CURRENT TRENDS IN ARAB UNITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A013900020031-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 23, 2013
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: June 23, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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No,
?CerNPEOFORN
Intelligence Report
No. 8035
CURRENT TRENDS IN ARAB UNITY
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH
Review of this document by CIA has
determined that
XCIA has no objection to declass
o It contains information of CIA
interest that must remain
classified at TS S 0
Authority: HR 704
o It contains nothing of CIA Interest
Dat Reviewer fos:_y_q
June 23, 1959
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This report is based on information available through June 1, 1959.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract
I.
Introduction . . ?
Domestic Dynamics of the Arab States
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1
3
A. Characteristics of the Arab Elites
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3
B. Characteristics of the Arab Regimes
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7
III.
Inter-Arab Relations -- The Three Regions ?
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8
IV.
The Unity Movement in the Arab World,
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A. "Arabism" and the Arab Nation ? ? ? 0
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11
B. The Arab East ?
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11
C. The Arab West
13
V.
The Outlook for Unity .
13
A. Arab East
13
B. The Arab West.
16
C. The Arabs -- East and West ., ? . *
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VI.
Relations with the non-Arab World
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A. The Arab East and the West
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B. The Arab East and the USSR : ?
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C. The Magbrib, the West and the USSR . .
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20
D. The Arabs and the Asian States
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20
E. The Arabs and Africa
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Abstract
This paper discusses primarily the internal power struggle which
is now taking place within the Arab world from Morocco to the Persian
Gulf. It is not suggested that the future evolution and orientation of
the Arab world can be deduced solely from an examination of Arab politics,
The continued existence in the Arab "homeland" of "enclaves" controlled
by non-Arab powers, such as Algeria, Israel, and certain areas of the
Arabian Peninsula; the Western stake in Arab oil; the geographic location
of the area through which major international communication routes must
pass; and the policies of the USSR ensure that the Arab world, as most
Arabs admit, cannot evolve in isolation. However, the domestic forces at
work within the Arab world are increasingly assuming greater importance
and in these circumstances it seems useful to examine them, both for the
light they throw on conflicts within and among the Arab states and as an
essential preliminary to any consideration of the capacities of non-
Arab powers to influence developments in the area.
The various elements now seeking to obtain or consolidate power
within the several Arab states can be divided into three broad categories
in terms of their attitudes toward the question of social change. The
strength of these elements -- traditionalists, reformists, and radicals --
varies greatly within each state) but the rate and direction. of change in
one state clearly affects developments in the others. These categories
do not of themselves permit specific predictions of behavior. Whether a
given ruling group will follow extreme or moderate tactics in its actions
or reactions depends, among other things, on its assessment of the strength
of its cmponents and the international and domestic consequences which
are likely to ensue at any given time. However, the categories do serve
the purpose of broadly differentiating between the ideologies and goals
of Arab political movements and their leaders and suggest the existence
of certain limits in their political, social and economic behavior which
inhibits even the most opportunistic politicians.
Power struggles among elites within the Arab states are accompanied
by intensified efforts to resolve a long existing Arab problem: the
achievement of "unity" within and among the three major power centers of
the Arab world -- Northwest Africa (known as the Magbrib), the Nile
Valley, and the Valley of the Tigris and Euphrates. Rivalry between the
latter two has been especially acute, focusing on the problem of control
of the buffer zone which separates them -- the Western Fertile Crescent
(historic Syria) and the Arabian Peninsula --, a struggle which has brought
to the fore once again, especially in Lebanon, the centuries-old problem
of ethnic and religious minority elements fearful of domination by the
area's Sunni Arab majority. However Arab unity is no longer being sought
merely in terms of general agreement to eliminate foreign influence and
control. The phase of "national liberation" is passing and today a
common approach to internal political problems is also held to be an
essential facet of Arab unity.
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Thus in the Arab East radical Iraq and reformist Egypt are in con-
flict, while in theArab-Wedt reformist Tunisia is troubled .by the prospect
of a Ilaghrib. unity dominated biridical Algerians and Moroccans. The .
trend throughout the area toward-mass.participation in politics, already
well advanced in the Maghrib-and Iraq, suggests that regimes, whether
traditionalist or reformist, which seek to-resist'it may find themselves
in growing difficulties.. Thii"is particularly true of the UAR.-r*The UAR
certainly seems to'have the kesouraes to maintain itself and'even,.
possibly, to expand over the next several years, but,. assuming a continu-
ation of present trends in Iraq, the-problem Of creating broad positive
support, especially in Syria, is likely to become increasingly acute.
The relatiOnship of the Arabs with-the outside world will increas-
ingly be conditioned by non-Arab attitudes toward these regional and
inter-regional issues. Arabs and non-Arabs May from time to time reach
agreement on tactics designed to meet specific situations but, especially
in the Arab East, the basic policies of Arab leaders are unlikely to be
entirely satisfantory-to either the West or the Bloc. It is possible
that the pace Of events inIraq may be progressing faster thin the USSR
might have wished. On the other hand, the return of the UAR to a public
posture more favorable to Western interests is likely to make more dis-
creet, but not significantly inhibit, Egyptian efforts to promote ac-
ceptance of Cairo's brand of neutralism not only in the Arab world but in
Africa as well. Arab leaders in-the Maghrib, Where conflicts with the
West-he,vi tended to be more political and less cultural) have been more
desirous of reaching-Mutually'beneficial undertakings with the non-Arab
world. But the Algerian. situation continues to intervene and, reinforcing
domestic pressure for drastic social change, threatens to undermine the
moderates' authority and popular appeal.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Arab world, stretching from Morocco on the Atlantic Ocean to
Iraq on the frontiers of Iran, has by and large, over the past decade,
succeeded in achieving at least the outward forms of political inde-
pendence. Nearly a dozen new states have emerged from various degrees of
British, French, and Italian control. Only the British-controlled rim
area of the Arabian Peninsula, French-dominated Algeria, minor Spanish
holdings on the Moroccan coasts, and, in the Arab view, Israel persist as
"foreign" controlled segments of the "Arab homeland."
The efforts of the Arabs to resolve the problems created by the
remaining foci of conflict with the West continue to complicate the
relations of the Arabs with the outside world and with each other, but it
is becoming increasingly apparent that the change in status of the bulk
of the Arab world from colonial dependencies to sovereign states has
brought about the emergence of new currents which will redefine the term
in which "Arab" issues are debated. With the drawing to a close of the
phase of "national liberation" and its pre-occupation with "imperialism,"
the phase of "national consolidation" is beginning to dominate the scene.
"Imperialism" will remain an important issue so long as the foreign en-
claves persist and the area continues to be a battleground in the cold
war. However, the new phase increasingly involves the contests of
strictly indigenous elites for power to determine and control the destiny,
nature, and orientation of the Arab world in its modern "renaissance."
The struggle for power begins at the "national" level, i.e., within the
framework of the "national" boundaries -- in some cases largely artificial --
which divide the Arab world. It progresses to the regional level: the
effort to apply historic political and economic ambitions under the guise
of an idealized Arab solidarity is translated into such concepts as
Magbrib unity, the unity of the Nile Valley and the unity of the Fertile
Crescent. Even before such vaguely defined but, to the Arab, deeply
meaningful schemes can be implemented, the contest reaches yet another
level: that between the regions and especially between the Nile and
Mesopotamia as they struggle for control of the intervening area -- Syria,
Lebanon, Jordan, and the Arabian peninsula.
In the past, and indeed for several millennia, such rivalries have
been taking place but at present and for the foreseeable future they
present a new dimension. Heretofore the Arabs have been primarily engaged
In a struggle against foreign political and economic domination. But
from the beginning of this struggle the Arabs, especially in the East,
have also been engaged in a search for "identity." The problem here is
to reconcile objective goals with an idealized inherited historic and
cultural legacy and both with the demands and the adopted values of the
modern world. The multiplicity of solutions put forward is reflected in
the present struggle for power, supported in certain circumstances by
foreign powers, but without that degree of imposed foreign guidance and
manipulation which so often characterized inter-Arab maneuvering since
World War I. The doctrinaire socialist ideas of Moroccan leaders, the
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middle-class social reformism of Egypt, and the extreme radicalism of
Iraq owe much to European models, but their exponents are Arabs having
their own capacity to act as they see fit and especially, to disregard or
heed foreign advice, depending on their own evaluations of the dictates
of the local situation, and eclectically to utilize these ideologies in
the pursuit,of specifically Arab goals. Some direct foreign control ?
still persists in-the Arab world. But French policy in Algeria, British.
tactics in the Arabian peninsula and Israel's very existence serve also
to heighten pressures for political change in the rest of the Arab states,
as each Arab faction puts forward its claim to be the most efficacious
advocate of Arab "liberation" and "unity."
.?
The fundamental contest for power in most of the states -- and
therefore in the principal regions -- which comprise the Arab world in-
focuee,s on the pace and nature of socio-economic change. In
certain countries -- the' ates, Iraq, Egypt, -- sjasAAlyiaions
as understood in the Western world have taken on increasingly important
ialtiFil-FigIftedn'ar7-1-E7CrWei-a.eaS7-=-aOrdan7-thE-Sudan, Libya, --
the internal struggle for power is still primarily carried on in terms af
conflict betWeen special interest groups of a'singIe:class; the political
issues are expressed in sectarian, tribal,.provinciall-and ethnic rather
than in "class" terms. But even in these areas, as a result of moderni-
zationrstudentsl-labor leaders, professional and military men, and
merchants are beginning to act in term i of concepts transcending histori-
-dal loyalties. The logical political consequence' of the economic and
technological development of the newly -Independent Arab states will be the
acceleration of this trend.
These new concepts have brought about a whole beries.of changes in
the regimes of the Arab'states. Over the last decade, traditional ruling
aristocracies -- tribal; secular, or'religioUs have either been over-
thrown by force or have' acquiesced in varying degrees in the transfer of
power to reformist -- regimes of military or
civilian character. These reformist_regimes in turn face the challenge
of other groups seeking radical_social and political change ostensibly
for the profit of the urban. and rural masses, whose suppiiit is essential
SO-their-ultimate_success. Except In Morocco and Iraq, where they have
obtained posltions of influence, 'theradicals have made little progress.
But if the areas of the Nile Delta and Damascus and Beirut, where the '
middle-class has-been more successful,,are-only facing minor threats of
social' revolution at the present time;-the prospects' for-other areas-are
much less promisihg. ? 7 - ? . - - ?11- -..
. Radical or reformist changes which occur mhy be comparativelycalm
and orderly as in Morocco and Egypt or violent as in Iraq and Syria. The
tacticsof?all.groups -- traditionalists, reformers; and radicals -- may
be moderate or extremist depending on the degree and mature of the
opposition they.encounter'andthe extent and nature of-the support they
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receive. Each of the various contestants for power elicits the support
of similarly-minded allies among the other Arab states. Support may also
be accepted and even solicited from the non-Arab world. "Foreign collabo-
ration" is probably tacitly accepted in the Arab world as an inevitable
consequence of the area's geography and economics and its need for
European skills and ideas if it is to play the international role its
leaders and peoples demand. But the "collaboration" will only be tolerable
if those in whose behalf it occurs clearly retain in the eyes of the
public at least the appearance of initiative and freedom of action. The
more aid given, the fewer the formal strings which can be tolerated.
Consequently the relationships between these factions and the outside
world -- the West and the Bloc -- have been characterized by alternating
periods of harmony and strong recrimination. Leaders, especially in the
Arab East, have found that allegations of Great Power interference are
most effective in rallying public support. But at the same time they ?
are aware of the importance of counter-balancing great power ties if
they are to avoid the appearance of leading their countries into a precari-
ous isolation without powerful friends. Neither subservience nor isolation
is acceptable in the modern.Arab world; at .the SAie time the search for
unity and the existence of constant power struggles domestically and
between the Arab regions, make constant relationships with the Great
Powers seem almost impossible to obtain.
Thus the prospects for the Arab world are the continuation and
even intensification of multiple and often conflicting Arab efforts to
-achieve internal and regional stability and homogeneity, aatimately
-unity_itaelf. Reformist Cairo and radical Baghdad will compete to dominate
the Arab East, while in the Arab West moderates of both reformist and
radical factions will seek to survive the extremism generated by uneven
social change accentuated by French policy in Algeria. In the process
the West is likely to find its opportunities to exercise direct influence
considerably diminished, though there will remain considerable room for
indirect influence. However, the Bloc, although initially benefitting
from the West's discomfiture, is not likely to assume a commanding role
In the area as a whole. Although the trend of events in Iraq shows
significant Communist progress, neither the radicals of,the Mae/rib nor
the reformers of the Nile favor the communist program and for the foresee-
able future they appear strong enough at least to prevent significant
communist gains. Moreover it is possible that close relations with "non-
imperialist" Europe -- West Germany, Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece -- and
with the Afro-Asian and possibly Latin-American countries may offer a
middle way leading to a modus vivendi between the Arabs and the non-Arab
world. -
? ' II. DOMESTIC DYNAMICS OF THE ARAB STATES .
A. The Characteristics of the Arab Elites
Broadly speaking, the various factions involved in the conflicts
within and among the Arab states can be divided into three categories in
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terms of of their attitudes towards the question .of social change. These
are the traditionalists, the reformists, and tharadicals.- The strength
and cohesiveness of these factions vary in the different parts of the
Arab world. The traditionalists are strongest in those areas compara-
tively. isolated from the impact of "modernism" i.e. European ideologies,
techniques, and material evidences of an industrial civilization. The
reformists are strongest in those"areas of the Arab world which have
been most heavily exposed to these influences through trade,,conquest,
and cultural penetration. The radicals emerge most?powerfully.in areas
which have been touched by modernization but which lack the stabilizing
factor of a substantial' middle-class whose social and economic conserva-
tism inhibits drastic actions and favors a gradualism designed to protect
the social system and its inherited values from too abrupt a transition..
Their potential is increased when there exist religious and ethnic
differences susceptible of exploitation.
Traditionalists.' The traditional wielders of power in the Arab
world have been those religious or secular figures -- the "upper class" --
whose prestige and status derive from traditional symbols in Arab society,
especially religion and family descent. Usually these figures are also
associated with wealth, 'but mere possession of wealth is not often a
means of entree into the traditionalist elite (although power expressed .
through conquest may be). The main object of these traditional rulers
and their supporters and of traditionalist groups in general is the
preservation of the existing structure of political and economic power
with a minimum of social change. This group includes religious and tribal
zealots who wish to return to an idealized past'free of non-Arab and non-
Muslim influences, but the majority of traditionalist leaders-are not
averse to employing modern methods and techniques to strengthen their .
positions. As a group, the traditionalists think politically in terms .of
a personal absolutiam-sanctioned by custom. Economically-they practice a
paternalism which compounds prestige-motivated luxury and largesse with
a general lack of 'awareness of the financial.requirements,of the modern
state and the:people as a whole. Among the representatives of this group
are the rulers of the Arabian peninsula and of Libya., the tribal sheikhs
of Iraq, the Druze amirs.of Syria, and the feudal chiefs of the Moroccan
%Atlas. However the King of Mcrocco has known how to adapt a position
which is religiously sanctioned to meet the needs of essentially secular.
institutions without abandoning that traditional prestige.which allows
him to be more than a constitutional figurehead.
The Reformists. Predominantly drawn from the-middle-class, reformist
groups advocate selective modernization of the inherited social order,-
since from the social, economic and political changes which ensue they
derive both livelihood and status. This group includes the bulk of the
small merchants and traders, civil servants, military officers, profession-
als and the technicians and students of the Arab world.. This class has
long been influenced by traditional values and has not abandoned thed
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altogether, but on the whole wealth and power are the goals of its
members -- not traditionalist symbols-which.are recognized as backward
and outmoded in a modern society.
In its political thinking a reformist elite is committed in theory
to constitutional government by its acceptance of modernization and its
concern to be representative. But this theoretical commitment is largely
nullified by an inherited tradition of authoritarian political practices, and
by the pressure of urgent social and economic problems demanding central-
ized direction of the country's economic growth. However, being essential-
ly committed to the principle of private property, the reformists' method
of state control is by preference indirect. The preservation of the
"public" interest -- i.e. the interest of the middle-class as the ruling
elite -- is assured through state supervision of the private sector with
safeguards against excesses by management or labor which could lead to
"monopoly" or "radicalism."
As elsewhere, the middle-class in the Arab world acts politically
through special interest groups. Should one of these groups -- for
instance the military be successful in its efforts to break a "monopoly"
of power, it tends to become, itself, a new elite and therefore the object
of attack by other special-interest groups. Therefore its objective is
to consolidate its power and newly-acquired status and to protect itself
not only frcm above but also from below. For it may face challenges not
merely from other elements of the middle-class but also, potentially,
from the "people" -- the peasants and the workers in whose name it may
endeavor to speak but whose loyalties it has great difficulty in winning.
Successful reformist elites would seem to require a dynamic leader who
can hold together the various social and special interest groups and, if
possible, weld them together in a national program.
Reformist elements throughout the Arab world have as their stated
initial objective the replacement of traditional patterns of rule by
modernized institutions. But reformist elites, even within the same
country, differ among themselves as to the extent to which they are pre-
pared to accept the political consequences of the social changes which
are occurring with growing rapidity in the Arab world. Certain reformists,
as in Tunisia, adopt programs emphasizing national unity in which all
classes and special interest groups are given a positive role to play.
Irreconcilables are isolated from the body politic while potential dis-
sidents can be neutralized and loyal followers rewarded through the
resources of the political party and eventually the governmental bureaucracy
itself.
The Egyptians on the other hand define their program as "revolution-
ary" and "socialist." They actually seek changes in the outward forms ?
rather than the substance of the political, social and economic legacy of
the 'past, although their condemnation of "feudalism" and monarchy expresses
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a deep and sincere aversion to any concentration of economic and politi-
cal poWer posing obstacles to upward mobility which, if carried to ex-
cess, could seriously damage the political and economic prospects of the
middle-class. The Egyptian program, like that of Tunisia, envisages mass
participation in politics; it also has a recognized channel for advance-
ment -- the military officer corps -- and it, too, uses the facilities of
the bureaucracy -- and private industry and commerce as well -- to main-
tain its authority. But unlike Tunisia, the Egyptian regime has yet to
develop truly positive support outside the urban middle-class despite its
claim to speak for "the people" as a whole. Egypt's military rulers
believe that "responsibility" must be the prerequisite for full partici-
pation in government. However they also feel compelled, during the
"transitional phase," to retain for the state, as guardian of the public
welfare, the sole right to choose both ends and means for all the in-
habitants. By precluding significant popular initiative, even in support
of the regime, Egypt's "socialism," -- essentially a policy of "social
welfare," perpetuates the very lassitude it seeks to overcome. The
difficulty is compounded by the inability of Egypt's rulers, like most
of their predecessors, to improve the conditions in which the bulk of
Egypt's expanding population lives.
The Radicals. Usually -- but not always radical leaders come
from middle-class and frequently ethnic and religious minority elements
frustrated in their aspiration to power and influence. Because they are
an outgroup which sees little chance of gaining and maintaining power
through existing social and political systems and values, they seek to
replace traditional or reformist structures with new patterns heavily
influenced by European -- Eastern or Western .-- socialist principles of
secularism and class struggle. Their abrupt repudiation of past cultural
traditions and their efforts to stir up the heretofore largely apolitical
rural and urban masses as in Iraq are particularly disturbing to the
reformists of the Arab East. The Bethists of Syria are attempting to
meet these pressures for change through a socialist program, peculiarly
Arab in character. But inhibited by its milieu, Ba!thist socialism may
prove in the long run to differ only in minor respects from the "social"
program of the reformist Egyptian regime. In the Maghrib, however,
ideological European-type socialism has firmer roota. Experience with
essentially secular government, an indigenous tradition which permits
considerable freedom for individual and group variations, long exposure
to French concepts, models, and values, a comparatively restricted middle-
class and increased political consciousness among the workers and peasants
are some of the factors which help to explain the growth of radicalism in
this area.
Like the traditionalists and reformists, the radicals follow an
authoritarian political approach. (In fact the radicals seem to work
relatively well in coalition with traditionalists since the authoritarian-
ism of both is admitted rather than denied as in the case of the reformists.)
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But the authoritarianism of the radicals is usually of an impersonalized
nature. While outstanding individual leaders are not precluded, especially
among the Communists, the tendency of the radicals is to produce col-
lective leadership comprising the elected heads of the various groups,
labor, peasants, students, youths etc. -- together with such others as the
intricate party organization may bring to the apex of the pyramid.
In their economic thinking, the radicals express a preference for
massive state intervention in the interests of the masses. They are will-
ing to sacrifice established patterns of trade and finance for the sake of
investment. However, deep-rooted social patterns inhibit state inter-
vention in the field of personal property; few Arabs would advocate col-
lectivization or genuine communal property.
In the present circumstances genuine radicalism in the Arab East
appears for the moment to be the preserve of the Communists. The area's
regimes -- both traditionalist and reformist -- have tended to equate
radicalism with subversion and consequently there has been no way for a
legal non-Communist radical movement to arise. In the Maghrib, on the
other hand, as elsewhere in Africa, working-class socialists have become
ministers, but in so doing they encounter a new problem: the need to
reconcile the demands of their followers with technical and policy con-
siderations which, as officials, they cannot neglect. Should they fail
to produce convincing evidence that they continue to work in the
interests of masses, their authority may be undermined by advocates of
particularist causes or by extremist elements, including the Communists,
who seem to promise more rapid and sweeping gains.
B. Characteristics of the Arab Regimes
Internal struggles are now proceeding at different rates in the
several Arab countries. Since these countries are becoming more and
more closely linked by cultural ties, modern communications (press and
radio), trade, migrations and visits, ta,te...and-direction of change
in one_state_affects_the-rate-in-others. The impact of the Egyptiaia
"revolution" of 1952 and its championing of the middle-class cause 'of
reform hastened the pace in the Sudan, the Fertile Crescent, and even in
the comparatively isolated Arabian Peninsula. Similarly, the militant
and populist orientation of the Algerian FLN has contributed to the rise
of radicalism in Morocco.
Local conditions and inter-action have combined to produce within
the Arab world regimes most of which reflect a continuing competition
between and within elites for primacy. Traditionalist Yemen and reformist
UAR and Tunisia have comparatively homogeneous governments; however, the
rest of the Arab states are ruled by coalitions of varying character.
Traditionalist rulers in Libya and Saudi Arabia have shared their power
to a limited extent with reformist elements. At the opposite end of the
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spectrum, radicals in Morocco and Iraq tend to dominate those with whom
power is shared -- the traditionalist King and Iraqi civil and military
reformists. Jordanian political leaders continue to be strongly in-
fluenced by traditional values and tactics. Although the state operates
in a modern secular framework mass participation in politics is dis-
couraged or even suppressed. Stability depends on coercion, exercised
through well paid security elements -- principally tribesmen who have
long been at odds with the sedentary population --, on the allocation of
key governmental posts to leaders commanding local status and authority
of a quasi-feudal nature, and on the personal prestige of the Hashimite
King Husayn. The succession of regimes in the Sudan stems from the in-
ability of reformist rulers to dominate the pressures of still powerful
tribal and religious traditionalist elements. Finally, in Lebanon un-
easy stability is attained through delicate negotiation and the formation
of pragmatic alliances among the leaders of the country's multiple special
interest groups.
III. INTER-ARAB RELATIONS THE THREE REGIONS
Just as the ending of the phase of national liberation has been
followed by the emergence of more clearly defined issues between indige-
nous groups in competition for control of the several Arab states, so
also has there followed greater pressure for resolution of the primary
inter-Arab question -- the question of unity among these states. From
the very beginning of Syrian Arab resistance to Turkish domination,
there has persisted, more or, less clearly articulated, the notion that
Arab unity was a historic truth.that would re-emerge once foreign
domination had been removed. This has been an article of faith among
the Syrian originators of the Arab unity movement since the early part
of the twentieth century. It was not until World War II, however, with
the imminent independence of a majority of Arab states and the appearance
of concrete steps toward Arab unity in the form of the Arab League, that
Egyptian nationalism joined hands with the Arab unity movement and the
Maghrib was conceived as constituting a part of a unified Arab world.
In the Magbrib, the mystique of union is playing an increasingly im-
portant role in relations between the states of that area and in the
relations of the Arab West with the Arab East. The fact that the destiny
of the individual Arab states is now largely in the, hands of indigenous
elements has only added a new dimension to this factor. TheAuest.ion7
present, is not "whether union?" but rather, "on what terms union?" In
other words the proponents of Arab unity are being obliged to face the
fact that historically unity was religious not political in:character
and that modeiiItion has elements which inhibit as wellAs stimulate
the cause of unity. 7
The Arab world is customarily viewed in terms of two major areas
the Arab East, including Egypt and the Sudan, and the Arab West (the
Magbrib), with Libya forming a division rather than a link between them.
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However, the Arab world more appropriately falls into three distinctive '
power centers -- Mesopotamia, the Nile Valley and the Magbrib. The first
two -- Baghdad and Cairo -- have, almost from the beginning of recorded
history, been in varying degrees of competition to dominate or at least
influence the buffer zone which separates them -- the Western Fertile
Crescent i.e., historic Syria -- and to a lesser extent the Arabian
Peninsula. The circumstances of history and geography have combined to
ordain for these 'two areas an intimacy (and rivalry) which has not and
probably will not characterize the relations of either with the third
region -- the Maghrib. Only in relatively recent times -- with the
lessons of Woild War II, the emergence of independent Arab states in
North Africa and the continuation of the "colonial" war in Algeria -- has
the Maghrib emerged from comparative isolation to become an area of grow-
ing concern to both-of the other regions and to seek, itself, to put
forth its own ideas of Arab interests. Bound together in a more or less
loose community by the power of the cultural idea of the "Arab nation,"
and increasingly acting in terms of this notion, these regions neverthe-
less have a diversity of interests and motivations stemming from their
differing historical and social evolution that is sufficient greatly to
complicate the search for Arab unity in a form transcending the particular
interests of any one of them.
Mesopotamia. From the time of the Assyrian Empire the valley of
the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers has contained a center of political and
cultural strength which at various times has extended its influence when-
ever possible or necessary towards the Mediterranean. In large measure,
the drive westward over the Syrian Desert to the coast has been in
response to real Or potential threats -- more often political and economic
than military -- from the southerly center of power which has existed in
the Nile Valley since the time of the pharaohs. Syria has also had an
attraction for the rulers of Mesopotamia either as an extension of empire
or as-a defensive outpost against Egyptian ambitions. In modern times,
withthe'apread of communications links and the discovery of oil,
Mesopotamia's rulers have also looked southward to the Persian Gulf and
its littoral.
Nile Valley. For Egypt, Syria has historically offered the same
promise's of empire and' security. Until Modern times the only effective
routeFbf land-anvasionsof Egypt, the Eastern Mediterranean coast and its
hinterland have" been special objects of concern for the rulers of Egypt.
This-concern,bas especially prevailed whenever a dynamic regime controlled
Mesopotamia.',iBut it has also existed when Mesopotamian power was in
eclipse afid"the threat came through 'that area from the North and West --
from Hittitesl-Crusaders,-TUrks; and Israelis.
" While the Mediterranean coast and Syria is for Egypt of important
strategio'concern, the southern areas of the Nile Valley offer problems
of even more vital economic -and political interest and have also histori-
cally inspired a dynamic and expansionist policy, especially in the Sudan.
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Similarly, the historic strategic concern of. Egypt to control the Red Sea
and the bordering Hijaz area has assumed in modern times important
economic and political overtones as a necessary preliminary to extension
of Egyptian influence throughout Arabia to the Persian Gulf. Present
Egyptian activity in Ethiopia, the Somalilands and East Africa is .
partially explicable in these terms.
Egypt's interest in its Western hinterland goes back to medieval
and even pharaonic times. In the modern context, the position of Libya,
between the Maghrib and the Nile Valley, makes it, much like Syria to the
North, an area of strategic concern since, in the hands of Egypt's
enemies or rivals, e.g. the UK, it could be used to hamper Egypt's efforts
to expand its influence or even directly threaten Egypt itself. Its newly
discovered oil riches will heighten Egypt's interest in influencing
developments there.
The Maghrib. In spite of a long history of local separatism, dis-
parate populations and ethnic groups and the varied political evolution
of its component parts under foreign rule, the countries of the' Maghrib
have frequently sensed a common destiny. But historically the Maghrib
has lacked a clearly defined power center. Morocco has tended to live in
isolation, Algiers and Tunis -- like Tripoli and Benet97.1 -- were important
trading stations but their control of the hinterland was onlysporadic.
The usual pattern of the area was that of successive waves'ofdesert
tribes which swept over one or another coastal area and merged more or
less with its inhabitants to form a mixed Arabo-Berber culture. At such
time as all of the Maghrib achieves full independence, Algeria will almost
certainly become itt7Trincipal power center for geographic, economic and
population reasonS;.tAnd because the Algerian Liberation Army is likely
to emerge from thevar,as the most powerful force in the area. Although
only rarely unitedunder,a coMMon sovereign, Moroccans, Algerians, and
Tunisians -- and sdme,oftWpeoples of the Saharan regions as well --
have recently found a neVcoMmon,interest in the effort to win total in-
dependence from France.
IV. THE UNITY MOVEMENT IN THE ARAB WORLD
Just as in medieval times the Muslim world reflected the diVisive
factors of earlier history and geographyoperating against Islamic unity,
so today do these factors operate against Arab unity. The common bond of
religion did not prevent then the emergence, at various times and at the
same time, of separate centers of political power corresponding roughly
to the three regions previously described. So today.the Arab unity
movement has centers in both. Baghdad and Cairo in the Arab East, and in
Tunis and Rabat (pending Algerian independence) in North Africa. While
most spokesmen of the unity movement postulate, as the ideal, unity of all
the Arab peoples from Iraq to Morocco, in practice, for the foreseeable
future, the distance between the two extremitiesof the Arab world is too
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great to be bridged by the mere idea of union. At most, possibilities
lie within the two ends of the Arab world -- Maghrib (Western) unity and
Mashriq (Eastern) unity.
A. "Arabise and the Arab Nation
The search for Arab unity is predicated upon the existence of a
common "Arabiam" or "Arabdom" which is conceived of as coterminous with
the "Arab Nation." The consciousness of Arabs as being different from
other subjects of the Ottoman Empire arose under European influence and
in reaction to the Pan-Turanianism of the Young Turks and their attempts
after 1908 to Turkify the Arab provinces of the Empire. Hence "Arabism"
was initially a product of Syria and Lebanon, the intellectual centers
of resistance to Turkification and was a non-sectarian ethnic movement
which began primarily among Christians but in which Muslim Arabs and
even Jews participated. However, during the mandate period the French
policy of encouraging minority separatism stimulated confessional
differences. Egyptian nationalism was entirely different in its origins;
in Egypt, the drive for independence had initially an Islamic coloration,
but as it developed, it stressed the unity of Copts and Muslims in winning
independence from British rule. As the goals against the British and the
French were won in Egypt and the Levant, the increasingly close contact
between Egypt and the other Arab states, (spurred on by the need for
unity against Israel) led to the closer identification of Egyptian goals
with those of the advocates of Arab unity.
In current Arab usage the term gawmiyah, conveys the idea of a
group of people of common descent or ethnic origin. While the theorists
of Damascus and Cairo maintain that this concept is entirely secular, the
social milieu in which they operate still in practice associates one's
loyalties with one's religion. Hence ethnic minorities such as Kurds and
religious minorities such as Lebanese Maronites and various other groups
resist a concept of Arab unity that in practice would relegate them to ala
inferior status under Sunni Arab domination. These are the groups that
represent the tendency of shu'ubiyah or ethnic and religious separatism
from the main body of the community. The theorists of Arab unity have
tended also to confuse a common cultural tradition (language, literature,
way of life) with political unity and to have assumed that because most
Arabs stand together against outsiders they will do the same on purely
internal issues. In fact, however, the historical political unity that
the theorists assume to have existed represents an idealized picture with-
out objective reality.
B. The Arab East
As the intellectual leader of the Arab: struggle against foreign
control, historic Syria has provided the locale- for the earliest and
most consistent exposition of the idea of Arab unity. Damascus, lacking
the resources since thayyad days to become itself a dominant power center,
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has sought self-expression by indirect means, offering to sacrifice its
identity to "Arabism." From the "Arab awakening" in the late 19th
century to the forming of the Arab League, Damascus (and its neighbor
Beirut) remained the ideological capital of Arab unity, but French con-
trol in Syria, indifference in Cairo, and Hashimite competition in
Baghdad prevented any concerted and effective unity moves. However,
after World War II, as a result of the attainment of Syrian, Lebanese,
and Jordanian independence and the impending Palestine crisis, the
Eastern Arab world began its move toward unity in earnest.
During World War II, Egyptian governments, seeking ways to end the
British occupation, began to look with increased interest to their Arab
neighbors, long at odds with the British in Palestine and briefly in 1941
in Iraq. British support of the idea of greater Arab unity, dictated by
the exigencies of the war and endorsed by Nuri al-Salid, led to the
formation of the Arab League and the restoration of Egypt to its tradition-
al role of competitor to Iraq for leadership in the buffer zone between them.
The League's operations were characterized by continued Egyptian attempts
(in alliance with Syria and Saudi Arabia) to frustrate the schemes advanced
from Baghdad (and Amman and London) for control of Syria.
Although Egyptians fought in Palestine in the name of "Arabiam,"
it was not until 1955, in response to the Baghdad Pact (which to Egyptians
meant Western determination to strengthen Baghdad as against Cairo), that
the rulers of Egypt moved with rapidity and in earnest into a full scale
commitment to Arab world politics. Within the space of a few years,
Egyptian nationalism has been made synamynous with Arab nationalism.
Drawing on all its resources, comparative wealth, historic tradition as
an Islamic center, its influential press and radio, its reservoir of
technicians, professional men and skilled administrators, Egypt proclaimed
and, more important, gave to the Arabs that feeling of importance in
world politics to which they had long aspired. The emotional satisfaction
of assertion of Arab "rights" as in the Russian arms deal and the Canal
nationalization coupled with the failure of the Western riposte at Suez,
permitted Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir to become, in spite of the reserves of most
Arab rulers, the popular champion of the Arab unity cause. In response
to Syrian pressure, the CAR was formed under his aegis -- the first total
renunciation of sovereignty by an Arab state and thus the first unqualified
step toward Arab union. On a lesser but potentially more important level,
the United Arab States was created between the UAR and Yemen -- an insti-
tution designed to accommodate diversity and sovereignty with a more
effective solidarity.
Handicapped by pro-Western policies which ran counter to the anti-
Westernism which had characterized Arab sentiment in Egypt and the
Western Fertile Crescent since World War I, avowedly pro-Western Baghdad
was unable to act successfully to meet the extension of Egyptian influence
although an effort was made in the abortive and defensive Arab Union
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between Iraq and Jordan: However, the collapse, of the Nuri regime in the.
revolution of July 14, 1958 in Iraq, while initially hailed as a victory
for the Arab unity movement, has in fact merely demonstrated that the
change in dramatis sersonae does not automatically change the scripti,
Today, for different reasons., Cairo and Baghdad continue to stand menac-
ingly in conflict for control of the buffer.zone between them and for
leadership of the Arab unity movement:
C. The Arab West
In the Maghrib, the search for unity inevitably centers on the
questionOf the liberation of Algeria and the Sahara from French control,
a conflict in which Morocco and Tunisia as well as the Algerian FLN are:
playing an important role. Even if the urge for unity were not as strong
as it is, Morocco and Tunisia would inevitably become involved in this -
struggle'. French troops remain in both countries and both states provide .
sanctuary for FLN staging .and training operations. In the meantime, Rabat
and-Tunis are pursuing their own interests but within the Maghrib'context.:.
Their methods and policies may differ in many respects, but any foresee--A,
able regime in either country will be committed to support at least in
principle and probably in practice the achievement of a free and united
Magbrib.
V. :THE OUTLOOK FOR UNITY
A. Arab East
Attitudes toward union in the Arab East have long been goyerned-
by the "formula" -- negative objectives unite while positive- objectives
divide. Arabs have generally been able to agree on the need for a
common front against outsiders, but there has been no meaningful consensus
in other fields. Thus, Nasser has often demonstrated that Egypt's in y: .
fluence can be effective in blocking policies distasteful to Cairo, but-. .?
In the past his regime has been less successful in winning common Arab
agreement on positive measures. -"
?
Some of the factors which have traditionally operated against-
Arab unity in the Arab East still apply, but, with .less force. The 7 .
capability of ruling traditionalist elites for protecting the status .02
with or without outside help has been reduced; the disparities in modern-
ization and administrative orientation among the several states are being
reduced; the development of modern communications has cut distance within
and between'the various parts of the Arab world; and loyalties, while
still ithportantly sectarian and provincial, are gradually undergoing-
transformation under the impact of modernization and secularization. On,
the other side, the positive factors which have encouraged the unity
movement have been intensified: the sense of "Arabism" which encompasses
the idea of common language, history, culture and religion has never,before
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been so deeply felt or widely accepted as a basis for action. Radio,
films, press and publications, teachers and, in a few areas, television,
have served as catalysts to create common attitudes and therefore more
coherent and pressing demands for unity and reform. In the Arab East
the fears, frustrations and aspirations of the communicants of Arabiam
have reached their greatest degree of articulation to date in the
reformist regime of the Egyptian "revolution." Nasir has, for better
or worse and for whatever it is worth, filled in the eyes of the
majority of the area's middle class "the role wandering in search of a
hero."
But the above description applies primarily to the Sunni Arab
majority. While Arabi= has tended to narrow the differences between
the younger, semi-Westernized numbers of various Arab Muslim sects (such
as Sunnis and Shiites, for example), the crystallization of this concept
around an Arab and Sunni majority nucleus has caused minority non-Arab
ethnic and non-Muslim religious groups to crystallize their own feeling
of nationality around their own religious or ethnic cores. Many modern-
educated middle-class Lebanese Christians, Iraqi Kurds, and even numerous
Iraqi Shiites (it is significant that Qasim himself is said to belong to
this last category) do not identify themselves with a "nation" that, they
fear will) in the last analysis, be characterized by Sunni Muslim Arab
dominance. As Arab unity gains momentum even greater pressure will be
felt by these minority groups. The increasing spread of secularization
and social change is already tending to undermine the traditional
loyalties which have long sustained the concept of communalism. However
in a few ares there remain significant minority groups prepared to
align themselves with Arabs (such as Qasim) and even non-Arabs in the
hope of maintaining their identity.
Nasir's position and that of the regime he beads have many vulner-
abilities -which tend to be Obscured by the more obvious evidences of the
Arab world's continuing struggle to clarify its relations with the great
powers. Nasir has the advantage of being the exponent of the neutralist
doctrine that is widely popular among the majority. His charges that
Qasim is an agent of Moscow and a traitor to the Arab cause are rend:.
niscent of his attacks on Nuri Satid, but Baghdad's counter-accusations
have added a new dimension to the struggle between the two power centers
of the Eastern Arab world. The Iraqi regime, in choosing to contest the
"buffer zone" between the two regions, adds to its own formula for Arab .
unity the Marxist element of the class struggle. Accusing Nasir's regime
of fascism, exploitation of the workers, imperialism, and bourgeois
capitalism, Baghdad appeals to the peasants, workers and intellectuals
not only of the western end of the Fertile Crescent but of the Persian
Gulf and, by implication, of Egypt itself. Baghdad's charges strike a
sensitive nerve. Nasir is still popular outside of Iraq among the Sunni
Arab intelligentsia and proletariat who are antagonistic toward their own
traditional or foreign-controlled regimes. But the GAR has yet to solve
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the problem of the role of the "masses" now being given new political
consciousness through the spread of literacy and economic development
and the exhortations of the mass media. The efforts of the regime to
channelize this broadened political activity will probably not produce
a significant measure of support and the military elite grout, as its
power becomes institutionalized is likely to grow careless and increas-
ingly corrupt. Still the chances of extensive changes in Egypt itself
seem slim during the next ten years. The necessity to combat the dafiger
of truly "revolutionary" ideologies inspired by Baghdad, to hold Syria,
and to secure the oil of Libya and the Arabian Peninsula and the water
of the Sudan are likely to inhibit internal dissension and, together
with the Israeli "threat)" to rally, as in the past, the bulk of Egyptian
opinion in support of "Arab glory" through "'Arab solidarity."
The Egyptian task will not be easy. The deep suspicions which
divide the ruling elites of the Arab East and especially fears of
Egyptian and Muslim domination have not yet been overcome and in some
cases have been strengthened by popular endorsement of Nasir's leader-
ship. The existence of the UAR can probably be maintained, although in.-
creasing security measures will be necessary in the Syrian region. The
Lebanese attitude toward the UAR will depend upon the degree of pressure
exerted on the Lebanese Christians to conform. Jordan's internal faction-
alism will present a constant temptation to outside intervention, but the
risk of Israeli reaction may inhibit closer ties between Amman and the
UAR or Iraq. In Saudi Arabia, Egypt has long played on fear of Iraqi
expansionism to its own advantage and Baghdad's new orientation should ?
permit the UAR to improve its position. However, in Kuwait and the other
sheikhdoms, the UAR's position is less strong. It may be that the rulers,
faced with the alternative of sharing their powers with the middle-class
or yielding them to the workers, will seek with British support to repress
all forms of political activity -- a tactic which would seem to have
validity only in the Very short run, and is likely to have the results
recently observable in Iraq.
But in extending its influence in the buffer zone Egypt may be
assuming commitments beyond its capacity. Tor Egypt and its allies will
have at the same time to cope with the political evolution now plaguing
the Saudis, the Gulf rulers, King HUsayn, and the British in Aden.
Harmony on foreign and "Arab" policy by no means guarantees internal
stability or a moratorium on the social mobility which increasingly
characterizes the Eastern Arab world. Nor will Egypt be unconcerned by
African developments. The Sudan's conflicting religious and secular
factions will continue to bring instability to the upper Nile. In Libya,
the demise of King Idris is likely to bring about chaotic conditions in
which elements prepared to tolerate the continuation of Western military
facilities will almost certainly be in conflict with the advocates of a
neutralism modeled on that of Cairo.
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It would seem that the' trends in the area are,such-:that the
prospects for survival of the Egyptian military regime over the long run
are not very bright unless it can broaden its base and change its tactics
so as to be more tolerant of diversity. -Otherwise frustration is bound,-
to grow, especially among the' middle-class intelligentsia, producing a'
corps of leaders to wham radicalism, with or without Soviet coloration, .
is likely increasingly to appeal. The social conditions of the area and
the prejudices of the regime would seem to make difficult the.adoption of
the secular and doctrinaire socialism which seems likely to dominate the
Maghrib and much of Black Africa. But, the socialist secular doctrine of
the Bethists, if effectively: practised, might permit the development pf.-
a more broadly based Arab unity which r- by combining the intellectual ?
appeal of the Western endof the.Fertile'Crescept with the power of the
Nile and the material resources of the Arabian peninsula and perhaps
Libya might resolve -- perhaps for a considerable period of. time the
struggle for unity in the Arab,Eaat.
We do not think the Iraqis will have much luck in extending their,,
influence even in the Persian Gulf, over the'next-few years. 'Qasim it
rejecting Arab unity of the Nasir brand has isolated himself and Iraq ,
from the Sunni majority of the Arab world, Qasim's friendship for the ? r
alien, non-Arab forces of the USSR and communism has contributed to this:
Isolation as the Hashimite regime's membership in the Baghdad Pact ?
isolated Iraq in the past. Iraq's isolation has-been'greater than was
that of.the-Nuriregime because of the fears. of revolutionary social-.
change which its communist-infiltrated government has aroused throughout
the area. However, while many Iraqi Arabs do not follow Nasir's views, .
/
neither do they wish to be divorced from the comforting feeling of meMber-
I1
p ship in the Arab family. Qasip senses thie., and probably:will seek to
drift closer to a more neutral osition and resist furthercommunist
(gains.. Should he succeed, Iraq, although not likely to espouse union -
with Egypt on the Syrian pattern, might favor a strengthened Arab League,.
or even be willing to participate in a loose confederation somewhat on
the model of the UAS. Such policies could in time blunt -- but not fully
overcome -- the deep-rooted suspicions and-rivalries for power which have
blocked Islamic unity since the fall of the Umayyad Caliphate. ? ,
1 1L --4. , ?? .
B. The Arab West (r
0--
_ \... ? ,
The first prerequisite for unity in theArabWest is the liqui-
dation of French control of Algeria, an event which seems unlikely in the
absence of a political reaction in France itself or the spreading of the
rebellion and massive .outside intervention on behalf of the Arabs such as
produced the independence of Syria, Lebanon, and the.Indo-Chinese states.
Meanwhile the Moroccans, the Tunisiansl.and the Algerians of the.FLN
will, as best they can, improve and expand the formal and informal co--
ordination of activity which is progressively increasing in operational
and policy matters. However, under the pressure of the Algerian question,
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the orientation of the Maghrib's leaders is slowly changing as new groups
come forward to advocate more extreme policies to meet both domestic and
Maghrib needs. More than anything else, the Algerian situation has
deprived North Africa's reformists of their best arguments and permitted
the radicals to level against them the two charges of neglect of the
interests of the masses and failure to work sincerely for the Maghrib's
independence and unity. Changes are taking place especially rapidly in
Morocco, where the old-guard reformist leadership with the acquiescence
of the King has all but lost control of the independence movement to
younger leaders of labor, youth and the rural proletariat. But even in
Tunisia, where the independence movement was better organized and splits
have been avoided through adroit maneuver, the elan of the reformist
regime seems to be somewhat less vigorous than in the past. Given the
political acumen of Morocco's King Muhammad and Tunisia's President
Bourguiba, change is likely to come about in comparative calm. Both are
acutely sensitive to popular sentiment and in spite of their personal
preferences have known how to avoid the mistakes of more unbending leaders
like King Saud and President Sham'un, The similarly oriented regimes
which will emerge in Morocco, Tunisia, and -- after independence is
gained -- Algeria, may differ among themselves from time to time on
border and other intra-regional problems. However in their, relations
with the outside world the Maghrib states will almost certainly speak
with a united voice.
C. The Arab -- East and West
The Arab West's contacts with the Arab East have been few in the
past and at the present time they are still essentially limited to
Egyptian and Iraqi assistance to the Algerians and to Tunisian and, to a
lesser extent, Moroccan hostility toward Egyptian "interference" in their
own internal affairs. The prestige of Cairo as a cultural center has
some attraction for the Maghribis, but they tend to look to Europe, and
especially to France for their political models and to the south as the
direction of their natural expansion. They are establishing ties with
the radical regimes and labor student organizations of West Africa, and
there seems little likelihood that they will be greatly influenced by the
course of events in the Arab-East. Even the establishment of a pro-
Egyptian regime in the buffer zone of Libya would have only a temporary
impact, although such a regime would probably accelerate the undermining
of Bourguiba's gradualist policies, already under heavy pressures from
the French and the FLN.
Further complicating the developments of closer bonds are the
fundamental cultural differences which characterize the two areas. Most
of the Maghribi intelligentsia criticize the failure of the Arab East to
develop political institutions of a truly popular nature. Nor do they
appreciate the disparaging comments of the Easterners, who tend to look
down on the strange ways of the predominantly rural yet increasingly well
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organized and dynamic Arab West. The Maghribis proximity to Western
Europe and the French colonization period, have produced a considerable
acceptance of European ideaa without, however, especially in Tunisia,
giving rise to the sense of inferiority which has long over-laid the
reaction of the urban areas of the Arab East to European innovation.
Perhaps, as in Black Africa, the very lack of indigenous governmental
and social institutions suitable to the requirements of the industrial
age facilitated the process of acculturation. Whether for that reason
or because the essentially rural Maghribis were more confident of their
own ability to cope with change than the more complex urbanites of the
Eastern Mediterranean, contact between Europe and North Africa has pro-
duced political but not necessarily cultural conflict. Indeed the
Maghribis have welcomed European patterns of thinking and action which
seem to open new vistas in the fields of social and political endeavor.
The struggle for Algerian independence, therefore, does not have quite
the same emotional overtones as does the Palestine question in the Arab
East. There is no desire to replace French with Arab values but to be
free to choose such methods and policies as may seem most in keeping with
the Magbribis interests.
? Traditional group-bound values are more important in the Arab
East, .the "heartland" of orthodox Islam. The conflict between this
emotional commitment and an intellectual appreciation,ofthe need for
modernization produces a reserve toward foreign-inspired innovation.
This reaction is intensified by a long and, to the Eastern Arab, unending
struggle for freedom from great power manipulation and expresses itself
in cultural as well as political ambivalence towards the non-Arab world.
Increasingly the bonds of "Arabism" will bring in some degree a greater
harmony of objectives, especially in the field of foreign policy, between
the Maghrib and the Mashriq.:?Mbrocco's policy of non-dependence, as well
as its relative remoteness, have produced a more positive approach to
Arab unity that has so far been possible in Tunisia. However, the prospects
for ties closer than those provided by the Arab League seem almost nil.
VI. RELATIONS WITH THR NON-ARAB WORLD
A. The Arab East and the West
The West is now clearly faced with the prospect of the eventual
collapse of such of its positions of predomanance as are based on the
support of traditionalist elites. In their relations with the West the
middle-class reformist regimes of the Arab East have produced controversy
in varying degrees. Their rise to power has been characterized by a
determination to destroy Western "positions of influence" and strongholds
of minority opposition having Western backing as preventing that unity in
neutrality which they hold to be necessary to preserve Arab independence
and assure Arab growth and "glory." This conflict between the West (in-
cluding Israel) and the Eastern Arab middle-class regimes has had as its
major consequence the entry of the Soviet Union as a counter-weight.
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The events of Iraq, however, have added a new dimension to the
problems of the reformists. As they see it, the pendulum has swung too
far the other way. In place of traditionalists and separatists supported
by a fading Western strength they face the prospect of radicals backed by
an expansionist USSR and Communist China. Consequently Nasir now clearly
seeks to enlarge his freedom of action to meet this new (and far more
serious) threat by reducing his dependence on Bloc trade and aid by de-
veloping compensating relationships with the West -- the "non-imperialist"
West if possibleplout the "imperialist" West if necessary. But just as
the West is inhibited in its relations with Nasir because of past conflicts,
so Nasir can hardly give up his own distrust of Western motives, so deeply
are they rooted in the middle-class from which the Arab East's reformists
come. For example, Nasir and his supporters will almost certainly con-
tinue their efforts to reduce Western influence in such sectors of the
"Arab homeland" as the Persian Gulf, Libya, the Sudan, and Jordan. Egylt
will also continue to seek an active role in East Africa and the Horn
and the problem of Israel will further complicate a rapprochement between
Egypt and the West. Even if Nasir were disposed to do otherwise, pressure
from Baghdad seeking to establish itself as the only legitimate spokesman
for Arab democracy and independence is likely to force him -- or his
successor -- to increase rather than reduce the pressure on Western
positions. If the Baghdad regime continues its leftward Orientation and
presents a serious challenge to Nasir's reformist concepts the choice
before the West may become more simplified and more acute, but a polari-
zation of the eastern Arab world along class lines would not be likely to
enhance Western influence. Since fear of the East in no way implies a
disposition to accept Western patronage, the issue is simply -- for the
Arabs to balance uncontrollable powers, and each side will be watched
with equal care for signs that it might overstep the bounds and seek a
"special" position.
B. The Arab East and the USSR
The USSR now stands accused by Cairo of "imperialist" adventurism
and promotion of separatist tendencies. Nevertheless, USSR short range
intentions are not yet. completely clear. The 21st Party Congress raised
the possibility that the USSR,fts considering at least a shift in emphasis
if not a- change of polioy towards,.bourgeois nationalism as epitomized by
Nasir and Nehru. This possibilityThas been made more real by'develop-
ments in Iraq and by certain comments Khrushchev has addreaced to Nasir
intheir cu=eni; dialogue over the role of Communists in the Arab world.
The USSR, having exploited nationalist hostility to the West to establish
a position in the area, appears to be beginning to exploit -- as a priority
and explicitly what has been heretofore only secondary and impliciog-the
turbulent Arabpressures for social change and the desire of the mtdority
for security from domination by the majority. Circumstances haveVrOvided
it with the historically important competition between the Nile Valley
and Mesopotamia to use in the challenge (if such it is or becomes) to
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bourgeoid, middle-class reformists in theArab East. ..The developments
in Iraq may be largely indigenous, and possibly have moved too hastily
arid too blatantly to suit the purposes .of the USSR. But Moscow may find '
its prestige.as well as its aid-increasingly committed to the radicalism
in Baghdad. However much the USSR .may prefer to maintain Important in-
fluence in the Nile Valley, the fury and violence of'llasir's attacks On
Soviet'uiriperialism" may offer it no choice but to support Baghdad.
Through Egypt-the Soviets may have hoped to establish influence in Africa),
but relations between Egypt and the AfriCan-states are difficult: -In any
case the stakes in Iraq are high. Even the Czars have never comeso.
close to the historic Russian aspiration of reaching the Persian Gulf.
C. Thellaghribi the West and the USSR
The relationships of the Arab West with the Western.powerd and ,
with the'USSR differ in emphasis from those prevailing in the East..
North Africans are morelatitudinarian than their eastern cousinsand...
the conflict with France is seen ?political and military rather than
ideological. Western support is actively solicited in a Spirit of
reciprocity, although Soviet 'aid.has not been excluded. Even North ?
Africa's radicals; like their'European socialist counterparts, are . ?
hostile to Communists -- their rivals for the leadership of the massed.r- -
and would 'riot be deluded as to the risks they ran. Bloc arms dealsagy--
not involve ideological commitments, but the inevitable result of a- failure
of North Africa and the West to reach an accommodation will almost certain-
ly involve the area's moving from the profession of neutralism-to its, ?
practice;
D. The Arabs andtheAsian?States
7
Communist China increasingly interests most Arabs as a powerful
state which has rid itself of colonialism and-has begun to play a role in
world politics suitable to its size and cultural heritage. Chinese unifi-
cation and rise to the status of -a great power strongly suggests to Arabs
parallels with' their own decline, division, and struggle to regain a place
in the sun. Many Arabs, too, have hoped that Communist-China would-be
less sensitive to European considerations than the USSR and therefore ,
more willing to provide arms and other forms of assistance which the ' -
Soviet Union might be embarrassed to supply. . ?
Arab attitudes towards the non-Communist Asian States are primarily.
influenced by the latter's foreign policies.- This is particularly notice-
able in the different degrees of friendliness.betveen the several Arab ?
governments and the Baghdad Pact States: Slams for some.time'relations
between the neutralist UAR and Turkey, Iran and Pakistan .have been cool.'
Arab relations with India, Indonesia and other Asian states have' 'been
cordial, on: the whole, but not particularly close.
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E. The Arabs and Africa
On the other hand the Arab states are becoming increasingly in-
volved in African affairs. Maghribi interest in the Sahara and in West
Africa has already been mentioned. While Arab overtures are still some-
what tentative and, not entirely reciprocated by West Africans, the
Sahara is becoming a bridge rather than a barrier. To Black Africans,
the struggle for Algerian independence is not dissimilar to the circum-
stances of the settler areas of eastern and southern Africa. Ultimately
the interests of the Maghrib and the West Africans may clash in the sub-
Saharan areas, but for the moment relations are likely to grow closer,
especially with the French-speaking areas.,
The course of Egypt's relations with Afr1d6Rs is much less clear.
In dealing with West Africans, the Egyptians are haNicapped, as in the
Maghrib, by the narrow basis and outlook of their regtme and the bitter-
ness of their feelings toward the Western powers. The more confident
West Africans are not attracted by either feature of Egyptian reformism.
But in the settler areas of East add Central Africa where racial bitter-
ness is on the rise, Egyptian attacks on the "white dogs" are beginning
to find a receptive audience, even among those repelled by the Egyptian
regime itself. In fact a significant question in East and Central
Africa is whether racialism will win out over the non-racial concept of
"one man, one vote" now advocated by moderate African leaders. The bases
of Egypt's interests in East Africa are peripheral but growing. Although
it contains the source of the White Nile and has a small Arab and some-
what larger Moslem population, Egypt's immediate concern is to eliminate
the "imperialists" from the area. The Horn of Africa is a more immediate
area of Egyptian concern. The Blue Nile waters, the region's proximity
to the Yemen and Aden, and the historic conflict between the Christian
Amhara elite of Ethiopia and the surrounding Moslem populations all
furnish justification in Egyptian eyes for actions designed to exploit
events in the area in Egypt's favor.
Arab interest in African safairs is likely to increase tensions
among Arabs, Africans, and the West. Whether in the form of efforts to
undermine the position of the French and their supporters in Mauritania,
Cameroun or French Somaliland, or the British in Kenya and Zanzibar, or
through encouragement of pan-Somalism and Eritrean separatism, the weight
of Arab influence will be in favor of changes to the detriment of present
colonial holdings.
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