SNIE 42-61: COMING CRISIS IN THE ROK?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A018600020009-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2014
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: March 14, 1961
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
14 March 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans, State (INR)
Colonel B. R. 'rown, USA (.CSI)
Captain H. W. McElwain, USN (ONI)
Colonel R. M. Lawson, USAF (AFCIN 2D3)
nolonnl Y- T. Gould. USA (J-20 The Joint Staff)
Director of Opera-.
tional Services, NSA
Mr. Randolph V. Zander, Defense (050)
SUBJECT: SNIE 42-61: COMING CRISIS IN THE ROK?
1. Attached is a copy of a memorandum dealing with develop-
ments in the ROK that was prepared for the Director of Central
Intelligence by the Office of National Estimates* At the 14 March
USID meeting, it was decided to prepare a SNIE on this subject*
2* It is requested that your representatives meet with us
at 1400. Wednesday, 15 March in Room 115 Administration Building
for the purpose of discussing the attached memorandum and, in
particular, to determine whether this memorandum can serve as the
basis for this SNIE. If the memorandum can be used in effect as
the draft SNIE, it is planned to schedule the SNIE for USID con-
sideration on 21 March.
DISTRIBUTION D
; ) 7(
. Cele_
CHESTER L. COOPER
Deputy Assistant Assistant Director
National Estimates
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE CF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
10 March 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Coming Crisis in the ROK?
le April 1961 will mark the first anniversary of the revo-
lution that felled Syngman Rhee and swept his government aad his
followers from the political scene. Little real progress has
been made in the past year on the crucial problems which confront
the ROK government and people.. Except for the departure of Rhee
and the elimination of police terrorism and press censorship, life
in Korea is just about as it was under Rhee. Prime Minister Chang
Myon has succeeded in consolidating a slim majority in parliament
and some reforms have been accomplished. However, as the anniver-
sary approaches, there are mounting signs of public frustration and
resentment directed at the government and, increasingly, at the
US, over the slow pace of reform and progress in South Korea.
Public demonstrations, which succeeded so well a year ago, have
DD/P and 0/CI have been consulted in the preparation of this
memorandum.
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continued to nark the ROK scene, especially in the ROK nerve center
of Seoul. ilence, there is a possibility that anniversary demonstra-
tions could erupt -- by design or accident -- and confront the ROK
government and the US with a major crisis in the next few weeks.
This memorandum seeks to assess the chances of such a crist: and
the conditions which might spark it.
I. THr. POSSIBLE SOURCES OF CRISIS
A. Political Weaknesses
2. The seven months of Prime ':inister Chang Lyon's govern-
ment, formed last autumn, have bnon wttended lar-oly in nolitickinr, and
the government's position is none too strong. In the July 1960
elections, the ruling Democratic Party had limn 174 of the 233 seats
in the Aouse of Representatives. However, the deep divisions with-
in the party showed up almost immediately and led to a prolonged
struggle for party control. Chang was elected Prime anister only
after Kim To-yon, a fellow Democrat, had been nominated but re-
jected by a very narrow margin. The faction led by Kim finally
broke away completely, formed the New Democratic Party, and is now
the major opposition, with about 61 adherents, in the House of
Representatives. Chang's Democratic Party has about 126 seats
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(117 are needed for a majority) and he can increase the number
slightly on certain issues b scattered support among some
of the 37 independents in the House. However, potentially
serious schisms exist even within Chang's own Democratic party,
the most significant being a group of 25-30 younger men who
believe Chang's leadership is not sufficiently imaginative or
vigorous.
3. The opposition in parliament is made up of the conser-
vative New Democratic Party, the independent group, and a few
n.mbers of left-of-center parties. The opposition has enjoyed the
full exercise of its constitutional rights of expression and pare
liamentary interpellation: it has been highly vocal and quick
to take advantage of any opportunity to embarrass the government
and force the resignation of individual cabinet members.
The
opposition in parliament is )acked up by a substantial segment
of the press which has taken advantage of the new freedom from
censorship to indulge in generally antigevernment? often irres-
ponsible journalism. The government has come under increasing
criticism from student, labor, veterans, and other groups as well,
who feel that the reforms and improvements which should have
followed upon Rhee's expulsion have been all tee slow in coming
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about. Demonstrations and mass meetings have become a charac-
teristic of Korean public life over the past year.
I. Some of this activity is almost certainly attributable
to Communist direction, although firm evidence is still largely
lacking. There are indications, however, of recent North Korean
efforts to increase the influx of subversive literature and
support into the ROK, largely by way of Japan.
5. The National Police and security services were a primary
target of the popular revulsion that led to last April's revolution.
Since that time, purges and reorganizations have gone on repeatedly,
causing a serious drop in the capabilities and morale of the police.
There is little likelihood that they could function effectively against
organized mass riots. In such circumstances, the Army would probably
become the most important element in the maintenance of order. We
believe that the government would call on the Army in an extreme sit-
uation, and that the Army would respond in its support.
6. Corruption continues to be a major problem for the govern-
ment. Public resentment over corrupt practices played an important
port in the making of the r volution. Student groups in particular
have continued to lead the outcry against corruption. Although
rime 2Tinister Chang and the government generally have thus far
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escaped serious attack for corruption, petty corruption at lower
government and military levels and among much of the pnblit is as
widespread as ever. The exposure of continuing corruption in
the police has caused new public concern over the issue and forced
the government to intensify its efforts to stamp it out.
There would appear to be little likelihood of any effective re-
solution of the problem as long as civil and militgry pay scales
remain at their present law levels.
7. On balance, the Chang government has achieved certain
limited goals but has not sparked any broad degree of public
enthusiasm or support. As the government in bower, it bears
responsibility for the absence of significant political or
economic advances. tell aware of increasing nationalist feel-
ing, Chang has sought to avoid becoming too identified with the
US. This has been difficult, however, as the covernment has
recognized the necessity also of working closely with the US
on the solution of its economic problems. Although the Korean
nubile probably does not regard Chnng as a US puppet, it almost
certz:inly believes that, under him, the US has taken a more
direct hand in the conduct of the government's economic affairs
and that the US shares responsibility for existing economic con.
ditions. ?
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B. Economic Grievances
8. Underlying the political unrest in South Korea is the
weak and uncertain state of an economy barren of natural resources
and diverted from the major problems of reconstruction by the
needs of a vast military establishment. Although the.,overnment's
efforts at economic reform may yield long-term benefits, there
has in general been no significant improvement in the lot of the
individual citizen since Chang's government took power last
August. Indeed, some problems have become more serious.
9. The annual food shortage, which the rural areas normally
experience in April and May before the early planting is harvested,
has already hit many districts.
There has been no starvation,
but rations in many areas have been sharply reduced. The urban
population has been subjected to a general rise in prices; in
Seoul the wholesale price index rose by about 10 percent in
January alone. This rise has slowed somewhat since, but the Korean
Public remains apprehensive over continuing inflationary trends.
The situation has already produced strik s, demonstrations, and
petitions among laboring groups. There hos been no improvement in
the employment situation, and unemployment and serious under-
employment continue to affect about 20 percent of the labor force.
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This number will scon be swelled by most of this y? arts 45,000
college and vocational schccl graduates. In seeking to fix
resp,nsibility, the Korean public, through demonstrations and
the press, blames not enly the government but also, to an in-
creasing extent, the US. In particular, the upward push of
prices is ascribed to US-sponsordd measures, namely the recent
revision of exchanr,e rates and a 50 percent increase in utility
rates now awaitin2: enactment b the parliament.
C. Grievances A;:ainst the US
10. The South Koreans have long resented the reluctance of
the US to c'mclude an administrative agreement providing for the
legal status of 1.1z=' armed forces in Korea. Under Rhee, nubile
expression on this subject was channeled and controlled. Since
his departure, public interest in such an agreement has n-unted
F;reatly, in keeping with the general rise cf nationalist sentiment.
The Koreans hold that whatever reasons excused the absence of a
stntus of frrces agrcement in the past, the end of Rhee and the
virtual restoration of peacetim enditims -- this latter recor...-
nized in the conclusi'n cf a Ur?ROK bilateral eccnomic aid arTee-
ment -- no lona.er justifies US reluctance to meet ROK desires on
this issue. On 2 :arch 1961, the Assembly unanimoualy passed a
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resolution urging the earliest conclusion" of such an agreement,
and Chang has been urging on the US the immediate necessity of
such a step.
11. Considerable controversy developed cver the bilateral
economic aid agreement, which was passed by the National Assembly
(-illy after prolonged P.nd bitter debate. Opponents of the agree-
ment alleged that, under it, the ITS was "interfering" in the
operations of the government, infringing Korean sovereignty, and
treating South Korea as a client state. The US and the ROK govern-
ment also continue to be criticized, sporadically, for being "pro-
Japanese."
D. The Unification Issuo
12. Although Korean unification has not become a burning
issue, interest in it has increased considerably over the past
year, at least in part as a consequence of dissatisfaction over
conditions in the ROK. Student groups have been in the forefront
of those calling for a reexamination of past stands and for now
initiatives to end the division of the country. The government
itr:elf, while eager to wrest the propaganda initiative on unifi-
catien from North Korea, has put off any action until after the UN
consideration of ROK membership this spring. Unification will
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almost certainly beceme an increasingly Serious problem for the
ROK and the US, although probably not in the near future.
II. THE PROSPECTS FOR A UAJOR CRISIS
13. Combustible materials are present. Design, incident,
or a cembinatien of accidents could ignite street demonstrations,
converting them into destructive mob action and a major crisis.
At a minimum, there will be considerable noise and some violence
in the next few weeks, and a major explosion of some kind cannot
be ruled out.
Th. firfuever? the odds appear to be against such a crisis
this spring. Despite the factors present which could spark a
new revolution, the situation in April 1961 is different
in many respects fr(m that cf April 1960. Present frustrations
are not as severe as those sc lom-:; suppressed by Rhee.
.eLereover,
although demon stators may nce again take to the streets, there
is at present no single, emetion-packed focus for disc-ntent cm-
parable to last year's electi,n frauds and police brutality.
15. Nevertheless, the Chary government is fritterini:: away
its period of grace. Seuth Korea's formidable problems of
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impoverishment, the burden of a huge army, and inexperience in
self?government face any ROK leadership. The present leadership
may rock along for some time, but does not appear capable of
making sufficient, visible progress to arrest growing public
dissatisfaction and unrest. Any ROK government will continue
heavily dependent on outside military and economic support.
Even given such support, the ROK will continue to be plagued
by an impoverished economy, a pull towards Korean unification,
and a rise in nationalist and neutralist sentiment.
FOR THE BOARD CF NATIONAL ICTIMATESt.
SHERMAN KENT
Chairman
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