ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A016800010001-6
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• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 20, 2014
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 17, 1961
• Content Type: NIE

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JAN 1961
208
N I E 1-61
17 January 1961
P31('
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 1-61\
ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD
SITUATION
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
on 17 January 1961. Concurring were The Director of Intel-
ligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant
Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Depart-
ment of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Assistant
to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the
Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy
Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant
Director,' Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the sub-
ject being outside of their jurisdiction.
ROURii to ARCMS & MUDS CEN k
ItMEMATELY AFTER 11SE , 4071
Jag 1/5R(aatux Aoq6:9, 12-
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy
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22 June 1953.
4. The title of this estimate when used separately from the text, should be classified:
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION?The Decade of the 1950's . . . . Paras. 1-12
A review of the fundamental changes in the structure of world power
which occurred in the 1950's?The drawing of lines between the
blocs?The major powers' reassessment of their military capabilities
and strategies?Changes in Soviet leadership and policy?The vast
improvement in Soviet military posture?The new opportunities for
the USSR in the underdeveloped areas?The imposing position of the
USSR at the end of the decade?The relative decline in the US world
position.
II. THE COMMUNIST WORLD Paras. 13-30
A. Soviet Progress and Policy Paras. 13-19
Soviet economic growth and economic power?Soviet belief that the
USSR can challenge the US on disputed issues?The peaceful co-
existence policy?The basis of the dispute with China.
B. Chinese Communist Growth and Aspirations. . . Paras. 20-24
The growing self-confidence of China?Chinese economic growth and
economic problems?The Chinese nuclear development program?
Chinese revolutionary ?n?The Chinese view of Communist world
strategy.
C. Sino-Soviet Relations and the Future of Communism
Paras. 25-30
The issues between the USSR and China?Unlikelihood of a clear res-
olution?Consequences of continuing disagreement?Probability that
the USSR will continue seeking to avoid serious risks?Possibility So-
viet leaders will misjudge Western will?Probability China will persist
in its militancy?Dangers involved.
III. THE EMERGING AREAS Paras. 31-45
A. The Political and Social Milieu Paras. 31-38
The objectives of the nationalist revolutions?The motivations of the
revolutionary intelligentsia?Their wariness of communism and their
attempt to carve out their own destinies?Political and social insta-
bility in the underdeveloped countries?The enormity of their prob-
lems?Tendency toward authoritarianism and socialism?Effect of
population growth?Need for outside aid?Danger to the present revo-
lutionary leaders.
B. International Outlook Paras. 39-45
Outside world viewed largely in terms of local problems?Choice of
neutralism by those who thought they could safely choose it?The
tendency to compensate for years of Western influence by accepting
closer relations with Sino-Soviet Bloc?Likelihood that trend toward
neutralism will become stronger?Political consequences for US, in-
cluding decline of US influence in the UN?Opportunities for Com-
munist penetration and subversion.
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IV. PROBLEMS OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCES . . . Paras. 46-59
West faces not only stronger Communist enemy but accumulating
crises in the underdeveloped nations?Western assets still very
great?Political weaknesses in the West?The condition of Western
alliances?The problem in Japan?Weakness of CENTO and SEATO?
By contrast, the greater strength of NATO?Military problems of
NATO?Divergencies and rivalries within Atlantic community?Im-
pact of colonial problems?Lack of a common view of world situation
among NATO members.
V. THE MILITARY PROBLEM Paras. 60-78
A. The Evolving Strategic Situation Paras. 60-65
Major problem of the 1960's posed by the accumulation of weapons of
mass destruction by the great powers?Each side capable of inflict-
ing enormous destruction upon the other?General nuclear war not
impossible, but highly irrational response to international disputes?
Problem of assessing risks?Other serious problems posed by strategic
situation.
B. Military and Political Implications of the Evolving
Strategic Situation Paras. 66-78
Existing uncertainty about present and future world military situa-
tion?Puzzlement over deterrents?Soviet efforts to improve their
military position?Soviet view of strategic situation?The advantages
the USSR derives from it--Limited war capabilities?Political and
military problems of conducting limited war?Consequences of addi-
tional countries acquiring nuclear weapons?Possibility of general
war coming about through miscalculation or accident?Pressure for
disarmament?Conclusion that decade ahead will be an extremely
dangerous one.
11
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ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION
THE ESTIMATE
I. INTRODUCTION?THE DECADE OF THE
1950's
1. The past several years have witnessed fun-
damental changes in the structure of world
power. The coming of the space age, the
Soviet bid for world leadership, the growth
of Communist China toward world power
status, the creation of new nations, and the
rapid economic growth of some of the ad-
vanced countries have greatly altered the out-
look for many of the world's peoples. We
believe it would be useful, as the decade of
the 1960's begins, to survey in a somewhat
broader fashion than has been our custom
the development of the world situation in the
years which have gone by.
2. By the time the decade of the 1950's began,
the major convulsions of the ?ostwar ears
had come to an end. The Chinese Commu-
nists had seized control of the Chinese main-
land, the colonial powers had relinquished
their hold on most of the Near East and
South and Southeast Asia, most of the East-
ern European governments were in the hands
of Communists responsive to Moscow con-
trol, and the Communist drive for political
power in Western Europe had been curbed.
The US had abandoned isolationism and had
accepted the leadership of the Western world.
Through NATO, the Marshall plan, aid to
Greece and Turkey, and an active participa-
tion in world councils, the US had asserted
its intention to use its economic and military
power in the interests of world stability and
the containment of communism. The major
tests of that intention came in Berlin and
above all in Korea; the firm and rapid US
response in Korea made clear to all the world
that an attempt by the Communists to acquire
territory by open military conquest was un-
profitable and dangerous.
3. In retrospect, it can be seen that these US
actions of the early postwar period were ma-
jor factors in creating the conditions which
dominated much of the decade. They led to
the drawing of lines between Communist and
non-Communist territory wmcn could not be
crossed by overt military forces without seri-
ous risk of retaliation. Thus the Communists
were in effect deprived of one tactic for ex-
panding their area of influence; they were
obliged to .confine themselvto?the more
devious and time-consuming methods of sub-
version, guerrilla action,_and__political and
economic warfare. These US actions also
gave courage and hope to many nations whose
borders were being threatened and whose
economic and political weaknesses made them
subject to internal and external Communist
pressure.
4. The war in Korea, following upon the
events in Europe of the late 1940's and upon
the Chinese Communist establishment of con-
trol in China, also aroused a lively sense of
danger in the non-Communist world. There
developed a general awareness of the world-
wide aims of the Communist revolution. The
US response was to rearm itself and to initiate
a military assistance program designed not
only to bolster countries on the periphery of
the Bloc but also to identify unmistakably
those areas which the US was taking under
its protection. The two blocs became increas-
ingly well armed and committed to the defense
of particular areas.
5. The Korean War, also seen in retrospect,
pointed up the need for the major powers to
reassess their military capabilities and strate-
"zatertaTir.
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gies. In that war, the Soviet leaders had
avoided overt participation; a major factor in
this decision was their recognition of US
nuclear superiority and of the threat which
this posed to the Sovia homeland and to the
entire Coi?fhi iunist position in the Far East.
Similarly, the US limited its military opera-
tions to the area of Korea; a major factor
in the US decision was recognition of Soviet
conventional military superiority in Eurasia
and of the threat wffich7tlus posed to Ub allies
in Europe and the Near East. Moreover, the
US encountered the very great difficulty of
bringing its superior nuclear capabilities to
bear on a situation in which the enemy's im-
mediate goals were limited and the non-Com-
munist world was anxious not to expand the
conflict.
6. The strategic reassessment and the reshap-
ing of capabilities which took place on 13?olh
sides were to some degree efforts to eliminate
th?e?s-hortcomingsLar
m,pkal_Tpt. On the side of the West,
this involved the establishment of NATO force
goals to provide a larger ground army in Eu-
rope, and the development of a capability for
tactical employment of nuclear weapons?
both designed to offset Soviet ground supe-
riority. In the USSR, the Soviet leaders speed-
ed up the development of their air defense
capability, the production of strategic nuclear
weapons, and the development of long-range
delivery capabilities.
7. While these military developments were
going forward, various political changes were
taking place in the world. The Soviet dictator
died and his great personal power passed to
a group of his former subordinates; in the
course of a few years Khrushchev emerged as
the dominant personality. Under Khru-
shchev's leadership, the Soviet rulers appar-
ently engaged in a comprehensive re-exam-
ination of the Soviet domestic scene and of
the world situation. 4asonsequence, there
wjgnificantixternal chaliges in the USSR,
in the Eastern European satellite states, and
in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. The
Soviet leaders evidently recognized that Sta-
linist rigidity had inhibited progress at home,
antagonized the satellite peoples, caused a
2
coalescence among the Western Powers, hin-
dered the exploitation of political unrest in
underdeveloped and colonial areas, and cre-
ated dangerous tensions with the US. To cor-
rect these "errors," the Soviet leadership mod-
erated its internal policies by easing police
terror and by taking some steps to improve
living standards, loosened the reins over the
Satellites, began to cultivate a broader range
of contacts with the Western Powers, devel-
oped a new policy of assistance to underde-
veloped countries, and sought to reduce ten-
sions with the US by personal diplomacy.
8. This new Soviet policy was not pursued
with thorough consistency, nor did it meet
with unqualified success. Loosening the reins
over the Satellites and giving encouragement
to anti-Stalinist elements in Eastern Europe
led to anti-Soviet manifestations in Poland
and popular revolution in Hungary. Reas-
sertion of Soviet authority made Hungary a
tragic battleground and discouraged other
liberal forces within the Communist move-
ment. Similarly, the denunciation of Stalin
produced intellectual confusion at home, and
the process of liberalization in the USSR was
slowed down. Although Khrushchev's per-
sonal diplomacy succeeded in reducing inter-
national tensions intermittently between 1955
and 1959, no substantial international accom-
modation took place, and in this situation of
stalemate an atmosphere of tension has re-
vived.
9. Nevertheless, this ne_w Soviet policy has
reagta_g?en thened the Soviet world posi-
tion. Among other things, its appearance
coincided with developments in the emerg-
ing areas which gave the USSR new oppor-
tunities for expanding its influence. Most of
the underdeveloped countries have been in
a state of social and economic ferment
during the past decade. Most of the peoples
in these countries were preoccupied with a
desire for modernization and self-government.
They are less concerned with ideologies than
with results, and more concerned to gain
tangible assistance and sympathetic under-
standing from both world power blocs than
to associate themselves with either of them.
They have become particularly sensitive to
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any remnants of colonialism or attempts by
the West to influence or to control their
domestic and foreign policies. On the other
hand, the USSR, through its pose as the
defender of Afro-Asian nationalism against
"imperialism," as the exponent of disarma-
ment, as the party offended by alleged US
provocations and stubbornness, as the example
and proponent of rapid economic develop-
ment, and as an alternative source of imme-
diate and unconditional aid, has gained much
influence and prestige.
10. These Soviet gains in the underdeveloped
countries coincided with the Soviet_achieye-
mely-imposture.
The USSR's achievements in space vehicles-
and missiles have not only enhanced Soviet
prestige but promise to give the USSR capa-
bilities roughly equivalent in their political
and strategic impact to those possessed by
the US. Thus, even while it possessed a less
advanced economy than that of the US and
still had only a toehold among the under-
developed nations, the USSR had created by
the end of the decade an imposing platform
from which to challenge the Western position
throughout the world. While the US still
continues to dispose tremendous power and
to wield enormous influence, it has appeared
to many of its friends and enemies alike to
be faltering in its hold upon that power and
in its initiative and resourcefulness in wield-
ing that influence. In the nature of things
it was impossible that the US should retain
for very long the unique position it occu-
pied at the end of World War II. The world
perceives that the US no longer enjoys mili-
tary invulnerability, overwhelming economic
strength, or unchallengeable world power.
11. At the same time, the world power posi-
tion of the US's European allies had vastly
deteriorated from what it was before World
War II. These nations had been deprived
of control over vast populations, enormous
sources of raw material; and far-flung com-
mercial and industrial enterprises. Their
ability to move freely and to operate from
widely dispersed bases was drastically cur-
tailed. These enormous losses were accom-
panied by strong nationalist and neutralist
3
tides running against them in their former
possessions. In this situation the US-sup-
ported economic recovery of most of these
states was not matched by a commensurate
effort to develop an adequate national defense
posture, or to share responsibility in dealing
with world problems.
12. These facts signify that the world has
entered into a new era. New leaders_and new
nations are arriving on the scene; there is
- -
a new relationship of military power; political
and social instability have become epidemic
in the southern two-thirds of the world;
schisms and heresies have appeared within
the Communist camp itself. There is no I
longer any question that radical change -will
UT-but--only-a, question-of
what direction it will-ralm?The future of
the West will depend to a large degree upon
the manner in which it mobilizes and employs
its political, economic, and military resources
to shape and guide the process of change.
In the paragraphs below we describe the char-
acteristics of the world situation in more
detail and attempt to outline the problems
for the future which are implied in this situ-
ation.
II. THE COMMUNIST WORLD
A. Soviet Progress and Policy
13. There can no longer be any doubt that
the USSR is well on the road toward match-
ing the US in many of the indices of na-
tional power. In 1950 Soviet gross national
product (GNP) was a little over a third that
of the US; in 1960 it was nearly half that
of the US. During the remaining years of
the Seven-Year Plan, the USSR will probably
achieve an annual growth rate of
less than six percent. By 1965, Soviet GNP
t of the US and about
equal to the level which the US reached in
1947. Total investment in the USSR will
probably reach about one-third of GNP by
1965, as compared with the present US rate
of about one-fifth of GNP. Soviet industrial
investment in 1958, measured in dollars, had
already exceeded the record US figure, set
in 1957.
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14. Overtaking the US in total output is a
distant prospect. aqt in more meaningful
ways, the economic power of the USSRl-
reiy..comarefavorblywith -that of its
chosen competitor. y virtue of-eb-mplete
suborcregime control, the Soviet
economy, despite its smaller size, is presently
supporting a military effort of approximately
the same size as that of the US. By 1965,
production levels in certain basic industrial
products will probably approach and in some
cases surpass present US records; for example,
the USSR has announced and probably will
achieve a steel production of 105 million met-
ric tons in 1965, which approximates the US
record of 106 million achieved in 1955.
15. There are and will remain certain ele-
ments of backwardness. Agricultural produc-
tion, despite heavy investment, will still em-
ploy a very much higher proportion of man-
power in the USSR than in the US. The in-
dividual Soviet consumer, although he will
gain about four percent per year in overall
consumption, will still have a standard of
living far inferior to that of his US counter-
part, especially in housing and in range of
consumer choice. Soviet society even by 1970
will not be affluent in the sense of possessing
a large servite-seaiTh in the economy or hav-
ing available a plethora of gadgetry, consumer
choices, and stylistic improvements. Never-
theless, in the decade ahead industry will be
expanding so rapidly that by the beginning
of the 1970's the Soviet leaders will be able
to confer upon the Soviet citizen benefits
considerably beyond those available today.
Most important of all, however, the USSR
already possesses an economy sufficiently
strong and flexible to permit it to assign-re--
sources relativ_ey and -without agoiii
ing self-denials-to_the major usi-S-Ofriaticirial
power?defense, science, and foreign political
and economic operations.
16. The Soviet leaders obviously understand
that science has become one of the key fronts
in the world struggle, not only because of
its relation to military and economic strength
but also because it is a major element in great
power prestige. The scale of the Soviet effort,
thanks to a heavy investment in training
scientists in past years, is probably now
roughly on a par with that of the US in
some fields of the basic sciences and in some
critical areas related to weapons technology.
17. Soviet progress in the field of rocketry has
probably had more effect upon world opinion
and upon the world situation than any de-
velopment of the past two or three years.
This progress, together with the earlier So-
viet achievements in nuclear weapons devel-
opment, has created a new strategic situa-
tion in the world which will be discussed in
greater detail in later paragraphs of this esti-
mate. It is enough here to say that this new
military capability is providing the Soviet
leaders with a weapons system that is valuable
in terms of both political exploitation and
military deterrence.
18. The Soviet leaders consider themselves to
be in a position of great strength. They
probably believe that they now possess, or will
soon have, a powerful counterdeterrent to the
existing US deterrent force, and that this
counterdeterrent will become more and more
persuasive in the years ahead. They almost
certainly feel that for these reasons they can
frequently and vigorously challenge the US
on disputed issues. They probably feel that
the range of anti-Western actions which-tliey
can surs - ,,i li le fear of nuclear re alia-
tion is growing, a oug they almost cer-
tainly?retrognizhey must act?with
catifion_ _Jest the rovoke the US into ?re-
i_p
c' itate action. he Sovie eaders evident
c_
recognize that a general nuclear exchange
could mean the destruction of the fabric of
odern -society.
19. The "peaceful coexistence" policy of_the
Soviet leaders is partly the consequence of
diese cautionary judgments. It is also partly
the consequence of the SoNzigUgileolo 'eal_cat-
look, which views_bistorv not. i.p.i.ly...as a
contest of ___illit_a_u___.power between states, but
as _a_long7term social revoliaior_______JAI.y_,?11.____Rgli le.
The total power position of the Communist
world?including but not focusing exclusively
around its military ingredient?is viewed as
an encouragement and a guarantee of the
success of revolutionary forces in the non-
Communist states. In the Soviet view the
T
CONFIDFNTIA
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the face of an annual population increase of
2.5 percent. In time some amelioration may
occur, since a large part of the industrial
expansion is directed toward the production
of items?tractors, fertilizers, irrigation equip-
ment?intended to support the agricultural
sector. A2.1._a_..o/ss_quence of population in-
crease and bad crop years in 179-9 and in 1960,
-per-capit-a-feed-cd sl.MntR_j_c__gi.in China has_ac-
Wally deviined-.--GNP-will probably continue
tifFincrease a a rapid rate, investment will
continue to be heavy, and per capita consump-
tion may increase somewhat. Any such
gains, however, will be realized largely by the
urban population, while the vast peasantry
continues barely to subsist.
22. The Chinese Communist military estab-
lishment continues to improve. A substantial
growth in the capacity to produce and as-
semble complex military equipment is likely,
and a nuclear development program is un-
derway. In a few years, say somewhere be-
tween 1962-1964, the Chinese Communists
m,y be --ale to test a nucleaand
soon thereafter build an elementary nuclear
wea15-6X--Cd-eliverable by_ medium bom ers. y
the end of the decade, they could have a 200-
500 mile missile with a fission warhead, and
they might be able to produce longer range
missiles. These dates could be moved for-
ward or backward by increases or decreases
in the amount of Soviet aid.
SECRET
situation especially in the underdeveloped
states, is poyi such that substantial and con-
tiniliag gains can be won busuit
of all forms of struggle s ort
of ?ThSo-
fits probab y also fia-that in carefully
chosen circumstances they could wage limited
war with Communist-supported, or even with
Bloc forces, without themselves incurring seri-
ous risk of general war. The comparative
caution implied in this strategy has led to
open dispute between the USSR and Com-
mu-riff China. Before we can estimate the
course of Communist policy in the years
ahead, we should therefore examine the po-
tential and the aspirations of Communist
China.
B. Chinese Communist Growth and Aspirations
20. During the past two or three years the
Chinese Communist regime has been exhibit-
ing a growing self-confidence. This probably
reflected, in part at least, the regime's in-
creasing satisfaction over its political effec-
tiveness within China and over a substantial
consolidation of its economic program. In
11959, the second year of the Second Five-Year
Plan, Chinese industrial production increased
by about 33 percent. Especially dramatic in-
creases were recorded in basic commodities?
steel, coal, and electric power. There was
also a better balance of product, a more ra-
tional distribution of the labor force, and an
improvement in the quality of the output.
In short, the Communists began to receive
the dividends from 10 years of hard and con-
centrated effort on the expansion of heavy
industry. GNP rose by about 18 percent in
1958; then by about 12 percent in 1959 and
10 percent in 1960. Investment in 1960
reached a peak of about one-third of GNP.
21. Despite such impressive gains, Communist
China still has a long way to go before be-
coming a major industrial power. It is still
largely an agricultural country with a small
industrial base relative to its huge population.
Eighty percent of the population is agricul-
tural, and industrial production is less than
0 percent that of the US. Communist
hina's most serious problem for some years
o come will be the lag in food production in
23. The most striking characteristic of Com-
munist china__is_mat_its___econamic progress
but its great revolutionary ?n. The Chi-
nese Communist leaders are men of intense
ardor who are cloAy sejlq_about transform-
ing Chinese society completely and irrevoca-
bly. They are determined to create a "new
Communist man," indeed even a "new Chi-
nese Communist man," and to give to the
world the benefits of their "constructive con-
tributions" to Communist dogma and social
theory. Confident of their own righteousness
and orthodoxy and reinforced in that confi-
dence by what they regard as the great
achievements of the past decade, they are
pushing, not only toward great power status in
the world, but also toward at least co-equal
status with the USSR in the world of inter-
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national communism. Indeed, it became clear
during 1960 that Peiping was presenting a
major challenge to Moscow's position as the
final authority in the Communist movement.
24. This Chinese Communist drive and sense
of mission is reflected not only in such revo-
lutionary social changes as the creation of
the commune but also in foreign policy out-
look. The Chinese Communists' view of the
world situation is strong1y doctrinaire, SinO-
centric, and?from the Soviet point of view?
The_Chinese leaders evidently
believe that "imperialism" is on its last lee,
that the Sino-Soviet Bloc has surpass-Ed?the
West in military power and politieal-ince,
and that the emerging _peoples in Asia, Africa,
and Latin America are ripe fof Communist
revolution, if pAly the_ ? el su ? itifted
to that end. Whereas in recent years the
Soviet leaders have preferred?within the gen-
eral context of belief in the inevitability of a
world Communist victory?a comparatively
low-risk policy of peaceful competition, the
Chinese Communists have urged a policy of
greater militancy, even at considerable risk.
They probably also find this policy useful in
spurring the Chinese people to the sacrifices
they are requiring of them.
C. Sino-Soviet Relations and the Future of
Communism
25. The character of Sino-Soviet relations in
the years ahead will have a profound effect
upon the future of communism and thereby
on the world situation. The quarrel with
Peiping has put the Soviet leaders in a diffi-
cult situation. They cannot condone Chinese
contumacy without losing control of the Com-
munist movement. They cannot permit an
open break without losing what influence they
still possess over the Chinese and without
gravely weakening the international Commu-
nist movement as a whole. The Soviet lead-
ers would consider an open break calamitous,
but we do not believe that they would go
so far in trying to avoid it as to surrender
to the Chinese position; both the USSR's de-
termination to preserve its supremacy in the
Communist movement and Soviet national'
interest in avoiding serious risk of general
6
war would preclude such a course. We also
do not believe that the Chinese would submit
fully to the Soviet position; their pride, self-
righteousness, and national aspirations are
too heavily committed to permit it.
26. The issues between the partners-ave-basic,
and will probably not be resolved in any clear-
cut fashion. The meetings in Moscow in No-
ven1960, clearly did not prodifee a corn-
Atte E7ment, or one which is_likely to be
lasting. The estrangement seems likely to
continue, with ups and downs as new issues
ariTe?difd tem sorary solutions are develo ? ed
and possibly moving owa ? . ooser conhec=__
tion. If the Sino-Soviet relationship does in
fiaTevelop in this way, there will probably be
a tendency for recurmmi.;iiitairaza and s_trains
to weaken the -Communist world posture and
to diminish the effectiVeness of world CDMIT111-
nism outside the bloc. In particular, faction-
alism would be stimulated in the Comn?ii?mcit
movement, with parties or factions in various
countries tending to identify either with the
USSR or with Communist China. The two
countries would compete with each other for
influence in a variety of arenas, from revolu-
tionary movements to world organizations. A
further widening of the Sino-Soviet split, if it
should occur, would dim the image oltl_z_bloc
as a great and-gpower center and thus
reduce the pressure upon peripheral coun-
tries to accommodate to the Communists.
27. The cohesive forces between the USSR and
China are strong, and we believe thalIlle
two states will not abando ?_ th *r nce
against the West. The Soviet leaders would
be confronted with a most serious dilemma,
however, if the Chinese pursued independ-
ently such a militant policy as to become
engaged in a major war. Caught between
a desire to avoid Soviet involvement, with its
attendant dangers, and a desire to preserve
a Communist state, with its attendant oppor-
tunity to re-establish Soviet influence in
China, the Soviet leaders might tend toward
the latter course. Thus a wider Sino-Soviet
divergency would not necessarily lead to a
less dangerous world.
28. It is impossible to predict with confidence
the course of Communist policy in the decade
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7
ahead, particularly in the light of the uncer- 30. Over the next decade at least, there ap-
taM future course in Sino-Soviet relations. pears to be a greater likelihood of flexibility
We believe that the USSR will stick to its in Soviet than in Chinese oficy. The Soviet
present?p-Olicy Of seeking to win, viercirieS- lia-de-rship's desire o prevent a general war,
without incurring serious ri-Sks, ah-d-01 alter=--the wider range of Soviet contacts with the
rating or combining s ows o anger outside world, the continuing pressure at
6-0-sityitla poses of reasonableness and con1,-- home for liberalization, and the growing ca-
promise. We say this largely because we be- pacity of the USSR to provide its citizens with
lieve that the relationship of power between a more confortable life?these factors taken
the US and the USSR will cause the Soviet together may tend toward moderation in for-
leaders to desire to avoid general war, and eign policy and toward a recognition of
tlatwithirit-he lirnaswIlthises?ue places some areas of common interest with the West.
on their action there will be co.ntantly shift- It is even possible that the Soviet leaders
ingfthpotential risks and gains in-
volved in the various situations Which-will
arise. A danger exists, of course, that in
assessing the risks involved in _particular sit-
uations or proposed courses of action, the
Spviet leaders might overestimate their posi-
tion while underestimating tha-t-Orth-e- West.
In particular, they might misjudge Western
will and determination in the face of Soviet"
threats or encroachnaents. Such a political
miscalculation could lead to the incurring of
serious risks without the intention to do so;
it could even lead to general war.
29. We believe that China will persist in press-
ing the USSR for a more militant bloc policy.
It will continue its hostility to the US, and
as it becomes stronger?especially after it
acquires a nuclear capability?it might press
its objectives much more aggressively than at
present. On the other hand, the Chinese
have in recent years assessed risks carefully,
and despite their bellicose talk they have re-
frained from actions which involved serious
risk of large-scale military operations. Thus,
their militancy has been tempered by some
de.gigt.pl_pidence, and this tendency toward
prudence might in time become somewhat
stronger as they become more familiar with
the dangers of nuclear war and as they come
to recognize the vulnerability of their develop-
ing industrial capacity. On the whole, how-
ever, we do not expect a general shift in the
Chinese domestic or world outlook fbr some
time to come, and Chinese militancy willpn-
tinue to create a serious nger
general hostilities in the Far East, and even
of general war.
will come to feel that the USSR has little in
common with China except an ideology which
the Chinese interpret in their own way, and
that by,19.3.0__Communist China, will
weapons and a population of almost 900 mil-
lion, will be a dangerous neighbor and as-
sociate.
III. THE EMERGING AREAS
A. The Political and Social Milieu
31. It is one of the key points in the Soviet
estimate of the world situation that condi-
tions are favorable for Communist gains in
the colonial and x-clnialareaoth?
o
world; there is much to support this Soviet
vie-WT- The nationalist revolutions in such
areas as Africa and the Arab states have been
directed largely toward revamping political
and social systems in order to modernize so-
cieties and to achieve a place in the sun. The
Communist revolutions in Russia and China
arose from broadly comparable aspirations.
Indeed, the system in these countries is widely
admired in the newer nations of the world be-
cause it has been demonstrably effective in
achieving rapid modernization, while the West
is associated in the' aa'nds with the colonial-
ism which they blame for most of their prob-
lems and miseries, both real and fancied.
32. Many of_these-.countries in emerging
areaspecially_in_Africa and the Middle
East?are in the ebarge_of_xevolutionary-
minc_tesil eadqs; in others of them such leaders
are making a bid for power. These leaders
are members of an intelligentsia who have fre-
quently had an education along Western
lines, some of it in military schools, and who
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have become aware through travel and educa-
tion?or through observation of the mode
of life of Westerners in their midst?of the
backwardness of their countries and the pov-
erty of their people. Out of a sense of obliga-
tion, frustration, and impatience, Murra-Se
alipted a revolutionary_ atfi 1-crg--',1-----
olu_tlsary action against the old orde-r?
whether it was colonial or indigenous. De-
spite the Western nature of their youthful
training, they tend to be resentful of Western
influence and critical of Western methods.
They therefore are tempted by Communism
insofa-r
method of bringing about rapid change. -
33. Nevertheless, the revolutionary' intelli-
gentsia are generally chary of embracing-eorr-F-
munism. Some of them have accepted Coin-
niunist advisers, economic aid, and diplomatic
support, and some have even sided with the
Communists against the West. But, for the
most part they do not wish to accept all that
now goes with the Communist ideology?the
goal of a classless society, wholesale social re-
organization, Soviet interference in or dicta-
tion of domestic policy, complete identifica-
tion with the Soviet Bloc in international
politics, and exclusion from Western economic
aid and technical assistance. Moreover,
many of them have become aware of their
own nation's history?in some cases a dis-
tinguished history?and they see themselves
as national figures capable of resurrecting
some features of that past and binding them
into the new fabric being created. Thus, they
see themselves, not as capitalists, Communists,
or exponents of any other borrowed ideology,
but as nationalists carving out their own des-
tinies and selecting from the past aria-
other societies the elements with which to
fashion new states and new societies of their
own.
34. There are, of course, wide variations within
the emerging world, not only as among major
areas?Latin America is quite different from
Africa?but even within major areas. There
are wide diversities of all kinds in social struc-
ture, degree of advancement, extent of revo-
lutionary feeling, degree of pressure upon
available resources, extent of implantation of
8
Western institutions, and cultural back-
grounds. Whereas Latin America is Chris-
tian, is predominantly Western in language
and culture, and has a long history of inde-
pendence, Africa is a melange of languages,
religions, and cultures, and is only now emerg-
ing from foreign domination. Even within a
continent such as Latin America, there are
societies which have passed through a major
social revolution and others which still possess
small social elites and a large mass of illiterate
and poverty-stricken peasants and tribes.
35. There is, however, a large common cif;
nominator in the underdeveloped world This
is the political and social instability which
is either manifest or dormant and which arises
from the rapidity with which knowledge is
growing and from the revolutionary manner
in which large numbers of people are react-
ing to the changes in the world around them.
Nearly all the nations of the underdeveloped
world?whether in Southeast Asia, South Asia,
the Middle East, Africa, or Latin America?
are beset by problems springing from
lation grow , c o developmen capital,
rjsing_popular expectations, interna 11-75atical
strife and competing ideological pressures,
lack of _political prowess and administrative
and technical competence, and an inadeq.uate
sense of national identity. While some states,
especially those barely emerging from tribal-
ism, as in Africa, suffer more intensely than
others from these assorted ills, even states
such as India and the more advanced Latin
American countries confront several of them
to a most serious degree. Many states have
adopted strongly socialist methods; some have
held to constitutional methods of government
with only the greatest difficulty; some have
thrown out bloody dictators only to acquire
equally distasteful successors; some have
taken halting and others more dramatic steps
toward the establishment of democratic gov-
ernments.
36. In states confronted by these enormous
problems, the toward some blend
of authoritarianism and socialism_ seems
likely to continue. Revolutionary leaders at-
tempting to deal with backwardness, tribal-
ism, feudalism, corruption, economic pres-
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sures, and ineptitude often have no alterna-
tive but to stifle political opposition. Western
states which set store by economic individual-
ism and political freedom will probably be
increasingly shocked by methods which will
be adopted, but in the eyes of local leaders
Western standards of political and economic
conduct are likely to be irrelevant to the prob-
lem. Revolutionary leaders are likely to ex-
pect the West to judge them more by what
they are trying to do than by the manner
in which they are doing it. If the West
does not understand and help them, they will
tend to rely more and more heavily upon the
Communists, until a point is reached when
they can no longer extricate themselves from
the Communist embrace.
37. Of all the problems confronting these na-
tions that of the relation between population
and economic growth may be the most diffi-
cult. indeed, population growth is a grave
world problem, with present rates making for
a doubling of the world's population every
35-50 years. In 1930 the world population
w-1:s- two billion; today it is three _biWon; in
twenty years it will probably be four billion;
in forty years it may be six or _seven billign.
GroWth is most rapid in the underdeveloped
areas, where nearly everywhere it exceeds
two percent a year. Ten years ago almost
no nation had a population growth rate of
three percent; now such rates are not un-
common and there is no reasonable prospect
that they can be significantly reduced in the
next decade, whatever means might be tried.
These increases impede capital formation in
the areas where it is needed most, since in-
creases in production simply go to keep
alive the larger numbers of unproductive old
people and children. In some cases total
GNP grows while per capita GNP falls. Stand-
ards of living are declining in some countries
at precisely the time when the revolutionary
leaders now in charge must begin to meet
the expectations which have arisen in their
own and in their fellow countrymen's minds.
38. The problem of maintaining standards of
living an even a o satisfying 6 regree
rising economic expectations robablrean be
met with substantial infusions of Usil aid
and-Wan?the execution of nationa1-develop-
S E
9
ment programs. However, even if these coun-
tries received outside aid in massive quanti-
ties, they would still confront the grave politi-
sg_gnd
social problems of bacJip-
rooted societies. Indeed, these problems will
'inhibit both the receipt and proper use of
needed economic assistance. The resent rev-
olutionary leaders must surmount this grea
-camplex-ty if--5i--.ogems if they are gi?sTa-ain
the character of their revolutions;
IT they fail, they may be replaced by Commu-
nist leaders ready to use Draconian methods
and determined to impose permanent totali-
tarian institutions.
B. International Outlook
39. If, as we suggest above, the emerging
countries will be preoccupied with their own
problems, their attitudes toward the outside
world will be determined largely by the way
in which they feel the outside world impinges
upon these problems. These countries and
their leaders will not be concerned so much
with ideological, moral, and cultural consid-
erations as they will with manipulating out-
side influences in order to protect themselves
or to advance their particular interests. The
two great powers are likely to be viewed
largely in terms of the threat or succor which
they will afford.
40. Some of thee ? tates have clearly
aligned themselves with one or anot er of the
gr_sat powers. Many of these are states
on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet Bloc?
Iran, Pakistan, Thailand, South Vietnam, and
South Korea?and their leaders have aligned
themselves with the US in order to obtain
that military and economic assistance which
they hoped would enable them to keep any
domestic enemies at bay and to stand up
against pressures from their powerful neigh-
bors. Cuba alleges similar reasons for align-
ing itself with the USSR.
41. In general, however, those who thauglit
they could safely do so have chosen neutral-
ism, and indeed some of them have made
41-life a profitable thing of it. In their de-
sire to achieve and maintain national inde-
pendence they have sought to avoid com-
mitment to either side, and they have recog-
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nized the value to both sides of their not
falling under the domination of the other.
This has permitted some of them successfully
to seek economic assistance from both and
some others to seek assistance from one side
by suggesting that they might appeal to the
other. Nevertheless, many of these countries,
in the course of their colonial or semicolonial
history, have been subjected to Western influ-
ences and institutions and have therefore
come to feel that "neutralism" requires a pro-
nounced reaction away from these influences
and some closer relationship with the Sino-
Soviet Bloc.
42. This trend has been accelerated b in-
creased Soviet willingness o ? ?? ? ete with
the Wes in provi ing economic assistance and
ttc support. Bloc economic assistance
overall is still considerably less than the US
equivalent, but the USSR in particular can
substantially enlarge its program. Moreover,
the USSR has some advantages over the US
in carrying out aid programs; it can move
more quickly and without regard to a variety
of politically-imposed restrictions which char-
acterize US activities. On the other hand, as
Soviet aid becomes more commonplace and
taken for granted, the USSR is beginning to
encounter some of the criticisms and prob-
lems which the US has faced in its foreign aid
programs.
43. We believe that if the present trend to-
ward neutralism is not reversed, it will become
so strong that it will draw away from the
West some of as-ow?SVErale-d
witli it. This might come ab-orrt-thr---diTgfi revo-
lations in some of these countries?for ex-
ample Iran or South Vietnam?with seizure
of power by nationalist-neutralist forces; it
could occur because existing regimes might
decide to seek the supposed benefits and safety
of neutrality; it could come about because
these nations might decide that the US was
becoming inferior to the Sino-Soviet Bloc in
military power and therefore would no longer
be willing or able to support them.
44. The neutralist posture of these countries
seems to us likely to produce in the decade
ahead some most serious policy problems for
the US. Aside from the probability of with-
10
drawal from Western association and at-
tempts to balance Western with Soviet or
Chinese influence, there will be continual
pressures for economic aid and political sup-
port, for denunciations of colonialism, for con-
cessions on disarmament, and for further
Western retreat from positions of predomi-
nance or influence. The US position in the
UN will probably becOme increasingly diffi-
cult, partici-Marty-Since many
tries?including such such influential members as
India and the UAR?now a ear to be ? _
that the UN machinery as been used by the-
iiajor Western powers and es eciall b the
US as an ins rumen o nationalee-
in their view "imperialist," policy. For this
reason, the idea of revising the UN charter
and proposals to bring in Communist China
have received widespread sympathy among
the emerging nations. Their numbers are
now so great that when their views become
more crystallized?as now seems unavoid-
able?the hitherto predominant Western in-
fluence in the UN will be greatly reduced.
45. It is obvious that neutralism as a prin-
ciple is fundamentally incompatible with th-e
-Soviet ob'ective of a Communist orld. Nev-
er e ess, neutralism o ten provide Com-
munists with opportunities for penetration
and su-bonT-Erarticularly in the areas of
the new states, the Communists will seize
upon rivalries among nations and tribes, upon
the need for economic and technical aid, and
upon the naivete and weaknesses of inexperi-
enced leaders. Hence the problem for neu-
tralist states is to keep out of Communist
clutches. Nevertheless, insofar as the new
and underdeveloped nations can overcome
their problems, they may take on a strength
and stature which will enable them to main-
tain their neutrality against Communist pres-
sures.
IV. PROBLEMS OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCES
46. Western statesmen are faced with enor-
mously more complicated problems than they
had to face ten years ago. Whereas then one
could think of military containment in terms
of defining vital areas or lines of demarcation
between the Communist world and the Free
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World, or even providing economic aid and
diplomatic support in order to achieve political
containment, the West must now contend not
only with strange-rT-more flexible, and more
dangemies b ? . ith crises if
tliF-8-authe wo-thirds of the world.
cifs-eTTs-C-we-have seen, arise on y partly from
Soviet and Chinese Communist machinations;
many other factors are at work, such as the
natural growth of population, knowledge,
communication, and human aspirations, and
the social dislocations that accompany rapid
change.
47. The West has substantial and growing
assets. The Western European--economies,
especially those in the Common Market area,
are booming. Rates of economic growth in
France and West Germany are ab-olit as high
as in the -USSR?ait'ag, ing around six or seven
percent per annum since 1950. In the UK
and the US growth rates are somewhat lower,
averaging around three or four percent; at
the moment, the V.J_K economy is in danger of
stagnation, while tha-Orthe--gs has markedly
slowed down. Nevertheless, ther?rrecon-
omia-b7rfor the most part highly advanced
and flexible, and they respond to trade and
fiscal policies designed to adjust them. The
t
greater emphasis in the Western economies
upon private capital, and upon the allocation
of resources through the market place, makes
\
it more difficult for them than for those of
the Communist countries to concentrate upon
he development of national power; however,
in times of emergency they can readily be
made to serve that objective.
48. Likewise, the major Western Powers, with
their systems of alliances, overseas bases, and
worldwide deployments of ground, naval, and
air forces, possess enormous militar power.
rrave problems exist with respec o stra egic
doctrine, weapons systems, and the political
application of military power. These we dis-
cuss below (Section V), but even with the
deficiencies and gaps which are generally
recognized this military power of the West
is great and widely respected.
49. Moreover, despite the anticolonialism of
many of the world's peoples, the Western
powers still wield great influence in many
11
a "is ? ? ? e English and
French are still the linguae francae of Africa,
the Middle East, and Southern Asia; they are
still the languages of the revolutionary in-
telligentsia and of the universities. While
Western influence has tended to decline in
some areas, as for example among the Arab
states, it has tended to rise in other areas,
as for example in India. The Western, not
the Communist, states are still the principal
trading partners of most of the emerging na-
tions, and still their principal bankers, in-
vestors, and developers. Despite the interest
shown by many leaders of the emerging na-
tions in Communist methods of development
and in Soviet economic assistance, these same
leaders still have borrowed from the West
most of their basic concepts of the good life.
50. Nevertheless, the Western countries have
grave and continuing problems. Political in-
stability, while becoming epidemic in the
southern two-thirds of the world, is still en-
demic in parts of the northern third. Basi-
cally unhealthy political situations exist in
Western Europe itself; Spain and Portugal are
restive under personal dictatorships, Italy
continues to struggle with finding a parlia-
mentary basis for constitutional government,
and France has put its burdens upon one man
who holds warring factions in harness through
a governmental system created by him and
for him alone. On the periphery of Europe,
Greece remains poverty-stricken and politi-
cally weak, while Turkey is passing through
a crisis of regime, the outcome of which can
only be surmised.
51. Outsid E
em alliance system is cle,tg_r_i_aLating Japan,
by far the most important non-Westerfiria-
ton associated with the system, enjoys a flour-
ishing economy, but is passing through ?ro-
found political an
SS' t" all
t-
social
es.
lthough
he rulers of Japan had successfully imposed
selected elements of Western society upon a
traditionalist society gradually over a period
of nearly a century, the impact of nuclear
w_arfare, defeat, and US occupation shook
Japanese society to its foundations. In par-
ticular, the psychological atmosphere is still
overcast with the memories generated by the
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only two nuclear weapons ever used in war.
Today the country, after a decade of US as-
sistance, is sg, not onyto find
life commori to itself, but to find a satisfac?tory
stancettrazta). o?Ths-taward_China and
the USSR and a desire for protection by the
US. In this atmosphere sharply contending
political alternatives are being presented to
the Japanese people: a radical left which fa-
vors neutralism and closer association with
the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and a conservative right
that is generally disposed to association with
the US. It is possible that the existing US-
Japanese defense agreement may prove more
a token than a reality; in any event the US
is likely to have increasing difficulties in the
years ahead in carrying out actions under
the agreement.
52. The minor alliances, CENTO and SEATO,
are floundering. Never a very effective organ-
ization, CENTO was gravely shaken in 1958 by
the revolution in Iraq and that country's
subsequent withdrawal. Iran seems to be
almost continuously in a condition of insta-
bility, and the British military position and
general influence in the Middle East are ex-
tremely weak. Moreover, neutralist tenden-
cies have emerged in Iran and Pakistan.
SEATO has always been a loose association.
It has only one member, Thailand, in main-
land Southeast Asia, and the course of events
in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam will
have a great effect upon Thailand's policy.
The continuing failure of the principal mem-
bers of the organization?the UK, US, and
France?to have a common estimate of the
situation in, and a common policy toward,
the Indo-Chinese states makes it extremely
difficult for SEATO to serve as an effective
instrument for stability in the area.
53. These problems and weaknesses in US al-
liances outside Europe put in sharp relief the
much greater vigor and strength of NATO.
Despite its many weaknesses, NATO has shown
itself to be a useful instrument of Western
cooperation, and it has absorbed numerous
shocks and crises arising both within and
outside the alliance. It bears promise of con-
tinuing so to serve and, with some increase
12
of constructive support by its members, even
of expanding its utility.
54. But NATO contains centrifugal as well as
centripetal forces. Some of these relate to the
NATO military program. France's opposition
to an integrated force structure is well known,
as is France's recurrent removal of NATO-
committed forces from NATO command.
Most NATO members, of course, maintain
forces, and in the case of the US very power-
ful forces, which they have never contem-
plated putting under NATO authority in
peacetime. The most important of these are
the US nuclear-capable strategic forces, and
the desire to possess similar forces as a symbol
of prestige and as a balance to US power with-
in the Atlantic alliance contributed to the
British and French decisions to develop inde-
pendent nuclear capabilities.
55. Excl sive US control of the major deter-
rent has troub e ropeans in the past be-
cat--hey fearea that the USu cwo-111?dinan sh
? ? ? ellicose a fashion. More recently
many have also become troubled by the op-
posite fear: that the US could no longer be
relied upon to risk nuclear devastation in
order to counter Sovie s
a e o ea ers, ju ging this to
be the case, would not be restrained-TMTI-jsuch
pressures. Various suggestions have been
Inade for solving the dilemmas presented by
the evolving world strategic situation?nu-
clear sharing, revision of the mission and
armament of the shield forces on the conti-
nent, arms limitations in the European area
or in special European zones, revised pro-
cedures for consultation and decision making.
Whatever position may ultimately be taken
regarding these suggestions, virtually all of
NATO's military concepts seem likely to come
under increasing questioning and to be sub-
jected to strong pressures for substantial re-
vision in the decade ahead.
56. In addition to these military problems
NATO as an organization confronts various
internal divergencies and rivalries which not
only sap its capacity to act but shadow the
image which it presents to the world. The
basic relationship between the US and its
European NATO allies is coming under strain,
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both because of the growing strength and as-
sertiveness of the jarger European NATO
countries and because of growirfrarreftean
doubts about the tutirre o_fILSp_21.17 and
US commitments-to Europe. Relationships
among the European members are aired
by considerable suspicion and jockeying for
position?notably as between the UK and its
principal continental allies?with the growing
economic division of Europe between the Com-
mon Market and the Outer Seven countries
compounding the mistrust.
57. The harmonization of economic policies
among the industrial nations of Western
Europe, and of these policies with those of
the US, will be a major problem of the forth-
coming decade. Should a major recession in
the Free World economy occur, there would
be danger of resort by the industrial nations
to protectionist measures, undermining the
pattern of economic cooperation stimulated by
the US in the postwar period. In any case,
the rapid emergence of Germany as the most
powerful nation economically in Western Eu-
rope and the relative weakness of the UK com-
plicate the problem of bridging the gap be-
tween the Common Market and Outer Seven
groups.
58. Another serious problem for the alliance
is created by the ipt of colonial problems.
This issue is at Present posed most gravely
by the Algerian conflict, which has stirred up
anti-Westernism among the emerging peoples
and dissension within the alliance. But Bel-
gian and Dutch sensitivities regarding the
Congo and West New Guinea problems, the
British dilemmas in Nyasaland, Rhodesia,
Kenya, and Uganda, and the strong colonial-
ist attitude of Portugal add to the difficulties
of individual states and tend to cause tensions
among them. Until some of these issues are
resolved it will be almost impossible for NATO
as a whole to escape reproaches as a protector
of colonialism.
59. Apart from these more obvious signs of
malaise, there is, we believe, a problem of
deeper significance. The world situation is
no seen in a common light amonetr5ian -
-for-West-ar-Fgal, TST?Th1T-TacICTirrcomnion
understanding is due partly to a failure to
13
communicate, partly to the cultural differ-
ences among the Western states, and partly
to the inevitable divergencies of interest in
many areas. As a consequence, a good many
urgent problems are unresolved. When sharp
tensions arise over these problems?as in the
case of the Offshore Islands and Berlin?a
common policy often has to be improvised,
while mounting fears impede united action.
V. THE MILITARY PROBLEM
A. The Evolving Strategic Situation
60. Despite a widespread feeling that allout
nuclear war is unlikely, the problem posed by
the accumulation of offensive w-. ? ? ? ? m s
estruction by the great sowers wi r
e major pro em of the 1,969_. Although
we haveunable to agree upon an esti-
mate of the size of the Soviet ICBM program
(estimates range from 200?or perhaps even
less?to 700 on launcher for mid-1963), the
Soviet capability even at the lowest estimated
figure will pose a grave threat to the US. To
illustrate, if one assumes the number on
launcher to be 200 and applies reasonable
TA:t_e_s_oL_Kettakility to the missile, the USSR
could detonate in the US in the target area
some j1000 to 1,250 megatons. The even
greater delivery capability provided by shorter
range missiles and nuclear weapons deliver-
able by aircraft or submarines and ships poses
an additional threat to the US, to US bases
overseas, to US allies, and indeed to most of the
northern hemisphere.
61. So far as we can see now, if the USSR
undertook to deliver such an attack, the US
could do little to prevent enormo ? . ?? a :e.
re-emptive a ac ?that is, an attack
delivered w en a Soviet attack was believed
to be imminent?would not prevent such dam-
age unless the various types of Soviet missile
launchers had been precisely located, and
there is doubt that a high proportion could
be so located. Antiballistic missile systems
of presently unproven ?ss prob-
ably be available about the middle of the dec-
ade, but such early systems almost certainly
will not be sufficiently developed or widely-
enough deployed to give assurance of destroy-
ing or neutralizing more than a small pro-
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portion of the missiles which the USSR will
be capable of launching.'
62. The US, however,
tainl ? - ? to do en
USSR even if
will also almost cer-
o-the
the USSR.
It is true that during the next year or so the
vulnerability of US retaliatory forces to a sur-
prise missile attack and the uncertainties re-
garding the size of the Soviet ICBM force in-
troduce some measure of doubt regarding the
extent of the US retaliatory capability. It is
very unlikely, however, that even during this
period the USSR will acquire capabilities suf-
ficient to give it confidence that it can pre-
vent an unacceptable level of US retaliation.'
As the decade advances, the US program of
maintaining a portion of the US bomber
force on airborne alert and of dispersing mis-
siles in hardened sites, aboard submarines at
sea, and on railborne carriers should virtually
assure the survival of a substantial retaliatory
capability. The Soviets are pursuing a vigor-
ous program for developing antimissile de-
fenses, and we estimate that the USSR will
probably begin to deploy an antimissile sys-
tem of undetermined effectiveness by the pe-
riod 1963-1966. The Soviet leaders probably
believe that they will acquire a military ad-
vantage through protection of selected areas
and through complicating the task of Western
military planners. They almost certainly
1 The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, De-
partment of the Army, concurs in the net judg-
ment contained in this paragraph and the suc-
ceeding paragraphs that, so far as can now be
seen, a general nuclear war would cause enor-
mous damage to all major protagonists and that
resort to general nuclear war, under these cir-
cumstances, is not a rational course of action.
He believes, however, that the intelligence com-
munity is unable to adjudge the capability of the
US to develop an effective defense against bal-
listic missiles.
2 The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF,
does not concur. As previously stated in his
footnote to NIE 11-4-60, "Main Trends In Soviet
Capabilities and Policies, 1960-1965," dated 1 De-
cember 1960, he feels that we are entering a very
critical twenty-four month period in which the
USSR may well sense that it has the advantage.
The Soviet leaders may press that advantage and
offer the US the choice of war or of backing down
on an issue heretofore considered vital to our
national interests.
14
consider that the first nation to deploy such
weapons will gain major psychological, politi-
cal, and military advantages. Nevertheless,
we believe it almost certain that these de-
fenses throughout the period will remain in-
adequate to shield large areas of the USSR
from widespread devastation.
63. Thus it appears likely that during most
of _the decade ahead the strate ic situation
j e3 one in which both the US an
USSR will possess relatively invulnerable nu-
clear wuaguns?sysfems capat_of Jnfflh[
enormous destruction upon the other. The
World must face the possibility that a general
nuclear war?brought to pass through acci-
dent, design, or miscalculation?would kill
many millions of people, destroy the capital
accumulation of many decades, render large
sections of the earth virtually uninhabitable
for a time, and destroy the power of most of
the modern nations of the world.
64. This strategic situation does not make
uperal ar im o' but i ? ees
make it a highly irrational response to inter-
national disputes. As long as this situation
continues, each side will be deterred by fear
of the consequences (if by nothing else) from
deliberately initiating general war. It is al-
most certain, moreover, that each side will
be deterred from action or policies which in-
volve serious risk of general war. The cru-
cial question is: how will the risks of a given
action be judged in the context of circum-
stances which exists when the action is con-
templated? To be more specific: how far will
the Soviets?or the Chinese Communists?be
emboldened by judging that Western reac-
tion to some Communist aggression will be in-
hibited by Western aversion to incurring
serious risk of general war? To what extent
will the Western reaction actually be so
inhibited? Such questions as these are likely
to be decisive in any sharp international
crisis.
65. But apart from the calculation of risks
in times of crisis, this strategic situation poses
other serious problems for policymakers.
How long will it persist? Can either side
achieve a clear military superiority? If the
situation of mutual deterrence does persist,
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can nuclear war be prevented from occurring
by accident? Can nuclear blackmail be
countered? Can nuclear armaments be re-
duced or eliminated without creating unfair
advantage or opportunities for evasion? We
do not pretend to offer answers, but only to
point out in the paragraphs below some of
the military and political problems which we
believe this strategic situation has created
and will create in the decade ahead.
B. Military and Political Implications of the
Evolving Strategic Situation 3
66. There is much ignorance and uncertainty
among military and civilian leaders through-
out the world?in both Communist and non-
Communist countries?about the present and
future world military situation. This is due
in part to security restrictions between gov-
ernments and even within governments, in
part to the complex technical and operational
factors involved in modern military actions,
and in part to the fact that the destructive
pg_t_eatial-of_moder. unprecedented
in human_history. Even among the rait-
cally and militarily sophisticated _there is con-
siderable puzzlement and disagreement_about
The Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, and the
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Op-
erations, believe that the tone of Section V, es-
pecially part B of this Section, compares a dy-
namic Communist Bloc to a static Free World.
While emphasizing the capabilities of the Bloc,
it gives little or no credit to the capability or
determination of the West to shape the course of
events.
For example: 1,4
a. Paragraph A4 charges "large numbers of
peop e '0:37.ezipAtheaze" with acceptance of the Ber-
trand Russell thesis of preferring Communist
chains to nuclear war. The Director for Intelli-
gence, Joint Staff, and the Assistant to the Secre-
tary of Defense, Special Operations, doubt the
validity of this as?.94,ion.
b. Paragraph_11,f6Tecasts Communist political
manipulation in crisis situations so as to try to
make Western intervention seem "capricious or
imperialistic." Adroitness in the political arena
by the West?believed by the Director for Intel-
ligence, Joint Staff, and the Assistant to the Sec-
retary of Defense, Special Operations, to be
equally possible?appears to be discounted as a
factor for consideration.
MA-e't.1-1
/I
the deterrent effect of present and future nu-
clearbout the-pro15able behav-
ior of states -in--critital siitions, and about
the most suitable.and effective strategic doc-
qc1Lies and weapons systems to develop.
67. These problems uble the Sovie
leaders as much as they trouble those oflh?
West. We do not believe that th-e?goviet
leaders conceive the ICBM to be the final
answer to their military problems, and we
doubt that they have formed definite ideas
about their force structure ten years hence
or about the precise role they will assign to
military power in their campaign to estab-
lish world communism. Then---them-
selves as emer ing from a period of strate_gtc
inte_riori yand they sure y consider_it a prime
objective not to let the_US-draw ahead-once
more. As long as the weapons race persists,
they will not be content with a strategic
equilibrium, or with the progress they have
hitherto made in weapons development. Be-
yond that, they will continue to carry on sci-
entific and weapons research and develop-
ment programs with a high sense of urgency
in order to find new weapons systems and de-
fenses against existing ones. They would do
this even without dream of vast military con-
quests, simply in the interest of defense. But
if they developed a weapons system which
gave promise of decided advantage over the
US, they would certainly seek to gain maxi-
mum profit from it.
68. In the decade ahead some such weapons?
for example, one providing defense against
missiles?may achieve operational status and
tend to upset the nuclear missile terror bal-
ance we have described. From what we know
of Soviet ideas, however, we conclude that
during the next five years?and perhaps long-
er?the Soviet leaders will concei e of their
j_c_nig-range striking capability in terms of de-
terrence and of employment in a heavy blow
sh finall o de t t deterre
had failed, rather than in terms of the de-
liberate initiation of general war. In their
view, a condition of mutual deterrence will
provide an umbrella under which they can
wage a vigorous campaign, using a wide va-
littn=re
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16
riety of methods, throughout the non-Commu-
nist world.4
69. In such a circumstance the Soviet leaders
will have substantial advantages. They can
create crises and issue threats over compara-
tively minor matters with a reasonable degree
of confidence that one or more of the West-
ern powers will give way because of the risks
of general war involved in resisting. In cir--_
cumstances where they judge the risk is not -
too great they might engage in military ac-
tion, possibly with Soviet forces but more prob-
ably with other bloc forces or with local revo-
lutionary armed groups. In ar,__1r2_aye
it_ap_.?peared that the choice for resisters was
one b-e-tVve-e-n massive nuclear destructjcnai
com romfs-e of (including even sur-
fined area of combat threatens expansion into
a major war and poses for both sides the
question of undertaking a large-scale pre-
emptive attack on the enemy's homeland.
Even when both parties accept limitations
upon their objectives and upon the area of
combat, the rules of combat within that es-
tablished area still pose problems. One of
these is that of using nuclear weapons for
--- tactical advantage. The use of nuclear weap-
ons in almost any form would greatly com-
plicate both the military and political prob-
lem. It would almost certainly confuse the
enemy and the neutrals as to the user's real
intentions?as distinct from his announced
ones?and alienate large and influential sec-
tors of world opinion from the cause of the
user, however just it may have been. The
Soviets would presumably regard the use of
nuclear weapons in the light of the proposi-
tion which they repeatedly assert and prob-
ably believe?that limit wa would carry
particularly_great risks of spreading into-gen-
eral war if nuclear weapons were introduced.
_-
72. From a olitical point of view, there are
also q?o circum'n
which one can intervene with limite
As a general rule and as a result of the ex-
perience of Korea, the Communist powers will
probably try to avoid-ElTartrix-- t-provotrga?ons
whieh-lroad permit the West to bring limled
war capa ies o sear. hey will instead
attemI--5rro-Tcse-si1uations which are legally
ifiFf"-T3o ittcatly-anomalous, that is, situations
in Which they liai-7--re e ensible color of riglit
for the use ofT?rfinwtrirtl1Tlitile
issue has b--eTOTET151--can?be made
so confuse a ern intervention
seerrieious-cir-imp enartach will
depend upon the way in which the issue is
presented to the world and is handled by both
sides. In many circumstances fear of the
spread of the conflict into a general nuclear
war might be so great that the intervener
would find himself severely condemned by
large segments of world opinion.
73. A major problem during the next decade is
also posed by the probability that additional
nations will acquire a nuclear weapons capa-
bility. France already has a program under-
render of erritory) , e numbers of people
around the world would ch??Ja1jte
70. It is now widely held that, in order to
prevent such a paralyzing choice from being
presented, it is necessary to have limited war
capabilities, so that comparatively mino?
threats can be countered with appropriate
means. But in recent years limited war capa-
bilities in the West have been declining rather
than rising. There has been a trend toward
the reduction of budgetary allocations for the
modernization and mobility of limited-war-
capable forces. TWo of the US allies, for
reasons of national prestige, or because they
fear that the US will not always support them,
have carried on strategic nuclear weapons pro-
grams of their own and have reduced their
conventional forces.
71. Even if substantial limited war forces
should be available, many 61-ralffirreiples of
their political and niTifary-trse-in a nue-rear
age remain to be developed and to be ac-
6_91_0. It is clear, for example, that only
limited ob'ectives can be won by limited
means, and that pursui of broad objectives
or extension of the conflict beyond a well de-
' The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF,
does not concur in this paragraph. It is his
belief that the evidence of offensive missile and
bomber production and deployment shows a defi-
nite intent by the Soviet rulers to achieve a clear
military superiority at the earliest practicable
date.
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way, and Communist China and Israel almost
certainly have started such weapons pro-
grams. Other nations might enter the field
if only to counter the power and prestige
which their rivals or their enemies might
gain through the acquisition of a nuclear ca-
pability. Even a small increase in the number
of nations possessing nuclear weapons will
add to the dangers inherent in critical situa-
tions as they arise. An increase in the num-
ber of states capable of using nuclear weap-
ons?even as a threat?will also increase the
chances for irrational and desperate action.
At a minimum, t.12t_s_pread of nuclear weap-
ons capabilities will stir up_ALlqitiol iiiifiti-
caFturmoil by encouraging intransigence in
their possessors and-by-e- cmif?if--.agirig fear and
counteraction among those who might con-
sider themselves threaterieT1.-
74. Related to these problems of limited war
and spread of nuclear capabilities is the prob-
lem of preventing miscalculations which
might precipitate general war unintentionally.
Whenever international disputes arise there is
a natural tendency for the parties concerned
to place their forces on an alert status and
progressively to strengthen the alert by var-
ious forms of deployment. In some cases these
might be normal precautions and in some
cases they might be intended to frighten the
adversary, or both. In any case, there is
likely to be considerable concern among neu-
trals and US allies that the US and the USSR
will act in ole a fashion, that both
the US and the USSR might become so com-
mitted that they would be unable to back down
and thus would become involved in war, or
that the state of alert on one side or both will
become so advanced that, fearing a surprise
attack, one would take pre-,. tive action
against the other. As the decade advances
and surprise attack against retaliatory weap-
ons systems loses much of its advantage, com-
pelling reasons for 1 nch* ? ?? e=emptive
attack will no longer exist. Nevertheless, fear
of surprise attack will probably persist and
might weigh more heavily in the minds of
policymakers than would in fact be justified.
75. Another concern is that general war may
come about by sheer accident. The worry
17
here is that with an increasing number and
variety of space capsules in orbit or being fired
into orbit, with an increasing number of mis-
siles nuclear-armed and on the ready, with
strategic air forces airborne and armed with
nuclear weapons, with a new and untested
ballistic missile early warning system in oper-
ation, war could come about through commu-
nications failures or anomalies, irrational ac-
tion by local crews or commanders, or errors in
judgment, without either side wishing this to
happen. As the decade advances and surprise
attack loses some of its advantages, there will
no longer be compelling reasons to respond
immediately to supposed or actual infringe-
ments of air space by presumably hostile mis-
siles or aircraft. Nevertheless, fear of attack
might in some circumstances be so great that
general war could come about in ways we have
noted.
76. In this situation of widespread fear of a
general nuclear war, it is natural that the peo-
ples of the world should look to arms control
as a means of reducing the danger. What-
ever its motivation, the USSR has carried on
a many-sided campaign for general and com-
plete disarmament. The Soviet leaders prob-
ably are interested in achieving some degree of
disarmament, to an extent which would at
least slow down or stop developments which
might harm their strategic position or increase
the danger of accidental war. During the
decade, it is possible that both sides will be-
come sufficiently concerned with stabilizing
the balance of terror that some limited agree-
ments may be reached. In any case, it is pos-
sible that?in order both to achieve stabiliza-
tion and to meet world pressures for reducing
the danger of war?the two sides will under-
take tacit agreements resulting in some degree
of arms limitation.
77. Also, the UN is likely to continue to be re-
garded by its members as an instrument for
the prevention of war. If two nations are in-
volved in dispute that threatens to result in
a general war which they wish to avoid, the
UN might provide a useful forum for airing
the dispute and UN action a useful excuse for
emerging from the dispute with less than full
satisfaction. Moreover, the underdeveloped
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nations, who are likely to become an increas-
ingly powerful voice in the UN, will almost cer-
tainly feel it in their interest to prevent a gen-
eral war and will therefore exert their in-
fluence for the preservation of peace.
78. While there is some reason to expect,
therefore, that the UN may play a role in pre-
serving peace, that the present balance of
forces will persist or become stabilized, that
the limited war concept may be sufficiently
capable of development to provide an escape
from nuclear blackmail and general nuclear
war, and that chances of general war coming
about by accident or fear of surprise attack
may be reduced, the decade ahead will still
be an extremely dangerous one. The So
-filets
18
see increasing opportunities for political gains
in their new strategic position, in their eco-
nomic growth, and in the changing situation
in the underdeveloped areas. They are almost
certain to test these opportunities, and such
tests could give rise to serious crises. Berlin
and the Offshore Islands exemplify situations
in which retreat may become impossible, and
civil wars in such areas on the periphery of the
Sino-Soviet Bloc as Laos could pose grave ques-
tions concerning the objectives and rules for
the conduct of limited operations. The world
contest in the decade ahead will necessarily
be conducted in the shadow of this strategic
situation, and it will affect the decisiofis of
statesmen everywhere.
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