .fitter event, the military would be likely to
seize upon the ensuing political turmoil to intervene and assume
power on its own.
13. The selection of these examples does not mean that we
think other Latin American states will enjoy serenity in the 1970's.
In many states political turbulence is virtually a certainty at
some time in the coming decade. Argentina, Colombia, and Uruguay
have serious social discontent, and lack political institutions
adequate to the changing demands of a more mature society. Ecuador,
Panama, and Guatemala are also prime candidates for abrupt political
changes in the 1970's.
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