THE PROSPECTS FOR TURKEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A021100040001-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 10, 2014
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 16, 1962
• Content Type: NIE

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CO IDENTIAL 19?
NIE 29.2-62
5 Janua /1962
1 t 1962
964
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 29.2-62
(Supersedes NIE 33-58, SNEE 33-60)
THE PROSPECTS FOR TURKEY
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The
Joint Staff.
? Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
on 5 January 1962. Concurring were The Director of Intelli-
gence and Research, Department of State; the Director, De-
fense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief
of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy;
the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director
for Intelligence, Joint Staff; and the Director of the Na-
tional Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission
Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant Director, Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being
outside of their jurisdiction.
DOCUMENT NO
NO CH /?N
CONFI NTIAL
CLA GED TO: TS S C
NEXT EW DATE:
A9,T41: HR 70-2
4E:Q?Perti 87 REVIEWER: 0092 56.1
N? 403
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
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following officials within their respective departments.
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b. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
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d. Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, for the Department of the
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4. The title of this estimate when used separately from the text, should be classified:
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
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THE PROSPECTS FOR TURKEY
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the outlook for Turkey over the next few years, with particular
reference to the prospects for political stability and economic progress.
CONCLUSIONS
1. The prospects for political stability and
economic progress in Turkey will depend
to a large degree upon the influence of
the military, which will remain the ulti-
mate source of power in Turkey. How-
ever, the election outcome probably made
the armed forces aware that while they
have high prestige with the Turkish
people, the country has no desire to be
governed by the military. (Para. 14)
2. It is questionable whether Turkey's
present coalition government between the
Republican People's Party and the Justice
Party, which was formed as a result of
strong military pressures, can remain in
office for more than a year or so. Its
collapse would not necessarily mean the
end of civilian government. However,
failure of the political leaders to provide
effective government?or attempts by
them to pursue policies strongly opposed
by the military?probably would lead the
military to reassume direct control. In
such an event, military rule probably
would be prolonged. (Paras. 11, 17-18,
20)
3. Turkey has the natural resources nec-
essary for substantial economic develop-
ment, and progress during the postwar
period has provided Turkey with a mod-
erate industrial base. The new govern-
ment intends to inaugurate an ambi-
tious five-year plan in 1963 in the hope
of stimulating the economy to expand
by as much as seven percent annually.
Achievement of this goal will be depend-
ent on optimum conditions, and we believe
it more likely that the Turkish economy
will grow at a rate substantially below
this level. The consequent slow rise in
living standards probably will lead to
growing pressure for more radical social
and economic policies. (Paras. 21, 24-26,
31-33)
4. Turkey is unlikely to alter the essen-
tials of the Western-oriented foreign
policy it has pursued since World War II.
As time goes by, the Turks will become
more conscious of the new threat of Soviet
medium-range missiles, and this feeling
1
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may in the long run have some effect on
their policy. Nevertheless, Turkey's basic
and longstanding distrust of the Soviet
Union will continue, although there may
be some improvement of relations in the
economic sphere. Differences between
the US and Turkey are likely to arise pe-
riodically. We estimate that the Turks
will continue to insist on at least some
measure of joint operations of certain fa-
cilities, and could go so far as to deny to
the US the use of these facilities if they
do not receive the treatment they feel they
deserve as full partners in the Western
Alliance. However, the Turks are too
aware of the Soviet threat and of their
heavy dependence on the US for both pro-
tection and aid to let such differences en-
danger their basic relationship with the
US. At the same time, Turkey is likely
to seek closer ties with Western Europe
2
to secure new markets and increased aid.'
(Paras. 38-41)
1 The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF,
does not concur in this Conclusion. Though he
considers that negotiations with Turkey on US base
rights will be troublesome, he believes this para-
graph overstates the likelihood of Turkey denying
the US the use of certain facilities. Thus, he be-
lieves the Conclusion should be changed to read:
Turkey is unlikely to alter the essentials of the
Western-oriented foreign policy it has pursued
since World War II. Turkey's basic and long-
standing distrust of the Soviet Union will con-
tinue, although there may be some improvement
of relations in the economic sphere. Many
Turkish military leaders are convinced that the
US regards its installations in Turkey as so im-
portant to the US global defense posture that
Turkey will be able to extract numerous conces-
sions from the US, and periodic differences may
become more difficult to resolve. We believe the
Turks are deeply aware of the Soviet threat and
of their heavy dependence on the US for both
protection and aid and will not intend to let such
differences endanger their basic relationship with
the US. However, in the course of bargaining
they might impose conditions which would be ex-
tremely difficult for the US to meet. At the same
time, Turkey is likely to seek closer ties with
Western Europe to secure new markets and in-
creased aid.
DISCUSSION
I. INTRODUCTION
5. The overthrow of the Menderes government
by the armed forces on 27 May 1960 marked
the end of nearly four decades of political
stability. This stability made possible sub-
stantial progress toward transforming Turkey
from an underdeveloped country to a modern
western-oriented state. For many years this
effort was carried out by an authoritarian re-
gime under the Republican People's Party
(RPP) founded by Ataturk and later led by
Ismet Inonu. However, after World War II
a two-party system was developed, and in 1950
the Democrat Party (DP) led by Adnan
Menderes came to power.
6. The Menderes government was popular
during its first few years in office, largely as
a result of the extremely rapid ecOnomic
growth which occurred and the greater per-
sonal freedom that was permitted. In time,
however, inflation arising out of the govern-
ment's grandiose economic plans and the DP's
endeavors to entrench itself and suppress op-
position led to increasing popular dissatisfac-
tion. Menderes resorted to increasingly re-
pressive measures to curb the resurgent
strength of the RPP, relying first on the police
and then on the army. However, the military
leaders?many of whom had ties with the
RPP?resented Menderes' efforts to make the
armed forces the instrument of the party in
power. As the political struggle between the
DP and the RPP increased in intensity, the
military, fearing that Menderes was destroy-
ing national unity and believing that only a
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military takeover could reunify the country,
seized power in May 1960.
7. The Committee of National Union (CNU) ,
the new governing body, which was composed
exclusively of military officers, emphasized
that its role was to restore orderly and re-
sponsible civilian government. The CNU's
aim was to assure the ascendancy of the RPP,
to destroy the DP, and to create in place of
the latter an opposition which in the mili-
tary's view would be responsible. However,
serious splits developed within the military,
the most important of which was between the
older and more conservative members of the
CNU and a group of younger officers led by
Colonel Turkes. The latter group was in
favor of an extended period of military rule
to carry out what is regarded as necessary so-
cial, economic, and political reforms. The
conservative members won this struggle, and
Turkes and 13 colleagues were expelled from
the CNU and assigned to Turkish embassies
abroad. These factional disputes were not so
serious as to prevent preparations for a return
to civilian government. The formation of
new political parties was encouraged and a
new constitution was adopted by referendum.
Despite a large protest vote which revealed
the continuance of widespread pro-DP senti-
ment, the military proceeded with national
elections on 15 October 1961.
8. The hopes of the military leaders for an
orderly transfer of power to the RPP were
dashed by the election outcome. The RPP
got only 40 percent of the popular vote and
obtained only a plurality in the lower house.
The Justice Party (JP) , which took over most
of the former DP local organizations and ap-
pealed to pro-Menderes elements, came in sec-
ond in terms of popular votes and obtained
a plurality of the elected members in the
Senate. Economic stagnation, the early re-
tirement of thousands of military officers, the
execution of Menderes, and the generally
high-handed manner of the CNU?with which
the RPP was identified?cost the RPP many
votes.
CO
1961 TURKISH NATIONAL ELECTION a
NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY
3
SENATE
Republican People's Party
173
36
Justice Party
158
70
New Turkey Party
65
28
Republican Peasant Nation Party
54
16
TOTAL
450
150"
a The differing positions of the RPP and the JP
in the National Assembly and Senate are due to the
use of different electoral systems?proportional
representation in the National Assembly and a form
of the majority system in the Senate.
b In addition, the constitution provides that the
President shall appoint 15 senators and that CNU
members shall be lifetime members of the Senate.
9. Thus Menderes, though condemned and
executed, left a powerful legacy. His policies
gained him widespread support among the
peasants, workers, and the lower middle class.
To secure their support, Menderes provided
them considerable economic benefits. Per-
haps even more important, he was willing to
make concessions to traditional religious at-
titudes. In the eyes of the Westernized
elite?which includes the military officers?
this endangered Ataturk's goal of a secular
republic.
10. The basic political problem faced by
Turkey today is that of continuing the de-
velopment toward a stable democratic govern-
ment. While this goal is widely desired in
Turkey and some progress toward it has been
made in recent decades, the obstacles to its at-
tainment remain formidable. The Turks
still face the task of reconciling within a
democratic framework the need felt by the
Westernized elite to preserve and expand the
secular reforms initiated by Ataturk with the
reluctance to accept such reforms on the part
of the tradition-bound majority. The legacy
of bitterness left by the recent political strife
and the active political role played by the
military will further complicate Turkey's task.
II. POLITICAL SITUATION
The Political Parties
11. Turkey is presently governed by a RPP-JP
coalition, with Ismet Inonu as Prime Minister.
Although each party has an equal number of
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cabinet positions, the RPP holds most of the
key portfolios?foreign affairs, defense, fi-
nance, and justice. The Cabinet has few im-
pressive figures. The coalition's most serious
weakness, however, is the basic hostility be-
tween the RPP and the JP?a hostility that
was only submerged as a result of strong mili-
tary pressure. The military insisted upon the
election of General Gursel as President and
also forced the party leaders to agree not to
reverse any of the CNU's important measures.
In addition, the Turks have had no experience
in operating a coalition government, and the
fact that the party balance in the Senate dif-
fers considerably from that in the lower House
will increase the government's problems.
12. The difficulties of the new government
will be further increased by disagreements
within the two parties as well as by the con-
flicts between them. While Prime Minister
Inonu remains the dominant figure of the
RPP, there is considerable dissension within
the party. The old guard leadership is under
pressure from younger elements from the
provinces who seek greater recognition. It is
also challenged by Kasem Gulek, a former
Secretary General of the party, who is con-
vinced that the party must be modernized in
structure and outlook to regain its once-
dominant position. The conflicts within the
hastily-organized JP are even more serious.
The party is formally led by General Gumus-
pala, with other retired military officers in
several high positions. However, it derives its
real motive power from former members of
the DP, many of whom are extremists bent on
avenging the execution of Menderes. They
have little sympathy for the warnings of party
leaders that such a course would only result
in a new military coup. In fact, more than
one-third of the JP deputies failed to follow
their leaders in the vote installing the gov-
ernment.
13. There are two smaller parties represented
in the legislative assembly. The New Turkey
Party (NTP) , led by former CNU Finance
Minister Ekrem Alican, has a moderately
liberal outlook, at least at the top. However,
the well-intentioned but so far ineffective
leaders have experienced considerable diffi-
culty in maintaining control over the bulk of
the party's adherents who are former DP
members. The Republican Peasants Nation
Party (RPNP) represents the most reactionary
religious elements in Turkey. It is largely the
creation of the opportunistic Osman Bolukbasi
and has no constructive program. It is un-
likely that other political groups will have
much influence. The Communist Party is
illegal and politically insignificant. The
minorities?Armenians, Greeks, Jews, and
Kurds?generally supported the DP in the
past but do not play a significant political
role.
The Role of the Armed Forces
14. The military remains the ultimate source
of power in Turkey and continues to regard
itself as the guardian of the unity of the
Turkish people and of Ataturk's ideals. In-
deed, it has been the most potent force strug-
gling for the modernization of Turkey over the
last century. The military officers have a low
opinion of most politicians, regarding them as
interested in their personal or party interests
rather than the welfare of the country. How-
ever, the election outcome probably has made
the armed forces aware that while they have
high prestige with the Turkish people, the
country has no desire to be governed by the
military.
15. Although the initial impetus for the 1960
coup came chiefly from middle grade officers,
the senior military commanders have steadily
asserted their control during the past 18
months. Nevertheless, the senior officers
clearly are concerned with the attitudes of
the younger officers, and are worried by the
latter's impatience and lack of restraint. For
example, the insistence of the younger offi-
cers probably was the ultimate factor behind
the execution of Menderes and two of his
close associates, as the senior officers were
more inclined to commute their sentences.
16. The relationship among the more influ-
ential military officers will probably re-
main fluid, in view of the extensive retire-
ments and widespread reassignments during
the past year. So far no senior military offi-
cer has emerged as the dominant figure.
-ft/gavot
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Colonel Turkes has some personal following,
but probably not enough to play a deter-
mining role, at least in the near future.
Probable Developments
17. It is questionable whether the coalition,
in its present form, can remain in office for
more than a year or so. The JP leaders will
be under rising pressure from their rank and
file to reverse some of the measures of the
military regime or even to attempt to form
a new coalition with the smaller parties. In
addition, feeling between the two parties is
bitter, and many JP members harbor an ac-
tive hatred for Inonu himself. In these cir-
cumstances, the JP leaders will almost cer-
tainly not be able to hold all their followers
in line. The critical question is how long
they can keep control of a sufficient number
to provide the coalition with a working ma-
jority in Parliament.
18. A collapse of the present coalition would
not necessarily mean the end of civilian rule
in Turkey. The military leaders might force
the parties to form a new coalition. Alterna-
tively, the present incohesive parties might
break up and permit the formation of a new
party with a parliamentary majority and
greater popular support. A third possibility
is that new elections might give a clear ma-
jority to the RPP or to a more stable coali-
tion acceptable to the military. Either of the
last two developments would increase the
chances that civilian leaders would gradu-
ally acquire full political control. At best
this process would be a slow one and would
depend on the development of purposeful and
effective civilian leadership mindful of the
ideals and principles which the armed forces
regard as essential to Turkish life.
19. In all these maneuverings, the role of the
77-year old Inonu will be important. As a
former military leader and close associate
and heir of Ataturk he occupies a unique
position. He is the only leader who has
thus far been able to muster the support of
a majority of the Parliament and at the same
time maintain the confidence of the military.
Even should constitutional government col-
lapse again, he might continue in a significant
role and help provide a restraining influence
on the more impetuous elements among the
military.
20. The failure of the political leaders to pro-
vide effective government?or attempts by
them to pursue policies strongly. opposed by
the military?probably would cause the mili-
tary to reassume direct control of the gov-
ernment. In such an event, military rule
probably would be prolonged.
III. ECONOMIC SITUATION AND PROSPECTS
21. Turkey's economy has expanded substan-
tially during the postwar period. Gross na-
tional product (GNP) grew 5-6 percent an-
nually between 1947 and 1960. This made
possible a substantial improvement in living
standards, despite an annual population in-
crease of nearly three percent. Agricultural
output increased by about one-half, indus-
trial and mineral production more than dou-
bled, and electric power production increased
nearly four-fold. A national highway net-
work was constructed, the railroad system
improved and extended, the port facilities
modernized, and an airways system created.
Finally, the government allowed increased
freedom to private businessmen, and a small
but growing industrialist class has emerged.
22. However, many government investments
were ill-conceived and made only a limited
contribution to the economy. Continued
deficit financing resulted in growing infla-
tionary pressures and balance of payments
difficulties. By late 1957 Turkey was in the
midst of a financial crisis, and in 1958 was
forced to agree to a stabilization program
drawn up by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) in order to qualify for continued
foreign aid. Once new injections of foreign
aid had been secured, however, the govern-
ment became less concerned with carrying
out the stabilization program, and Turkey
was again in a perilous financial position by
the time of the military coup.
23. The military regime reinstated the sta-
bilization program and halted inflation.
More stringent import controls and better
utilization of foreign aid resulted in a mod-
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erate rise of foreign exchange reserves. A
State Planning Office was established and
given the task of preparing an integrated
economic development plan. However, the
uncertain political outlook resulted in a re-
luctance to invest on the part of many busi-
nessmen. This reluctance, combined with
the regime's deflationary fiscal policies,
caused the economy to stagnate.
Turkey's Economic Potential
24. Turkey has the natural resources neces-
sary for substantial economic development.
It has extensive hydroelectric potential and
sizable and generally good quality deposits of
many of the mineral resources necessary for
an expanding industry. Moreover, recent pe-
troleum discoveries make it likely that Tur-
key will gradually reduce its present heavy
dependence on imports. Its agricultural re-
sources are less impressive. Soils are poor
and the rainfall is both inadequate and un-
dependable in the Anatolian plateau. The
coastal areas, on the other hand, have rich
soils, ample rainfall, and a milder climate.
25. The investments of recent years have pro-
vided Turkey with a moderate industrial
base?chiefly in textiles, food processing, and
building materials and, to a lesser but grow-
ing extent, in steel production and metal
manufactures. However, Turkish industry
normally utilizes little more than half of its
installed capacity. This has been partly due
to shortages of raw materials and spare parts
in recent years and to local preferences for
imported articles. In part it represents a
legacy of unwise past investments in the
state industrial enterprises?which employ
about half of the industrial labor force and
have most of the idle capacity. These enter-
prises have little incentive to economize on
their use of resources, as the government has
never required them to operate on a com-
petitive basis. In addition, the quality of
management in both the public and private
sectors is generally mediocre because of lack
of training and experience.
Turkey's Economic Development Program
26. The new government has pledged itself
to continue the military regime's emphasis
on economic planning. A considerable array
of talent has been assembled from the univer-
sities and from various state enterprises, and
the new State Planning Office has been given
very broad functions. It is drafting an in-
terim plan for 1962 and a series of five-year
plans commencing in 1963. The first two
five-year plans, while still rudimentary, en-
visage an expansion of GNP by as much as
seven percent annually. Such a rate of
growth would nearly double total production
by 1973, and increase per capita income by
about 50 percent?to around $270 annually.
This goal is predicated on a rate of invest-
ment of 18 percent of GNP in the first plan
and 20 percent in the second.
27. This is a very ambitious goal. In the
past the proportion of GNP invested has
certainly not exceeded 15 percent, and has
probably been nearer to 12 percent. Raising
the level of investment to 18 percent would
require a sharp increase in taxes as well as
special incentives to encourage personal sav-
ings and private investments. Some of the
necessary funds could come from a fur-
ther curtailment of subsidies to the agricul-
tural sector, but the political problems in
such an effort would be formidable. Some
progress could be made in curtailing the sub-
sidies of government industrial installations
by forcing them to operate on a competitive
basis. However, the major part of the addi-
tional resources needed would have to be
provided by sizable tax increases and foreign
assistance, since a return to substantial
budget deficits would quickly bring new in-
flationary pressures and balance of payments
difficulties.
28. During the five-year plan period the State
Planning Office envisages a foreign aid re-
quirement ranging from $200,000,000 in the
first year to $300,000,000 in the fifth
year. In addition, Turkey will need about
$120,000,000 a year to service its foreign
debts during the next five years. These fig-
ures do not include military aid, which has -
averaged about $90,000,000 in recent years.
Turkey hopes to obtain increasing amounts
of aid from international organizations and
Western European countries, especially the
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European Economic Community (EEC) ?
with which Turkey is seeking associate mem-
bership. However, Turkey will continue to
rely primarily on the US to support its eco-
nomic development effort.
29. We believe that Turkey may require even
more foreign aid than it presently estimates,
largely because of the country's difficult ex-
port position. Over four-fifths of Turkey's
exports are agricultural products?foodstuffs,
tobacco, and cotton. Most of these products
face chronic difficulties in international mar-
kets. In addition, domestic needs for cotton
and foodgrains are likely to increase more
rapidly than production of these items.
30. Even if Turkey is able to raise the domestic
resources and secure the foreign aid needed,
its ability to accelerate its development effort
as now envisaged by the State Planning Office
is doubtful. A more likely prospect is for a
progressive increase in the rate of growth over
a period of years. The basic limitation on
Turkey's economic progress is the need for
better trained people at all levels. While more
basic education is clearly needed to increase
the literacy rate?now about 40 percent?a
more serious weakness is the shortage of
skilled workers, technicians, and administra-
tive and managerial personnel.
Future Trends
31. Investments in state enterprises have been
increased in the 1962 budget, but this probably
will turn out to be?at least in part?at the
expense of private investment. In addition,
the defense budget has been increased by
about 20 percent, probably at the insistence of
the military. While Turkey's defense burden
has not been unduly heavy in the past?and
the training received by the conscripts has
benefitted the economy?such a sharp increase
will be difficult to finance. For obvious politi-
cal reasons the government is unwilling to in-
crease taxes now and plans to cover the in-
creased spending mainly through US local cur-
rency support. Although it probably will be
necessary to resort to some deficit financing,
it is unlikely that the government will follow
seriously inflationary policies. The preoccu-
pation of the party leaders with political af-
fairs is likely to prevent the government from
managing the economy with any great skill
in the next few years, and the lack of political
stability may inhibit private investment.
32. Achievement of the plan's goal of a seven
percent rate of growth will be dependent on
optimum conditions?enhanced political sta-
bility and receipt of virtually all the foreign
aid called for by the plan. Given the political
uncertainties, as well as the inherent economic
problems, we believe it more likely that the
Turkish economy will grow at a rate substan-
tially below this level. Agriculture is likely
to be the major limiting factor. With negli-
gible possibilities of bringing more land under
cultivation, even modest expansion of agricul-
tural output will require increased invest-
ments. Under these conditions, agricultural
production is likely to increase by only 2-3
percent a year, or somewhat less than the
growth of population. Industrial production,
on the other hand, is likely to expand more
rapidly, perhaps by as much as 8-10 percent
annually. Manufacturing will benefit from
the increasingly ample supplies of raw mate-
rials, power, and steel. For example, within
the next five years crude steel production prob-
ably will increase from about 200,000 tons to
nearly 1,000,000 tons a year.
33. The modest gains which we anticipate will
make possible only a slow rise in living stand-
ards, as Turkey's population is likely to con-
tinue to grow by nearly three percent an-
nually. The slow rise in living standards is
likely to have growing political implications.
The Turkish people have experienced their
first sustained economic progress in the post-
war period, and they are impatient for more.
The migration of large numbers of peasants
to the cities in recent years, where they have
observed the way of life of the middle and up-
per income groups, has already stimulated a
growing class feeling. Unless their minimum
economic desires are satisfied, there is likely
to be growing pressure for more radical social
and economic policies.
IV. MILITARY AFFAIRS
34. Turkey continues to place a high priority
on the development and maintenance of
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strong military defenses. Nearly all of the
country's armed forces are committed to
NATO. Much of the cost of modernizing and
maintaining Turkey's military establishment
has been assumed by the US. However, the
Turks themselves have assumed a substantial
defense burden. For 1962, defense spending
is scheduled to total about $285,000,000.
35. The 413,000-man military establishment
consists essentially of a large infantry army
supported by a small navy and air force. The
348,000-man army is the largest in the Middle
East. Its two largest field armies are sta-
tioned in the Istanbul area and in northeast-
ern Turkey to defend the country against at-
tack from Bulgaria and Transcaucasian Rus-
sia respectively. A smaller field army is in
reserve in central Turkey. The air force,
which consists of 31,000 men and 740 aircraft,
is designed to provide air support for the army
as well as air defense. The 34,000-man navy
is concerned mainly with defending the Straits
and the Black Sea coast. In addition, the
60,000-man gendarmerie, which receives mili-
tary training, is under army control in time
of war or national emergency.
36. Turkey will continue to face formidable
obstacles in its effort to improve the combat
effectiveness of its military forces. The physi-
cal endurance, good discipline, and strong
patriotism of the Turks will continue to be
assets, but the level of literacy is low and there
is a serious shortage of trained technical per-
sonnel. This weakness is compounded by the
fact that over 90 percent of the army is com-
posed of conscripts or reserve officers, and the
quality of leadership and command supervi-
sion in the armed forces is only fair.
37. The intervention of the military forces in
Turkish political life has resulted in a number
of important changes in the Turkish armed
forces. One of the CNU's major efforts while
in office was to improve the quality of the
armed forces by eliminating deadwood from
the officer corps. To this end, over 5,000 offi-
cers?including over 200 of the 225 general
officers?were retired to permit the promotion
of better qualified junior officers. While this
8
program temporarily reduced the capabilities
of the armed forces, its long-run effect will be
beneficial. However, the involvement of the
military in politics has produced significant
dissension within the armed forces. Con-
tinued preoccupation of key elements of the
officer corps with politics could have an ad-
verse effect on the armed forces.
V. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
38. Turkey is unlikely to alter the essentials
of the anti-Communist foreign policy it has
pursued since World War II. The new gov-
ernment has stated that it will adhere to
NATO and CENTO, and clearly regards NATO
and the US as the only feasible sources of
protection against the Soviet Bloc. As time
goes by, the Turks will become more conscious
of the new threat of Soviet medium-range mis-
siles, and this feeling may in the long run have
some effect on their policy. However, the po-
litical parties and the military appear united
with respect to the basic outlines of Turkey's
foreign policy. Although there are scattered
pockets of neutralist sentiment among intel-
lectual groups, few Turks advocate a signifi-
cant shift from the policy of alignment with
the West.
39. Turkey's relations with the US will con-
tinue to be close, although the trend toward
greater emphasis on Turkey's sovereign rights
initiated by the military regime is likely to
continue. In particular, Turkey is likely to
be less accommodating than in the past con-
cerning base rights of great importance to the
US as well as US military privileges. We esti-
mate that the Turks will continue to insist
on at least some measure of joint operation of
certain facilities, and could go so far as to deny
to the US the use of these facilities if they do
not receive the treatment which they feel they
deserve as full partners in the Western Al-
liance. Their effort to secure a more favorable
status of forces agreement will continue.
There will probably continue to be dissatisfac-
tion concerning the level of US military and
economic aid. Nevertheless, the Turks are too
aware of the Soviet threat and of their heavy
dependence on the US for both protection and
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aid to let such differences endanger their basic
relationship with the US.2
40. Turkey is likely to make a major effort to
expand its relations with Western Europe over
the next few years, particularly in the eco-
nomic sphere. The Turks are becoming in-
creasingly aware that Western Europe's rapid
growth offers opportunities to secure new mar-
kets and increased aid. Turkish leaders have
long stressed the need for NATO to provide
special economic aid to its less developed
members?Greece and Turkey?and expect
that the economic mission NATO has sent to
survey their economy will result in increased
aid.
41. Turkey's basic and longstanding distrust
of Russia will continue, but some expansion of
Turkey's economic relations with the USSR
may occur. To the extent that Turkey is un-
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF,
does not concur in this paragraph. Though he con-
siders that negotiations with Turkey on US base
rights will be troublesome, he believes this para-
graph overstates the likelihood of Turkey denying
the US the use of certain facilities. Thus, he be-
lieves the paragraph should be changed to read:
A trend toward greater formality will probably
mark US-Turkish relations over the next few
years. The strong feelings of nationalism among
the military will probably lead to a greater insist-
ence on Turkey's sovereign rights. Many Turkish
military leaders are convinced that the US regards
its installation in Turkey as so important to the
US global defense posture that Turkey will be able
to extract numerous concessions from the US, and
periodic differences may become more difficult to
resolve. In particular, Turkey is likely to be less
accommodating than in the past on matters con-
cerning base rights of great importance to the US
as well as US military privileges. Their efforts to
secure a more favorable Status of Forces Agree-
ment will continue. There will also probably con-
tinue to be dissatisfaction concerning the level of
US military and economic aid. We believe the
Turks are deeply aware of the Soviet threat and
of their heavy dependence on the US for both
protection and aid and will not intend to let such
differences endanger their basic relationship with
the US. However, in the course of bargaining they
might impose conditions which would be ex-
tremely difficult for the US to meet.
9
able to secure markets for its exports in the
West, it will try to dispose of them in the Bloc,
as it did in 1957 and 1958. The USSR made
offers of substantial economic aid to both the
Menderes government and the military re-
gime, and may do so again. So long as US and
European assistance is generally adequate for
its needs, however, Turkey is unlikely to ac-
cept large-scale assistance, although it might
decide to accept limited Soviet aid.
42. In the Middle East, Turkey's primary con-
cern at present is with Iran. This concern is
the chief reason for Turkish support of
CENTO, from which Turkish leaders feel their
country derives little direct advantage.
Turkey believes that by supporting CENTO
it contributes to the stability and Western
orientation of Iran, and probably will con-
tinue to urge the US to join CENTO.
43. Turkey's policy toward the Arab states
reflects its low opinion of the Arabs, a result
of the Ottoman Empire's long domination of
the area. Under the military regime, Turkey
played a relatively inactive role in the area.
The new government is likely to continue this
policy, partly because Inonu has long believed
that Turkey should remain as aloof as possible
from intra-Arab quarrels, but also because
Turkey probably believes Nasser has become
less of a threat since the breakup of the United
Arab Republic. At the same time, Turkey
will be inclined to continue its cooperation
with Israel and to give discreet support to
anti-Nasser forces, particularly in Syria.
However, the antagonism between Syria and
Turkey makes it unlikely that such coopera-
tion will be extensive or lasting.
44. The Cyprus settlement of 1959 resolved
the major outstanding issue between Greece
and Turkey, and relations are likely to remain
satisfactory as long as they continue to agree
on Cyprus. Turkey's support of the Cyprus
settlement reflects its conviction that the
present arrangements offer the best hope of
protecting the welfare of the Turkish Cypriots
as well as the strategic interests of Turkey.
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