THE OUTLOOK FOR GUATEMALA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A012200020008-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 8, 2014
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: April 29, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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NIE 82-58
29 April 1958
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER -8 - 5 8
THE OUTLOOK FOR ttATEMALA
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 29 April 1958. Concurring were The Director of Intelli-
gence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief
of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director
of Naval Intelligence; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelli-
gence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The
Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Repreentative
to the IAC and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, abstained, the *subject being outside of their
jurisdiction
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. AGENCY
2 9 April 1958
SUBJECT: NIE 82-58: THE OUTLOOK FOR GUATEMALA*
TRE PROBLEM
To estimate the outlook in GuateMaia over the next few yea&
with special reference to political trends and to Communist prospects.
CONCLUSIONS .
1. President MiguelYdigoras Fuentes, inaugurated on 2 March 1958,
is authoritarian in background and outlook, but will probably enaeavor to
maintain a middle-of-the-road course. He now leeks assured support in
Congress. We are unable to estimate whether he can develop effective
congressional and popular support for his moderate program before the
.1959 congressional elections.. (Paras. 12, 14 19, 3.0)
2. The moderate National Democratic Movement (MDN) will probably
dissolve as an effective political force. The leftist Revolutionary
Party (PR) is likely to become the principal party in opposition to the
Yd4soras're3ime. (Paras. 15, 16, 30)
This estimate. supersedes NIE .82-551 "Probable Developments in
Guatemala", 26 July 1955, and so much of NIE 80-57, "Political
Stability in Central America ....", 23 April 1957, as pertains
to Guatemala.
crmrm
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3. Under the leadership of men who were prominent in the Areivalo
administration, the PR exerts a'strong attraction as the clearest spokesu
for the political, social, and economic objectives of the Guatemalan
Revolution of 1944. It repudiate- association with communism, but has
taken no steps to check Communist penetration of its lower echelons.
(Paras. 16, 31)
4. The clandestine Communist Party (PIT), recently more active,
is not formidable in numbers. It is endeavoring to exert influence
through penetration of the PR and the labor unions. Although the
Communists will probably meet with some success in these efforts they
are not likely to gain control of these groups within the next few years.
(Paras. 17, 31)
5. Should Ydi'goras fail to muster sufficient party and popular
support to cope with growinc leftist opposition in Congress and in the
country, he will probably resort increasingly to more authoritarian
methods. He would probably do so reluctantly and with no greater re-
pressive force than he judged the circumstances to require, but he is
a strong man determined to rule and he would resort to outright dicta-
torship before he would permit political control to pass from his hands.
The more repressive his realm becomes, however, the more popular dis-
affection will grow. (Para. 32)
6. Ydigoras' tenure of power will ultimately depend on the
continued support of the armed forces, which he will make every effort '
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to ensure. The armed forces would act to displace him only if
popular opposition had reached such a pitch that serious civil
disorder was clearly impending. (Paras. 20, 22, 33)
7. The economic situation mill Probably remain favorable
during 1958. In the event of a fUrther decline in coffee prices,
or of a substantial decline in foreign aid after 1958, maintenance
of the present high rate of public investment would confront the
government with a 'growing budgetary deficit and an acute foreign
exchange problem. (Paras. 25, 26)
8. Good relations with the United States will continue to
be the cardinal element in Ydigoras foreign policy, if only be-
cause of the importance of continued US assistance to the success
of his administration. While adopting a more independent attitude
toward the US than did Castillo, Ydigoras will probably cooperate
on most international issues. However, his agitation of the
Guatemalan claim to British Honduras could be carried to ,a point
which would be contrary to US policy interests in the area.
(Paras. 23 27,29)
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