MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND POLICIES, 1958-1963

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A011000020001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 81
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 18, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 23, 1958
• Content Type: NIE

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N 1 E 1-1 ? 4 ? 5 8
23 December 1958
0 3 4 9 8 2
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N? 645
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 11-4-58
(Supersedes NIE 11-4-57)
MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES
AND POLICIES, 1958-1963
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff,
Defense, and the Atomic Energy Commission.
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
on 23 December 1958. Concurring were The Director of In-
telligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant
Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Depart-
ment of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
USAF; the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations;
and the Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the
USIB. The Director of the National Security Agency and
the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, ab-
stained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
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NEXT FiE'fIEW DATE:
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DATE;
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_
, 1
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE PROBLEM 1
SUMMARY ESTIMATE 1
DISCUSSION 10
I. INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 10
Ascendancy of Khrushchev 10
Role of the Party 11
Issues in Soviet Politics 12
Attitudes in Soviet Society 12
The Longer View 13
II. TRENDS IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY 14
General 14
Shifts in Economic Policy 14
Prospects for Economic Growth 16
Trends in Defense Expenditures 17
Industrial Prospects 17
Agricultural Prospects 19
Trends in Consumption 19
Foreign Trade 20
III. TRENDS IN SOVIET SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 22
Scientific Manpower, Training and Facilities 22
Soviet Capabilities in Major Scientific Fields 25
Space Program 25
Nonmilitary Applications of Atomic Energy 26
Physics and Mathematics 26
Geophysics 26
Chemistry and Metallurgy 27
Medical Sciences 27
Biological and Agricultural Sciences 27
Industrial Technology 27
IV. DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE SOVIET MILITARY
POSTURE 28
Soviet Military Thinking and Policy 28
Major Objectives of Military Policy 28
Soviet Attitudes Toward Limited and General War 28
Policy on Size and Types of Forces 30
Military Policy Toward Other Bloc Nations . 31
Special Weapon Developments 31
Nuclear Weapons 31
Guided Missiles 33
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 33
Chemical and Biological Warfare 34
Electromagnetic Warfare 35
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
Strengths and Capabilities of Soviet Forces 35
High Command 35
Long-Range Striking Forces
36
Long-Range Bombers
36
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
38
Other Long-Range Ballistic Missiles
39
Missile-Launching Submarines
40
Capabilities for Long-Range Attack
40
Air Defense Forces
41
Air Defense Weapons
41
Air Defense Radar and Control Equipment
42
Air Defense Concentrations
42
Passive Defense
42
Air Defense Capabilities
42
Ground Forces and Tactical Air Forces
43
Capabilities for Major Land Campaigns
45
Against Western Europe and Scandinavia .
45
Against Greece, Turkey, and the Middle East
46
In the Far East
46
Naval Forces
46
Submarine Construction
47
Capabilities for Naval Warfare
48
V. TRENDS IN SOVIET RELATIONS WITH OTHER COMMU-
NIST STATES
49
Relations with the Satellites
50
Prospects
50
Bloc Relations with Yugoslavia
51
Relations with Communist China
52
VI. TRENDS IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
54
Introduction ? The Current Conduct of Soviet Policy
54
Current Soviet Objectives and Main Lines of Policy
55
Attitude Toward War
55
A Posture for "Peace"
56
The Underdeveloped Countries in Soviet Strategy .
57
-Trade and Aid
57
Attitude Toward the UN
58
Disarmament
58
Soviet Policy in Particular Areas
58
The Middle East
58
Asia
60
Africa
60
Western Europe
60
Latin America
62
ANNEX
63
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MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND
POLICIES, 1958-1963
THE PROBLEM
To review significant developments affecting the USSR's internal political situ-
ation, economic developments, military programs, relations with other Bloc states,
and foreign policy, and to estimate probable Soviet courses of action through about
1963.1
SUMMARY ESTIMATE
1. New tendencies have appeared on the
Soviet political scene during the past year.
Externally, the lines of conflict with the
West have been drawn more sharply once
again, and "reduction of tensions" no
longer is the major theme of Soviet for-
eign policy. Internally there has been
both in the USSR and in the Bloc an
attempt to consolidate and stabilize, to
check the pace of change, to curb the
expectations and discipline the unruly
tendencies aroused among the people by
the milder policies of the post-Stalin
years. There has been a return to a cer-
tain rigor in policy and in ideology. Nev-
ertheless, the changes which affected
almost every aspect of Soviet internal and
external policy in the years after Stalin's
death have for the most part not been
reversed. The flexibility and pragmatism
of the current leadership continues; inno-
vations in policy may still be forthcoming,
particularly in internal affairs.
The reference to a five-year period is approxi-
- mate. The economic calculations carry through
1965, to conform to the Soviet Seven-Year Plan;
some of the political judgments, on the other
hand, pertain to periods of less than five years.
Trends in Foreign Policy
2. During the course of the last year there
has been a distinctly hardening tone in
Soviet foreign policy. It is true that
many of the new features introduced after
the death of Stalin remain in force. The
claim to be pursuing policies in the inter-
est of establishing "peaceful coexistence"
is still made; programs of cultural ex-
change and generally freer contact with
the outside world have been continued.
Nevertheless, a new militancy and asser-
tiveness in Soviet policy has emerged more
and more clearly. This has been most
strikingly manifest in the Quemoy and
Middle East crises, and in the developing
crisis over Berlin.
3. The Soviet leaders probably decided
that the special emphasis they had given
to "peaceful coexistence" and easing of
tensions had out-lived its usefulness. It
had not had the anticipated effect of
weakening Western alliances. Some fea-
tures of the relaxation line?the new ap-
proach to Yugoslavia, the repudiation of
Stalin, and the leeway given for some
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national autonomy in the Satellites?
proved dangerous to Soviet authority
in Eastern Europe. A return to a
harder course probably seemed desirable
on these grounds alone. But at the same
time, it appeared justified by the Soviet
leaders' belief that, in power terms, there
had been an enhancement of the Bloc's
position and a decline in that of the West.
This belief probably was based in the first
place on Soviet weapons advances and sci-
entific achievements. There was also a
feeling that the outlook was good for new
advances in Bloc economic strength after
a period of some difficulty in 1956-1957,
while at the same time Western economies
were believed to be showing symptoms
of economic crisis. Then, too, the Soviet
leaders considered that Communist influ-
ence was generally growing stronger in
underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa,
and the Middle East, while Western influ-
ence continued to decline. The confi-
dence of the Soviet leaders that they were
entering upon a promising phase in the
"struggle against imperialism" has been
articulated in a new doctrine, namely,
that an irrevocable shift in the relation
of forces in the world has taken place
to the advantage of the Communist Bloc.
4. This more confident and militant atti-
tude on the part of the Soviet leadership
does not mean that it has revised its atti-
tude toward war as an instrument of
policy. We continue to believe that the
Soviet leaders have no intention of delib-
erately initiating general war and still
wish to avoid serious risks of such a war.
They almost certainly believe that, even
with the acquisition of long-range mis-
siles capable of striking the US, the scale
of damage they would suffer in a general
nuclear war would threaten the survival
of their regime and society. Moreover,
2
they regard the final victory of Com-
munism as inevitable, and to be
achieved mainly through political forms
of struggle. The maintenance and fur-
ther strengthening of great military
power is primarily intended to deter a
resort to force by the "imperialist" enemy,
and to count as a weighty factor in per-
suading him to submit peacefully to a
succession of political reverses as the
revolutionary tide advances. Situations
might arise, however, in which the Soviets
would judge that military force could be
used without unacceptable risk or that
an imminent threat left them with no
recourse but to initiate military action.
5. Currently, while the Soviets still wish
to avoid serious risks of general war, they
probably believe that the Bloc can in-
crease its pressure on the West and can
exploit local situations more vigorously,
perhaps even through the use of Bloc
armed force, without incurring the same
degree of risk as they would have previ-
ously. While we have always considered
it possible that Bloc forces would be used
in overt local aggression if this could be
done without much risk of serious in-
volvement with Western forces, we do not
believe that the likelihood of such aggres-
sion has increased. The Soviets may even
believe that the West, also conscious of
Soviet gains in military power, will be
more and more disinclined to react vigor-
ously. Consequently, they now seem dis-
posed to test Western firmness and probe
for weaknesses in the hope that some key
position may be abandoned without seri-
ous resistance, or that the Western alli-
ance will split over some such issue.
6. In employing pressures against the
West, the Soviet leadership doubtless in-
tends to proceed with care. But its pre-
occupation with calculations of power,
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and its evident confidence in the strength
of the Communist position, may lead it
to underestimate dangers. We believe
that if the current attitude of the Com-
munist leaders persists, the danger of war
arising from miscalculations will be in-
creased.
7. The USSR has directed a major effort
over the last several years toward under-
developed countries. Its trade and aid
programs, propaganda and cultural of-
fensives are intended to displace Western
influence, and to orient the policies of
such states increasingly toward the Com-
munist Bloc. The Soviet leaders believe
that if they can associate the aspirations
of underdeveloped peoples with their own
cause they can increasingly constrict the
political maneuverability of their main
enemies, the Western Powers. We be-
lieve that the Soviet leaders will continue
to regard the effort to develop Communist
influence in underdeveloped countries as
a major facet of their policy. The USSR's
targets among the underdeveloped coun-
tries may shift considerably, in accord-
ance with changing opportunities and
local setbacks. In those countries where
its efforts are most successful, the USSR
may increasingly be tempted to support
local communists in attempts to seize
power. But the Soviets would carefully
weigh such gains against the harmful
consequences such a policy would inevit-
ably evoke elsewhere. They will prob-
ably generally maintain the pose of peace-
ful cooperation. Since the claim to a
"peace-loving" policy is one of the prin-
cipal elements of the Soviet appeal to
the neutralist states, the desire to sustain
the plausibility of this claim will impose
some restraint on the hard and uncom-
promising tone of Soviet policy toward
the West.
3
8. The major Soviet effort to extend influ-
ence in underdeveloped areas has been
made in the Middle East, where the West
has important economic and strategic in-
terests. The USSR will continue its pol-
icy of economic and military aid to Arab
states, hoping to deepen the conflict of
Arab nationalism with the West. The
initial aim of this policy is to displace
Western and increase Soviet influence,
and to make Western access to the re-
sources of the area precarious. The So-
viet leaders probably also contemplate
the eventual achievement of a long-
sought Russian goal?land access to the
strategic areas of the Middle East. To
this end, they will continue to encourage
and support such movements as that for
an independent pro-Soviet Kurdish state
and for a pro-Communist government in
Iraq, and will also continue pressures
against Iran and Turkey.
9. The Soviets also hope that radical anti-
Western nationalism in the Middle East
can eventually be given a revolutionary
turn toward Communism. While they
probably intend for the present to support
Nasser's claim to leadership of the Arab
nationalist movement, they regard him as
a "bourgeois nationalist" whose role is
a transitory one. Given a favorable op-
portunity in some Arab country, they
may encourage local Communists to cap-
ture the nationalist movement and at-
tempt a seizure of power. An open con-
flict between Soviet revolutionary policy
and Nasser's claim to leadership of the
Arab nationalist movement may occur
during the period of this estimate.
10. In South Asia and the Far East, So-
viet and Chinese Communist policy will
probably continue to emphasize govern-
mental contacts, supported by programs
of economic aid and cultural exchange
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and an active propaganda, with a view to
encouraging neutralist policies and where
possible openly anti-Western ones. Short
of a favorable opportunity to establish
Communist power in a key country, the
Chinese and Soviets will probably con-
tinue to put their main reliance on diplo-
matic action intended to influence gov-
ernments rather than to overthrow them,
and if possible to associate them with the
Bloc against the Western Powers. As
regards Africa and Latin America, the
Soviet Government apparently views with
optimism its prospects for successful dip-
lomatic and economic penetration and,
in keeping with a current trend, can be
expected to intensify its efforts in these
areas.
11. Soviet policy in Europe appears to be
aimed more at consolidating the USSR's
position in Eastern Europe than at an
early expansion of Soviet power beyond
the frontiers of the bloc. Soviet policy
toward Western Europe is concerned
mainly with breaking up the NATO po-
litical and military alliance and the de-
fense structure located in that area. This
is the main purpose of their maneuvers
and proposals aimed at achieving "Euro-
pean security." Apart from the ever-
present aim of creating discord among
the NATO allies, the more immediate So-
viet objectives are to prevent an increase
of West German military strength and
to prevent the establishment of additional
missile bases in Western Europe.
12. The current Soviet diplomatic offen-
sive over the status of Berlin is the most
striking example of Khrushchev's activist
foreign policy. It appears designed to
strengthen the East German regime as
well as to stimulate a more receptive at-
mosphere for other Soviet proposals on
Germany and to create divisions among
the NATO allies. The Soviet leaders prob-
ably intend to be cautious and tactically
flexible. We believe that they will try to
direct Soviet and East German maneuver-
ing in a manner which will avoid military
conflict with the Western allies, while at
the same time they will be prepared to
take advantage of any signs of weakness
on the part of the West, or of inclinations
to compromise on major issues. Never-
theless, they have already committed
themselves considerably, and we believe
that the crisis may be severe, with con-
siderable chance of miscalculation by one
or both sides. We do not believe that
the Soviets intend to modify the main
lines of their policy on the German prob-
lem as a whole, but will continue to insist
on maintaining the present division of
Germany. They regard the preservation
of Communist control in East Germany
as essential to the maintenance of Com-
munist power in Poland and Eastern
Europe as a whole. They hope to con-
solidate their control of that area and to
force Western recognition of the legiti-
macy and permanence of the Communist
regimes there.
13. Soviet disarmament policy, which has
at times shown some flexibility, is de-
signed at a minimum to earn credit for
the USSR as the leading proponent of
"peace." Actual Soviet proposals are
aimed mainly at the withdrawal of US
military power from Western Europe and
other bases, and also at discrediting and
inhibiting US reliance on nuclear weap-
ons. While it is possible that the USSR
would accept some limitations on its own
military posture in order to further these
objectives, the Soviets would almost cer-
tainly not consent to any very extensive
scheme for mutually inspected disarma-
ment. We believe that there is little like-
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lihood that the Soviets will desire a broad
disarmament agreement strongly enough
to move their policy significantly in the
direction of the positions now held by the
Western Powers.
Intra-Bloc Relations
14. In the last year a major effort has
been undertaken to consolidate the unity
of Bloc states. The conference of Commu-
nist parties in November 1957 launched
the so-called antirevisionist campaign in
order to curb deviationist tendencies
which threatened in 1956 to eliminate So-
viet influence from Poland and Hungary.
The latter regime is again effectively
under Moscow's control and the Gomulka
government in Poland, while still preserv-
ing Party autonomy and some degree of
independence in its internal policy, is
showing itself more deferential to Soviet
guidance. As compared with Stalin's
methods, Moscow's authority in the Satel-
lites will continue to be exercised dis-
creetly out of deference to national sen-
sitivities. In the very long run, we be-
lieve there will be a tendency for direct
Soviet control over these states to be di-
luted. Popular dissatisfaction will remain
widespread in Eastern Europe, but we
believe that the recurrence of popular re-
volt or of an attempt by a Satellite Com-
munist Party to defy Moscow on vital
issues is unlikely at least over the next
few years.
15. The scale of China's power and the
fact that the Chinese Communist Party
has long been organizationally independ-
ent of the USSR has made the Sino-Soviet
relationship more nearly one of equality.
The parallelism of material, strategic, and
ideological interests will continue to
weigh decisively in favor of cementing the
alliance of the two countries, even though
5
frictions over a variety of questions?ideo-
logical issues, economic and military sup-
port by the USSR to China, competition
for influence in other Communist par-
ties?may from time to time make the
relationship a sensitive and difficult one.
We believe that Communist China will
attain over the next several years an in-
creasing influence on general Bloc policy
and Communist ideology. However, so
long as the struggle against the Western
Powers remains the principal concern of
both regimes, there is unlikely to be any
serious split between them.
Soviet Internal Political Situation
16. Khrushchev's leadership of the Soviet.
regime does not seem likely to be seriously
challenged so long as his health remains
vigorous. In the absence of such a chal-
lenge, or of any major setback to his poli-
cies, he does not seem likely to attempt
a return to the terroristic methods of dic-
tatorship employed by Stalin. He ap-
pears to recognize that the abandonment
of such methods has improved the politi-
cal climate within the country. Never-
theless, the regime is now again empha-
sizing its vigilance against dissenters, and
would probably not hesitate to use more
severely repressive measures if it judged
this to be necessary. We believe that,
even though the regime continues to ali-
enate many, especially among intellectu-
als and the youth, it has gained wider
acceptance among the population gen-
erally. This is due mainly to the relaxa-
tion of police terror, to improvements in
material standards, and to pride in the
power, world position, scientific and eco-
nomic achievements of the Soviet state.
17: We believe that, although there will
be differences within the Soviet leader-
ship over certain issues of policy, and dis-
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contents within some groups of the popu-
lation, the regime will seldom be con-
strained in major foreign policy decisions
by concern for internal political weak-
nesses. Should Khrushchev die, there
would probably again be a period of con-
fused jockeying for the leadership. It is
unlikely that this would basically affect
the continuity of the regime's policies or
its ability to carry them out, but such a
period might diminish the authority of
the Soviet Party within the Bloc and lead
to divisions within and among Commu-
nist Parties. Over the very long run, loss
of belief in the ideological doctrine the
regime imposes, and the increasing influ-
ence of professional elements who are not
ideologically inclined, may moderate the
Soviet outlook. At present, however, we
see no prospect of change on the Soviet
domestic scene so fundamental as to
diminish the motivation, will, or capacity
of the regime to project its rapidly grow-
ing power externally.
Trends in the Soviet Economy
18. Soviet economic policy continues to
aim primarily at a rapid expansion of the
economic bases of national power. We
believe that the goals laid down in the
new Seven-Year Plan, which begins in
1959, are in the main feasible, except for
those in agriculture, and that the USSR's
gross national product (GNP) will grow
at an average annual rate of about six
percent during the plan period. Assum-
ing that the US maintains an average
rate of growth of about 3.5 percent per
year, Soviet GNP in 1965 will be, in dollar
terms, about half that of the US, as com-
pared with about 40 percent at present.
Despite the smaller size of its economy,
the dollar value of the USSR's defense
expenditure is about equal to that of the
6
US. Our estimates of the probable trend
of military expenditures indicate that by
1963 these will be 45-50 percent greater
than in 1957. Since growth of GNP in
this period is estimated at 45 percent, the
defense burden may thus be slightly
heavier in 1963 than at present. Despite
this, we estimate that Soviet industrial
production will grow over the new plan
period at an average annual rate of about
nine percent, and that per capita con-
sumption will be about one-third higher
in 1965 than it was in 1957.
19. Beyond what they contribute to Soviet
military power, the achievements of the
Soviet economy have become a vitally im-
portant element in the impact which So-
viet policy has on the world situation.
First is the direct politico-economic im-
pact, arising from the ability of the USSR
to initiate and support programs of eco-
nomic aid or credit to foreign countries,
to import goods from countries which
would otherwise be hard-pressed to find
markets, and to export various materials
in quantities which (if the Soviet leaders
so desired) could disrupt previously ex-
isting patterns of world trade. In this
connection, manipulation of prices is a
key weapon of the USSR. Second is the
political and psychological effect on un-
derdeveloped countries of the successful
and rapid economic development achieved
by Soviet and Chinese methods. The So-
viet and Chinese Communist leaders at-
tach , great importance to the possibility
of convincing these countries that only
by adopting Communist methods and ac-
cepting Communist assistance can they
too achieve rapid economic growth.
Third is the economic impact in a nar-
rower sense, arising inevitably from the
appearance in the world of a great new
producing and trading unit, the influ-
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ence of which could not fail to be great
even if it were not deliberately used for
political purposes by the Soviet leaders.
In all three ways the Soviet economy will
present a growing challenge to the West-
ern world.
Developments Affecting the Soviet Military
Posture
20. The Soviets will almost certainly con-
tinue to believe that they must have a
large and diversified military establish-
ment, designed to meet contingencies up
to and including general war. Thus they
will at all times maintain substantial
forces-in-being. Meanwhile, they will
press ahead with research and develop-
ment programs in order to acquire addi-
tional capabilities with advanced weapon
systems, and if possible to achieve clear
military superiority over the US.
21. The present Soviet nuclear weapons
stockpile could include weapons in a
range of yields from about 2 KT to about
8 MT. The USSR probably possesses suf-
ficient nuclear weapons to support a
major attack by its long-range striking
forces, but the supply of fissionable mate-
rials is probably insufficient for large-
scale allocation of such weapons to air
defense and tactical uses as well. Since
we estimate a substantial and high pri-
ority Soviet program for the expansion
of fissionable material production and
considerable further improvement in nu-
clear weapons technology, we believe that
current limitations will ease during
1959-1963.
22. The principal Soviet military compo-
nent presently capable of long-range nu-
clear attack is Long Range Aviation, with
about 1,450 bombers (including some con-
vertible tanker-bombers), among which
are about 950 jet medium bombers and
about 100 to 125 jet and turboprop heavy
bombers. This force?best suited for
attacking targets in Eurasia and its pe-
riphery?is capable of large-scale attacks
against the US only through the exten-
sive use of medium bombers on one-way
missions. While the size of the long-
range bomber force will probably decline
gradually, Soviet long-range striking
capabilities will increase markedly as the
stockpile of nuclear weapons grows, im-
proved bombers are introduced, the readi-
ness and proficiency of the bomber force
increases, and especially as the Soviet
capacity to deliver nuclear weapons by
missiles expands.'
23. The USSR will rely increasingly upon
missiles as nuclear delivery systems
during 1959-1963. Present operational
weapons include ground-launched ballis-
tic missiles with ranges up to 700 and
probably 1,100 nautical miles (n.m.), as
well as bomber-launched air-to-surface
missiles suitable for use against ships and
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army, does not concur in
the last sentence of this paragraph. He agrees
that Soviet long-range striking capabilities will
increase markedly but believes that this increase
cannot be attributed to the introduction of im-
proved bombers of the types and within the
strength levels estimated, or to continued train-
ing of bomber crews. In his view, the estimated
acquisition by the USSR of a substantial ICBM
capability, along with the anticipated increase
in the Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile, are
factors which far outweigh comparatively routine
improvements in the existing force. Therefore,
he believes that the last sentence of this para-
graph should read as follows: "The Soviets can
be expected to introduce improved bombers and
to increase the readiness and proficiency of Long
Range Aviation units, but the size of this force
and its significance in a long-range attack role
will gradually decline during the period. None-
theless, Soviet long-range striking capabilities
will increase markedly as the Soviet missile
delivery capability expands and as the stockpile
of nuclear weapons grows."
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certain other targets. A few conven-
tional submarines have probably been
converted to employ 200 n.m. cruise-
type missiles. The USSR will probably
achieve a first operational capability with
10 prototype ICBMs of 5,500 n.m. range
at some time during 1959. While it is
possible that a limited capability with
comparatively unproven ICBMs might
have been established in 1958, we believe
this to be unlikely. We believe that So-
viet planners intend to acquire a sizeable
ICBM capability as soon as practicable.
24. Air defense capabilities will increase
through improvements in the perform-
ance characteristics of weapons and
equipment, a higher proportion of all-
weather fighters, further incorporation of
guided missiles in the defenses of numer-
ous targets, and especially through wide
employment of semiautomatic air de-
fense control. But the Soviets will con-
tinue to have difficulty in opposing very
low altitude attack, the air defense sys-
tem will still be subject to disruption and
saturation, and the problem of warning
time will become more critical. The
USSR will probably not have a weapon
system with even limited effectiveness
against ballistic missiles until 1963 or
later.
25. The ground forces, estimated to have
67 mechanized or motorized rifle divi-
sions, 75 rifle divisions, 23 tank divisions,
and 10 airborne divisions, have been ex-
tensively modernized and reorganized, in
accordance with revised Soviet tactical
doctrine which supplements standard
tactics and training with those designed
for conditions of nuclear warfare. These
forces are closely supported by tactical
aviation consisting of fighters trained in
the ground attack role (in addition to
their air defense role) and light and
medium bombers trained in ground sup-
port bombing techniques. With appro-
priate air and naval support, Soviet
ground forces are capable of conducting
large-scale operations on several fronts
into peripheral areas, separately or con-
currently. The increasing availability of
nuclear weapons and guided missiles dur-
ing 1959-1963 will bring further evolu-
tionary changes, but probably no major
alterations in size or deployment of forces.
Tactical and naval air units, some of
which have already received jet medium
bombers, will probably receive new super-
sonic fighters and bombers. Increasing
attention is being paid to the develop-
ment of airborne forces and air transport
capabilities.
26. The present Soviet force of about 440
submarines includes about 260 long-range
craft of postwar design and construction.
A recent slowdown in construction prob-
ably reflects a shift to new types, includ-
ing nuclear-powered submarines and sub-
marines designed specifically to employ
guided missiles. A submarine-launched
ballistic missile system with a missile
range of about 1,000 n.m,. will probably
be available for first operational use in
1961-1963. Construction of conventional
submarines will probably continue, but
the greater complexity of nuclear-pow-
ered and missile submarines will prob-
ably result in a total annual production
rate considerably below the high levels
of recent years.
27. Space Programs. We believe that the
USSR is presently capable of orbiting
earth satellites weighing on the order of
5,000 pounds, of launching lunar probes
and satellites, and of launching plane-
tary probes to Mars and Venus. Its space
program could also include: surveillance
satellites and recoverable aeromedical
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satellites (1958-1959) ; "soft landings" by
lunar rockets and recoverable manned
earth satellites (1959-1960) ; a manned
glide-type high altitude research vehicle
(1960-1961) ; earth satellites weighing as
much as 25,000 pounds and manned cir-
cumlunar flights (1961-1962). While
each of these individual achievements
appears feasible as to technical capability
and earliest date attainable, we doubt
that the USSR could accomplish all of
these space flight activities within the
time periods specified. If the Soviets
desire to do so, an earth satellite could
be launched from the territory of Com-
munist China within the next year or so.
Soviet Scientific Achievements
28. The USSR's achievements during the
last year, including earth satellite launch-
ings, weapons development, and the scale
of its efforts in the IGY program, have
strikingly demonstrated that the USSR
has acquired a scientific establishment of
the first rank. As a result of a sustained
effort over the last three decades, the
number of graduates in scientific and
technical disciplines has steadily in-
creased, research facilities have been
greatly expanded, and the quality of So-
viet scientific training has improved.
Soviet scientists have made marked prog-
ress in many areas of fundamental and
applied research and in some fields rank
among the best in the world. We believe
that significant Soviet advances in
science and technology are likely to occur
in the future with greater frequency than
in the past.
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DISCUSSION
I. INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
Ascendancy of Khrushchev
29. Khrushchev's position as the dominat-
ing figure on the Soviet scene appears to be
well established. There does not appear to be
.any other leader or any group able or willing
seriously to challenge his position. The
Twenty-First Party Congress, scheduled for
January 1959, may install still more of his
followers in the highest Party organs and
further dramatize his personal and ideological
authority. Thus, it is likely to be Khru-
shchev who will preside over the Soviet re-
gime throughout the period of this estimate,
assuming that he retains his health and vigor.
However, Khrushchev's policies will probably
continue to arouse concern among certain
elements of the Party, and an attempt to
reduce his authority cannot be entirely ex-
cluded.
30. Although he is in a sense Stalin's heir,
Khrushchev will almost certainly not rule as
Stalin ruled. The style of his leadership is
characteristic of his own personality, and is
reflected in a suitable myth: the new leader
is a gregarious man of the people, and re-
mains "close to the masses;" he is a rough
and practical-minded man, but his political
judgment is unerring, and like Lenin he com-
mands the Party by the persuasive force of
his arguments rather than by the fear he in-
spires. This image probably reflects the man-
ner in which Khrushchev prefers to rule; he
fancies himself as the popular boss-persuader.
His method of leadership is also consistent
with the needs of the post-Stalin period. Con-
sequently, he will be disposed to avoid the use
of terror as a main instrument of rule, though
the police will be kept strong and employed
as necessary. Errors in judgment, even oppo-
sition on some issues, will not generally be
treated as political crimes. The Central Com-
mittee and Party Congresses will probably
continue to meet regularly. There will be
greater representation of outlying regions at
the center, and more concern displayed for
local interests. Iii short, the consolidation of
Khrushchev's power will probably not mean
a return to dictatorship of the Stalinist type.
31. Moreover, there will continue to be pres-
sures on Khrushchev which will work to limit
his exercise of dictatorial power. Since his
authority, unlike Stalin's, does not rest on the
use of terror, Khrushchev must to a far
greater degree seek to win and hold the sup-
port of groups within the Party apparatus.
Inner Party maneuverings are complicated by
the fact that greater account must be taken
of popular sentiment than was true under
Stalin; Khrushchev's position in particular is
exposed because he is identified with economic
and social programs which have stimulated
popular desires for further material improve-
ment and he is thus personally accountable
for maintaining a good record of performance
in relation to promises. At some point within
the period of this estimate Khrushchev may
face the dilemma either of tolerating radically
opposing views within the leadership, thus
imperiling his control, or of attempting to
suppress opposition tendencies, at the cost of
a return to terror. If, although we think it
unlikely, a serious challenge to Khrushchev's
personal position should arise, not all of the
allies and associates who supported him dur-
ing his rise to power would necessarily remain
loyal to him.
32. The ebullient personality of Khrushchev
has been considered by some observers as
likely to give Soviet foreign and domestic
policy an erratic and unstable course. We
think this is unlikely. His public manner is
probably in large part that of the conscious
actor-politician, intended to confound his op-
ponents and to impart vigor to the execution
of his policies. His advocacy of certain unex-
pected departures in Soviet policies in recent
years was probably not unrelated to efforts to
steal a march on his competitors in the sue-
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cession struggle. We think that the sub-
stance, as distinguished from the style, of So-
viet policy is likely to be little affected by
Khrushchev's idiosyncracies.
Role of the Party
33. The victory of Khrushchev has been paral-
leled by an increasing use of the Party ap-
paratus in all aspects of control and adminis-
tration. At the top, in the Party Presidium,
the majority now consists of Khrushchev's
followers who were elevated from the Secre-
tariat and of important regional Party secre-
taries; the former overwhelming representa-
tion of men in leading government positions
has been drastically reduced.3 Party person-
alities either preside over or play important
roles in the regional economic councils which
now administer the economy in place of the
former central ministries. Local Party secre-
taries have also been brought into the district
military councils, giving the Party a closer
hold on military administration. In rural
areas measures have been taken to give the
local Party more effective control over agri-
culture.
34. This increased role of the Party at all levels
of administration was probably intended in
part to insure Khrushchev's firm control over
the country, since the Party apparatus was
his principal instrument of power. But the
reforms in industry and agriculture which he
has sponsored in recent years ? all involving
decentralization and a fuller reliance on local
initiative ? have also made closer Party su-
pervision more necessary in order to combat
local violations of the Party's economic direc-
tives. Under Khrushchev much more will de-
pend on morale and discipline within the
Party at local levels than has been the case
in the past.
'At present, 11 of the 14 full members of the
Party's Presidium hold key posts in the Party
apparatus (including 9 of the 10 secretaries) ,
and only 3 other than Khrushchev himself hold
leading governmental positions. By contrast, at
the time of Malenkov's removal in 1955, of the
9 full members of the Presidium 8 were in leading
governmental positions, and only Khrushchev
was a full time official in the Party apparatus.
35. The increase in authority of the Party
apparatus has taken place at the expense of
the various interest groupings which compete
for place and influence behind the fa?e of
totalitarian Party unity. The professional
military opposes the system of political com-
missars and, despite Zhukov's removal for at-
tempting to reduce Party control over the
armed forces, this attitude will persist. Gov-
ernment administrators and economic man-
agers will continue to resent what they regard
as the bumbling interference of Party
hacks in their technical spheres. Intellec-
tuals ? writers, artists, scientists, students ?
will continue to press for a greater area of
freedom and a loosening of the Party's ideo-
logical strait-jacket. While each of these
groups has a stake in the success and pros-
perity of the Soviet state, each has also pro-
fessional interests to further. One purpose
of Khrushchev in elevating the Party appa-
ratus is to prevent the hardening of these
professional interests into self-contained, au-
tonomous groups which might ultimately
have independent political importance.
36. It has been suggested by some Western
observers that, as the Soviet economy matures
and becomes more complex, as the needs of
society come to be met by more specialized
administrative skills, as education is extended
and diversified, the totalitarian character of
the regime will be diluted. The dictator or
the Party as the single focus of power, it has
been argued, will give way to autonomy in
areas of less immediate political significance.
Even in the political field, institutional ar-
rangements will have to be found for repre-
senting many diverse interest groups: it was
possible to see signs of such a tendency in the
post-Stalin period of confusion occasioned by
the succession struggle. On occasion, the
Central Committee of the Party became an
arena of political decision with factional and
policy differences represented within it. In
the post-Stalin period the rulers have also
seemed to think it necessary to take account
of public opinion generally in framing their
policies. Such tendencies to dilute arbitrary
power and to broaden participation in policy-
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making beyond the narrow circle of the Party
Presidium may reappear at the time of Khru-
shchev's death or at some other period of
weakened authority. For the present, how-
ever, Khrushchev's restoration of one-man
leadership, and his manner of achieving it
through the Party apparatus, has maintained
Soviet society firmly in the totalitarian mold.
Issues in Soviet Politics
37. This development does not mean that
there will not continue to be group pressures
and much pulling and hauling over issues of
policy. Even under one-man leadership the
normal play of politics is not adjourned,
though it may become less visible. There are
a number of issues over which lines are likely
to be drawn behind the fa?e of unity. For
example, whatever the degree of its practical
success, the economic reorganization scheme
is laden with political significance. It calls
for the removal of a host of bureaucrats from
Moscow to the provinces, a fate little relished
by the migrants. The reorganization could
lead to a regionalism which would be a new
source of tension, although the revitalized
Party must, in Khrushchev's calculation,
serve as the cement which binds the periphery
to the center. This reorganization, like the
ideologically controversial measures Khru-
shchev has sponsored in agriculture, has yet
to be fully proved in practice. Khrushchev
may yet be driven to some agile maneuvering
to defend his innovations.
38. Also among the issues likely to affect in-
ner Party politics are those related to Soviet
economic growth. The growth achieved may
not be high enough to attain all the
goals ? high rates of investment, increase in
agricultural output, rising living standards,
modern armaments ? which now have prior-
ity in Party programs. Cutting back on any
of these objectives could lead to dispute. The
leaders of the armed forces, for example,
would not willingly accept either a substan-
tial cut in the military budget or reduced in-
vestment for industries of military signifi-
cance. The Party apparatus itself, influenced
by the lower ranks where there is direct con-
tact with popular pressures, would be re-
luctant to sacrifice prospective gains in living
standards. Failure to achieve satisfactory
rates of growth could produce resistance to
further outlays in foreign aid or bring into
question Khrushchev's economic reorganiza-
tion.
39. There are likewise some purely political
issues which may have divisive effects. The
Soviet ruling groups would be reluctant to
see a return to the systematic use of terror.
The question of the control of the secret police
is of widespread concern and would become
paramount in case Khrushchev's mastery
were ever placed in doubt. There must be
some in positions of influence who are con-
cerned with what seems to them the down-
grading of Soviet authority in the Bloc, as
represented by toleration of the Gomulka re-
gime in Poland and the increasing weight of
China in ideological and policy matters.
There may be others who question Khru-
shchev's policy of alliance with "national lib-
eration movements" in underdeveloped areas
on the ground that such a policy increases
the danger of war arising from clashes with
Western interests, and involves support of
bourgeois movements which cannot be used
to promote Communism.
40. Khrushchev's late arrival at supreme
power (he is now 64) will make the prospect
of a new succession struggle a lively, if seldom
discussed, factor in inner Party maneuverings.
As he grows older it will be difficult to sep-
arate policy issues like those discussed above
from the succession question. Thus major
tensions will probably continue to be present
within the Soviet body politic despite the
stabilization of power at the top, and these
will from time to time affect the face which
Soviet policy presents to the outside world.
Attitudes in Soviet Society
41. The post-Stalin leadership set out to ef-
fect a basic improvement in the attitude of
the Soviet people toward the regime. The re-
laxation of police terror and the greater at-
tention to living standards served this end.
The greatest material gains so far have been
made by the peasantry, but a continuing im-
provement of urban standards over the next
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few years, particularly in housing, is also
promised. In terms of its standing with the
population as a whole, the regime is probably
stronger now than it was five years ago. We
believe that the measures which have pro-
duced this improvement will be continued.
42. Soviet society continues nevertheless to be
marked by substantial areas of discontent.
There exists, and will probably continue to
exist, considerable disaffection among in-
tellectuals, particularly among Soviet writers
and university students. It is significant be-
cause it touches a highly vulnerable area, the
regime's ideological authority. Intellectuals
are aware of the discrepancies between the
Marxist-Leninist ideal and Soviet reality and
they also resent the regime's encroachments
on private life and professional interests.
They doubt that adequate safeguards exist
to prevent the repetition of Stalinist terror.
They feel contempt for Party careerists. They
resent restrictions on travel abroad, and limi-
tations on access to Western publications and
broadcasts. These discontents do not take
the form of active opposition but are limited
for the most part to a retreat into an inner
world so as to minimize the degree of involve-
ment with the Party and the state.
43. There continues also to be dissidence
among some national minorities. The peo-
ples of the old Baltic states harbor vigorous
Russophobe feelings. They feel strongly that
they are exploited and that their homelands
lag far behind their prewar cultural and liv-
ing standards. A considerable residue of anti-
Russian sentiment is also to be found in the
western Ukraine, as well as in Georgia, where
the downgrading of Stalin and the loss of its
former privileged status also rankle. It seems
probable, furthermore, that many of the two
million Jews in the Soviet Union would like to
emigrate. Because many Jews hold key pro-
fessional positions and have connections
abroad, the regime probably regards them as
a continuing security problem.
44. We do not believe that any of the discon-
tents and tensions described above are likely
to have major political significance during the
period of this estimate, although they will
place restrictions on the regime's ability to
mobilize the population for its own purposes.
The regime will deal with them by its well-
practiced methods of concession and suppres-
sion. Moreover, its success in identifying
with itself the sense of national pride and
power, extending even to chauvinism, is a
formidable asset with which to counter dis-
content. The Soviet people are well aware
that under Communist rule Russia has been
transformed from a backward, agrarian, de-
feated nation into the world's second most
powerful state, perhaps, they would like to
believe, the most powerful. The Russian tra-
dition takes it for granted that government
is by nature tyrannical, arbitrary, and exact-
ing. If it fulfills the aspiration to national
power, it can be forgiven much.
The Longer View
45. Have the processes of change which have
operated so broadly and visibly in Soviet so-
ciety since the death of Stalin opened up per-
spectives for more fundamental change in the
long run? It seems undeniable that such a
possibility exists. One source of such change
could be a failure by the totalitarian Party
repeatedly to renew its vitality; this might
result in a dilution of its monopoly of power
in favor of other interest groups upon which
the functioning of the society will increas-
ingly depend as its industrialization proceeds.
Another could be inability of the Party to
maintain its intellectual and ideological au-
thority as awareness of the gap between real-
ity and ideology increases, a process which
will be accelerated as contacts with the West
are extended. We consider that the effect of
factors like these cannot now be reckoned to
have any assured outcome. At present, we
see no prospect of change on the Soviet
domestic scene so fundamental as to diminish
the motivation, will, or capacity of the
regime to project its rapidly growing power
externally.
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II. TRENDS IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY
General
46. The performance of the Soviet economy
has become a vitally important element in
the impact which Soviet policy has on the
world situation. This importance derives
from an extraordinary record of growth over
the last decade, a growth which is certain to
continue at a rate faster than that of the US
economy. The strength of the Soviet econ-
omy has provided a foundation of great na-
tional power for Soviet policy, first and fore-
most military power: the USSR has had
available the means to maintain military pro-
grams and to develop advanced weapons on
a scale which no other state except the US
can undertake.
47. However, apart from its function as a basis
for Soviet military power, there are three
other ways in which the impact of the Soviet
economy on the world situation is already
observable to a greater or lesser degree, and
is certain to increase. First is the direct
politico-economic impact, arising from the
ability of the USSR to initiate and support
programs of economic aid or credit to foreign
countries, to import goods from countries
which would otherwise be hard-pressed to find
markets, and to export various materials in
quantities which (if the Soviet? leaders so
desired) could disrupt previously existing
patterns of world trade. In this connection,
manipulation of prices is a key weapon of the
USSR. Second is the political and psycho-
logical effect on underdeveloped countries,
achieved through the exhibition of success-
ful and rapid economic development by Com-
munist methods, and through the encourage-
ment of such countries to do likewise under
Soviet advice ? the Soviet leaders attach great
importance to this aspect. Third is the eco-
nomic impact in a narrower sense, arising
inevitably from the appearance in the world
of a great new producing and trading unit,
the influence of which could not fail to be
great even if it were not deliberately used for
political purposes by the Soviet leaders. In
all three ways the Soviet economy will present
a growing challenge to the Western world.
Shifts in Economic Policy
48. Soviet economic policy continues to be
marked by a spirit of innovation and experi-
mentation. With the announcement early in
1958 of the program to abolish the Machine
Tractor Stations, the present leadership added
another to the series of major measures of
change it has undertaken in recent years.
Most of the steps taken, in particular the reor-
ganization scheme of 1957 involving the dis-
solution of central ministries and their re-
placement by 104 regional economic councils,
have figured as issues in the political struggle
for Stalin's succession. Ichrushchev's rise to
power was probably due at least in part to his
initiative in sponsoring novel measures to
cope with the problems of economic policy
with which the regime found itself confronted
at Stalin's death.
49. These problems arose in part because of
the great growth and increasing complexity
of the Soviet economic system and the failure
of the Soviet leadership to adapt its planning
and control mechanisms to these develop-
ments. Difficulties were aggravated during
Stalin's later years by his unwillingness to
countenance any departures from the pattern
of economic policy laid down during the early
Five-Year Plans. Concentration on heavy in-
dustry led to imbalances in the economy;
agriculture and housing were denied invest-
ment and generally neglected. When the So-
viet leaders turned to reforming measures
after 1953, the problems which immediately
confronted them included the increased com-
plexity of planning and administration as in-
dustrial output became more varied and spe-
cialized, the need to employ labor and ma-
terial resources more efficiently as these came
to be more fully utilized, higher investment
requirements to maintain gains in output,
and the necessity to provide greater material
incentives in order to improve labor discipline
and obtain higher labor productivity.
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50. The attack on these problems has involved
a variety of measures over the last five years.
First, there was a change in the political at-
mosphere ? the easing of police terror and
penalties for economic dereliction. The in-
tention was to improve the conditions for
managerial initiative in enterprises and to
aid the campaign for faster growth of labor
productivity. Second, changes in investment
priorities were made in order to alleviate the
desperate situation in housing, to lift agricul-
tural output out of its stagnation, and to
overcome the failure of basic materials output
to keep pace with the requirements of fabri-
cating industry. These changes also reflected
the regime's desire to improve living condi-
tions, in the expectation that political and
economic benefits would flow from improved
attitudes on the part of the Soviet population.
Finally, in 1957-1958, the regime undertook a
sweeping reform of economic administration
in an effort to overcome the impediments
which bureaucracy had come to put in the
way of efficient operation of the economy.
51. The economic reorganization scheme has
been described as a decentralization plan, but
it was this in only a limited sense. There
never was any intention to weaken the basic
apparatus of centralized planning or to give
up the political determination of economic
priorities in favor of decision-making at lower
levels according to economic criteria alone.
The plan aimed at eliminating the top-heavy
vertical administration of the Moscow indus-
trial ministries. It was hoped that this would
result in a more efficient response to central
plan directives. The theory was that, by al-
lowing a greater degree of local initiative and
by placing the administrators in the regions
close to the enterprises they were supervising,
the implementing of decisions would be more
realistic and less wasteful.
52. The results obtained thus far probably
have included some gains of the kind antici-
pated ? better use of local resources, fuller
use of transportation facilities, less delay on
routine decisions. But the new system con-
tains dangers of its own, which have been
heavily attacked in the Soviet press under
the name of "localism." To the extent that
freedom to dispose of resources locally has
been allowed it has been difficult to prevent
decisions from being taken in local rather
than national interests. There evidently has
been a tendency, aside from some cases of
outright corruption, for the local authorities
to divert resources to plans of their own for
the greater development of their regions,
sometimes to the neglect of centrally imposed
plans and priorities. The chronic problem of
obtaining conformity to economic goals im-
posed by political fiat from the center, with
little regard for local desires or the economic
criteria which appeal to the managers of
enterprises, seems to persist. We believe,
therefore, that the regime will continue to
experiment with new techniques of economic
planning and administration.
53. The Soviet leadership under Khrushchev
seems confident nevertheless that it has al-
ready overcome the difficulties which emerged
in 1956 when cumulative mistakes in planning
caused shortages in basic materials and
forced abandonment of the Sixth Five-Year
Plan. The regime has announced a new
Seven-Year Plan which again sets ambitious
goals. It reaffirms the traditional emphases
upon the rapid growth of heavy industry, and
upon maintaining large military programs.
But the Plan also provides for other key pro-
grams to which the regime has committed
itself in recent years. The Soviet leaders in-
tend to go forward with increasing living
standards. Programs of lesser cost will in-
clude maintaining Soviet power in Eastern
Europe by supporting the Satellite economies
as needed, assisting the industrialization of
Communist China, and backing up Soviet
political objectives in underdeveloped coun-
tries with trade and aid programs. The main
question affecting Soviet economic policy over
the next five years is whether these multiple
priorities, all of which bear on the competitive
struggle with the West in which the Soviet
leaders see themselves involved, can be met
simultaneously. On the whole, we believe
that the Seven-Year Plan production goals are
feasible, except in agriculture, but that their
achievement will impose considerable strains
on the economy, and that some programs may
have to be modified as the plan period pro-
ceeds.
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Prospects for Economic Growth
54. The Soviet economy will grow less rapidly
during the next seven years than it did during
the last seven. Soviet gross national product
(GNP) increased at an average annual rate
close to 7 percent from 1950 to 1955, and at
about 6.5 percent from 1955 to 1957. This
slight slackening in the rate of growth ob-
scures a decline in the growth of industrial
production from an annual rate of about 11
percent to about 9 percent, and a nearly
offsetting acceleration in the growth of agri-
culture. Because of favorable weather and a
large agricultural output the rate of growth
of GNP in 1958 has apparently again risen
somewhat. Over the period 1958-1965 we be-
lieve that GNP will probably grow at an aver-
age annual rate of about 6 percent. At this
figure, assuming that the US achieves an
average annual rate of 3.5 percent, 4 Soviet
GNP in 1965 will be, in dollar terms, about
half that of the US, as compared with about
40 percent of US GNP at present.
' This projected rate of the US is approximately
midway between the postwar rate and the long
run trend.
55. As Soviet GNP continues to gain in size
relative to US GNP, the differences between
Soviet and US use of national product will
continue to be marked. With a GNP only
about two-fifths the size of US GNP, the dol-
lar value of Soviet defense expenditure is
approximately equal to that of the US.5 So-
viet investment, in dollar values currently
around two-thirds as great as US investment,
will grow more rapidly than Soviet GNP dur-
ing the next seven years, and will approach
still closer the absolute size of US investment.
Investment in industry alone was about 90
percent of US investment in industry (manu-
facturing, mining, and utilities) in 1957. The
dollar value of Soviet total consumption is
less than one-third that of the US. Soviet
consumption, on the other hand, will increase
at a slower rate than total GNP during the
1958-1965 period, thus becoming a smaller
share of the latter. (See graph below.)
The dollar value referred to here was derived
by valuing manpower at appropriate US pay
rates and other items of military significance at
comparable US costs.
SOVIET COVISUMPTION, II11ESTMEHT, AND DEFENSE
AS A PEEICENTAGE OF US, 1957
(Measured is Comparable Prices)
100
100
100 98
67
32
-
US USSR US USSR US USSR
CONSUMPTION
INVESTMENT DEFENSE
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56. The slightly reduced pace of Soviet eco-
nomic growth anticipated in this estimate re-
flects increasing difficulties in obtaining labor,
material, and machinery. The economy may
be better able to cope with such difficulties as
a result of recent changes in the planning,
organization, and implementation of economic
activity, but the benefits from these changes
will be offset by other factors. Agriculture
will tend to grow more slowly following the
period of sharp output gains of 1954-1958.
Industrial growth will be affected by rising
investment requirements per unit of addi-
tional output and by continuing difficulties in
supplying adequate quantities of key material
inputs, especially ferrous metals. In addition,
there will be a reduced rate of growth of the
labor force, owing to the growing impact of
the decline in the birth rate during World
War II, at a time when the introduction
of a shorter work week in industry may in-
crease the need for new industrial workers.
Trends in Defense Expenditures'
57. Our estimates of the probable trend of
military expenditures through 1963 indicate
a defense allocation in that year approxi-
mately 45-50 percent greater than the 1957
level. Achievement of the estimated 45 per-
cent growth in Soviet GNP would mean that
the defense burden, taken in the aggregate,
would be slightly heavier in 1963 than at
present, though still not as heavy as in the
years immediately prior to 1957. Defense
requirements will impose burdensome claims
upon various types of resources needed for in-
vestment and economic growth.
58. Most of the increase in defense expendi-
tures will result from increasing allocations to
more costly aircraft, to guided missiles, mili-
tary research and development, and nuclear
weapons. These programs together probably
account for about one-third of total expendi-
tures at present. By 1963 they are expected
to require about twice as much in resources as
at present and to account for about 45 percent
of total defense programs.
Estimates of Soviet defense expenditures are
subject to a wider margin of error than other
statistical estimates in this section and should
therefore be used with greater caution.
17
59. Soviet defense expenditures in recent
years, when converted into dollar values, ap-
pear to be of roughly the same magnitude as
US defense expenditures. As stated above,
the USSR, with a much smaller GNP than the
US, produces military goods and services with
a dollar value roughly the same. It is able
to do this primarily because in the USSR mili-
tary end-items are less expensive, relative to
consumption items, than they are in the US,
and because the average level of real pay and
subsistence provided Soviet military person-
nel is much lower than in the US.
Industrial Prospects
60. The eventual aim of overtaking US indus-
try in per capita production continues to
dominate Soviet planning for industry. Shifts
in the allocation of resources during the
period 1953-1955 in support of the economic
innovations of the post-Stalin regime ? first
Malenkov's broad consumer goods program
and then Khrushchev's agricultural con-
sumer goods and housing programs ? con-
tributed to a moderate decrease in the rate
of growth of heavy industry. Heavy industry
was expected to benefit, however, from a new
program of automation and re-equipment and
from changes in industrial management,
planning and control, introduced during this
period. But by 1956 the failure to provide
sufficient new capacity in the raw materials
industries caused a severe shortage of indus-
trial raw materials, particularly steel, coal,
and cement.
61. The leadership's response to this situa-
tion during the last two years has been to
abandon the Sixth Five-Year Plan, cut back
industrial output goals for 1957 and subse-
quently for 1958, and to order the formulation
of a new Seven-Year Plan for the period 1959-
1965. It also launched a remedial investment
program which was to increase capacity in
raw materials industries while still maintain-
ing ambitious programs in agriculture and
housing. The reorganization plan of July
1957, as already indicated, was also intended
to insure a better utilization of materials by
permitting greater leeway for local decisions.
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62. Industrial growth was claimed by the So-
viets to be 10 percent for 1957 and for the
first three quarters of 1958, and while this
claim was probably somewhat overstated, it
indicates that the reduced goals of 7.0 and 7.5
percent for these years were set too low.
These rates of increase, however, obscure the
continuing poor performance of some basic
industries, particularly ferrous metallurgy.
Moreover, in spite of the remedial investment
program, additions to production capacity in
these industries continued to fall short of
planned goals in 1957, and probably in 1958
also. Production goals for 1965 in the basic
materials industries indicate that they must
continue to receive priority treatment if
planned rates of increases are to be achieved.
Substantial overfulfillment of presently
planned goals in these industries, although
not likely to occur, would be necessary to ap-
proach the 11 percent annual increases in
industrial production which we believe were
achieved during the Fifth Five-Year Plan
(1951-1955). However, we believe that the
8.7 percent average annual rate of growth
given in the present version of the New Seven-
Year Plan is feasible. (See table below for a
list of some Soviet industrial output goals.)
63. One of the factors affecting future indus-
trial growth will be the impact of raw ma-
terial constraints on the machinery and metal
fabricating sector. Despite the current effort
being directed into raw materials it is ex-
pected that the rate of growth of metals will
fall from the 10.5 percent annual average of
the past seven years to about 8 or 9 percent
per year for the period 1958-1965. This slower
growth of metals output will have a restrain-
ing effect on the growth of the machinery and
metal fabricating sector. Even so, the Seven-
Year Plan targets in many of the metals in-
dustries are impressive even in terms of past
Soviet accomplishments. The announced
1965 goal for steel, stated as 86 to 91 million
tons, suggests uncertainty as to what can be
achieved in this industry. Even the lower
figure represents an increase of 31 million
tons over the present level of output, as com-
pared with a gain of 24 million tons in 1951-
1958.
SOVIET INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 1957-1965
Product
Unit I
US-USSR Outputs in 1957
USSR 1965
Goals
US
USSR
USSR
as Percent
of US
Electric Power
Billion KWH
754
210
28
500-520
Crude Oil
Million Tons
354
98
28
230-240
Coal
Million Tons
469
463
99
596-609
Crude Steel
Million Tons
102
51
50
86-91
Primary Copper
Thousand Tons
1,319
440
33
946
Primary Aluminum
Thousand Tons
1,500
550
37
1,830
Cement
Million Tons
50
29
58
75-81
Machine Tools
Thousand Units
62
130
210
140-200
Generators for
Steam Sz Hydraulic
Turbines
Million KW
10.8
5.6
52
17.5-18.4
Commercial Vehicles
Thousand Units
1,100
382
35
750-856
Sulfuric Acid
Thousand Tons (100%)
14,700
4,569
31
10,176
Cotton Fabrics
Million Meters
8,748
5,600
64
7,700-8,000
Leather Footwear
Million Pairs
594
315
53
515
Washing Machines
Thousand Units
3,589
377
10
4,048
1 All tonnage figures in metric tons.
Except for primary aluminum and copper, which are estimated, the production
official Soviet announcements and are accepted as valid.
Includes automobiles.
' Since no official goal has been published, this figure represents our estimate.
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64. The slower natural increase of the labor
force during the period of this estimate may
also be a limiting factor on the rate of Soviet
industrial growth. Population increase and
a continuation of past school programs would
provide an estimated increase of only about
seven million men in the total civilian labor
force over the next seven years. The Seven-
Year Plan requires an increase of about 11
million men in the nonagricultural labor force.
Moreover, the regime is heavily committed to
reduce hours of work and has reaffirmed such
an intention in its Seven-Year Plan announce-
ment. The goals for gains in productivity
reflect the regime's recognition that the labor
supply is now a limitation on the rate of eco-
nomic expansion. One of the aims of current
programs in agriculture is clearly to increase
productivity in this area so as to permit the
release of workers to industry. Moreover, re-
cent and prospective changes in the educa-
tional system are in part designed to free
additional young people for employment in
industry; these changes might release as
many as one million to the nonagricultural
labor force over the seven-year period.
Agricultural Prospects
65. In the years 1954-1958 agriculture ?
which had remained largely stagnant during
Stalin's last years ? underwent rapid devel-
opment. This was due both to the programs
for cultivating the new lands and planting
corn, and to other less spectacular but no less
important measures such as increased farm
supplies and greater financial incentives. In
the new lands the weather was better than
average. No slackening of attention is ap-
parent in the Seven-Year Plan and the rela-
tively high levels of agricultural investments
of the last several years are scheduled to con-
tinue. However, the growth rate gains in
agricultural output of recent years cannot be
maintained. Total acreage is expected to in-
crease during the next seven years at a rate
only about one-fourth of the earlier period.
Most of the future increase will have to come
from increased production per unit of land.
This is more difficult to achieve, particularly
since the unfavorable effect of indiscriminate
acreage expansion will manifest itself. Never-
theless, the existing potential is by no means
exhausted, and a number of measures such
as soil improvement will be undertaken.
66. Recent organizational changes and better
prices in agriculture probably have softened
the critical attitude of the peasant toward the
regime, as have other earlier measures which
were focused upon tax, product procurement,
and income conditions in agriculture. State
control over agricultural activity, however,
has not been weakened. The central organs
continue to determine state procurement
goals even though the enterprise manager in
Soviet agriculture is likely to exercise more
choice over what and how he will produce.
Collective farm control over most of the ma-
chinery formerly under the MTS may also
prove of some significance in increasing out-
put by eliminating conflict between the col-
lective farm chairman and the MTS director
concerning day-to-day operations of the col-
lective farm. Proposals have also been ad-
vanced recently to introduce more rigorous
cost accountability on the collective farms.
If carried out, these procedures, taken in con-
junction with the gradual introduction of a
guaranteed cash wage, will increase the effi-
ciency of collective farm operations, and per-
haps permit the release of farm workers to
industry. Moreover, the improvement in
peasant attitudes brought about by the aboli-
tion of the MTS and the effect of 1958 reforms
in raising the income of the poorer collective
farms will probably have a positive effect on
peasant work habits.
67. The Seven-Year Plan carries an unreal-
istic goal of a 70 percent increase in agricul-
ture. We believe that the actual increase will
be less than half of this. Dissatisfaction with
the progress of agriculture is likely to lead the
regime to continue its experimenting in the
agricultural field.
Trends in Consumption
68. The Soviet consumer will not enjoy as
rapid an increase in over-all consumption
during the next seven years as he did during
the last seven, when per capita consumption
increased by approximately 40 percent. This
will be true despite recently announced pro-
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grams to provide more meat, milk, housing,
furniture, and clothing. But per capita con-
sumption is still likely to be as much as one-
third higher in 1965 than it was in 1957, with
some qualitative improvement in consumer
goods. However, except probably in milk pro-
duction, the USSR will not succeed in its an-
nounced effort to match US per capita con-
sumption of meat and other selected food
products in the time periods set. Even if it
is able to do so eventually, other areas of con-
sumption, such as consumer durable goods
and housing, will continue to lag far behind
US levels.
69. The increase in the level of consumption
anticipated in this estimate should be ade-
quate to keep the population reasonably well
satisfied with the regime's efforts to provide
higher living standards. The regime will con-
tinue to exploit the propaganda value of ris-
ing consumption levels. The dollar value of
Soviet total consumption is less than one-
third that of US consumption, and on a per
capita basis only about one-fourth that of the
US. The Soviet consumer occupies only
about one-fifth the housing space enjoyed by
the US consumer. Khrushchev's much pub-
licized housing program will continue to re-
ceive a rising share of investment for the next
two years and then may level off at a volume
of construction which should provide an in-
crease of about one-third in per capita living
space over the next seven years.
70. The post-Stalin leadership has sought to
make the most out of increases in consump-
tion by selectively raising the money incomes
of particular groups in the population while
holding retail prices relatively stable. Al-
though both rural and urban workers have
received increases of approximately 18 per-
cent in total real income during the period
1953-1957, rural workers gained relative to
urban workers during the earlier part of the
period and urban workers received the greater
share of their increase during the latter part
of the period. In industry, wages and sal-
aries have been adjusted with the aim of re-
lating incomes more closely to productivity in
different occupations and in different indus-
20
tries. Continuation of this policy during the
period of this estimate should bring consider-
able improvement to the Soviet wage struc-
ture.
Foreign Trade
71. Soviet foreign trade policy will continue to
subordinate short-run economic gains to the
furtherance of national political objectives.
Trade will continue to be utilized in an effort
to strengthen Satellite ties with the Soviet
Union, to provide capital goods for Chinese
Communist industrialization, and to promote
Soviet relationships with underdeveloped non-
Bloc countries. Trade with the industrialized
countries of the non-Bloc world will probably
grow somewhat, and economic considerations
will be the governing factor affecting such
trade.
72. The maintenance of the Soviet empire in
Eastern Europe and the alliance with Com-
munist China, as well as trade policy toward
the underdeveloped areas, will require exports
of raw materials and capital equipment which
otherwise would be used by the USSR to fur-
ther its own economic growth, but the burden
imposed upon the domestic economy by this
policy will not affect significantly the planned
rate of Soviet internal economic growth. On
the other hand, internal forces affecting
domestic growth will provide incentive for an
increase of Soviet trade with the West, al-
though such trade will continue to account
for only about one-fourth of total Soviet for-
eign trade. The aggregate impact of Soviet
foreign trade upon the domestic economy is
slight because exports and imports together
amount to only approximately eight billion
dollars or less than five percent of Soviet GNP.
However, the export of scarce resources or the
import of advanced design machinery and
equipment for use as prototypes can be of
greater significance to the economy than the
total value of foreign trade would suggest.
73. Future developments in Soviet-Satellite
trade will be influenced by the outcome of
recent attempts to increase intra-Bloc eco-
nomic integration and specialization but the
effect will probably not be large. Although
Bloc economic integration is expected to in-
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crease, the benefits will be of greater impor-
tance to the smaller Satellite economies than
to the USSR. The Soviet Union imports ma-
chinery from the Satellites, though the con-
tribution to the Soviet economy of machinery
imports from the Satellites will continue to
be offset by the necessity of exporting scarce
Soviet raw materials. The Soviet export sur-
plus in its trade with the European Satellites
will be reduced if repayments of credits
granted to Satellite countries, scheduled to
begin in 1960, are carried out.
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III. TRENDS IN SOVIET SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
74. The USSR has for many years placed great
emphasis on science and technology with a
view to creating a corps of superior personnel
and building a scientific establishment ade-
quate to support its aspirations to national
power. Soviet scientific effort has been fo-
cused preponderantly on the building of a
strong industrial base and the development of
modern weapons. As a consequence, the
USSR's achievements in areas of critical mili-
tary and industrial significance are compara-
ble to, and in some cases exceed, those of
the US. During the past year, the Soviet
Union has strikingly demonstrated to the
world its maturity in science and technology.
Earth satellite launchings, striking progress
in weapons development, and fundamental re-
search of military and economic significance
attest to a rapidly increasing Soviet capability
which presents a growing challenge to the
Western World.
75. We believe that the rate of advance of So-
viet science is accelerating in consequence of
the building over the past three decades of a
broad scientific and technical foundation.
During this period, the number of graduates
of scientific and technical curricula has con-
stantly increased, research facilities have
been greatly expanded, and the quality of So-
viet scientific training has improved. The
size of the Soviet research and development
effort, in absolute terms, has been smaller
than that of the US. However, the Soviet
effort has been far more highly concentrated
on fields related to national power, while re-
search in consumer products has been propor-
tionately much less. Soviet expenditures on
science and technology are increasing yearly
and probably permit full utilization of new
personnel and facilities. Consequently, sig-
nificant Soviet advances in science and tech-
nology are likely to occur in the future with
greater frequency than in the past.
76. The reorganization of economic adminis-
tration in 1957 has probably been accom-
panied by improved planning and coordina-
tion of science, especially in the formulation
of long-range and nation-wide scientific poli-
cies. New scientific coordinating bodies have
been established with authority to cut across
administrative barriers, and planning is be-
ing centralized under the State Planning
Committee, which heretofore has had only a
passive role in science planning. Scientists
are being given more voice in planning and
Soviet policies in science and technology are
likely to reflect their point of view more
fully. Concurrently with the centralization
of planning and coordination, operational au-
thority over research is being decentralized
and directors of institutes are being given
more administrative authority.
77. Applied research will continue to receive
great emphasis in the USSR, although the
importance of adequate fundamental re-
search is well understood at the planning
level. Highest priority will continue to be
accorded to military-industrial research and
development, but the rapid expansion of So-
viet scientific resources will now permit
greater flexibility. Greater individual initia-
tive within assigned tasks of research will
probably be encouraged, basic research in
new fields undertaken, and somewhat more
scientific and technical effort allocated to the
consumer sector of the economy.
Scientific Manpower, Training and
Facilities
78. The number of scientifically and tech-
nically trained people in the Soviet Union has
increased approximately three-fold in the
postwar period. We estimate that as of mid-
1958, about 1,625,000 graduates of university-
level scientific and technical curricula are
actually employed in all scientific and tech-
nical fields, about 15 percent more than in
the US. Although US graduations in scien-
tific and technical fields are expected to in-
crease, the USSR will continue to enjoy a
numerical advantage. Based on current
trends, by 1963 the USSR will probably have
nearly 35 percent more graduates employed
in scientific and technical work than the US,
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as indicated by the accompanying table.7 It
should be noted that the bulk of Soviet nu-
merical superiority will continue to derive
from graduates employed in industrial and
agricultural production. The number of So-
viet scientists engaged in research and teach-
ing in the physical sciences has remained sub-
stantially smaller than in the US, and is per-
haps half the US total at present. However,
Soviet emphasis on research in military and
basic industrial fields probably results in a
near numerical equality between the two
countries in scientific manpower devoted to
these critical activities.
COMPARISON OF MAJOR SCIENTIFIC GROUPS, USSR AND US 7
(in thousands)
Estimated Numbers of Graduates of Higher Educational Institutions
Employed in Scientific and Technical Fields *
Mid-1958
US
Mid-1963
US
USSR
USSR
Engineering
856
500
1,227
630
Agricultural Sciences
228
163
368
183
Health Sciences
382
452
448
492
Physical Sciences
108
184
144
276
Biological Sciences
52
80
79
112
Total
1,626
1,379
2,266
1,693
Estimated Numbers of Soviet Kandidats and American Ph.D.'s
in Scientific and Technical Fields **
Mid-1958
USSR US
Engineering
27
6
Agricultural Sciences
8
5
Health Sciences
17
1
Physical Sciences
18
34
Biological Sciences
18
Total
78
64
? Estimates of the current total of Soviet scientific personnel are believed to be
correct within plus or minus 10 percent. The probable error of certain groups,
however, may exceed this amount.
** In the physical sciences, engineering, and the health sciences, the quality of
the Kandidat degree is roughly equivalent to or slightly below that of the US
Ph.D. In agricultural and biological sciences it is closer to that of a US
Master's degree.
79. In the postwar period the quality of Soviet
scientific training has been high. Engineer-
ing training, while not as broad as that given
7Such numerical comparisons provide only a
rough measure of relative scientific and tech-
nical strength, since: (a) the professional cate-
gories are not precisely equivalent in the two
countries; (b) the figures do not reflect the
broader US supply of scientific and technical
personnel who hold no degrees; and (c) they
give no weight to qualitative differences in
training and experience.
an engineer in the West, is good within the
particular field of specialization. Some de-
ficiencies continue in the practical and ex-
perimental aspects of training, particularly
in some fields of biology and engineering.
Recent changes in higher school curricula,
intended to overcome these deficiencies, in-
clude requirements for more laboratory and
independent experimental work outside the
classroom, as well as a plan to allow superior
students to follow individual study schedules.
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The USSR is not as well supplied as the West-
ern industrial nations with nonprofessional
technicians, mechanics, and maintenance
men. Shortages of skilled technicians will
persist, but the number available should in-
crease significantly as a result of the high
proportion of scientific and technical subjects
in the lower grades and the current emphasis
on specialized training after lower school.
80. Soviet scientific facilities, in terms of fi-
nancial support, organizational direction, and
number and quality of laboratories, are gen-
erally adequate for the utilization of scientific
talent. In a few fields the USSR has facilities
which are comparable, if not superior, to cor-
responding installations in the West. The
continued expansion of these facilities, as well
as a Soviet attempt to establish a broader
geographic base for research activities, is in-
dicated by the establishment of new scientific
centers in Siberia. Announced plans call for
completion in 1960 of a new "scientific city"
near Novosibirsk, consisting of 13 research
institutes and a university now under con-
struction. Another center near Irkutsk, con-
sisting of eight research institutes, is sched-
uled for completion in 1965. The regime is
making a major effort to attract competent
scientific personnel to the new centers by cre-
ating favorable living conditions, establishing
excellent research facilities, and assigning
certain eminent scientists to these locations.
81. Some shortages of complex research in-
struments are believed to exist, particularly in
low priority fields, but they probably do not
significantly hamper research programs of
major importance. For example, although
the US has a considerably larger number of
high speed electronic computers than the
USSR, the number of computer hours actu-
ally utilized for high priority research is prob-
ably nearly the same since Soviet computers
are not called upon to serve routine business
and government functions. Although Soviet-
produced equipment is often the equal of
foreign-produced equipment and occasionally
its superior, the USSR will probably continue
to import equipment for reasons of expedi-
ency. During the next five years the USSR
will continue to improve its capabilities in
scientific instrumentation. Increasing num-
bers of highly qualified engineers will proba-
bly be made available for the development and
production of scientific equipment, and an
increasing amount of equipment will reflect
original design concepts. However, we believe
that the West will continue to lead in the
development of scientific equipment except in
fields given very high priority by the Soviets.
82. The Satellites have made significant scien-
tific contributions to Soviet technological de-
velopment in only a few areas, principally in
optics, electrical measuring instruments, com-
munications equipment, synthetic fibers and
pharmaceuticals. We expect an increase in
Soviet use of Satellite resources in some basic
theoretical and experimental fields. The
Council for Economic Mutual Assistance
(CEMA) recently expanded the scope of its
activities to include greater coordination and
exchange in research and development activi-
ties. CEMA member-nations are assigned
major research, development, and production
responsibilities for the entire Soviet Bloc in
specified fields.
83. The USSR has become progressively less
dependent on Western research and develop-
ment. Nevertheless, the Soviet leaders have
adopted a policy of acknowledging foreign
achievement and encouraging maximum use
of foreign experience. The USSR presently
has an outstanding program for collection
and dissemination of scientific and technical
information. The All-Union Institute of Sci-
entific and Technical Information of the
Academy of Sciences publishes and circulates
extensive abstracts of foreign journals and,
at least in high priority fields, Soviet sci-
entists have access to the full range of scien-
tific research published throughout the world.
Evidence of Soviet work on such new methods
as machine translation, data searching, and
data processing suggests that Soviet informa-
tion handling facilities probably will improve
during this period.
84. The Soviets have evidently profited from
espionage in a few key fields. However, on an
over-all basis the performance of Soviet sci-
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ence ? especially the number of original con-
cepts and discoveries ? reinforces our belief
that the aggregate contribution of espionage
to Soviet scientific progress has been far less
important than the USSR's own achieve-
ments.
85. The USSR is clearly anxious to take ad-
vantage of the possibilities in international
scientific exchange. Soviet participation in
international scientific meetings and confer-
ences has increased markedly during the last
year, primarily in connection with the Inter-
national Geophysical Year (IGY) , but involv-
ing other scientific fields as well. The Soviet
IGY program has been well-executed and
comparable to the US program in scope. For
the most part, the Soviets probably will live
up to their agreements to exchange IGY in-
formation, but are likely to withhold the re-
sults of related investigations outside the
formal IGY program. They are believed to
have withheld considerable data derived from
their earth satellites. The USSR probably
will continue its active participation in the
various international committees and organi-
zations which are planning to extend pro-
grams begun under the IGY.
Soviet Capabilities in Major Scientific
Fields
86. The USSR's achievements during the last
year, including earth satellite launchings,
weapons development, and the magnitude of
its efforts in the IGY program, provide im-
pressive evidence of the present high level of
Soviet scientific capability. Animated by a
spirit of intense competition with the US,
Soviet scientists have made striking progress
over the last year in many areas of funda-
mental and applied research. In mathe-
matics, many fields of physics, and a few fields
of chemistry, fundamental research appears
to be comparable in quality to that performed
in leading nations of the West. In some
fields, Soviet scientists are among the best in
the world; their potential for wholly new dis-
coveries must be considered equal to that of
1 4
Western scientists.
87. Space program.8 The establishment of
the Interagency Commission for Interplan-
etary Communications, announced by the
USSR in April 1955, indicated the existence
of a program with manned interplanetary
travel as its stated ultimate objective. The
program is supported by extensive Soviet re-
search efforts in a number of related fields,
including rocket propulsion, electronics, me-
teorology, space medicine, astrobiology, astro-
physics, and geophysics. Activities to the
present appear to be directed toward the col-
lection of scientific data and experience to
provide the basis for future space programs,
and to advance basic knowledge in the above
fields. Since some satellite vehicles have
probably employed basic ICBM hardware and
some future space vehicles may also utilize
ICBM components, the two programs are to
some extent complementary.
88. Soviet successes with ballistic missiles and
earth satellites point to a considerable capa-
bility for early accomplishments in space. We
believe that the USSR is presently capable of
orbiting earth satellites weighing on the order
of 5,000 pounds, of launching lunar probes
and satellites and of launching planetary?
probes to Mars and Venus. Its space program
could also include: surveillance satellites and
recoverable aeromedical satellites (1958-
1959) ; "soft landings" by lunar rockets and
recoverable manned earth satellites (1959-
1960) ; a manned glide-type high altitude re-
search vehicle (1960-1961) ; earth satellites
weighing as much as 25,000 pounds and
manned circumlunar flights (1961-1962).
While each individual achievement appears
feasible as to technical capability and earliest
date attainable, we doubt that the USSR could
accomplish all of these space flight activities
within the time periods specified.
89. Communist China has announced its in-
tention to launch an earth satellite, and there
are indications that Chinese personnel are
studying rocket technology with Soviet assist-
ance. The Chinese would value highly the
8For a more detailed discussion of the Soviet
space program, see NIE 11-5-58, "Soviet Capa-
bilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles,"
19 August 1958 (TOP SECRET).
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political and propaganda gains resulting from
a launching, and we believe that an attempt
in China is a possibility within the next year
or so. Using Soviet equipment, and with So-
viet direction throughout the project, the Chi-
nese Communists could probably perform a
successful earth satellite launching in about
one or two years after initiation of the project.
The USSR itself probably has the capability,
with about six months' preparation, to place
an earth satellite in orbit from Chinese terri-
tory. There is as yet, however, no firm evi-
dence of the initiation of any projects to
launch earth satellites from the territory of
Communist China.
90. Nonmilitary applications of atomic energy.
There is evidence of a further reduction in
the ambitious Soviet nuclear power program
announced in February 1956 as part of the
Sixth Five-Year Plan. At that time, the USSR
set a mid-1960 goal of 2,000-2,500 megawatts
of nuclear-electric generating capacity. How-
ever, a Soviet reply to a UN questionnaire in
March 1957 described a program which could
produce a total capacity of about 1,400 mega-
watts by that date. Recent statements by
Soviet officials indicate a planned capacity of
about 700 megawatts in mid-1960. We esti-
mate that an additional 200 megawatts or
more could be obtained from dual-purpose
reactors installed at plutonium production
sites, giving the USSR a total of at least 900
megawatts by mid-1960 if the latest plans ma-
terialize. Continued references to the 2,000-
2,500 megawatt goal by leading Soviet author-
ities indicate that the progressive decrease in
nuclear generating capacity planned for 1960
reflects a slippage in Soviet plans rather than
a reduction in the Soviet nuclear power pro-
gram. The USSR is conducting extensive re-
search on controlled thermonuclear reactions.
91. Soviet employment of radioactive isotopes
and radiological techniques in medical, chem-
ical, metallurgical, biological, and agricul-
tural research lags behind that of the US by
up to five years. While the USSR has been
actively employing these means in research
investigations, little originality has been dis-
played and only recently has the quality of
this type of research shown improvement.
92. Despite this lag, the USSR has initiated
a sizable technical assistance program in nu-
clear energy within the Bloc and has offered
aid in this field to a number of non-Bloc
countries. To encourage collaboration among
nuclear scientists within the Bloc, the USSR
established in 1956 a Joint Nuclear Research
Institute near Moscow. Although the USSR
is a member of International Atomic Energy
Agency, its attitude toward the agency has
been passive. Future Soviet activities outside
of the Sino-Soviet Bloc probably will continue
to be largely limited to unilateral offers of
aid to non-Bloc nations. However, visits by
Soviet scientists to Western nations and So-
viet participation in international conferences
may be increased.
93. Physics and mathematics. Some Soviet
scientists in the various fields of physics and
mathematics are the equals of those in the
leading nations of the West. Greatest capa-
bilities are exhibited in theoretical mathe-
matics and physics, high-energy nuclear
physics, low temperature physics, solid state
physics, and acoustics. Research during this
period will probably stress a number of studies
related to the Soviet missile and space pro-
grams, and will also include theoretical anti-
gravity investigations, work in plasma physics,
and elaboration of present theories of ion,
photon, and free radical propulsion. Of great
aid to research in physics and mathematics is
the considerable Soviet capability in the de-
sign, development and application of com-
puters with larger memory capacity and in-
creased operation speeds, as well as small com-
puters suitable for mass production and usa-
ble in small computation centers.
94. Geophysics. Soviet performance in the
geophysical sciences is believed to be gener-
ally equal to that of the US, and superior in
some fields, particularly polar geophysics.
The large and comprehensive Soviet IGY pro-
gram is expected to have a considerable effect
on the development of geophysics in the
USSR. The orbiting of earth satellites carry-
ing heavy payloads of complex instrumenta-
tion probably has already given the USSR a
lead in these methods of upper atmosphere
and space research. The USSR probably will
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make advances comparable to those of the
US in meteorology and oceanography. It will
probably continue to be among the world lead-
ers in seismology, gravimetry, geomagnetism
and geoelectricity, and will add to its already
considerable achievement in permafrost re-
search and geochemical prospecting.
95. Chemistry and metallurgy. The USSR
lags behind the US in the magnitude and level
of research effort in most fields of chemistry
and metallurgy; however, Soviet research in
certain areas continues to be of high caliber.
A major strength will continue to be in the
theoretical aspects of some fields of chemistry.
There will probably be a major expansion of
all chemical research, with particular empha-
sis on fields where the West now leads, such
as in petrochemicals, new plastic materials,
and synthetic fibers. In metallurgy, research
will be especially pushed in the high tempera-
ture field and in those areas of metallurgy
related to solid state physics, particularly in
semiconductors and thermoelectric power
generation.
96. Medical sciences. With some exceptions,
Soviet medical research is still behind that of
the US. Soviet research assets, however, are
expanding rapidly and will continue to be
concentrated in areas of high economic and
military priority. The Soviets are conducting
an advanced program in space medicine and
astrobiology. The availability of rocket ve-
hicles and effective propulsion systems has
enabled the Soviets to use animals to test lif e-
sustaining systems in space and under space
equivalent conditions to a greater degree than
has been possible in the US. We believe that
they lead the US in rocket flight physiology,
studies of possible forms of life on other
planets, and in the techniques and equipment
for recovery of test subjects from extreme alti-
tudes. However, there are no indications
that they have conducted prolonged space
equivalent work similar to the US manned
balloon experiments. The USSR will expand
its intensive research program in the control
of human behavior, especially in condition-
ing techniques. In addition, the Soviets will
probably maintain their lead in research on
the effects of radiation on the nervous sys-
tem. It is possible that they will attain the
lead in the study of the effects of cosmic radia-
tion on organisms.
97. Biological and agricultural sciences.
There has been a notable improvement in the
quality of Soviet research in certain areas of
the biological and agricultural sciences. Ex-
cept in a few specific fields, however, the
USSR still lags behind most Western coun-
tries in these sciences. Although Lysenko
retains some limited political support, ideo-
logical theories are probably no longer per-
mitted to interfere with sound research in
biology and agriculture, and Soviet genetics
research should improve markedly. We be-
lieve that agricultural research and develop-
ment will receive increasing support, which
should assist the Soviet effort to increase food
supplies.
98. Industrial technology. For the immedi-
ate future, we estimate that the general level
of Soviet industrial technology will remain
below that of the US. However, the most
modern Soviet plants are already on a par
with those in the US, and the average level of
heavy industrial technology will probably im-
prove. Striking progress has been made over
the last few years in the theory and practice
of automation. Additional semiautomatic
and possibly fully automatic production lines
will be established during the period of this
estimate. There will probably be increased
emphasis on engineering process research and
on shortening the lead times necessary to
bring developed items into production. How-
ever, research and technology in consumer
goods fields will continue to lag far behind
that of the US.
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IV. DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE SOVIET MILITARY POSTURE
SOVIET MILITARY THINKING AND POLICY
Major Objectives of Military Policy
99. Soviet military thinking and policy since
the end of World War II, and particularly
since the death of Stalin, have been strongly
influenced by a growing appreciation of the
devastation inherent in nuclear war and of
the threat to the USSR's objectives and se-
curity posed by Western nuclear capabilities.
The Soviet leaders have made strong efforts
to build a substantial offensive nuclear capa-
bility of their own and to improve their air
defenses; indeed, to build up a broad range of
offensive and defensive capabilities, both nu-
clear and nonnuclear. At the same time,
Soviet political activity has aimed at reducing
the military and political usefulness of US
nuclear capabilities by attempting to make US
overseas bases untenable and to increase the
inhibitions attached to any use of nuclear
weapons.
100. We believe that despite these efforts the
Soviet leaders appreciate that if they launched
a general war at present, even with surprise
nuclear attacks, the USSR would suffer un-
acceptable damage from US nuclear retalia-
tion. On the other hand, they are probably
confident that their own nuclear capabilities,
even though not as great as those of the US,
have grown to the point where they consti-
tute a powerful military deterrent to the US.
It is therefore probable that in the Soviet view
both sides are now militarily deterred from
deliberately initiating an all-out nuclear war
or from reacting to any crisis in a manner
which would gravely risk such a war, unless
vital national interests at home or abroad were
considered to be in jeopardy.
101. The Soviets probably see this situation as
a great improvement over the relation of forces
which existed some years ago. Nevertheless,
we believe that the Soviet leaders will con-
tinue to seek ways to achieve, if possible, a
clear military superiority over the US. To
this end they will continue their intensive
weapons research and development, particu-
larly in such fields as long-range missiles, air-
craft and missile-launching submarines ca-
pable of attacking the continental US, air
defense weapons and associated equipment.
But despite further improvement in Soviet
capabilities over the next five years, we believe
that the USSR will still not become confident
that it can attack the US without receiving
unacceptable damage in return. This judg-
ment assumes the maintenance and improve-
ment of US armed strength and the absence
of an unforeseen Soviet technological break-
through of major military significance.
102. While strengthening their capability for
waging general war, the Soviets will endeavor
to maintain forces which they consider ade-
quate to insure military superiority in situa-
tions short of general war. To the extent that
Western inhibitions against vigorous reaction
in local situations are increased by the USSR's
growing capability for general war, superiority
in forces for local conflict will enable the So-
viets to exert greater political pressure in local
situations, and even give them greater freedom
to use force in such situations. In sum, the
Soviet leaders will view large deterrent and
other military capabilities as an essential sup-
port to their foreign policy and to the USSR's
status as a leading world power.
Soviet Attitudes Toward Limited and Gen-
eral War
103. As indicated elsewhere (Chapter VI, par-
agraphs 224-227) we believe that the Soviet
leaders do not at present intend to pursue their
objectives by employing their own forces in
warfare, limited or general. But they will also
recognize that, particularly in consequence of
the policies they are pursuing to compel a
retraction of Western power by political
means, situations might arise in which the
use of force on a local scale would seem essen-
tial to one side or the other. In such situa-
tions the Soviets would prefer to provide log-
istic and other support for local operations in
which only non-Soviet forces participated di-
rectly. Their objectives in such operations
would be limited, and they would seek to avoid
direct Soviet involvement, to limit the geo-
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graphic area of engagement, and to prevent
the use of nuclear weapons by either side.
104. Soviet planners probably consider, how-
ever, that such limitations might be impossible
in some instances, and that encounters be-
tween their own and Western forces might
result. They would prefer to minimize the
amount of force employed in such situations,
in order to limit the scale of conflict and the
degree of their own involvement as much as
possible. For example, they would almost
certainly wish to avoid the use of nuclear
weapons. In deciding whether to employ
their own forces in any particular local situ-
ation the Soviets would have to balance the
risk of provoking a train of counteractions,
possibly leading to general war, against the
stakes involved in the area of local conflict.
They probably believe that the West's military
posture and doctrine rest increasingly upon
the use of nuclear weapons, even in limited
wars. But they probably also view their own
nuclear deterrent capabilities as already hav-
ing raised the threshold at which the West
would react in such a manner.
105. It is impossible to forecast how the So-
viets would behave in all the situations of local
conflict which might arise. Despite the confi-
dence they evidently now have in the power of
their own deterrent, we believe that they
would handle such situations with the greatest
caution. They would realize that the dangers
of miscalculation would mount as each side
increased the scale of its involvement. There-
fore we believe that the Soviets would seek to
prevent any crisis from developing in such a
way as to leave themselves only a choice be-
tween accepting a serious reverse and taking
action which would substantially increase the
likelihood of general war. The Soviet leaders
would almost certainly not decide to precipi-
tate general war unless they concluded that
conceding a position to the West would sooner
or later threaten the survival of their regime.
106. We believe that the Soviets recognize that
very great advantages would accrue to the
side striking the first blow in an all-out nuclear
war, and that therefore, in the event that they
decided on general war, they would themselves
initiate it by strategic nuclear attacks. The
primary objective of such attacks would be to
destroy or neutralize Western nuclear retali-
atory capabilities?or at any rate to achieve
the maximum possible reduction in the weight
of Western retaliation that would have to be
met by Soviet air defenses. To an extent con-
sistent with this first priority, other key US
war-making capabilities would probably also
be attacked.
107. The outbreak of general war would prob-
ably find the USSR at a state of military
readiness beyond that of ordinary peacetime,
but short of what Soviet planners might be-
lieve best for the most rapid exertion of their
total military effort. During any local war or
crisis which they viewed as likely to become
increasingly serious, Soviet planners would
almost certainly prepare against the possi-
bility of a general conflict. However, they
would not want to push preparations so far as
to convince the US that general war was im-
minent, lest this lead the US to strike the first
all-out nuclear blow. The probability of in-
creased Western readiness during a crisis,
together with the normally widespread deploy-
ment of Western nuclear striking forces in the
US and overseas, would make it doubtful that
the Soviets could count on achieving surprise
against all of these forces, but they would
almost certainly attempt to do so.
108. Soviet recognition of the importance of
surprise in modern military operations has
been reflected in articles and statements over
the last few years, but it is evident that Soviet
military theoreticians do not regard surprise
as the decisive factor in the outcome of a major
war between great powers. In fact, they hold
that in such a war the strategic attack capa-
bilities of both sides might expend themselves
and leave eventual victory to the side with the
greatest residual strength, capacity for recov-
ery, and ability to occupy territory. They
visualize an important role for their ground,
tactical air, and naval forces in a general war,
which in their view would probably become a
protracted war of attrition.9
'The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF,
believes that as written this paragraph does not
correctly reflect the Soviet judgment of the role
of surprise in a general war. He believes it is evi-
dent that Soviet military theoreticians consider
surprise probably would be the decisive factor
in the outcome of a war between great powers.
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109. In the event of general war, Soviet
ground, tactical air, and naval forces would
probably be launched in major campaigns
against Europe, the Middle East, and the Far
East, in order to defeat those Western forces
within reach and to seize military objectives in
those areas as well as their industrial and
economic resources. The USSR would prob-
ably plan to commit its ready forces to an of-
fensive against NATO, especially through
Western Germany, as soon as possible consist-
ent with its attempt to achieve surprise for its
initial assaults against the US, overseas US
and allied nuclear bases, and naval striking
forces. Campaigns in other areas would be of
lesser priority, but we believe that in a general
war situation they would probably be initiated
with little delay.
110. In addition to participation in inital stra-
tegic attacks and support of other major Soviet
campaigns, the major offensive effort of the
Soviet Navy in general war would be the world-
wide interdiction of Western sea communica-
tions and reinforcement, intended to isolate
overseas theaters from the US. The major
defensive effort of Soviet naval forces would be
to prevent Western carrier strikes and sub-
marine-launched missile attacks against Bloc
targets.
Policy on Size and Types of Forces
111. In assessing the size and types of military
forces which would best fulfill their major
objectives, the Soviets will almost certainly
continue to believe that they must keep a large
and diversified military establishment, de-
signed to meet various contingencies, up to
and including general war. While they will
work to acquire additional capabilities with
advanced weapon systems, they will at all
times maintain substantial forces-in-being.
Nevertheless, there will be increasing competi-
tion among military requirements of different
types, and between military requirements and
the demands of highly important nonmilitary
programs, resulting in part from the cost and
complexity of new weapons and equipment.
In deciding whether to produce complex new
weapon systems in quantity, the USSR will
probably apply increasingly severe tests as to
whether these would add greatly to current
capabilities or tend significantly to alter the
world balance of forces, and as to whether
costs were justified by likely periods of use
before obsolescence. There may therefore be
a growing tendency in some fields to make do
with existing equipment until significantly
advanced weapons can be acquired.
112. We also believe that for several years the
Soviet leaders have been interested in finding
ways to reduce the number of men under arms.
The reasons for doing this will continue to
apply, and in the future may become more
compelling. An important factor will be the
pressure imposed by a shortage of manpower
for the rapidly growing Soviet economy (see
Chapter II, paragraph 64) . Other reasons in-
clude the desire for economies in order to ease
the burden of increasing costs of new equip-
ment, and the propaganda value of force re-
ductions. The importance of the last of these
factors has been evident in the USSR's well-
publicized announcements of military person-
nel cuts over the last three years. Reductions
amounting to over 1.8 million men in the
1955-1957 period have been claimed, and in
January 1958 a further planned reduction of
300,000 men was announced, bringing the
total to more than 2.1 millions.
113. On the basis of Soviet conscription trends,
published labor statistics, and other indirect
data, we believe that there has in fact been a
substantial reduction in the number of men in
service since the peak reached during the
Korean War. A considerable portion of this
reduction apparently occurred prior to the
first Soviet announcement of cuts in 1955.
Reductions are known to have been made in
nonessential supporting and administrative
elements. It is probable that other reductions
were accomplished by cutting down the
strength of certain units and by the transfer
of labor troops from military to nonmilitary
status. On the other hand, we have acquired
no evidence of the deactivation of any major
units and we are fairly certain that most of
the units withdrawn from satellite areas in
recent years were merely moved to locations
within the USSR.
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114. The evidence suggests that in their an-
nouncements the Soviets took propaganda ad-
vantage of fairly substantial reductions made
after the Korean War, and that additional
reductions were in fact begun but were de-
layed or cancelled entirely. The apparent
failure to carry out the announced cuts may
have been due in part to increased tension in
the satellites, and in the world situation gen-
erally, beginning in the fall of 1956. It may
also have resulted in part from Soviet dis-
covery that reductions in some elements were
to a large extent offset by the increased need
for technically-qualified personnel to serve
new and more complex equipment.
115. On the basis of available order-of-battle
information, we estimate present Soviet mili-
tary manpower strength at somewhat more
than 4 million men, of whom about 2,650,000
are in ground force units, about 835,000 are in
the air forces (including about 110,000 naval
aviation personnel) , about 765,000 are in naval
units, and about 75,000 are in air defense con-
trol and warning. In addition, we carry about
400,000 men in border guard and internal se-
curity forces.1? While there has been no re-
liable evidence of reductions over the last year,
we do not exclude the possibility that the So-
viet leaders believe that some additional cuts
can be made without danger to Soviet security.
But we think it unlikely that in the present
state of the Bloc's relations with the West
further reductions of substantial size would
be made.
116. Military policy toward other bloc na-
tions. The Soviet leaders view the East Eu-
ropean area as vital to the military posture of
the USSR, both as an extension of the defense
perimeter of the homeland and as a base for
offensive power; Communist China and North
Korea similarly strengthen the strategic posi-
tion of the USSR. The Soviets will therefore
continue to provide substantial military aid
to the Satellite and Chinese Communist mili-
tary establishments, including weapons, equip-
1? For more detailed estimates of the personnel
strength of Soviet and other Bloc forces, see
Annex, Tables 1 and 2; it should be understood
that these figures are only approximate and that
there is considerable uncertainty inherent in this
type of estimate.
31
ment, and training assistance. They will
continue their efforts under the Warsaw Pact
to develop and maintain reliable and effective
forces in the East European Satellites, but
they probably do not contemplate any signifi-
cant expansion of these forces. It is unlikely
that Soviet planners would count on East
European forces in general to make an impor-
tant contribution to Soviet military opera-
tions, except perhaps in air defense and in
maintaining security for lines of communica-
tion.
117. The Soviets probably regard the increas-
ing military capabilities of Communist China
with mixed feelings. While Chinese military
strength is a valuable addition to the power of
the Communist Bloc, as this strength grows
it will also give China increasing weight
within the Bloc. It will be many years before
the Chinese have a large and modern arms
industry of their own, a development the So-
viets might view with misgivings in any case,
and in the interim the Chinese will press for
Soviet aid to effect a costly modernization of
their forces. We believe that the Soviets
will probably try to restrain the pace of Chi-
nese military development in order to prevent
the Chinese from achieving too large a degree
of military independence. But they will prob-
ably also feel that they have no choice but to
support such development. It is probable
therefore that they will continue to assist the
Chinese in developing and producing certain
types of modern equipment. They will also
probably begin to supply such Soviet-made
weapons as jet medium bombers, advanced
fighters and guided missiles for air defense,
and possibly short-range missiles for offensive
use as well. The USSR would probably retain
control over any nuclear weapons based in the
territory of Communist China or other Bloc
nations.
SPECIAL WEAPON DEVELOPMENTS
Nuclear Weapons
118. The USSR is known to have conducted
more than 70 nuclear tests since August 1949
in its program to develop a variety of nuclear
weapons. Two test series were conducted
during 1958. In the first series, 13 tests
were conducted at two widely separated
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proving grounds during the three months pre-
ceding the USSR's announcement of a uni-
lateral test suspension on 31 March 1958.
The Soviets resumed testing in a second series
which began in September 1958. Explosions
in the latest series have included two of about
seven megatons, about twice the yield of the
largest Soviet explosion detected previously.
The latest two tests were of low yield and were
conducted in the general vicinity of Kapustin
Yar. From the present technical evaluation
of the 1958 tests, it appears that the Soviets
made further advances in the development of
high yield weapons suitable for use in bombs
or missile warheads. They also apparently
sought to improve low yield weapons from the
standpoint of size and economy of fissionable
materials, probably in order to meet air de-
fense as well as other requirements.
119. We estimate that at present the Soviet
stockpile could include nuclear weapons in a
range of yields from about 2 KT to about 8 MT;
we do not exclude the possibility that untested
bombs with yields of as much as 20 MT could
be in stockpile on an emergency or provisional
basis.11 We have insufficient evidence to sup-
port a firm estimate of the numbers and types
of nuclear weapons in the Soviet stockpile.
There is, however, considerable evidence from
the Soviet nuclear test program and from
other intelligence sources, providing indica-
tions as to what types of weapons the USSR
may be stockpiling and on what delivery sys-
tems it contemplates. Based on an analysis
of various factors involved, we believe that:
(a) nuclear weapons, including high-yield
weapons suitable for bomber delivery, are now
widely deployed to Long Range Aviation units,
and the Soviets will seek to provide such
weapons for all bombers of this component
which are designated for weapons delivery;
(b) nuclear warheads are being and will be
produced in numbers sufficient to equip sub-
stantially all operational submarine-launched
missiles, and ground-launched ballistic mis-
siles of 700 n.m. range and greater;
" For a detailed estimate of the present and future
Soviet nuclear weapons development potential,
see NIE 11-2-58, "The Soviet Atomic Energy Pro-
gram," 14 January 1958 (Limited Distribution) .
See also the forthcoming NIE 11-2-59.
(c) Soviet doctrine contemplates the tacti-
cal use of nuclear weapons by ground, tactical
air, and naval forces, and some such weapons
are probably now available for this purpose;
(d) the Soviets' emphasis on air defense
will lead them to provide nuclear warheads for
some proportion of their surface-to-air and
air-to-air missiles, but a sizable allocation for
such purposes has probably not yet been made.
120. Considering the estimated availability of
fissionable materials and the level of Soviet
nuclear weapons technology, we believe that at
present the USSR probably possesses sufficient
nuclear weapons to support a major attack
by its long-range striking forces, but that cur-
rent stockpiles are probably insufficient for
large-scale allocation to air defense and tacti-
cal use. We estimate a substantial and high
priority Soviet program for the expansion of
fissionable material production through the
period of this estimate, and we believe that the
USSR is capable of considerable further im-
provement in nuclear weapons technology.
Thus, by the end of the period the current
limitation on the allocation of nuclear ma-
terials to air defense and tactical operations
will have eased, although even then and for a
longer period, limitations imposed by the avail-
ability of fissionable materials will still be
felt.12
121. Prior to its suspension of testing in
March 1958, the USSR had probably developed
types of nuclear weapons which could meet
most of its major requirements for such weap-
ons. However, strong technical motivations
have continued to exist for further testing, for
example in the categories of lighter-weight,
more efficient warheads for air defense and
other purposes, higher yield warheads, and
antimissile defense techniques. The USSR's
reasons for conducting nuclear tests in the
fall of 1958 probably included the desire to
" For estimates of present and future cumulative
availability of fissionable material in the USSR,
see NIE 11-2-58. For theoretical ranges of mixed
nuclear weapon stockpiles, as well as illustrative
stockpiles showing reasonable maximum and
minimum limits for certain categories of weap-
ons, see the Supplement to NIE 11-2-58, "Possible
Soviet Allocations of Fissionable Material to
Weapons Stockpiles," 1958-1962, 30 September
1958 (Limited Distribution).
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fulfill technical requirements and, to a lesser
extent, the desire to create a situation in
which there would be increased world pressure
for a ban on further testing. Considering the
achievements of the Soviet nuclear test pro-
gram to date and the broader advantages the
USSR may feel it can achieve by negotiating
a multilateral test cessation, we believe that
technical requirements alone would not pre-
vent the USSR from joining in a test ban.
We also believe that if an agreed ban with a
suitable control system were negotiated, the
Soviets would be unlikely to attempt to carry
out a concealed test or abrogate the agree-
ment, at least for some time, but would in-
corporate into their weapons program such
refinements as could be achieved without new
test explosions.
122. Although we do not know the Soviet esti-
mate of minimum stockpile requirements for
fissionable materials, we doubt that such re-
quirements have been met and we know that
production facilities are expanding. There-
fore, while the USSR might enter negotiations
on cessation of weapons material production,
we believe it would neither unilaterally cease
such production nor agree to mutual cessa-
tion in the near future.
Guided Missiles
123. The USSR continues to press ahead with
an extensive research and development pro-
gram embracing all major categories of guided
missiles. Soviet achievements in surface-to-
surface ballistic missiles have been especially
impressive, and substantial success has also
been achieved in developing surface-to-air
missiles. While available evidence is not suf-
ficient to indicate comparable emphasis and
success in other Soviet missile programs, we
believe the USSR now has a variety of missile
systems available for operational use. It is
capable of developing advanced systems in all
categories during the period of this estimate,
and the experience it has already acquired in
missile production, troop training, logistics,
and deployment procedures will facilitate the
expansion of its operational capabilities."
124. On the basis of considerable evidence
concerning the research and development
program, we believe that for several years the
USSR has had available for operational use
surface-to-surface ballistic missiles with maxi-
mum ranges of about 100 n.m., 200 n.m., 350
n.m., and 700 n.m. It has also been develop-
ing and probably now has available for oper-
ational use a ballistic missile of 1,100 n.m.
maximum range. In addition, a very short
range antitank missile is probably now oper-
ational.
125. Intercontinental ballistic missile. Since
the completion of NIE 11-5-58, we have con-
ducted an intensive re-examination of the
Soviet ICBM test firing program and its im-
plications. On the basis of sufficient intelli-
gence coverage to establish with a high degree
of confidence the number of Soviet ICBM test
firings, it is clear that over the past year this
number has not been as great as we had an-
ticipated. Nevertheless, considering the So-
viets' progress in the whole field of missiles
and the capabilities demonstrated in their
ICBM, earth satellite, and other ballistic mis-
sile launchings, we continue to estimate that
the USSR will probably achieve a first opera-
tional capability with 10 prototype ICBMs at
some time during the year 1959. While it
is possible that a limited capability with com-
paratively unproven ICBMs might have been
established in 1958, we believe this to be
unlikely."
13
? 14
For an extended discussion of the USSR's guided
missile development program, and of factors
likely to affect its acquisition of substantial oper-
ational capabilities, see NIE 11-5-58, "Soviet
Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Ve-
hicles," 19 August 1958 (TOP SECRET) .
NOTE: Some statements by high Soviet officials
during the past year have indicated that the
USSR already possessed, or at least wished us to
think it possessed, a considerable operational
ICBM capability. Such a capability cannot be
ruled out as impossible if the Soviets have had a
test philosophy involving fewer long-range tests
and more reliance upon component tests at
Kapustin Yar than we think likely. Such a
philosophy would run greater risks of failure and
provide less assurance of accuracy and reliability
but also (if all went well) much more rapid
achievement of operational capability. The So-
viets may have believed the political and psycho-
logical value of ICBMs is so great as to justify
extreme measures to attain a substantial and
early deployment.
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126. When it first becomes operational, the
Soviet ICBM system will probably be capable
of delivering a nuclear payload to a maximum
range of about 5,500 n.m., with an accuracy
(CEP) of about 5 n.m. and a reliability of
about 50 percent after launching. (Some ad-
ditional percentage of missiles, which we are
unable to estimate, would prove unserviceable
before launching.) We estimate that the So-
viet ICBM is designed to carry a nuclear pay-
load of about 2,000 pounds, although there is
a possibility that it is designed to carry about
5,000 pounds. Reliability will probably be
considerably improved by the early 1960's.
At the beginning of the period 1962-1966,
the CEP could be about 3 n.m. with radio com-
mand/inertial guidance, and could be re-
duced to about 2 n.m. later in that period.
In 1960-1963, an all-inertial system with a
CEP of 3-5 n.m. will probably be available.
127. For air defense, the USSR now has avail-
able two different types of surface-to-air mis-
siles, one of which is employed in the fixed
missile complex around Moscow and the other
of which is probably suitable for employment
with the Moscow system or with a semimobile
system. These missiles have greatest effec-
tiveness against aircraft at altitudes of 30,000
to 60,000 feet; they are relatively short range
(15-30 n.m.) and almost certainly neither
is effective at very low altitudes (below about
1,500 feet) . During 1959-1961, surface-to-air
systems with increased range and improved
high and low altitude capabilities will prob-
ably become operational for defense of fixed
targets, field forces, and naval vessels. Short-
range air-to-air missiles (up to 6 n.m.) suitable
for employment with currently operational
Soviet fighter aircraft types are probably also
available, and a longer-range missile (15-20
n.m.) will probably be developed by 1960. In
1963-1966 the USSR will probably achieve a
first operational capability with a surface-to-
air system of limited effectiveness against
ICBMs and possibly against IRBMs.
128. For employment by submarines, the
USSR probably now has available a subsonic
cruise-type missile system capable of deliver-
ing nuclear warheads against land targets
34
within about 200 n.m. of the launching sub-
marine. These missiles could be launched by
a submarine only after surfacing. In 1961-
1963 the USSR will probably have available
for first operational use a submarine-launched
ballistic missile system capable of delivering
nuclear warheads from a submerged subma-
rine to a range of about 1,000 n.m. It is also
possible that the USSR will develop a 1,000
n.m. cruise-type system for first operational
use in 1960.
129. A Soviet air-to-surface missile system is
now capable of carrying nuclear warheads
at subsonic speed to a range of about 55 n.m.
against ships and other targets clearly defin-
able on radar. The USSR will probably have
operational in 1960-1961 a supersonic air-to-
surface missile with a range of at least 100
n.m., suitable for employment against a wide
variety of targets.
Chemical and Biological Warfare
130. Current Soviet tactical doctrine recog-
nizes the potentialities of CW and BW as use-
ful complements to other weapons. Soviet
military forces receive thorough training in
the offensive use of CW as well as in defense
against it. A stockpile of CW agents is be-
lieved to be maintained at the World War II
level and may have been increased. It prob-
ably consists of the nerve agents, principally
Tabun (GA) and in lesser quantity Sarin
(GB), as well as standard agents such as mus-
tard. A nerve agent of the "V" type, far more
persistent and toxic than the "G" agents, may
have been in production in the USSR since
1956. Research is probably also under way in
the field of nonlethal, incapacitating agents.
131. The Soviets possess standard munitions
for the dissemination of toxic agents by artil-
lery shells, and it is probable that a supply
of such munitions is normally carried by ar-
tillery units. CW agent dispersion by bombs
and aircraft spray is also contemplated. Im-
proved aerosol-producing devices necessary to
the effective employment of "V" agents are
believed to be under development. It is also
possible that CW warheads have been devel-
oped for certain types of guided missiles.
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132. The existence of an active Soviet BW re-
search and development program has been
confirmed, through identification of a re-
search center and field test site as well as
through extensive Soviet literature applicable
to this subject. While most known Soviet re-
search is also applicable to public health prob-
lems, we believe the Soviet program includes
research on antipersonnel, antilivestock, and
possibly anticrop agents. There is no evidence
of the existence of a mass-production facility
for BW agents, but existing plants for the
production of biologicals, together with other
laboratories, could easily produce BW agents
in quantities sufficient for clandestine employ-
ment and probably for larger-scale use.
133. In the field of defense against BW and
CW, present Soviet capabilities are at least
comparable to those of the major Western na-
tions, and in the case of CW are probably
superior. Soviet troops are well-equipped with
satisfactory CW defense items, many of which
are also suitable for use in defense against
BW. The current issue gas mask affords ade-
quate protection against inhalation of known
toxic agents, and articles of protective cloth-
ing issued to all troops afford protection
against toxic agent spray and area contamina-
tion. Extensive programs continue to indoc-
trinate the civilian populace as well as mili-
tary personnel in defensive techniques.
Electromagnetic Warfare
134. We believe that at present the USSR has
an appreciable capability for jamming West-
ern radars at frequencies up to 10,000 mc/s
and possibly higher, and especially for jam-
ming at lower frequencies normally used in
Western long-range radio communications.
The Soviets are now producing magnetrons
and traveling wave tubes suitable for jamming
in the microwave frequencies, and research
in this field is continuing. They are also cur-
rently employing passive detection equipment
believed capable of detecting signals from the
very low frequencies up into the microwave
spectrum. By 1963, the USSR will have in
operational use equipment capable of jam-
ming at frequencies from 10 kc/s through
35
36,000 mc/s, including all frequencies likely
to be employed by Western communications,
radar, and navigation equipment.
135. In recent months a trend toward greater
frequency diversification in Soviet radar and
radio equipment has appeared, in contrast
to the earlier concentration of frequencies in
a few narrow bands. The USSR is capable of
further increasing the spread of frequencies
employed and of developing improved anti-
jamming techniques, but through 1963 So-
viet electronic systems will probably still be
subject to disruption by properly employed
techniques.
STRENGTHS AND CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET
FORCES
136. High command. Top control over all ad-
ministrative and operational activity in the
Soviet military establishment is vested in a
single authority, the Minister of Defense. Di-
rectly under the Minister of Defense is a single
general staff, organized along functional lines
into operations, intelligence, communications,
military transportation, organization and mo-
bilization, historical, and topographical sec-
tions. The major administrative elements of
the Soviet armed forces include the chief di-
rectorates of ground, air, air defense, and
naval forces, each headed by a commander-in-
chief who reports directly to the Minister of
Defense. Operational control flows in a direct
chain of command from the Minister of De-
fense to the commanders of the major opera-
tional elements: military districts, groups of
forces, naval fleets, air defense forces, Long
Range Aviation, and possibly airborne forces.
137. Despite extreme centralization of re-
sponsibility, the Soviet command system re-
tains sufficient flexibility to effect integrated
employment of all types of forces in either
large- or small-scale operations. Constant at-
tention to new requirements will bring about
significant changes in armament and some re-
alignment among components, but we antici-
pate no radical alteration of the Soviet high
command structure in the near future. In
the following paragraphs, the different types
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of Soviet forces are discussed in terms of their
capabilities to perform those military missions
which we believe would be assigned by the
Soviet high command, i.e., long-range attack,
air defense, major land campaigns, and naval
warfare.
Long-Range Striking Forces
138. Since the end of World War II the USSR
has devoted a major effort to the develop-
ment of nuclear striking forces capable of
attacking distant military, industrial, and
other targets, not only in and near Eurasia
but in North America as well. This effort has
been dictated by the fact that the US, itself
possessed of long-range striking forces, lay
beyond the range of traditional Soviet mili-
tary power. The principal component of So-
viet military strength presently capable of
long-range nuclear attack is Long Range Avia-
tion, equipped with medium and heavy bomb-
ers. The medium bombers of Naval and Tac-
tical Aviation, as well as the light bombers
of these components, contribute to the Soviet
capability for attack on targets in Eurasia
and its periphery. Ground-launched and sub-
marine-launched guided missiles probably
now supplement the bomber capability.
139. Long-range bombers. We estimate the
strength of Soviet Long Range Aviation, as of
1 October 1958, at approximately 1,450 bomb-
ers, including about 400 obsolete BULL pis-
ton medium bombers, about 950 BADGER jet
medium bombers, and about 100 to 125 BISON
jet and BEAR turboprop heavy bombers. At
least one-fourth of the BISON and BADGER
regiments in this force have some aircraft of
these types which are convertible tanker-
bombers. Medium bombers have also been
supplied to other components?there are now
about 250 BADGERs and a few BULLs in
Naval Aviation units and about 100 BADGERs
in Tactical Aviation units.
140. The capabilities of Long Range Aviation
have been markedly increased in the last five
years, through the introduction of large num-
bers of modern aircraft, more realistic and
larger-scale training exercises, improvement
of potential staging bases in the Arctic, de-
velopment of inflight refueling, and improve-
ment of electronic equipment for ECM, bomb-
ing, navigation and other purposes. Nuclear
weapons storage sites have been identified at
many Long Range Aviation home bases, and
we believe that nuclear bombs are now the
primary weapons of this force. A few
BADGER units of both Long Range and Naval
Aviation are probably now trained and
equipped to employ air-to-surface missiles
suitable for use against ships and other well-
defined targets.
141. Despite these improvements Soviet Long
Range Aviation still consists primarily of me-
dium bombers, best suited for operations
against targets in Eurasia and its periphery,
and capable of attacking the continental US
only through extensive use of one-way mis-
sions. The history of the Soviet heavy bomber
program leads us to believe that despite the
efforts devoted to developing the BISON and
BEAR, Soviet planners probably decided
within the last year or two to forego a rapid
build-up with present heavy bomber models.
This decision may have been reached as a
result of one or more of the following factors:
dissatisfaction with the performance of
BISON and BEAR; progress in developing new
or improved bombers; confidence in Soviet
ability to acquire an ICBM capability at an
early date. Contributing to the decision may
have been a Soviet belief that the USSR's me-
dium bomber force, together with a small
heavy bomber capability, is at least tempo-
rarily acceptable as a deterrent force, and for
use against the US should general war occur.
142. The Soviets will almost certainly con-
tinue to strive for technological superiority
over the US in intercontinental weapon sys-
tems. Presumably they set great store by the
ICBM as posing an entirely new type of threat.
But Soviet military planners almost certainly
feel that even though they have good pros-
pects of acquiring a substantial long-range
striking capability with missiles, manned
bombers will still be required. Manned
bombers, especially advanced types, will pro-
vide the Soviets with flexibility and diversifi-
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cation of attack capabilities, and will remain
particularly applicable for attacks on small,
hardened targets, damage assessment, and
reconnaissance. We therefore believe that the
USSR will retain a large force of long-range
bombers throughout the period of this esti-
mate, although its size will probably decline
gradually. Its inflight refueling techniques
will probably be improved and extended to a
larger part of the force; however, there is
no present evidence of the development of an
aircraft specifically for use as a tanker. Im-
proved electronic and other supporting equip-
ment will probably be provided. Air-to-sur-
face missile launching capabilities will prob-
ably be augmented as more effective missiles
are developed.
143. Future projections of the strength and
composition of Soviet Long Range Aviation
are complicated by the fact that at present
the entire Soviet medium and heavy bomber
industry is in a state of transition, involving
considerably less current production than a
year or two ago. Production at BADGER
plants now appears to be tapering off, al-
though it will probably be sufficient to provide
moderate further increases in the jet medium
bomber force. The one identified BISON
plant, at Moscow, has continued to produce
aircraft of this type at a low and uneven rate,
while its design bureau has been working to
develop a new type of large bomber. A total
of about a dozen BISONs have been completed
since April 1958, bringing cumulative produc-
tion to about 100 aircraft. While considerably
less evidence is available on BEAR production,
we believe it unlikely that any new BEAR
bombers have been produced for well over a
year, or that more than 50 to 60 were produced
altogether. In the interim, the one identified
producer has probably been overhauling exist-
ing BEARs, modifying some aircraft of this
type for transport use, and building a few
new transports of the CLEAT type (similar to
the BEAR). Despite the decline in long-range
bomber production, the USSR's plant capacity
suitable for production of large aircraft has
been considerably enlarged over the last few
years, and there is some evidence to suggest
37
that several plants are preparing to produce
large bombers or transports.
144. Research and development in new
bomber types has continued and we believe
that it will be intensively pursued throughout
the period of this estimate. Considering the
demonstrated level of Soviet technology in
such fields as aircraft propulsion and aero-
dynamics, and the normal development of
these capabilities, we have estimated that
within the next few years the USSR could
probably place into operational units: (a)
improved versions of the BISON and BADGER,
at any time; (b) a new subsonic heavy
bomber with range and other performance
characteristics somewhat better than those
of an improved BISON, in 1959 or 1960; (c)
a new medium bomber with supersonic
"dash" capabilities and a range approximat-
ing that of an improved BADGER, in 1960
or 1961.
145. Since none of these aircraft types would
add substantially to Soviet capabilities for
two-way intercontinental operations, we have
reasoned that the USSR might proceed di-
rectly to more advanced types, such as a
heavy bomber powered by high-energy chemi-
cal fuel, capable of supersonic speed and
high altitude, or possibly a subsonic nuclear-
powered aircraft capable of long endurance,
even at low altitudes. We continue to esti-
mate that some aircraft of either or both
these types could probably be in operational
units by mid-1963. We also believe that with-
in the next few years the USSR could fly
an airborne nuclear testbed, with at least
one nuclear power unit providing useful
thrust during some phase of the flight.15
The attainment of a nuclear propulsion sys-
tem for operational use in supersonic air-
craft would probably require a long test and
15
The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for In-
telligence, Department of the Navy, and the
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believe
that the USSR could fly such a testbed during
1959. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
USAF, believes that an aircraft nuclear propul-
sion system could now be undergoing flight tests
in a prototype airframe.
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development program extending beyond the
period of this estimate.16
146. Recent evidence of Soviet developmental
efforts includes the observation at Moscow
of a new bomber, designated BOUNDER, of
large size and heavy weight, with a modified
delta-wing configuration apparently designed
for supersonic flight. With the limited in-
formation available, it has not been possible
to determine the BOUNDER's intended
mission, but we believe it could repre-
sent a significant step forward in So-
viet bomber design. Preliminary analysis
indicates BOUNDER to be powered by four
turbojet engines. The use of conventional
fuels would give it a range marginal for in-
tercontinental bombing. The possibility for.
development of BOUNDER with a more ad-
vanced propulsion system exists, and the de-
sign intent for a nuclear-powered vehicle can-
not be excluded at this time. However,
present information is inadequate to permit
an estimate of BOUNDER's probable devel-
opment.
147. Our evidence also continues to support
the existence of one or more other proto-
types of new or improved long-range bombers.
Past experience cautions that existing pro-
totypes may represent competitive designs.
The Soviets may not yet have evaluated such
prototypes in relation to each other or to
" See SNIE 11-58, "Possible Soviet Long Range
Bomber Development, 1958-1962," 4 March 1958
(SECRET) , and SNIE 11-7-58, "Strength and
Composition of the Soviet Long Range Bomber
Force," 5 June 1958 (TOP SECRET) . For esti-
mated performance characteristics of Soviet
long-range bombers for operational use to 1961,
see Annex, Table 6.
their missile programs. Such evaluation will
have an important bearing on the future
strength and composition of Long Range
Aviation.
148. We continue to project Soviet heavy
bomber and tanker strength for mid-1960
as lying within the range of 100 to 200 air-
craft. The high side reflects a Soviet option
to produce additional aircraft of BISON and
perhaps BEAR types, and perhaps to intro-
duce a few of a new heavy bomber into op-
erational units. The low side reflects their
option to forego a further build-up in heavy
bombers through mid-1960, relying primarily
on their one-way medium bomber capability
against the US for at least a little longer.
Our estimates of trends in Long Range Avia-
tion beyond 1960 are more uncertain, but
reflect our belief that the USSR will prob-
ably introduce new or improved interconti-
nental bombers during the period of this
estimate. Should Soviet planners desire a
large force of heavy bombers and tankers,
there is no question that they could have
five or six hundred BISONs, BEARs, and new
heavy bombers in units by mid-1963. As
indicated in the table below, however, it
seems to us more likely that the heavy
bomber and tanker force will remain con-
siderably smaller than this?say, about two
or three hundred, including some of new
types.
149. Intercontinental ballistic missiles. We
believe that Soviet planners intend to acquire
a sizable ICBM operational capability at the
earliest practicable date. However, we have
insufficient evidence to judge the magnitude
and pace of a Soviet program to produce
SOVIET LONG RANGE AVIATION
(Estimated Strength in Operational Units)
HEAVY BOMBERS
1 Oct 58
Mid-1959
Mid-1960
Mid-1961
Mid-1962
Mid-1963
AND TANKERS
100-
125
100- 150
100- 200
150- 250
200-
300
200-
300
MEDIUM BOMBERS
AND TANKERS
Jet
950
1,025
1,100
1,100
900
800
Piston
400
300
150
TOTALS 1,450-1,475 1,425-1,475
1,350-1,450 1,250-1,350 1,100-1,200 1,000-1,100
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and deploy ICBMs. Considerable preparations
for a build-up of operational ICBM capabilities
could already have been made without detec-
tion by intelligence, as implied by Khru-
shchev's recent statement that the production
of ICBMs has been "successfully set up." In
the light of such indirect evidence as exists,
we have considered those factors which would
affect an operational ICBM build-up, includ-
ing the Soviet capacity to produce missiles
and associated equipment, and concurrently
to complete launching facilities, establish
logistic lines, and train operational units.
150. Taking into account the complexities of
the tasks which would have to be accom-
plished, we believe that the Soviets could
achieve an operational capability with 500
ICBMs 17 about three years after first opera-
tional capability date. Based on our estimate
that a first operational capability will prob-
ably be achieved in 1959, we therefore be-
lieve that a capability with 500 ICBMs could
be achieved some time in 1962. With over-
riding priority and exceptional success in the
test and production program, this capability
might be achieved in as little as two years
after first operational capability date, i.e.,
some time in 1961. Assuming a build-up in
three years from first operational capability
to a capability with 500 ICBMs, a capabil-
ity with 100 ICBMs 18 would be achieved in
about a year and a half; assuming a two
year build-up, 100 would be achieved in about
a year. The achievement of operational ca-
pabilities such as these within the time periods
estimated would require an extremely high
order of planning and accomplishment, and
would also require an increase in the average
rate of ICBM firings for test and training
purposes.
151. There is evidence that mobility is an
important consideration in Soviet ballistic
missile development generally. For an ICBM
system a degree of mobility could be obtained
by use of rail transport to previously pre-
" " These numbers of ICBMs are selected arbitrar-
ily in order to provide some measure of the Soviet
production and deployment capacity; they do not
represent an estimate of the probable Soviet re-
quirement or stockpile.
pared launching sites, some of which would
have only a minimum of fixed equipment.
This would provide flexibility and security
through the use of relatively simple alternate
launching sites which would be difficult to
identify and locate. Our estimate of the So-
viet capacity to acquire ICBM operational
capabilities, given in the preceding paragraph,
applies to either a rail-transportable system
or a system of moderately hardened fixed
launching sites, or a combination of the two.
152. Other long-range ballistic missiles. The
Soviets probably consider ballistic missiles of
700 and 1,100 n.m. maximum range as con-
tributing primarily to their capabilities to de-
liver nuclear payloads on distant, fixed tar-
gets in Eurasia and its periphery, although
shorter-range ballistic missiles could also be
employed for this purpose within their range.
We estimate that nuclear warheads would be
provided for virtually all missiles of 700 and
1,100 n.m. range, but we do not exclude the
possibility of CW use in some 700 n.m. mis-
siles. On the basis of available intelligence,
we cannot judge the present scale of produc-
tion and we have not identified any units
equipped with these missiles. It is possible
that at present the USSR has only a very
limited capability to employ them in military
operations. But considering such factors as
estimated Soviet requirements, nuclear ma-
terials availability, and experience in shorter
range missiles, we believe that the USSR
may now have an operational capability with
as many as several hundred ballistic missiles
of 700 n.m. range, and with a few 1,100 n.m.
missiles.
153. The wide availability of medium and
light bombers capable of reaching Eurasian
targets probably reduces Soviet requirements
for missiles of these ranges. Since the 700-
mile missile has probably been operational
since 1956, we believe that the Soviets may
meet their requirements for this missile early
in the period of this estimate. A build-up
in 1,100 n.m. missiles would take longer.
Missiles of these types are probably designed
for road or rail mobility. They are probably
not deployed in Satellite areas at present,
but some operational units may exist within
the USSR.
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154. Missile-launching submarines. A few
conventional submarines have probably been
converted for topside stowage and launching
of 200 n.m. cruise-type missiles. The Soviets
could convert a large number of existing sub-
marines, but the problems involved lead us
to believe that such conversion is not likely
to be large-scale. A total of about 20 long-
range submarines could be converted within
4-6 months of a decision to do so. The USSR
is probably also developing one or more new
types of missile-launching submarines, de-
signed for internal missile stowage. These
types will probably include ballistic missile
submarines for first operational use in 1961-
1963, and possibly cruise-type missile sub-
marines at an earlier date. If the latter are
in fact developed and constructed, the USSR
may have about 35 submarines, some nuclear
and some conventional-powered, equipped for
internal missile stowage by mid-1963.
155. Capabilities for long-range attack. Pres-
ent Soviet capabilities for attack on the con-
tinental US are limited by the relatively small
numbers of operational heavy bombers, the
requirement to stage most bombers through
forward bases in the Arctic, and the lack of a
substantial infiight refueling capability.
Nevertheless, by employing their entire heavy
bomber force, many of their medium bombers,
and their small submarine-launched missile
capability, the Soviets could mount large-
scale initial nuclear attacks against retali-
atory strengths and other war-making cap-
abilities in North America. The actual weight
of attack launched against the US would de-
pend upon the Soviet judgment as to the
optimum combination of surprise and weight
of attack against all areas where US and
Allied nuclear retaliatory capabilities and
other essential targets are located. Against
those Western capabilities deployed on the
periphery of the Bloc, the Soviets could em-
ploy medium bombers, light bombers, and
ballistic missiles with ranges up to 700 and
probably 1,100 n.m. Bombs and air-to-sur-
face missiles could be employed against West-
ern naval forces possessing nuclear strike
capabilities. All Western targets of impor-
40
tance in North America and overseas, as well
as major naval operating areas, are within
range of one or more of the Soviet weapon
systems described above, although most of
the Soviet bombers would have to be dis-
patched on one-way missions to reach targets
in the continental US.
156. Soviet long-range striking capabilities
will increase markedly as the stockpile of nu-
clear weapons grows, improved bombers are
introduced, the readiness and proficiency of
the bomber force increases, and especially
as the Soviet capability to deliver nuclear
weapons by guided missiles expands.19 The
USSR will rely increasingly upon missiles as
long-range delivery systems as the period ad-
vances. While Soviet planners almost cer-
tainly recognize that ballistic missiles can
impose maximum surprise and difficulty of
interception, they probably consider that for
some years the accuracy and payload capacity
of such missiles will be inferior to those of
manned aircraft of comparable ranges. We
therefore believe that through the period of
this estimate, Soviet long-range striking ca-
pabilities will lie primarily in a mixed force of
manned bombers (probably equipped increas-
ingly with air-to-surface missiles) and ballistic
missiles. The Soviets may consider that bal-
listic missiles can best be employed to neu-
tralize Western retaliatory and other capabil-
ities temporarily in an initial blow, relying
upon bombers for follow-up attacks of maxi-
mum weight. In any event, effective Soviet
employment of long-range striking capabili-
ties against Western retaliatory and other es-
sential targets will still face great difficulties
of timing and distribution of attack against
widely deployed, mobile, and ready Western
strengths. The USSR's missile-carrying sub-
marines will contribute further to its capabili-
ties, but the scale of their use in an initial
attack would depend upon the Soviet judg-
ment of the risk of premature disclosure of
intent.
19 The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army, does not concur in this
sentence. See his footnote to paragraph 22 of
The Summary.
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Air Defense Forces
157. All Bloc forces useful for air defense are
organized for participation in an integrated
system which places primary emphasis on
providing defense in depth for key administra-
tive, industrial, and military centers within
the USSR. We believe that air defense will
continue to be given high priority.
158. Air defense weapons. The principal
current weapon system for defense of Sino-
Soviet Bloc targets against high-altitude at-
tack is the high-performance jet fighter, of
which there are over 14,000 in operational
units throughout the Bloc. More than 10,000
of these fighters are in Soviet units, about
4,200 of them in units whose sole mission is
air defense and the remainder in units with air
defense as one of their primary missions. The
principal day fighter in Soviet forces is the
subsonic FRESCO, although about 1,200 su-
personic FARMER day fighters were in units
as of 1 October 1958. Also in service are the
FLASHLIGHT all-weather fighter, as well as
the FRESCO "D" and FARMER "B" with lim-
ited all-weather capabilities, but their intro-
duction has proceeded at a relatively slow
pace. Total Soviet strength in the FLASH-
LIGHT and FRESCO "D" types was about
1,730 as of 1 October 1958, with some FARMER
"B" types also in operational units.
159. Most Bloc jet fighters in operational units
have combat ceilings of 50,000-55,000 feet;
FARMER and certain FRESCO versions prob-
ably have combat ceilings on the order of
60,000 feet. During 1959-1963 the USSR will
probably introduce new day and all-weather
fighter types, whose characteristics will em-
phasize speed and altitude at the expense of
combat radius. By 1962 the latest operational
Soviet fighters will probably be capable of
operating at altitudes up to 67,000 feet, and of
climbing to 40,000 feet in less than two min-
utes." Air-to-air missiles are probably now
available to improve the kill capabilities of
Soviet interceptors, although we have no evi-
dence that they have as yet been supplied to
operational units. Total numerical strength
" For estimated performance characteristics of
Soviet fighter aircraft, see Annex, Table 9.
in fighters will probably decrease after another
year or two, because of the growing destruc-
tive power of individual interceptors, greater
demands on industrial capacity resulting from
the advent of more complex fighters, and the
increasing availability and capabilities of sur-
face-to-air missile systems.
160. Surface-to-air missiles designed for op-
timum effectiveness at altitudes of 30,000-
60,000 feet and probably having limited effec-
tiveness at 80,000 feet are now in operation in
a dense and costly complex of 56 sites around
Moscow. This complex, which could include
a limited number of missiles with nuclear war-
heads, can probably direct a very high rate of
fire against multiple targets under all weather
conditions. It is probably ineffective against
very low altitude attack, however. We believe
the USSR may have altered an earlier inten-
tion to install a somewhat similar surface-to-
air missile complex around Leningrad, and
that the missile defenses of this and other
critical Soviet targets will employ systems with
greater flexibility and less cost than that at
Moscow. There is now some evidence of the
installation of surface-to-air missile sites in a
few other key areas, such as Baku. We believe
that more such sites will be built through the
period of this estimate as improved systems
for both high and low altitude defense become
available, and that surface-to-air missiles will
be provided for numerous Soviet fixed targets
as well as field forces and naval vessels. Sur-
face-to-air defenses in key areas will probably
become effective both at very low altitudes and
up to 90,000 feet during the period.
161. The Soviets continue to employ antiair-
craft guns for defense of field forces and fixed
targets, including airfields. More than 25,000
light and medium antiaircraft guns are be-
lieved to be available to Soviet forces at pres-
ent; in addition, about 5,000 are available to
East European forces and nearly 4,000 to Com-
munist China, North Korea, and North Viet-
nam. Large numbers of automatic antiair-
craft machine guns are also available to field
forces. As suitable surface-to-air missiles be-
come available in quantity, a large portion of
the medium and some light antiaircraft guns
will probably be phased out of the air defenses
of static targets in the USSR.
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162. Air defense radar and control equipment.
Radar coverage now extends over the entire
USSR and East European Satellite area, ex-
cept for certain inland portions of central
and eastern Siberia; coverage also extends
along the entire coastal region of Communist
China. The long-standing gaps in radar cov-
erage in the Soviet Arctic are now believed to
have been filled, although this deployment is
probably not as extensive as in many other
areas. About 1,200 heavy prime radars, pri-
marily of the TOKEN type, and about 3,000
light auxiliary radars are employed in various
combinations at about 1,700 radar sites in the
Sino-Soviet Bloc. Under average conditions,
TOKEN radars can probably detect jet me-
dium bomber aircraft, penetrating at altitudes
up to their combat ceilings, at distances be-
tween about 80 and about 180 n.m. from radar
sites. New radars of much higher quality, in-
cluding radars capable of more accurate
height-finding, are already in service and will
probably be widely deployed during 1959-
1963.21
163. For several years the Soviets have been
developing computers and other components
suitable for data-handling use. The use of
such equipment will have a marked effect in
increasing traffic-handling capabilities, reduc-
ing system reaction time, and improving co-
ordination within the Soviet air defense sys-
tem. For example, it is expected that data-
handling equipment will increase the traffic
capacity of each Soviet radar reporting site
to at least 20 simultaneous tracks. We believe
that an air defense system with some semi-
automatic features, including a data-link sys-
tem for vectoring interceptors, is being widely
deployed in western USSR in association with
early warning and GCI sites. This system is
believed to be similar in concept to the US
SAGE system, but less complex. It will prob-
ably come into use throughout the USSR and
East Europe within a few years. The Soviets
are also introducing a new IFF system which
will probably be fully operational by 1960.
164. Air defense concentrations. The areas of
highest concentration of Bloc air defense
21 Estimated performance characteristics of Soviet
early warning and ground-controlled intercept
radars are given in Annex, Table 10.
42
weapons and associated equipment include
that portion of European USSR from the Kola
Peninsula to the Caspian Sea, East Germany,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Maritime and
Sakhalin areas of the Soviet Far East. High
defense concentrations are also found at some
specific locations outside these areas, such as
Tashkent, Novosibirsk, and Khabarovsk. The
approaches to Moscow are by far the most
heavily defended of these areas, including (in
addition to the surface-to-air missile complex
mentioned above) about 1,100 day and 275
all-weather fighters as well as about 700 anti-
aircraft guns. We believe the Moscow de-
fenses are a unique case, dictated by the im-
portance of that area to the USSR.
165. Passive defense. Large passive defense
organizations contribute to the air defense
readiness of both military personnel and the
civilian population. Civil defense training is
a normal part of the program of DOSAAF, the
Soviet paramilitary mass organization whose
recruitment has been stepped up markedly in
recent years. The incorporation of air raid
shelters into newly constructed buildings is a
program of long standing in the USSR. This
program probably now affords some degree of
shelter for roughly one-sixth of the urban
population of the USSR, and this proportion
will probably rise considerably during the pe-
riod to 1963. Although most existing shelters
were not designed for protection against blast
from nuclear weapons, some newer building
shelters are of heavier construction. It is
probable that up-to-date protection is avail-
able to selected elements of the government,
but the general population is inadequately
prepared against large-scale nuclear attack.
166. Air defense capabilities. Present Soviet
air defense capabilities against attack by air-
craft and cruise-type missiles can be sum-
marized in general terms as follows:
(a) Against penetrations conducted during
daylight and in clear weather, at altitudes be-
tween about 5,000 feet and about 45,000 feet,
capabilities are greatest.
(b) At altitudes above about 45,000 feet,
capabilities would decrease progressively as
altitude increased, except in the limited areas
equipped with surface-to-air missiles where
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capabilities would be unimpaired to at least
60,000 feet.
(c) At altitudes below about 5,000 feet,
capabilities would decrease progressively as
altitude decreased, and would probably be seri-
ously reduced at altitudes below about 1,500
feet.
(d) Against penetrations conducted at
night and under conditions of poor visibility,
the capabilities of the system would be greatly
reduced because of the limited availability of
all-weather fighters and surface-to-air mis-
siles.
(e) Against varied penetration tactics uti-
lizing altitude stacking, diversionary maneu-
vers, decoys, and electronic countermeasures,
the capabilities of the system would be dimin-
ished through disruption and saturation.
167. The amount of warning time available
significantly affects the capabilities of air de-
fenses in various areas of the Bloc. Early
warning radar could now give Moscow and
many other targets in the interior more than
one hour's warning of attacks made with pres-
ent Western bomber types. The more limited
early warning time available in Bloc border
areas would reduce the effectiveness of the de-
fenses of even heavily-defended targets in such
areas. As the speeds of Western delivery ve-
hicles increase, the problem of warning time
will become more critical, despite probable So-
viet employment of picket ships, airborne ra-
dar and other extensions of warning capa-
bilities.
168. Over-all Bloc capabilities against aircraft
and cruise-type missiles will increase, however,
through improvements in the performance
characteristics of most Soviet air defense
equipment and especially through the wide
employment of semiautomatic air defense con-
trol. Air defense guided missile capabilities
will increase. Higher-performance fighters
will be employed, and the proportion of all-
weather fighters in Soviet forces may increase
to about 60 percent. But the Soviets will con-
tinue to have difficulty in opposing very low
altitude attack and air defense electronic sys-
tems will still be subject to disruption and
saturation. The USSR will probably not have
an operational weapon system with even lim-
ited effectiveness against ballistic missiles un-
til the very end of this period or later.
Ground Forces and Tactical Air Forces
169. The Soviet ground forces represent the
largest part of the Soviet military establish-
ment and are closely supported by tactical
aviation, consisting of fighters trained in the
ground attack role (in addition to their air
defense role) and light and medium bombers
trained in ground support bombing tech-
niques. These forces are well-balanced, ably
led, and equipped for the most part with ex-
cellent materiel of modern design. Units are
distributed among 17 military districts in the
USSR and three groups of forces in the Euro-
pean Satellites. The strongest concentrations
are in East Germany, the western and south-
ern border regions of the USSR, and the Mari-
time area of the Soviet Far East. Stockpiles
maintained in these areas are believed suffi-
cient to support large-scale ground combat
operations for several months without replen-
ishment from current production.
170. The order of battle of Soviet Army ground
forces is estimated at about 175 line divisions
plus supporting units. These divisions prob-
ably average about 70 percent of authorized
wartime strength, although the manning level
in some interior districts may be as low as
30 percent. All units probably have a high
proportion of authorized officer strength, how-
ever, and full equipment is believed to be kept
locally available. These peacetime manning
practices, together with standard conscription
and stockpiling programs, would probably en-
able all Soviet line divisions to be brought to
full strength by M+ 10. Conversion to a war
footing could be executed rapidly, and about
125 additional line divisions could be mobilized
by M+30.
171. There has been an extensive program
over the last several years to modernize and
reorganize the Soviet ground forces to meet
the requirements of modern warfare. More
advanced designs of practically all types of
equipment have appeared. The firepower of
individual units has been increased markedly,
additional vehicles (including amphibious ve-
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hides) have been provided, and communica-
tions equipment has been augmented.
172. A reorganization in the Group of Soviet
Forces, Germany, during 1957 produced a new
type of Soviet line division?the motorized
rifle division?which appears well-adapted for
fast, hard-hitting action. The mechanized
divisions were converted to the new motorized
type by removing heavy tank and assault gun
units, and the rifle divisions were converted
by addition of medium tanks, armored per-
sonnel carriers and rocket launcher. During
the same period a resubordination of divisions
resulted in the creation of "tank armies" com-
posed exclusively of tank divisions to provide
for rapid, deep exploitation in enemy rear
areas. The other units remain grouped into
"combined arms" armies, now composed of
motorized rifle and tank divisions. We be-
lieve that similar developments have been un-
der way since 1956 throughout the Soviet
ground forces.
173. These changes are in line with revised
Soviet tactical doctrine which emphasizes the
need to supplement standard ground force
tactics and training in order to meet the con-
ditions of nuclear warfare. New doctrine
stresses firepower, mobility and maneuverabil-
ity, greater initiative, deeper objectives, inten-
sified reconnaissance and the protection of
individuals and units against the effects of
atomic and chemical weapons. It also envis-
ages the tactical use of nuclear weapons in
support of Soviet field force operations.
174. Surface-to-surface ballistic missiles with
ranges of 100 n.m., 200 n.m., and 350 n.m.
have probably been available for operational
use since 1954. We believe these missile types
are intended for mobile use in support of field
forces, and for attacking fixed targets such as
air bases. Depending upon operational consid-
erations and the availability of nuclear war-
head materials, nuclear, HE, or CW warheads
could be employed. We have only a small
amount of evidence of military units equipped
to launch ballistic missiles, and it is possible
that at present the Soviet capability to em-
ploy them in military operations is quite
small. On the other hand, the Soviets have
had experience in producing missiles in the
100-350 n.m. range class, probably have an
extensive production capacity, and have had
ample time to train troops in their use. Very
recent evidence indicates that Soviet missile
units equipped with 100 n.m. missiles may
have been deployed to East Germany. It is
possible therefore, that the USSR's present
operational capability in the 100-350 n.m.
range class comprises as many as several thou-
sand missiles, although in view of other So-
viet requirements for nuclear materials it is
unlikely that many would be equipped with
nuclear warheads at present. Missiles of
these types may now be held in the high com-
mand reserve, but as their availability in-
creases they will probably be organically as-
signed to field armies. Some 700 n.m. missiles
may also be allocated to the support of Soviet
field forces.
175. Air support for ground operations is pro-
vided mainly by Tactical Aviation, the largest
single component of the Soviet air forces. Its
units are assigned to the military districts and
groups of forces. Tactical Aviation has ac-
quired at least some nuclear delivery capabil-
ity. It is now equipped (as of 1 October 1958)
with jet aircraft estimated to include about
4,700 fighters and 2,800 light bombers. The
fighter units are predominantly equipped with
FAGOTs and FRESCOs; however, the more
advanced FARMER day fighter and FLASH-
LIGHT all-weather fighter are also in service.
Tactical bomber units are still equipped with
the obsolescent BEAGLE, although a few units
have received BADGER jet medium bombers.
Prototypes of several new fighter types and
two new jet light bombers have been displayed
since 1956, but none of these aircraft has been
identified in an operational unit.
176. The increasing availability of nuclear
weapons and guided missiles during 1959-1963
will bring further changes in equipment and
organization of Soviet ground and tactical air
forces and a steady improvement in their ca-
pabilities. We believe that these changes will
be evolutionary in nature, and do not antici-
pate any major alterations in size or deploy-
ment. While nuclear weapons and guided
missiles probably will be used in support of
tactical operations, conventional field artillery
and unguided rockets will continue to provide
the major direct fire support for units in close
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combat. Tactical Aviation will probably re-
ceive new supersonic fighters and bombers,
but both fighters and bombers are expected to
decline in numbers as increasing reliance is
placed on guided missiles.
177. The USSR has sizable airborne forces,
estimated at 10 divisions and a total strength
of about 100,000 men. Airborne troops are
well-equipped, but the air transport compo-
nent has lagged far behind combat air units
in the Soviet aircraft re-equipment program.
Aviation of Airborne Troops now comprises
approximately 500 light transports of the
CAB, COACH, and CRATE types, 200 BULL
medium bombers converted to transport use,
200 helicopters and 200 gliders. This strength
could be augmented substantially by other
military and civil transports.
178. The appearance of new transports and
air-transportable equipment indicates that
the USSR is now paying increasing attention
to the development of its airborne forces. So-
viet airlift capabilities will probably increase
considerably during 1959-1963 as additional
helicopters and transports are introduced.
The BULL will probably be employed as an
interim medium transport until late in the
period, when it will have been replaced by the
CAMP twin-turboprop assault transport
(which has, however, not yet appeared in
units) and possibly other advanced types.
Better auxiliary transport will also become
available as improved aircraft are introduced
into civil aviation. In 1957, a number of new
transports were displayed, including the CAT
and COOT turboprop medium transports, a
four turbojet transport designated COOKER,
and a turboprop heavy transport, the CLEAT.
Of these aircraft, only the COOT is now in
service, and there is some evidence that tech-
nical difficulties have caused the transport
program to proceed more slowly than previ-
ously estimated.22
Capabilities for Major Land Campaigns
179. Soviet ground forces are capable of con-
ducting large-scale operations on several
22
For estimated performance characteristics of
Soviet transport aircraft, see Annex, Table 8.
45
fronts into peripheral areas, separately or con-
currently. These operations could be sup-
ported by the large available air forces, but
the high priority assigned to air defense would
limit the availability of fighter aircraft for
such support operations in the initial phase
of a general war. Surface naval vessels, naval
aircraft and submarines would be available for
operations in Bloc coastal areas in support of
ground campaigns. The logistic environment
is an important limitation on these capabili-
ties, and the capacities of military transporta-
tion systems have been considered in the fol-
lowing estimates of Soviet offensive capabili-
ties against selected land areas. These esti-
mates do not take into account the effects of
an initial nuclear exchange, of direct Western
opposition to advancing Soviet forces, or of
Western interdiction of essential logistic lines.
Moreover, these are not estimates of the num-
bers of divisions the USSR would consider it
tactically feasible or necessary to employ in
the areas discussed.
180. Against Western Europe and Scandi-
navia. Without prior build-up, Soviet forces in
East Germany and Poland could initiate an
offensive campaign into Western Europe with
22 line divisions, half tank and half motorized,
supported by about 1,400 tactical aircraft. To
augment the strength of the initial attacks,
a maximum simultaneous airlift of two
lightly-equipped airborne divisions of 7,500
men each could be mounted by Aviation of
Airborne Troops based in Western USSR. If
approximately one-half of the civil transport
aircraft normally in the area also participated
in the airlift, the equivalent of an additional
2-3 divisions could be lifted in a one-day op-
eration. However, we doubt that the Soviets
would risk loss of strategic surprise by as-
sembling such a large number of civil air-
craft prior to an initial attack. In addition
to airborne reinforcements, a maximum of
four divisions could be lifted in merchant
ships across the Baltic Sea. Air reinforce-
ment could be drawn from the nearly 2,000
aircraft of Tactical Aviation units in West-
ern USSR, and ground reinforcements from
the 56 divisions in Western USSR could be
brought up rapidly. Lines of communication
through the northern satellites are estimated
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to be capable of supporting a theoretical logis-
tic maximum of about 160 divisions.
181. Soviet campaigns to seize Norway and
Sweden could be launched from northwestern
USSR through Finland and from west central
Europe through Denmark. Forces immedi-
ately available in northwestern USSR consist
of nine line divisions and about 2,600 tactical
and naval aircraft. Operations against Nor-
way would be limited logistically in the north
to four divisions over Finnish land routes plus
one water-borne division, and in the south to
a maximum of five divisions water-lifted from
Denmark. If Sweden were also attacked, as
many as six additional divisions could be
moved across Finland and a maximum of nine
divisions could be ferried from Denmark to
southern Sweden. Additional reinforcements
might be water-lifted across the Baltic from
the USSR to Sweden, and airborne forces
could be used in securing debarkation facili-
ties.
182. Against Greece, Turkey, and the Middle
East. Forces available for operations in this
area include 44 line divisions and 2,750 tacti-
cal and naval aircraft in southern and south-
western USSR. For operations west of the
Black Sea, lines of communication would be
adequate to support as many as 10 divisions
against Greece or as many as 16 against Tur-
key, but not more than a total of 22 could be
supported concurrently. At most, 14 of these
divisions could be supported in an extension
of this campaign into northwestern Anatolia,
while seven divisions from the Caucasus could
move against eastern Turkey. Three addi-
tional divisions could be water-lifted to the
northern Turkish coast, provided that port
facilities could be secured. One or two air-
borne divisions could be employed in the area.
Lines of communication could support a force
of 15-20 divisions in offensive operations-
against Iran.
183. In the Far East. The USSR has 31 line
divisions, approximately 2,350 tactical and
naval aircraft and sizable naval forces avail-
able in this area. These forces could renew
hostilities in Korea, either alone or in conjunc-
tion with North Korean and Chinese forces.
One airborne division could be employed
against Japan. A seaborne force equivalent to
three lightly-equipped divisions could be
launched against Japan, using a mixed group
of ships and other craft. Provided port facil-
ities could be secured, fully-equipped forces
equivalent to 5-6 divisions could be landed al-
most immediately in a follow-up operation.
The same technique could be used in other
areas of the Far East within range of land-
based aircraft. Adverse climate, terrain and
logistic environment would probably limit op-
erations in Alaska to one airborne division and
a seaborne force of about 6,000 troops.
Naval Forces
184. During the postwar years, Soviet naval
forces have been greatly strengthened by an
intensive building program concentrated on
light cruisers, destroyers and submarines.
The Soviet submarine force is the largest ever
assembled by any single power; over half of
its present strength consists of long-range
craft of postwar design and construction.
Due to a recent slow-down in the naval con-
struction program, which included a tempo-
rary halt in submarine production, there has
been little quantitative change in Soviet naval
forces since last year. We estimate Soviet
naval strength as of 1 October 1958 at 28
cruisers, about 140 destroyers and 80 destroyer
escorts, and about 440 submarines. These
totals include vessels of postwar design num-
bering 20 light cruisers, 110 fleet destroyers,
80 destroyer escorts, about 260 long-range sub-
marines (18 "Z," 4 "F," and 237 "W" class)
and about 35 medium range submarines ("Q"
class). They are grouped in four major
forces: the Northern Fleet, located in the
Barents Sea area; the Baltic Fleet; the Black
Sea Fleet; and the Pacific Fleet, concentrated
largely at Vladivostok.
185. The surface forces are supported by So-
viet Naval Aviation, which comprises more
than 15 percent of total Soviet air strength
and is now the second largest naval air force
in the world. Approximately 3,200 aircraft
are assigned to the Soviet fleets, including
about 1,750 fighters, 600 jet light bombers,
250 jet medium bombers and nearly 700 mis-
cellaneous types. The combat aircraft are the
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same types as are assigned to Tactical Avia-
tion: FAGOTs, FRESCOs, FARMERs, FLASH-
LIGHTs, BEAGLEs, and BADGERs. We be-
lieve that selected naval bomber units have
been assigned an atomic delivery role and
there is evidence of a developing air-to-surface
missile capability in naval BADGER units.
Lack of aircraft carriers limits the operational
effectiveness of Soviet Naval Aviation to the
combat radius of its shore-based aircraft.
186. The operating efficiency and equipment
of Soviet naval forces, while still below US
standards in some fields, are quite high and
will continue to improve. The great increase
in world-wide unidentified submarine contacts
in recent years probably reflects the intensified
training of the Soviet submarine force, par-
ticularly in long-range operations. In the
naval weapons field, in addition to the develop-
ment of submarine-launched guided missiles,
the Soviets have vigorously pushed the produc-
tion of more effective mines with magnetic,
acoustic and pressure actuated firing devices.
We estimate that the USSR has stockpiled
mines of advanced types as well as conven-
tional mines. It is technically capable of
adapting nuclear warheads to mines, torpedoes
and depth charges. Nuclear tests in the No-
vaya Zemlya area have probably included the
testing of naval weapons. The Soviet Navy
has become increasingly aware of its initial
failure to keep pace with the rapid postwar
technological advances in antisubmarine war-
fare. In recent years there has been a steady
improvement in its ASW tactics and equip-
ment and a major effort has been made in
the construction of escort ships in order to
overcome this deficiency. The Soviet Navy is
also quite limited as to amphibious capability.
To meet the lift requirements of divisional-
size units the USSR would have to rely almost
exclusively upon merchant ships.
187. Several important developments in Soviet
naval forces are likely during 1959-1963 as a
result of changing weapon systems and new
concepts of naval warfare. In addition to
conversion of some submarines for the launch-
ing of surface-to-surface missiles, new sub-
marines specifically designed for this purpose
probably will enter service. Some Soviet
47
cruisers and destroyers will probably be
equipped with dual-purpose surface-to-air/
surface-to-surface missiles. Nuclear propul-
sion will be applied to submarines, and im-
provements in submarine hull design are ex-
pected early in the period. We believe that
antisonar coatings have probably been applied
to some Soviet submarines. To meet the
threat from US missile-launching submarines,
the USSR probably will continue to emphasize
improvement of its antisubmarine warfare
capability. This could include construction
of new and better antisubmarine vessels in-
cluding "killer" submarines, use of specialized
aircraft and helicopters, development of im-
proved detection systems (both sonar and ra-
dar) and more sophisticated antisubmarine
weapons including guided missiles. Naval
Aviation will probably receive aircraft of im-
proved performance as they become available,
as well as improved air-to-surface missiles.
188. Submarine construction. The USSR
will probably continue to place primary em-
phasis on submarines in its naval construction
program. Since 1950 the Soviets have built
about 290 submarines of the medium-range
"Q" class and the long-range "W" and "Z"
classes.23 Construction of "Z" class subma-
rines ended in 1955, but the "W" class and
"Q" class programs continued into 1957.
Their termination probably marked the initia-
tion of new submarine programs. A new class
of conventionally-powered long-range subma-
rine has been in production at Leningrad since
the beginning of 1958. This class (designated
"F") is apparently a torpedo-attack type,
larger than the "Z" class and with improved
sonar. Four "F" class submarines are be-
lieved to have reached operational status.
Additional submarine programs believed to be
under way include a nuclear-propelled type
and submarines specifically designed to em-
ploy guided missiles.
189. Although the evidence is not firm, we
believe that the USSR may already have com-
missioned one or more nuclear-powered sub-
marines. Soviet capabilities in this field have
23 For estimated characteristics and performance of
these submarines, see Annex, Table 12.
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been indicated by the development of the
icebreaker Lenin, which will probably become
operational in 1959. The Lenin is powered by
three nuclear reactors of a type which would
be suitable, with some redesign, for use in a
submarine. We estimate that by mid-1963 the
USSR will have about 25 nuclear-powered sub-
marines.
190. Construction of conventional submarines
will probably continue but, because of the
greater complexity of nuclear-powered and
missile submarines, annual submarine produc-
tion almost certainly will not reach the high
levels of recent years. Considering such fac-
tors as the decommissioning of obsolete boats,
the possible conversion of some additional sub-
marines to missile use, and the development of
new propulsion and weapons systems, we esti-
mate that the total force will approximate 470
submarines in mid-1963.
191. Capabilities for naval warfare. A grave
threat to Allied naval forces and merchant
shipping is posed by the Soviet submarine
force, which is about eight times the size of the
submarine force with which Germany entered
World War II. In the event of war, Soviet
submarines could conduct intensive operations
against Allied sea communications in most of
the vital ocean areas of the world. Mining
could be undertaken on a large scale and
would constitute a serious threat to Allied sea
communications. This threat is greatest in
waters relatively close to Soviet-controlled air
and naval bases, but Soviet submarines pro-
vide a distant minelaying potential of major
proportions. Soviet Naval Aviation could at-
tack Allied naval forces, shipping and port
facilities within range using bombs, mines, tor-
pedoes and air-to-surface missiles. Soviet
Long Range Aviation probably would also con-
duct attacks on naval targets, but its partici-
pation at the outset of a war presumably
would be limited to missions of the highest
priority. Although the primary threat to Al-
lied naval forces in the Atlantic, the Pacific
and the peripheral seas of Eurasia would come
from Soviet submarines and aircraft, the sur-
face navy would play a role in preventing at-
tacking forces from operating with impunity
close to Soviet shores. Naval exercises of the
last several years, stressing defense of the sea
approaches to the USSR, indicate a strong
defensive capability in the fleet operating
areas.
192. The Northern Fleet, with more than 100
long-range submarines and direct access to the
open Atlantic, is considered the most formid-
able of the Soviet fleets. Northern Fleet sub-
marines could deliver attacks throughout the
North Atlantic and the large "Z" class sub-
marines could operate in the Caribbean. So-
viet seizure of Norway would greatly extend
the submarine and air offensive capability of
this force. The geographic position of the
Baltic and Black Sea Fleets limits their offen-
sive capabilities. Seizure of the Baltic exits
would allow the Baltic Fleet submarine force
to join in the interdiction of Allied sea com-
munications in the North Atlantic and would
increase the potential of Baltic Fleet surface
forces for operations in the North and Nor-
wegian Seas. Similarly, seizure of the Turk-
ish Straits would permit submarines of the
Black Sea Fleet to range throughout the Medi-
terranean and threaten Allied sea communica-
tions in that area. Submarines from both the
Baltic and Black Sea Fleets might also be de-
ployed outside of home waters prior to the ini-
tiation of hostilities. Aircraft and subma-
rines of the Soviet Pacific Fleet could attack
Allied sea communications in the North Pacific
and adjacent Far Eastern waters from the out-
set of hostilities.
193. The capabilities of Soviet naval forces
will improve steadily throughout this period
with the acquisition of more advanced subma-
rines, aircraft, and naval weapons. The prin-
cipal weaknesses of the USSR as a naval power
will continue to derive from the wide separa-
tion of its sea frontiers and its inability to
control the sea routes between these areas,
although improvements in inland waterways
will increase its ability to interchange smaller
vessels including submarines. The lack of
adequate supply lines to its Northern and Far
Eastern fleet areas and the land-locked posi-
tion of its fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas
are additional handicaps.
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V. TRENDS . IN SOVIET RELATIONS WITH OTHER COMMUNIST STATES
194. The USSR's relations with other Bloc
states continue to be of pressing concern to
the Soviet leaders. During the past year Mos-
cow has moved energetically to repair the
damage done to its political control and ideo-
logical authority by developments of the last
several years. To this end, it sponsored an
international Communist conference ? her-
alded as the most significant in more than 20
years ? broke the three-year old rapproche-
ment with Yugoslavia, ordered the execution
of Imre Nagy, held a dual CEMA and Warsaw
Pact meeting in Moscow, and began publica-
tion of an international Communist periodical
designed to replace the defunct Cominform
journal. The Moscow conference of Commu-
nist parties in November 1957 produced a
codification of nine fundamental Marxist-
Leninist "laws" to which all true (Soviet-
oriented) "socialist" states must adhere. It
was the signal for an intensified drive against
"revisionism" calculated to inhibit departures
from the approved norms by member parties,
especially those which might be infected by
the spirit of nationalism.
195. These efforts have been intended to cope
with what has become one of the fundamental
problems in the Communist world: how to
preserve ideological conformity and political
unity. The Communist parties in the various
states are confronted with quite diverse local
conditions in "building socialism:" they are
tempted to resort to practical expedients
which have no counterpart in Soviet experi-
ence and require ideological justification in
terms close to "deviationism." In addition,
as parties now possessing state power they are
bound to think in terms of their own state
interests, not always identical with those of
the Soviet state, and to show some deference
to the national sensitivities of their peoples.
Consequently, there are present within the
Communist parties elements and factions
which harbor latent or open resentment of
Moscow's domination, and they are strength-
ened by the knowledge that within the gen-
eral population anti-Soviet sentiment con-
tinues to be vigorous and widespread.
196. The tradition of the Communist move-
ment took little account of localist proclivities
or the autonomy of national parties; it was
"internationalist" and centralist. This tend-
ency was enormously reinforced during the
period of Stalin's ascendancy. He rose to un-
disputed mastery of the Soviet party at a time
when other Communist parties were weak and
had little prospects of attaining power. His
organizational controls, his unquestioned ideo-
logical authority made him as much the abso-
lute dictator over them as he was in the USSR
itself. Only the Chinese Communists, iso-
lated in the interior reaches of China, estab-
lished organizational and even some degree of
ideological autonomy. In the postwar period,
after the Communist parties gained power in
Eastern Europe and China, Stalin had become
a towering historic figure in the Marxist-
Leninist hierarchy. Even where Moscow had
other and more direct means of control over
Satellite parties, its authority rested to a con-
siderable degree on the magic of Stalin's name
and myth. Only the Yugoslays challenged his
authority and survived the assault of the
whole Communist world, though they had to
pay the price of exclusion. The Chinese, al-
though able to go their own way, nevertheless
accepted the ideological authority of Stalin.
197. Stalin's death left a legacy in Eastern Eu-
rope of inefficient maladjusted economies and
of hatred for Soviet domination; Moscow's
ideological and organizational control was
crippled. The confusions resulting from divi-
sions within the Soviet leadership, Moscow's
modification of Stalin's oppressive controls
and policies, the attempts to redefine ideologi-
cal positions under new conditions, and the
partial repudiation of Stalin himself contrib-
uted to factionalism in the Eastern European
parties and facilitated the overt expression of
latent popular hostility to Soviet domination.
Communist China, which initially at least ap-
peared to view with sympathy the desire of
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some Satellite regimes for greater local au-
tonomy, emerged as a second ideological cen-
ter within the Bloc. Since the events of 1956
in Poland and Hungary, the Communist lead-
ers of all Bloc states, including especially the
Chinese, have presumably recognized that the
interests of all in the struggle against the
non-Communist world depend upon preserv-
ing unity on essential issues. In Communist
terms a necessary means of enforcing such
unity is conformity to ideological programs.
This was the point of the 12-party pronounce-
ment of November 1957 and subsequent in-
sistence on ideological conformity.
198. On the surface, unity has been restored
and the leading position of the USSR has been
re-emphasized. But the unity of ideological
program was achieved by collective discussion
in which at least some of the parties evidently
played an independent role, however heavy
may have been the weight of Soviet views in
the final outcome. We believe that the front
of unity ? both ideologically and in terms of
state policy on the international stage ? will
be effectively preserved for some time. But
over a longer period the divergence of state
interests and the need to develop policies in
accordance with local conditions and nation-
alist sentiments will tend increasingly to
dilute Moscow's control over the Communist
Bloc.
Relations with the Satellites
199. The Soviet approach to the European
Satellites during the past year represents, in
essence, an attempt to synthesize the post-
Stalin trend toward greater autonomy with
the post-1956 efforts to re-establish the sta-
bility of the Bloc structure. While this has
meant renewed emphasis on Soviet hegemony,
it has not led to a general resumption of police
terror, nor has it involved an abandonment of
Soviet economic aid and equitable trade rela-
tions. Further, the Soviet leaders ? though
now playing down the possibility of "many
roads to socialism" ? still concede limited
freedom of action to Satellite leaders and tol-
erate certain divergencies ? in the case of
Poland substantial ones ? based on differing
internal conditions.
200. The Soviet leaders thus appear to retain
their belief that Stalinist methods were in-
efficient and dangerous; even if they should
want to return to Stalinist policies toward the
Eastern European Satellites, the example of
Communist China's relative independence and
the special position of Poland would make such
a move exceedingly difficult. The Soviet lead-
ers still have not discovered any definitive
answers to the basic questions concerning
intra-Bloc relations: How best to reconcile the
contradictions between a policy toward East-
ern Europe which is at once "soft" (designed
to insure the Satellites economic and political
growth) and "hard" (intended to guarantee
stability and Soviet overlordship) ; and how
best to adjust to the changes since 1953 in
the USSR's position as Bloc leader.
201. With the exception of Gomulka in Po-
land, and possibly Kadar in Hungary, all of
the Satellite leaders have responded with
vigor to the Soviet call for ideological con-
formity and fealty to the USSR. Needing
no encouragement to combat "revisionist"
trends, they have been able to thwart those
elements which have sought basic reforms.
Moreover, their efforts to assure internal
security have been successful; there has been
no serious threat to the stability of any of
these regimes during the past year.
202. Popular hostility to the Communist sys-
tem and to the USSR has probably not been
reduced, however, although there may have
been some diminution in public resentment in
countries where there has been a gradual im-
provement in living standards. Popular un-
rest does not appear to be an immediate prob-
lem except in Poland, where it still could lead
to strikes and riots, and in East Germany,
where continuing emigration to West Ger-
many reflects active discontent and remains
a seemingly insoluble problem.
203. Prospects. A continuation of the current
pattern of Soviet policy toward the Satellites
for the next few years is probable so long as
outside events or developments within the
Satellites themselves do not force a change.
In general, the USSR is likely to limit its
direct interference in Satellite affairs as much
as it believes feasible, striving to give these
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regimes the appearance of full sovereignty.
Most of the orthodox Satellite leaders will
probably be allowed to exercise day-to-day
control over internal affairs, provided they re-
tain control over their own parties and con-
form to Soviet-established guidelines. The
fact that these leaders depend on Soviet sup-
port for their position and share many of the
same interests tends to reduce the risk for
the USSR in such a policy. The apparent
right of Bloc leaders to speak relatively freely
and frankly to the Soviets about their own
problems and about intra-Bloc economic af-
fairs will probably be maintained, although
this right is undoubtedly viewed in Moscow
solely as a consultative one. The renewed
Soviet effort to push Bloc economic integra-
tion and to achieve a better division of labor
will receive continuing emphasis. But past
resistance to this program, based on the na-
tional economic interests of the individual
Satellites, has been stubborn and persistent
and will almost certainly not be eliminated
over the next few years.
204. We believe that the recurrence of popular
revolt or of an attempt by a Satellite Commu-
nist party to defy Moscow on vital issues is
unlikely at least over the next few years. Such
developments are possible, however, and even
probable if Soviet policies should again be-
come indecisive, or if, because of Soviet in-
ternal or foreign policy considerations, con-
trols should be significantly relaxed. In the
event of a rebellion in the Satellites beyond
the capacity of the local regime to repress, the
Soviet leaders would almost certainly inter-
vene militarily. Soviet reaction to an attempt
of a Satellite to secede from the Bloc would
probably be the same. In the event of an-
other Satellite party "coup" like that in
Poland ? aimed at greater autonomy rather
than secession ? the Soviet response would be
dependent on the particular local and inter-
national circumstances of the moment. One
of the aims of the current "antirevisionist"
campaign is to prevent any disaffected inner
party faction from organizing a challenge to
the official leadership.
205. We believe that the Soviet Union will al-
most certainly maintain or increase its efforts
to reduce or eliminate the distinctive features
of the Polish regime. But, since Gomulka
would almost certainly resist pressures on any
fundamental aspects of his policies and would
have the support of the Polish people in doing
so, we think that the Soviet approach will be
cautious. If moderate pressure proves ineffec-
tive, however, the USSR might work for
Gomulka's ouster. Even in this case, we
think that the USSR would resort to military
intervention only if developments in Poland
were likely to jeopardize the political or mili-
tary security of the Bloc.25
206. Concerning East Germany, the Soviet
leaders will almost certainly continue their
campaign to build up the GDR as an ostensi-
bly sovereign power. Internally, the political
and economic weakness of the East German
regime will continue to pose major problems
for the Soviets. Attempts to give greater
stability to the GDR through more liberal in-
ternal policies would involve political risk and
would probably require greater economic sub-
sidy from the Soviet Union, something the
Soviet leaders would be reluctant to give. On
the other hand, turning up the screws to en-
force popular submissiveness and to make the
GDR more economically self-dependent has
led to the mass flight of key professionals, and
may lead to other serious losses. Thus the
Soviet tactical approach to the GDR regime
will probably continue to show signs of vacil-
lation and uncertainty.
Bloc Relations with Yugoslavia
207. Concern over their position as Bloc leader
and prime center of Communist doctrine, and
fear that the acceptance of Yugoslavia as a
non-Bloc Communist power was at least
potentially a serious danger to that position,
were probably the principal causes of the So-
viet leaders' decision to break off the rap-
prochement with Yugoslavia. The Soviet
effort to re-establish close relations With Tito
in the summer and early fall of 1957 was
aimed at inducing Yugoslavia to identify
itself with the Soviet camp. When it became
clear ? as it evidently did at the Interna-
25 See NIE 12.6-58: "The Outlook in Poland," dated
16 September 1958.
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tional Communist conference in Moscow in
November 1957 ? that Tito was unwilling to
so align himself on Soviet terms, the break in
the rapprochement was probably inevitable.
The appearance of the "revisionist" Yugoslav
Party program the following spring probably
only helped to shape the nature and timing
of the subsequent Soviet campaign.
208. For the foreseeable future, the USSR is
unlikely to attempt any essentially new ap-
proach to its Yugoslav problem. The tenor
of the Bloc anti-Yugoslav campaign, however,
will probably vary somewhat with time and
place, the greatest weight being given to it by
Albania, Bulgaria, and Communist China.
Moscow evidently does not intend to resume
the program of development credits for Yugo-
slavia and will probably also hamper the nor-
mal flow of trade from time to time, while
denying that these measures are intended as
economic sanctions. Though it wishes to
exert pressure on Yugoslavia in order to dis-
courage independence-minded and revisionist
elements in Poland and the other European
Satellites, it is fearful that dramatic anti-
Yugoslav measures would do real harm to
Soviet relations with the uncommitted na-
tions. However, the USSR will continue its
attempts to discredit Yugoslav foreign policy,
particularly in the Middle East and Asia, and
will try to link Tito with the colonial powers
in the minds of Afro-Asian leaders.
Relations with Communist China
209. Communist China over the past several
years has emerged as a nearly-equal partner
of the USSR within the Communist world.
The preponderant influence is still in Mos-
cow, but this appears to operate through dis-
cussion and persuasion rather than by the
exercise of authority or control. The founda-
tions of the alliance remain unimpaired: a
common ideology, which charts the broad
course of domestic developments and posits
hostility toward the capitalist enemy; a mu-
tual dependence, economic and military in
the case of China, political and strategic in
the case of the USSR; and a shared realiza-
tion that any major disruption of the alliance
would probably have catastrophic effects on
the future of the entire Communist movement.
We thus believe that the bases for the Sino-
Soviet partnership are compelling, that the
two regimes will remain closely allied over
the period of this estimate, and, indeed, that
neither regime is likely to believe that it could
afford a break even if serious divergencies
arose.
210. We also believe, however, that there are
certain differences between them which have
perforce led to compromises or which have
been glossed over. Such divergencies are more
likely to grow than to diminish over the next
few years and we believe that because of them,
and because of its growing power and prestige,
the Peiping regime poses a potential threat to
the kind of Sino-Soviet Bloc which the Soviet
leaders would like to envisage for the future.
Although the USSR will retain its senior posi-
tion, it is possible that the process of reconcil-
ing differences between the two may increas-
ingly involve compromises on the part of the
USSR, with corresponding adjustments in
Soviet policy.
211. Possible Chinese Communist differences
with the USSR in policy or tactical ap-
proach ? but not ultimate goals ? have in-
cluded the doctrinal innovations of 1956 and
1957 concerning the "100 flowers" concept and
the possibility of "contradictions" between
the party and the masses; and the apparent
sentiment in 1956 that the USSR had over-
played its role of Bloc leader and was, in fact,
guilty of "great power chauvinism." At
present Peiping and Moscow may view rela-
tions with the West somewhat differently; the
Chinese Communists appear to be more mili-
tant than the Soviets and less fearful of the
consequences of a "high risk" policy. In addi-
tion, there have been differences at least in
propaganda emphasis concerning various in-
ternational questions.
212. In the future, areas of friction may arise
from the general question of Communist
China's influence as an ideological and politi-
cal force within the Bloc as a whole. The
unprecedented Chinese organization of "com-
munes" must be a development ideologically
embarrassing to the Soviets, since it implies
that the Chinese are advancing toward Corn-
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munism more rapidly than the Soviets them-
selves. There may also be Soviet concern over
a Chinese tendency toward "adventurism" in
pushing for Communist advances, and over
the role to be played by Communist China in
those areas of the Far East where it has in-
dependent interests. Thus far these matters
do not seem to have occasioned serious dif-
ficulty, although even if they had every effort
would certainly be made to conceal the fact.
Peiping has been in the forefront in proclaim-
ing Soviet leadership of the Bloc, the USSR
has acknowledged Communist China's high
place in Bloc councils and its ability to make
independent contributions to Marxism-Len-
inism, and to date Sino-Soviet interests in
the Far East apparently have not clashed.
213. Problems associated with Sino-Soviet eco-
nomic and military relations could also lead to
friction. However, Soviet aid programs have
apparently gone forward on the planned scale,
and there is no evidence that the Chinese have
sought more aid than they are getting; Pei-
ping's desire for more assistance probably has
been counterbalanced by its wish to limit the
degree of its economic dependence. The ques-
tion of nuclear weapons may be a delicate one;
the Chinese have presumably sought them
from the USSR, or will do so. The USSR is
probably reluctant to supply them because of
unfavorable repercussions on the Soviet dis-
armament position, the attendant loss of So-
viet leverage over Communist China, and the
potential military risks involved. We believe
that nuclear weapons have not been given to
China, but that the Soviets may make them
available in the future under some form of
Soviet control.
214. In sum, we believe that Communist China
will attain over the next several years an
increasing influence on general Bloc policy
and Communist ideology. The Soviet leaders
themselves are almost certainly aware of this
likelihood and probably view it with concern.
Moscow will wish to retain its pre-eminent
position in the Bloc and, to the extent that it
fears the eventual emergence of an actual
rival, will attempt cautiously to minimize Pei-
ping's influence within the Bloc. On the other
hand, Peiping's growing stature strengthens
the Bloc both internally and externally and
in this respect is welcome in Moscow. More-
over, both partners recognize the importance
of solidarity to over-all Communist objectives
and realize that mutual adjustments are in-
evitable consequences of the alliance.
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VI. TRENDS IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
Introduction?The Current Conduct of So-
viet Policy
216. Soviet foreign policy, over the more than
five years since Stalin's death and increasingly
since the consolidation of Khrushchev's per-
sonal power, has acquired certain character-
istics which are important to note in gauging
the threat posed to US security. Though they
relate more to manner than to content, these
characteristics taken together are revealing
as to the development of Soviet policy in re-
cent years, and as to the changing assump-
tions about the world situation which under-
lie it.
217. Most striking perhaps has been the fact
that the conduct of Soviet foreign policy has
shown itself more energetic, assertive, and
rapid both in response and in seizing the ini-
tiative. In part, of course, this reflects the
impress of Khrushchev's personal style of
leadership, in part also Soviet consciousness
of the USSR's growing military and economic
power. But it also reflects the Soviet belief,
first, that a more dynamic posture would be
effective in the present world situation, and
second, that the main struggle with the West
lies at present in the world political arena,
rather than at the military frontiers between
the power blocs. Soviet policy has come to
employ its propaganda weapons with greater
aggressiveness and shrewdness, attempting to
build the image of a "peace-loving" yet for-
midable power, confident that by so doing it
can effectively alter the alignment of political
forces in the world.
218. Tactical and ideological flexibility has be-
come another hallmark of current Soviet for-
eign policy. The Soviet leaders have shown
themselves willing to entertain a variety of
new policies without regard to positions taken
up earlier and have accommodated ideology
more and more to the changing requirements
of policy. Thus in 1956, in support of the
tactics of peaceful coexistence, they under-
took a major revision in Communist doctrine:
they found that war with capitalist states was
no longer "fatally inevitable." They also
found it expedient to abandon Stalin's rigid
division of the world into the socialist camp
and the capitalist encirclement; instead of
assuming that all countries beyond the Bloc
were tools of world imperialism, they came to
discriminate various shades of political align-
ment, even among allies of the US.
219. There has also been an extension of the
scope of Soviet foreign policy. There are no
longer any neglected areas in the world as
there were in Stalin's time. Since 1955 the
Soviet leaders have taken major initiatives in
the Middle East, and have become far more
active in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
The Soviet press frequently tells its readers
that no longer can any issue in the world
be resolved without taking account of Soviet
views. Doubtless there is an element of prop-
aganda bravado for domestic consumption in
this, but it also reflects an increasing disposi-
tion to regard the USSR as now one of two
great world powers, and therefore entitled to
have global concerns. In situations of crisis
everywhere there has been a tendency to put
forward the Soviet view assertively and to
refer to the factor of Soviet military power
in a more blunt fashion.
220. Finally, Soviet conduct is marked by an
apparently high and genuine confidence. The
Soviet leaders evidently believe that, despite
the many and serious problems which face
them, the movement of events increasingly
justifies their long-held hopes for the ultimate
triumph of "world socialism" under Soviet
leadership and tutelage. This mood probably
reflects satisfaction with Soviet economic and
scientific advances, and with the growth of
Soviet military power, as well as gratification
over the sharpening difficulties for Western
interests in certain areas of the world. While
we do not conclude that the Soviet leaders
are so overconfident that they would be
tempted to incautious behavior, this is one
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of the hazards which might attend any strik-
ing new advance of Communist power or
reversal for the West.
Current Soviet Objectives and Main Lines
of Policy
221. How do the Soviet leaders view the out-
look over the next several years and what are
the immediate objectives which they consider
feasible to pursue in moving toward an ex-
pansion of Communist power? In broad
terms, they probably believe that there is an
accelerating trend toward enhancement of the
world power position of the Communist Bloc
and a corresponding decline in that of the US
and its allied states. This is the traditional
view which springs from Marxism-Leninism,
but which they will see as confirmed recently
by their own gains in economic power, their
weapons advances, and the sharp political
disturbances in the non-Communist world.
At the same time, they appear to believe that
the strength of the Western states continues
to be formidable and that it should not be
frontally challenged.
222. Consequently, the main strategy of Com-
munist policy continues to be that of reducing
the Western power position by gradualist
means and enhancing that of the Bloc. The
Soviet leaders probably list their principal
objectives over the next few years as follows:
(a) reinforcing the unity of the Communist
Bloc and pushing rapidly its growth in mili-
tary and economic power; (b) encouraging
political divisions within the non-Communist
world, particularly with a view to isolating
the US and constricting the deployment of its
military power and the extent of its political
influence; (c) seizing whatever opportunities
may offer for alignment of non-Communist
states with the Bloc, and, where expedient, for
outright territorial expansion of Communist
power.
223. The means which the Soviet leaders in-
tend to employ in pursuing these objectives
are various. As indicated, they will of course
push the actual expansion of their own eco-
nomic and military power base as rapidly as
they can. They see this as the foundation
of their policy. But they will also use all the
means at their command to make it widely
believed that Communist power is great and
growing, that in some important respects it
already outpaces the West, and that the fu-
ture belongs to their kind of society and their
power system. To project this image of them-
selves and of the world situation they will
press the programs they have developed in
recent years: an active diplomacy, a large-
scale propaganda effort, trade and aid, and
cultural exchanges.
224. Attitude toward war. We believe that
at least for the period of this estimate the
Soviet leaders will continue to put their main
reliance in the struggle with the West on
such political weapons. Despite the con-
tinuing growth of their military power, in
particular their acquisition of growing ca-
pabilities for nuclear attack on the US, we con-
tinue to believe that they will not deliberately
initiate general war. They will probably es-
timate that even with a lead in long-range
missiles, they could not be certain of winning
a general war, and that the scale of damage
in such a war would threaten the survival
of their society.
225. In the Soviet conception, military power
should be used in the first instance and by
preference as a political weapon. The enemy
should be maneuvered into such a vulnerable
military-political situation that he forfeits key
positions without military resistance. Actual
use of military power is envisaged only if
there is confidence both that the gains will
outweigh the losses, and that the risks are
acceptable. Therefore, the immediate ques-
tion posed by the growth of Soviet military
power is whether the Soviets will be increas-
ingly tempted over the next several years
to use the threat of their military power more
overtly and boldly as a means of pressure on
the West.
226. Another serious question arises from the
increasingly aggressive conduct of Soviet
foreign policy on the one hand and the con-
tinuing growth of Soviet military power on
the other: will the Soviets employ their own
or other forces controlled by them in local
military actions, estimating that the US will
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be deterred from making an adequate mili-
tary response by fear of general war or of
adverse political consequences?
227. National Estimates have stated consist-
ently over the last several years that the So-
viet leaders would try to avoid general war
and that they would seek to avoid situations
which in their view involved serious risk of
general war. We believe that this estimate
can be reaffirmed. However, we also believe
that the Soviet judgment with respect to the
kind of situations which do involve serious
risk may be changing. The advance of their \
own military power, together with the grow-
ing political vulnerability of key Western po-
sitions, will probably lead the Soviet leaders
to increase their general pressure on the West
and to exploit local situations more vigor-
ously. While we have always considered it
possible that Bloc forces would be used in
overt local aggression if this could be done
without much risk of serious involvement
with Western forces, we do not believe that
the likelihood of such aggression has in-
creased. However, we do believe that the So-
viets will combat more actively than hitherto
the presence of Western influence in con-
tested areas, relying upon threats to prevent
the West from taking counteraction to pre-)
serve its influence. In this sense, we believe
that there is currently a tendency on the ,
part of the Soviets to view the risks of a
more aggressive policy as less serious than in
the past. This tendency could be reversed
as a result of Western actions or as the result
of a change in the Soviet leadership. But
so long as this tendency persists we believe
that the danger of war by miscalculation will
be increased. At present, we believe that this
danger is somewhat greater than our esti-
mates in recent years have indicated.
228. A posture for "peace." Even if Soviet
political warfare does become more vigorous
and increasing pressure is applied against the
West, Soviet policy will continue to garb it-
self with the slogans of "peace." It will
not go over to an overtly and frankly ag-
gressive posture. Rather it will continue to
present itself as still striving for "peaceful
coexistence" and as leading the "struggle for
peace." The Soviet leaders recognize that the
world-wide fear of war is so intense that great
political strength is added to that side in the
power struggle which can capture the force
of this sentiment, and thus align large bodies
of opinion with its own cause. Identification
of the USSR with hopes for peace and the US
with war and aggression will remain a prin-
cipal aim of Soviet propaganda strategy.
229. To some extent, the desire to maintain
the plausibility of this posture imposes in-
hibitions on the use of force; this is one
reason for regarding open aggression by Bloc
forces across state frontiers as unlikely. In
general, Soviet leaders, believing they can con-
tinue to reap rewards with their "coexistence"
tactics with little risk, are likely to view open
military aggression as politically undesirable
and unnecessary. Instead it will be their
aim to create, mainly by political means,
situations in which the West must either
concede a Communist advance or resort to
the use of force under unfavorable circum-
stances. Western concessions could then be
construed by Soviet propaganda as bowing
to the Soviet deterrent. If the West elected
to use force, it would be compelled to do so
under political and perhaps military handi-
caps. In either case, the Soviets would ex-
pect to intensify divisions within free world
alliances and to align the uncommitted more
closely with the Communist camp.
230. The Soviets will probably continue also
to display an apparent readiness to engage
in direct negotiations to settle outstanding is-
sues. Proposals for high level talks will prob-
ably be renewed at any juncture the Soviet
leaders find favorable to themselves. They
will regard such meetings as primarily of a
demonstrative character,, intended not to re-
sult in freely negotiated settlements, but
rather to force the Western Powers under
pressure of world opinion to accede to Soviet-
proposed formulas. They will attempt to pose
the alternatives of "peaceful coexistence" on
the one hand, or of tensions bringing a rising
danger of nuclear war on the other, hoping
by occasional measured reminders of the
latter to stimulate acceptance of the former
on Soviet terms.
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231. The underdeveloped countries in Soviet
strategy. The effort to align the USSR in
apparent support of broadly held popular as-
pirations takes its most general form, other
than in peace propaganda, in identification
with various "national liberation movements."
People in underdeveloped countries are being
told that the USSR champions peace, progress,
and national independence, while the West
stands for war, reaction, and colonialism.
Moscow clearly sees the underdeveloped coun-
tries?with their weak economic and political
systems, strong nationalist and anticolonialist
sentiments, neutralist tendencies, and resent-
ment at past and present domination by
Western European countries?as the most
susceptible ground for expansion of Soviet in-
fluence at Western expense. It is this calcu-
lation which underlay the Soviet attack in
recent years on Western interests in the
colonies and former colonial countries of the
Middle East, Asia, and Africa.
232. In part this campaign is intended to
deny resources and bases in these areas to
Western use. But the Communists have ap-
parently come to believe also that it is pre-
cisely in underdeveloped and colonial areas
that the best prospects for Communist ad-
vances now lie. At a minimum, they hope to
bring national movements and states in these
areas under Soviet diplomatic and economic
influence. By thus entering into what in cur-
rent Soviet parlance is called the "zone of
peace" these peoples would enhance the weight
of the Bloc in the world political balance.
At a maximum, the Soviet leaders hope that
anti-Western national movements can with
native Communist participation be given a
gradually more radical complexion, a process
which would result ultimately in the estab-
lishment of Communist or Communist-con-
trolled parties in power. They anticipate that
rising expectations in these areas will far out-
run the possibilities of fulfillment, thus giving
the Communists a chance to seize the revolu-
tionary initiative. We believe that the effort
to capture a dominant position in underdevel-
oped areas of the world will continue through
the period of this estimate to be one of the
main preoccupations of Soviet policy.
233. The USSR's targets among the underde-
veloped countries may shift considerably dur-
ing the period under consideration, in ac-
cordance with changing opportunities and
local Communist successes and reverses.
Frictions between Moscow and Afro-Asians
will tend to arise in many countries?as they
have already arisen in some instances?as the
first bloom of friendly cooperation wears off.
Moreover, the basic rationale for Moscow's
present collaboration with most Afro-Asian
countries?their common anti-Western orien-
tation?may even be somewhat eroded as some
of the current points of difference between
the rising nations and the former imperial
powers diminish. At the same time, Moscow
will seek out new areas for the expansion of
its political and economic influence, par-
ticularly in Latin America and Africa. In
those countries where its efforts are most
successful, the USSR may increasingly be
tempted to resort to more direct means, that
is, support of local Communists in attempts
to seize power. But the Soviets would care:
Lu_lly weigh such gains against tlfe?harrntur
consequences such a policyl ineyitably
evoke elsewhere.
234. Trade and aid. Soviet trade and aid
programs are the economic adjunct to the
strategy of penetration in underdeveloped
areas. The underdeveloped countries, many
of which are also politically uncommitted,
are generally receptive to Soviet offers of aid
and offer the prospect of high political gains
in return for comparatively small economic
investment. Rather than being widely dis-
persed, aid has been concentrated on coun-
tries which are especially susceptible to So-
viet influence and also in most cases are of
political or strategic interest to the West.
235. From January 1954 to June 1958 the
USSR extended approximately $1.2 billion in
credits to underdeveloped countries in the free
world, of which $300 million has already been
used. Credits and grants by other Bloc coun-
tries bring the total to more than $2 billion,
of which $1.3 billion has been obligated and
$740 million has been expended. About three-
fifths of the total Bloc credits expended have
been in the form of arms deliveries to Syria,
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Egypt, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Indonesia.
These same countries plus Ceylon, India,
Burma, and Cambodia have received the ma-
jor part of the economic aid. During the first
half of 1958 there were at one time or another
an estimated 3,700 Bloc technicians (including
military specialists, totaling about one-third
of this number) in 17 underdeveloped coun-
tries, representing an increase of more than
50 percent over the preceding six months.
In magnitude these programs are relatively
small compared with Western efforts on a
global basis, and the burden they impose on
the Soviet economy is slight, annual expendi-
tures thus far being only a few tenths of one
percent of Soviet national product.
236. Attitude toward the UN. To the extent
that the Soviets succeed in gaining influence
over the policies of underdeveloped and neu-
tralist countries, and as the number of Afro-
Asian members increases, the UN will become
a more attractive forum for them. They
probably expect ultimately to find issues on
which they can align majorities against the
US and obtain endorsement of Soviet policies.
They calculate that such a demonstrative iso-
lation of the US would disturb US-allied rela-
tions and curtail US influence in many areas.
If the UN then became an issue in US domes-
tic politics, the repercussions abroad would
compound the Soviet advantage. We believe
that the Soviets consider the chances for polit-
ical warfare victories within the UN frame-
work to be sufficiently promising so that they
will continue to give that body major atten-
tion.
237. Disarmament. The Soviet leaders evi-
dently believe that by showing an active inter-
est in disarmament they can enhance their
claim to leading in the cause of peace. More
specifically, they hope to neutralize Western
nuclear striking power by intensifying the
stigma attached to nuclear weapons and thus
inhibiting their actual or threatened use by
the West. They may also believe that dis-
armament negotiations can help to reduce the
chances of nuclear war. They will almost cer-
tainly, when circumstances seem to them ap-
propriate, press for a continuation of such
negotiations.
58
238. It is possible that the Soviets will con-
clude limited agreements in the field of dis-
armament, even if these involve some limita-
tions on their own military capabilities, in
order to gain what they would consider to be
a net advantage. Probably they have not yet
resolved on the precise shape of agreements
which would meet this prescription. We be-
lieve that their deep suspicion of the West and
their aversion to extensive inspection in the
USSR will forbid their acceptance of any truly
comprehensive disarmament scheme, and will
make negotiations on even the most limited
measures highly complicated and drawn out.
Soviet Policy in Particular Areas
239. The Middle East. This area has offered
since 1955 the most striking example of the
attempt by Soviet policy to support anticolo-
nialism and nationalist movements against
Western interests and influence. The USSR
did not create the Arab nationalist movement,
but in providing the political backing of a
great power, together with substantial mili-
tary and economic assistance, it has enor-
mously increased the power and effectiveness
of the movement.
240. The immediate Soviet aim is to deny this
area to the West and to expand Soviet influ-
ence there, rather than to gain direct control
of it. If Soviet policy can deepen the con-
flict between Arab nationalism and the West
to the point of irreconcilability, several results
follow: closer association of Arab states with
the Bloc tends to alter the world political
alignment in the latter's favor; Western mili-
tary bases in the Arab states are eliminated;
Western control of the oil resources becomes
tenuous. Consequently, we believe that So-
viet policy will continue to present itself in
the Middle East as the friend and supporter
of Arab nationalism in the latter's struggle
against Western "imperialism," and more par-
ticularly, will for the present support Nasser
as leader of the Arab nationalist movement.
Further military and economic assistance will
be made available to the United Arab Repub-
lic; UAR positions on Jordan, Lebanon, the
Aden Protectorate, and other trouble spots in-
volving Arab-Western conflict will be sup-
ported in Soviet propaganda and in the UN.
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241. The Soviet leaders probably believe that
at some stage the Arab nationalist movement
can be given a revolutionary turn toward Com-
munism and brought under Soviet control.
They believe that a sharpening of the Arabs'
conflict with the West, to which their propa-
ganda and Communist subversive elements in
the area can contribute, will facilitate this
development. To the extent that such a rev-
olutionary turn towards Communism actually
takes place, the basic incompatibility of Soviet
aims with those of the present leaders of Arab
nationalism, whom the Communists regard as
"bourgeois nationalists" playing a transient
historical role, will emerge. Communist pene-
tration and subversion of the nationalist move-
ment may occur unevenly in different Arab
countries and the Soviets may at some point
be tempted to abandon their restraint and en-
courage a Communist takeover in some key
Arab state, provided they consider the stakes
high enough to compensate for the resulting
damage to Moscow's relations with other Afro-
Asian neutrals.
242. Insofar as Western influence is elimi-
nated from the area the Soviets will seek to
reduce Nasser's pretensions and to make him
increasingly their prisoner. They will try to
deny him the opportunity to pursue a truly
neutralist policy in which he tries to keep lines
open to both power blocs. They will seek to
displace his influence over other Arab states
with their own and to prevent the consolida-
tion of Arab unity under his aegis. They will
oppose his suppression of local Communist
parties and try to bring these into the open
as leaders of the nationalist movement.
There are already some signs, in Iraq for ex-
ample, that the Soviets are opposing Nasser's
leadership of the Arab nationalist movement
in these ways. We believe, however, that they
will be extremely cautious in their efforts to
undermine-Nasser and, before moving openly
against him, will await a time when they be-
lieve that the local Communists have captured
control of the mass movement or when Nasser
has so isolated himself from the West that he
can no longer hope to get its support against
the Soviets and the Communists. An open
conflit_betwenNasserism and Communist-
e)sp.o,nsienism-seems unlikely in the immediate
59
future, but it might develop during the period
of this estimate.
243. The Soviet leaders must be aware that the
Western Powers are bound to attach the high-
est importance to the protection of their inter-
ests in the Middle East. How do they evalu-
ate the possibility that their pledges of sup-
port to the leaders of the Arab nationalism,
who cannot be fully controlled by them, may
entrain the USSR in situations of great risk?
Developments in the area over the past few
years have probably led Moscow to place con-
siderable confidence in the growing effective-
ness of a Soviet deterrent against Western use
of force to overthrow an Arab government
friendly to the USSR. The Soviet leaders
probably also believe that the Western Powers
in most instances would be restrained from
such action by the unfavorable political re-
actions that would follow, both in the area and
in the neutralist countries throughout Asia
and Africa. Nevertheless, the intervention of
the US and UK in Lebanon and Jordan dem-
onstrated that there are circumstances in
which Western powers would be willing to use
military force. If the Western Powers became
involved in conflict in the area, the Soviet
leaders would probably not engage Soviet
forces openly or take other actions which in-
volved in their view serious risk of expanding
hostilities. However, we believe that the Mid-
dle East is one of the areas where the danger
of war by miscalculation has increased.
244. While Soviet policy in the Middle East
is not aimed primarily at military gains, the
Soviet leaders probably view the developing
situation there as offering opportunities to
build potential military assets. They un-
doubtedly calculate that in the event of So-
viet military operations in this area they would
benefit from their earlier peacetime introduc-
tion of military technicians, Soviet type weap-
ons, fuel and materiel, from their increased
capabilities for espionage and subversion, and
from the improvements which have been made
in local airfields, harbors and other facilities.
The Soviet leaders probably also contemplate
the eventual achievement of a long-sought
Russian goal?land access to the strategic
areas of the Middle East. To this end, they
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will continue to encourage and support such
movements as that for an independent pro-
Soviet Kurdish state and for a pro-Communist
government in Iraq, and will also continue
pressures against Iran and Turkey.
245. Asia. The USSR will probably rely on
its current policies?propaganda about the
successes of Communism, support of national
independence against Western imperialism,
and offers of trade, aid, and cultural ex-
change?to sustain and deepen neutralism,
promote pro-Soviet alignments, and gradually
to erode Western influence in Asia. Further
increase in the strength of the Communist
parties in Indonesia and India might induce
the Soviet leaders to switch to open support
of them, but it is more likely, in the case of
India at least, that for the next several years
Soviet policy will find greater advantage in
cultivating the existing governments. In
Asia, it is probably these two countries which
are of primary interest to Communist policy
at present.
246. Policy toward Japan will probably con-
tinue along the routine line laid down over the
last several years?propaganda to stimulate
Japanese neutralism, disturb Japanese-Ameri-
can relations, and maintain pressure for denial
of bases to the US. The Soviet leaders prob-
ably do not believe that they have the means
to alter the situation in Japan in any impor-
tant way for the present. Likewise, they prob-
ably regard the situation in Korea as stale-
mated, although they will continue to agitate
for withdrawal of US forces.
247. Soviet policy in Southeast Asia appears
to operate jointly with that of Communist
China on the principle of shared influence.
The Soviets will probably continue to give pri-
mary emphasis to cultivating closer relations
with neutralist governments in the area.
They will maintain their effort to disrupt
SEATO and to align uncommitted states with
the Sino-Soviet Bloc on all broad international
issues. They will also stress their willingness
to extend economic aid to the Southeast Asian
states and will tout the value of Communist
methods as the best way to achieve the eco-
nomic development these countries so desper-
ately seek. However, we believe that, should
favorable opportunities arise and should they
estimate that the gains would outweigh the
losses, the two Communist powers might sup-
port a local Communist party in an attempt
to seize power. At present, Indonesia or
Laos seem the most likely places for such a
development eventually to occur.
248. Africa. As part of its effort in the
underdeveloped areas, the USSR will almost
certainly increase its activities in Africa dur-
ing the next five years. It is already develop-
ing diplomatic and economic relations with
the newly independent states of Morocco,
Tunisia, and Ghana, and is devoting some-
what greater efforts to Libya and the Sudan.
It has offered trade, aid, technical assistance
and, in some cases, arms. Although Soviet
policy is somewhat constrained by the desire
not to appear to compete too obviously with
Nasser in the primarily Arab and Moslem
areas in which he hopes to extend his influ-
ence, the USSR will almost certainly expand
its efforts to establish its diplomatic and eco-
nomic presence on the continent, to encour-
age nationalist and anticolonial movements,
and to attempt to end the exclusiveness of
Western influence in most of the area.
249. Up to the present the USSR has followed
a policy of restraint toward North Africa,
largely out of regard for Soviet relations with
France and for the position of the French
Communist Party. At some point, however,
the USSR may abandon this policy. Internal
developments in France or in Algeria might
convince the Soviet leaders that they would
gain more from open support of North African
nationalism. In any case, material support
may be given to the Algerian nationalists,
though probably through Egypt rather than
directly. Arms and economic aid offers will
probably be pressed on the Tunisian and
Moroccan Governments.
250. Western Europe. Current Soviet policy
in Europe appears to be aimed more at con-
solidating the USSR's position in Eastern Eu-
rope than at an early expansion of Soviet
power beyond the present frontiers of the
Bloc. In order to achieve greater security for
Communist control of Eastern Europe, as well
as to weaken the position of Western Europe,
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M-E#T SECRET 61
the Soviets are bound to regard the dissolu-
tion of the NATO alliance and the withdrawal
of US military power from Europe as basic
objectives of their policy. These are the main
purposes of all their maneuvers and proposals
aimed at achieving "European security." The
more immediate Soviet objectives are to pre-
vent an increase in West German military
strength and the establishment of additional
missile bases in Western Europe. Soviet dis-
armament policy and its attendant propa-
ganda is directed largely at these targets.
Moreover, the Soviet policies in the Middle
East, Asia, and Africa, apart from their in-
trinsic importance, are themselves calculated
to impose material and political losses on
Western Europe and to encourage divisions
there.
251. The current Soviet diplomatic offensive
over the status of Berlin is the most striking
example of Khrushchev's activist foreign
policy. The Soviet leader must be aware that
there is virtually no point of controversy be-
tween East and West on which the West has
so thoroughly committed itself, and that there
can scarcely be a more dangerous interna-
tional issue to push to the point of crisis. In
raising the issue, the Soviets have had in
mind the achievement of a number of major
objectives. They seek to compel the Western
Powers to deal with East Germany and thus
to accord at least tacit recognition to the
GDR. This in turn would constitute an im-
portant step toward a ratification of the status
quo in Eastern Europe, a development which
the Soviets have long sought. Further, the
removal of the Western presence from Berlin
would permit the Soviets to handle the escapee
problem and generally to reinforce the inter-
nal security of their East German Satellite.
They probably further calculate that the Ber-
lin initiative, even if only partially successful,
will stimulate a more receptive atmosphere
for other Soviet proposals on Germany, par-
ticularly disengagement and peace treaty ne-
gotiations. In addition, the Soviets probably
expect that a serious Western retreat on Ber-
lin would bring into question for many West
Germans the desirability of the NATO al-
liance.
252. It is not clear why the Soviets have
chosen the present moment to raise the Ber-
lin issue, but their action is certainly in ac-
cord with the generally hardening tone of
their foreign policy. This in turn is related
to their growing conviction, manifest over the
last year or so, that their relative power posi-
tion has improved. They are presumably act-
ing on the assumption that what they de-
scribe as "a shift in the relation of forces
in the world arena" in their favor gives them
an opportunity to test the solidarity of the
Western Alliance over a major issue. The
Soviet leaders probably intend to be cautious
and tactically flexible. We believe that they
will try to direct Soviet and East German
maneuvering in a manner which will avoid
military conflict with the Western allies,
while at the same time they will be prepared
to take advantage of any signs of weakness
on the part of the West, or of inclinations
to compromise on major issues. Neverthe-
less, they have already committed themselves
considerably, and we believe that the crisis
may be severe, with considerable chance of
miscalculation by one or both sides.
253. We do not believe that the raising of the
Berlin issue signalizes a Soviet willingness to
move toward a settlement of the German
problem as a whole on other than Soviet
terms. We foresee no change at present in
the USSR's adamant opposition to German
reunification despite the handicaps this im-
poses on Soviet maneuverability in Western
Europe. The Soviet leaders cannot contem-
plate abandonment of East Germany because
of the threat which would probably develop
to their whole position in Eastern Europe,
beginning with Poland. Over the longer run,
a major political change in West Germany,
such as might develop after the death of
Chancellor Adenauer, could lead to a new and
seemingly more flexible Soviet and East Ger-
man approach to Bonn and to the reunifica-
tion problem. The Soviets probably believe
that a period of political uncertainty would
ensue, and that party realignments would
give them new opportunities to promote West
Germany's separation from NATO and the
withdrawal of Allied military forces, to achieve
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international recognition of East Germany,
and eventually a reunification scheme ac-
ceptable to the USSR.
254. Moscow probably has come to view the
Communist Parties in Western Europe more
as a vehicle for propaganda and agitation
than as the basis for revolutionary action,
at least for the next several years. While
the long-range subversive and political poten-
tial of these Parties will be cultivated, their
present role is mainly to support Soviet for-
eign policy objectives, such as arousing popu-
lar concern against West German nuclear
armament and the stationing of missiles in
Europe.
255. Latin America. The trend noticeable
in the last year of increased Soviet attention
to Latin America will continue during the
coming five years. The USSR apparently esti-
mates that current economic and political
62
differences between the US and Latin America
and the elements of political instability in
certain countries provide a promising op-
portunity to expand Soviet influence. In the
immediate future, Moscow will concentrate
on broadening its diplomatic and cultural
relations and on trade or eaonomic assistance
offers in selective, politically sensitive situa-
tions in order to expand Soviet influence on
the governmental level and to facilitate both
the overt and the subversive activities of local
Communists. The most significant recent
Soviet economic moves in Latin America have
been the conclusion in October 1958 of a
$100 million credit to Argentina for the pur-
chase of Soviet petroleum equipment (the
largest Soviet credit offer extended to any
non-Communist country outside the Afro-
Asian Bloc) , large-scale Soviet purchases of
Uruguayan wool, and the conclusion of a
barter deal with Brazil.
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ANNEX
Tables of Sino-Soviet Bloc Military Forces
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TABLE 1
ESTIMATED ACTUAL STRENGTH OF BLOC ACTIVE MILITARY PERSONNEL, 1 October 1958
ARMY GROUND
FORCES
AIR FORCES
(Including Naval
Aviation)
NAVAL FORCES
AIR DEFENSE
CONTROL AND
WARNING
MILITARIZED
SECURITY
FORCES
TOTALS
(Excluding
Security)
USSR (Rounded totals)
2,650,0002
835,000 2 a
765,00024
75,000
400,000
4,325,000
EE Satellites (Rounded totals)
880,000
100,000
40,000
300,000
1,020,000
Albania
25,000
1,500
900
10,000
27,400
Bulgaria
110,000
16,000
6,200
30,000
132,200
Czechoslovakia
170,000
23,000
45,000
193,000
East Germany
75,000
8,000
12,000
45,000
95,000
Hungary
100,000
5,500
35,000
105,500
Poland
200,000
34,000 5
12,000
45,000
246,000
Rumania
200,000
13,500
9,200
60,000
222,700
Communist Asia (Rounded totals)
3,230,000
105,000
55,000
35,000
3,390,000
Communist China
2,625,000
87,0000
48,000
2,760,000
North Korea
334,000
20,000
7,000
361,000
North Vietnam
270,000
250
2,000
35,000
272,250
BLOC TOTALS (Rounded)
6,750,000
1,050,000
850,000
75,000
750,000
8,725,000
Figures in this table are based on estimated order of battle. Estimates of this type yield approximate rather than precise measures of
strength at any given time, and can lag considerably behind changes in actual strength.
These figures do not include ground, naval, and air forces personnel permanently assigned to the air defense forces (PVO) with air-
craft control and warning as their primary duty.
For purposes of this table, an estimated 110,000 Naval Aviation personnel are included in total Soviet air forces personnel strength.
Does not include KGB naval forces which in this table are carried in Soviet security forces total.
Includes 2,000 naval air.
Includes 8,000 naval air.
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TABLE 2
ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF BLOC GROUND FORCES IN LINE DIVISIONS, 1 OCTOBER 1958'
Rifle Divisions
Mechanized Divisions
Motorized Rifle
Divisions
Tank Divisions
Airborne Divisions
Total
Country
No.
TOE
Actual
No.
TOE
Actual
No.
TOE
Actual
No.
TOE
Actual
No.
TOE
Actual
No.
USSR 2
75
13,335
8,850
40
15,415
9,800
27
13,150
9,300
23
10,630
8,300
10
9,000
7,000
175
Communist
China
114
17,600
15,000
3
7,850
6,000
3
8,300
7,000
123
East
Germany
5
12,500
6,000
2
10,500
6,000
Poland
5
11,500
8,000
7
14,000
10,000
2
11,500
7,000
14
Bulgaria
9
11,500
5,500
9
Czecho-
slovakia
8
11,500
7,000
4
14,000
8,000
2
11,500
7,000
1
6,000
4,000
15
Hungary5
0
Rumania
12
11,500
8,000
1
14,000
8,500
1
11,500
9,000
14
North
Korea
18
10,700
9,600
18
North
Vietnam
14
12,640
10,250
14
TOTAL
255
52
32
33
14
389 6
1 Actual strengths of divisions vary. The figures shown represent estimated averages.
= Additional Soviet combat units are estimated to include 20 artillery divisions, 80 antiaircraft artillery divisions, and 120 separate brigades.
Estimated dispositions of Soviet line divisions: Occupied Europe, 25; Northwestern USSR, 9; Western USSR, 56; Southwestern USSR, 20;
Southern USSR, 24; Central USSR, 10; Soviet Far East, 31.
The total of Chinese Communist divisions includes 3 small cavalry divisions.
The Hungarian Armed Forces not now considered to be effective; ground force in process of formation will amount to some 4 divisions.
? Estimated breakdown by major groupings: USSR, 175; Communist China, 123; European Satellites, 59; North Korea and North Vietnam, 32.
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TABLE 3
ESTIMATED ACTUAL STRENGTH OF BLOC AIR UNITS, 1 OCTOBER 1958 to MID-1963
FIGHTER
MID-1958
MID-
1959
MID-
1960
MID-1961
MID-
1962
MID-1963
USSR
E.E.
SAT
CCAF
NVAF
NKAF
USSR
USSR
USSR
E.E.
SAT
CCAF
NVAF
NKAF
USSR
USSR
E.E.
SAT
CCAF
NVAF
NKAF
Jet (Day)
8,415
2,165
1,930
7,930
6,950
5,600
2,910
1,920
4,410
3,380
2,715
1,805
Jet (A/W)
1,730
70
60
2,370
3,200
4,150
610
580
4,890
5,520
835
765
Prop
-
10
35
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
ATTACK
Jet (Ftrs)
325
35
300
-
-
-
-
30
-
-
Prop
-
560
70
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
LIGHT BOMBER
Jet
2,875
170
540
2,650
2,440
2,270
270
880
2,100
1,930
275
875
Prop
-
-
165
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
MEDIUM BOMBER/TANKER
Jet
1,325
-
-
1,475
1,675
1,725
-
60
1,575
1,475
-
60
Prop
435
-
20
300
150
-
-
60
-
-
-
60
HEAVY BOMBER/TANKER
Jet & Turboprop
100 to
-
-
100 to
100 to
150 to
-
-
200 to
200 to
125
150
200
250
300
300
TRANSPORT
Jet (Med)
-
-
-
5
5
5
-
-
20
20
-
-
Prop (Lt)
1,670
105
210
1,465
1,455
1,440
165
330
1,440
1,400
175
330
Prop (Med)
190
-
-
275
330
360
-
15
405
440
-
40
HELICOPTERS
Light
355
25
90
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Medium (Large
after 1958)
10
-
-
595
715
735
130
115
735
735
210
185
RECONNAISSANCE
Jet (Ftrs)
65
30
40
-
-
-
150
75
-
-
150
105
Jet (Lt Bmrs)
490
10
20
410
395
375
40
90
360
345
40
140
Prop
145
80
10
175
220
225
30
10
225
225
30
10
UTILITY/LIAISON
Jet (Lt Bmrs)
130
-
-
140
140
140
-
-
140
120
-
\ -
Prop
145
15
100
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
TRAINER
Jet (Ftrs)
765
195
200
850
850
820
280
200
810
700
285
205
ROUNDED TOTALS
19,200
3,500
3,800
18,800
18,700
18,000
4,600
4,400
17,400
16,600
4,700
4,600
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TABLE 4
ESTIMATED GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET AIRCRAFT BY ROLE, 1 OCTOBER 1958
FIGHTER
Eastern
EUROPE'
North-
western
USSR 2
Western
USSR'
West
Central
USSR 4
Caucasus
USSR 5
East
Central
USSR'
Far East
USSR'
Total
Jet (Day)
810
1,215
2,035
1,375
1,050
535
1,405
8,415
Jet (A/W)
145
255
425
290
240
105
270
1,730
ATTACK
Jet (Ftr)
90
75
?
75
85
325
LIGHT BOMBER
Jet
230
375
1,145
235
290
80
520
2,875
MEDIUM BOMBER 8
Jet
?
230
787
104
15
?
189
1,325
Prop
?
18
159
134
42
?
82
435
HEAVY BOMBER
?
?
40 to 50
50 to 60
?
?
10 to 15
100 to 125
TRANSPORT
Jet
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Prop (Lt)
110
180
415
375
75
40
485
1,670
Prop (Med)
?.
30
130
?
?
?
30
190
HELICOPTER
Light
20
45
100
100
5
5
80
355
Medium
?
?
?
10
?
?
?
10
RECONNAISSANCE
Jet (Ftr)
45
?
5
?
5
10
?
65
Jet (Lt Bmr)
55
90
160
20
40
30
95
490
Prop (Seaplane)
?
50
10
?
25
?
60
145
UTILITY/LIAISON
Jet (Lt Bmr)
50
20
30
?
30
130
Prop (Misc)
40
?
25
10
15
55
145
TRAINER ,
Jet (Ftr)
110
117
175
106
80
36
141
765
ROUNDED
TOTALS
1,700
2,600
5,700
2,800
2,000
1,000
3,400
19,200
'East Germany, Poland, Hungary.
Northern and Leningrad MD's.
Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian, Kiev, and Odessa MD's.
4 Moscow, Volga, Voronezh, and Ural MD's.
'North Caucasus and Transcaucasus MD's.
Turkestan and Siberian MD's.
Far East and Transbaikal MD's.
Includes medium bombers assigned to Naval and Tactical Aviation.
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TABLE 5
ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET AIRCRAFT BY ROLE WITHIN MAJOR COMPONENTS,
1 OCTOBER 1958
67
FIGHTER
TACTICAL
AVIATION
FIGHTER
AVIATION
OF
AIR DEFENSE
LONG-
RANGE
AVIATION
NAVAL
AVIATION
AVIATION OF
AIRBORNE
TROOPS
TOTAL
Jet (Day)
3,260
3,700
?
1,455
?
8,415
Jet (A/W)
665
750
?
315
?
1,730
ATTACK
Jet (Ftr)
325
?
?
?
?
325
LIGHT BOMBER
Jet
2,390
?
?
485
?
2,875
MED. JET BOMBER
and TANKER
115
?
960
250
?
1,325
MEDIUM BOMBER
Prop
?
?
420
15
?
435
HEAVY BOMBER
and TANKER
?
?
100 to 125
,
?
?
100 to 125
TRANSPORT
Prop (Lt)
730
110
225
140
465
1,670
Prop (Med)
?
?
?
?
190
190
HELICOPTER
Light
80
?
?
90
185
355
Medium
?
?
?
?
10
10
RECONNAISSANCE
Jet (Ftr)
65
_
_
?
_
65
Jet (Lt Bmr)
410
?
?
80
?
490
Prop (Seapin)
?
?
?
145
?
145
UTILITY/LIAISON
Jet (Ftr)
?
_
_
?
_
?
Jet (Lt Bmr)
50
?
?
80
?
130
Prop (Misc)
145
?
?
?
?
145
TRAINER
Jet (Ftr)
365
280
?
120
765
ROUNDED
TOTALS
8,600
4,850
1,700
3,200
850
19,200
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Combat Radius/Range (nm)
a. 25,000 lb. _bombload
one refuel 2
b. 10,000 lb. bombload
one refuel'
c. 3,300 lb. bombload
one refuel'
Speed/Altitude (kts./ft.)
a. Maximum speed at
optimum altitude 7
b. Target speed
target altitude'
Combat Ceiling (M)'
Terminal Target Altitude (ft.) 8
a. 25,000 lb. bombload
b. 10,000 lb. bombload
c. 3,300 lb. bombload
SECRET
TABLE 6
ESTIMATED OPTIMUM PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET MEDIUM AND HEAVY BOMBERS
For Operational Use to 1961
(Calculated in accordance with US Mil-C-5011A Spec except that fuel reserves are
reduced to permit a maximum of 30 minutes loiter at sea level, and
aircraft operate at altitudes permitting maximum radius/range)
CURRENT MODELS
POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
BULL
BADGER
BISON
BEAR
BADGER
19588
BISON
1958 8
BISON
19608
MB
1960-61
2600/4900
3750/7100
2750/5200
2950/5600
3500/6600
5100
3700/7000
3950/7500
1800/3300
1600/3100
1800/3400
2800/5500
4200/8100
3000/5800
3200/6300
2400/4500
2300/4200
3650/7400
5750
2400/4600
4000/7800
4300/8500
2050/3700
1800/3600
2950/5800
4400/8700
2000/3900
3100/6100
3300/6600
1950/3800 '3
2750/5000
2500/4800
3700/7800
6100
2650/5200
4150/8200
4450/8900
2650/5100?
350/30,000
550/13,200
530/18,000
495/21,600
555/14,000
540/18,800
540/18,800
1085/35,0008
310/30,000
475/40,800
460/40,900
410/41,900
475/42,300
460/43,400
460/43,400
865/47,000 8
36,500
45,400
44,000
41,200
46,700
46,500
46,500
57,500 8
52,500
48,200
54,200
54,200
41,500
50,000
52,500
61,000
54,200
50,000
55,800
55,800
42,000
51,500
54,800
51,000
54,300
56,500
56,500
62,500
Additional possible developments during the period of this estimate, for which no detailed performance characteristics have been estimated, are men-
tioned in the Discussion, Chapter IV, paragraph 144.
2 Refueling estimates based upon use of compatible tankers which provide approximately 30-40 percent increase in radius/range.
8Future improvements of BISON and BADGER aircraft are based on normal expected improvements through the 1960 period; in particular, replacement
of the present 18,000 lb. thrust engines with those having a thrust of about 20,500 lbs.
'Jet medium bomber with supersonic "dash" capability.
5 Capable of carrying 100 n.m. range ASM, of approximately 11,000 lb. gross weight.
?Includes 500 n.m. "dash" at Mach 1.5.
'For 10,000 lb. bombload unless otherwise indicated.
'For 3,300 lb. bombload.
'Service ceiling at maximum power with one hour fuel reserves plus bombload aboard. No range figure is associated with this altitude.
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TABLE 7
ESTIMATED OPTIMUM PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET LIGHT BOMBERS
1959
1950 1951 1954 1951 MADGE SUPERSONIC 4
BEAGLE MADGE ' BEAGLE BOSUN (Turboprop) Tactical
Combat Radius/
Range (n.m.) 735/1,400 580/1,450 745/1,400 765/1,510 950/2,200 9002/1,6008
Bombload (lbs) 4,400 3,000 4,400 4,400 4,400 6,600
Maximum Speed at
Optimum Altitude 460/15,000 165/SL 480/9,000 475/15,000 270/5,000 705 (Mach 1.23)
(Kts/ft) /35,000
Target Speed/
Target Altitude 385/39,000 110/5,000 395/42,200 400/35,100 610 (Mach 1.06)
(Kts/ft) /43,300
Combat Ceiling 43,800 20,200 46,900 39,500 22,000 49,400 (or 57,300
with after-
burning)
I May also be used in antisubmarine warfare.
'Includes 50 n.m. supersonic dash.
3Includes 100 n.m. supersonic dash.
'Expected to become operational in the 1958-1963 period.
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TABLE 8
ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT
(Calculated in accordance with US Mil-C-5011A Spec)
AIRCRAFT
CAB
COACH
CRATE
CAMEL
BULL TYPE
COOT
CAMP
CLEAT
COOKER
CAT
TURBOJET
Operational Date
1937
1947
1955
1956
1956
1958
1959
1959
1959
1959
1960
Soviet Designation
Li-2
11-12
11-14
Tu-104
11-18
Tu-114
Tu-110
An-10
(Moskva)
(Rossiya)
(Ukraina)
Power Plants
Number
2
2
2
2
4
4 2
4
4
4
4
Type
Piston
Piston
Piston
Turbojet
Piston
Turboprop Turboprop
Turboprop
Turbojet
Turboprop
Turbojet
Combat Radius/Range
(n.m.)
530/1215
665/1335
710/1560
900/2050
1670/3150
1500/2800
730/1440
2500/5200
1400/2900
665/1300
1800/3800
Payload
Troops or
20
21
21
60
42
110
80
230
125
125
185
Passengers or
15
18
18
50
-
75
-
120
78
84
100
Cargo (lbs)
3300
5000
4600
23,000
25,700
27,000
20,000
55,000
30,000
30,000
45,000
Speed/Op. Alt.1
165/5000
220/10,000
231/10,000
580/SL
300/20,000
410/27,000
280/17,000
500/20,000
550/13,750
400/28,000
535/20,000
(Kts/ft)
Cruise Speed/Alt. 2
130/13,000
165/10,000
140/10,000
430/32,800
198/10,000
315/25,000
230/15,000
400/25,000
425/33,000
300/25,000
425/33,000
(Kts/ft)
Service Ceiling
16,600
26,599
24,000
37,700
39,550
30,000
31,000
40,000
43,000
33,400
50,000
Remarks
Soviet
version of
DC-2
Transport
design
based on
Transport
version
of BULL
Assault
Transport
called
New
transport
based on
Prototype
not
observed
BADGER
Whale by
BEAR
Soviets
1 Normal rated power.
'Constant altitude mission.
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TABLE 9
ESTIMATED OPTIMUM PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET JET FIGHTERS'
(Calculated in accordance with US Mil C-5011A Spec. except that fuel reserves
are reduced to permit a maximum of 20 minutes endurance at sea level and
aircraft operate at altitudes permitting maximum radius)
FAGOT
Day
fighter
FRESCO
A, B Day
fighters
FRESCO C
Day
fighter
FRESCO D'
All-weather
fighter
FARMER
Day
fighter
FLASHLIGHT A
All-weather
fighter
FACEPLATE
Day
fighter
All-weather
fighter
FITTER'
Day
fighter
All-weather'
fighter
All-weather
fighter
Operational
Current
Current
Current
Current
Current
Current
1958
1958
1958
1959
1962
Maximum Speed (Kts)
Sea level
580
615
635
635
680
610
700
690
800
825
800
35,000 ft
530
550
570
570
735
540
885
860
1,185
1,150
1,440
40,000 ft
525
545
570
570
725
535
850
1,150
Combat Ceiling (ft) =
51,100
55,100
59,200
58,700
61,100
49,300
61,300
60,000
60,400
62,000
67,000
with external fuel
50,800
53,400
58,600
58,300
59,700
48,700
59,100
60,000
58,300
62,000
67,000
Combat Radius (n.m.)
290
450
380
380
290
450
215
250
140
130
200
with external fuel
490
700
640
640
655
530
610
675
480
440
Time to climb to
40,000 ft (mins.)
7.6
7.3
4.7
4.7
2.6
7.8
3.8
2.6
3.5
2.2
1.7
with external fuel
8.8
10.6
6.8
6.8
7.9
8.4
6.3
5.6
5.1'
Armament
Guns
2 x 23mm
lx 37mm
2 x 23mm
1 x 37mm s
2 x 23mm
lx 37mm
3 x 23mm
2 x 23mm
1 x 37mm
2 x 37mm
and
3 x 23mm
and
2 x 30mm
and
2 x 30mm
and
2 x 30nun
and
Rockets
76 x 55mm
or
76 x 55mm
2 x 325mm
76 x 55mm
4 x 325mm
76 x 55mm
or
38 x 55mm
05
4 x 220rrirn
4 x 325mm
Or
2 x 325mm
or
2 x 220mm
4 x 220mm
4 x 220mm
or
or
or
Or
Or
or
Guided Missiles
4 AAM
2 AAM
4 AAM
2 AAM
2 AAM
4 AAM
' Unless otherwise noted, performance figures are calculated with internal fuel only.
Highest altitude at which aircraft can climb at the rate of 500 feet per minute with maximum power.
Data shown at gross take-off weight with maximum power unless otherwise noted.
'FRESCO D and E have a limited all-weather capability (i.e., equipped with search radar, but without tracking capability) . The E version, however, has no afterburner and has
about the same performance as the A and B.
FISHBED, the delta-wing version of FACEPLATE, is believed to have similar performance characteristics.
'FISHPOT, the delta-wing version of FITTER, is believed to have performance characteristics somewhat inferior to FITTER's. However, it is estimated that the USSR will con-
tinue to develop and improve FISHPOT as an all-weather fighter for first operational use in 1959. FISHPOT appears compatible with installation of a search-track radar.
Military power (without afterburning) .
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TABLE 10
ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET EARLY WARNING AND GCI RADARS
Year in
Frequency
EARLY WARNING RADAR
GROUND CONTROL INTERCEPT RADAR
Type
Service
(mcs.)
Detection Range (n.m.)
Altitude
Tracking Range (n.m.)
Altitude Coverage
Medium Bomber Fighter
Coverage (ft.)
Medium Bomber
Fighter
DUMBO
Current
70-75
50-140
35-85
70,000
50-110
40-75
60,000
TOKEN
Current
2700-3100
80-180
70-100
60,000
80-110
50-70
80,000
TOKEN/ROCK CAKE
Current
2700-3100/
2615-2630
KNIFE REST
Current
70-85
50-140
35-85
75,000
GAGE
Current
2700-2800
160
100-160
80,000
GAGE/PATTY CAKE
Current
2700-2800/
S-Band
70-90
40-60
80,000
BIG MESH
Current
S-Band
2700-3130
170-210
100-120
80,000
100-120
80-90
80,000
L-Band
550-600
170-210
100-120
80,000
STRIKE OUT
Current
2700-3100
170-210
100-120
80,000
STRIKE OUT/
Current
2700-3100
100-120
80-90
80,000
ROCK CAKE
New Type
1960
up to 3000
250
100-160
100,000
150
100,000
New Type
1965
up to 3000
300
100,000
250
100,000
Notes: 1. All radars listed as currently operational are believed to have height-finding capabilities, with the exception of GAGE and STRIKE OUT when
used in an early warning role.
2. With the exception of DUMBO, all of these radars are believed to be equipped with antijamming devices.
3. All of these current types are believed to be mobile except for the DUMBO, the GAGE and the GAGE-PATTY CAKE combination.
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TABLE 11
ESTIMATED BLOC NAVAL SHIPS 1 OCTOBER 1958 ? MID-1963
YEAR
1 October 1958
Mid- Mid- Mid-
1959 1960 1961
Mid-
1962
Mid-1963
FLEET AREA
Baltic
Northern Black Sea Pacific
Total All Fleets Total All
Fleets
Sat. &
Corn.
Com.
Corn.
COUNTRY
USSR Sat.
USSR
Sat. USSR Sat. USSR China
USSR
Sat. China USSR USSR USSR
USSR
USSR
China
Major Surface Ships'
Heavy Cruisers
2 ?
?
? 2 2 ?
6
? ? 5 3 1
1
1
- ?
Old Heavy Cruisers
? ?
?
? ? ? ?
?
? ? 1 3 5
5
5
?
Light Cruisers
5 ?
6
? 5 ? 4 ?
20
? ? 19 19 19
19
16
?
Old Light Cruisers
1 ?
?
? 1 ? ? ?
2
? ? 2 2 2
2
2
?
Guided Missile Cruisers
? ?
?
? ? ? ? ?
?
? ? 1 1 3
6
9
?
Destroyers
41 3
33
? 26 1 36 4
136
4 4 145 135 120
120
118
3
Old Destroyers
3 1
1
? 3 4 ? ?
7
5 ? 7 17 32
32
34
10
Guided Missile Destroyers
? ?
?
? ? ? ? ?
?
? ? 1 4 10
16
22
?
Escorts
12 2
19
? 16 1 34 4
81
3 4 86 91 96
101
106
7
?
? 53 6 76 8
252
12 8 267 275 288
302
313
Total
64 6
59
20
Submarines 2
Long Range New
Construction 8
35 ?
105
? 59 ? 56 7
255
? 7 255 255 255
255
255
32
Long Range New Design 3
4 ?
?
? ? ? ? ?
4
? ? 10 20 30
40
40
0
(Nonnuclear)
Other Long Range
5 ?
13
? ? ? 2 4
20
? 4 12 7 2
0
0
0
Old Long Range
7 ?
16
? 3 ? 9 ?
35
? ? 39 37 32
27
23
0
Nuclear (Torpedo)
? ?
?
? ? ? ? ?
?
? ? 1 3 5
9
14
?
Nuclear (Guided Missile) 4
- -
-
- - - -
-
- - 1 3 6
9
12
?
Guided Missile
(Conventional Power) '
? ?
?
? ? ? ? ?
?
? ? 2 5 11
18
22
?
Guided Missile (Converted
to Topside Stowage)
Estimate 2 (W and/or Z class) now converted. Whenever decision taken to do so, estimate Soviets could
convert up to 20 of this type within 4 to 6 months.
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TABLE 11 (Continued)
Mid- Mid- Mid- Mid-
YEAR 1 October 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 Mid-1963
FLEET AREA Baltic Northern Black Sea Pacific Total All Fleets Total All Fleets
Sat. &
Com. Com. Corn.
COUNTRY USSR Sat. USSR Sat. USSR Sat. USSR China USSR Sat. China USSR USSR USSR USSR USSR China
Submarines' (Continued)
Medium Range New
Const. 3 33 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 33 ? ? 38 43 43 43 43 ?
Other Medium Range 5 8 ? ? ? ? ? ? 4 8 ? 4 7 5 3 2 ? ?
Old Medium Range 2 1 ? ? 3 ? 2 ? 7 1 ? 7 6 6 6 8 1
Short Range 5 26 6 ? ? 5 3 19 4 50 9 4 47 47 47 42 33 13
, Old Short Range 3 0 3 ? 13 3 12 1 31 6 1 29 21 12 12 19 6
Total 123 7 137 ? 83 6 100 20 443 16 20 448 452 452 463 469 52
In addition to the major surface ships shown, we estimate in mid-1958 there were 1,980 minor surface ships in the Soviet service, and 599 in the
Satellites and Communist China. Minor surface ships include amphibious, mine warfare, and patrol ships. "Old" surface ships are those more than
20 years old.
2 "Old" submarines are those 14-20 years old.
a Conventional submarines of post-World War II design and construction, including "W," "Z," and "F" Class long range, "Q" Class medium range, and a
new medium range submarine.
'New Soviet submarine programs now under way will probably include ballistic missile submarine systems, and possibly also submarines designed for
internal stowage of cruise-type missiles. While there is little evidence on the progress of such programs, the figures given here take account of both
possibilities. For further information as to types, see Chapter IV, paragraph 154.
6 Submarines older than post-World War II but less than 14 years old.
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TABLE 12
ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET "Z," "W" AND "Q" CLASS SUBMARINES
Length/
Displacement (tons)
Diving
Armament
Performance ? Speed (Kts) /Endurance (n.m.)
Operation Radii *
Class
Beam (ft)
Surfaced/Submerged
Limit (ft)
Torpedo/Mine
Surfaced
Snorkeling
Submerged
n.m./days on station
290/26
1950/2290
650
24/48
Maximum
16/6900
11/7100
17/8.5
6600/1
(Long range)
Cruising
10/17,200
8/12,400
3/108
6000/17
240/22
1300/1450
650
14/26
Maximum
15/6000
11/5100
16/8
4500/1
(Long range)
Cruising
10/12,000
8/8300
4/144
4000/16
165/17
400/465
450
8/12
Maximum
16/1700
12/1300
15/7.5
1500/1
(Med. range)
Cruising
4/4600
8/2500
4/144
1000/15
* These radii are based upon the following arbitrary patrol conditions: Each day of transit consists of 12 hours of surface running at 10 knots during
hours of twilight and darkness and 12 hours of snorkel running during the day at 8 knots. Fuel consumption on station is based upon submerged
running at 3 knots with sufficient snorkeling to maintain batteries.
TABLE 13
ESTIMATED COMPOSITION OF BLOC MERCHANT FLEETS MID-1958 and MID-1963
(Ocean-going vessels, 1,000 GRT and up)
Mid-1958
Mid-1963
Non-tanker
Tanker
Non-tanker
Tanker
No.
GRT
DWT
No.
GRT
DWT
No.
GRT
DWT
No.
GRT
DWT
USSR
707
2,426,308
3,089,535
95
546,768
816,039
972
3,701,620
4,657,860
141
915,718
1,369,634
EE
120
493,271
682,961
5
31,872
48,355
171
707,471
961,421
13
110,930
166,942
China
120
313,941
350,357
8
11,394
13,821
146
398,903
477,797
17
44,694
57,821
Total
947
3,233,520
4,122,853
108
590,034
878,215
1,289
4,807,994
6,097,078
171
1,071,342
1,594,397
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