NASSER AND THE FUTURE OF ARAB NATIONALISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A018500030001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 16, 2014
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 27, 1961
• Content Type: NIE

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3 JUL
NIE 36-61
27 June 1961
4.
32t2
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 36-61
(Supersedes N I E 30-59)
NASSER AND THE FUTURE OF
ARAB NATIONALISM
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
on 27 June 1961. Concurring were The Director of Intelli-
gence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief
of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assist-
ant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department
of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF;
the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director
of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Com-
mission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant Di-
rector, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject
being outside of their jurisdiction.
1
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NASSER AND THE FUTURE OF ARAB NATIONALISM
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the outlook for Arab nationalism generally and to assess the prob-
lems and prospects of Nasser and the UAR in particular.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Militant nationalism will continue to
be the most dynamic force in Arab politi-
cal affairs, and Nasser is very likely to
remain its foremost leader and symbol
for the foreseeable future. The long-
term outlook for the conservative and
Western-aligned regimes is bleak. De-
spite important differences between com-
peting brands of Arab nationalism, the
significant ones all reflect desires for in-
dependence and neutralism, social and
economic reform, and varying degrees of
Arab unity. (Paras. 10-11, 13, 29)
2. We do not believe that the appeal of
Arab unity, strong as it is to most Arab
nationalists, will overcome the host of di-
visive and particularist interests which
work against the creation of a union of
Arab states. Nasser probably now ap-
preciates the practical obstacles involved
in seeking to establish such a union. He
is likely to settle for more limited means
of trying to assert paramountcy. (Paras.
28, 30, 36-38)
3. The UAR will make strong efforts to
achieve progress in economic develop-
ment, but neither the Egyptian nor
Syrian region is likely to attain significant
economic growth without substantial and
continued foreign aid. (Paras. 15,20-35)
4. Nasser will probably continue to work
for consolidation of unity between the
Egyptian and Syrian regions through a
fairly pragmatic combination of authori-
tarian control and tactical concessions
to Syrian sensibilities. In most respects,
such consolidation involves a high degree
of Egyptian domination of Syria. We
believe that Nasser has a good chance of
avoiding a breakup of the union. How-
ever, striking successes are unlikely, and
serious setbacks remain constantly possi-
ble. (Paras. 14-24)
5. Nasser's control of the UAR?as well
as his position in the Arab world gen-
erally?will be helped by Arab fear and
hatred of Israel. Israel's nuclear poten-
tial and Israeli plans to divert Jordan
waters will intensify Arab apprehensions.
The UAR has the only Arab armed forces
with any significant potential against
Israel, which gives Nasser a unique claim
to Arab leadership. (Paras. 19, 37-38)
WkWiSSW
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6. This claim is further buttressed by
Nasser's accepted position as the leading
exponent of Arab reformism, and by his
demonstrated readiness to assume lead-
ership in defending Arab nationalism
against communism. Despite his de-
pendence on the Bloc, he is not neutral
in the conflict between Arab nationalism
and communism. (Paras. 10-11, 19,
46-50)
7. It is highly unlikely that Nasser will
abandon his broad foreign policy of "posi-
tive neutralism." He has a basic belief
that either of the great power blocs, if
given free rein, would move to dominate
or destroy him; he believes that neither
can get free rein because of the determi-
nation of the other to prevent it. He
will thus seek to avoid both total depend-
ence on, and total alienation from, the
Bloc as well as the West. Although in
practice this strategy leads him to side
more often with the Bloc than with the
West, he has shown himself ready to
respond vigorously to Soviet attacks.
(Paras. 48-51)
2
8. It is probable that with the passage of
time the inherent incompatibility between
ultimate Soviet ambitions in the Middle
East and the aspirations of Nasser and
the Arab nationalists to preserve and
strengthen their independent position
will become increasingly manifest. If
the Soviets should decide to abandon sup-
port of the Nasser regime in favor of in-
creasingly heavy-handed pressure and
subversion, the result would probably be
a fundamental breach between Nasser
and the USSR. However, such a breach
may not come for years. (Para. 52)
9. Nasser's efforts to play a leading role
among neutralists and Afro-Asians con-
front him with complex problems.
Almost all African leaders, for example,
are unwilling to see him play a dominant
role on that continent. Moreover, mat-
ters like the forthcoming conference of
nonaligned states and the future struc-
ture of the UN involve him in conflict-
ing pressures from the Sino-Soviet Bloc
and the neutralists. (Paras. 41-42, 45,
53)
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%.4644140014,
DISCUSSION
A. The Nature and Present State of Arab
Nationalism
10. Militant nationalism remains the most
dynamic force in Arab political affairs. There
are of course different and competing types of
Arab nationalism, which spring from impor-
tant regional and religious distinctions as well
as individual and governmental interests.
However, all significant brands of Arab
nationalism have important qualities in com-
mon. They rely on the modern secular state
as the instrument for achieving their objec-
tives, and place decreasing emphasis on tradi-
tional Islam as a basis of nationalism. The
main manifestations of Arab nationalism are
strongest among the emerging urban middle
classes. These manifestations reflect desires
for Arab independence and dignity, funda-
mental social and economic reform, and some
degree of Arab unity. They provide expres-
sion for longstanding and widespread griev-
ances in Arab society?feelings of inferiority
to the great powers, extreme social and eco-
nomic inequalities, hostility to the old elites,
fear and hatred of Israel, and frustration over
the obvious disharmony between traditional
ways and the modern world.
11. In most of the Middle East, as indeed for
most of the rest of the world, Nasser remains
the prime leader and symbol of Arab national-
ism. No other leader has so consistently and
forcefully expressed its essential sentiments,
and no other leader has enjoyed such concrete
successes in its name. There is no Arab
leader now on the scene nor, so far as we can
tell, waiting in the wings, capable of matching
Nasser's appeal or achieving a comparable
basis of power and authority. King Saud and
King Hussein are widely regarded as survivals
of an outmoded past. Bourguiba commands
but limited attention in the Arab states out-
side North Africa. And Qassim has failed to
capture popular imagination outside Iraq or
indeed very much within his country.
12. Nasser's own prestige and influence in the
Arab world generally have been subject to
fluctuations. In the last two or three years
he has met with certain checks and reverses.
The revolutionary regime in Iraq failed to join
the Nasser camp, and in fact has frustrated
more than one UAR effort to bring Iraq in by
force of subversion and threat. The shining
spirit of Arab unity which characterized the
UAR's formation in early 1958 has been tar-
nished by exposure to the daily strains of
actually implementing unification between
Egypt and Syria. King Hussein has so far
kept his throne despite strong blasts of
vituperation from Nasser, and for several
years there has been no dramatic success
against Israel or the Western Powers to match
the heady triumphs of the initial Soviet arms
deal and the outcome of the Suez crisis.
13. Whether Nasser himself gains or loses
strength in the coming years, the political,
social, and psychological conditions and needs
which have given rise to Arab nationalism will
persist. It is unlikely, however, that any new
leader could in the foreseeable future achieve
the stature which a combination of political
adroitness and substantial achievements have
given Nasser.
B. The UAR
14. In the first instance, Nasser's future
fortunes will depend heavily on developments
in the UAR. The union of Syria and Egypt
was a signal triumph for the Pan-Arab move-
ment and a strong testimonial to Nasser's own
appeal. It is also proving a critical test of his
ability to sustain his appeal and to translate
slogans and aspirations into realities. So far,
he has met the test somewhat more success-
fully than most observers considered likely
at the outset. Nonetheless, Syria presents to
Nasser a situation in which spectacular gains
are no longer open to him, but in which he is
still vulnerable to major losses and damaging
setbacks. In Egypt, we anticipate no sig-
nificant challenges to Nasser's authority. The
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Egyptian military, the principal instrument
of power in the UAR, have achieved elite status
under Nasser, and will almost certainly con-
tinue to give him their support.
15. In general, Nasser has gone farthest and
has met with the least trouble in consolidating
centralized control in the field of UAR foreign
policy. He has proceeded most slowly and
has encountered the most resistance in the
area of economic integration. Progress to-
ward fully unifying the political and military
structures of the two regions has been uneven.
Nasser's unitary government does in fact exer-
cise the real authority, and is buttressed in
theory by a monolithic political organization,
the National Union, which was organized in
Egypt and then extended to Syria to replace
the several Syrian political parties which are
now officially disbanded.
16. In fact, however, the Syrian politicians of
both left and right remain active, factional-
ism continues strong, and Nasser has been
compelled to exercise his authority through
an opportunistic system of playing factions off
against each other?meanwhile relying on au-
thoritarian controls exerted through his
Syrian strong man, Sarraj, and the Egyptian
Marshal Amer, UAR Commander in Chief.
Unification of the military has in practice
been implemented by establishing overall
Egyptian control and by placing Egyptian
officers in key positions in most Syrian units
down to the company level. The inevitable
result has been considerable resentment
among Syrian officers. Restrictions on the
press and economic control measures have
antagonized important elements of the civilian
population as well.
17. If anti-Egyptian sentiment among the
Syrian military should ever be effectively
joined with the discontent over the union
prevalent among many Syrian civilians,
Nasser's control of the UAR?indeed its very
existence?would face a critical test. So far,
Nasser has been successful in forestalling any
coalescence of active and potential dissidents.
He has been helped by the fact that civilian
opposition is seriously weakened by factional-
ism and disparate ideologies. The old-line
leaders of the Populist and Nationalist parties
4
have trouble getting together themselves, let
alone cooperating with socialist groups like
the Baath. The sharpening conflict between
nationalism and communism has made
nationalist cooperation with the Communists
difficult. And unless one or more of the
civilian factions can acquire significant army
support, they will have only limited practical
effectiveness in the face of Nasser's prestige
among the masses and his authoritarian con-
trols over the instruments of government.
18. One contingency which would quickly
create a crisis for Nasser in Syria would be a
falling out with Sarraj and his supporters.
Aided by Nasser's support, Sarraj has de-
veloped over the years an efficient network of
followers in the Syrian military and security
services, and more recently in the civilian
ministries, which makes him the most power-
ful Syrian on the scene. At least at present
his role is central to Nasser's continued con-
trol in Syria, a fact no doubt appreciated fully
in Cairo, and one which gives Sarraj con-
siderable leverage in the central government.
There is no reliable basis for estimating the
durability of the Nasser-Sarraj collaboration.
So far, it has proven mutually beneficial,
especially since Sarraj himself is unpopular
in Syria.
19. We consider that a total disruption of the
UAR is highly unlikely. Nonetheless, the
initial urge toward close unity on the part of
many Arab nationalists will give way to de-
sires for a looser association, and Nasser him-
self may make some concessions to these de-
sires rather than try to keep control exclu-
sively by force. Moreover, threats such as
communism, "imperialism," and Israel will
continue to serve as unifying factors and
Nasser is fully alive to their value as such.
To the extent that progress is made toward
integration of the institutions of the two re-
gions, the union will benefit from familiarity
and usage. The charismatic personality of
Nasser himself is a prime factor in holding the
union together, and if he should disappear
from the scene the continuation of the union,
at least in its present form, would be open to
question. Nasser would probably be suc-
ceeded by one of his longstanding military col-
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leagues, who would continue his essential
policies. But without Nasser, the difficulties
of holding Syria would be greatly increased.
20. The attainment of effective economic in-
tegration between the two regions of the UAR
will remain a stubborn problem. Difficulties
arise from incompatibilities between Syria's
traditionally laissez-faire, comparatively pros-
perous economy and that of Egypt?which
has long had a high degree of centralized con-
trol and which is hampered by scanty re-
sources.
21. So far, the UAR Government has pursued
a cautious approach toward economic unifica-
tion. Nonetheless, some steps toward unifi-
cation have been taken, such as imposition of
Egyptian type foreign exchange controls in
Syria and increasing Egyptian control of
Syrian economic development plans. To
achieve real integration, much more drastic
measures would be required, notably the in-
troduction of a common currency, the estab-
lishment of a single central bank, and integra-
tion of the customs systems. Such steps how-
ever are virtually certain to encounter Syrian
resistance in one degree or another, and the
central government may decide to go slowly
lest this resistance aggravate existing eco-
nomic and political problems.
22. Whatever its success with respect to eco-
nomic integration, the UAR is earnestly com-
mitted to a program of economic development
in both regions. During the current Five-
Year Plan (1961-1965) , UAR officials plan to
invest nearly $5 billion in the Egyptian region
and almost $800 million in Syria. The
planned investment figure for Egypt includes
about $650 million toward completion of the
Aswan High Dam. The development plan for
Egypt stresses industrial projects, while the
plans for Syria primarily emphasize agricul-
tural projects. The foreign exchange com-
ponent required for these overall plans
amounts to about $2.2 billion, of which $570
million, has been pledged by the Bloc. In
addition, about $125 million in West German
credits is available, as well as smaller sums
from other free world countries. Thus, more
than half the total foreign exchange required
remains to be found.
5
23. In addition to the difficulties of securing
foreign exchange, the UAR will have to cope
with formidable problems including those of
securing adequate domestic financing, the
probability of inflation, and inadequate na-
tional resources and human skills. If the
UAR secures the required foreign aid and con-
tinues to make reasonable use of its limited
domestic resources, it can probably achieve
small but steady rises in living standards, de-
spite the rapid increase in population?about
2.5 percent annually. Nevertheless, even
upon completion of their present plans, it is
probable that neither region would be able to
sustain significant economic growth without
continued and substantial external aid.
24. Certain important generalizations can be
made about the future patterns of economic
development in the UAR. For one thing, the
regime will make a major effort to bring it
about?even though success will be far from
certain. For another, the government will
continue to place its principal reliance on
state-initiated and state-supported schemes.
There is little prospect that private invest-
ment will be allowed or encouraged to share
to more than a limited degree in the effort.
Private domestic or foreign investment is
identified, in the minds of the UAR leaders,
with the kind of foreign domination and in-
digenous class exploitation which they seek
to eradicate. There is, indeed, likely to be a
growing trend toward nationalization and
state control of already existing private enter-
prises in Syria?a trend which is already far
advanced in Egypt.
25. Nasser is fully aware of the need for
foreign aid if he is to have any chance of
carrying out this program. Special impor-
tance attaches to Soviet economic assistance
because of its long-term character. Yet, even
if the West were willing to supply the aid
Nasser gets from the Soviets, Nasser would be
constrained to seek aid from both sides in
order to avoid exclusive dependence on either
one. Nasser ;therefore will seek to avoid any
disruption of relations that threatens to shut
off his assistance from either side. Although
a complete cutting-off of aid by the Soviets is
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not likely, deliberate Soviet foot-dragging as a
means of pressure is a source of worry to
Nasser.
26. In the important sphere of military as-
sistance, Nasser is critically dependent on the
Bloc, and he would regard the loss of such aid
as catastrophic. He can have little hope that
the West would replace it if the Bloc cut it off.
Moreover, no Western guarantee of UAR se-
curity would serve Nasser's purpose of achiev-
ing superiority over Israel. In addition, the
armed forces are the keystone of Nasser's re-
gime in the UAR and of his prestige vis-a-vis
his Arab neighbors.
27. Whatever Nasser's differences with the
West, he is not likely to engage in interference
with Suez Canal shipping, except in the case
of Israel. Barring a crisis like the Suez war
of 1956, Nasser will continue to run the canal
efficiently. He will, however, almost certainly
persist in denying transit to Israeli vessels,
though in certain circumstances he might go
along with some form of discreet accommoda-
tion for Israeli cargoes in other flag vessels.
It would, however, be extremely difficult to
find any such arrangement acceptable to
both Nasser and Israel.
C. Nasser and the Rest of the Arab World
28. Arab unity remains a major theme of
Nasser's nationalism, but his chances of trans-
lating the ideal into the kind of political real-
ity represented by a single state are not bright.
He probably realizes this. Certainly the con-
cept of Arab political union under his aegis
appears farther from realization today than it
did, for example, in 1958 when the formation
of the UAR, the Iraqi nationalist revolution,
the pro-Nasser insurrection in Lebanon, and
King Hussein's request for British interven-
tion in Jordan all combined to dramatize the
strength of Nasser's appeal and the degree to
which his opponents were on the defensive.
29. We believe that the basic trends which
brought on the events of 1958 will shape the
future of the Arab world. Sooner or later,
such conservative governments as those in
Jordan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the rest of
the Arabian Peninsula are likely to be re-
6
placed by regimes which, if not directly in-
spired or actively backed by Nasser, will at
least pursue domestic and foreign policies
broadly comparable to his. Briefly stated,
this means neutralism in world affairs and
efforts, or at least gestures, toward domestic
modernization and reform through central-
ized and authoritarian means.
30. But it is highly unlikely that the Arab
states will one by one be absorbed by the UAR.
Arab particularism remains a strong obstacle
to unity as a result of rivalry for leadership
of the movement, fear by certain elements
that they will be dominated by others, and
economic self-interests. Any regime in Saudi
Arabia or Libya, for example, would be reluc-
tant to share oil revenues with the UAR simply
to prove its dedication to the cause of Arab
unity. And while Nasser is of course capable
of supporting and influencing revolutionary
movements in these states, it is quite another
thing for him to consolidate control over a
revolutionary regime once it has gained power.
Arab nationalism in other countries, even if
inspired by Nasser, will not necessarily lead to
submission to centralized UAR control. In-
deed, it may provide new challenges to him.
Nasser's experience with Iraq demonstrated
this.
31. Iraqi nationalism has a strength and char-
acter of its own, derived not only from the
historic rivalry between Cairo and Baghdad
and Iraq's unwillingness to share its oil
wealth, but also from the reluctance of Iraq's
influential Shia and Kurdish minorities to
submit to Sunni Arab domination under
Nasser. The nationalists of Iraq will con-
tinue to pay their respects to Arab unity, and
a minority probably hopes for actual merger
with the UAR, but separatist tendencies are
likely to prove stronger for years to come.
Probably the strongest stimulus for a resur-
gence of pro-Nasser Pan-Arab sentiment in
Iraq would be a renewed threat of a Com-
munist takeover.
32. The Iraqis have for years periodically as-
serted a legal claim to Kuwait, based on
questionable interpretations of long-dead
Ottoman rights over Kuwait. Qassim's most
recent assertion of this claim was probably
UNWAIAPP
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motivated by fear that, as Kuwait gains full
recognition of its independence following the
recent termination of its special treaty with
the UK, Iraq's claim would be given even
shorter shrift in Arab League circles than it
has hitherto. Iraq's claims are opposed by
the Kuwaiti regime and by most other ele-
ments in Kuwait. They will also be resisted
by most other Arab states, probably led by
Saudi Arabia and the UAR. In addition, the
UK retains the obligation to defend Kuwait
against aggression if the Ruler requests it.
We believe that any serious Iraqi attempt to
take over Kuwait would fail. Nasser and the
Saudis would mobilize the Arab League
against it, and probably succeed in isolating
Iraq politically. The UK would almost cer-
tainly take the necessary steps, including use
of force if required, to forestall or defeat any
such Iraqi effort.
33. The poverty-stricken and highly artificial
state of Jordan, dependent for its existence
on Western support, contains a large element
which favors some form of association with
the UAR. Even so, there would be strong
obstacles to any merger even if King Hussein
were removed. These include the risk that
Israel would take military action to forestall
a Nasser-controlled government in Jordan,
the fact that some influential elements in
Jordan?including most of the army?would
oppose a merger, and Nasser's own probable
reluctance to take on the unrewarding and
risky burden of responsibility for this unviable
state.
34. Yemen has been associated with the UAR
through the United Arab States, an almost
meaningless association. Having made the
gesture, the Imam has successfully blocked
any significant growth in Nasser's influence in
this primitive state. When the Imam leaves
the scene, the prospects for a growth in
Egyptian influence will increase, especially if
Crown Prince Badr?who is supported by the
Egyptians?succeeds his father.
35. Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria have tradi-
tionally had a separate status in the Arab
world and are much less susceptible to
Nasser's influence and to the pull of Pan-
411,0Bai
7
Arabism than the eastern Arab states. The
same may be said to a lesser degree of Libya
and the Sudan, both of which have reason to
fear Egyptian subversion. While Nasser will
remain a model for radicals and a possible
source of support for dissidents in all of these
areas, it is not likely that he will be able to
influence events decisively in former French
North Africa during the next few years. In-
deed, his influence there might decline should
the Algerian problem be settled.
36. It is probable that Nasser himself is recon-
ciled to the prospect that Arab unity will take
more time to achieve and will assume a less
organized form than he once hoped. The ex-
perience of governing Syria has almost cer-
tainly impressed him with the practical dif-
ficulties of consolidating and exerting formal
control over areas beyond Egypt, as has his
failure to bring Iraq into line. He almost cer-
tainly believes that Arab unity will eventually
come and that the "logic of history" and the
passage of time will bring it. He will remain
ready to facilitate the process by his efforts to
make a success of the UAR and by encourage-
ment and support of sympathetic elements in
other states. He will be quick to defend
against all comers his role as chief spokesman
and symbol of the movement.
37. Nasser's efforts to preserve and enhance
this position are likely to be along several,
reasonably predictable lines. His voice will
continue to be the strongest one in Arab
League councils. Indeed, it is primarily
through a strengthened Arab League that
Nasser and his colleagues probably now hope
to assert paramountcy in Arab affairs. Fear
of and hostility toward Israel are still the
strongest cohesive elements in the Arab
League. In such circumstances, Nasser's
control of the UAR armed forces?the only
Arab force with any potential against Israel?
supports his role as the prime champion of
Arab interests. No Arab leader outside the
UAR has any prospect of enjoying this ad-
vantage.
38. The UAR is currently striving through
the Arab League to create a unified Arab mil-
itary command, which it would naturally
dominate. Most other Arab states have
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agreed in principle to this command, since for
them it is a gesture with little practical mean-
ing. Jordan will continue to resist it, lest
it give the UAR control of Jordanian forces.
Similarly, Nasser's concept of forming a dis-
tinct entity representing all Palestinians has
received general agreement except from the
government of Jordan, where most of them
live. Nasser may indeed come to a falling out
with Qassim over tactics on the Palestine
issue, but it is unlikely to mean more than
a suspension of Iraq's participation in League
activities. All in all, Nasser will continue to
use the Arab League as a ready-made in-
strument to influence the rest of the Arab
world.
39. Potent as the Israeli issue is in drawing
the Arabs together and underlining the im-
portance of Nasser and the UAR, it confronts
him with increasingly critical problems. His
belief that Israel may develop a nuclear weap-
ons capability raises for him the specter of
clear and decisive Israeli military superiority
over the Arabs for the indefinite future. If
the Israelis go ahead with present plans to
divert Jordan waters in the next two years or
so, there will be the strongest pressures on
Nasser to lead the Arabs in preventive action.
Yet it remains likely that Israel would defeat
the Arabs in any new round of hostilities, and
Nasser probably appreciates this.
40. Though we cannot rule out the possibility
that Nasser might initiate hostilities out of
desperation or overoptimism concerning UAR
capabilities, we think it more likely that he
will fall back on political moves to forestall
such dangers from Israel. In addition to
making the most of a united Arab front on
these questions, he will continue efforts to
marshal Afro-Asian and neutralist sentiment
against Israel, to keep the issues alive in the
UN, and to elicit assurances of support and
protection from both the USSR and the US.
He has an ingrained suspicion of Zionist in-
fluence over the US, and at the same time,
quite likely exaggerates the extent to which
Israel is responsive to US influence. However,
he will continue to press the US for support in
curbing Israeli threats to the UAR.
8
D. Nasser and the Afro-Asian World
41. Beginning with his successful appearance
at the Bandung Conference in 1955, Nasser
has devoted much effort to establishing a posi-
tion as a leader among the Afro-Asian states
generally, making particular use of his doc-
trine of "positive neutralism" to appeal to the
nonaligned or uncommitted states. His most
recent foray into this arena, the conference
of nonaligned states scheduled for September
1961 and sponsored primarily by the UAR and
Yugoslavia, underlines his achievement of a
leading role in this respect. His chances of
sustaining and developing his influence along
these lines are greatest among certain of the
new states of Africa, where a degree of re-
ligious affinity with African Moslems, Nasser's
own record of militant resistance to the West-
ern colonial powers, and his successful prac-
tice of the neutralist strategy all give him
advantages.
42. Nevertheless, we do not believe that he will
prove a decisive or dominating influence on
the African scene. Nasser has neither the
political nor the material leverage with the
African states to enable him to play this role.
He will encounter some competition from
Israel in certain African states. More im-
portantly, he will find that almost all of the
African leaders?in the new states as well as
the older ones?are unwilling to see him play
a dominant role in Africa. Moreover, he will
find himself involved in rivalries among com-
peting African groups.
43. Nasser himself is not unaware of these
limitations, and of the difficulties of control-
ling events in a volatile situation like the
Congo. For this reason, he is likely to avoid
the kind of total commitment which would
jeopardize UAR prestige if the side he favors
should lose. Nevertheless, Nasser will main-
tain an active interest in identifying himself
with nationalist and anticolonialist move-
ments. More specifically, in cases where there
is a conflict or choice between moderate and
extremist nationalist leaders (e.g., between a
Kasavubu and a Gizenga) Nasser will be in-
stinctively inclined to side with the extremist.
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As a result of his still-lively suspicions that
the Western Powers remain bent on halting or
reversing the trend of events in Africa, he has
a strong tendency to judge the credentials of
African leaders by the degree of hostility they
show toward the Western Powers.
44. Nasser's African policies will inevitably in-
volve him in continuing clashes with the in-
terests and policies of the Western Powers.
There will thus almost certainly continue to
be a considerable parallelism between Soviet
and UAR policies in Africa. As in the Arab
world, however, when and if Nasser comes to
believe that Soviet support for a given African
regime clearly threatens to develop into Soviet
domination, he would oppose it. In both
areas, the more obvious and imminent the
Soviet bid for power appears to Nasser the
more likely it is to bring forth his opposition.
The uncertain factor lies in what it takes to
convince Nasser of the existence of an urgent
Soviet threat in any given situation.
45. Nasser's efforts to play a leading role in
neutralist and Afro-Asian circles involve him
in some competition and conflict with other
neutralist powers. Nehru, for example, has
disapproved of several Nasser moves in recent
months?including UAR opposition to the UN
in the Congo operation, and the efforts to
develop a strong neutralist or "third force"
bloc implicit in Nasser's sponsorship of the
projected conference of nonaligned states.
The latter project has for different reasons
also incurred Sino-Soviet displeasure?partic-
ularly since Tito is cosponsor.
E. Nasser, Arab Nationalism, and the Great
Powers
46. Nothing has contributed more to Nasser's
stature among the Arabs than his militant as-
sertion of independence against external forces
believed by the Arabs to be hostile. Arab
feeling is rooted deeply in resentment over
decades of Western domination of the Arab
world. It was intensified by the humiliating
Arab defeat at Israel's hands in 1948. It is
the stronger because it provides an excuse?
the wickedness of the great powers?for a
host of deficiencies and inadequacies in Arab
9
society. Defiance of the once dominant
powers?and of Israel?thus became virtually
indispensable to the program of any Arab na-
tionalist leader desirous of proving his bona
fides, and successful defiance was bound to
bring commensurate prestige in the Arab
world. It was not until very recently that
Arab fear of foreign domination even began
to encompass the Soviet Union as well as the
West.
47. In asserting his militant independence,
Nasser has been aided immeasurably by two
trends in the policies of the great world
powers. On the one hand, the Western na-
tions which once dominated the region have
become in recent years increasingly resigned
to abandoning special positions and influ-
ence in areas once treated as colonial or semi-
colonial states. He has been equally helped
by a concurrent development in Soviet policy:
the willingness of the USSR, in the post-Stalin
period, to espouse the cause of nationalist
movements in the Afro-Asian world as a means
of weakening Western influence in the hope
of enhancing Soviet prospects for control in
these areas. Much more than any other Arab
leader, Nasser has successfully exploited these
two trends.
48. Nasser's policy toward the two great power
blocs is derived from a basic belief that either
side, if given free rein, would move to dominate
him or destroy both his independence and that
of the Arab world. What prevents this from
happening, in his view, is that neither side has
nor can get free rein because of the determina-
tion of the other to prevent it. With the
giants thus standing each other off and
(ideally) competing positively for his favor,
Nasser has, in his own view, the best chance
both of insuring his own freedom from their
domination and being the recipient of essen-
tial material support.
49. However, although Nasser's practice of
"positive neutralism" has gained for him con-
siderable maneuverability, it has not given
him a free field in the Middle East. The ex-
istence of Arab particularism, described above,
is itself an obstacle. In addition, both power
blocs, partly by supporting this particular-
ism, are in a position to hinder Nasser's ex-
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pansion. So, too, is the State of Israel.
Even at the height of Nasser's successes in
1958 these elements worked to inhibit any
sweeping triumph on his part.
50. Despite his dependence on the Bloc, it is
significant that Nasser has shown himself
ready to respond vigorously when he felt that
the USSR threatened his position. The Com-
munist challenge to nationalism in Iraq in
1959 led to a period of estrangement between
the UAR and the Bloc, and there has been a
recent dispute occasioned by Soviet attacks on
the "socialist" philosophy of the UAR and the
UAR's suppression of local Communists. Nas-
ser characteristically responded to these at-
tacks by seeking friendlier relations with the
US and by loud defiance of Soviet attempts to
interfere in the UAR's internal affairs.
51. It is highly unlikely that Nasser will
abandon the broad foreign policy of "positive
neutralism." He will seek to avoid both total
dependence on, and total alienation from,
either of the great power blocs?while at the
same time trying to derive maximum inde-
pendent power and maneuverability through
his position of leadership in the Arab world
and his influence among the neutralists.
Clearly, however, this strategy will work only
so long as both the West and the Bloc con-
tinue willing to support Nasser's independent
role.
52. It is probable that with the passage of
time the inherent incompatibility between
ultimate Soviet ambitions in the Middle East
and the aspirations of Nasser and the Arab
nationalists to preserve and strengthen their
independent position will become increasingly
manifest. In time, the Soviets may conclude
that support for bourgeois nationalist regimes
like that of the UAR should be replaced by in-
creasingly heavy-handed pressure and sub-
version. Such a change would probably re-
sult in a fundamental breach in USSR-UAR
10
relations. The Soviets probably already feel
that Nasser's heavy dependence on Bloc mili-
tary and economic assistance gives them a
considerable leverage over him. A decisive
breach may not come for years. However,
the Communist push for power in Iraq in 1959
and Khrushchev's recent, brief flurry of propa-
ganda attacks on the UAR suggest that the
Soviets may be willing to risk a breach some-
what sooner than appeared likely three years
ago. A Soviet decision to make such a radical
change in approach would depend on con-
siderations outside the scope of this estimate
on Nasser and Arab nationalism.
53. In this connection, the Soviet attack on
the UN structure, growing out of the Congo
affair, has already posed a dilemma for Nasser.
He is, on the one hand, subject to strong
Soviet pressures to support what amounts to
a drastic weakening of the organization. At
the same time, he is sensitive to the fact that
an effective UN is important to the security of
the UAR and other weaker states which he
hopes to cultivate, and that it constitutes a
major hope of making their influence felt in
the world.
54. In any case, the lessons of recent Soviet
behavior have not been lost on Nasser. His
innate suspicions and distrust of the West will
remain, but he has probably been compelled to
take a somewhat more sober view of the risks
and uncertainties involved in dependence on
the Bloc. His response will probably be an
increased willingness to take out reinsurance
in the form of better relations with the West,
principally the US. But such moves will stop
well short of any lasting or clear alignment.
Any such adjustment in Nasser's policy to-
ward the great powers will be supplemented
by continuing and earnest efforts to cultivate
influence and leadership among the non-
aligned states. These efforts, however, will
not end his dependence on the great powers
for military and economic aid and markets.
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