SHORT-TERM OUTLOOK FOR SOUTH KOREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A021300020005-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 9, 2014
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: September 7, 1962
• Content Type: SNIE

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SEgRET
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SN1E 42-2-67 ADVCON
7 September 1962
SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
SHORT-TERM OUTLOOK FOR SOUTH KOREA
NOTE: This is an advance copy of the conclusions of this estimate
as approved by the United States Intelligence Board. The com-
plete text will be circulated within five days of this issuance.
? Position of the Regime
? Public Atitudes
? ROK-US Relations
? The Communist Threat
Central Intelligence Agency
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Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
on 7 September 1962. Concurring were the Director of
Intelligence and Research, Department of State; The Direc-
tor, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff
for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief
of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy;
the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director
for Intelligence, Joint Staff; and the Director of the National
Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Repre-
sentative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside
of their jurisdiction.
CLASSIFICATION OF TITLE IS OFFICIAL USE ONLY
WHEN USED SEPARATELY
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC *DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
7 September 1962
SUBJECT: SNIE 42-2-62: SHORT-TERM OUTLOOK FOR SOUTH KOREA
TIE PROBLEM
To assess the political situation in South Korea and to estimate
probable developments over the next few months.
CONCLUSIONS
A. The recent outbreak of factional strife within the military junta
which rules South Korea has been caused largely .by controversy over the
expanding role of Colonel Kim Chong-p'il and the ROK Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA). Quarreling between the senior officers and the Eighth
Class group of field grade officers led by Kim will'continue, but it now
seems likely, that the two. factions will seek to avoid a showdown. We
believe that the junta, with General Pak Chong-hui as the key figure, will
remain in power until the elections scheduled for 1963, and will exercise
a large degree of control over thenew.civilian government. (Paras.
1-5, 9-12).
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
S -E -C -R -E -T downgrading and
declassification
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B. The junta currently has little popular support. Blatantly rigged
elections or further economic deterioration could cause riots and demonstra-
tions. While the regime can suppress local outbursts, massive public dem-
onstrations could trigger coup attempts by disgruntled military leaders,
perhaps acting in concert with presently disbarred political elements. The
outcome of such attempts cannot be estimated, but the government which
emerged from such a situation would almost certainly require a large degree
of backing from the ROK military. (Paras. 6-8, 11)
C. ROK-US relations will continue to be difficult over the next few
monthe. There will probably be some attempts to improve liaison with US
officials in economic matters, although the CIA will continue its largely
uncontrolled economic activities. In political matters, it is doubtful
that either Pak or Kim will accept US suggestions which might impose limi-
tations on their actions. Despite strong US pressures, it is doubtful that
the issue of ROK-Japanese relations will soon be resolved. Only on the
military plane will ROK-US relations remain reasonably open and friendly.
(Paras. 13-17)
D. Factional strife within the junta, increased public apathy and
even hostility toward the regime) and strained relations with the US have
increased the danger of Communist subversive activities. Appeals to Korean
nationalism and for peaceful unification may prove more effective than in
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the past. _During the next few months, a real Communist threat to the
regime is unlikely to develop, but if the political erosion, which has
already commenced, is not halted and if economic stagnation persists,
the problem of countering Communist subversion will become far more
serious. (Paras. 18-20)
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