SPECIAL ASPECTS OF THE NATO SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A014700050001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 10, 1959
• Content Type: SNIE

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SNIE 100-10-59
10 November 1959
IS #035606
38
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 100-10-59
SPECIAL ASPECTS OF THE
NATO SITUATION
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
on 10 November 1959. Concurring were the Director of In-
telligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant
Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Depart-
ment of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
USAF; the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and
the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic
Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the
Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained,
the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
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ThMMUOilair
SPECIAL ASPECTS OF THE NATO SITUATION
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the probable impact of a substantial unilateral reduction, within
the near future, of US NATO forces in the European area on: (a) the political atti-
tudes and defense policies of European NATO members, and (b) the over-all Western
negotiating position on Berlin, Germany, and disarmament.
THE ESTIMATE
I. INTRODUCTION
1. For some years, the NATO members have
been agreed on a strategic concept and a
phased buildup of forces to support that
strategy. As recently as October, in its NATO
Annual Review presentation, the US stated
its intention of fulfilling its MC-70 commit-
ments for the next year. The US as leader
of the alliance, and General Norstad as
SACEUR, have consistently urged that attain-
ment of agreed NATO force goals is essential
to the military effectiveness of the alliance.
Although many other NATO members have
fallen short of compliance with NATO force
goals and standards, the US has with minor
exceptions consistently fulfilled its own com-
mitments. Consequently any substantial uni-
lateral reduction of US NATO forces in Europe
within the next few months would be re-
garded as an abrupt withdrawal from firm
commitments to NATO.
2. The reduction would come at a time of con-
siderable European concern over Soviet missile
and space advances and the unresolved Berlin
situation?with new East-West negotiations
immediately in prospect or already underway.
It would also come during a period marked
not only by French efforts to assert a special
role in NATO and a continuing desire by the
British and others to reduce their own defense
expenditures, but also by growing European
concern about the future role of the US in
world affairs. This has been particularly true
since the Khrushchev visit to the US. These
developments have already led to some public
controversy over the future direction of the
alliance.
II. REACTIONS WITHIN NATO
Political Attitudes
3. Although the impact in Europe of an early
reduction of US forces would depend primarily
on the magnitude and nature of the reduction,
it would be conditioned to some degree by the
manner in which it became known to our
European allies. The adverse reaction toward
the US would be increased if the US appeared
to be reticent about acquainting its allies with
the facts, or if the reduction was announced
abruptly without prior diplomatic prepara-
tions. Any substantial reduction at this
time, would, however, lend substance to fears
that have long prevailed in some European
quarters that the US would ultimately aban-
don its basic commitments to Europe. The
adverse impact on the morale of the West
Berlin people would be particularly great.
The reduction would also encourage the fear
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that the US was preparing to settle outstand-
ing issues directly with the USSR over the
heads of its allies.'
4. Diplomatic preparation and explanation
could mitigate the worst effects of a uni-
lateral US reduction. Since the military re-
duction is assumed to be substantial, however,
it would be very difficult to convince our allies
that NATO had not been weakened. We do
not believe that the earmarking for NATO/of
forces elsewhere would be regarded as an
equivalent for forces actually in Europe. Ex-
planations of the US action in terms of the
US financial position and the needs of other
US defense programs (e.g., space and missiles)
might have some weight, but would not be
sympathetically received.
5. In any event, a US decision to make a sub-
stantial reduction of its forces in Europe would
be widely interpreted as reflecting a growing
US preoccupation with economic and other
domestic concerns and a decreased sense of
urgency about European security.2 There
would be a decline in confidence in the US and
a growth in neutralist sentiment and of efforts
for accommodation with the Bloc. There
would be a feeling among Western Europeans
that the US was taking the first step in a
progressive reduction of US forces in Europe.
Similar adverse reactions would almost cer-
tainly arise in varying degrees among the
other allies of the US in other parts of the
world.
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF
considers that this sentence places undue em-
phasis upon "fears" that the US, as a consequence
of its NATO force reductions, would be preparing
to settle outstanding issues on a bilateral basis
with the USSR. Such "fears" per se do not now
appear prevalent in Europe. This has been due
principally to the fact that the US has, over the
past several months, consistently assured Western
European leaders that critical issues would not
be settled "over the heads of the allies." So long
as such assurances continue, the Assistant Chief
of Staff, Intelligence, USAF believes that US
NATO forces structure reductions thus far pro-
posed will not, of themselves, arouse Western
Europe to the point of reviving such "fears."
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF
would delete the words "and a decreased sense
of urgency about European security." As noted
2
Effect on Defense Policies
6. The willingness of NATO countries to sup-
port NATO programs has already fallen be-
hind the generally rapid economic progress
of NATO members. At the present time the
public in these countries is uncertain as to
current trends in East-West relations and the
danger of hostilities in Europe. In this atmos-
phere, a substantial unilateral reduction in
US forces would almost certainly operate, at
least in the short run, to reduce popular will-
ingness to support contributions to NATO at
their present level. Present and planned de-
fense contributions of most NATO countries
would be forced downward by political pres-
sures.
Reactions of Particular Governments
7. West Germany. The Federal Republic
would probably be the NATO Government
most seriously concerned over the direct mili-
tary and political effects of the reduction.
The West German military buildup is pre-
mised heavily on the validity of the forward
strategy and the presence of US forces. Great
military significance would be attached to the
cut. It would be most difficult to persuade
the Germans that this was not the first in a
series of US cuts gradually reducing the US
presence in Europe. It would reawaken Ade-
nauer's fears, most strikingly demonstrated by
his reaction during the 1956 scare created by
allegations that the US contemplated with-
drawal from Europe. While Adenauer him-
elsewhere in the estimate the principal deterrent
to Soviet military adventures in Western Europe
remains the US strategic capability. In evaluat-
ing the US decision to make certain force reduc-
tions in its NATO commitments, most Western
Europeans would be unlikely to view the con-
templated cuts as touching the principal US con-
tribution to deterring the Soviets. In fact a
convincing case might be made for the argu-
ment that Western Europeans would regard the
proposed cuts as an indication of a more real-
istic assessment of the current Soviet threat, and
that the reduction implied US acknowledgment
that certain NATO commitments required re-
assessment, especially in the light of weapons de-
velopment, and did not represent a "decreased
sense of urgency."
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4t1"EriENSIMPERIRL
self would endeavor to maintain his close as-
sociation with the US, he would, however, feel
that West German security was diminished.
Therefore he would consider ways to increase
West German military strength and influence.
At the same time he would move forward to-
ward closer cooperation with the French on
military and other matters involving the crea-
tion of closer Franco-German ties within
NATO. On the other hand encouragement
would also be given to those neutralist and
other forces in the Federal Republic which
seek a reorientation of current West German
foreign policy. At the least, Adenauer's basic
policy would come under heavy fire and ques-
tioning, both from other parties and from
some elements of his own party.
8. France. The French military leaders would
be concerned by the weakening of shield forces.
However, the unilateral character of the US
reduction would probably be used by de Gaulle
to support his arguments for individual deter-
mination by the NATO countries of their de-
fense arrangements and needs. Thus, the ef-
fect would be to encourage de Gaulle in his
efforts to take the lead in a continental group-
ing to match the US-UK partnership, and at
the same time permit him to cite the US reduc-
tion as a reason for requiring closer political
and military coordination among the major
NATO partners before major strategic deci-
sions are made.
9. The UK. British leaders, already on record
as favoring the "tripwire" concept, would seize
on the US reduction to justify completing the
planned reductions in the British ground
forces stationed in West Germany. These re-
ductions have been delayed primarily because
of US objections. Further reductions might
also take place. The British would renew
their pressure within NATO to re-examine
NATO plans or at least to construe present
NATO force goals as maximum targets rather
than as minimum requirements. More
broadly, the US reductions would further
stimulate the tendency of British leaders in
both parties to seek a compromise with the
Soviets on specific issues such as Berlin and
3
Germany, and to advocate a zone of disarma-
ment in Europe.
Effect on NATO
10. The NATO forward strategy would have
decreasing plausibility as a concept on which
NATO military planning could be realistically
based. In light of the above appraisals,
notably the divergent reaction of West Ger-
many and the UK, it seems clear that NATO
cohesion would also be adversely affected.
While the reduction would probably not lead
to a major split within NATO, it would in-
tensify the underlying strains within the
alliance.
IlL EFFECTS ON THE WESTERN BARGAINING
POSITION
11. In the light of the foregoing, a substantial
unilateral reduction of US forces in Europe
at this time would weaken the Western bar-
gaining position on Berlin, Germany, and dis-
armament. The Western delegates would be
confronting the Soviets in an atmosphere of
greatly increased misgivings about the mili-
tary program on which NATO is based and
about NATO's ability to maintain its position
vis-a-vis the Bloc. Existing strains between
West Germany and the UK over the degree of
firmness which the West could effectively
maintain on Berlin and the German problem
would probably be increased. Even those
Europeans who basically favored a reduction
of armaments would believe that the US, by
its substantial unilateral reduction, had
thrown away assets which might have been
used to extract concessions from the USSR.
The divisions arising in NATO as a result of
the reduction of forces would not only com-
plicate the formulation of agreed Western
positions for East-West talks but would also
be subject to Soviet exploitation.
12. The Soviet leaders would probably regard
a unilateral reduction of forces as an indica-
tion that the US was less able or willing to
maintain a strong military position in Europe.
An attempt by the US to represent the action
as a gesture toward relaxation of tensions
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would be unlikely to elicit a more forthcoming
Soviet position in East-West negotiations.
The Soviets would probably believe that the
US move had been a divisive force in NATO
and that, as a result, the Soviet bargaining
position on Berlin and Germany had been
greatly strengthened. In disarmament talks,
Moscow would probably be encouraged to be-
lieve that the chances had been improved of
reaching agreement on a Soviet sponsored
European security plan providing for a dis-
engagement of forces in isolation from the
question of German unity.
13. In a larger sense, the Soviet estimate of
the NATO bargaining position would depend
upon the total military and political posture
of the West. The principal deterrent to So-
viet military adventures in Europe remains
the US strategic capability. Nevertheless the
Soviet leaders know that there is much con-
troversy in the US and in Europe over current
Western security concepts, and they have al-
ready seen NATO declining in unity because
of a series of unilateral decisions taken by its
principal members. They would probably be-
lieve that a substantial reduction of US forces
in Europe would reinforce these tendencies.
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