CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES, 1963-1969

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A023200010001-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 70
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 15, 2014
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 8, 1964
• Content Type: NIE

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S RET
CONTROLLQ DISSEM
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 11-14-63
NIE 11-14-63
8 January 1964
Capabilities of the Soviet General
Purpose Forces, 1963-1969
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
8 JANUARY 1964
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CONTROLL D DISSEM
N? 373
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The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of
this estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Depart-
ments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.
Concurring:
Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF
Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB
Director of the National Security Agency
Abstaining:
The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside
of his jurisdiction.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 11-14-63
Capabilities of the Soviet General
Purpose Forces, 1963-1969
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE PROBLEM
1
FOREWORD
1
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
2
DISCUSSION
6
I. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
6
II. SOVIET THEATER FORCES
7
A. Past Trends in Development
7
Reorganization and Modernization of Ground Forces
7
Tactical Air and MisSile Support
8
Personnel Strengths
9
B. Current Size and Composition
10
Manning Levels of Divisions
10
Number of Divisions
11
Types of Divisions
12
Ground Armies
13
Tactical Air and Missile Support
15
C. Current Strengths and Weaknesses
16
Nondivisional Support
16
Status of the Re-equipment Program
17
Mobilization Potential
17
Tactical Air and Missile Support
18
Theater Force Air Defense Capabilities
19
Tactical Nuclear Capabilities
19
Other Supporting Capabilities
20
III. NAVAL GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
22
A. Past Trends in Development
22
B. Current Size and Composition
23
Submarine Force
23
Surface Forces
24
Naval Aviation
24
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C. Current Strengths and Weaknesses 25
Against Carrier Task Forces - 25
Against Sea Lines of Communication 25
ASW Capabilities 26
Sealift 27
IV. CONTRIBUTION OF THE EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITES 27
A. Warsaw Pact 27
B. Ground Forces 28
C. Tactical Air and Missile Support 28
D. Reliability 29
V. GENERAL WAR CAPABILITIES AGAINST NATO . 29
A. Current Operational Doctrine 29
B. Forces Available for Employment 30
Ground Forces 30
Air 'and Missile Suppbrt 31
Naval Support 31
C. Capabilities to Launch Campaigns Against Central Region 31
Immediately Available Forces 31
Reinforcement Capabilities 32
D. Capabilities for Naval Operations Against NATO 33
E. Capabilities to Launch Campaign's in Other Areas 33
VI. LIMITED WAR CAPABILITIES 34
A. Non-Nuclear Theater Warfare 34
B. Limited Nuclear Warfare 35
C. Distant Limited Military Operations 35
VII. TREND'S IN GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES TO 1970 35
A. Ground Forces 35
B. Tactical Aviation 'and Missiles 37
C. Air and Missile Defense 37
D. Naval Forces 37
E. Nuclear Weapons 38
ANNEX A?STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION OF SOVIET AND
EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITE GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
ANNEX B?TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET GEN-
ERAL PURPOSE MISSILES, AIRCRAFT, AND SUBMARINES
ANNEX C?ORGANIZATION OF LARGE SOVIET THEATER
FORCE UNITS
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CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES,
1963-1969
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the role and capabilities of Soviet generaf purpose
forces over the next six years, especially against the NATO area
in Europe.
FOREWORD
As considered in this estimate, Soviet general purpose forces
include: (a) theater forces, i.e., ground combat and tactical air
forces plus their associated command, support, and service ele-
ments up through the level of military districts and? groups of
forces; (b) naval general purpose forces, i.e., naval forces subor-
dinate to fleets and separate flotillas, including naval air forces,
but excluding strategic attack missile submarine forces; and
(c) military airlift and sealift elements. In addition, Soviet com-
mand and service elements providing general support to all com-
ponents of the Soviet military establishment are considered where
appropriate. Those Soviet forces which perform other military
missions, notably long-range striking forces and air and missile
defense forces, are the subject of other National Intelligence
Estimates,' and are discussed herein only insofar as they might
be used in support of theater operations.
It should be emphasized that, in discussing Soviet theater forces
and their capabilities, we do not take account of the actions of
opposing Western forces. In particular, we do not assess the
effect on Soviet theater forces of an initial strategic nuclear ex-
change. It is obvious that such an exchange would profouridly
affect the ability of Soviet theater forces to carry out their
assigned missions in a general war.
INIE 11-8-63, "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack," dated 18 October 1963
(TOP SECRET) Restricted Data and Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11-3-62,
"Soviet Bloc Air and Missile Defense Capabilities Through Mid-1967," dated 20
November 1963 (TOP SECRET).
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. Soviet requirements for general purpose forces are the sub-
ject of a continuing debate within the Soviet leadership. Russian
and Communist traditions alike prescribe the maintenance of
large ground forces in being as well as a large mobilization po-
tential. Conservative elements, both military and political, argue
that this tradition remains valid, even in the circumstances of
a nuclear general war. Khrushchev, however, with some military
and political support, stresses the deterrent effect of medium, in-
termediate, and intercontinental range ballistic missiles and
argues that Soviet requirements for general purpose forces are
consequently reduced. This debate remains unresolved, but in
general the trend in the size of Soviet general purpose forces over
the years since Khrushchev came to power has been downward.
(Paras. 1-7, 12, 15)
B. We estimate that the personnel strength of Soviet general
purpose forces now includes 1.6-1.8 million men in theater ground
forces, about 400,000 in naval units, and about 150,000 in tactical L
and military transport aviation. In addition, there are roughly
400,000 men performing command and general support functions
for the entire military establishment.' General purpose forces
are estimated to include: 110-140 line divisions; about 350 torpedo
attack and cruise missile submarines; about 180 major surface
ships; about 3,400 tactical fighters and light bombers; and about
375 naval jet medium bombers. (Paras. 15, 18-19, 21, 32, 62-64,
67-68)
C. The Soviet ground forces are formidable and modern, with
a large number of combat strength divisions backed up by a large
mobilization potential. All presently existing divisions have been
at least nominally converted to one of three types: tank, motorized
2 Thus the total manpower in the Soviet military establishment is estimated
to be approximately as follows:
Command and General Support
400,000
General Purpose Forces
2,150,000-2,350,000
Ground
(1,600,000-1,800,000)
Air
(150,000)
Naval
(400,000)
Strategic Defense Forces
400,000
Strategic Attack Forces
300,000
Total 3,250,000-3,450,000
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rifle, or airborne. The modernization program has made heavy
demands on resources in short supply in the USSR, and we believe
that Soviet ground force capabilities are still adversely affected
by quantitative and qualitative deficiencies in equipment.
(Paras. 8-10, 22-25, 39-40, 42-43)
D. During the past several years, the Soviets have reduced
the total number of their divisions and have also reduced the pro-
portion maintained at high levels of combat readiness. We esti-
mate that 60-75 Soviet divisions are now maintained at combat
strength, i.e., at 85 percent or more of total authorized wartime
personnel strength. The remainder are at either reduced
strength (60-70 percent of authorized personnel) or at cadre
strength (25 percent or less). Even at full wartime strength,
Soviet divisions are considerably smaller than US divisions. The
authorized wartime strength of tank divisions is about 9,000 men,
and of motorized rifle divisions, about 11,000. Most divisions
are organized into armies, which are also quite small by US
standards. The non-divisional combat and service support ele-
ments presently maintained are probably considerably short of
wartime requirements. (Paras. 8-10, 15-17, 22-28, 37-40, 42-43)
E. Currently there are 22 combat strength Soviet divisions
and about 1,200 Soviet tactical aircraft in East Germany and
Poland. Without prior buildup, this force could launch a limited
objective attack, designed to maximize the chance of achieving
surprise. We believe, however, that the Soviets would seek to
assemble a considerably larger striking force if they intended
to launch a campaign against Western Europe. Reinforcements
could be drawn from western USSR and froin the Satellite forces.
We estimate that under noncombat conditions a 50-60 division
striking force, including some 5-15 Satellite divisions, could be
assembled and organized for operations against Western Europe
within about 30 days after a Soviet decision to do so.3 In addi-
tion, such a force might include some 2,000 tactical aircraft and
'In terms of manpower, these divisions and their support would include:
Soviet ground troops normally stationed in East Ger-
many and Poland
330,000
Soviet ground troops from Western USSR
480,000
Satellite ground troops
100,000-300,000
Total
910,000-1,110,000
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be backed up by a theater reserve of ground units. The Soviets
would not expect to reinforce on such a scale without detection.
(Paras. 91-94)
F. In recent years, Soviet theater forces have acquired im-
portant tactical missile capabilities, including unguided rockets
and ballistic and cruise missiles. Nuclear and toxic chemical
bombs and warheads have been provided for tactical use; we
believe that their release is kept under strict political control.
(Paras. 14, 33-36, 49-55)
G. With the provision of tactical and air defense missiles for
the support of theater forces, the strength of Tactical Aviation
was sharply reduced but has remained fairly stable since 1961.
The number of tactical aircraft seems low in relation to the size
of the theater ground forces. Moreover, most tactical aircraft
are obsolescent. Fighter-bombers have been conspicuously lack-
ing, although such a type is now being introduced. Theater
force air defense is limited by the lack of surface-to-air missile
systems for low altitude defense and for rapidly moving situations.
(Paras. 31-32, 45-46, 48)
H. Until recent years, the Soviet Navy has been equipped
and trained for a primarily defensive role. Much of the impetus
for change has come from the USSR's concern over the threat
posed by U.S. carrier task forces and missile submarines. To
counter the former forces at sea, the Soviets have introduced
cruise missiles carried by bombers and submarines. Soviet anti-
submarine warfare capabilities are negligible in open ocean areas
and probably will remain quite limited, but capabilities for re-
connaissance against carrier task forces have been improved by
employment of aircraft of Long Range Aviation. The Soviet sub-
marine force poses an increasing threat to Free World shipping,
primarily in the northeastern Atlantic and northwestern Pacific
areas. Soviet surface ships are largely dependent upon land-
based air cover and their capabilities are correspondingly re-
stricted. (Paras. 60-61, 70-75, 95, 113)
I. There are an estimated 940,000 men in the East European
Satellite ground forces (excluding Albania). These forces have
about 62 divisions at various levels of strength and effectiveness.
We believe that about half of these divisions are sufficiently
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manned and equipped for early employment in conjunction with
Soviet forces. Their political reliability would remain an un-
certain factor in some circumstances. ( Paras. 78-83)
J. During the past year, the Soviets appear to have modified
somewhat their expectation that any major conflict in Europe
would either be nuclear from the start or would inevitably esca-
late. Their recent writings indicate that some thought has been
given to the possibility of non-nuclear war in Europe. While
Soviet capabilities to conduct non-nuclear warfare remain formid-
able, efforts to gear their theater forces for nuclear operations
have had some adverse effects on conventional capabilities. The
USSR's capabilities for limited warfare in areas remote from its
borders remain severely limited. (Paras. 100-104)
K. For at least the next few years, the size and composition
of Soviet general purpose forces will probably be governed by
compromises in a continuing debate within Soviet ruling circles
rather than by any clearly-defined strategic and political con-
cept. Economic considerations, Sino-Soviet relations, and de-
velopments within NATO will be critical factors influencing the
future of Soviet theater forces. In our view, the chances are
good that the number of personnel and divisions in theater ground
forces will decline moderately over the next six years. Moderni-
zation of ground, naval, and air general purpose forces will tend
to correct current deficiencies. (Paras. 7,105-116)
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DISCUSSION
I. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
1. Historical, geographical, and political factors have made large-scale
land warfare on the Eurasian continent the basic concern of Soviet
military doctrine. Except for Long Range Aviation, the Soviets have
not visualized independent offensive air operations; in particular, tactical
air forces are subordinated to commanders of theater ground forces.
Except for the recent development of missile submarines, Soviet naval
power has been oriented toward defense of the homeland, support of the
ground forces in Eurasian waters, and interdiction of sea lines of com-
munications.
2. Even in the nuclear era, the emphasis on theater warfare persisted
in spite of the allocation of major resources to strategic defense and
attack forces. So long as Soviet capabilities for strategic nuclear at-
tack remained very limited, the military basis for Soviet policies neces-
sarily rested heavily on war-winning capabilities for theater forces?
whatever misgivings there may have been regarding their viability in
a general nuclear war. In terms of actual war-fighting capabilities and
deterrence of Western military action, the large ground and tactical air
forces were, until the late 1950's, the prime element of the Soviet mili-
tary establishment. Even today, the bulk of the Soviet strategic bomber
force, as well as most of the submarine force, is best suited for operations
in the Eurasian area.
3. As Soviet capabilities for nuclear/missile attack against both Europe
and North America began to emerge in the late 1950's, the first funda-
mental challenge to the primacy of land warfare in Soviet military
doctrine was issued. An intense military debate ensued. Khrushchev
and apparently a majority of the political leadership, supported by a
minority of the military spokesmen, argued for revision of doctrines and
forces in ways appropriate to nuclear/missile warfare. This school of
thought was almost certainly influenced by concern for the strains on
the Soviet economy resulting from the heavy costs of advanced weapons,
new equipment, and manpower for both strategic and theater forces,
and the effect of such strains on key nonmilitary programs.
4. Khrushchev has argued that massive standing armies are an
obsolete luxury which the Soviet Union can ill afford. In his fullest
exposition of military doctrine, in January 1960, and in subsequent
public and private statements, he has maintained that the enormous
increases in firepower achieved by the introduction of nuclear and missile
weapons greatly reduce the need for military manpower. Khrushchev's
public position on the relative utility of types of military forces may have
been exaggerated in order to maximize the political impact of his argu-
ments at home and abroad, and we have no conclusive indications of how
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far he might actually wish to go in restructuring Soviet forces. Never-
theless, Khrushchev's tendency to deprecate the importance of general
purpose forces appears to reflect a calculation that the existence of
nuclear weapons can and will deter both sides from initiating war.
5. The military, who are more immediately concerned with developing
forces for use in the event deterrence fails, have naturally taken the
question of general purpose forces much more seriously. However,
they have not been of one mind on the question of the role of theater
forces in nuclear war. There has been complex debate over the issue.
Some have taken the Khrushchevian or modernist approach with its
emphasis on deterrence. Most have argued for a war-winning military
capability in both strategic and theater forces, including mass armies
ready for immediate employment. Out of the debate, compromise posi-
tions on military doctrine were formulated and were published in the
open press. These compromises were contradictory and precarious.
That they satisfied no school of Soviet military thought became evident
through revisions and criticism in the public press.
6. The 1960-1961 cut in the numerical size of Soviet forces, which
Khrushchev sponsored, was resisted by the military. The process of
reduction had stalled even before Khrushchev announced the augmenta-
tion of Soviet forces as a foreign policy move in the 1961 Berlin crisis.
In early 1963, when his political position seemed to have weakened,
Khrushchev spoke defensively about the primacy of military needs and
hinted strongly at increased military spending. Recently, however,
Khrushchev has reverted to public advocacy of reductions in both the
military budget and the size of the forces.
7. In sum, the development of Soviet general purpose forces since the
mid-1950's has not, in our view, resulted from Soviet pursuit of a well-
defined concept of the role of these forces in war. In the future, Soviet
policy towards these and other types of forces will continue to be shaped,
not only by a variety of strategic, historical, technical, economic, and
political factors, but also by differing views about the relative importance
of these factors and by shifting compromises among these views. The
fluctuations in this ongoing debate rather than a single, clearly-defined
strategic concept are likely to govern the size and composition of Soviet
general purpose forces through the period of this estimate.
II. SOVIET THEATER FORCES
A. Past Trends in Development
Reorganization and Modernization of Ground Forces
8. The Soviets have pursued an ambitious program to convert World
War II rifle, horse cavalry, tank, and mechanized divisions into highly
mobile, heavily armored units. The modernization of the huge, rela-
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tively unsophisticated ground forces was an enormous undertaking.
It made heavy demands on motor vehicles, electronic equipment, and
skilled personnel, all of which were in short supply in the USSR. Con-
currently with the modernization of the Soyiet theater forces, the Euro-
pean Satellite armies were organized and equipped from the ground up.
In addition, the Soviets also equipped Asian Communist forces with large
quantities of materiel, including that expended in the Korean War.
9. We believe that all Soviet line divisions are now at least nominally
constituted as modern tank, motorized rifle, and airborne units, although
we doubt that the process of reorganization and re-equipping has been
completed in all cases. Moreover, it is evident that there were im-
provisations along the way. Some equipment adopted as standard was
far short of desired military specifications. For instance, the original
armored personnel carriers were general purpose trucks with light
armor added. Most armored personnel carriers presently in service lack
overhead cover, and, being wheeled rather than tracked, have poor cross-
country mobility.
10. In order to provide combat support to the modernized ground ele-
ments, the Soviets required artillery with greater mobility, more and
better engineer support, much better communications, modern tactical
aviation, and a mobile field army air defense system. As the ground
forces were progressively converted, their ability to conduct operations
with a minimum of logistic support supplemented by field improvisation
was diminished. In particular, requirements for fuels, lubricants, and
maintenance for the vastly greater number of vehicles increased sharply.
The Soviets apparently paid less attention to providing the modernized
support structure required for the theater forces than to reorganizing
and re-equipping the line units.
Tactical Air and Missile Support
11. The emphasis given strategic defense of the USSR against bomber
attack in the late 1940's and early 1950's has had a considerable influence
on developments in Soviet tactical aviation. The Soviet program during
those years to develop and produce jet interceptors was very large, but
all models were short-range types and fighter-bombers with offensive
capabilities comparable to those in Western tactical air forces never
appeared. Tactical air units were equipped with the same interceptors
that were provided to strategic air defense units, despite their poor
characteristics for ground attack missions. On the other hand, during
the years 1949 to 1957 a large number of first generation jet light
bombers (BEAGLE) were produced for strike and reconnaissance roles
within theater forces.
12. During 1960-1961, the total number of jet fighters and light
bombers in tactical aviation was reduced to less than half of its prior
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strength. The sharpest reductions resulted from the deactivation of
aging BEAGLEs, probably due in large part to a Soviet decision to rely
heavily on missile strikes, including MRBMs and IRBMs, in nuclear
war. There was also a reduction in fighter strength, probably due in
large part to increased reliance on surface-to-air missiles introduced
during the same period for air defense of the homeland and of field forces.
Since 1961, the number of combat aircraft in tactical aviation has re-
mained fairly stable.
13. The changes in tactical aviation were accompanied, and in part
caused, by the advent of missile systems for the tactical support of
ground force operations. Since the end of World War II, the Soviets have
developed several types of short-range unguided rockets and ballistic
and cruise-type missiles for field use. Early generation ballistic missiles
included a Soviet version of the German V-2 and a Soviet-designed
follow-on system with about twice its range. Both of these systems had
low mobility and slow reaction times. We think they were probably
not deployed in large numbers and that, in any event, they have now
been superseded.
14. Since about 1957, the highly mobile SCUD 150 n.m. ballistic missile
system has been available to ground force units. Deployment in
strength to Soviet forces in East Europe and western USSR was probably
accomplished by about 1961. More recently, the SHADDOCK, a truck-
mounted 300 n.m. cruise missile system, has been introduced. We be-
lieve that the SCUD and SHADDOCK are the principal surface-to-surface
missiles (other than unguided rockets) now in service with Soviet theater
forces. Their increasing availability provides the theater forces with
important missile delivery capabilities for high explosive, toxic chemical,
and nuclear warheads.
Personnel Strengths
15. During the Korean conflict the number of men in the Soviet
theater forces reached a post-World War II high of roughly four million.
By the late 1950's, this strength had been reduced to roughly two mil-
lion. As the net result of changes that have occurred since 1959, the
theater forces have been further reduced to a level which we estimate
is within the range of 1.7 to 1.9 million at present.4 We believe that
numerous line divisions and tactical air units have been deactivated over
the years, but that the reduction in the number of line divisions has
not been proportionate to the personnel reductions. There is evidence
"These numbers include 1.6-1.8 million in theater ground forces and about
100,000 in Tactical Aviation. They exclude roughly 400,000 general command
and support personnel, most of whom have been included in previous estimates
as part of theater forces. These personnel support all elements of the Soviet
military establishment." See Annex A, Table 1.
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that in many cases the Soviets elected to cut manning levels within
divisions, thus reducing the proportion of divisions maintained at com-
bat strength. A low ratio of nondivisional support units to divisions has
continued despite the growing logistic and maintenance requirements
of a more mechanized army.
B. Current Size and Composition
Manning Levels of Divisions
16. There is little direct evidence on which to base an estimate of
the actual personnel strengths of Soviet divisions. From a variety of
reliable sources, including classified Soviet documents, we do know that
there are three general categories of divisions. The differences between
these categories are measured most conveniently in terms of the per-
centage of authorized personnel strength normally maintained in peace-
time. These differences, however, reflect a more fundamental element
of Soviet planning for mobilization in the event of general war or a threat
of general war. Much of this planning is designed to mount and sustain
large-scale operations against powerful NATO forces in Europe. The
Soviets evidently anticipate that some divisions would need to be ready
for combat on short notice, others would constitute reinforcements for
initial or very early operations, and still others would comprise a
longer term mobilization base. This planning, moreover, implies that
the required combat effectiveness of divisions' would vary depending
upon such factors as the time of their availability for commitment to
battle, the tasks they would be expected to perform, and the effectiveness
of the enemy forces they would face when committed.
17. Considering the fragmentary direct evidence on division manning
levels, limited evidence as to the total manpower available in the ground
forces, and the apparent basic structure of these forces, we estimate
that the three categories of Soviet line divisions have the following gen-
eral characteristics:
a. Category I or combat strength divisions are probably manned at 85
percent or more of authorized wartime strength. They are ready for
commitment to combat with little or no augmentation. They are in-
tended to form the backbone of first-echelon striking forces against
powerful enemy forces. They would have the highest combat effective-
ness of any Soviet divisions when committed.
b. Category II or reduced strength divisions are probably manned at
60-70 percent of authorized wartime strength. They could probably
be fleshed out with reservists and ready to move to a theater of opera-
tions within about a week or so. They are intended, therefore, to com-
prise reinforcements for early combat operations by Category I divisions.
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Their greatest usefulness would probably be as second-echelon or theater
reserve units.
c. Category III or cadre strength divisions are probably manned at
25 percent or less of authorized wartime strength, containing most of
their officer and NCO complements but few troops. They are intended
to comprise a longer term mobilization base. They could probably be
fleshed out with reservists within a week or so, but they would probably
not be suitable as reinforcements or replacements for operations against
powerful enemy forces for a matter of months. After several weeks,
however, they could probably be useful for mopping-up operations, line-
of-communications duties, or reconstruction work.
Number of Divisions
18. We have conducted a thorough review of all evidence bearing on
the number of Soviet divisions, their distribution by type, and their
geographic location. As part of this review we have made a detailed
assessment of 174 entities, each of which might be considered to be a
division on the basis of some kind of evidence, and have made judg-
ments as to which were firmly identified and which should be regarded
with lesser degrees of assurance. We have !also considered the number
of divisions likely to be associated with the corps and army structure
of the Soviet ground forces. Finally, we have calculated the probable
number of existing divisions taking into account the varying degrees
of uncertainty about individual organizations. From the results of
these cdmplementary forms of analysis, we conclude that the present
number of division-level organizations in the Soviet ground forces al-
most certainly falls within the range of 110-140.5
19. Considering the evidence available, we believe that no single num-
ber within the 110-140 range estimated above is more likely than any
other to be the actual total number of Soviet divisions. However, in
order to discuss the probable distribution of Soviet divisions by type
and location, we have had to employ the only form of analysis suitable
for this purpose?the assessment of individual entities. This form of
analysis produces a single number, 139, as the total number of entities
rated as firm, highly probable, or probable divisions, excluding those
rated as only possible. While using the results of this analysis in the
following paragraphs and in our tables as a matter of convenience, we
emphasize that the total number, 139, is no more probable than any
other in the 110-140 range. It should be noted that an assumption
that the total number of Soviet divisions is on the high side of the
This range is 10 divisions lower than the range estimated in NIE 11-14-62,
"Capabilities of the Soviet Theater Forces," dated 5 December 1962, SECRET.
The change results from re-evaluation and should not be taken to mean that
the USSR has reduced its forces by this amount in the past year.
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110-140 range would imply greater requirements for equipment and
nondivisional support, and so would tend to maximize any Soviet de-
ficiencies in those respects.
20. Our analysis indicates that the probable number of divisions
maintained at the highest peacetime manning level, i.e., Category I
or combat strength divisions, fall within the range of 60-75.6 In the
remainder of this estimate, to discuss the probable distribution by type
and location, we use the figure 75, a number which is appropriate only
? if the total number of divisions is 139. It should be noted that this
procedure maximizes the immediate Soviet threat in the event of war,
but it also maximizes the time required to bring additional divisions
to combat readiness, since most of the remaining 64 divisions would be
at cadre strength if, within a given total number of personnel, 75 divi-
sions were maintained at high strength.
21. The assurance regarding the identification of the 139 divisions
included in this estimate varies markedly with their location. Of this
total, 76 individual organizations are considered firmly and currently
established as divisions (in one or another of the three Categories), and
59 of these 76 are in areas west of the Urals. The divisions in Eastern
Europe are firmly identified; most of those in western USSR are firmly
identified or highly probable; those in more remote areas are much less
certain. Our evidence also leads us to believe that divisions in Eastern
Europe and western USSR are generally at higher manning levels than
divisions deep within the USSR. Thus, the uncertainty represented
by the range 110-140 involves primarily low strength divisions located
in areas remote from NATO, and does not significantly affect immediate
capabilities against NATO.
Types of Divisions
22. The Soviets have three types of line divisions: motorized rifle,
tank, and airborne. Even at wartime strength, all types of Soviet divi-
sions are considerably smaller than US divisions. Further, they are
much lighter in divisional logistic support and some types of combat
support. Since the publication of NIE 11-14-62, we have acquired
evidence leading us to believe that in about 1960 the Soviets reduced
the authorized wartime personnel strength of divisions by as much as
20 percent, together with some reductions in combat vehicles and
artillery. At the same time, new armaments were authorized for divi-
sions, such as anti-tank missiles, FROG 7 launchers, and new combat
vehicles.
6 This compares with the figure 80 estimated in NIE 11-14-62. In that estimate,
we made no attempt to arrive at a range of uncertainty. As in the case of the
total number of divisions, the change results from re-evaluation.
7 Similar to US HONEST JOHN.
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23. Motorized rifle divisions are the most numerous of the types
in the Soviet (and Satellite) ground forces; the 139 Soviet divisions
cited above include 87 motorized rifle divisions, 37 of them at combat
strength.8 In the course of the postwar evolution of the Soviet ground
forces this type of division was developed as a more compact version
of earlier mechanized divisions. The authorized personnel strength of
the motorized rifle division has been gradually reduced. There has been
a general trend to increase its armor and mobility in order to adapt
it to the combined arms tactics and fast rates of advance advocated in
Soviet doctrine for the nuclear battlefield. It is almost certain that
a significant proportion of the motorized rifle divisions are not yet
fully equipped according to the latest tables of organization and equip-
ment (TOEs).
24. Tank divisions have also evolved from World War II types. The
tank divisions are small and light in infantry troops when compared
to US armored divisions.8 In some tank divisions one of the three
organic tank regiments is equipped with heavy rather than medium
tanks, but there is some evidence that heavy tanks are being phased
out and replaced with mediums. In our recent review of evidence, we
have concluded that 11 divisions which we formerly identified as
motorized rifle or older mechanized divisions are probably tank divi-
sions.9 The 139 Soviet divisions cited above include 45 tank divisions,
31 of them at combat strength. As in the case of the motorized rifle
divisions, tank divisions are not yet fully equipped according to the
latest TOE.
25. Less evidence is available on the organization and strength
of Soviet airborne divisions than on other types. The division is prob-
ably similar to a motorized rifle division, but without heavier items of
equipment such as tanks and larger artillery pieces. The number of
airborne divisions has declined over the past few years from ten to
seven. They are all believed to be at combat strength.
Ground Armies
26. Most Soviet divisions are organized into combined arms armies
or tank armies, which contain the bulk of the combat and service sup-
port for the divisions. The composition of a Soviet ground army in
wartime would vary depending upon such factors as terrain and mis-
sion. Evidence from Soviet exercises and cla-ssified military writings
shows that the Soviets usually assume that a wartime ground army will
contain four or five divisions. In this estimate, we consider this to
The motorized rifle and tank divisions at authorized wartime strength are
believed to have about 11,000 and 9,000 men respectively. See Annex C, Tables 1
and 2 for TOEs.
These were carried as motorized rifle divisions in NIE 11-14-62.
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represent the size of a typical Soviet army, recognizing that many
variations are possible.
27. Our evidence indicates that about 22 or 23 armies now exist in
the Soviet ground forces. These armies are much smaller than the
image often invoked by the term "army," not only because of the
relatively small size of their divisions but also because of their paucity
of combat and service support elements. Supporting artillery, missile,
and antiaircraft artillery brigades and regiments are either allocated
to armies or retained under higher command headquarters. In addi-
tion th the armies, there is evidence that five to seven corps still exist,
and we believe that these serve, in effect, as small armies.
28. In the event of general war most of these armies would probably
be grouped into fronts. The Soviet wartime front is an echelon roughly
comparable to a Western army group.'? The Group of Soviet Forces,
Germany (GSFG) , which can be regarded as a front, contains four
combined arms armies and two tank armies.n While we have not
identified every army in the USSR as to type, there appears to be a
similar ratio of two combined arms armies to one tank army through-
out the ground forces.
29. A typical Soviet combined arms army (CAA)12 in wartime could
be composed of one tank division and four motorized rifle divisions
with organic army combat and service support troops. We believe that
the wartime personnel strength of such a CAA would be about 76,000.
The present strength of the four CAAs in GSFG, however, is estimated
to vary from 35,000 to 50,000. This lower strength is due in part to
the fact that these armies contain 3 or 4 rather than 5 divisions, but
probably also to their having an even smaller support structure than
that estimated for the wartime CAA.
30. Soviet tank armies 13 usually contain only tank divisions. We
believe that a typical tank army would be composed of four divisions,
although at present the two tank armies in GSFG contain only three
divisions each. The estimated personnel strength of a typical wartime
tank army would be about 53,000, whereas the two tank armies in
GSFG are estimated to contain about 35,000 troops each. The reasons
for this difference are probably basically the same as in the case of
the combined arms army. Soviet tank armies probably contain a
SCUD missile brigade, but no other nondivisional field artillery.
'? See Annex C, Table 5 for illustrative organization of a 'wartime front.
See Annex A, Table 2 for estimated composition of GSFG.
'2 See Annex C, Table 3 for illustrative organization of a wartime CAA.
28 See Annex C, Table 4 for illustrative organization of a wartime tank army.
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Tactical Air and Missile Support"
31. Soviet doctrine calls for a tactical air army (TAA) to support
major ground commands, generally at a ratio of one TAA per front
of four or five ground armies. The size and composition of the 10
identified tactical air armies varies considerably. With the exception
of the 24th TAA in GSFG, which has about 900 combat aircraft, these
units range in aircraft strength from about 125 to 350.
32. Since the reduction of Tactical Aviation a few years ago, it has
been generally stabilized in overall aircraft strength, with phasing in
of new model aircraft and continuing retirement of older models.
There are currently about 3,400 combat aircraft in Tactical Aviation,
comprising about 2,800 fighters and 600 light bombers, including recon-
naissance aircraft of both types.15 About half this total strength is
with Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, and most of the remainder is in
western and southern USSR.
33. Soviet tactical missile support includes free rocket (FROG)
launchers with ranges up to 26 n.m. These launchers are mounted
on a light tank chassis. Sightings of these weapons with Soviet units
have been rare, but we estimate that at least the Category I divisions
probably now have a FROG battalion with two launchers.
34. The SS-1 tactical ballistic missile (SCUD) is found at both army,
and higher echelons. The SCUD is mounted on a heavy tank chassis
which gives it cross-country mobility, and it employs storable liquid
fuel. The latest model has a maximum range of 150 n.m. with HE,
CW, or nuclear warheads; earlier models, probably still in service, have
this range with HE or CW warheads, but only about half the range with
nuclear warheads. A few SS-1 missiles have been sighted in GSFG, but
direct evidence of the extent of deployment is not available. The mis-
sile system has been operational for several years, however, and, on the
basis of its probable assignment to field army and higher echelons, we
estimate that about 210-240 SS-1 launchers in 35-40 six-launcher
brigades exist.
35. The Soviets have shown a growing interest in cruise missiles for
tactical use. The principal cruise missile now employed in support
of theater forces is the road-mobile SSC-1 (SHADDOCK), which can
deliver nuclear or CW warheads to a range of 300 n.m. The missile
employs a low altitude flight profile and flies at a low supersonic
speed. It may have replaced the 350 n.m. SS-2 (SIBLING) ballistic
missile as a front weapons system. The evidence is equivocal as to
whether SHADDOCK units are assigned to tactical air armies or to
U See Annex B, Table 1 for tactical missile characteristics.
See Annex A, Table 5 for numbers and location.
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separate front artillery formations, or to both. Our knowledge of the
extent of deployment of SHADDOCK is even poorer than that available
on SCUD, but on the basis of the same general considerations, we esti-
mate a present force level of some 50-60 launchers, the majority of them
in western border areas of the USSR.
36. We believe that over the past year or so, the quantity of tactical
guided missile launchers in theater forces has remained relatively stable
at some 250-300, while quality has improved with the introduction of
improved missile systems. Although nuclear warheads are probably the
primary 'armament for these missiles, there is some evidence that CW
warheads were provided for a relatively high percentage (about half).
This proportion is probably declining as nuclear warheads become in-
creasingly available. High explosive warheads are probably also avail-
able.
C. Current Strengths and Weakriesses
37. Soviet 'ground forces include a large number of line divisions
which can be readied for combat on short nOtice, backed up by others
constituting a large mobilization potential. The ready force is gen-
erally equipped with modern materiel, is highly mobile, and is designed
for effective employment in a nuclear environment. The troops are well
trained, highly disciplined, and have great endurance. Soviet con-
scripts are called up for three years or longer depending on their branch
of service and this system results in a fairly stable personnel structure
for theater forces. Soviet forces are at peak efficiency in late summer
and early fall. However, a decline in combat readiness occurs with a
one-third turnover in lower ranks later in the fall of the year. The
Soviets have recognized the need to avoid fluctuations in readiness and
are attempting to 'spread the induction of new recruits more evenly
through the year.
Nondivisional Support
38. Our evidence on nondivisional supporting elements is even more
fragmentary than that available on divisions. However, in view of the
increased requirements of the modernized Soviet ground forces, the
percentage of personnel in nondivisional elements appears austere. If
there are in fact 139 divisions, 75 of them in Category I, then the total
number of personnel in theater ground forces assigned to nondivisional
logistic and service support may now be as small as about 200,000.16 It
seems likely that Soviet forces in East Europe and western USSR have
more nondivisional 'support than those deep in the interior, but examples
of austere support for major units can be found even in GSFG, where
headquarters and service, support elements probably account for no
"See Annex A, Table 1.
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more than 10 percent of the total strength in each of the combined
arms armies. Based on the fragmentary data available, we think that
the number of nondivisional support personnel normally maintained
in peacetime is likely to be somewhat less than half of the wartime re-
quirement for a 139-division force.
Status of the Re-equipment Program
39. The program of modernization and reorganization has involved
the introduction in recent years of more advanced designs of many types
of equipment, including many types of missiles and improved combat
vehicles. In most instances, successive generations of equipment have
been produced since World War II. Although Soviet ground forces are
not fully equipped with materiel of the later designs, many older models
still in service remain generally effective. Despite the introduction of
several more advanced models of tanks, it appears that some 10 percent of
the medium tanks in GSFG are World War II-type T-34's. In certain key
categories of equipment, such as armored personnel carriers, general
purpose trucks, and POL transporters, there are good indications that
Soviet forces are short of total wartime TOE requirements. Authorita-
tive Soviet military spokesmen have alluded to equipment deficiencies
and problems of obsolescence.
40. Our evidence is fragmentary and inconclusive as to total Soviet
production and total inventories of ground force equipment.17 In previ-
ous estimates we presented inventory figures based on this evidence
and on calculated Soviet requirements, but we now consider that such
figures have insufficient validity to be included in an estimate. We are
currently re-evaluating the evidence in an effort to arrive at probable
ranges of uncertainty in total equipment inventories. Pending com-
pletion of this re-evaluation, the evidence does seem clearly to support
the belief that there are shortages of at least the types of equipment
mentioned above.
Mobilization Potential
41. The Soviets have available a large pool of trained reservists to fill
out existing units and mobilize additional units. About 500,000 trained
ground force personnel enter the reserve force yearly, not counting
those in home air defense forces. Most of the personnel released from
the active force over the past five years or so were probably trained
171n many cases, the evidence is so incomplete that widely varying estimates
can be derived from it, depending on the assumptions made. For example, the
available evidence supports a firm conclusion that a minimum of 10,000 T-54
tanks have been produced. The number is almost certainly larger than that.
On the basis of certain assumptions, the available evidence can support an in-
ventory figure of more than 40,000.
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with the more modern equipment and in current Soviet tactics. Enough
of these personnel are available as reservists to provide the additional
men required to fill out a theater ground force of 139 divisions and their
associated nondivisional support.
42. As indicated in previous paragraphs, our information on Soviet
equipment inventories is not good enough to support a confident judg-
ment about the adequacy with which 139 divisions could be equipped
in the event of mobilization. In general, we believe that Category I and
II divisions probably have nearly full complements of equipment, ex-
cepting only certain newer items. Whatever quantity of equipment is
available for Category III divisions, it is probably not as up-to-date as
that of the higher categories.
43. Should the Soviets choose to do so, additional divisions could be
formed by detaching cadres from existing divisions and calling up
trained reservists. There are probably sufficient inventories of some
types of equipment to allow for mobilization beyond a ?139-division force,
but shortages would make themselves felt even more severely if the So-
viets attempted such an expansion. Moreover, it is doubtful that all of
the necessary additional combat and service elements could be mobilized
at the same rate as divisions. Such a mobilization of additional divi-
sions would involve the loss of greater and more immediate capabilities
which could be achieved through fleshing out a 139-division force.
44. Almost all Soviet aircraft and ships are maintained in active
status. Naval and air reservists would probably be mobilized to bring
existing units up to full wartime personnel complements. We would
expect no significant increase in the operational inventory of ships
'and aircraft as a result of mobilization, but 'supporting elements would
probably be expanded.
Tactical Air and Missile Support
45. Soviet Tactical Aviation is currently characterized by a low num-
ber of aircraft relative to the size of the theater ground forces, limited
offensive capabilities, and the obsolescence of the force. The Soviets
are reducing deficiencies in Tactical Aviation through the introduction
of improved aircraft and armament, as well as increased training em-
phasis on ground support missions. The obsolescent BEAGLE (IL-28)
light bomber is still the mainstay of Soviet offensive 'tactical air 'sup-
port, but appears now to be phasing out in favor of FIREBAR A, a new
supersonic jet light bomber, which has entered service in small num-
bers. Some FIREBAR A's have radar bombing equipment. .
46. Most current Soviet fighters were designed primarily as inter-
ceptors and therefore have poor load-carrying and range capabilities
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for offensive missions.18 About 70 percent of the tactical fighters are
obsolescent FAGOTs, FRESCOs, and FARMERS. However, even with
their limitations, Soviet fighters can perform a variety of missions in
support of ground forces and can be equipped to deliver nuclear bombs.
Some of the newer fighters (FITTER and FISHBED C), although they
were also basically designed as interceptors, have improved character-
istics over the older models for offensive missions. The number of new
generation fighters in Tactical Aviation has increased from 25 percent
of the total inventory to 30 percent over the past year.
47. Soviet tactical missiles, particularly the FROGs and SCUDs
(SS-1), have good mobility and appear rugged and simple in design.
However, some classified Soviet articles have 'criticized the inability of
tactical missile units to maintain continuous fire support because of
the time required to displace them to new firing positions. These articles
reflected the desire of Soviet theater ground force officers to have
MRBMs allocated to their operational control, but their proposals were
evidently rejected.
Theater Force Air Defense Capabilities
48. Despite increasing numbers of surface-to-air missiles, Soviet
theater force air defenses still rely primarily on automatic 'antiaircraft
weapons (57mm and smaller) and tactical aircraft. The introduction
of nearly 200 new FISHBED D interceptors into Soviet tactical air units
(including over 100 in East Germany) has significantly increased air
defense capabilities. SA-2 missile units are now believed to be assigned
to armies and higher echelons, but because of displacement time and
lack of low altitude capabilities, this system has only limited effective-
ness in a rapidly moving situation. The automatic antiaircraft weapons
currently constitute the only defenses mobile enough to provide con-
tinuous air defense for troops when fighter cover is not available, and
the effectiveness of these weapons against modern high performance
aircraft is minimal.
Tactical Nuclear Capabilities
49. Nuclear weapons appear not to be physically located with field
forces in peacetime. As far as we can determine, they are stored in
Ministry of Defense depots located within the USSR, although there
is some evidence, which we have not been able to confirm, that two nu-
clear depots may exist in East Germany. Special units of KGB (Com-
mittee of State Security) troops have been created to maintain custody
of nuclear weapons, not only in storage, but also during transportation
to firing units. Once their use was authorized by national leadership,
18 See Annex B, Table 3 for estimated close support capabilities of tactical
aircraft.
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tactical nuclear weapons would be delivered to firing units by the special
KGB units.
50. Command and allocation lines of authority for the use of nuclear
weapons run from the High Command to commanders of fronts and, in
some cases, armies. These procedures give the national leadership sub-
stantial control over the numbers and yields of weapons employed in
major theaters. Allocations within the theater are governed by estab-
lished guidelines which limit the freedom of field commanders to select
targets. The entire system of oommand and control appears well de-
signed to reserve to the national leadership the decision to initiate use
of nuclear weapons.
51. The broad range of nuclear tests in 1961 and 1962 points to an
effort to improve the nuclear capabilities of all arms of the Soviet military
establishment. The numbers of nuclear weapons available to the Soviet
theater forces have probably been limited by higher priorities afforded the
strategic attack forces. Nevertheless, we believe that a variety of tacti-
cal nuclear weapons is now available, virtually all of them with yields
in the kiloton range, but possibly including some in the low megaton
range. The Soviets are probably developing subkildton warheads, but
there is no present evidence that they are developing delivery systems
specifically for such weapons.
52. Classified documents indicate that Soviet military planners for the
past few years have been in a position to think in terms of committing
up to a few hundred nuclear weapons in a front operation. Initial nu-
clear strikes are considered crucial to an operation. A high volume
of concentrated nuclear strikes is called for prior to offensive thrusts
by ground forces, with theater forces expending a large percentage of
their nuclear weapons allocations in these strikes. The primary targets
in all phases of theater operations remain enemy nuclear delivery sys-
tems. To the extent of weapons availability, nuclear strikes would also
be directed at command and control complexes, air defense facilities,
logistical installations, and major troop formations. We believe, how-
ever, that existing procedures, together with deficiencies in logistic sup-
port would hamper the Soviets in terms of operational readiness and
rapid response in their employment of tactical nuclear weapons. We
have no doubt that the Soviets are working to overcome these deficiencies,
although we have no evidence on their progress.
Other Supporting Capabilities
53. Chemical Warfare." We possess good technical data on the pres-
ent capability of Soviet theater forces to employ tactical cruise and
ballistic missiles and FROGs with toxic chemical warheads. In addi-
19For a fuller discussion, see NIE 11-10-63, "Soviet Capabilities and Intentions
with Respect to Chemical Warfare," dated 27 December 1963, SECRET.
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tion, chemical bombs and projectiles are available for use with other
delivery systems such as tactical aircraft, artillery, mortars, and barrage
rockets. Spray systems and land mines have also been developed.
Whereas our evidence indicates that missile warheads are bulk-filled
exclusively with one of the extremely toxic "V" agents, all other muni-
tions are apparently filled with less toxic nerve agents of the "G" type
(sarin or soman) or with agents of older types which first saw use in
World War I.
54. Our evidence indicates that Soviet organization, equipment, train-
ing, and research and development can support substantial toxic chemi-
cal warfare operations. Although some CW munitions are probably im-
mediately available to Soviet tactical units, logistical problems might
affect the Soviet's ability to bring their stored CW stocks into play against
NATO forces in Europe. About 75 percent of the probable toxic chemi-
cal depot storage we have identified is in Western and central USSR and
about 25 percent in the Far East. Nearly all that in the western and
central USSR is located in the Volga and Turkestan Military Districts.
It is therefore not well sited for use in a war in the West which began with
short warning times and involved heavy interdiction of transportation
facilities.
55. We believe that in Soviet thinking the same constraintS which
apply to the use of nuclear weapons apply also to toxic CW, and that
the use of either would require ar decision at the highest political level.
The present Soviet emphasis on CW munitions for theater operations
probably results in part from restricted availability of tactical nuclear
weapons due to the longstanding nuclear priority assigned strategic
forces. Considering this and other factors, we believe that the Soviet
leaders almost certainly would authorize the use of toxic chemical agents
by their theater field forces in a general nuclear war. In a non-nuclear
war, the Soviets probably would not initiate the use of toxic chemicals.
56. Biological Warfare. Intelligence derived from Soviet scientific
publications indicates continued interest and research in the field of
biological warfare. We have no evidence of current Soviet military
capabilities for application to theater operations, however, and we be-
lieve Soviet tactical use of BW highly unlikely.
57. Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defense. Soviet military
authorities evidently assume that the West would use chemical and
biological as well as nuclear weapons in the event of general war. All
elements of the Soviet forces stress training for chemical defense. This
training, as well as most items of chemical defense equipment, is in-
tended also for defense against radiation and biological warfare agents.
Manual and automatic radiation and chemical detection devices are
available, but sensitivity of the latter to nerve agents is inadequate to
guarantee human safety. An armored personnel carrier has been modi-
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fled for mobile chemical and radiation reconnaissance, but we do not
know the sensitivity of the detection systems. The chemical defense
equipment supplied the individual combat soldier is adequate to protect
him in a toxic environment for only a short time.
58. Reconnaissance. While there is little current information on So-
viet battlefield surveillance techniques, intelligence available does not
suggest that substantial progress has been made in overcoming long-
standing Soviet deficiencies in this field. Most Soviet aircraft designated
for this mission are obsolescent, although the FLASHLIGHT D, a new
tactical reconnaissance aircraft, is now available. In the theater ground
forces*there are 'apparently no longer any nondivisional armored recon-
naissance units; divisions themselves are expected to perform required
ground reconnaissance missions, but their specialized reconnaissance
elements are minimal. The reconnaissance equipment in operation is
apparently, for the most part, incapable of rapidly providing the ground
missile units with accurate fire-adjustment data, automatically processed
and transmitted. There are probably still serious organizational im-
pediments in the way of exploitation of collected intelligence. Some
Soviet authors have strongly criticized the system of battlefield surveil-
lance available, at least up to 1962, as incapable of fully meeting the
requirements of nuclear warfare.
59. Airlift. Approximately 185 light transport aircraft of the CAB,
COACH and CRATE types and about 380 medium turboprop transports
of the CAT, CAMP and CUB types are assigned by Soviet Military Trans-
port Aviation to support of airborne forces." The assigned transport
aircraft of the airborne troops are sufficient to airlift a single airborne
division in one sortie. The range of the Soviet troop transport aircraft
would limit the radius of airborne assault to about 700 n.m. from assembly
airfields. The probable addition in the near future of more transports
will enhance Soviet capabilities to lift large numbers of troops or cargo
to peripheral areas. We believe that in several years transports as-
signed to support of airborne troops may have twice the present lift
capacity, but still to limited ranges.
Ill. NAVAL GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
A. Past Trends in Development
60. Until recent years the Soviet Navy was equipped and trained for
a primarily defensive role. An intensive postwar shipbuilding pro-
gram, which reached its peak in 1955, produced a surface fleet including
"For estimated characteristics and performance of these and other Soviet
transport aircraft, see Annex B, Table 4.
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cruisers, destroyers, and escort ships, which was limited for effective
operations to the range of shore-based aircraft. The large Soviet sub-
marine force has been composed, for the most part, of types limited to
operations in the northeastern Atlantic and northwestern Pacific waters.
However, in the past few years the Soviets have developed an increasingly
diversified naval force with a new emphasis on ships, weapons, and equip-
ment of greater range and effectiveness.
61. Much of the impetus for technological change in the Soviet Navy
has come from the USSR's concern over the threat posed by ITS carrier
task forces and missile submarines. To counter these forces at sea,
the Soviets have introduced medium bombers equipped with air-to-surface
missiles, submarines equipped with cruise missiles, new classes of anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) ships, and improved weapons and electronic
systems. They have also introduced improved attack submarines, both
nuclear and diesel. Soviet surface forces have been strengthened by
the addition of missile armament to two cruisers and several classes
of destroyer and patrol craft, and by the introduction of new mine-
warfare ships.
21
B. Current Size and Composition
Submarine Force 22
62. Soviet capabilities for conducting operations at long distances from
the Soviet coast derive primarily from the submarine force. The total
strength of the Soviet submarine force has changed little in the past
few years, and we believe that for the period of this estimate it will con-
tinue to include about 375-400 first line units. However, with the con-
tinued emphasis on missile armament and nuclear propulsion, its ca-
pabilities are changing significantly. For example, in 1958, the USSR
had only about 20 diesel-powered, torpedo-attack submarines capable of
conducting patrols off North American coasts. It now has about 115
nuclear and diesel submarines with this endurance, about half of them
armed with missiles.
63. The bulk of the Soviet torpedo-attack submarine force consists of
diesel submarines, built for the most part in the 1950's. These include
some 174 W class, 19 Z class, 20 R class, and 30 Q class submarines.
Since 1958 the Soviets have produced 31 F class diesel submarines and
11 N class nuclear submarines; both of these classes have sufficient en-
durance to conduct long-range patrols.28
"See Annex B, Table 2 for characteristics of Soviet naval missiles.
"See Annex A, Table 8 for strength and composition.
"See Annex B, Table 8 for submarine characteristics and armament.
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Surface Forces"
64. Naval surface forces, which are still heavily dependent upon land-
based logistic and air support, appear suited primarily for defensive
operations in waters adjacent to the USSR. Conventionally armed major
surface units now comprise 14 light cruisers, 85 destroyers, and 62 de-
stroyer escorts. In recent years, however, the Soviet Navy has consider-
ably increased the firepower of its surface forces by the addition of
missile armament, including surface-to-air missiles, which has extended
the potential scope of effective operations. The only known major sur-
face combatant ships now being built in the USSR are guided missile
destroyer types. The Soviets now have operational 14 destroyers armed
with cruise-type missiles for use against surface. targets. In addition
to their missile armament, most of these ships also carry ASW weapons
systems. They are probably intended primarily for operations against
both naval striking forces and submarines, either in defense of the sea
approaches to the USSR or in coastal areas in support of theater field
forces.
65. The Soviet auxiliary fleet, composed primarily of older ships, is
being augmented by new tankers and cargo ships, and logistic support for
submarines is being reinforced by the addition of submarine tenders,
rescue ships, repair ships, and missile support ships. Additional logistic
support could be provided by the growing Soviet merchant marine. The
widespread Soviet fishing fleets could also provide limited support to
submarines, and they have considerable utility for training, minewarf are,
and collection of intelligence.
Naval Aviation 25
66. Soviet Naval Aviation underwent a drastic reorganization in 1960
with the deactivation or transfer of all naval fighter units. Naval Avia-
tion is now composed largely of jet medium bombers, but also includes
jet light bombers, patrol aircraft, and helicopters. Its capabilities are
focused primarily on reconnaissance and strike missions against mari-
time targets, and to some extent on antisubmarine warfare. Defensive
air cover for naval operations would have to be provided by fighter air-
craft not subordinate to Naval Aviation.
67. Nearly 300 of Naval Aviation's 365 BADGER jet medium bombers
are equipped to deliver antiship air-to-surface missiles. These missiles
are of two types: the subsonic AS-1, which has a range of 55 n.m., and
the supersonic 100 n.m. AS-2. Both are estimated to have a CEP of
150 feet against single, well-defined ship targets and some of these mis-
" See Annex A, Table 8 for strength and composition.
26 See Annex A, Table 9, for composition and distribution.
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siles probably carry nuclear warheads. Missile-launching BADGERS
are either configured to carry two AS-1's or one AS-2.
68. Naval medium bomber strength will probably increase slightly over
the next five years. We believe that Naval Aviation has received some
supersonic-dash BLINDER medium bombers, and they will probably ap-
pear in greater strength within the next few years. Some of these may
be equipped with air-to-surface missiles.
69. Most of the naval BADGERs which are not equipped with missiles
are assigned to reconnaissance or support roles. Recent evidence indi-
cates an increasing use of medium and heavy bombers of Long Range
Aviation on maritime reconnaissance missions; overflights of US carrier
task forces also suggest an attack training mission for these aircraft.
We believe that the naval requirement for long-range aerial reconnais-
sance is growing, and that it will be met either by the continued use of
Long Range Aviation aircraft in this role, or by the assignment of long-
range aircraft to Naval Aviation.
C. Current Strengths and Weaknesses
70. In recent years, the missions of the Soviet Navy have been ex-
panded to encompass strategic missile attack against foreign territory
and operations against Western naval forces, while retaining the more
traditional roles of interdicting Western sea lines of communication,
defending the littoral of the Soviet Bloc, and providing support for the
seaward flanks of ground forces. Soviet surface forces operating outside
coastal waters would lack air cover, although in certain circumstances
SAM-equipped ships may operate beyond the range of land-based air
cover.
Against Carrier Task Forces
71. Soviet capabilities against carrier task forces have been improved
by continued conversion of jet medium bombers to carry antiship mis-
siles and by the introduction of submarines equipped with cruise-type
missiles. In the European area, BADGERS with antiship missiles could
operate against surface ships in the northeastern Atlantic, the Norwe-
gian and Barents Seas, and much of the Mediterranean. These capa-
bilities are, of course, subject to problems of target detection and identi-
fication. In the past year or so, reconnaissance of open ocean areas
by Long Range and Naval Aviation hias increased. Submarine opera-
tions against carrier task forces could extend to US coastal waters.
Against Sea Lines of Communication
72. The threat of the Soviet submarine fleet to Free World sea lines
is greatest in the northeast Atlantic and northwest Pacific. The capa-
bility of Soviet submarines to interdict these supply lines would depend
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on a number of factors: endurance of the submarines, transit time to
station, repair and overhaul requirements, logistic support, and the ex-
tent of opposition. Interdidtion operations against North Atlantic sup-
ply routes would be undertaken largely by submarines of the Northern
Fleet. We estimate that this force includes some 86 torpedo attack
submarines whose endurance would limit operations to the Norwegian
Sea and eastern Atlantic, as well as eight diesel submarines equipped
with 'antiship cruise missiles.
73. Not considering combat attrition, about 24 Northern Fleet subma-
rines could be maintained on station continuously in the eastern Atlan-
tic approaches to the UK and Europe; this number might be augmented
slightly by submarines deployed from the Baltic prior to hostilities. The.
Soviets could also maintain some 5-10 nuclear and diesel torpedo-attack
submarines on more distant stations for operations against shipping in
the western Atlantic and in the approaches to the Mediterranean. The
number in the western Atlantic could be More than doubled if the So-
viets were able to provide logistic support during patrols from a forward
base such as Cuba.
74. In the Pacific, the Soviets are estimated to have some 57 torpedo-
attack submarines which they could use against sea lines of communi-
cation as well as six nuclear and three diesel submarines equipped
with antiship missiles. While only one-third of this force has sufficient
endurance to operate off the US west coast, the remainder can oper-
ate in those areas through which US shipping must pass to support
Pacific island bases and Asian allies. The Pacific Fleet now includes six
nuclear and three diesel-powered cruise-missile-launching submarines.
We believe the Soviets would employ these submarines primarily in an
antishipping role, but they could also be 'employed against land targets.
The Soviets could probably maintain some 13-20 submarines on station
in the ocean area between Hawaii and Japan, as well as about five off
the US Pacific Coast.
ASW Capabilities
75. Since the mid-1050's, the Soviets have made a major effort in the
construction of ASW ships, particularly 'small coastal types, and 'are
testing new helicopters and modified seaplanes. An ASW role may have
been assigned to Soviet F and R class submarines, as well as to the
nuclear-powered N class. Detection equipment and weapons now in
service 'include air-launched passive sonobuoys, 'airborne magnetic anom-
aly detection (MAD) equipment, depth charges, multiple tube ASW
rocket launchers, and passive homing torpedoes. ASW 'exercises have
expanded in scope, and training doctrine has become more sophisticated.
We believe that the USSR now has the capability to conduct fairly effec-
tive ASW operations within 50 miles of a major Soviet naval base against
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a conventional submarine operated by a moderately well4rained crew.
Against a conventional submarine with a crew experienced in evasive
techniques this capability would be materially degraded, and against a
nuclear submarine it would be very poor. Soviet ASW capabilities di-
minish rapidly as the distance from their naval bases approaches 200
miles, and beyond that distance must still be regarded as negligible.
Sealift
76. The amphibious assault capability of the Soviet Navy is extremely
limited. We have re-examined the numbers and characteristics of the
ships and craft available to the USSR for shore-to-shore operations; we
conclude that very few can be used for assault landings across open
beaches, and that these are suitable only for short-distance operations.
We now believe that only in the Baltic are there sufficient num.bers of
appropriately designed ships and craft to lift balanced forces in an am-
phibious assault. In this area, a maximum of two regiments can be
lifted. Token numbers of amphibious ships and craft in other fleet
areas could, of course, be used ship-to-shore for logistic support or for
small landing operations not requiring assault by balanced forces.
77.. The Soviets possess a total merchant ship lift in all seas which is
theoretically sufficient to transport 'approximately 20 motorized rifle
divisions; however, such .a lift would require port or 'other extensive off-
loading facilities in the landing area. Assuming all Soviet merchant
ships were available for use in their respective areas of registry, their
approximate lift capability would be: .
North Sea 21/2 motorized rifle divisions
Baltic Sea 5 motorized rifle divisions
-Black Sea 6 motorized rifle divisions
Pacific 7 motorized rifle divisions
IV. CONTRIBUTION OF THE EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITES
A. Warsaw Pact
78. Since May 1955, Soviet and European Satellite forces have been
part of a unified military 'command established, under the Warsaw
Pact. The headquarters of this command is in Moscow, and its Com-
mander in Chief is a Marshal of the Soviet Union as well as a First
Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR. 'Satellite defense ministers
are designated Deputy Commanders in Chief, but there is no evidence
that they regularly participate in the functions of the unified com-
mand, which are evidently handled almost exclusively by Soviet staff
officers.
79. In wartime, European Satellite military forces would be under
the ultimate control of the Soviet High Command, and we believe that
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the Warsaw Pact command as such would have little or no operational
role. The manner and extent to which the Soviets plan to employ
Satellite forces is probably determined by the Soviet estimate of their
reliability and effectiveness, and by the availability of supporting ele-
ments. Selected Satellite divisions, corps, and field armies would be
integrated directly into Soviet field armies or fronts. Others would be
retained under national command for offensive missions on secondary
frcints, as well as defense against NATO air attack and sabotage, theater
reserve, and line-of-communications security.
B. Ground Forces
80. The total personnel strength of the East European ground forces
is estimated to be 940,000 (excluding Albania). Of this total, more
than half are in the 62 Satellite line divisions.26 The remainder are in
combat and service support units and home air defense forces, as well
as general support for the Satellite military establishments. As in the
case of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, our evidence as to the existence
of Satellite divisions is relatively good. However, our evidence on or-
ganization and equipment, peacetime manning levels, and equipment
status varies from good in the case of some divisions to poor in the case
of others.
81. The divisions are organized generally along Soviet lines. Some of
the equipment for these ground forces is manufactured by the Satellite
armaments industries, but the bulk of it is supplied bye the Soviets.
Those models of ground force equipment which are in widespread use
with Soviet units are also on current issue in the Satellites. Items of
latest model Soviet equipment have been observed in some East European
armies, but these are certainly in even shorter supply in the Satellites
than in the USSR. In general, the equipment available to East German
divisions and to many Polish and Czechoslovak divisions appears to be
nearly comparable to that of GSFG in quality. We believe that 32 of
the Satellite divisions are sufficiently manned and equipped to be com-
mitted to combat on short notice in conjunction with Soviet forces. Of
these divisions we estimate that 8 are Polish, 8 Czechoslovak, 6 East
German, 5 Bulgarian, and 5 Rumanian.
C. Tactical Air and Missile Support
82. While the primary mission of Satellite air forces is air defense,
fighter units are being trained and equipped to perform ground attack
missions as well. These air forces are made up largely of obsolescent
aircraft.27 However, more advanced fighters are being furnished to
2? For details of location and type, see Annex A, Table 4.
For details of type and location, see Annex A, Table 6.
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the Satellites and we believe this trend will continue. Certain key cities
of East Europe are defended by SAMs of the SA-2 type, but the Satel-
lites still depend heavily on their fighter aircraft for air defense. The
Satellites have dual capable weapons of various types, but the Soviets
are almost certainly unwilling to provide them with nuclear bombs and
warheads. There is evidence that SCUD and FROG missiles are being
provided to some of the Satellites.
D. Reliability
83. The political reliability of the Satellite forces is still a critical
consideration in Soviet planning for their employment. Their utility
would vary among units and nationalities, and would further depend
on the circumstances, including the cause and nature of the hostilities,
and the nationality of the opposing forces. By careful selection of
courses of action and missions, the USSR could make effective use of
Satellite forces, but it could not count upon them for the full range of
operations against NATO.
V. GENERAL WAR CAPABILITIES AGAINST NATO
A. Current Operational Doctrine
84. The Soviets are preparing their theater forces against the con-
tingency of general nuclear war. Soviet military doctrine does not
address itself in any depth to the variety of circumstances in which
general nuclear war might begin. Although there is increasing atten-
tion given to general war resulting from escalation, most Soviet military
writings assume that such a war would be initiated by a Western attempt
to launch strategic attacks against the Soviet Bloc. In this context,
a primary Soviet concern is to ensure that the theater forces would
be able to survive the massive employment of nuclear weapons by the
enemy and to fight effectively in conjunction with the USSR's own air
and missile strikes.
85. During an initial nuclear exchange, the role of theater field forces
would be secondary to that of strategic attack and air defense forces,
but theater forces would be expected to contribute to initial Soviet
offensive and defensive action by engaging the enemy on a broad front
and by neutralizing nuclear weapons and bases where possible. The
ultimate strategic objectives of Soviet theater operations in general war
would be to defeat enemy ground forces and to occupy strategically im-
portant territory. The principal operations of Soviet theater forces in
general war would be directed against NATO in Europe. Soviet plan-
ning evidently calls for moving massive forces rapidly toward the Chan-
nel coast in the initial days of such a war.
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86. Soviet operational doctrine recognizes that in the event of general
war, NATO's nuclear delivery capability imposes a need for dispersal,
mobility, and flexibility in deployment and control of Soviet theater
forces. To meet these needs, Soviet operational doctrine calls for the use
of armored units as the key element of maneuver, and tactical missiles
and rockets with nuclear and CW warheads as the chief elements of fire-
power. Soviet doctrine also calls for a rapid and continuous rate of
advance for ground forces (up to 100 km per day), without the traditional
degree of concern for open flanks or by-passed enemy forces.
B. Forces Available for Employment
87. A great many variable factors have decisive bearing on the size
of the forces which the Soviets could and would employ in operations
against NATO. Some of the most important of these are: (a) the man-
ner in which the conflict arose, i.e., whether suddenly or more grad-
ually; (b) the number of units which would be retained as a mobiliza-
tion and training base; (c) the extent of employment and the combat
effectiveness of Satellite divisions; and (d) force requirements in other
areas. We are not certain as to the quantities of weapons and equip-
ment available for mobilization purposes. However, we believe that
shortages of some types of combat and support equipment, as well as
of trained specialists for support units, would impair the effectiveness
of an expanded force.
Ground Forces s
(
88. Soviet theater ground forces are disposed in such a manner that i
the bulk of their strength is available for use against NATO. Of the \
139 28 divisions whose identification is considered firm, highly probable,
or probable, 105 28 are located west of the Urals. About 65 28 of these
are believed to be in Category I (combat strength), and have probably S
been given the highest level of support within Soviet ground forces.
Our detailed assessment of the types and locations of combat strength
i
Soviet divisions available for employment against NATO is as follows:
i
MTZ Ant-
LOCATION RIFLE TANK BORNE TOTAL
Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG) 10 10 o 20
()
Northern Group of Forces, Poland (NGF) o 2 o 2
Southern Group of Forces, Hungary (SGF) 2 2 o 4
Western USSR 12 9 3 24
/
Northwest USSR 3 o 1 4
Southwest USSR 3 4 o 7
Southern USSR? 2 1 1 4
_
Total 32 28 5 65?
28 See paragraphs 17-21 for a discussion of the validity of these numbers.
29 Excludes four divisions opposite eastern Iran and Afghanistan.
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Air and Missile Support
89. We estimate that Soviet tactical air strength now in East Ger-
many, Poland, and Hungary consists of about 225 jet light bombers
and nearly 1,250 fighters.3? The Satellites (excluding Albania) have
about 165 light bombers and about 2,450 fighters, the latter serving
primarily air defense functions. In the entire European USSR, there
are in Tactical Aviation an additional 275 light bombers and about
1,450 fighters. In addition to the tactical delivery systems available
to the Soviet forces in East Europe and those organic to reinforcing
Soviet formations, some medium and intermediate range missiles and
medium bombers would almost certainly be directed against targets
of immediate interest to the theater forces.
Naval Support
90. The units assigned to the three Soviet fleets in the European
area are estimated as follows:
TORPEDO
BALLISTIC
CRUISE
ATTACK
MISSILE
MISSILE
DESTROYERS
FLEETS
SUBS
SUBS
SUBS
CRUISERS AND ESCORTS
Northern
126
39
8
3 50
Baltic
84
0
1
5 33
Black Sea
45
0
1
6 32
Of the forces in ?the Northern Fleet, with unrestricted access to the
open seas, we estimate that there are some 86 torpedo-attack sub-
marines whose armament and endurance makes them best suited for
antiship operations in the northeastern Atlantic. The eight cruise mis-
sile subs are also available for such missions. The surface ships of
the Northern Fleet are capable of operations in the northeastern At-
lantic, but their operations would probably be confined to the North,
Norwegian, and Barents Seas within the radius of land-based air cover.
About 250 BADGER medium bombers, the bulk of them equipped with
ASMs, and about 40 MADGE seaplanes are assigned to the three Euro-
pean fleets.
C. Capabilities to Launch Campaigns Against Central Region
Immediately Available Forces
91. The size of the ground and tactical air forces the Soviets could
employ initially against the Central Region of NATO would depend in
part on whether operations were begun on short 'notice or after a period
of preparation. The Soviets currently have 22 line divisions and about
1,200 tactical aircraft stationed in East Germany and Poland. Without
2.? The figures in this paragraph include reconnaissance aircraft.
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prior buildup, the Soviets could launch a limited objective attack against
Western Europe designed to maximize the chance of surprise. Such
an action, however, would conflict with Soviet doctrine concerning
the necessity for numerical superiority in the area of engagement.
Reinforcement Capabilities
92. Soviet military doctrine and training exercises indicate that, if
circumstances permitted, the USSR would seek to assemble a consider-
ably larger striking force for any campaign into Western Europe. Con-
sidering current Soviet doctrine for combat organization and echelon-
ment, as well as the geography of the area, we believe that a striking force
for such a campaign would probably comprise three fronts with a total
of 50-60 ground divisions and air support totalling some 2,000 tactical
aircraft. Soviet doctrine would also call for some theater reserve forces
in Poland and eastern Czechoslovakia.
93. The ground and tactical air forces to accomplish the reinforcement
could be drawn from the western military districts of the USSR and from
the Satellite forces of East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The
24 combat-strength divisions and about 1,000 tactical aircraft in western
USSR, as well as 22 of the Satellite divisions, would be the earliest avail-
able reinforcements. After some delay, additional divisions could be
drawn from lower strength divisions in western USSR, or from north-
western, southwestern, or southern USSR.
94. In arriving at an estimate of Soviet capabilities to augment forces
for a campaign into Western Europe, we have considered a number of
factors, including the capacity of the East European rail and road net-
works, the time required to prepare transportation systems to operate
at peak efficiency, the confusion factors common to all large military
movements, and the problems of organizing divisions and supporting
elements into effective armies and fronts. Considering all factors, we
continue to estimate that, under noncombat conditions, a 50-60 division
striking force could be assembled in East Germany and western Czech-
oslovakia and organized for operations against Western Europe within
about 30 days after a Soviet decision to do so. Such a force could com-
prise the 22 Soviet divisions normally stationed in East Germany and
Poland, plus 24 combat strength Soviet divisions from the western USSR,
plus 5-15 Satellite divisions.31 In addition, a theater reserve of Czech,
81 In terms of manpower, these divisions and their support would include:
Soviet ground troops normally stationed in East Ger-
many and Poland
330,000
Soviet ground troops from western USSR
480,000
Satellite ground troops
100,000-300,000
Total
910,000-1,110,000
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Polish, and Soviet Category II divisions could be assembled in eastern
Czechoslovakia and Poland. The Soviets would not expect to reinforce
on such a scale without detection.
D. Capabilities for Naval Operations Against NATO
95. Long-range torpedo-attack and cruise missile submarines, both
nuclear and diesel-powered, could be deployed in the North Atlantic for
operations against NATO naval forces, and this would probably be a
primary Soviet objective in the initial period of a general war. Those
aircraft of Long Range Aviation and Naval Aviation which are equipped
with antiship missiles could operate against surface ships in the north-
eastern Atlantic, the Norwegian and Barents Seas, and much of the
Mediterranean. The Soviet ballistic and cruise missile submarines could
contribute, in the initial period, to a campaign against western Europe
by attacks against important coastal targets. Attacks could also be
directed against some inland targets, depending on their location in rela-
tion to sea approaches and on the depth and effectiveness of Western
coastal ASW defenses. Following the initial phase of a campaign, part
of the Soviet submarine fleet could be deployed for operations against sea
lines of communication from North America.
E. Capabilities to Launch Campaigns in Other Areas
96. A major drive across central Europe would probably be accom-
panied by lesser thrusts in other military theaters, employing the ground
divisions adjacent to them and the limited numbers of tactical aircraft
not committed to the main westward thrust. In the following para-
graphs, we canvass Soviet strength available for such campaigns, on the
basis of the breakdown of divisions by number, category, and location
used in earlier sections of the paper. If the actual number of divisions
is toward the low side of our estimate of 110-140 divisions (60-75 in
Category I), Soviet forces available for simultaneous campaigns in
theaters other than NATO Central Region would be smaller than in-
dicated below.
97. For an initial campaign against Scandinavia, the USSR could use
the four combat strength and four understrength divisions facing Finland
and northern Norway. The four Soviet divisions in Hungary might form
the initial echelon of a front moving toward Italy. For a campaign into
Greece and Turkish Thrace, the USSR has available seven combat
strength divisions in the southwestern USSR and up to five Bulgarian
and five Rumanian divisions. Some of the seven Soviet combat strength
divisions in the Carpathian Military District, if not sent westward, could
also be used in this theater. The position of Yugoslavia as neutral, ally,
or enemy would be a key factor influencing the strategy of Soviet cam-
paigns against Italy or Greece and western Turkey.
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98. In the initial stage of a general war, limited operations might be
launched against Iran and eastern Turkey. Eight combat strength divi-
sions are stationed in southern USSR facing eastern Turkey and Iran;
because of logistic limitations, not all of these divisions could be employed
against eastern Turkey.
99. Soviet forces in the Far East number six combat strength and ten
understrength divisions, including one airborne division. The Far East-
ern forces have no significant capability for amphibious assault, although
there is a capability to sealift forces in merchant ships against such
areas as Japan, provided that adequate port facilities could be secured.
The theater forces in the Soviet Far East have been substantially reduced
in recent years, and it is doubtful that in the initial phase of a general
war the Soviets would launch a theater campaign in the Far Eastern area.
It is possible that additional Soviet theater forces will be moved to the
Far East because of an exacerbated Sino-Soviet dispute.
VI. LIMITED WAR CAPABILITIES
A. Non-Nuclear Theater Warfare
100. The Soviets have been especially concerned with developing con-
cepts and capabilities for waging nuclear theater campaigns. This
appears to have been in response to a NATO policy which was frankly
based on a resort to nuclear weapons from the beginning of hostilities.
More recently, the Soviets appear to have modified somewhat their ex-
pectations that any major conflict in Europe would either be nuclear
from the start or would inevitably escalate. Recent Soviet writings have
indicated that some thought has been given to the possibility of non-
nuclear warfare in Europe, in view of the US interest in building up NATO
conventional capabilities. The Soviets recognize the advantages to them
if an engagement in the European theater could be kept non-nuclear,
and have stated that a Soviet objective in such a conflict would be to
prevent escalation. But they also recognize that the risk of escalation
would be very great.
101. While current Soviet capabilities to conduct non-nuclear warfare
remain formidable, efforts to gear the theater forces for nuclear opera-
tions have had some adverse effects on conventional capabilities, particu-
larly in terms of firepower. The sharp decreases of past years in tactical
aviation and tube artillery would hamper the Soviet forces in the con-
duct of large-scale non-nuclear operations. Further, while we believe
that the austerity of combat and service support at all echelons of the
ground forces might suffice in the "quick-or-never" context of general
nuclear war, it is doubtful that it could support a more protracted con-
ventional conflict without considerable augmentation.
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B. Limited Nuclear Warfare
102. The Soviets have been even more reluctant to admit the possibility
that tactical nuclear weapons could be introduced into local war without
precipitating escalation to general war. They have evidently not elabo-
rated any doctrine for limited warfare involving the tactical use of
nuclear weapons. In May 1963, however, this possible use of nuclear
weapons was mentioned for the first time in open Soviet literature.
Limited nuclear warfare against NATO would pose acute problems to
the Soviets in that their most significant nuclear delivery capability
against European theater targets rests with MRBM/IRBM and medium
bomber forces whose bases are inside the USSR.
C. Distant Limited Military Operations
103. Soviet theater forces are primarily designed for operations in
areas contiguous to the Bloc. In recent years, the USSR has increased
its concern with areas remote from its borders, and the Cuban venture
shows that it can deploy small ground and air contingents to distant
areas andmaintain them once deployed. However, the USSR would face
many disadvantages in any present attempt to initiate and sustain com-
bat operations in a distant area, or to deploy a large force to such an
area. It is severely limited in airlift, sealift, and naval support suitable
for distant military operations. Moreover, in many areas it lacks political
arrangements to insure that it could provide adequate logistic support.
104. There is no evidence that the USSR has established any special
military component trained and equipped specifically for independent
small-scale operations, although of course it can employ portions of its
existing forces. It is possible that over the next few years the Soviets
will seek to improve their capabilities for distant, limited military opera-
tions through the designation and training of appropriate forces, and
the development of equipment specifically for their use and logistic
support. They may attempt to overcome their geographic disadvantage
for applying such forces by negotiating with neutralist countries to
utilize available facilities for refueling and maintenance of Soviet mili-
tary aircraft or naval ships.
VII. TRENDS IN GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES TO 1970
A. Ground Forces
105. We believe that debate regarding the proper size of the Soviet
ground forces will continue within Soviet ruling circles over the next
few years. This debate will be shaped by the conflicting views which are
already evident on the appropriate role of these forces in general war.
Economic factors will also be a major consideration; even now Khru-
shchev is evidently pressing anew the case for reducing military manpower
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in order to free resources for higher civilian allocations. Those who
support the concept of a large standing army will probably contend, in
addition to their customary arguments, that the contingency of non-
nuclear war raised by current NATO discussions and the hostility of
Communist China are new factors reinforcing their propositions.
Within the context of a possible force reduction, or independent of it,
there is a possibility that Soviet forces in East Europe will be scaled down,
primarily for political effect.
106. Much will depend on the evolution of NATO itself. The Soviets
will observe the Western Alliance not only in order to respond to changes
in its military capabilities, but also to assess its cohesiveness and deter-
mination. NATO's ability to agree upon and implement significant im-
provements in forces would probably increase the deterrence to Soviet
resort to arms, but it would also add to the arguments that the USSR
should not reduce its ground forces and should concentrate upon raising
their quality.
107. The interaction of these factors over the next six years cannot
be wholly foreseen. In our view, however, the chances are good that the
number of personnel in theater ground forces will decline over the period.
The decline might come about as a result of economic pressures and of
repeated compromises in the debate lover military doctrine. This
process could lead, by 1970, to a theater ground force of about one and
one-half million men, that is, a reduction of some 100,000-300,000 from
present estimated strength. Such a reduced force might have some 100
to 120 line divisions, about half of them at combat strength.
108. On the other hand, we do not exclude the possibility of reductions
along the lines of Khrushchev's 1960 proposals, which implied a theater
ground force strength of about one-million men, perhaps backed up by a
territorial militia system. Such a drastic reduction would involve basic
strategic decisions which the Soviets thus far do not appear willing or
ready to make. Considering current indications from Soviet military
budgeting, and from the status of the military debate, we believe that
current plans for the size of theater ground forces would call for more
moderate reductions, such as outlined in the preceding paragraph.
109. Modernization will continue to improve the quality of Soviet
ground forces. The extent of improvement, however, will be closely
related to trends in total size; the larger the forces which the USSR
elects to retain, the more it will have to contend with obsolescence and
shortages. If the Soviets decide that they must seriously respond to the
contingency of non-nuclear warfare, they will probably provide increased
combat support as well as increased service support. Such efforts would
reinforce the pressures for a reduction in the number of line divisions.
110. Present trends in the ground weapons development program point
to a continuing emphasis on firepower and mobility. Specific areas of
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concentration probably will include improved, more mobile missile
weapons to defend against tactical aircraft, increased quantities of the
better armored personnel carriers, of T-62 medium tanks with smooth-
bore guns, and of guided missile antitank weapons. The Soviets may
introduce a new light reconnaissance tank to replace the PT-76, which
several Soviet military authors have criticized as being undergunned and
vulnerable, as well as a new medium tank replacing the main gun with
missile weaponry. More and better general purpose vehicles and in-
creased reliance on pipelines will reduce somewhat the Soviet dependence
on rail lines for logistic support.
B. Tactical Aviation and Missiles
111. We believe :that the Soviets will continue to modernize Tactical
Aviation, improving its ground attack capabilities in particular. We
expect the rate of modernization to increase over the next few years, and
we believe that tactical aircraft with much improved range and payload
characteristics will be introduced. We expect a gradual decline in total
numbers of tactical aircraft. The numbers of guided missiles in Soviet
theater forces will probably remain about constant, but new and im-
proved systems will probably be introduced. It appears likely that addi-
tional free rocket launchers will be assigned to divisions.
? C. Air and Missile Defense
112. Field force air defense capabilities will improve over the next few
years through the modernization of Tactical Aviation and probably
through the introduction of the SA-3 or follow-on SAM systems into
ground formations. There is considerable evidence that the Soviets
have been developing transportable ABM defenses for their field forces,
and we believe that such defenses could be operational in 1964. We have
no basis for determining the extent to which they may be deployed, but
it seems likely that considerable improvement of defenses against air-
craft would be a prerequisite to deploying an ABM vulnerable to air-
craft attack.
D. Naval Forces
113. We believe that the numerical strength of Soviet surface naval
forces will remain fairly stable over the next five years. Soviet production
of guided missile destroyers and of smaller specialized craft will probably
continue at about present levels. Modernization of destroyers will also
continue, and additional surface ships will probably be retrofitted with
missile armament. The aircraft strength of Naval Aviation is expected
to remain fairly stable with an increased proportion of new models such
as BLINDER, MALLOW, and MAIL. As regards missiles, we expect some
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extension of range, either through improvement in missile fuels or design,
or by improved target acquisition means, or both.
114. The USSR will continue to improve ASW and anticarrier capabili-
ties, primarily through the application of improved submarines and long-
range aircraft to these missions. The effectiveness of surface units at
distances beyond the range of land-based fighter cover will probably be
strengthened through the addition of SAM armament. Despite these
improvements, however, we believe that the capabilities of the Soviet
Navy to conduct surface operations in open ocean areas will remain
severely limited. In particular, it probably will have only a limited
capability to detect, identify, localize, and maintain surveillance on sub-
marines operating in open seas.
115. There is little evidence of the development within the Soviet Navy
of a capability to replenish ships on the high seas. However, we believe
the Soviets are developing a system for emergency mobile basing of sur-
face ships and submarines in their coastal waters. Mobile bases probably
will consist of several small ships for repair, refueling, and replenish-
ment of weapons and supplies. As the period advances, we think a num-
ber of such bases will be deployed in protected coves and fiords to provide
wider dispersal and thus enhance the survivability of the Soviet base
for naval operations.
116. The Soviets may seek to develop their amphibious lift capability,
but significant improvement will depend upon their acquisition of addi-
tional amphibious craft, extensive training, and development of a reliable
logistic support system. There are few current indications of efforts
along these lines.
E. Nuclear Weapons
117. Shortage of nuclear weapons for support of theater forces will
probably be alleviated by 1970, even if the Soviets allocate priority to air
and missile defense warheads. If no such priorities interfered, the
Soviets could probably have the numbers of tactical nuclear weapons
which they would consider requisite for theater forces within two or
'three years. Soviet procedures for control and use of tactical weapons,
as well as reconnaissance and target acquisition, are likely to improve
significantly over the next year or so, particularly should the Soviets
come to give more credence to the possibility of limited nuclear warfare.
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ANNEX A
STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION OF SOVIET AND EAST
EUROPEAN SATELLITE GENERAL PURPOSE 'FORCES
TABLES
Table 1: ILLUSTRATIVE BREAKDOWN OF PERSONNEL IN SOVIET
GENERAL PURPOSE AND GENERAL SUPPORT FORCES
Table 2: ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION OF THE
GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES, GERMANY
Table 3: ESTIMATED NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET
GROUND DIVISIONS AS OF OCTOBER 1963
Table 4: ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITE
GROUND FORCES AS OF OCTOBER 1963
Table 5: ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF SOVIET TACTICAL AIRCRAFT
BY LOCATION AND TYPE AS OF OCTOBER 1963
Table 6: ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITE
AIRCRAFT BY TYPE AS OF OCTOBER 1963
Table 7: ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN
SATELLITE TACTICAL AIRCRAFT BY TYPE, MID-1964 TO
MID-1969
Table 8: ESTIMATED SOVIET NAVAL STRENGTH AND DEPLOY-
MENT, OCTOBER 1963 TO MID-1969
Table 9: ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF SOVIET
NAVAL AVIATION AS OF OCTOBER 1963
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Table 1
ILLUSTRATIVE BREAKDOWN OF PERSONNEL IN SOVIET GENERAL PUR-
POSE AND GENERAL SUPPORT FORCES
This table is based on a 139-division force with 75 at combat strength. It accounts for the
total estimated Soviet military personnel strength less those assigned to strategic
attack missions and to air defense of the homeland (PVO). The table represents only
one of numerous possible breakdowns of military personnel strength which would be
reasonably consistent with the limited evidence available.
1. General Purpose Ground Forces
1,700,000
Category I Divisions g
660,000
Category II and III Divisions b
310,000
Combat Support
480,000
Service Support d
260,000
2. General Purpose Naval Forces
400,000
Forces Afloat
175,000
Supporting Shore Establishment g
175,000
Coastal Defense
25,000
Naval Aviation f
25,000
3. General Purpose Air Forces
150,000
Tactical Aviation f
100,000
Military Transport Aviation g
50,000
TOTAL GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES.
2,250,000
4. Command and Service Support h
400,000
Assuming 75 divisions averaging 90% of authorized wartime strength.
h Assuming 64 divisions averaging 45% of authorized wartime strength.
e Assuming a 1 to 2 ratio of personnel in nondivisional combat support units to personnel
in divisions, a ratio consistent with evidence on GSFG.
A residual based on a general purpose ground force total of 1.7 million men, the mid-
point in our estimate of 1.6 to 1.8. Includes elements up through military districts and
groups of forces.
e Assuming a 1 to 1 ratio of military personnel in the shore establishment to personnel in
forces afloat. Includes elements up through fleet headquarters.
f Includes appropriate headquarters, air service detachments, and transport aircraft units.
g Includes headquarters and air service detachments. Helicopters, liaison, and utility
aircraft, not in other functional elements, are also included.
h This. entry presents separately general command and service support personnel,
many of whom have been included in previous estimates as a part of operational general
purpose forces. General command and service support elements back up strategic and air
defense forces as well as the general purpose forces. These elements include military per-
sonnel performing such functions as Ministry of Defense staff; service schools and pre-
operational flight training; zone of interior supply, medical, transportation, and construction
troops; research, development, test and evaluation personnel; and mobilization and in-
duction staffs.
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Table 2
ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION OF THE GROUP OF
SOVIET FORCES, GERMANY
UNIT
STRENGTH
GSFG TROOPS
Headquarters
2,400
Artillery Division
4,400
Missile Brigade SS-1
1,350
Engineer Regiment
1,500
Amphibious Engineer Regiment
900
Signal Regiments (5)
4,000
Guard Battalions (5)
1,900
Service Elements
39,400
TOTAL
52,550
ARMY LEVEL GROUND TROOPS (6 Armies)
Motorized Rifle Divisions (10)
92,700
Tank Divisions (10)
77,900
Mixed Artillery Brigades (3)
4,100
Antitank Artillery Regiments (4)
3,800
SS-1 Missile Brigades (6)
8,100
SAM Regiments (6)
6,000
Heavy Tank-Assault Gun Units (2)
2,000
Ponton Bridge Regiments (6)
5,400
Amphibious Engr. Battalions (4)
1,700
Engr. Construction Battalions (4)
1,400
Signal Regiments (6)
4,800
Chemical Battalions (6)
3,900
Motor Transport Bns (6)
1,600
Army Headquarters (6) and Service Support Elements
24,300
TOTAL
237,700
TACTICAL AVIATION (24th TAA)
35,000
TOTAL GSFG PERSONNEL STRENGTH
325,250
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Table 3
ESTIMATED NUMBERS . AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET GROUND DIVISIONS AS OF OCTOBER 1963
AREA
MOTORIZED RIFLE
TANK
AIRBORNE
TOTAL
NUM-
BER
COMBAT
STRENGTH b
REDUCED
STRENGTH
NUM-
BER
COMBAT
STRENGTH b
REDUCED
STRENGTH c
NUM-
BER
COMBAT
STRENGTH b
East Germany
10
10
0
10
10
0
0
0
20
Poland
0
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
2
Hungary
2
2
0
2
2
0
0
0
4
Western USSR
25
12
13
15
9
6
3
3
43
Southwestern USSR
8
3
5
5
4
1
0
0
13
Northwestern USSR
6
3
3
1
0
1
1
1
8
Southern USSR
18
4
14
4
2
2
2
2
24
Central USSR
9
0
9
0
0
0
0
0.
9
Far Eastern USSR
9
3
6
6
2
4
1
1
16
87
37
50
45
31
14
7
7
.139
The actual number of divisions in Soviet ground forces almost certainly falls somewhere in the range of 110-140. The
139-division figure used herein is no more likely than any other in that range, but is the result of the only analytical ap-
proach which permits a detailed breakdown of divisions by location, type, and strength category.
b Includes Category I divisions manned at 85 percent or more of authorized strength. These figures represent the
highest probable number of divisions in this Category, consistent with our estimate that the actual number is probably
somewhere in the range of 60-75. The figures therefore probably include some but not all Category II divisions, manned at
60-70 percent of authorized strength.
Includes Category III divisions manned at 25 percent or less of authorized strength, and such Category II divisions
as are not included under "combat strength."
Table 4
ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITE GROUND FORCES AS OF OCTOBER 1963
STRENGTHS
DIVISIONS.
TOTAL
IN
DIVISIONS
OTHER
UNITS b
TOTAL
RIFLE
MTZ.
RIFLE OR
MECH.
MECZ
TANK
AIR-
BORNE
East Germany
90,000
53,000
37,000
6
0
4
2
0
Poland
225,000
121,500
103,500
15
0
10
4
1
Bulgaria
125,000
72,000
53,000
10
0
7
3
0
Czechoslovakia
200,000
118,000
82,000
14
0
12
2
0
Hungary
100,000
37,500
62,500
5
0
4
1
0
Rumania
200,000
103,500
96,500
12
5
6
1
0
TOTALS
940,000
504,500
434,500
62
5
43
13
1
. Peacetime strength of Satellite divisions is estimated to range from 60 to 90 percent of wartime strength except for
the East German divisions which are at 95 percent strength and the Polish airborne division which is probably under 50
percent.
b Includes all nondivisional combat and service support units, home air defense forces, and command and general sup-
port elements.
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Table 5
ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF SOVIET TACTICAL AIRCRAFT BY LOCATION AND TYPE AS OF
OCTOBER 1963
FAGOT
FRESCO
A, B, C
FRESCO
D, E
FARM-
ER
FLASH-
LIGHT
A
FISH-
BED
C, E
FISH-
BED D
FIT-
TER
FLASH-
LIGHT
FIRE-
BAR
A
BEA-
GLE
TOTALS
(ROUNDED)
East Germany 25
175
40
85
25
100
110
125
10
30
140
860
Poland 10
70
25
35
60
25
35
40
20
320
Hungary
35
10
35
85
35
25
65
290
Baltic 20
30
10
10
10
20
10
35
90
240
Belorussia
130
20
10
30
30
220
Carpathian 45
200
10
45
20
10
65
400
Moscow
10
20
30
20
80
Leningrad
95
35
130
Kiev
65
..
..
65
Odessa 10
90
30
20
10
20
20
200
Trans Caucasus
25
10
40
20
10
35
140
Turkestan 70
70
20
20
180
Far East
165
35
10
70
280
TOTALS BY TYPE ?
(Rounded) 180
1,160
150
300
50
340
180
280
110
50
590
3,400
Table 6
ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITE
AIRCRAFT BY TYPE AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1963
FAGOT
FRESCO
A, B, C
FRESCO
D, E
FARMER
FLASH-
LIGHT A
FISH-
BED
C, E
FISH-
BED D
FLASH-
LIGHT])
BEAGLE
TOTALS BY
COUNTRY
(ROUNDED)
Albania
25
20
20
5
..
70
Bulgaria
35
170
30
100
20
20
380
Czechoslovakia
75
185
95
150
40
20
50
620
East Germany
240
50
40
35
360
Hungary
..
35
35
10
60
140
Poland
220
190
160
60
20
70
720
Polish Navy
25
35
10
5
10
90
Rumania
110
80
10
35
'
40
15
290
TOTALS BY TYPE
490
960
410
400
40
200 5
160
2,700
(Rounded)
Although FISHBED D has not been firmly identifiepi in these countries, we believe that the aircraft is now entering
inventory.
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Table 7
ESTIMATED NUMBERS OF SOVIET AND SATELLITE TACTICAL AIRCRAFT, OCTOBER 1963 TO MID-1969
Cn
rn
r)
?1
ocToDER
1963
MID-1964
MID-1965
MID-1966
MID-1967
MID-1968
miD-1969
cn
rn
n
rn
Soviet
Old Models be
Current Models'
Future Model d
TOTAL
Satellite
Old Models b
Current Models d
TOTAL
2,400
1,000
0
1,800-1,700
1,200-1,600
0
1,200-1,000
1,500-2,000
0
800- 600
1,700-2,200
0
400- 200
1,800-2,400
0? 100
150-0
1,800-2,400
50- 200
0
1,700-2,200
100- 400
3,400
2,500
200
3,000-3,300
2,100-2,000
400- 600
2,700-3,000
1,700-1,500
700-1,000
2,500-2,800
1,400-1,200
1,000-1,300
2,200-2,700
1,100- 900
1,300-1,600
2,000-2,600
700- 600
1,600-1,900
1,800-2,600
500- 400
1,700-2,000
2,700
2,500-2,600
2,400-2,500
2,400-2,500
2,400-2,500
2,300-2,500
2,200-2,400
41.
. The Soviet aircraft shown in this table include only those assigned to Tactical Aviation. For additional aircraft which are assigned to air
defense of the USSR, see Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11-3-62. The primary mission of the Satellite aircraft is air defense, but they could
also be used for tactical missions.
b Includes FAGOT, FRESCO, FARMER, FLASHLIGHT A, and BEAGLE, aircraft which phased out of production prior to 1960.
Includes FLASHLIGHT D, FISHBED, FITTER, FIREBAR A, aircraft which were in production during 1963. FISHPOT may enter
Satellite forces by mid-1966.
d An advanced design tactical fighter estimated to become operational as early as mid-1967.
e As the current models have been phased into operational units, the older models have been retained in considerably greater numbers than
was previously anticipated. The future numbers reflect our estimate of probable retirement of older models due to prolonged time in service.
While it seems likely that large numbers will be retired in the next few years, recent trends suggest that these older models may be retained at
higher levels than shown. Their operational status remains questionable.
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Table 8
ESTIMATED SOVIET NAVAL STRENGTH AND DEPLOYMENT OCTOBER 1963 TO MID-1969 nb
BY FLEETS, OCTOBER 1963
TOTAL
OCTO-
TYPE
OF
SHIP
BLACK
MID-1964
MID-1965
MID-1967
MID-1969
NORTH
BALTIC
PACIFIC
BER
SEA
1963
FIRST LINE SUBMA-
RINES
Nuclear
Ballistic Missile
(H or successor) 11
11
13-15
15-20
19-28
23-36
Cruise Missile (E)
6
6
8? 9
10-12
14-20
18-28
Torpedo Attack
(N or successor) 11
11
15-13
19-15
27-19
35-23
TOTALS 22
6
28
36-37
44-47
60-67
76-87
Diesel
Ballistic Missile
(G and Z-con.) d . . 28
10
38
39-42
41-45
41-45
41-45
Cruise Missile
(W?conv.) . ? 7
1
1
3
12
12
12
12
12
(J) f 1
1
3? 4
5? 8
8-18
8-18
LR Torpedo
(Z, F) 29
8
13
50
53
54
54
46
LR Torpedo
(W, R) a 86
35
29
44
194
194
194
194
139
MR Torpedo (Q)
26
4
30
30
30
30
22
SR Torpedo (M)..
12
9
13
34
24
9
SECOND LINE SUB-
MARINES
All Types
3
3
6
12
22
37
24
73
TOTALS 173
85
46
95
399
413-418
426-436
423-444
417-442
FIRST LINE SUR-
FACE SHIPS
Cruisers 3
4
h5
4
16
16
16
16
15
Missile Destroyer. . 5
2
6
3
16
20-21
22-25
26-33
30-41
Destroyer 25
18
15
27
85
84
82
82
82
Destroyer Escort.. 20
13
10
19
62
58
58
58
58
SECOND LINE SUR-
FACE SHIPS
Cruisers
1
2
4
1
1
Destroyers
1
1
a First line submarines are those of modern construction. The second line category lists units from 14 to 20 years old
which, by virtue of age and design are considered useful only for training or perhaps coastal defense. Some of the second
line ships will probably be retired from service earlier than on an age criterion.
b Surface ships which are at least 20 years old are carried in a second line status until there is evidence of their removal
from the fleet or until they are finally considered removed (in the absence of contrary evidence) when 25 years old.
Totals for future years include submarines of follow-on classes which may be built during the period. An annual con-
struction rate of 8-10 nuclear-powered submarines of all types has been estimated.
.d We have previously estimated that construction of G class submarines would terminate by the end of 1962. How-
ever, the possibility exists that this program may still be active. While we are unable to predict the future numbers of
this class with certainty, our estimate reflects both the past evidence and the possibility that construction will continue
for about another year. The size of the G class construction program will probably be influenced by Soviet decisions
regarding construction of other classes of missile submarines.
e Includes 6 LONG BIN, 5 TWIN CYLINDER, and 1 SINGLE CYLINDER. It is estimated that the W?Conversion
program has probably been terminated.
f Recently sighted exiting the Baltic, evaluated as probably new construction, diesel-powered SSG. Future estimates
reflect construction capabilities and trends rather than a firm estimate of numbers programmed.
a Includes 4 W class (CANVAS BAG) radar picket submarines. Seventeen R class are in the Northern Fleet and three
in the Black Sea.
b Includes 2 units fitted for missile Research and Development.
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Table 9
ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF SOVIET NAVAL AVIATION
AS OF OCTOBER 1963 .
AIRCRAFT
NORTHERN
FLEET
AIR FORCE,
WHITE SEA
AREA
BALTIC FLEET
AIR FORCE,
?
BALTIC SEA
AREA
BLACK SEA
FLEET
AIR FORCE'
BLACK
SEA AREA
PACIFIC
FLEET AIR
FORCE, FAR
EAST AREA
TOTAL
Jet Light Bomber
BEAGLE
35
45
45
125
Jet Medium Bomber
BADGER
100
60
80
125
365
BLINDER
10-20
10-20
Patrol
MADGE
20
10
15
30
75
MALLOW
5
5
Helicopter
HOOK
2
2
HOUND
25
25
10
35
95
. For future years, we estimate a gradual phase-out (about 10 percent per year) of older
aircraft such as the BEAGLE, BADGER, and MADGE, with a corresponding increase in
newer models such as BLINDER, MALLOW, and MAIL. Unless strength of Naval
Aviation is increased through transfer of long-range bombers such as BEAR to naval sub-
ordination, we expect the total number of aircraft to remain fairly stable.
SECRET 45
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SECRET
ANNEX B
TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE
MISSILES, AIRCRAFT, AND SUBMARINES
TABLES
Table 1: ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET TACTICAL
MISSILES AND ROCKETS
Table 2: ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS OF SELECTED SOVIET
NAVAL MISSILE SYSTEMS
Table 3: ESTIMATED CLOSE SUPPORT PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT CALCULATED UNDER SPECIFIED
ASSUMPTIONS
Table 4: ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET TRANSPORT AIR-
CRAFT
Table 5: ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET HELICOPTERS
Table 6: ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE OF
SOVIET SUBMARINES
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ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET TACTICAL MISSILES AND ROCKETS
SS-1A SCUNNER I
55-1B SCUD A
SS-1C SCUD B
SS-2 SIBLING
I SSC-1 SHADDOCK I
FROG-1
FROG-2
FROG-3
FROG-4
Maximum
range
150 n.m.
Warhead (lbs). 1700, HE
Configuration
Trajectory
Propulsion
Guidance
Accuracy
rn
rn
?I Overall
Reliability
Refire Time
Reaction
Time
V Mobility
single stage
ballistic, es-
sentially a
V-2
ballistic
lox-alcohol
radio-inertial
0.75 n.m.
CEP
60-70%
4-6 hours
2-4 hours
after arrival
at presur-
veyed site.
Can be held
at X-1 hour
for
extended
periods and
at X-15
minutes for
limited
periods.
Has cross-
country
mobility in
unfueled
condition.
150 n.m. (CW
or HE); 80
n.m. (nuc.)
1,500 HE;
1,900-2,400
Nuc.
single stage
ballistic;
mounted on
heavy tank
chassis
ballistic
stor. liquid
all-inertial
0.5 n.m. CEP
60-70%
3-4 hours
2 hours after
arrival at
presurveyed
site. Can be
held at X-
10 minutes
for
extended
periods.
Some cross-
country
mobility in
fueled con-
dition.
150 n.m.
1,800-2,000
HE, Nuc.
single stage
ballistic;
mounted on
heavy tank
chassis
ballistic
stor. liquid
all-inertial
0.5 n.m. CEP
60-70%
3-4 hours
2 hours after
arrival at
presurveyed
site. Can be
held at X-
10 minutes
for
extended
periods.
Some cross-
country
mobility in
fueled con-
dition.
350 n.m.
300 n.m.
2,000-2,400 1,000-2,000
HE, Nuc. HE, Nuc.
single stage
ballistic,
towed
launcher
ballistic
nonstor. liq-
uid
radio-inertial
0.75 n.m.
CEP
60-70%
4-6 hours
2-4 hours
after arrival
at presur-
veyed site.
Can be held
at X-1 hour
for
extended
periods and
at X-15
mins. for
limited
periods.
Mobile on
good roads,
limited
cross-coun-
try mobil-
ity.
cruise; trans-
ported in a
launch tube
on a wheeled
vehicle
aerodynamic,
low altitude,
low super-
sonic
turbojet
unknown,
poss. radio
link
0.5 n.m. CEP
at 150 n.m.
range
60-70%
Unknown
1 hour after
arrival at
presurveyed
site.
Good on high-
ways, lim-
ited on
secondary
roads.
15 n.m.
3,000
HE,
Nuc.
mounted
on a
heavy
tank
chassis
11 n.m.
13 n.m.
26 n.m.
1,300 1,300 700, HE
HE, HE,
Nuc. Nuc.
mounted on a light tank chassis
free flight
solid fuel
none
400-800 300-600 500-
yds CEP yds CEP 1,000
yds CEP
650-
1,650
yds CEP
15-30 minutes
From arrival at presurveyed site, 15-30 minutes
Good cross-country mobility
a While all Soviet tactical missiles could carry CW Warheads, we have good technical data on the CW capabilities of SCUD, SHADDOCK and FROG-4.
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cx)
Table 2
ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS OF SELECTED SOVIET NAVAL MISSILE SYSTEMS
NAME AND TYPE
SS?N-1 (SSM)
SS?N-2 (SSM)
SS?N-3 (SSM)
SA?N-1 (SAM) b I SSCD-1
Range 20-30 n.m. un- 13-20 n.m. 300 n.m. (some in this family 25-35 n.m
assisted possibly 450 n.m.)
130 assisted
Altitude 1,000-10,000 ft 1,000 ft 1,000-3,000 ft 3,500 ft
Speed High subsonic About MACH 1 Low supersonic MACH 0.9
Warhead d (lbs.) 500 to 2,000 HE or 1,000 to 2,000 HE 1,000 to 2,000 HE or NUC 500-1,500 lbs HE
and Type NUC or NUC
CEP 150 ft with termi- Approx. 150 ft 150 ft with terminal homing 150 ft
CA nal homing; against ships; 2 n.m. against cn
rn about 0.5 n.m. land targets m
n n
xi without homing XI
m at less than 30 m
--I --I
n.m. to about 5
n.m. at max.
range
Guidance Programmed with Preset autopilot Intertial with active terminal Beam rider with
radio command with active ter- homing semiactive
override and minal homing homing
terminal homing
Propulsion Turbojet with Storable liquid fuel Turbojet with RATO boost Turbojet with
probable solid rocket probably
RATO boost with RATO
boost
See footnotes at end of table.
RATO boost
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Number of Launch-
ers and Missiles
per Unit
KILDIN-single
launcher aft (9
missiles per
launcher);
KRUPNYY-
single launcher
fore and aft (10
missiles per
launcher)
4 launchers per
OSA (1 missile
per launcher) 2
launchers per
KOMAR (1
missile per
launcher)
Reaction Time 1 min alerted 5 min alerted and
rn 5 min routine routine
fl Refire Time 5-10 min None
SINGLE CYLINDER ? W
class (SSG); TWIN CYL-
INDER ? W class (SSG)
(2 tubes); LONG BIN ? W
class (SSG) (4 tubes); 3 ?
TWINS on E class (SSGN)
(6 tubes); J class (SSG)
(possibly 4 tubes); (all sub-
marines carry 1 missile per
tube); KYNDA Quad
launchers fore and aft (4
missiles per launcher)
5-10 minutes for submarines
No reload for submarines, but
KYNDA may have reload
capability of up to 4 mis-
siles per mount
KYNDA ? 1
dual launcher,
forward; (4 mis-
siles per launch-
er); KASHIN ?
2 dual
launchers, for-
ward and aft; (4
missiles per
launcher);
KOTLIN Con-
version, 1
launcher aft (4
missiles per
launcher)
2 launchers per
site (4 mis-
siles per
launcher)
15 min alerted
10 min
a Characteristics of naval ballistic and air-to-surface missiles are found in NIE 11-8-63, Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack (Top Secret,
Restricted Data) limited distribution, 18 Oct 63.
b SA-N-1 has been observed on KYNDA, KASHIN and coverted KOTLIN class destroyers. We have insufficient evidence to estimate
characteristics and performance.
a AS-1 KENNEL modified for coast defense.
d CW warheads may be available for naval cruise missiles.
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Table 3
ESTIMATED CLOSE SUPPORT PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET TACTICAL
AIRCRAFT CALCULATED UNDER SPECIFIED ASSUMPTIONS*
AIRCRAFT
FUEL LOAD (LBS)
ARMAMENT
RADIUS (N.M.)
-LO-L0-
HI-L0III HI
LO-L0-
LO
MIG-15
2,500
2x550 lb bombs
FAGOT
(Internal)
1x37 mm gun
100
55
45
2x23 mm guns
3,200
1x550 lb bomb
(1 External
1x37 mm gun
230
100
70
Tank)
2x23 ram guns
3,900
1x37 mm gun
(2 External
2x23 mm guns
360
140
90
Tanks)
MIG-17
2,500
2x550 lb bombs
FRESCO
(Internal)
1x37 mm gun
75
55
45
2x23 ram guns
3,200
1x550 lb bomb
(1 External
1x37 mm gun
200
95
70
Tank)
2x23 mm guns
3,900
1x37 mm gun
(2 External
2x23 mm guns
330
135
90
Tanks)
MIG-19
3,950
2x550 lb bombs
FARMER
(Internal)
2x30 mm guns
160
80
50
5,050
1x550 lb bomb
(1 External
2x30 mm guns
285
140
80
Tank)
6,150
2x55 mm rkt pods
(2 External
2x30 mm guns
415
210
110
Tanks)
* See note at end of table.
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SECRET
Table 3 (Continued)
AIRCRAFT
FUEL LOAD (LBS)
ARMAMENT
RADIUS (N.M.)
HI-LO
HI
LO-L0-
HI
LO-L0-
LO
MIG-21
4,600
2x550 lb bombs
FISHBED C
(Internal)
4,600
2x30 mm guns
lx1,100 lb bomb
325
145
95
(Internal)
2x30 mm guns
325
145
95
5,500
2x550 lb bombs
(1 External
2x30 ram guns
425
185
120
Tank)
5,500
2x55 mm rkt pods
(1 External
2x30 ram guns
440
190
120
Tank)
FITTER
7,000
2x30 mm guns
.
(Internal)
2x1,100 lb bombs
275
185
100
9,100
2x30 mm guns
(2 External
2x210 mm rkts
500
275
140
Tanks)
9,100
2x30 mm guns
(2 External
2x550 lb bombs
440
270
140
FIREBAR
Tanks)
10,000
lx30 mm gun
(2 External
3,300 lb bombs
395
255
200
Tanks)
FLASHLIGHT D
7,100
Reconnaissance
200
90
(Internal)
Equipment
BEAGLE
14,600
4,400 lb bombs
490
240
14,600
6,600 lb bombs
460
225
(Internal)
NOTE:
Mission allowances are:
(a) Take-off (2 minutes at normal rated power).
(b) Outbound leg:
High altitude:
Climb on course at military power.
Cruise at speed and altitude for maximum range.
Descent to sea level (no distance credit).
Low altitude: (SL)
Fly at military power, or, if applicable, pertinent limited speed.
(c) Combat for five minutes at military power at sea level (no distance credit).
(d) Return leg:
High altitude:
Climb on course at military power.
Cruise to base at speed and altitude for maximum range.
Low altitude:
Fly at military power or, if applicable, at structural limit speed.
(e) Range free reserve allowance of 10 minutes maximum endurance at sea level.
SECRET 51
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Table 4
ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT
(Calculated in accordance with US MIL C-5011A, Basic Mission)
AIRCRAFT
OPERA-
TIONAL
DATE
SOVIET
DESIG-
NATION
POWER PLANT
NR, TYPE
CARGO
(Las.) '
PASSENGER/
PARATROOP
CAPACITY .
COMBAT
RADIUS/
RANGE
(NM)
AVER-
AGE
CRUISE
SPEED
(KTS.)
iisirriAL
CRUISE
ALTITUDE
(YE)
SERVICE
CEILING
(yr.) '
CAB b
1937
LI-2
2 Piston
3,300
25/20
530/1,215
130
13,000
16,600
COLT
1949
AN-2
1 Piston
1,650
10/12
450/945
90
5,000
16,400
BULL
1954
TU-4
4 Piston
23,000
33/42
1,800/3,320
200
10,000
39,500
CRATE b
1954
IL-14
2 Piston
4,750
24/21
720/1,600
165
11,500
24,400
CA
m
r)
CRATE b ... . .
CAMEL A
1956
1957
IL-14M
TU-104A
2 Piston
2 Turbojet
6,350
20,500
36/21
70/70
720/1,600
960/2,000
165
450
11,500
34,500
24,400
46,900
cn
rn
(I
71
m
-I
CAMEL B
COOT '
1957
1958
TU-104B
IL-18
2 Turbojet
4 Turboprop
22,500
23,000
74-100/90
84-110/90-100
920/1,900
1,550/2,600
455
340
33,300
26,800
46,100
39,000
73
rn
CAMP b
1959
AN-8
2 Turboprop
19,000
-/60
740/1,400
270
24,400
38,200
CAT b
1959
AN-10
4 Turboprop
20,600
84-100/91
710/1,450
335
30,800
39,700
CLEAT
1959
TU-114
4 Turboprop
29,000
170-220/-
2,700/5,400
410
32,200
40,800
CUB b
1959
AN-12
4 Turboprop
21,000
-/91
710/1,450
335
30,800
39,800
COKE
1961
AN-24
2 Turboprop
6,730
32-42/40
530/1,000
245
25,000
32,000
COOKPOT
1961
TU-124
2 Turbofan
10,000
44/40
?/4,000
450
32,500
CLASSIC d
1964
IL-62
4 Turbofan
30,000
182/-
?/4,000
485
Performance shown is for cargo load; Passenger/Paratroop Capacity is shown as alternate load, but performance would differ for this load.
b Aircraft most suited for paratroop operations.
o COACH/IL-12 is not shown since performance is similar to CRATE.
d 1962 is year of first flight.
Calculated at combat weight.
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Table 5
ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET HELICOPTERS
CHARACTERISTIC I HARE I HOUND I HORSE I HEN I HOG I HOOK I HARP b I HIP b I HARKE b I HOOP b I HOPLITE b
CA
M
n
z,
rn
?I
Operational Date
Soviet Designation
Power Plant
Number
? Type
Radius/Range (n.m.)
Nr. of Crew
Payload (plus crew)
Troops
Or Cargo (lbs)
(normal)
Or Cargo (lbs)
(max)
Max speed (kts at
sea level)
Cruise speed at 5,000
ft. (kts)
Service Ceiling (ft).
1951
Mi-1
1
Piston
85/210
1
3
350
600
100
75
16,400
1953
Mi-4
1
Piston
120/240
3
11-15
2,640
3,500
110
75
18,000
1958
Yak-24
2
Piston
65/135
4
40-55
8,800
12,000
110
85
13,500
1958
Ka-15
1
Piston
120/260
1
1
200
400
80
65
9,800
1959
Ka-18
1
Piston
110/240
1
3
350
550
85
65
11,500
1960
Mi-6
2
Turbine
120/250
5
80 ?
20,000
28,600
175
110
16,000
?
Ka-20 (?)
2
Turbine
100/250
2
3
1,000
2,000
90
70
12,000
?
Mi-8
2
Turbine
150/350
3
24
4,400
?
130
90
20,000
?
Mi-10(?)
2
Turbine
100/200
5
70-120
20,000
33,000
100
80
7,500
?
Ka-22
2
Turbine
200/400
4
70
20,000
25,000
200
160
15,000
?
Mi-2
2
Turbine
100/250
2
6-8
1,500
?
120
80
17,000
CA
m
n
71
rn
?I
? Performance quoted is for normal cargo load; alternate loads are shown to indicate capacity, but performance would differ from that shown.
b Seen only in prototype version; operational date undetermined.
? There is evidence that a passenger version may have 120 seats.
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Table 6
ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET SUBMARINES
TYPE/CLASS
DIMENSIONS
DEPTH
SPEED
ARMAMENT
PATROL CAPABILITIES b .
LENGTH/
BEAM
(FEET)
DISPLACEMENT
(TONS)OPER-
SURFACED/
SUBMERGED
MAXI-
MUM
ATING
DEPTH
(FEET)
COL-
LAPSE
DEPTH
' SURFACED
SNOR-
KEL
SUBMERGED
SPEED/
ENDURANCE
(N.M.)
TOR-
PEDO.
MIS-
SILES
DAYS
ON
STA-
TION
RADIUS
(N.M.)
PA-
TROL
DURA-
TION
(DAYS)
ENDUE-
ANCE
FACTORS
Ballistic Missile
Nuclear-Power H
. . 365/32
5,000
5,900
800
1,270
Max 20
20/-
20
3
20
5,300
60
Sea
Cruise 12-14
12-14/-
10
6,600
1
7,800
Diesel-Power G
320/28
2,350
2,800
900
1,440
Max 17.5
10.5
16/12
24
3
20
4,400
60
Sea
Cruise 8.3
6.0
2/100
10
4,700
53
Fuel
1
4,850
46
Fuel
Z-Conversion
295/27
1,950
2,400
735
1,170
Max 18.4
7.0
15/15
24
2
20
4,300
60
Sea
Cruise 8.5
7.0
2.5/125
10
5,450
60
Sea
1
6,150
58
Fuel
Cruise Missile
Nuclear-Power E.
370/32
5,100
6,000
800
1,270
Max 20
18-20/-
20
6
20
5,300
60
Sea
Cruise 12-14
12-14/-
10
6,600
1
7,800
Diesel Power
W-Conversion d
249/21
1,055
1,355
675
1,080
Max 18.5
6.8
13.5/13.5
12
1-2
Cruise 10
6.8
2/100
20
1,800
40
Sea
W-Conversion
275/21
1,160
1,500
675
1,080
Max 18
5.5
12/12
10
4
10
2,600
39
Fuel
(LONG BIN)
Cruise 10
5.5
2/100
1
3,000
34
Fuel
"J"
280/33
POSS.
4
Torpedo Attack
Nuclear N
330/32
4,600
5,400
800
1,270
Max 20
20/-
28
20
5,300
60
Sea
Cruise 12-14
12-14/-
10
6,600
1
7,800
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TYPE/CLASS
DIMENSIONS
DEPTH
SPEED
ARMAMENT
PATROL CAPABILITIES b .
LENGTH/
BEAM
(FEET)
DISPLACEMENT
(TONS)
SURFACED/
SUBMERGED
MAXI-
MUM
OPER-
ATING
DEPTH
(FEET)
COL-
LAPSE
DEPTH
SURFACED
SNOR-
KEL
SUBMERGED
SPEED/
ENDURANCE
(N.M.)
TOR-
PEDO .
MIS-
SILES
DAYS
ON
STA-
TION
RADIUS
,
(N.M.)
PA-
TROL
DURA-
TION
(DAYS)
ENDUR-
ANCE
FACTORS
Diesel F
300/27
1,950
2,400
800
1,290
Max 18.4
9.5
17.5/13
24
20
4,400
60
Sea
Cruise 8.5
7.0
2.5/125
10
5,400
60
Sea
CA
1
6,150
58
Fuel
m
(-)
Z
295/27
1,950
2,400
735
1,170
Max 18.4
7.0
15/15
24
20
4,300
60
Sea
70
m
?4
Cruise 8.5
7.0
2.3/125
10
1
5,450
6,150
60
58
Sea
Fuel
R
249/21
1,055
1,355
675
1,080
Max 18.5
9.0
15.5/12
12
20
1,850
40
Sea
Cruise 10.0
7.0
2/100
10
2,800
40
Fuel
1
3,300
37
Fuel
W
249/21
1,055
1,355
675
1,080
Max 18.5
6.8
13.5/13.5
12
20
1,800
40
Sea
Cruise 10
6.8
2/100
10
2,600
39
Fuel
1
3,000
34
Fuel
Q
185/18
420
510
450
725
Max 17.6
8.0
16/16 .
8
10
850
18
Fuel
Cruise 12
8.0
2.5/125e
1
1,150
12
Fuel
See footnotes on next page.
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? Torpedo capacities are the maximum numbers which can be carried. A combination of torpedoes/mines could be carried.
b The time on station and radius (distance to station) have been computed on the basis of various operational factors, principally those relating to "Sea endur-
ance" and "Fuel endurance."
"Sea endurance" is defined as the total length of time that a submarine can remain at sea without replenishment under combat conditions and is estimated
on the basis of personnel endurance, general habitability, food, spare parts, and consumables other than fuel. The H, E, and N classes of nuclear pro-
pelled submarines are estimated to have a "Sea endurance" of .60 days. The G, F, Z, and Z-Con. classes of diesel powered submarines are estimated
to have a "Sea endurance" of 60 days, while the W, W-Con., and R classes are estimated to have a "Sea endurance" of 40 days.
"Fuel endurance" is defined as the total length of time that a submarine can remain on patrol under combat operational conditions without refueling. For
diesel powered submarines, it is computed on the basis of fuel consumption resulting from an arbitrarily assumed average transit routine of 8 hours surface,
& hours snorkel, and 8 hours submerged operations daily; fuel consumption on station is computed on the basis of a few hours of snorkel operations daily, suffi-
cient only to maintain the state of charge of the main storage battery for submerged operation the remainder of the day.
The endurance and maximum operating radius of nuclear-powered submarines are limited by factors other than fuel. For the purposes of this table it has
been arbitrarily assumed that Soviet nuclear-powered submarines would transit to station using the following criteria:
Speed of 7 kts in area where ASW opposition is anticipated (assumed to be about 34 of the time).
Speed of 13 kts in area where ASW opposition is not expected (about 2% of the transit time).
? Selected distances from Soviet ports:
North
West
British
Bermuda
or New
From-To
Iceland
Isles
Halifax
York
Norfolk
Gibraltar
Panama
Kola Inlet
1,500
1,600
3,350
3,950
4,000
2,950
5,600
Los
San
From-To
Seattle
Honolulu
Manila
Angeles
Francisco
Singapore
Panama
Petropavlovsk
3,200
2,750
3,100
3,600
3,400
4,200
6,500
Vladivostok
4,400
3,700
1,900
5,000
4,550
3,000
7,750
d Three different conversions have been observed on "W" class cruise missile launching submarines, enabling 6 to carry 4 missiles each, 5 to carry 2 each
and 1 to carry 1 missile.
e About 10 units of the "Q" class are believed to have been modified for closed-cycle operations of their diesels while submerged with liquid oxygen employed
as the oxidizing agent. These modified units have an estimated submerged endurance of 75 n.m. at a maximum speed of 16 kts or an endurance of 160 n.m.
at a cruising speed of 10 kts. This endurance is in addition to that listed on the above table.
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SECRET
ANNEX C
ORGANIZATION OF LARGE SOVIET THEATER FORCE UNITS
TABLES
Table 1:
Table 2:
Table 3:
Table 4:
Table 5:
ESTIMATED WARTIME TOE OF THE SOVIET MOTORIZED
RIFLE DIVISION
ESTIMATED WARTIME
DIVISION
TOE OF THE SOVIET TANK
A WARTIME SOVIET
COMPOSITION OF A WARTIME SOVIET
COMPOSITION OF A WARTIME SOVIET
ILLUSTRATIVE COMPOSITION OF
COMBINED ARMS ARMY
ILLUSTRATIVE
TANK ARMY
ILLUSTRATIVE
FRONT
SECRET
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SECRET
ANNEX C
TABLE 1
ESTIMATED WARTIME TOE
OF THE
SOVIET MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISION
HO
DIVISION
190
SERVI7
ELEMENTS
794
FAED11.1NK
741
REGI tAgN1
TA
FECCTI
COMPANY
165
?
MOTORIZED
RIFLE
REGIMENT
1,852
COMPANY
COMPANY
103
ARTILLERY
REGIMENT
970
DIVISION ARTILLERY
HEADQUARTERS
BATTERY 85
ANTIAIRCRAFT
ARTILLERY
BATTALION
586
F0
F17-71
BATTALION
187
1-1173CKET
BATTALION
LAUNCHER
279
ANTI-TANK
BATTALION
350
SIGNAL
BATTALION
245
SAPPER
(ENGR)
BATTALION
416
ARTILLERY INSTIL
RECONNAISSANCE BATTERY,
96 I
TOTAL PERSONNEL AUTHORIZED,' 11,013
MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT AUTHORIZED:
Armored Combat Vehicles
Medium Tank 190
Light Tank 24
Assault Gun 10
Field Artillery
1521nrn Howitzer 18
122mm Howitzer 18
160mm Mortar 18
120mm Mortar 18
82mm Mortar 27
Multiple RKT Launchers 20
FROG Launchers 2
Anti Tank Weapons
85/100mm AT Field gun 18
85rnm AT Gun APAT 18
57mrn AT Gun APAT 18
AT GM Launchers 45
AAA Guns
57 AA Gun, towed 30
57 AA Gun, SP 4
Armored Personnel Carriers
BTR - 40 73
BTR 152/60p 229
BTR 50p 41
Armored Scout Car, amphibian ao
Other Vehicles 1065
Light Aircraft 5
SECRET
6312 23 A
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SECRET
ANNEX C
TABLE 2
ESTIMATED WARTIME TOE OF THE SOVIET TANK pmsioN
DIVISION HQ
90
SERVICE
ELEMENTS
830
RECON CO
165
CI-IEM CO
103
DIV ARTY
HQ BTRY
as
HV TANK
REGT
905
MED TANK
REGIS
991
ARTY REGT
647
AAA BN
561
ASSAULT GUN
BN
253
MTZD RIFLE
REGT
1980
FROG BN
187
SAPPER BN
419
SIGNAL BN
254
ARTY RECON
BTRY
96
TOTAL PERSONNEL AUTHORIZED: 8,936
MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT AUTHORIZED:
Armored Combat Vehicles
? Heavy Tank 95
? Medium Tank 229
light Tank 24
Assault Guns 51
Field Artillery
122mm Howitzer 36
120mm Mortar 6
nrnin Mortar 9
Multiple Rocket Launcher 14
FROG Launcher 2
Anti Tank Weapons
85/1COrnm AT - Field gun 6
85mm AT gun, APAT 6
57mm AT gun, APAT 24
AT GM Launcher 27
AAA Guns
57 AA gun, towed 24
57 AA gun, SP 20
Armored Personnel Carriers
BTR - 40 34
BTR-l52 9
BTR - 50p/60p 261
Armored Scout Car, amphibious 48
Other Vehicles 1717
Light Aircraft 5
SECRET
ROCKET
LAUNCHER BN
279
6312 23 13
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SECRET
Table 3
ILLUSTRATIVE COMPOSITION OF A WARTIME SOVIET COMBINED ARMS
ARMY
This table is based primarily on our information concerning the current composition of the
Soviet combined arms armies in East Germany. The table also reflects judgments derived
from Soviet documents as to likely wartime compositions of combined arms armies, which
could vary considerably depending upon the mission of the army, the terrain in the area of
operations and other factors.
Motorized Rifle Division (4)
Tank Division (1)
Army Combat Support Units:
Artillery and SS Missiles
44,000
9,000
5,100
Artillery Brigade
2,000
SCUD Brigade
1,000
Antitank Artillery Regiment
1,100
Heavy Tank and Assault Gun Regiment
1,000
Air Defense
SAM Regiment
1,000
Engineers
3,100
Engineer Regiment
1,800
Ponton Bridge Regiment
900
Assault Crossing Battalion
400
Signal Units
1,300
Signal Regiment
800
Radio Relay Battalion
200
Line Construction Battalion
300
Chemical Battalion
600
Intelligence Battalion
300
Headquarters and Service Elements
12,000
Total CAA Strength
76,400
Table 4
ILLUSTRATIVE COMPOSITION OF A WARTIME SOVIET TANK ARMY
This table is based primarily on our information concerning the current composition of the
Soviet tank armies in East Germany. The table also reflects judgments derived from
Soviet documents as to likely wartime compositions of tank armies, which could vary con-
siderably depending upon the mission of the army, the terrain in the area of operation, and
other factors.
Tank Division (4)
36,000
Army Combat Support Units:
Artillery
SCUD Brigade
1,000
Air Defense
SAM Regiment
1,000
Engineers
2,900
Engineer Regiment
1,800
Ponton Bridge Regiment
700
Assault Crossing Battalion
400
Signal Units
1,300
Signal Regiment
800
Radio Relay Battalion
200
Line Construction Battalion
300
Chemical Battalion
600
? Intelligence Battalion
300
Headquarters and Service Elements
10,000
Total Tank Army ?
53,100
,SECRET 57 '
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SECRET
Table 5
ILLUSTRATIVE COMPOSITION OF A WARTIME SOVIET FRONT
This table is based primarily on our information concerning the Group of Soviet Forces,
Germany (GSFG) which is the nearest equivalent to a wartime Soviet front currently in
existence. However, GSFG is tailored to meet the requirements of its particular mission
in East Germany and thus does not correspond in detail to our illustrative front composition,
which has considerably more ground troops and less tactical air support. ? Soviet wartime
fronts would vary widely in composition and strength depending upon the mission, the ter-
rain, and other factors. This table is intended as a rough guide to understanding of Soviet
theater force structure rather than as a source of detail.
Combined-Arms Armies (4)
306,000
Tank Armies (2)
108,000
Tactical Air Army
20,000
Front Combat Support Units:
Artillery and SS Missiles
7,000
Artillery Division
5,000
SCUD Brigades (2)
2,000
Air Defense
SAM Brigade
2,000
Engineers
8,000
Engineer Brigade
3,000
Ponton Bridge Regiments (2)
2,000
Assault Crossing Regiment
1,000
Pipeline Brigade
2,000
Signal Units
3,000
Signal Regiment
1,000
Signal Intercept Regiments (2)
1,500
Radio Relay Battalions (2)
500
Chemical Brigade
3,000
Intelligence Regiment
1,000
Headquarters and Service Elements
46,000
Total Front
504,000
58 SECRET
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,
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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