ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A010700020001-2
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• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 4, 1958
• Content Type: NIE

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25 APR 195',;
NIE 10-58
4 March 1958
,
345
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 10-58
(Supersedes NIE 10-55)
ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL
IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 4 March 1958. Concurring were The Director of Intelli-
gence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief
of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director
of Naval Intelligence; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelli-
gence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The
Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative
to the IAC and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their
jurisdiction.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE
SINO-SOVIET BLOC
THE PROBLEM
To appraise the intensity and scope of dissidence and resistance in the Sino-
Soviet Bloc, and to estimate the resistance potential in times of peace and war.
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
Like its predecessor,' this estimate is a
brief appraisal of the causes, nature, and
extent of anti-regime dissidence and re-
sistance within the Sino-Soviet Bloc. It
is based upon eleven country studies pre-
pared by the inter-agency Resistance In-
telligence Committee established by the
IAC. These studies, which analyze dissi-
dence and resistance in each country of
the Bloc, have been noted but not indi-
vidually approved by the IAC; they are
appended as annexes to the estimate
itself.
In the estimate and the annexes, the
following terminology is used:
Dissidence ? a state of mind involving
discontent or disaffection with the
regime.
Resistance ? dissidence translated in-
to action.
Organized resistance?resistance
which is carried out by a group of indi-
viduals who have accepted a common
1 NIE 10-55, "Anti-Communist Resistance Poten-
tial in the Sino-Soviet Bloc," 12 April 1955.
purpose, agreed upon leadership, and
worked out a communications system.
Unorganized resistance ? resistance
carried out by individuals or loosely asso-
ciated groups which may have been
formed spontaneously for certain limited
objectives, without over-all plan or
strategy.
Passive resistance ? resistance, organ-
ized or unorganized, which is conducted
within the framework of the resister's
normal life and duties, and involves de-
liberate nonperformance or malperform-
ance of acts which would benefit the
regime, or deliberate nonconformity with
standards of conduct established by the
regime.
Active resistance ? resistance, organ-
ized or unorganized, which expresses
itself in positive acts against the regime.
It may or may not involve violence, and
may be conducted openly or clandestinely.
It may take such forms as intelligence
collection, psychological warfare, sabo-
tage, guerrilla warfare, assistance in
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escape and evasion, open defiance of
authority, or preparatory activity for any
of the above.
With the progressive consolidation of
Communist control, however, active re-
sistance has in general tended to take less
the forms mentioned above, and to be
expressed more in such forms as strikes,
demonstrations, and open manifestations
of intellectual and other dissent. While
in many cases these activities are not
wholly motivated by anti-regime atti-
tudes, they nevertheless have anti-regime
connotations.
ESTIMATE
Scope and Intensity of Dissidence and
Resistance
1. Dissidence continues to be widespread in
the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Improvements in living
standards and such relaxation of regime con-
trols as took place during the last three years
have been, except perhaps in the USSR, in-
sufficient to reduce substantially general dis-
content. Save in semi-independent Poland,
nationalist anti-regime feelings in Eastern
Europe are as strong as ever. In addition to
common grievances, various population ele-
ments harbor special resentments, such as
those of peasants towards collectivization,
workers towards Communist labor discipline,
intellectuals and students towards enforced
ideological conformity, believers towards anti-
religious measures.
2. The scope and intensity of dissidence, how-
ever, varies widely from country to country.
One of the most important distinctions in
both peacetime and wartime resistance poten-
tial is whether or not the regime is viewed as
representing the national rather than an
alien interest. Except among certain of its
own national minorities, the Soviet regime
has succeeded in identifying itself among its
own population as a legitimate national gov-
ernment. But Communist regimes in the
Far East have made somewhat less progress
in this respect, and those in Eastern
Europe, again excepting Poland, have failed
almost completely. In the divided countries,
the existence of a functioning alternative gov-
ernment exercises some attraction which
operates to increase dissidence, but this ap-
pears to be a major factor only in East
Germany. Other variations in resistance
potential arise from differences in national
character, in historical traditions, in economic
conditions, and in religious attitudes.
3. In the last few years most Bloc regimes
have sought to reduce popular discontent and
to narrow the rifts between the regimes and
their peoples. The leashing of the Soviet
secret police, the decollectivization of Polish
agriculture, and efforts to improve living
standards are cases in point. These policies
have had some success. On the other hand,
the very trend toward relaxation of controls
and resulting confusion as to regime policies
have given greater scope to overt manifesta-
tions of discontent. Sharp criticism arose,
for example, among Moscow writers and Chi-
nese intellectuals when the regimes experi-
mented with a looser application of controls.
In Hungary and Poland, inhibitions upon the
use of police terror and serious splits within
the Communist parties permitted dissi-
dence to swell into active resistance, in Hun-
gary on a mass scale. In reaction, the Bloc
regimes have tightened their controls, and in
Hungary after the bloody suppression of the
revolt the regime reverted to harsh repression.
The Bloc leaders have striven to insure party
unity, to circumscribe the range of permissi-
ble criticism, and to provide various reminders
of their physical power. As a result, organ-
ized active resistance is negligible in the Bloc
at the present time.
Resistance Potential in Peacetime
4. During the next few years, conditions of
life probably will not improve sufficiently to
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reduce dissidence significantly in most coun-
tries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. This dissidence
will probably continue to be expressed pri-
marily in various forms of passive resist-
ance ? noncompliance with regime orders,
economic malingering, other low-risk ways of
expressing individual opposition. So long as
the regimes do not revert to all-out repression,
there is also likely to be some continuation of
those forms of active resistance ? strikes,
demonstrations, open expressions of intellec-
tual dissent ? which have characterized the
past few years. In particular, such manifes-
tations are likely in parts of Eastern Europe.
In Communist China, some disturbances by
peasants and ethnic minorities are also likely.
5. Moreover, many Bloc regimes recognize
that the cultivation of popular support and
the eliciting of broader initiative would re-
quire not only economic betterment but some
degree of liberalization of controls. However,
they also recognize that such steps increase
the difficulty of maintaining party unity and
complete control over the populace. Thus
they will probably accede to popular pressures
only in those cases in which they regard it
as relatively safe to do so. But any relaxation
of controls will tend to give dissident elements
opportunities to press their grievances in in-
direct ways.
6. Further, each regime's problems may be
increased and complicated by developments
elsewhere in the Bloc and influences from the
Free World. The repercussions of the USSR's
de-Stalinization campaign and the events in
Hungary and Poland have agitated dissidents
throughout the Bloc, in some cases to the
point of stimulating various forms of resist-
ance. Intra-Bloc variations in ideology and
policy have contributed to dissatisfaction and
ferment among intellectuals and students.
As contacts with non-Bloc countries increase,
unfavorable comparisons will arise. In con-
sequence, campaigns against dissidence, while
primarily concerned with its domestic sources,
must also contend with unsettling influences
from abroad.
7. The difficulties of dealing with dissidence,
various forms of resistance, and foreign influ-
ences may lead to policy vacillations between
"hard" and "soft" lines or to intra-party dis-
putes. These developments might evoke
greater resistance activity. This activity,
however, would tend to be directed towards
the elimination of specific grievances rather
than to the overthrow of the existing regimes,
since the latter course would seem highly un-
promising unless there were a serious prior
weakening of party and police.
8. For these reasons we regard major out-
breaks of active resistance as unlikely, al-
though these cannot be excluded in certain
volatile situations in Eastern Europe. Spo-
radic local outbreaks will probably recur, but
they will almost certainly be within the capa-
bilities of security forces to repress. The
regime's counter-weapons ? primarily the
monopoly of physical force (coupled with an
evident willingness to use it) and a near-
monopoly of means of communication ? will
remain formidable. In Poland the regime has
shown less reliance on these weapons, but a
primary safeguard against violent resistance
is the widespread recognition, to which the
Catholic Church lends important support,
that it would provoke Soviet intervention.
Here, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, Soviet
suppression of the Hungarian revolt and the
absence of Western assistance have under-
lined the futility of violent resistance.
9. Emigre organizations of former Bloc na-
tionals have, in general, lost effective contact
with their homelands and are little known to
Bloc populations. Virtually all of them have
suffered from internal bickering, and many
have been penetrated by Communist agents.
Emigre groups do not significantly contribute
to resistance potential, and with rare excep-
tions their leaders would not be welcomed to
positions of power after liberation.
Resistance Potential in Event of
General War
10. At the outset of a general war, patriotism
would act to diminish sharply the resistance
potential in most of the USSR and to some
extent in Communist China, though in the
latter case this would depend more on the
nature of the conflict. In the Far Eastern
satellites, any increase in resistance potential
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probably would be only marginal. But in the
satellite states of Eastern Europe, as well as in
certain minority areas of the USSR and Com-
munist China (e.g. the Baltic States, Georgia,
Western Ukraine, Tibet) , the outbreak of
war would rekindle hopes of liberation and
immediately increase the resistance potential.
This potential probably would be highest in
Poland, Hungary, and East Germany. We
believe, however, that unless the tide of war
ran sharply against the Bloc and its military
and security forces were significantly weak-
ened, resistance activities of a para-military
nature could be prevented or at least confined
to manageable -proportions.
11. While we conclude that resistance activi-
ties probably would not be a major factor so
long as the outcome of the main conflict re-
mained dubious, resistance activity probably
could be expected, especially in Eastern Eu-
rope, in the form of intelligence collection and
transmission, aid to Western personnel in
escape and evasion operations, and minor sab-
otage. The level of such activity would vary
considerably, because of differences in resist-
ance potential, and also as a result of the
amount of outside assistance available and
the location of battle lines.
12. Only conjectures can be made concerning
the impact on resistance activity of the use of
nuclear weapons. Much would depend on
such factors as the extent and locale of the
attacks, the types of weapons used, the dam-
age caused, the extent to which regime con-
trols were disrupted, etc. Among population
4
groups suffering direct losses, survivors prob-
ably would first be stunned, then concentrate
their energies exclusively on problems of per-
sonal survival. In areas sufficiently distant
from attack to be largely unaffected, resist-
ance might increase as dissident elements
found that Communist controls had been
weakened; on the other hand, they might con-
clude that nuclear weapons were so decisive
that extensive resistance was irrelevant or un-
necessary. Groups outside the attack area
but sufficiently close to be caught in the re-
sulting chaos would be subject to all these
effects. It is possible that, in certain cases,
attacks against selected targets might weaken
the regime's anti-resistance capabilities more
than they impaired resistance potential.
13. The question of responsibility for the in-
itiation of general war probably would not
substantially affect the will to resist the
regimes in the Bloc countries. Nor would the
nationality of attacking forces be likely, in the
majority of cases, to have great bearing upon
the cooperation offered by resistance ele-
ments. Exceptions would be cases in which
long-standing national antipathies might con-
flict to an important degree with anti-regime
feelings, e.g. (a) German forces in Czechoslo-
vakia, Poland, and the USSR; (b) Yugoslav,
Greek, and Turkish forces in Bulgaria; (c)
Greek, Italian, and Yugoslav forces in Al-
bania; and (d) Japanese forces in North
Korea and Communist China. On the other
hand, in the divided countries anti-regime re-
sistance might increase if military forces of
the non-Communist government were used.
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COUNTRY ANNEXES
A. ALBANIA
B. BULGARIA
C. COMMUNIST CHINA
D. CZECHOSLOVAKIA
E. EAST GERMANY
F. HUNGARY
G. NORTH KOREA
H. NORTH VIETNAM
I. POLAND
J. RUMANIA
K. USSR
These Annexes were prepared by the Resistance Intelligence Com-
mittee of the IAC. They have been noted but not approved by the IAC.
The cut-off date of the information contained in these Annexes is 1
January 1958.
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ANNEX A ? ALBANIA
BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE
1. The continuing low standard of living in
Albania since the Communist take-over in
1944 has been a major factor in the general
dissidence prevalent among the great ma-
jority of the population. The Communist
take-over in Albania was greatly facilitated by
the promises made by the Communist-domi-
nated National Liberation Front during World
War II of basic economic and political reforms
which would grant the people "freedom,
bread, and land." The program for political
independence from foreign rule and for im-
provement of social and economic conditions
had a dynamic appeal, particularly among the
intellectuals, youths, and poor peasants in
central and southern Albania where living
conditions were wretchedly poor and syste-
matic exploitation by the local feudal land-
owners was the rule. But after 13 years of
rule the Communist regime not only has
failed to fulfill its promises of providing the
Albanians with a decent standard of living
but has imposed an economic system of regi-
mentation, oppression, and exploitation that
was unheard of even in the period of the Otto-
man Empire. The government has repeated-
ly admitted that attempts to improve the
availability of foodstuffs have met with little,
if any, success, and that during certain
periods of the year the food situation becomes
very critical.
2. Politically, there are two basic factors
which account for the widespread hostility
the great majority of Albanians bear toward
the present regime. First, the Communist
ideology has for nearly all Albanians a defi-
nite Slavic connotation and is therefore con-
sidered wholly alien. It is, moreover, regarded
as merely another instrument through which
the Slays can dominate the country. Just as
the Ottoman Empire was resisted for five cen-
turies because of its alien traditions and
political and social institutions, so today the
Communist regime is opposed as equally alien
even though its leaders are native Albanians.
3. The second factor is the ancient traditions
of and beliefs in individual freedom and the
hatred of central authority. No past govern-
ment in Albania, either foreign or native, has
been so ruthless as the present one in impos-
ing its will on the mountaineers in the north
and the peasantry in central and southern
areas. Individual freedom has been com-
pletely suppressed; the closely knit family
pattern has been virtually destroyed; and vil-
lage life, around which most social and politi-
cal activities have evolved in the past, has now
been placed under the control of local Com-
munist functionaries whose chief task is not
to serve the villagers but to carry out the
unpopular program and policies of the regime.
The greatest opposition to the regime has
originated among mountaineers and villagers,
who resent the inroads into their economic
and family life by the central authorities.
4. Religion does not seem to have played a ma-
jor role in the dissidence that has developed
against the regime. There are two basic rea-
sons for this situation. First, religion in Alba-
nia has found it difficult to offer a united front
to Communism because the population is di-
vided into three denominations: Moslem, com-
prising about 70 percent of the population; Or-
thodox Christians, about 20 percent; and Ro-
man Catholics, about 10 percent. The regime
has fostered and exploited this division. Sec-
ond, aside from the Catholic element, the Al-
banians as a whole are not devoutly religious.
Their religious sentiments are expressed pri-
marily in ancient traditions and tribal cus-
toms representing something essentially Al-
banian, whereas the three existing denomina-
tions have often been associated with spheres
of foreign influence: the Ottoman Empire,
the Greek Church (which dominated the
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Albanian Orthodox Church until 1922) , and
the Italian influence through the. Roman
Catholic Church. The regime had little diffi-
culty to convert the Moslem and Orthodox
Churches into instruments of Communist
rule. The Roman Catholics, however, having
expressed somewhat deeper religious senti-
ments and strong opposition to Communism,
have been subject to severe persecution. In
fact, the regime has destroyed the Catholic
Church as an independent institution.
5. While the regime was able to eliminate or
subdue the three principal religious institu-
tions in Albania, it has not been able to eradi-
cate the religious feelings, beliefs, and cus-
toms of the Albanian people. Despite anti-
religious propaganda and repressive measures,
the Albanians continue to attend church serv-
ices and maintain their customs and beliefs.
The Albanian peasants in particular, compris-
ing nearly 80 percent of the country's 1,400,-
000 population, not only refuse to work on
religious holidays or wedding days, but have
been known to slaughter hundreds of rams to
be consumed on such holidays in violation of
government restrictions. In some sections of
the country where threats and pressure have
failed, the regime has used force against what
it considers an ancient practice damaging to
the present economy.
MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS
6. Dissidence toward the regime apparently
remains strong among all classes. With the
possible exception of the higher governmental
and Party bureaucracy, the ranking army offi-
cers, and a limited number of intellectuals
there is no group which derives real benefit
from the regime. The denigration of Stalin
has had hardly any effect on the Albanian
Communist leaders who continue their repres-
sive rule without the benefits of "relaxation."
Large numbers of the population are still in
jails and labor camps.
7. The Peasantry. Albania is basically a
country of peasants and villagers, who as a
group comprise the largest and most formida-
ble anti-Communist element in the country.
As stated above, during the war the Commu-
nist movement found considerable support in
the south among the poor and landless
peasants. This group profited by the so-called
agrarian reforms of 1945-46 but shortly there-
after became thoroughly disillusioned and dis-
affected. The principal reasons for its dis-
affection, as well as for that of nearly all the
country's peasants, were the crushing taxes,
the heavy obligatory delivery quotas, and the
low prices paid by the government for agri-
cultural products; the seizure of livestock; the
imposition of "voluntary" (forced) labor; the
imposition of the agricultural collective sys-
tem; and the oppression and terror practiced
by the Communist security police. The Al-
banian peasant is a fierce individualist, proud
of his past independence; he knows nothing
of, and cares less for, the subtleties of the
Communist ideology. However, despite their
opposition to the regime, the peasants have
been unable to stem the tide of total collecti-
zation of agriculture that is presently being
conducted by the regime. This deep peasant
discontent accounts for much of the resist-
ance potential in the armed forces, among the
youth in the countryside, among peasants
who have been drafted for work in industrial
projects and mining, and among other groups
of peasant origin still having contact with
friends and relatives on the land.
8. Youth. Albanian youth, both rural and
urban, began resisting the Italian occupiers
immediately after the latter invaded the coun-
try in 1939. Later the Communists, camou-
flaging themselves in the National Liberation
Front and using patriotic slogans, deceived
large sections of the country's youth and drew
them under its banner. Thus the youth be-
came the backbone of the Communist move-
ment in Albania during the war. However,
disillusionment began to set in soon after the
Communists took over the country and re-
vealed their true political, social, and eco-
nomic aims. By 1950 Communist propaganda
had ceased to be effective among the great
majority of the youth, especially in the coun-
tryside, because of first-hand experience with
"voluntary" labor and because of widespread
economic want and inequality which youth
saw in the villages.
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9. Industrial Workers and Civil Servants.
Aside from a relatively small number of work-
ers who have risen from the ranks to man-
agerial positions in the nationalized indus-
tries, the laboring class in Albania has gained
nothing under the Communist regime. Wages
are low; prices are generally high; and non-
rationed goods are either in short supply or
prohibitively expensive. There is constant
pressure to meet the high work norms based
on achievements of shockworkers and stak-
hanovites; there are stringent restrictions on
changing jobs and heavy penalties for tardi-
ness or breaking of work discipline; some "vol-
untary" (forced) work must be performed by
all laborers; frequent political meetings after
work are compulsory; various deductions for
Communist publications and contributions
are made, etc. Like most other Albanians,
the workers have shown signs of disaffection
and are looking forward to the day of libera-
tion from the Communist regime. Among
this class may be included the low-level office
workers and civil servants, all of whom are
subject to the same general restrictions and
heavy obligations as the laboring class.
10. Intelligentsia and Clergy. The intelli-
gentsia of pre-Communist Albania consisted
of older elements who since the beginning of
the century had worked for the creation of an
independent country, and of younger people
who were brought up during the period of
national revival after World War I and were
imbued with Western culture and ideas. Some
of the younger intellectuals, mostly school
teachers, government officials, army officers,
and journalists, who in the period 1925-39
were disgusted with the behavior of King Zog
and his ruling group and with the feudal land-
owners, gradually tended to the left. During
World War II they became the backbone of
the national liberation movement through
which the Communists managed to seize con-
trol of the country. Other intellectuals, how-
ever, opposed the rise of Communism and a
number of them fought actively against the
Communist-controlled Partisan formations.
Balli Kombetar (National Front) , the strong-
est anti-Communist organization during the
war, was founded by nationalist democratic
elements among intellectuals, both old and
young, who had the vision to foresee the catas-
trophe that would befall the country in the
event of a Communist success. Although a
large number of anti-Communist intellec-
tuals were either driven out of the country or
imprisoned or executed when the Communists
assumed control, there are still strong ele-
ments among those remaining who are thor-
oughly dissatisfied with the regime and who
look toward liberation. There is only a hand-
ful of intellectuals in Albania today who could
be relied upon completely by the regime.
11. As noted above, the Moslem and Orthodox
clergymen have been cowed into submission
by the Tirana regime and the Catholic clergy
almost completely eliminated. However,
smouldering hatred exists among most of the
remaining clergymen, particularly the Cath-
olic, and they represent a definite resistance
potential.
12. Armed Forces. Morale in the Albanian
Armed Forces is low and the majority of the
men probably feel hostile toward the present
Albanian regime. This hostility arises pri-
marily from basic dislike of the present regime
and from resistance of individual Albanian
conscripts to military control. Moreover, the
ranks in the armed forces derive chiefly from
peasant families and as such have the same
antagonism toward the regime as their elders
in the villages. For this reason the army
ranks appear to be considered by the regime
as unreliable. This is indicated by the fact
that units of the armed forces have never been
employed to stamp out guerrilla bands. Most
of the permanent commissioned and noncom-
missioned officers, comprising perhaps one-
third of the total armed forces strength, were
selected because of their apparent loyalty to
the regime. Nevertheless, during the past two
years, there has been evidence of some dissi-
dence among high-ranking officers, some of
whom were dismissed. The demobilization
late in 1955 and early in 1956 of a considerable
number of officers considered unreliable by
the regime not only embittered those affected
but also had a demoralizing effect on others
still in the service. This substantial dissi-
dence potential, however, is not organized and
has not been focused on a uniform objective.
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INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE
13. Reliable reports on the people's attitudes
in Albania indicate that more than 90 percent
of the country's population is disaffected with
the Communist regime. The intensity of the
anti-regime feeling ranges from a rather mild,
chronic irritation on the part of disillusioned
Communists and Party sympathizers to a vio-
lent hatred on the part of those persons or
groups who have been directly harmed by the
regime. With the exception of the national
and most local Party leaders, some members
of the top bureaucracy, and the security
forces, there is at present no group, including
the Party rank-and-file, which escapes the
police terror of the regime or derives material
or other benefits from it. Nor does the popu-
lation have hopes for a better future under
Communist rule. There are many hidden
enemies of the regime, despite the constant
efforts of the secret police to root them out.
The suppression of certain groups, which are
considered by the regime as past redemption,
and their internment in labor or concentra-
tion camps, only adds to the widespread ill
feeling.
14. Although there are signs of hostility
toward the Soviet military and civilian experts
in Albania, derived from their preferential
treatment and higher wages, there is no evi-
dence that the population holds the Soviet
Union, whose armed forces played no part in
imposing the Communist regime on them, pri-
marily responsible for their present plight.
Hostility appears to be directed chiefly against
the native Communists. Even the more edu-
cated people hold the central authorities re-
sponsible for imposing an alien ideology on
the country. There appear to be compara-
tively few Albanians who are fully aware of
controls and pressures exerted on the regime
by the Kremlin. In the countryside hostility
is directed almost wholly against local Com-
munist and governmental functionaries who
implement the regime's policies. It is signifi-
cant that the vast majority of escapees from
Albania are villagers, not former members of
the bourgeois class or of the bureaucracy. The
village escapees know little if anything about
Communist ideology.
TRENDS OF DISSIDENCE SINCE 1953
15. The Soviet-Yugoslav declaration of June
2, 1955 recognizing the existence of "different
roads to socialism" and the denigration of
Stalin in the spring of 1956 gave rise to serious
frictions within the Albanian Party's top lead-
ership, but there is no evidence that the pop-
ulation at large was affected in any measur-
able way by these events. The Soviet-
Yugoslav declaration encouraged nationalist-
minded members of the Party's Central Com-
mittee to request that the Party follow a more
independent policy vis-a-vis Moscow and to
advocate the liberalization and democratiza-
tion of Party life and the establishment of
friendly relations with the West as well as
the East. These men were at once deprived
of their army ranks and dismissed from their
Party and government posts.
16. The denigration of Stalin also had serious
repercussions in the Albanian Party and re-
sulted in further purges in April?May 1956.
In April a number of Party intellectuals, offi-
cials, and army officers at a meeting of the
Party Committee of Tirana pressed for the re-
habilitation of all Party groups who had been
purged prior to Stalin's death, requested that
relations with Yugoslavia be normalized as
soon as possible, attacked the top Party lead-
ership for its rigid Stalinist views, belittled
the economic "successes" of the regime, and
asked that measures be taken at once to de-
mocratize and liberalize Party and state life.
Prompt and severe measures were taken
against all dissenters, but difficulties within
and outside the Party continued.
17. The anti-regime sentiments of intellec-
tuals, both Communist and non-Communist,
appear to have been fanned by the Soviet-
Yugoslav rapprochement, the Polish rebellion
and the Hungarian revolution. These events
probably had some positive effects on the Al-
banian resistance potential. But the defeat
of the insurgents in Hungary resulted in dis-
appointment among the Albanian national-
ists and strengthened Communist morale, as
the Free World, in the Albanian view, did not
dare to oppose Soviet power.
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RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE
18. Although no general unrest and disturb-
ance were reported in Albania immediately
after the death of Stalin, special security
measures were taken by the regime. Security
pursuit battalions continued their punitive
expeditions against those regions suspected of
giving aid and comfort to resistance bands.
The activities of the small, scattered, poorly-
organized-and-equipped bands in the moun-
tainous north began to diminish in 1953 and
by 1955 had become virtually nonexistent.
However, there have been reports of small,
isolated guerrilla bands in areas near Tirana
which in the past year have attacked head-
quarters of local People's Councils and killed
Party, government, and police officials.
19. No organized resistance group is known to
exist today in Albania. Activities reported
from time to time, such as assassinating local
Party leaders and governmental officials, am-
bushing army and state transport trucks and
security units, setting fire to cooperative
warehouses and state depots and factories,
and committing sabotage, are probably ac-
tions of local individuals or of persons tem-
porarily infiltrated from abroad.
20. There are signs that some unorganized
resistance, both active and passive, continues
throughout the country. Open hostility
toward the regime has been manifested chiefly
in complaints about the cost of living and
shortages of food. Riots reportedly occurred
late in 1956 and early in 1957 in a number of
cities protesting against economic depriva-
tions, but these were easily suppressed by the
security forces. In certain areas in the north
the people are said to have pillaged grain
depots of the cooperatives; workers at various
mines and factories staged token demonstra-
tions against shortages of food and low
wages; students at some high schools distrib-
uted tracts against the top rulers, and anti-
Communist slogans and caricatures of Soviet
and Albanian leaders were written or drawn
on school walls. Workers show no interest in
raising productivity. Peasants' resistance to
collectivization consists mainly of failure to
comply with the regime's measures to increase
agricultural output or to meet quotas. All
classes fail to pay, or try to avoid paying,
taxes. Youth has largely resisted Communist
indoctrination, and the people defiantly con-
tinue to practice religion. The stagnation of
the Albanian economy probably stems in part
from this attitude of passive resistance.
ROLE OF EMIGRES
21. Efforts by emigre groups to organize re-
sistance within Albania have failed. No
known lines of communication exist between
these groups and the Albanian people. Politi-
cal jealousies and bickering have weakened
the various emigre parties and organizations.
The aims of the National Committee for a
Free Albania had been to guide and encourage
resistance to Communist tyranny and to or-
ganize Albanians abroad to give effective aid
to the resistance. The committee, however,
was dissolved in April 1956 as a result of its
disunity and ineffectiveness. A new emigre
organization, the Free Albania Committee,
formed under the sponsorship of the Free Eu-
rope Committee, shows no promise of greater
effectiveness. However, there are definite
signs that Greece and Yugoslavia, especially
the latter, continue to infiltrate agents into
Albania for purposes of subversion. There
may also be some substance to the Albanian
charges that in the spring and summer of
1956 the Yugoslays recruited former influen-
tial Communists for the purpose of overthrow-
ing the present Albanian leadership and re-
placing it with pro-Yugoslav Communists. A
plot of this kind was exposed by the Albanian
authorities in September 1956.
REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE
22. The Albanian Army has a strength of
30,000 and in addition, the regime has at its
disposal 10,000 militarized security troops.
Frontier Troop elements, distributed fairly
uniformly along the Greek, Yugoslav, and
coastal borders, constitute 6,000 of this figure.
An estimated 4,000 men are organized into
Interior Troop units which are stationed
throughout the country, with the largest
single concentration in the Tirana area. In
addition to these militarized forces, the Corn-
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munist Government controls an overt and
covert policing apparatus totaling an addi-
tional 10,000 men. Thus, the Albanian re-
gime has a control ratio of one soldier, police-
man, or agent (in addition to countless in-
formants) for every 29 Albanian citizens. In
addition, the regime has instituted the stand-
ard police controls used in all Communist
countries: identity cards for all citizens over
15 years of age, travel permits along border
areas, as well as work and residence cards.
Through these measures the regime has suc-
ceeded in cowing the people and instilling in
them a sense of insecurity and total fear. The
effectiveness of these measures is attested by
the fact that open organized resistance has
been practically wiped out in the past few
years and that passive resistance during the
same period has been reduced. Albania, un-
like most of the other satellites, took no meas-
ures in the post-Stalin era to reduce police
terror or relax internal tensions. To counter-
act any attempts from outside the country to
foster dissidence among the people, severe
penalties are imposed on anyone implicated
in aiding and abetting diversionists. These
penalties also apply to anyone found listening
to anti-regime radio broadcasts or possessing
propaganda material received from outside
the country.
CAPABILITY TO SUPPRESS REVOLT
23. There is no likelihood, at present, of any
spontaneous uprising in Albania such as oc-
curred in Poland and Hungary in 1956. The
Stalinist regime has taken rigid measures to
nip in the bud any manifestations of faction-
alism within the Party or of deviationism
among intellectuals, students, or other groups.
Moreover, Albania, unlike some of the other
European satellites, has not tinkered with its
security apparatus, which still follows the
standard Stalinist methods of complete re-
pression. However, should a revolt break out,
the regime's security forces could probably
suppress it, unless the population secured
arms and the uprising spread generally
throughout rural areas. The Albanian Army
would be of doubtful loyalty in such a crisis,
and a widespread popular revolt actively sup-
ported by the army could not be suppressed
without active military assistance from the
Soviet Bloc countries.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS
OF PEACE
24. Under present conditions, dissidence has
no capability of developing into successful
organized resistance. Should an attempt be
made to establish organized resistance, the
regime would take the severest countermeas-
ures, and control over the whole country
would be even more repressive. However, a
number of external and internal developments
could increase the level of the current unor-
ganized resistance and dissidence. Economic
and political successes in Yugoslavia and Po-
land could have a telling effect on certain
groups in Albania, especially intellectuals,
professionals, some managerial elements, and
students. Internally, the continuing eco-
nomic deprivations and the acceleration of
agricultural collectivization could increase the
disaffection of the workers and peasants, espe-
cially of the latter who are potentially the
greatest threat to the Communist regime.
25. There were signs that resistance and dis-
sidence in Albania decreased after the Geneva
summit conference of 1955, but an upward
swing was noted after the Hungarian revolt
of 1956. Moreover, the denigration of Stalin
and the Soviet-Polish difficulties encouraged
certain factions within the Party to attack
the Albanian Stalinist leadership and to de-
mand liberalization of Party and government
life. Such deviations were, however, quickly
liquidated by the Tirana rulers.
26. A substantial improvement of the people's
living conditions, which at present is not in
sight, could lessen the will to resist among
certain elements, especially the working class
and the civil servants. Conversely, disaffec-
tion could be expected to increase should the
present very low living standards deteriorate
further.
27. There are at present no signs of any relax-
ation of security controls in Albania; in fact,
the regime is callihg for increased strength-
ening and perfecting of the security police ap-
paratus in order to stamp out what little
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resistance is left in the country. In the un-
likely event of a relaxation of security controls
and police terror, the people could be expected
to seize the opportunity to give vent to their
smouldering, pent-up hatred and might even
attempt to organize open resistance against
the regime. In the countryside, in particular,
the peasants would begin at once to defy the
local officials and refuse to fulfill quota obli-
gations.
28. Any external assistance to potential re-
sistance groups in Albania could be expected
to increase their ranks and ability to fight,
and to widen their popular support. Resist-
ance bands in the country, particularly in the
north, were strong in the period 1949-53 when
moral and some material support were given
them by neighboring Yugoslavia and other
countries. Once this stopped, the bands'
activities came to a virtual standstill.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR
29. All evidence indicates that the Albanians
expect liberation only through the outbreak
of a general war. Therefore, should such a
war break out and internal controls be weak-
ened, dissidence and unorganized resistance
could be expected to increase, especially if re-
sistance elements could be organized and re-
ceived material support and tactical assist-
ance from the West. The peasantry in par-
ticular could be expected to become more
recalcitrant about obeying the government's
economic orders.
30. In the event of general war, the possibility
of sporadic, but ineffectual, military action on
the part of resistance elements exists. How-
ever, effective military action could be under-
taken only if substantial arms and direction
were supplied from abroad and if substantial
elements of the armed forces defected and
took to the mountains. Without such assist-
ance from abroad, any sustained military
activities by organized resistance groups could
not be expected to continue for long. How-
ever, because of the terrain and the tradition
of Albanians for guerrilla warfare, small bands
could manage for an indefinite period to con-
duct sabotage and harassing activities. Al-
though poor communications and difficulties
in coordinating activities of resistance bands
would seriously impede large-scale escape and
evasion operations, possibilities do exist for
assisting individual and small group escapes.
Also, intelligence collection could be arranged
through the infiltration of small groups of
well-trained officers to work closely with the
guerrilla bands.
31. The reaction of Albanians to an invasion
of their country by Western armies would al-
most certainly depend upon the composition
of these armies. Invasion by Italian, Greek,
or Yugoslav armies would probably be met
with general hostility because in the past such
armies have destroyed Albania's independ-
ence. However, the Albanian people probably
would offer all possible assistance to invading
forces under NATO command even if these
forces included some nationals from tradi-
tional enemy nations. In the event of such
an invasion, it is likely that there would be
considerable defection to the invading army
from the Albanian Army (although probably
not from the security forces) including offi-
cers. Moreover, assurance from the West of
the preservation of Albania's independence
and territorial integrity could, in the event
of an open East-West conflict, unite the vast
majority of the people against the present
Communist regime as they have never been
united before. Only the hard-core Commu-
nists would be likely to offer stiff resistance,
especially in guerrilla warfare, in which they
are pre-eminently qualified by their tempera-
ment and wartime experience in rugged ter-
rain.
32. The effect on Albanian resistance poten-
tial of the use of nuclear weapons by attack-
ing forces would depend on which side em-
ployed them and the manner in which they
are used. It is conceivable that a nuclear at-
tack limited to Soviet shore bases, to tactical
use during actual operations, and to the seats
of power could be so designed as to eliminate
the major military resources and control cen-
ters of the regime without incurring popular
hatred or destroying resistance potential.
Such an attack could produce an opportunity
for indigenous resistance groups to take over
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control of the country if outside help were
available.1
33. If non-Bloc forces sponsored lenient occu-
pation policies in Albania, the people would
cooperate with the occupiers ? especially if
1 The representative of the Assistant Chief of
Staff, Intelligence, U. S. Army, does not believe
that the effect on resistance potential of the use
of nuclear weapons in Albania would differ
substantially from the effect on Bulgarian resist-
ance potential of a nuclear attack on that coun-
try. (See Annex B, para. 37.) Army would sub-
stitute for this paragraph: "If Albania were the
target of a nuclear attack, resistance potential
probably would be adversely affected. The de-
struction and demoralization resulting from such
an attack probably would be such that the peo-
ple would concentrate on survival."
control were gradually turned over to local
officials. As word of such liberal occupation
policies spread to remote unoccupied areas,
some Albanian tribal chieftains would or-
ganize cooperation with the occupiers and
harassment of Bloc forces. If supplied with
arms and explosives, these bands could inter-
fere significantly with the activities of Bloc
troops. They could also collect some intelli-
gence for non-Bloc forces and assist them in
evasion and escape.
34. Aspirations of individual factions for post-
war leadership would probably not adversely
affect resistance activities during the war and
might indeed intensify them. But clashes
among factions and leaders would almost cer-
tainly develop after hostilities had ended.
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ANNEX B? BULGARIA
BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE
1. Bulgaria has been traditionally more close-
ly linked to Russia than any other Eastern
European state, and consequently anti-Rus-
sian feeling ? as distinguished from anti-So-
viet?is not as widespread and intense as else-
where. Although much of the legacy of good-
will deriving from the Russian liberation of
Bulgaria from Ottoman rule in 1878 and from
German control in 1944 has been dissipated as
a result of Soviet domination since World War
II, traditional ties with Russia have tended
to check the development of hatred of Russia
and of its culture as such. This contrasts
with the situation in nations such as Poland
and Hungary, where national antagonism to-
ward Russia has been traditional. Moreover,
there are no Soviet troops in Bulgaria to ir-
ritate national pride. Antagonism created by
Soviet military and other advisors who are
present is probably limited to the relatively
few Bulgarian functionaries with whom they
come into direct contact. Soviet advisors
reportedly keep to themselves and do not as-
sociate with Bulgarians. Soviet military per-
sonnel wear civilian clothes. Nevertheless,
the regime's economic policies and programs
are regarded by the majority of the population
as furthering the interests of the USSR rather
than those of Bulgaria.
2. Serious economic problems have developed
since Stalin's death. In September 1957 the
regime admitted the existence of urban unem-
ployment, estimated at 150-180,000 persons
or some 15-18 percent of the nonagricultural
labor force. An urban housing shortage has
also become acute. Agricultural production,
which remains the mainstay of the economy,
is still below prewar levels, as evidenced by the
fact that temporary bread rationing and a So-
viet wheat loan were necessary to tide the Bul-
garians over a bad harvest in 1956. The re-
gime revealed in December 1956 that national
income had declined and that planned invest-
ments in 1957 would be considerably less than
in 1956.
3. The population as a whole, however, ap-
pears disposed to suffer the currently depressed
standard of living and tends openly to express
its dissatisfaction only when economic condi-
tions become acutely unbearable. Realizing
this, the regime has moved to allay economic
discontent through a series of limited eco-
nomic relief measures: family wage allow-
ances have been tripled; compulsory deliveries
of certain agricultural items have been abol-
ished; and wage increases ranging from eight
to 20 percent have been granted to industrial
workers. In order to relieve urban unemploy-
ment a series of make-work projects have been
introduced with Soviet assistance, and about
15,000 young people have been sent to work
in the USSR and Czechoslovakia. Recent re-
ports by Western observers in Sofia claim
that the regime's economic concessions re-
sulted in a slight improvement in living stand-
ards and an alleviation of economic discontent
in the summer of 1957. Living conditions,
however, are still below prewar levels and eco-
nomic discontent remains a major source of
dissidence.
4. Politically, dissatisfaction with totalitarian
Communist rule is widespread. The popula-
tion resents Communist control and regula-
tion of all phases of life through the so-called
"mass" social and cultural organizations.
Bulgarians have long been accustomed to ty-
rannical rule but never has such rule been so
oppressive as under the present regime. The
regime lacks popular support and maintains
itself in power through police state methods
and the ever-present threat of Soviet military
intervention.
5. Although organized religion is a potential
instrument for resistance, it is not, at this
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time, an important source of dissidence in
Bulgaria. Although regime efforts to convert
younger people to atheism have embittered
parents, the regime has refrained from any
intensive religious persecution. Harassment
of religious leaders has been limited to non-
Orthodox faiths (Catholic and Protestant) ,
which represent an insignificant proportion
of the population, and has been directed
against alleged subversive ties of religious
leaders with Western countries rather than
against profession of religious faith. On the
other hand, the regime has openly endorsed
Eastern Orthodoxy ? to which some 90 per-
cent of the population belongs ? as the na-
tional faith. The regime was instrumental
in healing the schism between the Bulgarian
Exarchate and the Patriarch of Constantino-
ple in 1945 and later raised the status of the
Bulgarian Orthodox Church to the patriarchal
level. Moreover, the hierarchy of the Bulgar-
ian Orthodox Church completely cooperates
with the regime. Members of the lower clergy,
although believed to be largely anti-Commu-
nist, have resigned themselves to Communist
rule and refrain from making anti-regime
statements. Currently Jewish, Moslem, Cath-
olic, and Protestant religious leaders also co-
operate with the regime.
6. Traditional hostility toward Yugoslavia has
served to check the spread of Titoism in Bul-
garia. Bulgarians would not welcome Tito
as a liberator, in view of traditional suspicion
of Yugoslav motives. Tito's national brand
of Communism and other ideological innova-
tions have had little influence among Bul-
garian Communists. The regime's policy of
close ties with Moscow enjoys the support of
anti-Yugoslav elements in the Party who fear
that rapprochement with Yugoslavia would
result in territorial encroachments. Bulgar-
ian Communists have not forgotten Yugoslav
efforts, prior to the Tito-Cominform break, to
secure control of Bulgarian Pirin Macedonia
by incorporating it into the Yugoslav federal
republic of Macedonia.
MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS
7. Peasants. Bulgarian peasants, steeped in
a tradition of individual farming, resent the
regime's collectivization program. Compris-
ing some 75 percent of the total population,
the peasants are numerically an important
dissident group and traditionally a source of
political opposition. In 1951 a collectiviza-
tion drive culminated in local outbreaks of
armed peasant resistance. The regime's latest
collectivization drive began in 1955 and aims
at virtually complete collectivization in a few
years (87 percent of total arable land is cur-
rently in the socialized sector): Although
there has been no open peasant resistance as
in 1951, discontent in the countryside is still
widespread.
8. In recent years the regime has gone to
great lengths to persuade former agrarian op-
position leaders to renounce their ties with the
late Nikola Petkov, agrarian leader executed
in 1947 for treason. It has had little success,
however, and Dimitur Gichev, a former right-
wing agrarian leader, has especially inspired
the peasantry with his stubborn refusal to
renounce his past opposition activities. Nev-
ertheless, it remains a fact that the agrarian
character of Bulgarian society serves to mili-
tate against the organization of dissidence
into an effective resistance movement. Re-
sistance is difficult to organize among a popu-
lation thinly distributed throughout the coun-
tryside. The absence of large urban centers
is also an important consideration, inasmuch
as resistance has been traditionally organized
by urban intellectuals and workers rather
than by peasants.
9. Youth. The disillusionment and antipathy
of young people probably represent the most
serious failure of the regime to eliminate po-
tential sources of resistance, since Commu-
nism admittedly relies upon the indoctrination
of the younger generation to assure the even-
tual stability of its regime. Significantly,
there is considerable dissatisfaction among
students with courses on Marxism-Leninism.
However, the government made it clear that it
will resolutely oppose student demands for
the abolition of these courses. Party and
youth leaders were urged to re-educate young
people who had come under the influence of
bourgeois ideology and propaganda.
10. Intellectuals. Ferment among intellec-
tuals, especially among writers and artists,
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has been evident since Stalin's death. In
December 1955, some two months prior to the
denigration of Stalin, Stalinist leader Vulko
Chervenkov severely castigated certain writers
for attempting to undermine Party control
over literature and urged that deviations from
the Party literary line be "strangled in the
embryonic stage." Bulgarian writers who be-
gan openly to advocate removal of Party con-
trols immediately following the 20th CPSU
Congress were quickly rebuffed. In September
1956, Bulgarian writers, attracted by an earlier
version of Mao's "100 flowers" theory, were
told that Communist Chinese ideologists did
not mean that "weeds and noxious plants"
would be allowed to bloom among the "flow-
ers" of socialist realism. However, despite
repressive measures and warnings by the re-
gime, restiveness among writers has contin-
ued.
11. Party Members. There is evidence of dis-
sidence among the Party rank and file, who
apparently have been disillusioned by the re-
gime's failure to democratize Party life. Dis-
content among lower-echelon Party members
is admitted by the Bulgarian press, which
complains that disunity has existed in some
lower Party organizations since the Hun-
garian revolt. In early 1957 the regime
launched a campaign to cleanse Party ranks
of "careerist and alien" elements. Dissidence
in the higher echelons of Party leadership (at
the Politburo and Central Committee levels)
takes the form of rivalry for power. The
purge of a Politburo member and two Central
Committee members in July 1957, for example,
was indicative of such rivalry. Thus far, how-
ever, top leaders have subordinated their dif-
ferences for the sake of unity.
12. Armed Forces. Although in the summer
of 1956 some 200 officers reportedly were
purged from the army, apparently for nation-
al-Communist tendencies, dissidence, at this
time, is believed virtually nonexistent within
the Bulgarian armed forces. Military per-
sonnel, as a whole, are less prone to dissident
attitudes than is the general population. The
permanent cadre, constituting some 25 per-
cent of the total military strength, consists of
commissioned and noncommissioned officers
who have demonstrated their reliability; many
of these are Communist Party members. The
conscripts, 35,000 of whom are inducted into
the Army annually, reflect the attitudes of
Bulgarian youth generally, although persons
of demonstrated antipathy toward the regime
are screened out or consigned to the labor
troops. Once they are inducted, military
discipline and persistent political indoctrina-
tion militate against the intensification and
spread of dissidence. The conditions of serv-
ice life in Bulgaria, while extremely poor by
Western standards, are in general acceptable
to the typical recruit.
13. Industrial Workers. Industrial workers,
officially the favored class of the regime, are
disillusioned with low wages and poor work-
ing conditions. It is unlikely that recent wage
increases have significantly offset this atti-
tude. Urban unemployment has further ag-
gravated their discontent. Bulgarian workers
resent political and economic regimentation
by Communist-dominated trade unions, whose
primary function is to enforce labor discipline
rather than represent the interests of the
workers. Frequent criticism in the Bulgar-
ian press of the failure of trade unions to
maintain close ties with the workers is in-
dicative of the hostile attitude of workers to-
ward Communist trade union officials. A
trade union congress scheduled for the fall
of 1956 was reportedly postponed because of
demands by workers that they be allowed to
elect their own union officials.
INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE SINCE 1953
14. Dissidence in Bulgaria has not significant-
ly increased since Stalin's death. Rank and
file Party members, writers and students open-
ly expressed their discontent after the 20th
CPSU Party Congress, but repressive measures
by the regime effectively curbed such manifes-
tations. During the Hungarian revolt some
student demonstrations reportedly occurred
but apparently failed to arouse other elements
of the population. All available evidence indi-
cates that the majority of the population still
feels that armed rebellion against an efficient
police state, backed up by Soviet military
force, would be futile without effective mili-
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tary support from outside. Unquestionably,
the failure of the Hungarian revolt has served
to strengthen this attitude. Only a signifi-
cant worsening of economic conditions, ac-
companied by a break-down of the authority
of the central Party leadership and its secur-
ity apparatus, could precipitate a general up-
rising. If localized disturbances arising out of
economic conditions assumed larger propor-
tions and resulted in bloodshed, the current
attitude of popular passivity could change
to that of active resistance. Much would de-
pend on the ability of the regime to curb ini-
tial disturbances without exacerbating the
hatred of the population.
15. The regime's relatively stable leadership
has been instrumental in checking the spread
of dissidence. No Bulgarian leader has shown
any tendency to champion greater autonomy
from Moscow ? as Gomulka did ? and top
leaders appear agreed that essential internal
controls should be maintained. Elements dis-
satisfied with the regime's failure to liberalize
internal life following the denigration of Sta-
lin were unable to find a spokesman for their
cause among the leaders. Certain journalists
and writers who openly called for more drastic
destalinization were sternly rebuked.
16. Nevertheless, the ordinary citizen report-
edly began to enjoy relatively greater freedom.
Arrests for minor political offenses ceased and
Bulgarians became less afraid of expressing
anti-regime opinions in public. Minor politi-
cal offenders were released and forced labor
camps began to close. In September 1956 a
Central Committee decision promised ex-
panded powers and responsibility for local
governmental organs, more effective curbs on
police abuses, and debate in the national
parliament. The Central Committee de-
cision also rehabilitated individuals previously
purged from high places for Titoism.
17. The Polish and Hungarian upheavals,
however, reversed this trend and the police
state atmosphere of the Stalin era was rein-
troduced. In early November 1956, shortly
after the suppression of the Hungarian rebels,
the regime carried out precautionary arrests
of unreliable elements and began to reopen
forced labor camps. The regime urged the
population to report persons making anti-
regime statements to the authorities, and po-
lice patrols in Sofia and other cities increased.
By July 1957 some 5,000 persons reportedly
had been expelled from Sofia.
18. Popular dissidence in Bulgaria is directed
toward both the native regime and Soviet
domination. There is little likelihood that
Bulgarians distinguish between Soviet dom-
ination and local Communist rule. Bul-
garian Communist leaders, who prior to
World War II spent many years of their adult
life in the Soviet Union and even acquired
Soviet citizenship, are regarded as more Soviet
than Bulgarian. Bulgarians appear to at-
tribute their depressed standard of living
both to Soviet domination and to the policies
of the regime. Dissidence is also equally
directed at Communism per se, since it is asso-
ciated with the regime and Soviet domination.
While some Party members and members of
the intellectual class may feel that Soviet
practice is a perversion of true Communism,
the majority of Bulgarians are opposed to
Communism in general.
RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE
19. Generally, active resistance activities have
declined since the death of Stalin even though
there are indications of some increase of dissi-
dence among the Party elite. There is no
present available evidence of any organized
resistance against the regime, either on a na-
tional or on a local scale. Reports alleging
activities of such organizations have remained
unconfirmed. Whatever resistance there is,
appears to be entirely limited to the passive
and unorganized variety.
20. Passive resistance is found among the
peasantry, workers, intellectuals, and youth.
The clergy and members of the former middle
class do not figure prominently in passive re-
sistance. Peasant resistance is displayed by
failure to meet agricultural delivery quotas
set by the regime and neglect of collective
farm machinery. Malfeasance by collective
farm officials indicates an attitude of indif-
ference, if not opposition. Occasional active
resistance in the form of sabotage has been
reported but such reports are difficult to
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verify. Whatever sabotage there is appears
to be spontaneous and not the work of any
organized group.
21. In industry, workers resort to slowdowns
and absenteeism, are careless with mainte-
nance and handling of equipment, and fail to
meet norms. While it is difficult to determine
whether such acts are due to inefficiency or are
manifestations of passive resistance, the fre-
quency with which the Bulgarian press dis-
cusses such matters would indicate the latter.
22. Passive resistance among youth is mani-
fested by complete lack of interest in the ac-
tivities of the Communist-sponsored Dimitrov
youth organization, deliberate failure of
courses in universities in order to avoid work
assignments to unpleasant areas or jobs, and
failure to attend Party meetings and other
youth activities of the Fatherland Front.
Young people also, on occasion, manifest re-
ligious devoutness.
23. Bulgarian writers and journalists have
been accused by the regime of deliberately
avoiding writing about contemporary life in
order to eschew political controversy. Writers
occasionally get articles and short stories criti-
cal of the regime published in the press.
Judging from discussions of literary activities
in the press, heated debates and differences of
views take place at meetings of the Bulgarian
Writers' Union.
ROLE OF EMIGRES
24. Although Bulgarian emigre organizations
have numerous contacts with persons in the
homeland, there is no evidence that they are
in a position to organize resistance activities.
The Bulgarian emigre movement is divided by
jealousies and opportunism, which have served
to reduce its potential to inspire resistance in
Bulgaria. There is a general feeling that emi-
gres have been abroad too long to keep in
touch with conditions and current aspirations
in Bulgaria and consequently cannot provide
post-liberation leadership. Recent regime
propaganda against the emigre movement,
spread by voluntary returnees, has probably
served to further lower Bulgarian estimation
of emigre organizations.
25. Dr. Georgi M. Dimitrov, representing the
left wing Agrarians in exile, is the only emigre
leader known to have seriously attempted to
maintain contacts inside Bulgaria. His activ-
ity, however, has been confined to keeping
track of followers through sporadic refugee
debriefings and personal correspondence. He
has mounted about five cross-border opera-
tions, with the assistance of Western intelli-
gence services, to contact local Agrarian lead-
ers, asking them to start organizing against
the day when the Communist regime col-
lapses. The Dimitrov organizational activity
is oriented toward eventual assumption of
power by his party rather than toward present
or eventual resistance to the Communists.
He has condemned the operations of other
groups and intelligence agencies aimed at or-
ganizing internal resistance.
REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE
26. Following the 20th CPSU Congress, the
Bulgarian regime refused to grant any signifi-
cant concessions. Voicing its allegiance to the
principle of "socialist legality," it resumed pre-
ventive and arbitrary arrest and deportations.
While calling for a new spirit in art, it in-
sisted on conformance to "socialist realism."
Requesting constructive criticism by Party
members, it silenced or expelled all but the
most platitudinous critics. Stalinist type
oppression will probably continue to be effec-
tive even though it will exacerbate already
existing grievances.
27. The powers of the police have not been
significantly restricted. During the suppres-
sion of the Hungarian revolt, the regime open-
ly appealed to the population to inform on
individuals guilty of anti-regime statements
and activities. Since March 1957, unreliable
elements from Sofia and other large towns
were expelled. Sofia citizens, marked for ex-
pulsion to the countryside, were visited by the
police after midnight and given two to four
hours to leave the capital. Even Party func-
tionaries and other persons formerly consid-
ered reliable by the regime were among those
expelled.
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CAPABILITY OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS
REVOLT
28. The regime could successfully suppress
any localized revolt. The Bulgarian mili-
tarized security forces consist of 30,000 well-
trained, loyal men, evenly divided between
Frontier Troops and Interior Troops. The
overt and covert police organizations bring
the total strength of the security apparatus,
exclusive of the armed forces, to 80,000-
100,000 persons. This figure gives a control
ratio of one trained operative, policeman, or
militarized security force man to every 77 to
96 Bulgarian citizens, not taking into account
the informer network. The efficiency and
quality of the police system appears good and
there is no indication of disloyalty in the
police forces. Although certain elements of
the ordinary police (such as the traffic police)
were placed under local control in July 1957,
there has been no major reform of the Bul-
garian internal security apparatus which
might lessen its effectiveness in suppressing
local resistance. Frontier and Interior Troop
strength is believed to have been cut, but
these reductions are not believed to have seri-
ously affected the efficiency of the state secu-
rity apparatus. Moreover, the Bulgarian
police system has not been discredited by ad-
mittance of past "errors" as in the case of
some other satellites. Following the April
1956 Plenum's restoration of "socialist legal-
ity," and the quiet repudiation of the 1949-
1952 Party purge, the security apparatus suf-
fered only a minimal loss of efficiency result-
ing from confusion over the new line and the
eclipse of a number of security officers impli-
cated in the earlier extortion of false confes-
sions and other malpractices.
29. In the highly unlikely event of a national
uprising, however, the Bulgarian security ap-
paratus would need the support of the Bul-
garian Army and, if the conflict threatened to
prolong itself, the support of Soviet forces.
Top Bulgarian Army officers and commanders
would remain loyal to the regime, and lower
ranking officers and enlisted men would gen-
erally maintain discipline and seek to suppress
the rebels unless they were convinced that the
1-tter truly represented a nationwide popular
movement. In the event that rebel efforts
promised some success and some lower rank-
ing officers and men turned over their arms
or joined the revolt, Soviet intervention in
force would be inevitable.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS
OF PEACE
30. Assuming conditions of peace and barring
widespread revolts in the Bloc, there is little
real potential among any elements in Bul-
garia for effective organized resistance to the
regime. Unorganized and passive resistance
will probably continue to manifest itself, but
under present conditions the population will
increasingly feel that their position is hope-
less and that aid from the United States or
any other Western power is unlikely. Local
outbreaks of resistance born, of desperation
with economic conditions, particularly among
the peasants, might occur from time to time,
but a general spontaneous revolt such as
occurred in Hungary is unlikely, given present
conditions and the temper of the population.
31. Whether or not passive and unorganized
resistance activity will increase depends on
the ability of the regime to cope with eco-
nomic problems. Thus far it has shown a
willingness to grant limited economic conces-
sions, and the Soviet Union has shown itself
ready to render assistance for the solution of
economic problems, which would make it ap-
pear unlikely that the economic situation will
deteriorate sufficiently to bring about a
marked increase in this type of resistance.
32. There seems to be little possibility of in-
crease or change in resistance activity by the
general population under foreseeable condi-
tions of peace if no Party upheaval occurs.
The principal opportunity for maintaining at
least some resistance potential is through
Western propaganda, transmitting a feeling
of hope and a sense of direction among the
people. This may prevent complete apathy
and cynicism and encourage the expression of
grievances and demands by every semi-legal
method, so that a spirit of resistance can be
maintained and molded into the strongest
possible instrument of pressure upon the Com-
munist regime.
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33. Although any marked increase in East-
West tensions would have the effect of raising
hopes of eventual liberation from the outside,
Bulgarians would still not be disposed to un-
dertake liberation by themselves. Ideological
and factional disputes, whether in the Bul-
garian leadership or in other Communist re-
gimes, have had little impact on resistance in
Bulgaria. Bulgarians undoubtedly envy the
greater freedom of Poland from Moscow's
domination but have shown no disposition to
emulate that country. Possibly Bulgarians
are still doubtful of the permanence of Po-
land's status of greater autonomy.
34. To a certain degree, the easing of security
measures would act as a safety valve. A sud-
den relaxation of essential internal controls,
however, might create a precarious situation
unless it were accompanied by measures to
remedy the basic causes of dissidence. It
would be particularly dangerous, if, at the
same time, an alternative political leader or
faction emerged as a "liberal" force. Pres-
sures for the abolition of all oppressive con-
trols would mount, and it is doubtful that,
under such circumstances, a strongly pro-
Soviet regime could maintain itself in power
without Soviet military support.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR
35. Under conditions of general warfare the
resistance potential of the Bulgarian popula-
tion would increase considerably. The ruling
Communist minority would be under unceas-
ing pressure from the antagonistic majority
of Bulgarians, a situation which would prob-
ably result in more forthright action on the
part of elements now passive and would
theaten the political stability of the govern-
ment. Such instability would give rise to con-
siderable doubts on the part of many individ-
uals in the Party and state apparatus about
the future of Communism, especially if Soviet
defeat became apparent. Political opportu-
nists would emerge, with the result that the
potential for widespread effective action would
be sharply enhanced. Nevertheless, anti-re-
gime resistance activities could not be intensi-
fied initially. Only if Western forces appeared
to be winning, would the Bulgarians engage
in espionage, sabotage, and other harassing
activities ? but not to the extent that might
be expected by the people of other satellites
under similar circumstances.
36. During any type of war in the Balkan
area, there would be almost no possibility of
independent military action by anti-regime
elements.' As in World War II, resistance
groups ? if supplied with arms and explosives
from the outside ? could tie down some Bloc
forces through sabotage of rail lines and in-
dustrial plants. Bands of guerrilla fighters
might be developed, but they would be entire-
ly dependent upon outside support. If ene-
my forces consisted of such traditional ene-
mies as Turks and Greeks, the Bulgarians
would do very little to assist them. If the war
were being fought by Western forces on, or
adjacent to Bulgarian territory, the Bulgari-
ans might aid enemy forces by supplying in-
telligence, by destroying lines of communica-
tion, and by sabotaging Soviet Bloc supplies
and installations. As indicated above, the
extent of such activities would depend on the
nationality of the enemy and upon logistic
support from outside. However, the populace
would probably not participate in evasion and
escape activities until enemy forces were close
to Bulgaria, and even then would weigh the
risks involved very carefully. If military ac-
tion were taking place within Bulgaria or an
area within the Bloc, Bulgarian resistance
capabilities would be increased, and if the
West appeared to be winning, there would be
more anti-regime activities. If the Bloc coun-
tries appeared to be winning, the Bulgarians
would have less capability and less inclina-
tion to help the West.
37. Use of tactical nuclear weapons would
probably have little effect on Bulgarian re-
The representative of the Assistant Chief of
Staff, Intelligence, USAF would add the follow-
ing: It is possible that resistance groups could
carry out limited independent military opera-
tions if the following three conditions prevailed:
(a) disruption or diversion of the regime's means
of internal control; (b) development in resist-
ance groups of effective leadership and coordina-
tion, and receipt of outside material support;
and (c) assurance of early direct military sup-
port and relief.
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sistance, unless Bulgaria was to be a target
for a major nuclear attack. The human and
material destruction and social dislocation re-
sulting from a nuclear attack on Bulgaria
would eliminate the population's potential for
resistance.2
38. Resistance elements would make little ef-
fort to assist Greek, Turkish, or Yugoslav
military forces even if they were identified
with the West, unless these nationals consti-
tuted only a minority of a force under United
2 The representative of the Assistant Chief of
Staff, Intelligence, USAF would add the follow-
ing: It is conceivable that an air attack could
be so designed as to eliminate the major sources
of the military and control strength of the re-
gime without incurring popular hatred or de-
stroying resistance potential. Such an air at-
tack could produce an opportunity for indigenous
resistance groups to take over control of the
country.
States or other Western command. Further-
more, assurance that forces of countries other
than Bulgaria's traditional enemies would be
assigned occupation duties in the country
would be necessary.
39. Occupation policies of the attacking forces
would have a crucial effect on all resistance
capabilities. To be effective these policies
would have to reflect the aspirations of the
Bulgarian people for national sovereignty and
the overthrow of communism. The aims of
individual resistance factions for post-war
leadership in Bulgaria probably would not
seriously impede intelligence, evasion and
escape, and military capabilities. However,
political ambitions of some resistance leaders
could affect political warfare operations, if the
resistance leaders were supported by an in-
fluential following.
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ANNEX C?COMMUNIST CHINA
PREAMBLE
1. In the years following the Communist
take-over in mainland China, the regime sup-
pressed organized resistance. During this
period, the regime failed to gain the positive
support of large segments of the population
and created widespread apathy and dissatis-
faction. In the course of the past two years
this situation has been aggravated. The vol-
ume and intensity of dissidence has increased
significantly, particularly among the peas-
antry, the intellectuals, and some youth, most
of whom were formerly inclined to accept the
regime at least passively. Despite this in-
crease, however, there has been no significant
organized resistance or active resistance on
other than a purely local level, with the im-
portant exception of Tibet, where dissidence
flared into armed rebellion in 1956, forcing
important shifts in the Communist time-table
for this area.
BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE
2. Among the most important causes of dis-
sidence are economic grievances. The re-
gime's policies of rapid industrialization, mili-
tary modernization, and socialization have
required the diversion of substantial resources,
which have been secured through demanding
increased productivity while greatly restrict-
ing the benefits accruing to the people. In
consequence, workers and peasants have been
frustrated in failing to achieve promised levels
of real income and well-being, while land-
owners and businessmen resent the loss of
their properties to the state and the reduction
in their income. Politically, the system of
rigid regimentation and tight control over
every aspect of life is generally resented, al-
though in varying degrees among different
groups. Finally, Communist efforts to change
age-old social concepts, such as that of the
family hierarchy, have created considerable
ill will. In contrast to Eastern European
satellites, however, resentment of close ties
with the USSR is not a nation-wide factor
although it does affect the attitude of some
groups.
3. The Communist regime is now engaged in
a gigantic effort to remake China's ancient
society and create a modern, industrial state.
This has involved a series of sweeping political,
social, and economic changes, including at-
tempts to reshape education and to revamp
organizational media for controlling and in-
doctrinating the populace. The innumerable
pressures brought to bear by the regime and
the disruption of traditional social pat-
terns have produced a widespread tension and
insecurity. Not all these "strains and stresses"
are the result of, or can be attributed to, the
Communist system. Large segments of the
population have remained indifferent, how-
ever; many others have adopted a wait-and-
see attitude; still others are willing to accept
the regime because they believe its accom-
plishments and policies have improved their
personal position or prospects. Considerable
elements of the population feel they have
gained rather than lost since the defeat of
the Kuomintang. Thus anti-regime attitudes
vary with differing conditions and among dif-
fering groups as they are affected by specific
programs.
MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS
4. Peasantry. The land reform of 1950-1952
liquidated the landlords and redistributed
land among the tenant, poor, and some mid-
dle-income peasants. These beneficiaries con-
stitute 75 percent of the total peasant popula-
tion which, in turn, constitutes the bulk of
Communist China's population. Many of
these peasants probably believed that they
benefited from reform, and dissidence did not ?
appear to be widespread except at times of
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agricultural crisis, such as the crop failure
01 1954. The regime's sudden rush into agri-
cultural socialization, following Mao's speech
in July 1955, was largely completed in 1956.
During this process, there were only few re-
ports of rural opposition, but by the end of
1956, peasant dissatisfaction was again devel-
oping. The peasants resented the bureau-
cratic and inefficient management of the co-
operatives and/or collectives. They disliked
having to increase their labor for the state,
since this seriously affected the sideline
occupations that traditionally contributed to
their income. They were disillusioned be-
cause the regime did not fulfill its promise
of an immediate rise in income.
5. Reports on Chinese peasant dissidence are
relatively convincing. Peiping has admitted
widespread peasant withdrawals from collec-
tives in some areas, and has reported minor
peasant uprisings in several provinces. How-
ever, an increase of peasant discontent will
depend largely on whether the harvests are
good or bad and on the willingness of the re-
gime to let the peasants enjoy more of the
fruits of their labor. There is no uniformity
in the pattern of discontent, and regional con-
ditions will continue to vary.
6. Intellectuals. At the time of its establish-
ment, the regime enjoyed passive acceptance
by, and in some cases the active support of,
many of the country's intellectuals. However,
despite continuous efforts to "reform" the in-
tellectuals, their attitude toward the regime
has steadily deteriorated, except during a brief
period in 1956-57 when the regime tolerated
some degree of intellectual diversity. How-
ever, the effect of the "Hundred Flowers"
policy has recently been negated by the "anti-
rightist struggle," which has been directed
more at the intellectuals than at any other
group. Disaffection among intellectuals has
centered on lack of freedom to undertake orig-
inal research or creative activity not approved
by the regime, on the Communist Party's
domination of all significant aspects of public
activity, and on inadequate material incen-
tives and inappropriate employment.
7. Dissidence among the intellectuals is par-
ticularly significant because their skills and
experience are badly needed by the regime.
Many of those who have been attacked as
"rightists" have achieved relatively high ? if
often nominal ? positions in such fields as
government administration and education.
The vehemence of the regime's attack against
intellectuals during the latter half of 1957
testifies to the Communists' concern over the
implications of opposition in this group. How
successful the regime will be in its efforts
to "reform" and "educate" the intellectuals
is still uncertain. Recent events have prob-
ably increased the level of dissidence among
them. Of equal importance is the probability
that these same events, by bringing about a
strengthening of controls over the intellectu-
als and curbing their influence, will greatly
reduce their inclination and opportunities to
translate dissidence into resistance.
8. Youth. Initially, youth, and especially
students, included some of the most ardent
supporters of the regime and it appeared that
dissidence among them was minor. However,
a definite decline in enthusiasm for the re-
gime seems to have occurred. This is the
result mainly of the regimentation, prosaic
tasks and living conditions which face most
youths during the present period of indus-
trialization in contrast to the expectations
created by the establishment of a "New
China," the Korean hostilities, the spread of
Chinese Communist influence in the Asian-
African area, and the socialization period of
1955-56. Dissatisfaction with their strictly
controlled curriculum and their prospects for
further education and for suitable employ-
ment has been evident. Generally being sen-
sitive to ideological matters, youth was also
influenced to some extent by de-Stalinization
and the Hungarian uprising. Such disaffec-
tion has in several cases erupted into stu-
dent riots. Although dissidence among youth
may not be widespread at present, it remains
a serious problem because it opens to question
the fundamental Communist emphasis on the
early molding of opinion.
9. Former Businessmen. When the bulk of
remaining private commerce and industry was
socialized in 1956, there was virtually no
overtly expressed opposition from the former
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proprietors. However, it was clear in the
"anti-rightist struggle" that the regime did
not consider the "bourgeoisie" resigned to
current conditions. Except in certain indus-
trial-commercial centers such as Shanghai,
and except for connections with other groups
such as the intellectuals, the "bourgeoisie"
now has negligible political or economic power.
Dissidence among former private businessmen,
while widespread, is thus significant only
to the extent that it limits the regime's ability
to utilize their technical and managerial skills.
Former businessmen possess talents which
cannot yet be matched by a new Communist
trained generation, and their dissatisfaction
with the regime, and the consequent distrust
of them by the regime will be an adverse fac-
tor of some but not crucial importance in
the economic development of the country.
10. Armed Forces. In the active Chinese Com-
munist military service there is virtually no
dissidence and no likelihood of resistance.
This is reflected in current low desertion rates
and is the result of close Party control of all
levels, careful selection of personnel for mili-
tary service, constant indoctrination and sur-
veillance of all military personnel, highly
preferential treatment of military personnel,
constant attention to officer-enlisted civilian
relationships, and prompt action to ease or
eradicate tensions and other problems. Ex-
'Nationalist defectors and other disloyal per-
sonnel have been eliminated from the service;
equipment, food, clothing, and shelter are
available in generally satisfactory quantities
by Chinese standards; the pay and leave situ-
ation is improved; and terms of service are set
by law. There is a close relationship between
armed forces and the civilian component of
the Peiping regime. The top military com-
manders are all Party veterans and concur-
rently hold high Party posts. The majority of
the rank and file of the armed forces belong
either to the Party or the Young Communist
League.
11. Militia. There are several million mem-
bers of the People's Militia ? a heterogeneous
group whose functions, training, equipment,
and social standing vary throughout the
country. It is probable that there are Militia
members who are dissatisfied with their role
and resent having to give up their spare time
to unrewarding work. The great majority of
the Militia, however, probably are loyal to the
regime. Dissidence among this group is more
apt to reflect their status as peasants rather
than their para-military position.
12. Veterans. The demobilization of over five
million men from the armed forces since 1949
has created a sizable population group who
face many problems. In at least one province
demobilized servicemen have been blamed re-
cently for trouble in rural areas. The vet-
erans therefore constitute a group within
which there are dissident feelings and within
which there is probably a certain amount of
potential resistance and possibly some actual
resistance. Many veterans are disgruntled
and unhappy because they have been forced
to leave the comparative security and prestige
of service life for the much more difficult life
of a peasant. Additionally, numbers of them
wanted to work in the cities after discharge
but were forced to return to the rural areas
where dissatisfaction has arisen over employ-
ment, housing, and acceptance given them by
the villagers. At present, dissidence among
veterans is not intense and is not likely to
develop into a serious security threat. Never-
theless, the veterans, trained in the use of
arms, experienced in guerrilla warfare, and
bound together by a common background,
constitute a potentially serious security prob-
lem.
13. Communist Leadership. The Chinese
Communist Party and regime has demon-
strated unusual cohesiveness and unity at its
highest levels. With virtually the sole excep-
tion of the Kao-Jao affair in 1954-55, the
regime has adjusted policy differences and
other internal disputes without recourse to
drastic purges and without evidencing dissi-
dence among disgruntled leaders. When Mao
dies or retires from active leadership, some
diminution of party unity can be expected,
with struggles for power among the senior
party leaders who would probably collectively
succeed Mao in his various functions. How-
ever, it seems unlikely that even Mao's death
would cause a serious leadership crisis that
would critically affect the party's cohesiveness
and effectiveness.
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14. At lower levels of the Communist Party
there appears to be a certain amount of dis-
content, seldom intense enough to be called
disidence. Rural cadres are particularly sus-
ceptible to occasional misgivings. They are
often forced to lead a peasant-level life; they
miss the companionship and cultural activi-
ties available in urban centers. Blame for a
failure of the regime's policies is often laid to
them directly. They find themselves caught
between the millstones of Peiping's policies
and the realities of their immediate environ-
ment, and there is evidence that some of them
occasionally identify themselves more directly
with the peasants than with Party demands.
Dissidence in the Party is likely to become
significant only if the regime has major eco-
nomic reverses or if dissidence within other
major groups becomes acute.
15. Government Bureaucracy. While key
positions in the bureaucracy are held by Party
members, there are a substantial number of
nonmembers in it who are rewarded less gen-
erously both in a material and psychological
sense, and who accordingly are more prone to
be dissatisfied with the regime. Criticisms of
the regime by non-Party persons in mid-1957
revealed a considerable degree of resentment
in the bureaucracy over the preferential posi-
tion of Party members and the Party's unwill-
ingness to grant authority to nonmembers.
At the same time, many such persons have a
vested interest in the regime which may par-
tially negate any dissident tendencies. In the
future, the level of dissidence in this group
will be largely determined by the Party's will-
ingness to improve its methods of working
with the group.
16. Religious Groups. Organized religious
groups have been significant sources of dissi-
dence chiefly in minority-inhabited areas of
Communist China, most notably in Tibet and
in some Hui (Moslem) areas. In China proper
organized religion is not of great numerical
importance because the great majority of Chi-
nese take an informal, eclectic view of religion,
adopting elements of a number of religions
without formal adherence to any. Despite
their relatively small membership some of the
organized religious groups in China proper
are nevertheless significant as sources of dissi-
dence and passive resistance. In some cases
the regime's moves against religious groups or
adherents has aroused resentment. Members
of a number of religious groups continue pas-
sive resistance against the regime despite con-
certed drives against some religious groups
(particularly Catholics) and Communist ef-
forts to organize religious adherents into front
organizations that are susceptible to Commu-
nist control and that support the regime's pro-
gram (fronts for Buddhists, Moslems, Protes-
tants, Catholics, and Taoists have been or-
ganized).
17. Superstitious Sects. In addition to the
above, certain semi-religious sects, including
such secret societies as the I-kuan-tao, have
figured in Communist admissions of unrest
and local rebellion. These sects with an
ideology based on elements of various religions
and superstitions have been subjected to con-
tinuous Communist suppression efforts, but
probably continue to exist on a local level in
many rural parts of China, where they appar-
ently succeed from time to time in organizing
minor peasant rebellions through appeals to
magic and superstition and through exploita-
tion of various peasant grievances. None of
these sects, however, appears to have retained
an effective national or even regional organi-
zation or following.
18. Minorities. The ethnic minorities in
China traditionally have resisted the expan-
sionist tendencies of the predominant Han
Chinese. In actual practice the Communist
regime has continued the engulfment of the
minorities by the Han Chinese. This pre-
sumably has led to dissatisfaction among the
minorities which, in turn, has produced cor-
rective efforts to curb "great Han chau-
vinism." Aside from Tibet ? a special case
where the dissidence has flared into active
resistance ? the extent of disaffection
among minorities is not known, but the fre-
quent reference to the regime's corrective for
"great Han chauvinism" indicates that some
exists.
19. Former Overseas Chinese. There are ap-
proximately 12,000,000 persons in mainland
China, concentrated largely in Kwangtung
and Fukien provinces, who are considered
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"Overseas Chinese" by virtue of previous resi-
dence abroad or as "Overseas Chinese de-
pendents" because they have relatives abroad.
Members of this group have been treated with
greater leniency than the rest of the popula-
tion; they have received preferential rations,
and have occasionally been excluded from
some of the most onerous consequences of the
1955-56 socialist transformation. Neverthe-
less, some dissidence probably exists in this
group; accustomed in the past to an above-
average standard of living and more knowl-
edgeable about the outside world, they proba-
bly resent various aspects of Chinese Commu-
nist policies.
20. Urban Workers. The urban workers are
cultivated as the mass base of the regime.
Despite preferential treatment since 1949, dis-
affection has developed among urban workers
in some areas and, in several cases, has
resulted in strikes. While many factory
workers now have more job security and
material rewards than in pre-Communist
days, there is resentment of the psy-
chological pressures, such as high work
norms, and dissatisfaction that living stand-
ards have not improved more rapidly. How-
ever, dissidence among urban workers does
not appear to be widespread nor intense. As
in the case of youth, however, dissidence
among workers is regarded with the utmost
concern by the regime on ideological grounds.
21. Former National Government Officials.
Of the National government officials who did
not escape to Taiwan, a small number are col-
laborating with the Peiping. regime, more are
probably still in prison or in labor camps, and
still more are retired or not fully active. The
collaborators work for the regime either be-
cause of a timely shift of allegiance to the
Communists before or when the regime was
established or because their valuable technical
skills have earned them a special position.
Some of this group probably resent the dom-
ination of the Communist Party and may be
dissatisfied with conditions. But they would
be cautious about exposing their dissatisfac-
tion because of their own past history. The
noncollaborators in many cases have been
branded as enemies of the regime from the
beginning. They unquestionably are dissatis-
fied with their present condition, but to an
even greater extent than the collaborating
group, must suppress their feelings.
22. Tibetans. The Tibetans for centuries
have used every means at their disposal to
resist the imposition of political, military, eco-
nomic, or cultural controls by whatever Chi-
nese government has been in power. Proba-
bly a majority of them has continued to resist
all efforts of the Chinese Communist regime
to bring Tibet under the centralized control of
Peiping. This has been true not only of the
Tibetans living in what the Chinese Commu-
nists refer to as the "Tibet region," but equal-
ly so of the seminomadic Tibetan tribes who
live in Tibetan areas now included in the
provinces of Tsinghai, Kansu, and Szechwan.
Among the causes of Tibetan resistance have
been resentment at Chinese interference with
Tibetan religious activities, Communist indoc-
trination of Tibetan youth, attempts to "re-
form" Tibetan society, food shortages and in-
flation, and Peiping's failure to honor a
promise to release certain imprisoned Tibetan
leaders.
INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE
23. While it may be possible, on the basis of
the preceding analyses, to make an assess-
ment in general terms of the major sources
and areas of ill will, the intensity of dissidence
in Communist China and the degree to which
it may be transformed into actual resistance
remain largely matters of conjecture. It is
logical to conclude that some degree of dissi-
dence exists at almost every level of Commu-
nist Chinese society. However, this does not
mean that such dissidence can develop into
resistance unless the control capabilities of
the regime were greatly weakened.
24. The regime's policies and practices, de-
spite the "rectification campaign," have ac-
centuated a number of factors causing ill will.
At the same time, the regime has developed
and exploited the growing pride of the Chi-
nese people in their country's achievements,
particularly their military strength and their
new international prestige. As in the USSR,
Communism was imposed on the people by
indigenous elements in the face of seemingly
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overwhelming odds rather than by a foreign
power. These points are recognized, mainly
by members of the "intelligentsia." The bulk
of the people are illiterate peasants and know
little of and care less about ideology and na-
tional policies. They are preoccupied with
local affairs. They judge a regime by the
extent to which it exploits them. However,
in the vast majority of cases, dissidence is not
translated into organized, active resistance.
Sometimes it has led, and may lead in the
future, to unorganized passive resistance
which is more difficult to detect and to sup-
press but has far less potential than has the
revolutionary mood in some Eastern Euro-
pean satellites.
TRENDS OF DISSIDENCE SINCE 1953
25. Events following Stalin's death and the
uprisings in Poland and Hungary in 1956 had
relatively little influence on the level of re-
sistance in Communist China. Peiping's
unique status in the Communist world, its
geographic location, its different problems
and the newness of its revolutionary experi-
ment precluded any necessity to follow the
Kremlin line. However, events since the So-
viet 20th Party Congress in February 1956 did
have some impact even though the Chinese
Communists successfully minimized the shock
of Stalin's denigration. Whatever confusion
existed apparently contributed only slightly
to dissidence or resistance and was to some
extent alleviated by official explanations and
by claims that the Chinese Communist lead-
ers had avoided the pitfalls into which the
USSR had slipped.
26. Between 1954 and 1957, there were two
peaks of resistance activity in mainland
China. The first, in late 1954 and early 1955,
was occasioned primarily by the poor harvests
of 1954 and led to the drive against "counter-
revolutionaries" personally ordered by Mao
Tse-tung in the spring of 1955. The drive did
not reach the proportions of earlier similar
drives, even though 360,000 cases of subver-
sion and "economic sabotage" were admitted-
ly dealt with in 1954 and early 1955. It was
credited by the Communists with creating the
preconditions necessary for popular accept-
ance of the wholesale collectivization and so-
cialization campaign inaugurated by Mao Tse-
tung in mid-1955. The second peak of resist-
ance in 1956-57, was occasioned by poor crops,
food shortages, and disappointing economic
conditions following collectivization and so-
cialization. It has not occasioned a formal
drive against "counterrevolutionaries," but
appears to be one of the underlying causes of
the current "rectification" drive. In addition,
the period was marked by considerable resist-
ance activity by the Tibetans, culminating in
serious but somewhat localized rebellion in
1956.
27. The upheavals in Poland and Hungary
also had some effect, as the Peiping regime
itself admitted. As a result, the Communist
leaders, in order to forestall possible popular
unrest, granted that "contradictions" existed
and accelerated the "rectification" campaign.
This experiment partially backfired and the
Party was forced to revert to its long-used
methods of controlling public opinion, which
undoubtedly contributed to discontent in the
minds of some non-Party people. Moreover,
the shifting of policies may also have gener-
ated considerable disagreement among Party
leaders. But the main significance of these
recent developments on the question of dissi-
dence and resistance lies in the probability
that the Chinese Communist leaders now have
a better appreciation of the extent of discon-
tent and a strengthened determination to
crush, by forceful means if necessary, any sig-
nificant overt manifestations of this discon-
tent.
RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE
28. As already intimated, resistance in Com-
munist China was not appreciably affected by
the death of Stalin and subsequent events.
Rather, the course of such resistance was de-
termined by local conditions. Except among
certain tribal minorities it is estimated that
virtually no organized resistance of a signifi-
cant scale existed in Communist China at the
time of Stalin's death. In some areas organ-
ized groups may have survived from the time
of the Communist takeover, but they were
almost certainly few and small.
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(a) Organized Resistance
29. A few incidents of active, organized resist-
ance on a purely local basis have occurred.
For example, it is probable that uprisings
against local authorities occurred in South-
west Sinkiang in 1954 and 1956. Seemingly,
there was considerable popular participation
in these incidents, and arms were reportedly
used against government authorities and
troops. Additionally, during 1956 there were
reliable reports, some of which were admitted
by the Peiping regime, of revolts in western
Szechwan, an area outside of Tibet, but popu-
lated by Tibetans. Persistent reports have
also been received of the spread of these upris-
ings to Tibet proper, and of the use of military
aircraft by the Communists to quell the dis-
turbances. At least one revolt was reliably
reported during 1956 in the Liangshan Yi
Autonomous Chou, an area populated by the
Yi minority rather than Tibetans, in what is
now western Szechwan.
30. An organized resistance group in Tibet,
the Mimang, presumably had its origin at the
time of the Communist occupation in late
1951, but did not come to the fore until about
1956. The numerical strength of this group
is not known. The Mimang probably does not
engage in specific training, the effectiveness
of the group depending on the natural in-
clination of these people towards guerrilla-
type warfare. The group's appeal stems from
the antipathy Tibetans feel toward Han Chi-
nese and their loyalty to Lamaism which binds
them together in opposition to both the Han
and fellow Tibetans who have cooperated with
the Communists. Except for supplies cap-
tured from the Chinese Communist military
forces, the weapons of the Mimang are prob-
ably limited to ancient rifles and homemade
weapons. They probably operate in fairly
small groups largely against targets of con-
venience.
31. Another organized anti-Communist Chi-
nese resistance group consists mainly of emi-
gres in Indian border towns. It is believed
that the Dalai Lama's brother, Gyalo Thon-
dup, is connected with the group. This group
may be supporting some of the resistance
activities in Tibet.
(b) Unorganized Resistance
32. Unorganized resistance on the China
mainland has appeared sporadically but there
is no indication of a definite pattern of such
activities or of a concerted effort on the part
of the population against the regime. Peri-
odic, spontaneous acts of resistance have
taken place but remain localized, limited to
certain social, minority, and religious groups.
They have never presented a serious threat
to the regime although it has at times led the
regime significantly to alter some of its
policies.
33. Resentment of the peasants against the
compulsory cooperative system has expressed
itself in such forms of passive resistance as
withholding taxes, refusing to participate in
government-sponsored programs to increase
agricultural and livestock production, and to
withdrawals from cooperatives. In 1956, a
considerable number of provinces failed to
meet their tax quotas. During 1957, 307 co-
operatives in Kiangsu Province alone distrib-
uted grain to their members without allotting
any for the public tax.
34. General dissatisfaction among urban
workers over unsatisfactory working condi-
tions (such as the speed-up system and exces-
sive required overtime) and against unsatis-
factory living conditions (such as poor hous-
ing and lack of consumer goods) has taken
the form of strikes and passive resistance, in-
cluding slowdowns, absenteeism and extensive
use of "sick-leave." Unorganized active resist-
ance is illustrated in a People's Daily report of
23 July 1957 of 253 cases of sabotage or sus-
pected sabotage in factories and enterprises
in Canton.
35. Unorganized resistance among students
has taken the form of sporadic strikes and
riots. In the early autumn of 1956 only 40
out of 4,000 students at a Peiping University
attended what was supposed to be a compul-
sory discussion of the "Political Current
Events Report."
36. Dissidence among intellectuals was ex-
pressed by intensive criticism of the Commu-
nist regime during the "bloom and contend"
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period (not classified as "counterrevolution"
by the Communists) , and by occasional defec-
tions to Hong Kong. Nevertheless, the intel-
lectuals who make up the "democratic" minor
parties that collaborate with the Peiping re-
gime have in those parties unique instruments
for maintaining contact with one another,
even though they have no mass following and
are limited to major cities. Some individual
intellectuals have apparently utilized these
parties and other contacts to build up small
personal followings. However, it appears that
in almost all cases, dissident intellectuals
hoped to use such contacts not to overthrow
the regime but to exercise a "moderating" or
"restraining" influence on it.
37. One of the most persistent problems for
the regime is resistance to the Communist
program by many of the non-Han Chinese
minorities, particularly in the border areas.
In addition to resistance by the Tibetans, the
Communists have admitted uprisings also
among the Turki peoples of Sinkiang in De-
cember 1954 and in March 1956, and resist-
ance among the Hui (Moslems) of Kansu at
unspecified periods. Minority areas include
some of the most remote and inaccessible
parts of China, areas from which even rumors
are slow to leak to the outside world.
Peiping's concern with minority dissidence is
reflected in the general moderation of Com-
munist policies in minority areas, and in the
continuing warnings in Chinese Communist
propaganda against the error of "great Han
chauvinism." The most significant fact con-
cerning resistance in minority areas is not so
much the occasional outburst of rebellion, but
rather the fact that the Communists have
established effective control in some areas
which for centuries have been breeding
grounds for rebellion against Chinese author-
ity. In the past few years the traditionally
troublesome area of Sinkiang has been ex-
hibited regularly to visiting dignitaries from
Moslem countries, indicating that whatever
rebellious activity may persist is at most local
in extent.
38. Except for the secret sects, the Hui (Mos-
lems) , and the Tibetan Buddhists, there has
been no recent significant, active resistance to
the regime by religious groups. However, the
basic divergence between Communism and re-
ligious adherence manifests itself in passive
resistance by many of the religious communi-
cants throughout mainland China, reflected
in continuing arrests of religious figures and
in the restrictions imposed on such groups as
Catholics. The regime has attempted to deal
with this passive resistance by organizing
Communist-front organizations of Moslems,
Buddhists, Protestants, and most recently,
Catholics and Taoists. While these attempts
have been partially successful, some passive
resistance continues among these groups.
39. The "rectification" campaign which
spread throughout China as a consequence of
Mao Tse-tung's speech on contradictions in
February 1957, indicates that the Communist
Party has taken serious cognizance of the
existence of widespread antagonism toward
the regime although the Communist leaders
appear to have initially underestimated this
antagonism. Peiping is fully capable of main-
taining internal security, however, and pros-
pects for an uprising along the Hungarian
lines are unlikely to develop in the forseeable
future. The fact that the regime has made
minor concessions to counteract dissidence,
such as the recent withdrawals of Chinese
civilian cadres from Tibet and the relaxation
of some policies in the face of peasant unrest,
does not mean the regime is incapable of con-
trolling the masses. In the overall picture,
resistance in its various overt forms appears
to be of minor significance ? not accurately
reflecting the large extent of underlying dis-
sidence. That dissidence expresses itself in
apathy and lack of positive response to the
regime's programs however, and constitutes
one of Peiping's chief problems. The principal
significance of such dissidence and resistance
as presently exist or is predictable in Commu-
nist China lies not in any revolutionary threat
to the regime itself but rather in the evolu-
tionary effect it may have on the regime's
policies. Lack of popular cooperation may
delay the achievement of some of the Chinese
Communists' objectives, particularly in the
economic field, and may force the leaders to
modify some policies. In particular, peasant
dissidence may reduce agricultural production
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and hamper the regime's efforts to collect
agricultural surplus. This in turn, by its
effect on food supplies, would increase dissi-
dence in urban groups.
ROLE OF EMIGRES
40. There is a small group of Tibetans, in
Kalimpong, India, composed of persons who
have fled from Tibet since 1951. Some mem-
bers of this emigre group are former high-
ranking officials, and others were members of
the Dalai Lama's retinue on his trip to India
in the winter of 1956-1957. This group has
reportedly tried to obtain aid from the Indian
government, both in removing the Chinese
Communists from Tibet and in granting asy-
lum to the Dalai Lama. These attempts have
been unsuccessful, although there is a possi-
bility that the recent Chinese Communist de-
cision to postpone the socialization of Tibet
may have been somewhat influenced by rep-
resentations from India and other "neutral"
countries.
41. The more than 12 million Overseas Chi-
nese who inhabit the various countries of
Southeast Asia do not seem to be playing a
significant part in guiding or aiding resistance
activities in the homeland. There is a contin-
uing bond between the Overseas Chinese and
their ancestral land, and undoubtedly they are
proud of the emergence of China as a world
power, even though they may be opposed to
Communism. These Chinese abroad continue
to send back regular monetary contributions
to their families on the mainland, and until
recently there was a substantial flow of young
Chinese back to the mainland for their educa-
tion. This flow has declined during 1957.
There is no evidence of Overseas Chinese con-
tact with, or aid to, any resistance group in
Communist China.
CHINESE NATIONALIST ACTIVITIES
42. The Government of the Republic of China
on Taiwan is the most important group of
Chinese outside of the China Mainland and
has a limited potential to guide and assist
resistance groups on the mainland. They
have well organized and equipped military
units numbering over 600,000 including all
services. Although these forces pose no real
threat to the existence of the Chinese Com-
munist regime, they are able, with outside
support, to maintain a certain amount of mili-
tary pressure along the central east China
coast. Although the Nationalists conduct
small-scale ground actions, propaganda mis-
sions and other air operations, and harass the
Communists by artillery and naval patrol
activity, they are not capable under present
circumstances of maintaining major military
operations on the mainland or of providing
significant military support to other dissident
or resistance elements on the mainland.
43. The most persistent category of "counter-
revolutionary" activity to appear in Commu-
nist news and propaganda is that of Nation-
alist subversion, infiltration, espionage, and
sabotage. Most of this activity is reported to
be concentrated in the coastal region of Com-
munist China, particularly in the area op-
posite the Nationalist-held offshore islands.
Communist charges concerning Nationalist
activities almost invariably deal with single
agents or small groups of a half dozen or less,
who are usually said to have surrendered or
been apprehended almost immediately after
being landed. The Communists have avoided
implying that a widespread Nationalist net-
work may exist on the mainland or that the
Nationalists have organizational or communi-
cations lines to resistance groups that may be
active, and there is little information avail-
able to determine the extent of popular sym-
pathy toward Nationalist efforts on the main-
land.
44. In northern Burma, and also in Laos and
Thailand, former Chinese Nationalist irregu-
lars numbering approximately 4,000-6,000
continue to exist. Although Taiwan has offi-
cially severed all ties with these elements, it is
believed that the Chinese Nationalists still
maintain contact with and provide limited
support for these units. While these ex-Na-
tionalist troops possess limited capabilities
and presently confine their activities to main-
taining their existence, they must, neverthe-
less, be considered as a potential resistance
group.
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REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE
45. The characteristic response of the Peiping
regime to dissidence has been to combat it
with the propaganda and administrative re-
sources of the vast interlocking state-party
apparatus. It also has been characteristic
to alternate pressure and relaxation and to
make concessions when expedient. Resist-
ance, on the other hand, almost invariably
has been dealt with by uncompromising sup-
pression by the machinery of the police state.
In addition to an extensive police network
and the armed forces, the repressive machin-
ery of the regime has been extended into all
spheres by a system of occupational organiza-
tions, urban residence committees, and rural
collectives. The existence of this tremendous
security apparatus, the incessant program of
indoctrination and propaganda, the strictness
of travel controls, the rigid control of press,
publications and radio, and the unceasing
regimentation of people in every walk of life,
explain the disappearance of earlier resistance
groups and the lack of present organized re-
sistance.
CAPABILITY OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS
REVOLT
46. Communist China is a police state, and it
is difficult to draw clear distinctions between
its military forces and its security forces. The
powerful People's Liberation Army (PLA) ,
numerically the largest army in the world,
with an estimated strength of two and one
half million men, has a strong political back-
ground dating back to the days when the
army and the Party were one. The People's
Armed Policy (PAP) numbers more than
500,000.
47. A part of the stated mission of the PLA
is the maintenance of internal security. The
nature of PLA organization, and the organiza-
tion of the PAP under the Ministry of Public
Security imply that the detection and sup-
pression of dissidence and minor resistance
activity is a function primarily of the PAP,
while only major, well-organized resistance
requiring relatively extensive military opera-
tions in the field would become a target for
PLA activity. To accomplish such missions
the PLA has Public Security regiments and
divisions as well as its regularly organized
ground, air, and naval forces. The Public
Security units are small, lightly armed ver-
sions of their regular counterparts and have
served in regular military operations. They
are, however, well suited for operations in the
field against irregular forces such as might
be organized by resistance movements. The
effectiveness of the PLA in maintaining in-
ternal security in China has been outstanding.
48. In addition to the PLA and the PAP, the
People's Militia appears to have an internal
security role in rural areas. Its members are
subject to part-time duty, and most are poorly
armed and trained. The effectiveness of the
militia in suppressing resistance activity is
probably very low. However, it undoubtedly
serves as a fairly useful group in maintaining
surveillance over the peasantry and reporting
possible dissidence or other suspicious activity
to local Communist authorities.
49. Moreover, the security forces have a very
close relationship with the mass organizations
which link the formal government and Party
agencies with the various social groups in the
population. These organizations, with a
membership of many millions, extend the gov-
ernment's control down to the lowliest local
neighborhood organization in the towns and
to the cooperative level in the rural areas.
Street and Lane Committees function as ex-
tensions of the police apparatus in urban
areas.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS
OF PEACE
50. In peacetime, organized resistance to the
Peiping regime has virtually no chance of
developing on a significant scale. With the
possible exception of the Tibetan revolts, re-
sistance in Communist China in recent years
arose in reaction to specific local grievances.
Effective internal security controls will con-
tinue to prevent potential resistance elements
from organizing. The same strict controls
will confine unorganized resistance to certain
limited types of action largely of a passive
character.
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51. Resistance activity is handicapped by a
number of key factors. The Party, army, and
police are loyal to the regime. Dissident ele-
ments, although widespread throughout the
population, with few exceptions, lack organi-
zation or communication with one another
and generally lack the necessary appreciation
of each other's problems and grievances to co-
operate in active resistance on a wider scale.
There is thus no presently identifiable basis
for an anti-Communist front known to exist
in Communist China. Dissident students and
intellectuals who might conceivably provide
leadership for a resistance movement, as they
have in past periods in Chinese history, are
disillusioned and demoralized. The "Hun-
dred Flowers" period probably brought forth
the maximum effort and even that effort al-
most certainly cannot be repeated in view of
stringent measures.
52. The main factor that might affect the re-
sistance potential in China is the state of the
economy. Improvements in economic condi-
tions sufficient to permit more liberal eco-
nomic incentives would decrease popular ill
will, while a deterioration of economic condi-
tions would increase resistance activity. A
general economic crisis could conceivably cre-
ate conditions under which organized resist-
ance on a larger scale could develop and unor-
ganized resistance be considerably intensified.
Even in such a case, however, it could not be
assumed that a revolt would be possible on
more than limited local levels, where the re-
gime could suppress it with dispatch. In the
special case of Tibetan resistance there ap-
pears to have been at least some degree of
organization, motivated not solely by local
grievances but also by a revulsion against
Communism and a hatred of the Chinese
invaders.
53. If there is little potential for active re-
sistance in Communist China at present, there
is nevertheless a substantial potential for dis-
sidence. The Communist program of maxi-
mum investment in heavy industry will con-
tinue to lead to a great measure of dissatis-
faction and disillusionment throughout the
population and particularly among the peas-
ants. However, Communist countermeasures
33
and devices for persuasion and force are suffi-
ciently well developed to enable Peiping, if it
continues to demonstrate the flexibility of
policy it has exhibited to date, to confine dis-
sidence to manageable levels and to prevent
outbreaks of resistance in other than isolated,
local instances. Nevertheless, dissidence will
probably continue to be a limiting faetor for
the regime's program. The significance of
dissidence lies not in a revolutionary threat to
the regime, but rather in the effect it may
have on the evolution of the regime's policies
and the country's future development.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR
54. The extent of resistance in Communist
China would depend on the nature and for-
tunes of the war. If the regime's military
operations were successful, or the Communists
could make it appear that it was, Peiping
probably could rally many dissident elements
to its side by an appeal to Chinese nationalism
and xenophobia. In this case, dissidence
would probably remain inactive and covert, as
it did during the Korean war. If the regime
suffered military setbacks, it is still doubtful
whether resistance forces would be capable of
strong and effective independent guerrilla
action, even with help from abroad, unless
Peiping security controls and propaganda
facilities were seriously weakened. Under cir-
cumstances of fairly impressive non-Commu-
nist military successes, anti-regime operations
in Communist-controlled territory would
probably still be difficult, with the population
generally avoiding the risks involved in
organizing for or engaging in outright
rebellion, or in assisting non-Communist
intelligence or escape and evasion efforts.
If the tide seemed to be clearly turn-
ing against the Communists, major defections
from the Communist cause might be expected,
and isolated and individual resistance activi-
ties would increase. But even under these
conditions most types of resistance activities
behind the Communist lines requiring an
organizational effort would probably be a
minor factor at least initially because of the
time required to organize and train the re-
sistance elements. If the war were a pro-
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longed one, passive peasant resistance might
become particularly significant by affecting
the regime's food supply.
55. If a situation develops in which resistance
elements could emerge, they would face a
number of basic difficulties in developing a
capability to harass the regime through guer-
rilla and political warfare activities, including
sabotage. To provide any resistance efforts of
military significance, groups would require
effective leadership, coordination and material
support. Moreover, the effort to develop such
an organization would take place in a country
where the bulk of the population is not prone
to political action but rather tends to adopt a
"wait and see" policy. Because of this tradi-
tional attitude, it is believed that lodgements
in such strength as to assure early direct mili-
tary support and relief would be required.
By the same token, however, the average Chi-
nese does not want to offend those who may
succeed in taking over control of his country,
an attitude that may under some circum-
stances assist in escape and evasion opera-
tions and intelligence collection efforts.
56. The nationality of the attacking forces
would make some difference; Chinese forces
from Taiwan would probably meet with a fair
amount of popular acceptance, while Japanese
forces would probably arouse the traditional
antipathy against Japan, particularly in those
parts of China with a tradition of guerrilla
resistance against the Japanese. American
participation would enable the Communist
regime to appeal for popular support on the
basis of Chinese nationalism and xenophobia,
but would not be likely to antagonize potential
active resistance elements. Furthermore, US
participation might create the impression
that the attack is likely to be successful. The
nationality of other Asian or non-Asian forces
would not be of major psychological signifi-
cance. The really decisive psychological fac-
tor would not be the nationality of the forces
engaged, but the prospect of military success
or failure.
57. The use of nuclear weapons in an attack
against the Chinese mainland which severely
crippled the regime's control mechanisms
would create an opportunity for some indig-
enous resistance. Initially at least, as indi-
cated earlier, resistance efforts would be
handicapped by lack of organization, and in
this case, the disruptive nature of the attack
would almost ensure that any actions would
be localized. Moreover, it seems probable that
the regime's local control agencies will rally
to maintain their position and will pose a
threat to the establishment of a strong re-
sistance organization. To the extent that
nuclear weapons were used for more tactical
purposes than total destruction of the re-
gime's control mechanisms, the problems in
organizing effective resistance described above
would obtain.1
58. Existence under stringent Communist
control has created among the masses of Chi-
nese a great tolerance to harsh authority. It
is probable that a relatively strict occupation
policy would, by comparison, seem preferable
to regimentation under Communism so long
as no heavy demands were placed on the local
economy for food, clothing, and shelter. How-
ever, a liberal occupation policy, especially
one which provided for the relief of the needy,
would undoubtedly tend to foster increased
resistance activities in unconquered areas.
59. It is doubtful that the attitudes and ac-
tions of either regimes or resistance groups in
other Sino-Soviet Bloc countries, with the pos-
sible exception of Soviet actions, would have
any strong effect on resistance potential.
Basic contributing factors to this are the lack
of an efficient resistance organization in
China, the isolation of resistance groups
Since this study has repeatedly demonstrated
the existence of widespread dissident elements
throughout the population and because a vast
reservoir of emergent resistance leadership prob-
ably exists among former business leaders, intel-
lectuals, and elements of the 5,000,000 veterans
discharged from the army since 1949, the repre-
sentative of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intel-
ligence, USAF, believes the conclusion is justi-
fied that the elimination of selected targets im-
portant to the military and control strengths of
Communist China and the widespread resultant
disruption would greatly promote effective action
on the part of dissident elements rather than
discourage such action.
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within China, and the lack of communication
with groups in other countries. In the case
of European bloc nations, the isolation result-
ing from distance and terrain and racial and
cultural differences add to the unlikelihood
that cooperation of any sort would eventuate.
60. Responsibility for the initiation of hostili-
ties would not materially affect, either at the
outset of hostilities or subsequently, the atti-
tudes and consequently the capabilities of in-
dividuals and groups willing to engage in re-
sistance activities.
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ANNEX D ? CZECHOSLOVAKIA
BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE
1. Even though the old Czechoslovak Republic
had a more vigorous democratic tradition than
any other Eastern European country and
was strongly Western-oriented, Communist
strength was greater in Czechoslovakia than
in the other present satellites. In the last
free elections in 1946, Communist candidates
got 38 percent of the votes. Since the 1948
coup, however, the Communists' drastic re-
shaping of Czechoslovak political and eco-
nomic life has alienated many one-time sym-
pathizers and even many Party members.
Today, despite a surface appearance of
calm and stability, the Czechoslovak pop-
ulation harbors considerable ? though sup-
pressed ? dissatisfaction with the regime and
with the USSR of which the regime is one of
the most faithful servants. This dissatisfac-
tion has been accumulating and becoming
more apparent since the death of Stalin in
1953.
2. Among the factors that have tended to
create ill will are the following: The regime's
subservience to the USSR and the resulting
subordination of CSR interests to those of the
USSR; the efforts of the regime to reshape
CSR society in the Soviet image with the con-
comitant adulation and copying of everything
Soviet, falsification of history, repudiation of
native traditions and severing historic and
cultural links with the West; the belief that
the CSR is being economically exploited by
the USSR even though the living standard is
somewhat higher than in other satellite states;
loss of civil liberties and excessive interference
with the citizens' lives; the persecution of
church leaders as well as the harassment of
believers; the detention of large numbers of
political prisoners in jails and forced labor
camps; and the all-pervading atmosphere of
coercion, lawlessness and hypocrisy which
characterize the regime's activities.
3. The one significant non-Czech minority, the
Slovaks, resent what seems to them an undue
monopoly of power and privileges by the
Czechs, especially the concentration of au-
thority in Prague and the dispatch of Czech
officials and technicians to Slovakia. Al-
though this is a grievance of long standing,
antedating the Communist era, the apparent
failure of the regime to remedy this situation
after the liquidation of the "bourgeois" gov-
ernment aggravated the already existing ill
will on the part of the Slovaks. The Slovaks
blame the Czechs for having allowed the Com-
munists to seize power, and the Slovak Com-
munists have always been weaker numerically
and in actual influence in Slovakia than the
Czech Communists.
MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS
4. Intellectuals and students. Writers, who
have been restive under rigid Party controls
on literary expression, are among the most
dissatisfied of the social groups. They par-
ticularly resent the lack of liberalization after
Stalin's death. Regime controls were openly
challenged at the Writers' Congress in April
1956, and some writers, especially in Slovakia,
have not capitulated to the Party's demand
for conformity and obedience. University
students drew up an extensive list of political
demands in May 1956 which were ignored by
the regime. While there has been no student
trouble since that event, this group almost cer-
tainly harbors anti-regime views. Like many
young people in Czechoslovakia, they resent
the excessive regimentation of life under Com-
munism, and may on occasion be disinclined
to caution and passive acceptance of the Com-
munist regime.
5. Youth. The average young person in
Czechoslovakia has assumed a protective col-
oration which enables him to live relatively
comfortably under the present regime and to
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escape more than minimum interference in
his daily life by the Communist authorities.
There is, however, a sizeable element of young
people who resist all efforts at regimentation
and besides adopting exaggerated imitations
of Western dress and other external signs of
disaffection will on occasion engage in riots
and scuffles with the police. The regime has
recently cracked down on this group in what
was probably a nervous reaction magnified
by last year's Hungarian events. This rest-
lessness and lack of discipline of youth result-
ing from the Stalinist system prevailing in
Czechoslovakia has been a problem for years.
These elements are made up of less educated
young people and are essentially negative in
their motivation. Although they would prob-
ably be quick to join in any disturbances such
as clashes between student demonstrators and
police as in Hungary in October 1956 or be-
tween strikers and police as at Poznan, they
are not a primary danger to the regime.
6. Professional people, managers. Middle-
ranking civil servants, professional men, eco-
nomic managers and engineers, are dissatis-
fied not only with the working of the regime
as it affects them in their careers but also
with the general nature of the regime, par-
ticularly its subordination of national inter-
ests to those of the USSR, its bias in favor of
political reliability rather than efficiency, its
general crudity, dishonesty, and lawlessness.
Though this dislike of the very nature of the
regime is found in all segments of the popula-
tion, the professional group seems to be most
sensitive to it. Yet there is perhaps more
willingness in this group than in most others
(except industrial workers) to accept a Com-
munist regime provided it were cleaned up at
various levels, committed to a humane and
national-minded socialist program, and acted
more independently of the USSR. Since this
is not the case, disillusionment increasingly
engenders dissidence.
7. Peasantry. The farming population ob-
jects to compulsory delivery quotas. But its
resistance is characterized by apathy in plant-
ing and a slowdown in the required deliveries.
The accelerated tempo of collectivization over
recent years is chiefly the result of increased
regime pressuie which has overcome peasant
resistance. This weakening resistance has
been exacerbated by the rapid aging of the
rural population. Very few young people are
staying on the farms, drifting into industrial
jobs instead.
8. Industrial workers complain about long
work hours, low real wages, poor housing
facilities, and shortage in and high prices of
consumer goods. They dislike the stringent
labor discipline. There have been reports of
scattered strikes in heavy industry and min-
ing but none apparently serious. Despite
their complaints, industrial workers have not
been openly rebellious and, under present cir-
cumstances, are not likely to engage in active
resistance.
9. Armed Forces. The permanent cadre of
commissioned and noncommissioned officers
gives continuing support to the regime, some
from conviction and others from opportun-
istic motives. The approximately 90,000 con-
scripts inducted annually represent a cross
section of Czechoslovak youth and probably
reflect the general popular dissatisfaction with
Communist rule. However, obviously unreli-
able individuals are not inducted into the
Armed Forces, and conditions of military life
and stringent political controls prevent the
expression and dissemination of dissaffection
among the troops. Personal dissatisfaction
with military service may be expressed not
only in terms of the soldier's usual grievances,
but also by a dislike of Soviet type of training
and political indoctrination. However, al-
though this discontent seldom overrides the
normal military obedience to authority and
there are no known instances of group defi-
ance of military orders, the reliability of the
Armed Forces in case of emergency is open
to question. The militarized security, forces
(Frontier and Interior Guard), because of
their very close screening of recruits, prob-
ably constitute the most reliable elements of
the Armed Forces. On balance, it is highly
unlikely that military personnel would offer
active resistance to the regime under present
conditions.
10. Religion. Religious believers resent the
regime's policy of interning church leaders
and doing everything possible to hamper the
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normal functioning of the churches, to impede
religious education, and to harass the faithful.
In itself, this resentment does not pose a
serious threat to the regime, but in combina-
tion with other factors helps to keep dissidence
at a high level, especially in Slovakia.
11. Slovaks, being predominantly Catholic,
historically at odds with the more advanced
Czechs, individualistic and nationalistic, have
always represented a special problem to the
Communist regime. Not only is there in Slo-
vakia a stronger anti-Soviet sentiment but
also there has remained the traditional anti-
Czech feeling. As a result, Communism has
had considerably less success establishing firm
roots in Slovakia than in the Czech lands, and
it continues to have difficulties in organizing
loyal Communists on the grass roots level as
well as in obtaining faithful adherence by
Party members to central directives. Many
of the unconfirmed but plausible reports of
unorganized and modestly organized resist-
ance relate to Slovakia. Thus, a considerable
potential for resistance exists in Slovakia, but
its apparent lack of organization and focus
against the centers of Communist power re-
stricts its actual effectiveness.
INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE
12. Although dissidence is more pronounced
in Slovakia than in Bohemia-Moravia, there
is little evidence of active resistance in either
area. Communist security controls have not
changed significantly since the death of
Stalin; they are still so pervasive that people
are afraid to voice criticism of regime, let
alone engage in open resistance. Moreover,
the events in Hungary have only deepened the
conviction that Soviet troops, while not at
present "stationed in Czechoslovakia, would
come to the assistance of the regime to put
down any revolt that could not be handled
locally and that there is no hope of Western
help. As a result, the population at no time
was in the reckless revolutionary mood which
characterized Poland and Hungary in 1956.
Isolated expressions of dissidence found no
active popular response. The regime has not
wavered since in its firm attitude, and the
population has refrained from overt expres-
39
sion of hostility other than grumbling about
restrictive policies, extensive government con-
trol, and living conditions in general.
13. It is true that dissatisfaction with the
regime is found in all segments of the Czecho-
slovak population, even among Party mem-
bers. But dissidence is not translated into
widespread strikes, riots and public disturb-
ances, except for occasional trouble with
young "hooligan" elements. It is confined
largely to verbal criticism of the regime and
fairly mild demand for change on the part of
certain educated and articulate segments of
the population, notably writers, university
students, and some Party groups in govern-
ment ministries. These dissident groups ap-
pear for the moment to be biding their time,
waiting for more opportune external and in-
ternal conditions.
14. In general, the Czechoslovak population
as a whole is not in a mood to defy the regime
and press for revolutionary changes. There
is a deep-seated fear of the risks involved in a
change on the part of those who have lived
through the upheavals caused by the German
occupation and the imposition of the Commu-
nist regime in its place, and who have experi-
enced the absence of Western intervention in
Eastern Europe. These people fear not only
the painful loss of life and property in a Hun-
garian-style uprising but also the possible loss
of jobs and various social benefits, and an-
other prolonged period of uncertainty and
political upheaval.
TRENDS OF DISSIDENCE SINCE 1953
15. Despite the surface appearance of calm
and stability, dissatisfaction of the Czecho-
slovak people has been accumulating and in-
creasing since the death of Stalin, mainly be-
cause the regime did not move toward greater
liberalization. There were a few concessions,
such as a slight relaxation of police pressure
and an improvement of the standard of living.
But by mid-1956, it had become clear that the
Communist leaders did not intend to grant
any basic concessions, either internally by
permitting greater freedom, or externally by
moving towards a more independent position
vis-a-vis the USSR. The population is dissatis-
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fled with this unyielding attitude on the part
of the regime, but appears unwilling to do any-
thing about it. Some open expressions of dis-
sidence in May 1956 were quickly countered,
and, at the Party Conference in June 1956,
it was firmly stated that no further conces-
sions would be made in response to demands
for political liberalization.
16. The regime has been able to cope suc-
cessfully with dissidence largely because un-
rest has been confined to small groups and has
been kept from spreading to broad segments
of the population. There has been a closing
of ranks under pressure of events among the
leadership and hence no opening which could
be exploited by dissident elements. Nor is
there any weakening of the authority and
effectiveness of Party and police controls of
the kind which permitted similar beginnings
of dissidence in Poland and Hungary to grow
bolder, stronger and more widespread. So
far as the Communist Party itself is concerned,
the sustained campaign against "revisionism"
and the efforts made to deny the applicability
of Mao's theories on socialism to Czechoslo-
vakia show that the leaders continue to have
good reason to doubt the loyalty and ortho-
doxy of the mass of Party members. Thus
the regime strives to maintain strict ideologi-
cal orthodoxy as the official policy. This pol-
icy evidently receives full support from the
hard core members of the Party apparatus,
and hence the regime has been able to sup-
press the kind of deviationist thinking which
cropped up immediately after the Twentieth
Congress.
RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE
17. There are no known organized resistance
groups in Czechoslovakia, nor have there been
any for many years. There is, however, a
certain amount of passive, unorganized resist-
ance, mostly in the form of attempts to evade
labor discipline, non-attendance at political
meetings, failure to pay dues to Communist
organizations, and similar derelictions. The
motives are not always political. There are
occasional cases of active resistance by in-
dividuals, largely in the form of violent assault
on and even murder of Communist function-
aries by one or more aggrieved individuals, and
sometimes in the form of support by individ-
uals for Western intelligence.
ROLE OF EMIGRES
18. Since the death of Stalin, material sup-
port by emigres to internal Czechoslovakia
resistance has been non-existent, as has that
from any other external source. No regular
channels exist at present for getting such sup-
port into Czechoslovakia. Emigre guidance
for internal resistance has been equally lack-
ing, except to the extent that one or another
political grouping of the Czechoslovak emigra-
tion has succeeded in gaining acceptance for
its views by some Western propaganda agency,
which has then incorporated such a "line"
into its efforts to reach the Czechoslovak pop-
ulation. A considerable body of evidence in-
dicates that Western broadcasts are widely
heard in Czechoslovakia and that propaganda
in pamphlet form does receive some attention.
There are also indications that Western broad-
casts have both adherents and critics among
the population.
REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE
19. The regime has maintained intact its com-
prehensive security controls. The threat of
these organs to the people is being kept alive
by repeated announcements of the arrest of
"enemy agents," reminding would-be conspir-
ators that their activities are doomed to fail-
ure. Apart from the regular armed forces,
the regime's security apparatus consists of
highly centralized units, all under the com-
mand of the Ministry of the Interior. Its total
strength is estimated at from 110,000 to 140,-
000. This strength figure does not include
some 160,000 to 200,000 personnel who serve
part time in various civilian militia groups.
In addition, many thousands of people assist
as paid and unpaid agents and informers and
as such make a considerable contribution to
the mission of maintaining the security of the
regime. Under the Ministry of Interior are
the following major components: (1) The
Frontier Guard (PS) and Interior Guard
(VS) , with a total strength of 45,000 men or-
ganized into military units; (2) the secret
police (StB) , with an estimated strength of
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only 5,000 but controlling a widespread net
of agents and informers; and, (3) the Public
Security Corps (VB), with a strength of 60,-
000 to 90,000 which includes as its largest com-
ponent the regular police. This apparatus is
supplemented and supported by an elaborate
system of population registration and docu-
mentary control.
20. The Czechoslovak regime conducts con-
tinuous propaganda by press, radio and per-
sonal agitation for the purposes of indoctrina-
tion, vilification of Western objectives, label-
ing faith in Western "promises" as futile self-
delusion, etc. The regime eagerly exploits all
evidence of refugee activity which may be con-
strued as advocating that the only alternative
to the post-war economic and social system is
a return to conditions of 1938, conditions that
may no longer be satisfactory to what is prob-
ably a majority of the population. Moreover,
the regime plays up the continuing Czech dis-
like and fear of the Germans, claiming that
the end of Communism in Czechoslovakia will
mean the return of German domination.
While exploitation of these themes falls far
short of the regime's objectives of winning
over the population to enthusiastic support,
nevertheless they help to keep alive Czech
disillusionment with the West and the pain-
ful period of German occupation and to this
extent may contribute to the many other
factors inhibiting resistance. Moreover, the
people in Czechoslovakia are undoubtedly
aware that their standard of living, while low,
is higher than that of neighboring satellites.
CAPABILITY OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS
REVOLT
21. The Czechoslovak security forces are fully
capable of preventing an expansion or in-
crease of resistance activity by any local anti-
regime elements, organized or unorganized.
But even if security controls were relaxed, and
the people were less cautious in voicing their
opinions of the regime, they probably would
not increase their resistance activities, at least
not in the Czech lands. Traditionally, the
Czechs are a cautious people, and it is believed
that they would be more inclined to wait for
liberation by external powers than to fight
for it themselves. However, the Slovaks are
of a different temperament, and it is possible
that some of them would renew their partisan
activities against the regime in the event of
a security relaxation.
22. However, in the unlikely event of a wide-
spread popular revolt, the regime would al-
most certainly be incapable of successful
counter-action without Soviet help. In such
a situation, the regular armed forces probably
would not be considered reliable, and the re-
gime would ask for help from the Soviet Army,
substantial units of which are available in
adjacent areas of the Soviet Union and in
East Germany, Poland, and Hungary.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS
OF PEACE
23. So long as Soviet power remains un-
changed, the regime's security controls un-
altered, and the present standard of living
unimpaired, organized resistance has virtually
no potential. Unless a significant deteriora-
tion of internal controls occurred and possible
Soviet intervention were precluded by a major
internal crisis within the USSR or heavy So-
viet involvement elsewhere, the prospects for
organized resistance remain poor. The re-
gime's effectiveness in eliminating all signifi-
cant organized underground and partisan re-
sistance groups, the prevailing view that lib-
eration cannot be achieved without direct
Western assistance, and the regime's pervasive
controls serve to inhibit the evolution of a
popular resistance movement.
24. Passive resistance along lines already in-
dicated could assume greater proportions and
extend to frequent acts of economic sabotage
if the regime were forced to revise drastically
downward its present level of efforts to in-
crease housing, consumer goods, and food
stocks. Further political or military crises
in other Bloc countries might then act as a
catalyst for spontaneous disturbances in
Czechoslovakia. Unorganized passive resist-
ance will probably continue but within rather
narrow limits. Isolated instances of unrest,
such as occurred in June 1953 and in May 1956,
are possible but of no long-range significance.
Neither are the limited capabilities of intel-
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lectuals and students to pressure the regime
for liberalization because the Communist
leadership is quite able to suppress such ac-
tivities or keep them within easily manage-
able proportions. There is a bare possibility
that the intellectual ferment might affect the
Communist Party bureaucracy, but the ap-
parent lack of a leader of the Gomulka type
will almost certainly leave Czechoslovak for-
tunes in the hands of the unrelenting "Stalin-
ists." Thus present evidence does not pro-
vide a basis for expectation that unorganized
resistance will become anything more than an
irritant to the regime.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR
25. In the event of war between Bloc and non-
Bloc states, the Czechoslovak regime would
immediately intensify its security measures.
This would initially restrict the populace from
participating in resistance activities. It would
also give them time to observe the progress
of the struggle so that they could place them-
selves in a more favorable position with the
prospective victor. It is not likely that resist-
ance would develop if it were apparent that
Soviet forces were generally gaining and would
continue to control Czechoslovakia and the
areas adjacent to it, and that there was no
immediate prospect of the arrival of Western
troops. It is likely that in case of war the
Czechoslovak security police would immediate-
ly take drastic precautionary measures, prob-
ably interning or even deporting to the USSR
thousands of known or suspected anti-Com-
munists. In these circumstances only a small
number of courageous people could be found
who would be willing to risk serious resistance
activity, such as sheltering Western airmen
or escaped prisoners, mainly in rural areas
and Slovakia.
26. On the other hand, were it apparent that
Soviet forces were generally losing and that a
retreat of Soviet power from Czechoslovakia
and adjacent areas was imminent, there would
be an increase in resistance activity accom-
panied by a breakdown of Communist police
controls as Communists fled or simply failed
to carry out orders. Resistance elements
would engage in industrial and agricultural
sabotage activities; with outside help, they
would undertake intelligence collection, es-
cape and evasion operations and other ac-
tivities that would be detrimental to the Bloc.
At the same time, skeleton underground clan-
destine organizations and guerrilla bands
might begin to operate. Good possibilities for
guerrilla type operations appear to exist in
the mountainous areas of Slovakia. In ad-
dition, there is a limited basis for cooperation
between Slovak, Polish and Ukrainian anti-
Communist groups by virtue of their common
access to the Carpathian mountain ranges,
past cooperation among them, and bonds of
ethnic kinship. Since Soviet troops would be
deployed in Czechoslovakia in the event of
war, an effective partisan movement probably
could not develop unless substantial Western
assistance was made available, and their ac-
tivities coordinated with Western military op-
erations.
27. In case of a major breakdown of Soviet
military power in the area, it is possible that
elements of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces
might switch sides, even undertaking guer-
rilla action against the retreating Soviet
forces. More likely, however, would be a gen-
eral breakdown of military organization as
Communists and non-Communists fought
each other, deserted or simply stood by idly
till Western forces arrived.
28. The nationality of attacking forces would
probably make little difference, provided it
was made clear that Czechoslovakia would re-
tain its present frontiers and be restored to
full independence. The presence of a sub-
stantial number of Germans among the at-
tacking forces is likely to have noticeable neg-
ative psychological effects at least in the Czech
lands. Most of the people of Czechoslovakia
probably would not be concerned with the
responsibility for initiating hostilities because
they look upon war as the only means of na-
tional liberation.
29. The extensive use of large nuclear weap-
ons on Czechoslovak territory would greatly
antagonize the people, and the survivors would
concentrate their efforts on self-preservation
rather than assisting either side in the strug-
gle. Such adverse reactions might be reduced
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but by no means eliminated if tactical nu-
clear attacks were limited primarily to mili-
tary and government control targets, isolated
from larger populated areas. In the latter
case the will to resist might be increased since
such attacks could diffuse and lessen the con-
trol strengths of the Czechoslovakian regime.
30. Occupation policies formulated by the ad-
vancing Western powers, designed to guaran-
tee the territorial integrity and national inde-
43
pendence of Czechoslovakia, would almost
certainly enlist Czechoslovak cooperation and
stimulate resistance in areas still under Com-
munist control.
31. No individual resistance factions for post-
war leadership are known to exist in Czecho-
slovakia. Certain emigre groups may desire
to establish leadership, but their unpopularity
among their countrymen would make such a
goal unattainable.
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ANNEX E - EAST GERMANY
BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE
1. Popular opposition to the East German
regime continues to be widespread. It is sus-
tained by resentment of the regime's police
state methods which, though changed in the
employment of outright cruelty since the
death of Stalin, have remained essentially the
same in repressing political freedom. It is
further aggravated by economic regimenta-
tion and the failure to raise the standard of
living to a level comparable to that of West
Germany. Most of all, dissidence is directed
against a regime which is regarded as the tool
of an alien power, representing the interests
of the USSR and dependent on Soviet support
for its continued existence. This was clearly
demonstrated when only the intervention of
Soviet occupation forces prevented the East
German regime from disintegrating during
the June 1953 uprisings.
2. The character of popular disaffection in
the "German Democratic Republic" (GDR) is
shaped, to a considerable extent, by the cir-
cumstance that contacts between the people
of the GDR and those in the West are much
more free and frequent than are contacts be-
tween the populations of other satellites and
the West. Moreover, the East Germans are
tied to West Germany by common bonds of
national identity and by the hope that even-
tual unification will mean liberation from
Soviet-Communist rule. As a result, nearly
all East Germans do not identify themselves
with the GDR as a separate country and do
not look upon the GDR as permanent.
3. Soviet occupation of East Germany cannot
be disguised. It underlines the puppet re-
gime's complete dependence on the USSR and
thus prevents it from permitting any modifi-
cation of the system not approved by the
Kremlin. Furthermore, traditional disdain of
the Slays, combined with experience of Soviet
brutality, tends to equate Communist meth-
ods ? rather than Marxist philosophy ? with
Soviet overlordship. Meanwhile, the existence
of a much larger prosperous West German
state confronts the GDR regime with the obvi-
ous rebuttal to any claim of representing the
interests of the German people as a whole.
As a result, the leaders of the Communist SED
(Socialist Unity Party) and the government
are generally hated and detested.
4. Economic privations, even though lessened
by concessions made after Stalin's death, con-
tinue to affect nearly every East German, with
the exception of the Party elite, high govern-
ment officials and leading intellectuals. These
deprivations ? in the face of West German
abundance ? are made particularly unpalat-
able by the regime's compulsory ideological
indoctrination and by its attempts to orient
German culture eastward. The East Ger-
mans consider themselves as belonging to the
West and in fact believe their culture to be
superior to that of the East. The regime's
anti-Church activities have also contributed
to popular dissatisfaction.
5. In the wake of Soviet political gyrations,
East German dissidence has fluctuated be-
tween resignation and the desire for revolu-
tionary action. The events of 1956 1 caused
considerable unrest, compelling the regime to
take extensive precautionary measures.
These measures, coupled with subsequent So-
viet efforts to stabilize the position of the
USSR and International Communism and the
successes, real or apparent, of this campaign
have probably cautioned East German resist-
ance elements. Nevertheless, the potential
remains very great, not only among the dis-
The 20th CPSU Congress, CPSU statements in
June and October, the emergence of Gomulka
in Poland, the Hungarian revolution, and the
29 December statement of the Chinese Commu-
nist Party.
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affected groups listed below but also among
many rank and file members of the Party and
its mass organizations, the government bu-
reaucracy, white collar workers and the intel-
ligentsia. It has been estimated that not
more than 10 percent of the population ac-
tually support the regime, and it is almost cer-
tain that such support is confined to people
who have a personal stake in its continuation.
Since late 1949, when the refugee registration
program was initiated in West Germany and
West Berlin, at least two million persons have
fled to the West, about half of them under 25
years of age.
MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS
6. Industrial Workers. Disaffection and re-
sistance in the GDR are endemic in the indus-
trial centers. More than one-third of the
wage and salary earners in the GDR are in-
dustrial workers. About 70 percent of them
are employed in the nationalized industries.
Soviet hopes that these workers would become
the ideological and social foundation of Com-
munist authority in the GDR have not mate-
rialized. After 1945, the sharp trend of Ger-
man labor toward Communism during the
Weimar Republic moved back toward the tra-
ditional social-democratic channels which are
tied to strong but free trade unions. German
social-democracy has been evolutionary (re-
visionist) rather than revolutionary and,
therefore, has been traditionally the target of
intense Bolshevik hostility. Since the tradi-
tion of free trade unionism is still very strong,
the fact that under the GDR the unions have
become 'instruments of government control
has greatly contributed to the workers' dis-
affection. Furthermore, the workers are dis-
gruntled over low wages, high work norms,
substandard living conditions, insufficient
food supplies, lack of consumer goods, ever-
present ideological propaganda, forced at-
tendance at political rallies, and imposition of
alien Soviet labor methods.
7. Youth, from which the regime had ex-
pected to obtain strong support, has proved
to be as disappointing as labor. More than
one-third of the East German population,
about seven million persons, are under 25
years of age, a generation disillusioned by
Nazism and therefore thought to be ready for
the acceptance of Communism. But there is
evidence that the majority of youth is indif-
ferent or hostile to the regime. The influence
of parents, Church affiliations, older workers
and non-Communist teachers, and the near-
ness of the West still militate against the
success of the Communist youth program.
Nevertheless, although the majority of East
German youth almost certainly are not loyal
to the Communist regime, they, like their
elders, have been unable to organize their
opposition to the regime. Youth has shown
opposition primarily in individual actions,
especially flight and nonconformity. Most
outspoken in their opposition probably were
students who demanded ? in vain ? the abo-
lition of compulsory instruction in the Rus-
sian language and in Communist ideology, the
right to organize freely, and easier access to
the West. Whether there will eventually
emerge a small leader group of more mature
young people constituting a more effective re-
sistance potential, or whether resistance will
remain limited to passive expressions of dis-
content, will depend on the stability of Com-
munist leadership.
8. Armed Forces. There is considerably less
evidence of dissidence in the East German
Army than in the population as a whose. Dig-
content is strongest among those who "vol-
unteered" for service under any of the various
forms of duress commonly employed by the
regime. There is undoubtedly less disaffec-
tion in the permanent cadre of commissioned
and non-commissioned officers ? constituting
some 20 percent of the 100,000-man
force ? than among the two-year "volun-
teers." Most of the latter, however, are
former members of Communist youth organi-
zations who have been specially selected by
Party boards throughout the country because
of their presumed reliability ? or at least the
absence of any evidence of disloyalty on their
part. Military organization and discipline
and constant surveillance make any spread of
dissidence within the force difficult. More-
over, since the physical conditions of service
life have improved, they no longer serve as
primary sources of resentment toward the
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present Communist government. In general,
these same considerations apply to the mili-
tarized security forces (Border Police and In-
terior Troops). There is believed to be less
dissidence in these forces than in the Army,
however, because of more careful screening
before induction.
9. No actual organized resistance has been
noted within the Army or militarized security
forces. Morale and discipline within the
Army are only fair, however, and instances of
inattention to duty and individual acts of in-
subordination are frequent. Forceful opposi-
tion to military and governmental authority
probably would not occur on a significant
scale except in extraordinary circumstances,
such as widespread domestic revolt or a war
in which Western forces (particularly if these
included West German contingents) were
about to invade East Germany. In less dra-
matic situations, such as local disorders, the
East German Army probably would give no
more than nominal support to the present
regime.
10. Businessmen. From the outset of the So-
viet occupation of East Germany, it has been
Communist policy to eliminate the middle
class as an independent political factor. This
policy has been applied most ruthlessly to the
economically stronger elements of the popu-
lation; it has been considerably modified, how-
ever, when applied to those groups which the
regime needed for political or technological
reasons. Although there is still some private
enterprise left,2 businessmen almost certainly
realize that they have only a temporary re-
prieve and will be eliminated in due time.
While the outlook of these elements is neces-
sarily anti-regime, they are almost certainly
bound to remain cautious, inclined to passive
resistance only if they see no risk.
11. Professionals and Intellectuals. With the
exception of some artists and scientists who
Private industry produced 11.6 percent of the
East German total by the end of 1956. The
turnover of private retail trade in the GDR
amounted to a slightly less than 29 percent of
total retail trade turnover in 1956. In the whole-
sale business, the share of private enterprise had
sunk to less than 4 percent by the end of 1956.
have been offered and have accepted a highly
favored social and economic position and who
thus have a stake in the continuance of the
regime, the vast majority of the intellectuals
have remained anti-regime. Many of them
have withdrawn from professional life and
others have become noticeably less productive.
Quite a few have escaped to the West, but
others have remained in East Germany in an
effort to maintain German cultural traditions
without surrendering to the ideological de-
mands of Communism. In view of the respect
and influence which intellectuals and artists
generally enjoy in Europe and particularly in
Germany, their resistance potential is consid-
erable though largely intangible. This does
not mean that all those who oppose the re-
gime are also anti-Communist; the case of
Wolfgang Harich is representative of persons
who hate the regime and detest Soviet over-
lordship although they would go along with a
national Communist type of government.
Nevertheless, in spite of the advantages
offered to those intellectuals who are willing
to collaborate with the regime, most of them
will remain opposed to Communist methods
and many will, as the occasion arises, express
this opposition directly or indirectly through
their media, or, alternatively, either by with-
drawal ("inner emigration") or by flight.
12. Churches. Of the 17.6 million inhabitants
of the Soviet Zone and the Soviet Sector of
Berlin, about 15 million are Lutheran/Evan-
gelical and two million Catholics. Both
church groups have resisted Communist athe-
ism and immorality, each according to its own
institutions and its own traditional attitudes
to the state and to governments. Generally
speaking, however, the ideological and insti-
tutional struggle of the SED regime against
the churches has not been as intense as that
of the regimes in Czechoslovakia, Hungary
and Poland. The SED regime has not wished
to attack excessively the Lutheran/Evangeli-
cal churches in the Soviet Zone because of the
impact such a policy of total persecution
would have on their own coreligionists (24.5
millions) in the Federal Republic. Secondly,
the Lutheran/Evangelical churches are ad-
ministratively decentralized within the Soviet
Zone and therefore do not present a cohesive
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institutional challenge to the policies of the
SED regime. This coincidence of SED policy
goals and traditional Lutheran/Evangelical
attitudes of cooperation with existing authori-
ty has resulted in a difficult but tolerable truce
between the two in which each tries to erode
rather than explode the powers of the other.
For its part, the Catholic Church is too small
to have much influence in the Soviet Zone.
13. Party and Government Functionaries. Al-
though the regime has strenuously attempted
to maintain ideological conformity among its
supporters, there is evidence of a cleavage be-
tween the working level in government and
Party and the central authorities. Particu-
larly those persons who were more recently
drawn into the Communist apparatus have
had difficulties in adjusting themselves to the
conflicting pressures imposed on the one hand
by the rigorous demands of the central au-
thorities and on the other hand by the pop-
ular rejection of the regime. This conflict has
affected not only persons sensitive to popular
feeling but also those influenced by idealistic
elements in Marxist doctrine, who have be-
come disillusioned or frustrated by the im-
possibility of achieving anything consistent
with their concepts of the general welfare.
Some dissatisfaction has appeared among the
lower ranks of functionaries and others on
whom the regime relies. This has been re-
flected in numerous defections of party offi-
cials, police, local government officers, and
active as well as former members of the secu-
rity and military forces who have fled to West
Germany. However, the treatment accorded
in Hungary to security officers and other Com-
munist functionaries during the 1956 revolt
by the populace has tended to make Commu-
nist functionaries in East Germany close
ranks behind the regime.
INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE
14. Despite the great extent of disaffection in
the GDR, dissidence, with the single excep-
tion of the 17 June 1953 uprisings, has ex-
pressed itself only in defection, transmission
of intelligence, passive resistance (without
significant risk) , and anti-regime propaganda
activities. In the second half of 1956, initially
under the growing impact of "de-Staliniza-
tion" and later as a response to developments
in Poland and Hungary, considerable discon-
tent manifested itself, especially among intel-
lectuals, students, and workers in the
larger industrial enterprises. This dis-
content reached its peak during the early suc-
cesses of the Hungarian revolution. With the
suppression of the Hungarian revolt, however,
the intensity of discontent and of resistance
became progressively dissipated until, by mid-
1957, when communal elections were held
throughout the GDR without major incidents,
the regime had demonstrated again its hold
over the population.
15. However, the ease of access to the GDR
from West Berlin and West Germany has
facilitated the organization of some resistance
groups operating from these areas. These
groups encourage cautious covert resistance;
their main objects are anti-regime propa-
ganda, keeping files of persons in Communist
prisons and assisting families of the prisoners,
keeping track of crimes committed by the
Communists, keeping alive the spirit of resist-
ance, and gathering as much information as
possible. They discourage, however, overt ac-
tive resistance which stands little chance of
escaping harsh retaliation.
TRENDS OF DISSIDENCE SINCE STALIN'S
DEATH
16. The only conspicuous resistance in East
Germany since the death of Stalin was the
June 1953 uprising. Although there does not
appear to have been any central guidance to
the uprisings, they followed the same pattern
everywhere, thus showing the uniformity of
anti-regime feeling and producing a solidarity
of action among East Germans not observed
previously or since. Caught unprepared by
the extent of the disorder, the East German
government could not contain the uprisings
and was forced to call on Russian forces to
quell them. The readiness of the Soviets to
respond to the regime's call for help provided
an object lesson which the East Germans took
to heart. While there is no reason to believe
that anti-regime feelings in East Germany has
abated in the slightest since June 1953, the
prevailing temper since that time has been
one of restraint. The population is apparent-
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ly resigned to the fact that the Communist
regime is there for some time to come and that
any active resistance to it is foolhardy as long
as Russian troops remain in occupation. Con-
sequently, except for individual acts of resist-
ance, occasional small-scale strikes, and a few
student demonstrations, resistance since 1953
has been limited to the passive variety, with
flight to the West ? still regarded by many
as a measure of last resort ? serving as an
essential safety valve.
17. Some dissidence has arisen in university
and Party intellectual circles since the 20th
CPSU Congress and the ensuing de-Staliniza-
tion program. The temporary ideological dis-
orientation and the anti-Party trends which
resulted from the Stalin denigration caused
confusion in Party thinking, an outbreak
of "deviationism," and widespread ferment
among intellectuals. SED spokesmen indi-
cated that they were determined not to per-
mit events in East Germany to proceed as
they did in Poland or Hungary. Large-scale
precautionary measures were taken to pre-
vent any outbreaks. These measures were
almost certainly helped by efforts in West
Germany to stave off any hopeless revolt.
18. It is improbable that the intellectual op-
position to Ulbricht and present SED policies
holds any real danger for the regime as long
as Ulbricht retains the support of the Soviet
Union. It is to be noted, however, that de-
spite the regime's measures, the intellectuals,
though they may have been intimidated and
silenced, have not been reconciled, as is evi-
denced by the flight to West Germany on 22
August 1957 of Professor Alfred Kantorowicz,
a dedicated Communist since 1931 and one of
the GDR's leading intellectual figures.
RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE
19. NO organized resistance groups of any
significance are known to exist today in East
Germany. Anti-Communist groups based in
West Germany are active in the GDR and
command the cooperation both of individ-
uals and of small numbers of politically con-
scious East Germans who meet regularly to
exchange news. But organized resistance
groups of the type which that term usually
denotes ? partisan or guerrilla bands ? are
believed entirely lacking.
20. There are indications from almost all
areas of East Germany of unorganized resist-
ance, largely passive in nature. While all
segments of the population appear to manifest
passive resistance in one form or another, the
stimulus to resist appears to come primarily
from student, intellectual and upper working
class strata. Dissidence also has been noted
within the Party and Party-affiliated groups,
though on a lesser scale. At times of inter-
national unrest (e.g., the Hungarian revolt)
and major policy changes (e.g., the advent
of de-Stalinization), there is a definite and
perceptible increase in widespread passive
resistance, as well as an appearance of local-
ized, sporadic overt opposition.
21. The present SED regime is universally
detested by the East German population, of
which it is estimated that less than 10 percent
would vote Communist in a free election. The
people generally resent the government's
police state methods and high-pressure in-
doctrination, its economic regimentation and
failure to sufficiently raise the standard of
living, its alien character and subservience to
the Soviet Union, and its position as a major
obstacle to German reunification. One of the
most obvious indications of the general dislike
of the regime which exists among all cate-
gories of East Germans is the persistent flight
of East Germans to West Germany and West
Berlin. From 1949 until the end of 1957, it
is estimated that 2,275,000 persons ? equal
to almost 13 percent of the present popula-
tion of the GDR ? have expressed their op-
position by flight.
ROLE OF EMIGRES
22. Germany being a divided country, Ger-
man emigre groups do not exist in the sense
that they do in relation to other orbit coun-
tries. However, passive resistance in East
Germany is stimulated, and to an extent
guided, by anti-Communist groups based in
West Germany or West Berlin, such as the
Eastern Bureaus (Ostburo) of West German
political parties, especially the Social Demo-
cratic Party, the Investigating Committee of
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Free Jurists (Untersuchungsausschuss Freier
Juristen), and the Fighting Group Against
Inhumanity (Kampfgruppe gegen Unmen-
schlichkeit). In West Germany and West
Berlin, their activities are largely based on
direct contacts with individuals and involve
providing information, advice and material
support. Their activities in East Germany
consist chiefly of large-scale clandestine dis-
tribution of various kinds of literature, in-
cluding their own publications, and the col-
lection of information on events in the GDR.
23. These organizations strive more to main-
tain the spirit of resistance than to sponsor
acts of sabotage or other forms of active resist-
ance. They generally take the line that active
resistance at this time is futile although pas-
sive resistance is possible. This accords with
official West German and NATO policy which
forbids the incitement of the East German
population to revolt. This policy was fol-
lowed even during the height of earlier Hun-
garian successes in 1956 when these groups,
the Bonn government and individual West
Germans with contacts in the GDR warned
that on no account should active resistance
against the regime be undertaken since it
would produce no useful results and could
only bring renewed disaster to Germany.
24. There is no evidence of non-German
groups or individuals offering guidance or ma-
terial aid for resistance activity apart from
the limited efforts of the ICFTU (working
through West German trade unions) and
several Russian emigre groups based in West
Germany, such as NTS (National Solidarists)
and TSOPE (Central Association of Political
Immigrants from the USSR) .
REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE
25. The East German security apparatus is
directed by the Ministry for State Security
(MfS) and the Ministry of Interior. The MfS
controls the covert organization for combat-
ting and negating resistance and dissidence,
whether organized or unorganized. It main-
tains an extensive and elaborate system of
informants and surveillance, and uses pene-
tration and provocation as primary means for
detecting, combatting, and forestalling anti-
regime activities. The MfS also conducts
campaigns to discredit the West German anti-
Communist organizations with East Germans
and to harass them in West Germany. The
MfS also attempts to penetrate these Western
organizations and to subvert their members.
26. The role of the Ministry of Interior has
varied as a result of the continuous reorgani-
zation of the East German security apparatus.
Already in control of the civil police, it ac-
quired further security responsibilities in Feb-
ruary 1957, when the militarized security
forces were subordinated to it.
27. In addition to standard devices of censor-
ship, travel controls and informer nets, the
regime uses such measures as the employment
of a special party militia to help suppress op-
position in factories; discriminatory taxation;
the transfer of suspect workers and employees;
and the arbitrary classification of failures to
meet assigned production quotas, regardless
of cause, as economic sabotage. The occa-
sional practice of imposing severe penalties for
the most minor infractions is another effective
means used by the regime.
28. The primary deterrents to uprisings in
East Germany are approximately 400,000 So-
viet armed forces, stationed throughout the
country. The regime itself controls some
240,000 trained uniformed men, equally di-
vided between military and police forces,
whose very existence tends to inhibit resist-
ance activities. In addition, the Kampfgrup-
pen (Auxiliary Shop and Factory Guards) ,
organized following the June 1953 riots to
prevent such disturbances from recurring, is
being strengthened and intensively trained.
It has held ostentatious antiriot exercises in
various cities, with the obvious intent of in-
timidating the people.
CAPABILITY OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS
REVOLT
29. Although capable of suppressing unco-
ordinated local uprisings, the East German re-
gime, without the aid of Soviet forces, would
be unable to suppress a major revolt. While
the government probably could depend on a
dedicated minority in the MfS in case of trou-
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SECRET 51
ble, none of its military and police forces are
considered completely reliable. Some mem-
bers would probably be reluctant to fight
against their own countrymen, and in case of
widespread revolt, might well defect to the
side of those in opposition to the regime, de-
pending on the exact conditions which pre-
vailed. However, the 22 Soviet line divisions
stationed in East Germany would be available
for swift intervention to suppress any large-
scale revolt. But barring an unforeseen
change in the temper of the East German
population, which remembers the Soviet ac-
tion in June 1953 and more recently in Hun-
gary, no revolt is likely to occur as long as
these Soviet forces remain in East Germany.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS
OF PEACE
30. There are no known organized resistance
groups in East Germany. However, unor-
ganized resistance is still rampant. It ex-
presses itself primarily through flight to the
West, the eruptions from time to time of
minor strikes and slowdowns, student demon-
strations, or other incidents. Dissidence with-
in the Party and intellectual circles may con-
tinue, but the regime's demonstrated inten-
tion of dealing vigorously with such devia-
tions, as well as Ulbricht's firm control of the
Party apparatus and his explicit Soviet back-
ing, will probably prevent such intellectual
ferment from becoming any real danger to
the regime.
31. Capabilities of anti-Communist groups
based in West Germany and West Berlin con-
sist mainly of widespread distribution, either
by balloon or by mail and hand-to-hand
methods, of anti-Communist, anti-regime lit-
erature. Under given circumstances, appeals
by these Western-based groups to the East
German population calling for active resist-
ance might be heeded. This, however, would
presuppose a major change in Western strat-
egy, for West German and NATO policy now
forbids incitement of East Germans to vio-
lence, and these groups adhere rigidly to that
policy.
32. In the absence of organized resistance
groups, any increase or change in resistance
potential must come from the unorganized
dissident elements in the population. The
June 1953 uprisings showed what the East
Germans are capable of when sufficiently
aroused. But as long as the stability of the
regime remains unshaken and Soviet troops
remain in East Germany, any attempted new
form of, or increase in, the level of resistance
activity runs the grave risk of counteraction
and suppression by the regime's security
apparatus.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR
33. In case of warfare between Bloc and non-
Bloc countries on East German territory,
large numbers of Soviet troops would be re-
quired to retain control of the GDR, thereby
tying down units which could otherwise be
used against attacking forces. As a result,
initially, there would be little change in re-
sistance activities other than a probable in-
crease in acts of sabotage and attacks on local
Communist functionaries. There would prob-
ably also be attempts at espionage, subversion,
factory slowdowns, failure to cooperate on
agricultural projects and, in isolated cases
where topography permitted, small guerrilla
warfare against the Soviet Army. Neverthe-
less, it would take time, outside support and
the emergence of strong leadership capable of
organizing and directing a centrally co-
ordinated resistance force before opposition
groups could become effective. The forma-
tion of such groups would be a hazardous task
while the Soviet Bloc remained in power. If
and when the Communists appeared to be
weakening, the East Germans would intensify
their efforts to sabotage supplies and materiel,
to disrupt lines of communications, and to
collect and disseminate intelligence to the
non-Bloc countries involved in the encounter.
On the other hand, Western defeats would
immediately lead to a reduction in East Ger-
man resistance activities.
34. The nationality of attacking Western
forces would be immaterial to the East Ger-
mans since these forces would be regarded as
liberators. For example, the employment of
French and Italian troops would not adversely
affect resistance capabilities.
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35. If the military action took place in East
Germany, the attitudes and actions of regimes
and resistance groups in other Bloc countries
would be of little significance. If the military
action took place elsewhere within the Bloc,
the East Germans could expect little coopera-
tion from resistance groups in other countries,
chiefly because resistance groups of other
satellites would probably be preoccupied with
their own national objectives. Nevertheless,
in spite of distrust or fear of the Germans,
the possibility of some resistance cooperation
between elements in East Germany and other
Soviet satellite countries cannot be entirely
discounted if liberation from the Soviet yoke
is at stake.
36. East Germans probably would not favor
nuclear weapon attacks even though their
hatred for the Soviets and the regime is in-
tense. If use were made of major nuclear
weapons, the resulting mass destruction and
dislocation would virtually eliminate any
effective forms of resistance activity. On the
other hand, if circumstances permit use of
tactical nuclear weapons, East Germans prob-
ably would accept their effects on the popula-
tion as an unavoidable cost of liberation.
Under these conditions resistance capabilities
outside of areas immediately involved would
not necessarily be adversely affected, and, in-
The representative of the Assistant Chief of
Staff, Intelligence, USAF, would add the follow-
ing: "It is conceivable that a nuclear air attack
could be so designed as to eliminate the major
resources of the military and control strengths
supporting the regime without incurring popular
hatred or destroying resistance potential. Such
an attack could produce an opportunity for the
East Germans to take over control of the coun-
try."
deed, the opportunities for Western-assisted
resistance groups to seize local control would
be materially increased.3 4
37. The Soviet occupation of East Germany
has prejudiced the people permanently
against the Soviets. More liberal occupation
policies by the Soviets during a war would be
regarded simply as an opportunity for resist-
ance. However, occupation of some parts of
East Germany by NATO forces would encour-
age anti-Soviet resistance activities in unlib-
erated areas.
38. There is no information available on indi-
vidual resistance factions in East Germany
which might aspire to post-liberation leader-
ship.
4 The representative of the Assistant Chief of
Staff, Intelligence, US Army, notes the presence
in East Germany of six Soviet armies, including
22 line divisions, whose neutralization would re-
quire extensive use of nuclear weapons, and
therefore thinks this paragraph should read as
follows: "The East Germans would not favor
the use of nuclear weapons on targets in East
Germany. Initially, after a nuclear attack of
any scale, active and effective assistance to the
West would not materialize because of the con-
fusion and uncertainty of the populace and the
absence of pre-organized, strongly disciplined
local resistance groups. Subsequently, resist-
ance potential would be determined by the in-
tensity of the attack, the emergence of native
resistance leadership and organizations, the ex-
tent of material support from the West, and
the unpredictable ultimate reaction of the popu-
lace to the use of nuclear weapons. If demorali-
zation and physical destruction were not wide-
spread, and if resistance organizations could be
developed and given substantial assistance by
the West, an opportunity could arise for East
German groups to engage in anti-Soviet ac-
tivity."
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ANNEX F - HUNGARY
BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE
1. The Hungarians have always considered
themselves the last eastern outpost of the
West and an integral part of Western civiliza-
tion. Culturally, the eastern Hungarian eth-
nic frontier has been the traditional dividing
line between German and Latin culture on
the one hand and Slavic culture on the other.
From the viewpoint of religion, Hungary rep-
resents the farthest outpost of Roman Cathol-
icism in Southeast Europe. Politically, the
organization of parliamentary assemblies
under a constitution preceded by several cen-
turies the establishment of similar Western-
type governmental institutions and parties in
Eastern Europe. Being non-Slavic, non-
Orthodox, and highly individualistic, the
Hungarians are predisposed to side with any
adversary of Soviet power. This predisposi-
tion, firm even before World War II, became
particularly intense in 1945 under the excesses
of Soviet military occupation, and even more
so after 1947-48, when a non-representative
Hungarian Communist minority was imposed
upon the anti-Communist masses and com-
plete isolation from the West set in.
2. Among the factors which created, and will
for an indefinite period of time continue to
create, popular hostility toward the regime is
a historically anti-Russian attitude stemming
from 1848-49. At that time, Hungary's
greatest self-liberating effort was frustrated
by invading Russian armies. Significantly,
many of the slogans of the 1956 revolt alluded
to that earlier uprising, and many of the
actions of the rebels were patterned after steps
taken at that time. Still another element is
rooted in the fact that for two decades pre-
ceding World War II, the climate of Hun-
garian opinion was dominated by a collective
sense of frustration created by the huge losses
which the country had suffered under the
post-World War I peace treaty. It lost rough-
ly 64 percent of its territory and 58 percent of
its population to Rumania, Czechoslovakia,
and Yugoslavia. Hostility against neighbor-
ing beneficiaries of those losses continues
to exist despite official Communist claims
of close friendship among the People's De-
mocracies.
3. Further contributing to the deep-rooted
difficulties of the Communists are distasteful
popular recollections of the country's earlier
(1919) sanguinary Communist dictatorship, a
fairly strong social democratic tradition
among the working class, a persistent short-
age of new leadership potential because of
indifference toward Communist indoctrina-
tion on the part of youth and shaky military
morale of conscripts of anti-Communist
peasant parentage.
4. Of at least equal importance is the inade-
quate standard of living. Work norms are
high, wages are low, housing is poor, and food
is scarce. Soviet exploitation of the Hun-
garian economy was bitterly resented. Since
the revolution shattered many segments of
the Hungarian economy and since there are
no real indications of economic liberalization,
the economic factor of dissidence remains
strong.
5. Thus the attitude of the overwhelming ma-
jority of the population ? some 95 percent, if
the recent general uprising is a guide ? to-
ward the regime ranges from hatred to
apathy. The characteristics and attitudes
cited above are buttressed by opposition to
agricultural collectivization, stress on heavy
industry to the detriment of consumers' goods
production, cultural and psychological Soviet-
ization, anti-religious policies, regimentation
of workers and the use of forced or quasi-
forced labor, and the thwarting of various
aims of a nationalistic coloration. The Hun-
garian revolution of 1956 furnished a full-
scale demonstration of the degree and kind
of anti-Communist and anti-Soviet potential
of the Hungarian people.
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MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS
6. The majority of industrial workers, some of
whom were among the few original supporters
of Communism, constitute a major dissident
element. They were foremost among the
forces battling the Communist suppressors in
the days of the revolution. Along with lack
of national independence and personal free-
dom, they resent the limited attempts, if not
the outright refusal on the part of the regime
to satisfy the desire for more consumer goods
and a higher living standard, the perversion
of labor unions, the lack of safeguards against
"speed-up" work without adequate incentives,
unsafe and unsanitary working conditions,
arbitrary penalties, activities of labor inform-
ers, harsh work discipline and exhausting
work methods.
7. The intellectuals who have sparked the up-
risings against the regime, continue to con-
stitute a resistance potential out of propor-
tion to their small numbers. They resent the
suppression of freedom of expression, the iso-
lation from the West to which they feel cul-
turally bound, the intellectual deterioration
behind a facade of educational and cultural
pretensions, and the generally low level of
Hungary's intellectual life within the imposed
framework of an alien and inferior pattern.
8. Youth. One of the most conspicuous fail-
ures of the regime has been its inability to
secure the support of youth. Communist
youth organizations have been plagued for
years by a general apathy toward Party work.
The participation of numerous youths in the
uprising was impressive; even teen-age chil-
dren battled the Soviet forces with unbeliev-
able heroism. Youth resents the Party-
imposed discipline, the compulsion to absorb
an alien philosophy (Marxism-Leninism) and
to learn the Russian language and the im-
possibility of gaining access to the Western
culture complex.
9. The peasantry, although probably as anti-
Communist a group as any in Hungary, can
hardly be counted on to furnish active organ-
ized resistance. The best key to the role they
are likely to play in the future may be their
behavior during the recent revolt, when peas-
ants spontaneously supported the insurgents
by delivering food supplies, but did not enter
the fighting to any extent. While their senti-
ments are doubtless basically unchanged, and
while their resentment of government inter-
ference continues, it is possible that some of
the opposition has been blunted by regime
concessions, such as the deemphasis of collec-
tivization.
10. Armed Forces. Before the 1956 revolu-
tion, considerable resistance potential was be-
lieved to exist within the Hungarian armed
forces. Indeed, the Hungarian armed forces
all but disintegrated during the uprising. A
considerable portion of the military, officers
as well as enlisted personnel, either refused to
take action against the rebels or sided with
the anti-regime forces to whom they gave
weapons and with whom they fought side by
side. As a result, a careful screening of mili-
tary personnel was initiated by the Kadar
regime. Only those were to be retained who
were considered unlikely to foment trouble
and who were not known to have participated
in the revolt against the Communists. The
same criteria were applied to the new con-
scripts inducted in April 1957 (and undoubt-
edly to the additional class scheduled for in-
duction in the fall of 1957) and to the Fron-
tier Guard organization which has been newly
created. Nevertheless, in spite of all precau-
tions and the strictest surveillance, it would
be impossible for the regime at this time to
organize any forces that are free of dissidence
even though, as a result of careful screening,
there is probably now somewhat less disaffec-
tion in the military establishment than in
other elements of the population.
11. The clergy, while it continues to exert con-
siderable influence among the people, has been
showing signs of decreasing willingness to
sharpen, or even discuss, outstanding issues
in the Church-State relationship. The Cath-
olic Bench of Bishops, particularly adroit in
pre-revolt times in applying between-the-lines
techniques in sermons and statements, seems
to have decided to exercise the utmost caution
for the time being. The resistance potential
on the Church leadership level generally, both
Catholic and Protestant, appears to be at its
lowest ebb in years.
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INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE
12. Even before the 1956 revolution, there was
strong resentment against Soviet control and
influence, but the effectiveness of the security
system limited Hungarian resistance to pas-
sive, unorganized manifestations. Other fac-
tors, such as physically and psychologically
exhausting work norms, material want, com-
pulsory political activities and unfavorable
topography further discouraged active re-
sistance. On the other hand, passive resist-
ance in Hungary appeared to have been more
widespread than elsewhere in the satellites.
The 1956 revolution was almost certainly a
spontaneous explosion which was as unex-
pected, even by Hungarians, as it was unor-
ganized. It demonstrated the intensity of
anti-regime and anti-Soviet feeling in the face
of overwhelming odds. But it cannot be re-
garded as a precedent. Its inevitable outcome
served as a warning to active resisters every-
where that except under extraordinary condi-
tions, such ventures are bound to end in dis-
aster. It did show, however, the depth of
hatred of Soviet and native Communist rule.
13. The regime's awareness of the continuing
validity of the basic reasons for dissidence is
indicated by the intensive drives of repression
which it carries on with the announced intent
of eliminating "all vestiges" of the revolt. In
the violent and sanguinary uprising, the peo-
ple showed themselves to be almost entirely
united in their hatred of the Communist sys-
tem, the Soviet overlordship, and its local rep-
resentation. The Kremlin and the Hungarian
regime are now, even more than before, facing
a hostile population in Hungary, and the time
when this hostility may subside is not in sight.
TRENDS OF DISSIDENCE SINCE 1953
14. Profoundly dissatisfied under the Commu-
nist regime during the Stalin era, the Hun-
garian people expected major improvements
after Stalin's death. However, the liberaliza-
tion program adopted in 1953, ameliorated
only a few of the conditions at the root of the
widespread dissidence. Relaxation of police
terror and mitigation of peasant regimenta-
tion appeared to heighten popular demands
rather than reconcile the population to the
regime.
15. Initially, liberalization seems to have had
little effect on resistance. Passive resistance
continued, as did isolated instances of indi-
vidual active resistance. There was no evi-
dence of anti-Communist organization and
there were no instances of mass anti-regime
action such as in East Germany and Czecho-
slovakia in 1953, in Poznan in the summer of
1956, or even the Czech student demonstra-
tions in May 1956. However, there is abun-
dant evidence that after the 20th Congress of
the CPSU, parts of the population, especially
workers, perhaps encouraged by the example
of the "revolting" Party intellectuals, vigor-
ously and uninhibitedly criticized Party lead-
ers and local functionaries in group meetings
at the local level. But there is no substantial
evidence that violent resistance was then con-
templated by any significant group.
16. A very important manifestation of dissi-
dence on a mass scale, though unorganized,
was the spontaneous turnout of many thou-
sands of Hungarians on the occasion of Rajk's
reinterment early in October, 1956. As a prel-
ude to the nationwide uprising that took
place some three weeks later, this demonstra-
tion was significant in that the Hungarian
people, at least in Budapest, at one stroke be-
came conscious that their sentiments were
fundamentally the same. Years of suffering
at the hands of undercover security police,
agents provocateurs, and informers had frag-
mented the Hungarians so that no one felt he
could trust any other individual. The demon-
stration made them aware that untold thou-
sands of individuals shared the same senti-
ments upon which they were willing to act,
even against the wishes of the regime.
17. Within certain sectors of the Party, the
comparatively liberal policies of the Nagy re-
gime in 1953 gave rise to a belief (expressed
by the writers and other intellectuals) that
modification of Communism toward greater
freedom and humaneness was not only desir-
able but feasible. The Nagy experiment stim-
ulated the beginning of organized opposition
by the intellectuals in late 1954. This opposi-
tion became increasingly vocal and far-reach-
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56 SECRET
ing in its demands, especially after the 20th
Congress. It is unclear to what extent the
opposition of Communist intellectuals and
their collaborators to the Rakosi-Gero regime
can be construed as resistance against the
Communist system. It is unlikely that any
substantial group of these avowed Commu-
nists contemplated the overthrow of the re-
gime or plotted violence. In fact, the intellec-
tuals' maximum program had more in com-
mon with political concepts of Western social
democracy than with Communism. Accept-
ance of their program would have meant the
end of Hungarian Communism as a one-party
dictatorship subservient to the Soviet Union.
The fact that the intellectuals approved the
prospects of a non-Communist Hungary while
the revolution was successful, does not neces-
sarily mean that they had consciously striven
for these objectives in the preceding months.
The evidence suggests rather that their orig-
inal and more consistent aims were limited to
freedom of creation, i.e. freedom from Party
press censorship, and did not extend to the
destruction of the Communist system.
18. This intellectual "revolt" established a
unique link between an important body of the
Communist Party and the population at large.
For the first time people began to read the
Communist press voluntarily and with gen-
uine interest. The grievances and hopes of
the writers struck a responsive chord within
the population, and hope arose that changes
for the better could take place, particularly
since influential Party members were agitat-
ing for them.
19. Ferment within the Party, caused by the
factionalism between Rakosi-Gero tradition-
alists and new liberalizers (adherents of the
Nagy-type Communist program) can hardly
be classified as resistance. Neither faction was
anti-Communist in the sense that it envisaged
the end of Marxist-Leninist system, though
nationalistic impulses, explicitly or implicitly
anti-Soviet, presumably motivated many of
the liberals. However, as in the case of the
dissension represented by the opposition of the
intellectuals to the upper hierarchy, the split
in the Politburo indirectly stimulated the pop-
ular resistance potential by the confusion it
created. It must have been evident to the
population that the Party could no longer
claim monolithic unity. The confusion which
the vagueness and zig-zagging of the Party
line bred throughout the lower levels of the
Party emboldened ever larger sectors of the
population to challenge and defy Party direc-
tives and to hope for and demand far-reaching
changes in the direction of humaneness, in-
ternal freedom, independence, and improved
living conditions.
POST-REVOLUTIONARY RESISTANCE
20. Even though its translatability into action
is undoubtedly far more limited than before,
resistance potential may well be considered to
be nearly as high as it was in the months pre-
ceding the uprising. Popular distaste for the
regime and the entire Communist system is
evidenced in various ways. Workers engage
in slowdowns, absenteeism, and poor quality
production, despite the regime's application of
incentives on the one hand and punitive meas-
ures on the other. Party and government
functions are poorly attended, and the Party,
now reduced to 400,000 members, has had to
admit the prevalence of skepticism and indif-
ference among its own members.
21. Reports of organized resistance have been
received continually since the Soviet suppres-
sion of the Hungarian revolt in November
1956. Some of the reports received shortly
after the revolt, have been verified and can be
taken as evidence of organized resistance in
the early months of 1957. Since that time,
however, reliable information has been re-
placed more and more by reports of dubious
validity. The evidence suggests a decline in
the extent of organized resistance. This de-
cline is probably due to the increasing effec-
tiveness of government countermeasures and,
to some extent, to loss of hope for immediate
success in these activities. Moreover, in the
generally flat terrain of Hungary, major armed
resistance could not long survive. Neverthe-
less, the hiding of arms, one of the major
reasons given by the Kadar regime in jus-
tifying many arrests, has been reported by
several sources who claimed that a consid-
erable part of the small arms, given by
Hungarian Army elements to revolutionary
groups, were still missing.
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22. Another form of organized post-revolt re-
sistance was the general strike late in 1956.
When workers finally returned to the facto-
ries, they continued a virtual sabotage in the
form of an evidently well-planned display of
inactivity. As late as February 1957, this
organized opposition apparently circulated
such slogans as "Long Live Free Hungary,
Long Live Imre Nagy!"
23. During November, December and Janu-
ary, a strong organization of Workers' Coun-
cils was a major source of active opposition
to the Kadar regime. Although the regime
dissolved the central and regional councils in
December 1956 and the local councils in No-
vember 1957, there was firm evidence during
January 1957 that their spirit of resistance and
a professional awareness of the importance
of organization remained high. Members of
these councils have volunteered the informa-
tion that they were changing tactics from
overt to covert opposition. Early in January,
they claimed a hidden radio transmitter for
use in emergencies, facilities for printing a
newspaper, a cache of arms, and an under-
ground network embracing the whole coun-
try. Later in the same month, they also
claimed to be supported by a network of
political parties and an organization of
writers.
24. The majority of the writers, grouped in
the Hungarian Writers' Federation, showed
signs of organized opposition up to the spring
of 1957, drafting resolutions and voicing de-
mands on the Kadar government. This op-
position forced the regime to "suspend" the
Federation's activities on 18 January and to
dissolve it on 21 April. Arrests of writers
have been announced from time to time.
Many of the leading writers appear to have
gone on a "silence strike," refusing to write
for the Communist-approved publications.
Although in the autumn of 1957, this "strike"
showed signs of weakening ? such as the
forced signing of the 13 September manifesto
protesting the UN debate on Hungary its
base still warrants consideration as a factor
of potential resistance.
25. Under these circumstances, considering
the general exhaustion and frustration of the
people, as a result of the unsuccessful revol-
ution and in view of the strong security
measures of the Soviet-sponsored regime, no
organized resistance can be expected in the
near future. For the time being, at least, the
simplest and safest method by which the
citizen can resist is by carrying out his work
in a superficial manner and only externally
complying with regulations, consistent with
self-preservation and personal security.
ROLE OF EMIGRES
26. The existence of a sizeable anti-Commu-
nist emigration has been a source of discom-
fort for Communist Hungary in the period
since World War II. A vigorous repatriation
campaign is being conducted to alleviate this
situation. Emigre efforts to broadcast anti-
Communist material from the West have
found some response in Hungary and have
assisted in strengthening the morale of the
numerous dissidents there. In general, how-
ever, Hungarians have tended to ignore emigre
activities or to be critical of their leaders.
Although some insurgents in late October
1956 called for the return of certain emigre
leaders, especially pre-Communist Premier
Ferenc Nagy, their absence during long years
of national plight was generally resented.
The manifest inability of pre-revolutionary
emigres to exert any influence on the upris-
ing has dealt a blow to their organizations
in the Free World and it is not likely to be
forgotten in their homeland.
27. The Hungarian Veterans Comradeship
Society (Magyar Harcosok Baj tarsi Kozos-
sege ? MHBK) an emigre organization of
Fascist leanings under General Andras Zako,
was considered for some years as militantly
favoring Hungarian liberation from Commu-
nist rule. That it gave actual assistance to
resistance groups inside Hungary, however,
is doubtful. In 1953, the MHBK was thought
to be disintegrating. An attempt to activate
the group by proposing to stage an invasion
was made, by General Zako, soon after the
October 1956 revolt, but the proposal was not
taken seriously by the West. The MHBK is
not believed to have adherents capable of
staging a resistance effort inside Hungary to-
day.
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28. Pre- and post-revolutionary emigre groups,
though acting mainly outside Hungary and
not yet effectively united, have plans which
may have the effect of strengthening the over-
all resistance potential in Hungary. Also,
numerous individual members of the pre-rev-
olutionary emigre group in the Hungarian
National Council, as well as the newer emigres
in the Hungarian Freedom Federation, claim
to maintain potentially useful contacts in
Hungary. However, it remains doubtful that
the present basic disposition of the Hungarian
people toward resistance could be substantial-
ly influenced by emigre organizations.
29. Of the emigres identified with Hungarian
political parties, the Social Democrats, repre-
sented abroad by Anna Kethly, a member of
Imre Nagy's coalition cabinet during the rev-
olution, are believed to have the strongest
political resistance assets in Hungary today.
She probably has retained most of her large
personal following as a respected political
leader. It is also probable that late in 1956
the Social Democrats and other political
parties, including the Smallholders, took steps
to institute dual leadership at home and
abroad to prepare for underground work.
REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE
30. In order to obliterate the liberal trends
and nationalist spirit of 1956, the Kadar re-
gime made a determined and apparently suc-
cessful effort to eliminate all discernible focal
points of resistance. Repression has proven
effective, insofar as it has reduced or thwarted
the danger of any renewal of overt resistance,
but it has failed to eradicate passive resistance
and recalcitrance. During the immediate
post-revolt period, and again in July and Au-
gust 1957, the regime resorted to domestic
deportations. Until recently it has made spe-
cial efforts to publicize the trials and the harsh
sentences of a large number of "counterrev-
olutionaries" in order to impress the people
with its strength. The old AVH (Secret
Police) has been reconstituted; now called
BACs (State Security Group) , it operates
ruthlessly and with apparent efficiency under
the Ministry of Interior. The Central Work-
ers' Council, almost the equivalent of a peo-
ple's government during the early phase of the
uprising, was outlawed on December 9, 1956;
the Writers' Union was banned in April 1957.
By April, the leaders of the Protestant
churches were forced to reaffirm their support
of the Kadar regime; on May 24 the Hun-
garian Catholic Church not only announced
its adherence to the regime by joining the Na-
tional Peace Council but also formed an aux-
iliary peace movement ("Opus Pacis") within
the Church itself, and on August 30 issued a
purely political statement, first of its kind, in
support of the regime (attacking the UN de-
bate on the Hungarian uprising) .
CAPABILITIES OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS
REVOLT
31. The Armed Forces which disintegrated
during the revolution, have been gradually
reconstituted. They appear to remain, de-
spite recurrent screenings, technically weak
and of doubtful reliability. The present
strength is estimated at 100,000. In addi-
tion, there are 35,000 militarized Security
Forces, about 20,000 of whom are Frontier
Guards. Morale of the armed forces is be-
lieved to be low but the Security Forces are
probably somewhat less disaffected than the
Army. Furthermore, in February 1957, a
Party-directed Workers Guard, probably mod-
elled after the East German Kampfgruppen,
was formed in order to prevent outbreaks
against the regime in the industrial establish-
ments. It is not known how well organized
or trained these elements are but it can be as-
sumed that the regime has selected for this
role only those it considers to be the least
susceptible to dissidence.
32. The Hungarian security forces have made
progress in re-establishing their pre-revolu-
tionary efficiency and organization. However,
it will undoubtedly take some time before
these security forces approach the level of or-
ganization and training achieved before the
revolt. And it will be a long time before the
organization responsible for functions for-
merly assigned to the State Security Authori-
ty (AVH) achieves the reliability of that ap-
paratus. The security police have had some
difficulty in restoring its extensive informer
system, which in fact probably hinders the
attainment of its pre-revolutionary effective-
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ness. They cannot be expected, and never
were considered able, to suppress a revolt of
any significant proportions, since this exceeds
the normal function of the organization. The
present regime could not suppress an outburst
of any significant proportions with the indig-
enous machinery now available to it. The re-
gime owes its continued existence to the ma-
jor elements of six Soviet line divisions which
are stationed in Hungary.
MODIFICATION IN THE SECURITY
APPARATUS
33. As a result of the uprising, many agents
were killed; many others left the country, and
still others were unwilling to continue serving.
At first two former AVH officers reconstituted
the AVH as the "R Unit," and early in No-
vember 1956, three new officer regiments were
reported as consisting largely of former AVH
men in officer uniforms. That local armed
forces were principally composed of former
AVH members and Party functionaries was
also reported in mid-December 1956. The or-
ganizing program seems to have proceeded
rapidly in the following months with the re-
instatement of policy-level personnel belong-
ing to the Rakosi wing reported again in late
May 1957. Also by May and probably earlier,
the informer system, backbone of the AVH
system, had been reorganized to some extent,
and attempts were being made to recruit for-
mer rebels as spies and informers. The des-
ignation "R Unit" was not heard again. The
new secret police, at first referred to as In-
terior Ministry Security Police, or Special
Police Establishment, soon developed into the
present BACs (State Security Group). The
widespread and growing volume of arrests of
"counter-revolutionaries" up to the summer
of 1957, may indicate the increasing efficiency
of the secret police.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS
OF PEACE
34. Under peacetime conditions, passive re-
sistance would undoubtedly increase if there
were a substantial relaxation of police meas-
ures. Such circumstances might even render
an eventual crystallization of some organized
resistance possible. However, no such relaxa-
tion appears likely in the foreseeable future.
Even if it did occur, tangible developments
would materialize only after an initial period
of undeterminable length, during which the
population could convince itself that the re-
laxation was not a tactical device camouflag-
ing a trap. Strong police control, Soviet occu-
pation, disillusionment over the lasting effec-
tiveness of open resistance in the light of the
recent experiences, and the absence of visible
prospects of outside assistance will limit re-
sistance efforts in Hungary, for the foresee-
able future, to minor and sporadic acts of de-
fiance and sabotage. The regime may be in-
creasingly successful in neutralizing all focal
points of organized resistance; in the absence
of war, even without sizeable additions to its
ranks, a Soviet-supported apparatus seems
quite adequate to prevent the development
and spread of any important organized re-
sistance.
35. Nevertheless, there probably still exist
some resistance nuclei which have been in-
genious enough to evade detection. They may
be able for some time to maintain contact
security, and to cache arms and other equip-
ment. Similarly, they could accomplish a
small number of acts of sabotage and produce
propaganda leaflets. Their possibilities for
spearheading a renewed uprising seem re-
mote, given the general attitude and psy-
chological condition of the majority of the
population and the systematic efforts on the
part of the regime to destroy any remnants of
expectation and hope which prevailed before
the October uprising.
36. More difficult for the regime to cope with
is the resistance potential of the intelligentsia.
Evidence suggests the possibility of some form
of organization among anti-regime students
and intellectuals. The latter have displayed
a form of passive resistance in that they do
not produce for the regime's propaganda pub-
lications. Their capabilities probably do not
extend beyond this form of resistance, since
the regime-sponsored publications do not per-
mit expression of their real views openly or by
"Aesopian" devices which they used success-
fully before the revolution. Students will
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probably continue to defy the regime by vari-
ous ingenious nuisance devices. Neither
group seems to have the opportunity, which
existed before the revolution, to forge a link
between their own aims and aspirations and
those of the population at large.
37. Unorganized active resistanoe, possibly
making use of arms hidden during and after
the revolution, may occur from time to time
but is unlikely to be of more than local sig-
nificance. Unorganized passive resistance,
however, will continue to be widespread. It
is capable of sabotaging or slowing down in-
dustrial and agricultural production and, in
covertly disregarding the regime's orders, it
may remain a source of embarrassment for
Hungarian as well as other Eastern European
Communist leaders.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR
38. Under conditions of open warfare, a con-
tinuing lack of massive popular support would
undoubtedly act as a great hindrance to the
regime and to its Soviet mentors even in the
performance of the relatively minor tasks the
regime could expect to be assigned. In the
initial stages of a war, the Hungarian regime
would increase its security measures, and it
would be difficult for the people to engage in
effective resistance activities. The populace
would attempt to slow down both industrial
and agricultural production. It would try to
disrupt transportation and communications,
and would probably manage to publish propa-
ganda against the Soviet war effort. Some
men anticipating induction into the Armed
Forces would hide in an attempt to avoid
service. Most Hungarians would watch for
opportunities to aid the forces opposing the
Bloc more actively and many would bide their
time, awaiting a chance to go over to the
enemy. However, large-scale desertions and
organized resistance activities would not take
place until basic Soviet weaknesses in the field
became manifest or at least one major mili-
tary defeat was inflicted upon Soviet forces.
39. The regime has tried to recover all arms
and other supplies hidden by Hungarians dur-
ing and after the 1956 revolt, but there still
remain considerable quantities of hidden
small arms scattered throughout the country.
They are almost certainly insufficient, how-
ever, to permit large-scale or effective armed
resistance. Thus, the capability of the
Hungarians for anti-Bloc military activity
and ? to a large extent ? for sabotage would
be largely dependent upon supplies of arms,
munitions, and explosives from outside.
40. In the initial stages of war, the major con-
tribution of dissident elements of the Hun-
garian populace to the Bloc's enemies would
be acts of sabotage and intelligence collection.
There would probably be little opportunity to
assist in evasion and escape measures, but if
channels for transmission could be estab-
lished, non-Bloc forces could expect to be sup-
plied with complete descriptions of Soviet
activities inside Hungary.
41. If actual fighting were taking place on or
near Hungarian territory, Hungarian resist-
ance elements would intensify their efforts.
It would not matter to them which side ap-
peared to be winning; their efforts would be
concentrated on assistance to the enemies of
the Soviets. As the actual conflict drew closer
to Hungary, opportunities to assist in evasion
and escape efforts would be multiplied.
Familiarity with the topographic features of
their own country and with Soviet search
techniques would enable the Hungarians to
facilitate the escape of enemy soldiers. Prox-
imity to the scene of battle would make it
easier to pass intelligence to the enemy. If
supplied with radios, the Hungarians would
probably provide intelligence information
more rapidly than non-Bloc forces could ex-
ploit it. If supplied with arms and special
equipment, the Hungarians could be expected
to organize guerrilla bands which, through
hit-and-run tactics, would be able to tie down
significant numbers of Bloc troops and also
deprive the USSR of some of its forward oper-
ations based in Hungary. In the event of sub-
stantial Soviet reverses in war, all major fac-
tors and forces of the recent revolt could be
expected to come into play on a scale and with
an intensity probably even larger than that of
last fall's explosion. The validity of this
assumption is made secure by the continuing
existence of every major factor from which
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popular opposition to Soviet occupation and
Soviet-sponsored Communist rule stems in
Hungary.
42. The nationality of attacking forces would
not be a factor adversely influencing the de-
gree and extent of resistance operations and
capabilities. The attitudes and actions of re-
sistance groups in other Bloc countries would
probably strongly influence the Hungarians.
Cooperation with resistance groups in other
Bloc countries would develop after the initial
uprising and particularly if other resistance
groups could help supply the Hungarians with
arms and equipment. Also, circumstances
surrounding the initiation of hostilities would
not affect resistance capabilities. The Hun-
garians probably would approve the initiation
of hostilities since they regard a war as pro-
viding the best means of liberation.
43. Hungarian hatred of the Soviets is so in-
tense that the people probably would accept
the use of any instrument of war, including
nuclear weapons, against Soviet forces in
Hungary. However, the physical destruction
and social dislocation resulting from a large
scale nuclear attack on Hungary could be ex-
pected to virtually destroy Hungarian capa-
bilities for resistance. If a nuclear air attack
could be so designed as to eliminate the major
resources of the governmental and political
strengths of the regime, Hungarian resistance
capabilities would not necessarily be adversely
affected. Thus, an opportunity would emerge
for Hungarian resistance groups to take over
control of the country if the following addi-
tional conditions should prevail: (a) develop-
ment of effective leadership and coordination
in resistance groups; (b) provision of material
support; and (c) assurance of early direct
military support.
44. Occupation policies of Western forces
would not be a crucial factor affecting resist-
ance potential and capabilities so long as
these policies were pronounced to respect and
aid in the accomplishment of Hungarian aspi-
rations for freedom, independence and the
end to Soviet domination. Thus, enlightened
occupation by non-Bloc forces would intensify
the Hungarian desire to be helpful. Hun-
garian capabilities for assisting the occupying
power in areas of the country which were not
yet taken would be enhanced by a cooperative
attitude on the part of the occupier.
45. Questions of a future regime and of the
specific character of agencies to be instru-
mental in the liberation are likely to be re-
garded by the people as secondary in relation
to liberation itself. The question of German
rearmament, a key item in Communist propa-
ganda, is to be viewed in this light. Although
many fundamental and even irreconcilable
differences exist between the German and
Hungarian mentality and character, the cul-
tural affinities of the two peoples are based
on a common Western heritage. Also, in con-
tradistinction to the situation vis-a-vis Czech-
oslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia as re-
ferred to in paragraph 2, Hungary has no ter-
ritorial claims against Germany. However, if
armed units of countries toward which Hun-
garians are now hostile, participated in efforts
to liberate Hungary, it may be assumed that
such units would be welcomed.
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ANNEX G?NORTH KOREA
BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE
1. The principal sources of in North
Korea are the regime's drastic industrial re-
construction and expansion effort and the
agricultural collectivization program, which,
following the extreme suffering and demands
made during the hostilities, have placed an
extraordinarily heavy burden on the North
Korean people. Additional factors tending to
create or stimulate dissidence are: (1) the ex-
istence of a rival Korean government in the
South offering an alternative focus of loyalty;
(2) the continued presence of large numbers
of foreign troops within the country; (3) past
and potential future factional rivalries in the
North Korean ruling hierarchy between the
dominant pro-Soviet elements and the minor-
ity "Yenan" faction, and (4) the latent clash
of interests and competition between the So-
viet Union and Communist China for control
of North Korea which these factional rivalries
reflect. In most other respects the objectives,
overall approach, and systems of control of
the North Korean rulers are the same as those
of Communist regimes elsewhere, and most of
the specific factors creating are the
same. However, because of the cultural and
intellectual backwardness of the predomi-
nantly agricultural North Korean society, the
North Koreans' extreme isolation from the
outside world and their complete inexperience
with free, modern, and independent govern-
ment before 1945, their resistance, present
and potential, to Communist domination is
less intense than among the satellites with
experience and contacts in the modern world.
2. A further important reason for dissidence
has been the imposition by the regime of
oppressive burdens on the populace, such as
heavy taxes, forced contributions to political
and social organizations, forced labor, direct
or indirect pressures to turn farmers into in-
dustrial laborers, farm collectivization, short-
ages of consumer goods, high production
quotas for industrial and farm workers, and
military conscription. During the hostilities,
loss of life and property and other direct and
indirect suffering brought the populace to a
state of almost complete exhaustion. Though
more than four years have passed since the
hostilities ended and North Korea has received
aid from the Sino-Soviet Bloc, the war dam-
age, the reconstruction program, and the
maintenance of a military force exceeding
that at the beginning of the hostilities exacts
heavier contributions from the reduced popu-
lation than those required before the hos-
tilities.
3. Another factor contributing to dissension
in North Korea is the close supervision and
control exercised by the regime over all facets
of personal life. However, Stalinist-type per-
secution is no longer needed except for occa-
sional purges of Party members and govern-
ment functionaries. Agricultural landlords,
Christians, middle class elements, and other
anti-Communists who did not flee to South
Korea in the early years of Communist control
generally are being controlled through Com-
munist-dominated "social" organizations and
"punishment" is being meted out by discrim-
inatory treatment and surveillance rather
than through persecution. Also discrimi-
nated against and under close surveillance is
the large minority of the population who col-
laborated with the UN forces during their
occupation of North Korea, or who are closely
related to members of any of these suspect
groups.
4. The existence of a rival Korean govern-
ment asserting jurisdiction and seeking con-
trol of the Korean peninsula also has a bear-
ing on dissidence. The appeal of the ROK to
North Koreans has been minimized to some
extent by the antagonisms inevitably engen-
dered by the war, by North Korean propa-
ganda, vilifying the Republic and contrasting
the situation in the north and south to the
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disadvantage of the ROK, and by a lack of
sympathy for the Rhee government. Never-
theless, there exists considerable sentiment
for the ROK in North Korea even though few
North Koreans in the present situation would
be willing to assume the risks involved in
actively supporting the ROK.
MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS
5. Dissidence, unhappiness and hopelessness
exist to varying degrees in almost every ele-
ment of North Korean society. However, the
extent of such feelings in terms of resistance
potential is difficult to estimate. It can al-
most certainly be presumed that dissidence is
limited to relatively small numbers in the
various social groups, a phenomenon which is
partly attributable to the fact that more than
two million persons who might have strength-
ened the resistance potential, have fled to
South Korea since World War II.
6. Dissidence is intense among the small rem-
nants of the Christian and former middle-
class groups and in the suspect elements of
the populace that are kept under surveillance
and are treated in discriminatory fashion be-
cause of their relationship to anti-Commu-
nists. The farmers remain basically out of
sympathy with the objectives of the regime.
As recently as September 1957, the regime
listed as one of its major tasks in the agricul-
tural field the "socialist transformation" of
the peasants' thinking, which it characterized
as "lagging far behind their socialist environ-
ment." Two post-armistice policies are par-
ticularly important causes of among
the farmers: wage increases and other pref-
erential treatment granted to industrial
laborers and the government's program of
agricultural "cooperativization," now nearly
completed. The industrial laborers, too, prob-
ably are generally unhappy and frustrated,
but on a lesser scale than the farmers. They
are treated as a privileged group in contrast
to the farmers, but are subjected to oppressive
labor requirements. Army morale is proba-
bly only fair despite indoctrination, though
dissidence is probably mild in the Air Force
and the Navy which are much smaller and
more select services.
7. As industrialization proceeds the regime will
become increasingly dependent on the middle
ranks of the government bureaucracy and in-
dustrial technicians. Faced with a shortage
of such personnel and without adequate facil-
ities for training them at home, the regime
has sent several thousand students to the So-
viet Union and Eastern Europe for further
education. The inevitable comparisons made
by these young people between conditions in
North Korea and in other parts of the world
based on personal observation and increased
access to information have profoundly
shocked some and have undoubtedly affected
all. Several North Korean students who de-
fected to the West commented that Eastern
Europe appeared to be a paradise in compari-
son with their homeland. Korean students in
Hungary joined the revolutionary forces in
October and November 1956 and have since
been returned to North Korea. These young
technicians might also serve as a channel for
introducing into North Korea the ideological
ferment which has swept the Soviet bloc since
the 20th Congress of the CPSU but which
apparently has as yet had little effect on
North Korea.
INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE
8. Despite widespread dissidence the North
Koreans are inclined toward hopelessness and
apathy rather than active resistance. More-
over, as prospects for reestablishment of non-
Communist control over the area have de-
clined, the will to resist appears to have dimin-
ished. Dissidence is seldom voiced and even
less frequently acted upon since the regime
provides severe punishment for any infraction
of its laws and regulations. Although there
are geographic areas, particularly in the
rugged, mountainous terrain of North-central
Korea, in which dissidence could be mani-
fested by guerrilla activity, there are no
known guerrilla groups in existence. Pres-
ently, dissidence is of such a low intensity as
to preclude a popular movement. Only if the
Communist control apparatuses were weak-
ened and the regime seemed on the verge of
crumbling under outside pressures, would a
substantial minority probably be willing to
participate in resistance activities with any
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prospect of success. But in the present situ-
ation actual resistance on any significant
scale is unlikely and in fact virtually im-
possible.
9. Such resistance as does occur in North
Korea is primarily directed not at Commu-
nism per se or at Soviet domination but at the
North Korean regime itself. Ideological con-
siderations are not a major contributing fac-
tor in creating dissension in North Korea, and,
except for the small remnant of the Christian
community in North Korea, apparently few
people strongly oppose Communism as a sys-
tem. Nor is there much opposition to Soviet
domination which is exercised through an
ostensibly "native Korean" regime. However,
there is at least some opposition to those
North Korean policies which appear to favor
the USSR over the needs and desires of the
North Koreans themselves. This opposition is
almost certainly stimulated by the strong na-
tional consciousness of the Korean people and
their long history of resistance to external
domination. Although the presence of nearly
300,000 Chinese Communist troops in North
Korea has undoubtedly aroused some resent-
ment and nationalist sentiment, it does not
appear to have caused widespread discontent
among the population at large.
TRENDS OF DISSIDENCE SINCE 1953
10. North Korea does not appear to have been
affected directly by the events which followed
the death of Stalin. Rather, it has been
struggling with its reconstruction program
following the cessation of hostilities. Changes
in the regime's policies were the result of in-
ternal rather than external developments.
Even in relation to developments elsewhere in
the Sino-Soviet Bloc, North Korea has re-
mained surprisingly isolated.
11. The regime has not relaxed its rehabilita-
tion and development programs and has not
altered the policy of giving priority to the
development of heavy industry. Neither the
Soviet criticism of the "cult of personality"
nor the Chinese Communist "hundred flow-
ers" policy have been echoed in North Korea.
The Hungarian revolt was not extensively re-
ported in the North Korean press, and the
65
scale and character of the outbreak were mini-
mized and distorted. Its effect on the possi-
bility of rebellion in North Korea has probably
been minimal, although the return of students
sent to Eastern Europe may inject an intel-
lectual ferment previously lacking.
RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE
12. Guerrilla activity in North Korea, which
was extensive in 1951 immediately following
the withdrawal of UN forces from the area,
steadily declined during the remainder of the
hostilities as the battle line stabilized. At the
time of Stalin's death, which preceded the
signing of the Korean armistice by less than
five months, virtually all guerrilla bands,
which had been most numerous in central
Hwanghae Province just north of the present
demilitarized zone, had been driven onto the
off-shore islands, where they presumably have
since been liquidated. Guerrilla activity in
the latter stages of the hostilities appears to
have been sustained only where it was linked
with the UN command; aside from such
groups, resistance activities after the Commu-
nists regained control were minor.
13. Since the conclusion of the armistice,
guerrilla and other resistance activity appears
to have declined almost to the vanishing
point. Some small guerrilla groups were re-
ported to have been holding out in the moun-
tainous areas of Hwanghae and North P'yon-
gan Provinces as recently as early 1956, but
their continued survival is doubtful. Active
resistance appears to be limited to the occa-
sional distribution of leaflets and mutilation
of Communist posters, some intelligence col-
lection, and rare instances of sabotage and
assassination of members of the North Korean
armed forces, apparently on an unorganized
basis. No organized resistance groups are
known to be in existence at the present time.
14. Unorganized passive resistance is probably
fairly widespread in North Korea, particularly
among the farmers, whose failure to identify
themselves with the official policies and aims
has been acknowledged by the regime. Such
passive resistance, however, is probably char-
acterized more by apathy and unwillingness
to expend effort in accomplishing the tasks set
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by the regime than by a deliberate effort to
obstruct those tasks through a slowdown.
Student elements probably retain the best
resistance potential as do relatives of persons
adversely affected by regime policies. Never-
theless, so long as the present regime remains
in power, even unorganized resistance has
only dim prospects.
ROLE OF REFUGEES
15. The presence in South Korea of large
numbers of North Korean refugees constitutes
a strong attraction for their compatriots still
in the North and represents a potential source
of leadership and guidance in the event that
effective resistance in the North should be-
come feasible. However, although there is
some contact between the members of fam-
ilies split between the North and the South,
this relationship appears to have little politi-
cal significance. The ROK is known to have
penetrations into North Korea, but there is no
evidence that there has been contact with
potential resistance groups in the North,
much less any support to them.
REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE
16. The North Korean security apparatus,
under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, com-
prises, in addition to its administrative per-
sonnel, political police, security guards, border
and railroad constabulary police, and regular
constabulary police. Through strict controls
on speech, press and radio listening, and
through constant local surveillance, the re-
gime keeps alert to any indication of dissen-
sion. Travel controls are very thorough, espe-
cially in Kaesong and the rest of the area
adjacent to the Demilitarized Zone. Rela-
tives of persons who have gone to South Korea
are particularly watched and discriminated
against. There has been considerable reloca-
tion of persons resident in Kaesong and other
areas of unrest. Families of medical students
who participated in the Hungarian uprising
are reported to have been imprisoned.
CAPABILITY OF THE REGIME TO SUPPRESS
REVOLT
17. Although the majority of North Koreans
probably dislike the regime and respond
apathetically to its demands and appeals, they
are effectively controlled by the Soviet-trained
security apparatus and by the omnipresent
cadres of the Korean Labor Party. There is
every reason to believe that the regime would
be capable of suppressing opposition from any
internal quarter without Soviet or Chinese
Communist aid.
18. Security controls which had been intensi-
fied at the time of the Armistice in July 1953
were made more rigid at the time of the Hun-
garian revolt. The number of security guard
forces has been sizably increased, particularly
in the border and port areas, in the interests
of even stricter travel control. No popular
reaction has been reported, though there prob-
ably is a greater feeling of intimidation. In
addition there has been an increase of marine
patrolling of the coast during the last year.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS
OF PEACE
19. Assuming continuation of the armistice,
resistance in North Korea is unlikely to be of
much significance. At best it may provide a
limited source of intelligence. Organized re-
sistance groups apparently have been unable
to sustain operations against the regime and
have little prospect of greater success in the
future. Unorganized passive resistance may
increase in the future if the economic burden
on individual North Koreans increases or if
security controls are relaxed. A substantial
improvement in the standard of living
throughout North Korea would probably re-
duce dissension significantly. Barring re-
sumption of hostilities in Korea, however, dis-
sension is generally unlikely to be translated
into active resistance.
20. Prolonged and open unrest within the
USSR, presaging a weakening in the Soviet
system, would undoubtedly have a profound
effect on North Korea, should such events
become known by any sizeable number of peo-
ple. Moreover, the existence of anti-Soviet,
pro-Communist Chinese elements has been
confirmed, and the historical evidence of
Korean inclination toward China is strong
enough to suggest that a switch from policies
supporting the USSR to those favoring Corn-
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munist China might occur. Such an event
however, would probably not mean a very
marked departure from the present state of
affairs and it is highly unlikely that any pro-
ROK or US group would be able to exert any
significant influence.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR
21. Under conditions of open war, North
Korean resistance potential would probably
increase somewhat but would still be limited
to isolated instances of sabotage, some passive
resistance defections, assistance to anti-Com-
munist personnel in escape and evasion opera-
tions, and some intelligence collection. Mili-
tary action by resistance elements without
external support would be virtually impossi-
ble. Increased domestic security measures
and external bloc support for the regime
would make organized resistance highly un-
likely except immediately in front of advanc-
ing non-Communist forces. Nor could North
Korean troops be counted on to defect since
they are considered politically reliable.
22. The circumstances surrounding the initi-
ation of hostilities would have little effect on
resistance potential. The same is true of the
use of tactical nuclear weapons against
selected targets. However, if large-scale nu-
clear warfare were used, the possibilities of
effective resistance would be negligible.
23. The nationality of any Free World forces
would not matter provided that no Japanese
forces were employed. If a US-type military
government were instituted by occupation
forces, staffed by ROK personnel and receiv-
ing Western support and guidance, most
North Koreans would probably accept it and
resistance in areas still under Communist
control might be stimulated.
24. The aspirations of individual resistance
factions for post-war leadership probably
would not be of great significance.
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ANNEX H?NORTH VIETNAM
BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE
1. Economic pressures are probably a major
factor in creating dissidence in the Commu-
nist "Democratic Republic of Vietnam" (DRV,
North Vietnam). The levies, regulations, and
controls of the regime impose a heavy burden
on the population, especially when compared
with economic measures in South Vietnam.
Agricultural taxes, principally a levy of about
40 percent of paddy yields, deprive peasants
of almost all surplus output, while local mer-
chants face stiff taxes calculated to prevent
the accumulation of wealth. In addition, the
dearth of trained technicians of all kinds,
bureaucratic unwieldiness, and the disruption
of normal trade channels have tended to
hamper economic growth. Living standards
although slightly improved since the signing
of the Geneva Agreements are still low; rice
yields are poor; and population pressures are
great. Other important factors in the crea-
tion of resentment are the regime's rigid
police-state restrictions; the bloodshed and
personal hardships in the rural areas, caused
by the regime's agrarian reform policies dur-
ing the past three years; its continued use of
terroristic methods; its persecution of cer-
tain socio-economic, minority, and religious
groups; its disruption of the traditionally
strong family ties of the Vietnamese; and the
influence in the DRV of the Chinese, who have
long been feared and disliked in Vietnam.
2. Generally, the popular appeal of the re-
gime, following the military victory over the
French and the 1954 Geneva Agreements, has
diminished in recent years largely for the rea-
sons mentioned above. The inherently re-
pressive nature of the Communist regime has
become increasingly clear to the Vietnamese
public since Geneva, and this revelation prob-
ably has shaken the allegiance of many of its
supporters. The steady consolidation of Pres-
ident Ngo Dinh Diem's anti-Communist gov-
ernment in South Vietnam, where levies, reg-
ulations, and controls are less stringent than
in the North, has provided an irritating con-
trast to the North Vietnamese regime for the
allegiance of its citizens. To combat this com-
petition, the DRV seeks to direct popular re-
sentment against Diem's government, which
it portrays as an American puppet, and
against the United States itself, which it
claims has taken over France's colonialist
aspirations in the area, is perpetuating the
division of the country, and is responsible for
most of the area's economic difficulties.
MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS
3. Catholics. The estimated 700,000 Cath-
olics in the DRV (roughly six percent of the
population) probably constitute the largest
single concentration of actual or potential
dissidents in the country. The general hos-
tility of Vietnamese Catholics to Communist
rule has been demonstrated on several occa-
sions. Soon after the division of Vietnam in
mid-1954, for example, about 700,000 Catho-
lics from North Vietnam sought refuge in
South Vietnam. More recently, the fact that
the November 1956 uprisings in Nghe An
Province occurred in primarily Catholic vil-
lages indicates that those who remained be-
hind ar'e far from reconciled to the DRV re-
gime. Catholic dissatisfaction with the DRV's
treatment of the church has been stimulated
by the contrast with the favored position the
church occupies in South Vietnam, where
Diem and many other leaders are devout
Catholics. Nevertheless, church leaders in the
north have not encouraged overt resistance to
the regime, evidently an effort to ensure the
church's survival. Although they have re-
sisted DRV encroachments upon the church's
prerogatives, they apparently have sought to
avoid openly hostile acts that presumably
would result in even more stringent DRV con-
trol measures.
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4. Tribal Minorities. The Vietnamese have
traditionally disdained the tribal minorities
who, for their part, fear and dislike the Viet-
namese. Approximately 900,000 tribal minor-
ity peoples in North Vietnam are acknowl-
edged by the regime to be a source of disaffec-
tion. Made up of a variety of groups such as
the Tho, Nung, White and Black Thai, Muong,
Meo, and Man, they are located chiefly in up-
land and mountainous regions in the northern
part of North Vietnam and along the western
boundary with Laos. DRV authorities have
placed tight restrictions on entry into and
egress from many of these areas, while they
have sought to bring the tribes under control
by a combination of force and persuasion.
Communist cadres assigned to these areas
have often increased tribal hostility, accord-
ing to some reports, by disregarding tribal
hierarchies and customs. The tribal peoples,
however, are disunited, and lack modern
weapons.
5. The Peasantry. Many of the peasants
(who make up perhaps 90 percent of the pop-
ulation) feel dissatisfied with the regime, par-
ticularly as a result of the DRV's agrarian re-
form program during the past three years.
Since mid-1956 there has been extensive criti-
cism in DRV media of the agrarian reform
cadres for arousing popular resentment, im-
pairing the Lao Dong Communist Party's
foundations, and causing tension in the coun-
tryside. Regime attempts to correct the mis-
takes have generally not been successful, how-
ever. While present resistance has occasion-
ally taken the form of violence, apparently
spontaneous and unorganized, in most cases
rural dissidence seems to have been expressed
by failure to respond to the regime's agrarian
program or by general apathy. Fear and
hopelessness appear to characterize the peas-
ant's outlook, and deliberate efforts to sabo-
tage DRV policies are rarely made.
6. Intellectuals. There are indications that
some dissidence exists among intellectuals. in
North Vietnam, especially those who were
French-educated and French oriented. Dur-
ing the latter half of 1956, the regime, copying
the Soviet pattern of admitting errors and
adopting a "liberalized" policy to correct the
errors, somewhat relaxed its censorship and
allowed criticism of DRV policy in various
newspapers. These papers, non-Party but
still supporters of the regime, quickly ex-
ceeded the acceptable limits of criticism and
were suspended in mid-December 1956. None-
theless, the rapidity with which some intellec-
tuals responded to this one opportunity to air
their grievances is an indication that the re-
gime's efforts to win over this group have not
been wholly successful.
7. Landlords and Merchants constitute ele-
ments of dissidence on an individual basis,
but they have not been nor are they likely to
become leaders of effective resistance. Mer-
chants, reportedly engaged in extensive
hoarding, speculation, and tax evasion, are
contributing to the regime's poor economic
situation.
INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE
8. Although there have been widespread indi-
cations of dissidence, the North Vietnamese
generally do not seem to feel impelled to active
resistance. Few have ever known anything
other than marginal living standards, author-
itarian government, and insecurity; they also
are extremely war-weary following the years
of fighting in the area. Accordingly they
seem to possess a large capacity for enduring
privation and repression, and many have be-
come apathetic. Moreover, the strength of
the regime's control apparatus and the gen-
eral lack of a means for armed resistance pre-
sumably make potential resistance elements
even more discreet. Outbreaks of violence
that have occurred appear to have been local-
ized, unpremeditated and unorganized flare-
ups.
9. Most dissidence in North Vietnam seems
directed primarily at the DRV regime itself.
Catholic dissidence and resistance activity
probably is directed at Communism per se,
although the distinction between the regime
and the ruling ideology probably is not sharp-
ly drawn. There have been no reports of any
ill will directed specifically against Soviet or
Chinese Communist influence, even though
fear and dislike of the Chinese people prob-
ably provides a supplementary motivation for
resistance.
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10. There does not seem to have been any ma-
terial change in the basis and intensity of dis-
sidence in North Vietnam as a result of new
Soviet policies adopted after Stalin's death.
The 20th Soviet Party congress, the disorders
in Poland and Hungary, and the appearance
of ideological differences and factionalism
within other Communist parties do not seem
to have had any lasting impact on DRV Party
and government circles.
RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE
11. From the time of Stalin's death to the
signing of the Geneva Agreements about 16
months later, most if not all organized resist-
ance activity in North Vietnam involved
groups associated with the French and Viet-
namese forces engaged in hostilities with the
Viet Minh. After the Geneva Agreements,
however, most of these groups either withdrew
from DRV territory or were rendered virtually
impotent by DRV control measures. Fairly
continuous but minor conflicts seem to have
occurred between small groups of tribal
minorities and DRV forces in the areas now
known as the Thai-Meo Autonomous Zone,
Viet Bac Autonomous Zone, and the North-
east Zone. Vietnamese Catholics seem to have
played a prominent role in numerous local
anti-regime disturbances during the last half
of 1956 and the first half of 1957. The most
publicized and probably most severe outbreaks
of resistance were those tliat occurred in Nghe
An Province in November 1956. Although
this uprising was followed later by scattered
anti-regime disturbances in other localities,
no general resistance movement evolved.
12. No reliable information is available con-
cerning any organized resistance groups that
may now be operating in North Vietnam.
Presumably some members of Catholic lay
organizations which existed in North and
Central Vietnam prior to the Geneva Agree-
ments have remained. These organizations,
such as the Catholic Socialist Party (Dang
Xa Hoi Cong Giao), the Youth Movement for
Devotion to the Country (Thank Nien Phung
Su Quoc Gia), and the Catholic militia, which
prior to 1954 included about 11,000 members,
might constitute a structural basis for organ-
ized resistance activities among the Catholic
minority. It is possible also that small rem-
nants of several anti-DRV political parties and
labor groups ? notably the Nationalist Party
of Greater Vietnam (Dai Viet Quoc Dan
Dang), the Vietnam Nationalist Party (Viet
Nam Quoc Dan Dang), and the Vietnamese
Confederation of Christian Workers ? which
were active in North and north-central Viet-
nam before 1954 probably are still located in
those regions, and retain some subversive
potential.
13. Potential resistance groups constitute
less than ten percent of the DRV's total popu-
lation, and clearly lack the capacity to initiate
successful, organized, active resistance. Most
unorganized resistance is of a passive char-
acter extending from criticism of the regime
by intellectuals to apathy and failure to ac-
tively support the regime by peasants. Pas-
sive resistance against the regime's agrarian
policies will probably continue to impede Com-
munist goals. There have been recent reports
of expressions of discontent among industrial
workers over low wages and excessively high
work norms. Dissatisfaction also exists
among all classes of the population with con-
sumer goods shortages, the Communist eco-
nomic control system, and the 30 days com-
pulsory labor levy for all able bodied adults.
ROLE OF EMIGRES
14. Despite the border controls of the regime
and its efforts to patrol a rugged and sparsely
populated border area, considerable numbers
of persons cross the borders, including some
who are allowed to smuggle certain needed
goods. A steady trickle of refugees continues
to reach the South from the Catholic areas in
North and northern Central Vietnam, and it
may be assumed there is considerable contact
between the Catholic refugees in South Viet-
nam and their families and compatriots in
the North. There is no evidence, however,
that guidance and assistance are at present
being offered by Catholics in the South to any
resistance groups in the North. There are
known to be contacts by South Vietnamese
government services with individuals in the
denied areas in the North, but there is no evi-
dence that aid or guidance is being given to
resistance groups there.
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REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE
15. The DRV regime has foreseen most actual
and potential centers of resistance, and has
adjusted its counter-subversion tactics in or-
der to meet the individual requirements of
each resistance center. The "People's Army
of Vietnam," one of the regime's major instru-
ments for suppressing resistance, now con-
sists of 268,000 well-organized and mobile reg-
ular troops. In addition, forces designed spe-
cifically for internal security, under the con-
trol of the regular army, include 38,000 re-
gional forces responsible for provincial secu-
rity, and a local militia, numbering 75,000
responsible for local security. Border secu-
rity regiments of the regular army along the
Laotian border and along the demilitarized
zone above the 17th parallel are known to
have security responsibilities.
16. The DRV maintains strict controls over
travel, documentation, press, radio and other
media of expression. Party penetration of all
mass organizations, social, and religious
groups enables the regime to keep informed
of the acts and attitudes of Vietnamese on all
levels of society. With respect to the ethnic
minorities, the DRV utilizes the system of
penetration by Communist cadres of the same
ethnic stock and background. There is some
evidence to indicate that the regime has made
use of Chinese Communist cadre-training cen-
ters in the Kunming area in Communist
China for its work among minority tribal
groups. It has also established a large school
in Hanoi for giving instruction and indoc-
trination to promising members of ethnic
minorities. An over-all literacy program has
been started, both in tribal dialects and in
Vietnamese, which incidentally make propa-
ganda and organization controls more effec-
tive.
CAPABILITY OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS
REVOLT
17. As long as the regime's leadership remains
united and determined to check dissidence, it
will be extremely difficult for future resistance
to become organized and to grow in force and
importance. Insofar as is known, actual or
potential resistance groups are not united and
have no background of common action against
the Communists; their interests (except for
their anti-regime outlook) do not coincide;
and they have little power. Moreover, through
its security and surveillance systems, the DRV
is capable of effectively controlling whatever
sporadic resistance activity arises in either
Vietnamese or ethnic minority areas. Al-
though some sympathy reportedly was shown
by army troops to the resisting villagers at the
time of the Nghe An uprising, the military
forces are believed loyal to the regime.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS
OF PEACE
18. At this time, it seems unlikely that organ-
ized or unorganized resistance to the regime
will attain sufficient magnitude or intensity
to impede seriously the realization of its fore-
most goals. The DRV has firm control of its
security forces and can throttle any serious
internal threat to its existence. Although
some small and independent guerrilla bands
may exist in the remote areas of North Viet-
nam where control is extremely difficult, there
is little likelihood that an amalgamation of
the various dissident groups could result.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR
19. If hostilities were taking place outside
Vietnam, the resistance potential within the
DRV will probably increase, but only by minor
proportions. It would probably be limited to
annoying acts of sabotage, intelligence collec-
tion, and assistance to anti-Communist per-
sonnel in various forms. Independent mili-
tary action without external support would
probably be suicidal for anti-regime elements
unless the DRV security apparatus were
greatly weakened.
20. In the event of hostilities within North
Vietnamese territory, resistance activity
would probably assume more serious propor-
tions, especially if external assistance and
encouragement were provided. Assistance to
attacking forces would most likely take the
form of sporadic uprisings which, however,
would have little chance of becoming nation-
wide in scope because of the extremely poor
communications. Aid in escape and evasion
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operations could be expected throughout most
of rural Vietnam. Assistance would be great-
est in the southern areas, among indigenous
Catholic groups, and among other minorities,
particularly the Meos. Resistance forces, al-
though small and un-coordinated, would still
be able to disrupt and reduce the over-all
strength of the regime. The intensity of
active local resistance generally would depend
on the success of local military action by
attacking forces.
21. The nationality of attacking forces would
probably influence the willingness of resist-
ance groups to act. Tribal groups which have
been helped by the French for many years
would be most receptive to French invaders.
Vietnamese would prefer to aid other Viet-
namese the most and the French the least.
Participation of Nationalist Chinese might
seriously jeopardize resistance and create an-
tagonism toward the occupation.
22. A military government administered by
Vietnamese in ethnic Vietnamese areas would
probably have a salutary effect on resistance
activities. A French occupation would be dis-
trusted by the majority of the Vietnamese peo-
ple, and would adversely affect anti-Commu-
nist partisan warfare. The occupation poli-
cies of the attacking forces would affect con-
tinued resistance capabilities. However, any
occupation government of long duration, ad-
ministered and controlled by other than Viet-
namese, would probably be unpopular with
the people of the occupied area.
23. The circumstances surrounding the initi-
ation of hostilities would have little effect on
resistance potential. The same is true of the
use of tactical nuclear weapons against
selected targets. However, in case of large-
scale nuclear warfare, the possibilities of effec-
tive resistance would be negligible.
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ANNEX I - POLAND
PREAMBLE
1. Events of 1956 have made the pattern of
dissidence and resistance in Poland far more
complex than that in the other Eastern Euro-
pean satellite nations. There are anti-Com-
munists who do not oppose Gomulka; within
the Party there are Communists who do. The
population is basically anti-Communist and
anti-Russian, yet it tolerates Gomulka be-
cause other possibilities look even less attrac-
tive. The Roman Catholic Church is basically
anti-Communist, but Cardinal Wyszynski sup-
ports Gomulka's appeals for sobriety, hard
work, and the nationalist aspects of his poli-
cies. Stalinist elements within the Party are
die-hard orthodox Communists, yet they use
every means to tear Party control away from
Gomulka. "Revisionists" within the Party
swear fealty to Marxism, but they resist
Gomulka's narrow definition of the "Polish
road to Socialism." In short, Poland is a con-
geries of dissident elements held together by
strong nationalist sentiments, bitter memories
of Soviet destruction of Hungarian freedom,
the Roman Catholic religion, and the strong
personalities of Wladyslaw Gomulka and
Cardinal Wyszynski.
BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE
2. Despite Gomulka's successes in eliminat-
ing many sources of dissidence, a number of
factors still operate to build popular dissatis-
faction. The most important of these is the
failure of the regime to fulfill the hopes placed
in it in October 1956. The population as a
whole has been disappointed that there has
been no automatic improvement in the stand-
ard of living. Workers especially have been
shaken by the cold realities of the post-
October economic situation, and the more
politically minded among them are dissatis-
fied that workers' councils failed to become
real instruments of worker control of industry.
Writers, journalists, intellectuals, and stu-
dents have been disillusioned to find the per-
missible bounds of freedom of expression to be
narrower than they had hoped.
3. The Gomulka regime's policies themselves
have created additional sources of dissidence.
The reduction of the governmental and Party
bureaucracies has created a new source of dis-
sidence among former bureaucrats who have
been forced to make radical readjustments in
their personal lives as a consequence of the
loss of their economic and social position.
Encouragement of private handicraft indus-
tries as part of the program designed to ex-
pand consumers' goods production and the
encouragement of private shops in trade and
services to supplement the existing socialist
network have stimulated black marketing,
profiteering, and speculation and corruption.
This in turn has led to the growth of a class
of "new rich," who have aroused the enmity
of the authorities and of a considerable por-
tion of the population. In the former Ger-
man territories now under Polish control, re-
gime suspicions toward and the previous
regime's discrimination against the indig-
enous population have created a considerable
degree of resentment among the people who
resided in these areas before World War II,
as well as among the remnants of the former
German population.
4. Given the basically anti-Communist and
anti-Soviet attitude of the population, dissi-
dence is to be found in every element in Polish
society. Although Gomulka has considerable
personal popularity, he has been unable to
transfer this popularity to the Party he heads
and the system he represents.
MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS
5. Peasants, although appreciative of the
gains they have made under Gomulka, remain
hostile to the regime's long-term objective of
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reconstructing agriculture on socialist lines,
and also to the continuation of compulsory
deliveries, no matter how low the delivery
quotas. The influence of the Church is espe-
cially strong in the countryside and helps to
deepen the peasants' distrust of Communist
policies and objectives. The revival of anti-
Communist influences within the ranks of the
United Peasant Party (ZSL) has become a
matter of major concern both to the leader-
ship of the ZSL and that of the Polish United
Workers' (Communist) Party (PZPR).
6. Industrial workers have expressed dissi-
dence in a series of strikes and threats to
strike which have been a feature of Polish life
ever since Gomulka's return to power. Al-
though none of these labor conflicts has had
the political implications of the pre-Gomulka
outbreak in Poznan, they do represent an
open expression of dissatisfaction with the
regime's wage policy. The outbreaks against
civil authority which have become character-
istic of Polish life since Gomulka's return,
seem to draw considerable strength from the
ranks of young unskilled or semiskilled work-
ers. These people find that a tangle with the
police affords them an opportunity to express
their amorphous protests against the regime
in general as well as a chance to express their
contempt for the police. Special groups of
workers who have suffered loss of employment
or loss of status as the result of Gomulka poli-
cies are particularly agitated.
7. Among intellectuals, dissidence arises out
of the regime's efforts to gradually but firmly
reduce the limited freedom of expression
which, for a short time, had been permitted
to contribute materially to the 1956 changes
in Polish politics. The increasing strictness
of controls over the press has heightened dis-
satisfaction among the writers and journalists
who played an important role in the upheaval
of 1956 and their aftermath and whose strong
opposition to the USSR and the Soviet system
of pre-Gomulka days was matched only by the
Hungarian intellectuals. But while the latter
have been suppressed, the Polish intellectuals
continue, within increasingly narrow confines,
to militate against the imposition of increas-
ing limits on the freedom of expression.
8. Closely associated with this group are the
students who broke from the Communist fold
in October 1956 and are especially resentful of
any attempt to force them back into it. The
inability of the Gomulka regime to create a
viable successor to the Polish Youth Union,
which folded up under the impact of the
events of October 1956, is a striking commen-
tary on the regime's failure to command the
confidence of Polish youth. Likewise, the
riots in Warsaw at the beginning of October
1957, which started as a student protest
against the suppression of the influential stu-
dent paper Po Prostu, indicated how tenuous
are the ties of loyalty which bind the students
to the regime.
9. In addition to the Gomulka faction, there
are elements in the Party which aspire to an
even greater degree of independence from the
Soviet Union than Gomulka has achieved and
others which desire a return to sterner and
more far-reaching Party control over all
phases of Polish life. The first group ? the
"revisionists" ? for the most part are intel-
lectuals, while the latter group ? the "dog-
matists" ? for the most part are old-line
Party workers of long experience. The "revi-
sionists" have no real organizational base but
find their strength in a communion of ideas
with the larger group of intellectuals, journal-
ists, and students. The "dogmatists," on the
other hand, have no popular support, but find
strength in the cohesion which springs from
long-term service in and familiarity with the
Party organization. For a time after the re-
turn of Gomulka they had the added material
advantage (but popular disadvantage) of
open Soviet support.
10. The Roman Catholic Church, although
not a political organization, is entitled to con-
sideration as the only organized anti-Com-
munist resistance group in the country: its
ideology and basic objectives are opposed to
those espoused by the Party and it has broadly
based popular support and a disciplined,
trained organization. It is true that the
modus vivendi of December 7, 1956 formally
ended a long period of outright political war-
fare and intimidation directed by the Party
against the Church. The Church has in com-
mon with the Party the aim of defending
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Poland's national sovereignty and Poland's
claim to former German territories now under
its control. Nonetheless, Church-State rela-
tions have continued to be marked by conflicts
of interest, though for the most part these
have been kept within negotiable limits and
have been threshed out by a joint Church-
government commission which meets regu-
larly.
11. Armed Forces. The army generally re-
flects the discontent pattern of the population,
although on a lesser scale. The army's mo-
rale and loyalty to the regime considerably ex-
ceed those of the populace at large, and there
is no evidence of any focus of anti-regime
attitudes. On the other hand, there is in the
Polish armed forces, as in any group of Poles,
a significant potential for resistance. Under
present conditions, this potential cannot be
realized. In the first place, the military lead-
ers are loyal to the regime; secondly, the orig-
inal enthusiasm for Gomulka's "independ-
ence" from the Kremlin has not entirely dis-
sipated. Further, the military rank and file
are better housed, clothed, and fed than their
civilian counterparts and are kept busy with
disciplined activity. Polish troops would prob-
ably obey orders and a civil revolt against the
present regime could not be expected to re-
ceive much support from the army if such a
revolt remained localized. If Soviet forces
sided with Gomulka in quelling any type of
general hostilities, the army would probably
not fight in an effective unified manner on
the side of the Gomulka regime. On the other
hand, were the Gomulka regime to oppose
Soviet military forces on any issue, the Polish
military would side with the regime against
the Soviets as an effective unified army.
INTENSITY AND TARGETS OF DISSIDENCE
12. The high level of dissidence in Poland
which gave rise to the Poznan riots of June
1956 and led to Gomulka's return to power in
October has been considerably reduced by the
regime's efforts to eliminate some of the prin-
cipal sources of dissatisfaction, and by its
ability to make common cause with dissident
elements in appeals to Polish national feel-
ings. In contrast to the pre-Gomulka period,
when the dissidence of the Polish population
77
focused on the Communist regime, the ubiq-
uitous symbols of Soviet oppression, and the
hated secret police, there are no comparable
focal points today. However, the poor eco-
nomic conditions will probably persist in the
foreseeable future and remain a source of
deep-seated dissatisfaction which may give
rise to acts of resistance. Unless the regime
uses increasingly forceful measures of repres-
sion, the intensity of dissidence is not now
sufficiently high to provide a favorable setting
for resistance activity.
13. Given the absence of a broad popular set-
ting for resistance activity in Poland, it is not
strange that the most effective organized re-
sistance operating there today takes a some-
what different form than that found else-
where in Eastern Europe. The Roman Cath-
olic Church expresses its resistance for the
most part at the conference table of the joint
Church-government commission. Its princi-
pal target is the regime, from which it seeks
constantly to obtain more concessions or
better performance on concessions already
granted. In these negotiations the Church
has consistently played an aggressive role
while the government has been defending its
positions. Within the Party, the most syste-
matic organized resistance has been offered
by the Stalinists ("dogmatists") , who have
consistently opposed the Gomulka program.
Their target is Gomulka and their objective
is to obtain control of the Party in order to
return to Stalinist policies once again. The
"revisionists" in the Party are opposed to a
return to repressive measures characteristic of
the Stalinist era. Consequently, they oppose
primarily the Stalinists in the Party but they
also oppose all evidence of Stalinism which
they see in the Gomulka program.
TRENDS OF DISSIDENCE SINCE 1953
14. The death of Stalin in 1953, the fall of
Beriya and the reorganization of the Polish
police system in 1954 signaled the beginning
of the "thaw." From 1954 to October 1956,
dissidence became most marked among intel-
lectuals in general and Party intellectuals in
particular. The regime's rigidity in cultural
matters and the continued suppression of civil
liberties became the specific targets of open
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criticism. Moreover, the Party's "central ac-
tive," consisting of more than 200 of the most
active political workers in the Party appa-
ratus, showed signs of dissidence. Growing
relaxation in Polish life served to increase
rather than diminish dissidence among intel-
lectuals and Party apparatchiks. The rever-
berations of the 20th Party Congress of the
CPSU further intensified dissidence within the
Party, while a decrease of police terror per-
mitted the open manifestation of popular
opposition to regime policies in the Poznan
uprisings of June 1956. The extent of dissi-
dence by elements upon which the regime was
supposedly based paralyzed its power of de-
cision and prepared the ground for the funda-
mental changes within the regime which took
place in October 1956.
15. During his first year in power, Gomulka
succeeded in reducing both the basis for and
the intensity of dissidence in Poland. He did
this by: (1) eliminating terror as an instru-
ment of public policy and substantially reduc-
ing the size and authority of the security
police; (2) reducing the size of the govern-
ment and Party bureaucracy; (3) ceasing
political warfare against the Church and
reaching a modus vivendi with it; (4) permit-
ting the decollectivization of agriculture; (5)
eliminating from political life those personali-
ties like Marshal Rokossovsky who were the
most glaring symbols of Soviet domination
and reducing the influence of those Polish
Communist leaders most subservient to the
Soviet Union; (6) restoring to public life
many persons who suffered from Soviet-
imposed tyranny; (7) achieving Soviet recog-
nition of Polish sovereignty and a degree of
amelioration of Polish grievances; (8) recog-
nizing the bankruptcy of the economic policy
followed since 1950 and starting to rectify
past errors.
RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE
(a) Organized
16. Although the existence of small, isolated
resistance groups is acknowledged by the re-
gime from time to time, there have been no
known significant anti-Communist organized
political resistance groups operating in
Poland since the death of Stalin. In a number
of cases such groups appear to be organized by
people associated with World War II non-
Communist and anti-Communist under-
ground organizations. They are small and
uncoordinated. While they have an anti-
Communist orientation, their objectives can-
not be precisely defined. Their activities ap-
pear to consist largely of the printing and dis-
tribution of anti-regime propaganda or the
conducting of campaigns of intimidation di-
rected against specific local Party function-
aries. Many of these organizations appear to
be on the borderline between organized and
unorganized resistance and many are proba-
bly no more than just criminal gangs.
17. Within the Party itself the Stalinist fac-
tion has a sufficient degree of cohesiveness
and community of purpose to be viewed as an
organized resistance group in the sense that
it is opposed to the Gomulka program. The
revisionist "faction" has no organization, nor
any clearly defined program, but it acts
within the Party as a pressure group for fur-
ther liberalization, currently opposing curtail-
ment of liberties already conceded or granted.
The basic conflict within the Party is not be-
tween these two extremes but rather between
the Stalinists who favor subservience to the
USSR and the rest of the Party which favors
Polish sovereignty. Among the elements
favoring national sovereignty, the revisionists
are those least concerned with its realistic
limits, while the elements surrounding Go-
mulka are most anxious not to exceed them.
Gornulka's efforts to take this conflict out of
the limelight ? where it has been since the
Central Committee's Seventh Plenum (July
1956) ? first by appeals to Party unity and,
more recently, by threats of expulsion, have
so far failed.
18. Within the ranks of the regime-allied
United Peasant Party (ZSL) there is a similar
conflict between those who support the PZPR
and those who wish the ZSL to pursue an in-
dependent course responsive to peasant
wishes. It is not clear whether the dissidents
have enough organizational strength to con-
stitute an organized resistance group. The
scanty evidence available indicates that they
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do control the local organization in some
localities; but their activity appears to be
along the lines of unorganized resistance
which operates to lower the efficiency of the
ZSL in cooperating with the PZPR.
(b) Unorganized
19. There have been some manifestations of
dissidence since Gomulka assumed power.
Their significance in terms of resistance po-
tential varies considerably. In most cases, it
would be difficult to ascribe these disorders as
indicators of political resistance. For exam-
ple, the widespread existence in Poland of
alcoholism, "hooliganism," bribery, stealing in
industrial plants, and other forms of corrup-
tion is for the most part not politically moti-
vated, and it is questionable whether they can
be regarded as indicators of dissidence even
though they might unintentionally spark new
disturbances. Even the riots following the
suspension of the newspaper Po Prostu in
early October 1957, though politically moti-
vated, were not an impressive showing of stu-
dent dissidence: only 3-4,000 of the 28,000
Warsaw students participated the first two
nights, leaving the field to the police and
rowdies the following nights.
20. The relaxation of restrictions on travel to
the West has given Poles some opportunity to
engage in unorganized resistance by collect-
ing and transmitting intelligence material or
by defecting to the West. Defection, with
subsequent cooperation with foreign intelli-
gence organizations, has been the most com-
mon form of unorganized resistance utilized.
Polish officials have seized the opportunity to
defect while abroad on official business; Polish
seamen and fishermen, air force members, and
members of civilian flying clubs have utilized
the opportunities open to them to defect;
other Poles continue to leave Poland illegally
by crossing into East Germany and thence in-
to West Berlin; and, finally, slightly over one
percent of Polish tourists who visited Western
Europe during 1957 failed to return home.
21. General relaxation after years of police
repression has served to increase greatly in-
stances of localized, unorganized, and gener-
79
ally non-political attacks upon civil authori-
ties. At the same time the marked improve-
ment, mainly political in nature, on the Polish
scene has decreased the intensity of dissidence
and has deprived it of clear cut focuses with
nationwide applicability. The surprising de-
gree of realism recently shown by the Poles in
judging their country's precarious position
has served to blunt the stimulus for resist-
ance.
ROLE OF EMIGRES
22. Emigre groups have played no significant
role in guiding or assisting resistance activi-
ties in Poland. Although some emigre groups
do encourage defection and resistance, there
is no evidence by which their efficacy can be
judged. Even prior to the reinstatement of
Gomulka there was no known contact be-
tween Polish emigre elements in the West and
Polish resistance groups in Poland. Moreover,
then as now, Poles in Poland reportedly feel
that the majority of emigres are out of touch
with them and neither know nor represent the
true sentiment of the Polish people. Events
since the Poznan uprising probably have rein-
forced this conviction. Even anti-Commu-
nists in Poland are believed to give little sup-
port to the idea of a future government com-
posed of present Polish emigre leaders.
REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE
23. In the pre-Gomulka period the Commu-
nist regime in Poland relied mainly upon the
use of repression and terror to prevent resist-
ance. Since the advent of Gomulka, the re-
gime has sought to inhibit resistance by elim-
inating or reducing some of the more impor-
tant causes of dissidence and by handling
grievances in such a way as to avoid provoking
open political resistance. In handling civil
disturbances, the regime has used whatever
firmness has been necessary to maintain its
authority without employing measures which
would inflame the population. The security
apparatus, although reduced in size and influ-
ence and deprived of its resort to terror, still
functions to inhibit the development of re-
sistance activities. It is estimated at 160,000,
including the ordinary police, the militarized
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security forces, and the military security
police, as well as 65,000 internal security
agents. These forces are considered to be
quite efficient.
CAPABILITY OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS
REVOLT
24. The regime has shown that it is capable
of maintaining its authority in the face of civil
disturbances uncomplicated by political over-
tones, or in the face of disturbances in which
political considerations are relatively minor.
It could probably suppress a revolt if it were
localized and could be dealt with decisively
within a few days. Moreover, with the two
Soviet line divisions in Poland and many more
posed along the frontiers, Soviet intervention
may be expected if the regime seemed to be
unable to cope with a large-scale uprising.
This very fact, of which most Poles are aware,
would act as a powerful deterrent so that only
in extraordinary circumstances, such as can-
not now be foreseen, would large-scale upris-
ings (throughout Poland) be expected.
MODIFICATION OF SECURITY APPARATUS
25. A general realignment of security func-
tions started shortly after the period marked
by Stalin's death, Beriya's execution, and the
disclosures of Jozef Swiatlo, a former Deputy
Director of Department X of the defunct Min-
istry of Public Security (MBP) . Since Go-
mulka's return to power, the regime has made
concessions to popular feelings through addi-
tional changes in organization, personnel, and
nomenclature within the security apparatus.
The MBP was dissolved in late 1954. In No-
vember of 1956 its successor, the Committee
for Public Security (KBP) , was also dissolved
and its duties of protecting the state from
espionage and terrorist activities were as-
signed to the Ministry of Internal Affairs
(MSW) . Departments of the former secret
police (UB) which had been responsible for
foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and
internal activities, were probably transferred
to the MSW. Other UB departments were dis-
solved and many former UB employees were
transferred to training programs designed to
equip them for work in other fields. Local
units of the People's Militia were given re-
sponsibility for the few remaining functions
of the secret police.
26. The overhauling of the security apparatus
following the events of October 1956 consid-
erably increased the possibility for the expres-
sion of dissidence. Nevertheless, the arrest in
1957 of Poles serving as agents for British,
French, and American intelligence indicates
that the reformed security apparatus is active
and efficient in its efforts to ferret out and
apprehend individuals and groups seeking to
take advantage of the new situation to engage
in resistance activities. There is no evidence
of any change in popular attitudes toward the
police as a result of the reduction in size and
authority of that arm of the regime.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS
OF PEACE
27. So long as the regime continues its
present policies, the power position of the
USSR remains essentially unchanged, and the
Polish-German frontier problem unsettled, the
development of significant active organized
resistance in Poland is unlikely. In the ab-
sence of a Stalinist-type of repression, dissi-
dence is more likely to express itself in politi-
cal indifference than in organized resistance.
Moreover, the regime's current unwillingness
to engage in open warfare with the Catholic
Church or with its intra-Party opponents
makes it likely that the resistance of these
groups will be conducted on a level that would
exclude massive retaliation by the regime.
Thus, under existing circumstances, it seems
unlikely that there will be any expansion of
the types of organized resistance activity now
existing. It also seems unlikely that there
will be any significant increase in the level of
resistance activity by organized resistance
groups ? i.e., the Church and Party faction-
alists ? which are all operating within self-
imposed limits.
28. The potential for unorganized resistance,
active or passive, is considerably greater than
it was prior to the substantial reduction in the
forces of the security police and the curtail-
ment of their authority. On the other hand,
the incentives to engage in such resistance
have been greatly reduced as the result of
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Gomulka's reforms and by growing apolitism
among all elements of the population. Unor-
ganized resistance is not likely to take on new
forms. Thus, if the regime remains unable to
improve economic conditions, an increase in
the level of intensity of unorganized resist-
ance, in the form of strikes, poor work disci-
pline, theft and corruption, and political non-
conformism or apathy might be expected. If
there were a further tightening of control
measures, resistance activities would probably
be impeded, but dissidence would rise. It
should be noted, however, that current dissi-
dence and the unorganized resistance poten-
tial it represents have circumscribed Go-
mulka's freedom of action in organizing
Poland to serve Communist ends. The danger
to the regime inherent in popular dissidence
has prevented Gomulka from effectively stop-
ping certain unorganized or informally organ-
ized resistance activities, such as strikes,
demonstrations, passing of intelligence infor-
mation to the West, and overt but discreet
anti-Communist propaganda in the press and
by the Church.
29. The effect of an increase in East-West ten-
sions on resistance would depend on the na-
ture of the tensions and the regime's response
to them. If the tensions led to the regime's
acceptance, real or apparent, of a diminution
of Polish independence and a greater degree of
Soviet domination, it is likely that resistance
activities would increase, particularly if com-
bined with an increase of repressive measures
and a return to pre-Gomulka policies. If, how-
ever, the tensions were of such a nature that
Poland's national existence would appear to
depend upon loyalty to the regime, resistance
activities would decline. A general increase in
tensions would probably lead to increased ac-
tivity on the part of the security forces, and,
this, even without the imposition of repressive
measures against the population as a whole,
would probably result in a decline in active
unorganized resistance. A marked decrease
in tensions, on the other hand, achieved by
mutual East-West accommodation, would
probably give the regime greater opportunity
to introduce more flexibility in its policies and
afford greater opportunities for individual un-
organized active resistance to the regime. At
the same time, if a substantial decrease in ten-
sions were accompanied by increasing trade
opportunities and greater ease in obtaining
foreign credits, it could enable the regime to
offer the population some material benefits to
sustain their hopes for a better future. All
these factors would serve to reduce dissidence
and resistance.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR
30. The anti-regime resistance potential in
Poland in time of war would depend upon the
nature of the war. Polish involvement in a
war on the side of the Soviet Union against
the West would be unpopular and would raise
the level of dissidence, especially if the Soviet
Union commenced hostilities and if Polish in-
terests were not directly involved in the con-
flict. However, if hostilities were not begun
by the Soviet Union or if the war seemed to
threaten Poland's independence, sovereignty,
or territorial integrity, the level of dissidence
would in all likelihood decrease, if not cease
altogether. The inclusion of a large number
of German troops in invading forces would
help the regime in that it could reduce dissi-
dence and rally support by equating the Ger-
man forces with Hitler's armies.
31. At the inception of hostilities between
Bloc and non-Bloc states, the regime would
intensify its security controls, but anti-Com-
munists would probably still be able to com-
mit acts of sabotage. Later, if the USSR were
suffering reverses, Polish guerrillas would tie
down some Bloc troops, destroy supply dumps,
disrupt lines of communications, and sabo-
tage industrial and agricultural output. Ef-
forts would also be made to assist the enemy
in evasion and escape activities, and to collect
intelligence which would be useful to non-
Bloc planners. Without outside encourage-
ment, guidance, and material support, how-
ever, they would constitute only a relatively
minor nuisance to the regime.
32. Chances for organized anti-regime resist-
ance would appear to be particularly favorable
if military developments indicated the immi-
nent collapse of Soviet power and the oppor-
tunity were offered for real Polish independ-
ence. Under those circumstances, organized
resistance might consist of independent, local-
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ized attempts to dislodge local Communist
authorities. Efforts of this type would most
likely be made first in villages and country
towns where the authority of the Party is
weakest, and in former German territories
where Western forces might be looked upon as
liberators by the indigenous population.
Whether such resistance activities would lead
to the appearance of a genuine liberation
movement or whether they would merely re-
sult in the total breakdown of law and order
would depend upon the circumstances at the
time. Organized, centrally directed resist-
ance involving military action along the lines
of World War II's Armia Krajowa (AK) is
hardly conceivable unless it were preceded by
a complete breakdown of Polish authority and
a Soviet occupation. Although the actual for-
mation of a centrally directed resistance ac-
tion would seem to be possible only under
special circumstances, the tradition of the AK
would probably continue to be strong in Polish
minds. However, various forms of unorgan-
ized active or passive resistance would appear
to be more likely than organized resistance.
Given factors creating a high level of dissi-
dence, a considerable amount of assistance to
the West might be expected in the production
and distribution of anti-regime propaganda,
the harassment of some especially obnoxious
local regime officials, help in evasion and
escape operations and, to a lesser degree, in
intelligence collection.
33. The Poles are sufficiently sophisticated
militarily and politically to accept the use of
nuclear weapons in future warfare as an in-
evitable reality. If Poland were involved in a
nuclear attack, the people's first reaction
would be determined self-preservation. If use
were made of major nuclear weapons, the re-
sulting mass destruction and dislocation
would virtually eliminate any effective forms
of resistance activity. On the other hand, if
a nuclear attack were so designed as to elim-
inate the major resources of military and
political control strengths, such an attack
would probably be accepted as an unavoidable
cost of liberation, would not necessarily de-
stroy the will to resist, and could present anti-
Communist Poles with an opportunity to take
over control of the country.,
34. Occupation policies of Western forces
would not be a crucial factor affecting resist-
ance potential and capabilities so long as
these policies were pronounced and imple-
mented to respect and aid in the accomplish-
ment of Polish aspirations for freedom, na-
tional independence, and the end of Soviet
domination. Such enlightened occupation
would intensify the Polish desire to be helpful
and stimulate resistance activities in areas of
the country still under Communist control.
35. Fear of Germany has traditionally played
an important role in determining the atti-
tudes of the Polish people. The Poles thus
would be extremely apprehensive over the use
of German forces in Polish territory, as well
as over postwar territorial adjustments vis-a-
vis Germany, and this factor might have a sig-
nificant negative effect on the anti-Soviet re-
sistance effort. However, this effect cannot be
usefully measured at this time since it would
depend on such presently unknown factors as
the nature and degree of the German involve-
ment, the announced war aims of the Western
powers with respect to territorial settlements,
and the over-all military situation. Other-
wise, the nationality of attacking Free World
forces would probably not influence the
willingness of resistance groups to act, nor
would the responsibility for initiation of hos-
tilities greatly affect resistance potential.
The representative of the Assistant Chief of
Staff, Intelligence, Army, would substitute the
following:
"The Poles are sufficiently sophisticated mili-
tarily and politically so that they accept the
use of nuclear weapons in future warfare as an
inevitable reality. If Poland were involved in a
nuclear attack, the people's first reaction would
be determined self-preservation. As coordinated
groups were developed, they probably would take
all possible steps to strengthen their native
government and to eliminate any Stalinist or
authoritarian remnants. Conditioned by their
bitter experience in the 1944 Warsaw uprising
and the immediate postwar resistance period,
however, the Poles probably would not attempt
to initiate independent anti-Soviet military ac-
tion until their forces had received substantial
commitments (in terms of materiel and person-
nel as well as political support) from the West.
The extent of their assistance in these circum-
stances probably would be dependent on the
amount of damage suffered in the nuclear strike."
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ANNEX J - RUMANIA
BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE
1. A basic cause underlying popular discon-
tent in Rumania is the failure of the regime
to improve the people's economic well being.
Soviet economic exploitation in the postwar
period, nationalization of industries, the de-
struction of private trade, economic regimen-
tation, and inefficiency of the state economic
enterprises have reduced large sections of Ru-
mania to a low level of subsistence. The peo-
ple, including workmen in supposedly pros-
perous towns, give every appearance of ex-
treme poverty and gloom. A large part of
the peasantry is dressed in rags. The popula-
tion ascribes the shortages, particularly of
food and fuel which before and even during
World War II were in abundance, to exports
required to meet obligations imposed by the
Soviet Union and to poor planning by the
government. Knowledge that food and fuel
shortages in a country rich in oil, forests, and
agriculture are due to government policy has
further increased the people's resentment of
both the regime and the Soviet Union.
2. The basic political factors in the anti-
regime feelings of the Rumanians stem from
their historical enmity toward Russia and
Communism, their non-Slavic, traditionally
Western orientation, and their disapproval of
a governmental policy which seems counter to
Rumanian aims of national independence, ter-
ritorial integrity, and continuance of Western-
oriented culture. Rumanians have not for-
gotten that the USSR, after World War II, re-
annexed Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia,
drove out the King, and delegated power to a
puppet regime under absolute Soviet control.
Regarding their country as a virtual Soviet
colony, Rumanians have almost certainly
identified Communism with their traditional
fear of Russia. Moreover, individual liberties
have been completely suppressed; the tradi-
tional family patterns have been destroyed;
and village life, around which most social and
political activities evolved in the past, has now
been placed under the control of local Com-
munist functionaries whose chief task is not
to serve the villagers but to carry out the un-
popular program and policies of the regime.
However, despite the strong anti-Communist
feeling of the vast majority of the Rumanian
people, they do not possess an active revolu-
tionary tradition and are generally apathetic
in the face of adversity.
3. The Rumanians have always been a devout
people, considering religious institutions as
playing a major role in their lives. The spir-
itual needs of the people were satisfied by a
large number of churches and monasteries.
The various religious organizations functioned
primarily for the benefit of their followers
rather than of any special political or racial
groupings, and their secular activities were
generally incidental to the fulfillment of their
spiritual aims. Therefore, the transformation
in 1947-48 by the Communist regime of reli-
gious organizations into instruments of sup-
port for its program was a great blow to the
population. Subsequent measures, such as
the complete destruction of the Uniate
Church, and the reduction to virtual inactiv-
ity of the Roman Catholic Church by arrest-
ing nearly all its leading clergy, had a de-
pressing effect on the people.
4. Prior to the advent of the Communist re-
gime in 1945, Rumanian education and cul-
ture were oriented wholly toward the West.
Speaking a predominantly Romance language
and considering themselves modern repre-
sentatives of Latin civilization, the Ruma-
nians looked to the Western countries, partic-
ularly to France, for political, cultural, and
social guidance; the French language, along
with Rumanian, was until the end of World
War II compulsory in the Rumanian schools.
French schools, operated either directly by the
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French Government or by private and reli-
gious institutions from France, were regarded
as the best in the country. However, by 1948
the Rumanian Government had closed all
French and other Western-operated schools
and had taken stringent measures to elim-
iate Western culture from the country, sub-
stituting Soviet influences in their place.
Through various measures the regime has
transformed educational institutions into in-
doctrination centers, designed to eliminate
Western cultural patterns and to suppress
freedom of thought and expressions.
MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS
5. Peasants. Of all the groups in Rumania,
the peasants, who compose over two-thirds of
the country's population, constitute the great-
est resistence potential. They have opposed
the regime's agricultural policies, not only by
widespread passive resistance, but on many
occasions by hostile action as well. The bulk
of the peasantry cannot reconcile its own in-
terests with those of the regime and continues
stubbornly to oppose the latter's agricultural
policy. The traditional attachment of the
peasant to the land, his deep-seated ambition
to become a landowner and exercise a right
which he regards as inalienable, his resent-
ment over disruption of his simple way of life,
and his traditional refusal to become organ-
ized are in opposition to the entire agricul-
tural policy of the Communists. The peasant
has been difficult to discipline, and he has
often openly protested against policies de-
signed to regiment him. The various non-
collectivized rural groups, are suffering most
at the hand of the regime. The collectivized
peasants, who have been drawn into a tight
controlled network, would run great risks in
active resistance; they can, however, resist
passively with relatively little danger of detec-
tion by the bureaucratic maze of collective
administration.
6. Industrial Workers. In spite of the re-
gime's past policy of favoring industry over
agriculture, the industrial worker has not
benefited much. In many ways his situation
is inferior to that of the peasant who can at
least evade deliveries to some extent and who
has a local food and fuel supply. The indus-
trial worker suffers from a depressed standard
of living, poor housing, food shortages, and a
fear of possible unemployment. He is forced
to work hard for low wages, often under primi-
tive conditions. Most workers are probably
aware of the fact that the products of their
labor are often destined for shipment to the
Soviet Union. Consequently even those who
initially supported the Communist regime
have become disillusioned. Worker dissatis-
faction is manifested in reluctance to join the
Party. The Communists in theory derive
their chief support from the working class,
but the Rumanian Worker's Party has had
little success in improving its "social composi-
tion" by recruiting factory labor. The great-
est discontent is to be found among the work-
ers of the state railroad system; at one time
these were the staunchest supporters of the
Communists, furnishing the Party with such
top leaders as Gheorghiu-Dej and Gheorghe
Apostol, who were among the instigators of a
bloody railroad strike in 1933.
7. Youth. Rumanian youth, particularly the
77,000 students of higher schools, are among
the most outspoken opponents of the regime.
Family tradition and the individualistic tend-
encies of youth have encouraged opposition
to the regimentation enforced by Commu-
nist group control. Several important
events ? the 1953 Bucharest Youth Festival,
the 1956 Polish uprising and the Hungarian
revolt ? have stirred young people to express
open discontent, particularly the ethnic Hun-
garians. Their demonstrations against Com-
munism in general and Marxist-Leninist in-
struction in particular brought comment even
from Khrushchev. A number have defected
from groups traveling abroad even though
their political reliability had been strictly
checked by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
The Party and its youth organization (Union
of Working Youth) are seriously concerned
over the continued interest of students in all
things Western, and there is much criticism
of youth in both agriculture and industry for
absenteeism, thievery, immorality, laziness
and failure to work toward the aims of the
regime and the Communist ideology.
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8. Military. Soviet authorities have become
increasingly careful, in the past several years,
to refrain from flaunting their military forces
and advisors in Rumania. Although some
Rumanian soldiers may resent their presence
and authority, it is probable that professional
military personnel are not averse to accepting
the modern weapons and equipment being
supplied by the Soviets, even though they
hardly believe the Communist-nourished
legend of the historical bond between Rus-
sians and Rumanians. Although Air Force
personnel are presumably more carefully
screened for political reliability than are
Army personnel, dissident elements apparent-
ly still persist. Most military deserters have
been Air Force officers, and these have re-
ported general discontent in their service
branch. There seems to be little dissidence in
the Army's permanent cadre, which includes
approximately 25,000 well-indoctrinated offi-
cers. Somewhat more dissatisfaction proba-
bly exists among noncommissioned officers
and those enlisted men who are held over for
an extra year of service. The two conscript
classes of about 80,000 men each, largely de-
riving from the rural areas, are on the whole
more disaffected than the rest of the Army,
although the most obviously unreliable indi-
viduals in each age class are not taken into
the Army.
9. Among the forces of the Ministry of In-
ternal Affairs, the state security police con-
tain the most fanatical supporters of the re-
gime. Personnel of other branches, such as
the border guards, are for the most part not
ardent Communists and are not devoted to
the regime. Most of the members of these
formations are conscripts and many of them,
despite screening, share the anti-Communist
feelings of the general population. Morale
among the border guards is low. In the police
force, attitudes ranging from tolerance of
known anti-Communists to positive acts of
disloyalty have been responsible for a series
of purges. Nevertheless, while on the whole
the loyalty of Rumanian armed forces is
questionable, there has been no evidence of
actual resistance within the Rumanian Army
or the militarized security forces. Morale and
discipline are not high. Apart from political
resentment of Soviet control, Rumanians are
not militaristically inclined and they gener-
ally dislike the service as such.
10. Minorities. Ethnically Rumania is the
most heterogeneous of the countries in the
Satellite area, with minorities comprising 15
percent of the population. Groups of Hun-
garians, Germans, Jews, and others, who for
the most part form sizeable islands within
Rumania, look to other countries for political
and cultural inspiration, thus constituting a
potential fifth column. In its desire to inte-
grate these minorities, the regime has contrib-
uted to their discontent by attempting to wipe
out their distinctive cultures and by using
minority institutions and languages as vehi-
cles for the propagation of Communism.
These minorities have probably become
stronger in their ethnic group loyalty as a
result of such inroads and of the anti-Com-
munist attitudes manifested by their parent
nationalities in West Germany, Hungary, and
Israel.
11. Intellectuals. Rumanian intellectuals,
particularly men of letters, have been restive
under the Communist ideological yoke, but
the Party has successfully stifled any open
expression of opposition. The only major
demonstration of open resistance to Party
pressure ? in May 1956 when latent discon-
tent finally erupted at a series of writers'
and Party meetings ? was immediately sup-
pressed. The intellectuals realize that they
have little future unless they support the
Communists or appear to do so. The lack of
opportunity for advancement and creative
freedom has motivated a number of engineers,
professional men, artists, and dancers to de-
fect on their visits to countries outside the
Soviet Bloc. Other intellectuals, valuing pres-
tige and material benefits, have accommo-
dated themselves to the regime and have
achieved leading positions, but for the most
part they secretly harbor intense disaffection.
12. To a large extent, members of the govern-
ment administration, factory officials, teach-
ers, and engineers, who comprise the upper
middle class, still retain a Western outlook.
They are oppose.d to Communism but con-
tinue to work for the government in order to
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exist. They pay lip service to the Party, even
though they would prefer a liberal govern-
ment and a renewal of contacts with the
Western world. As in the past, they have
been able to adapt themselves to political
upheavals and internal changes. In view of
the small size of the Party when it came to
power in Rumania, the Communists have had
to employ many non-Communist opportunists
in positions of importance. Despite their
high rank, officials holding technical positions
in the state administration and economic en-
terprises, have little voice in policy and, for
the present at least, are in no position to
change the course of events in the country.
13. Religious Groups. The various religious
organizations in Rumania do not at present
engage in resistance but have been forced to
cooperate with the regime in order to survive.
Because of Rumania's history of foreign dom-
ination, many of the churches long ago
adopted an attitude of accommodation to the
civil authority in order to ensure the con-
tinuation of their activities. Religious faith
in the country, however, is more vital than
in the past. Churches of all denominations
are heavily attended, and religious enthusiasm
is markedly greater than before World War
II, constituting a form of protest against the
regime. People of all ages attend services,
including even young men in military uni-
form. ?
14. Rumanian Workers' Party. The Ruma-
nian Workers' (Communist) Party probably
has a relatively small percentage of convinced
Communists among its members. Only those
working as professionals in the Party ap-
paratus and a small number of workers in
special categories are sincerely attached to
the Party and to the regime. Despite the
purge of nearly 200,000 members in 1949-50
and the expulsion of an equal number in
1950-55, the Party (total membership today
is about 600,000, including both regular and
candidate members) still contains a large
proportion of opportunists who are interested
only in personal profit and advancement or
even mere subsistence. Nevertheless, the large
percentage of opportunists in its midst in no
way endangers the Party's stability at the
present time. The expulsions of the past
years have even served in some measure to
increase unity. There are no signs of nation-
al deviationism among the top leaders and
the extent of factional maneuvering in the
Politburo is not serious. Party chief Gheor-
ghiu-Dej has maintained his position and
influence through the period of Communist
rule, and since the purge of top leaders Ana
Pauker, Vasile Luca, and Teohari Georgescu
in 1952 no one of sufficient stature or influence
remains to endanger his position. A purge
of the intellectual faction of the Politburo
in July 1957 in no way affected the status of
Gheorghiu-Dej.
INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE
15. Of all the disaffected groups and classes
in Rumania the peasantry is the most im-
portant. The Hungarian minority is poten-
tially as dangerous to the regime, as are
the students and intellectuals. Other groups
with a subversive potential are the industrial
workers, lower governmental officials and the
"class enemies," that is, private tradesmen,
former members of the professions, large land-
owners and industrialists. Together these
comprise some 90 percent of Rumania's total
population of 17.6 million. The regime has
been able to limit their ability to resist, but it
has failed to win their cooperation, and their
passive resistance has been effective in re-
tarding achievement of the domestic objec-
tives of the government. The Rumanians
possess a native facility for passive resistance.
They have not been misled by the intense
propaganda of the regime, and have shown
themselves particularly adept at bribery,
graft, and black marketing in accommodating
themselves to conditions created by the Com-
munists. The intensive hatred of the Soviet
and of the native Communist regime is such
that under certain circumstances, such as a
breakdown of internal security, open strife
within the top leadership, or general revolts
and disorders in the other satellites, a setting
for actual resistance activity could be created,
provided the risk did not appear too great.
16. The vast majority of the Rumanian peo-
ple tend to hold both the Russians and the
native regime responsible for their present
plight. The most intense hatred is directed
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against the former, since Soviet influence
and control of every facet of life are more
complete and immediate than anything expe-
rienced before. The presence of Soviet armed
forces in the country has served as an addi-
tional irritant.
TRENDS OF DISSIDENCE SINCE 1953
17. In the past several years, there has been
a noticeable decrease in the number of iso-
lated guerrilla actions in Rumania, owing
chiefly to attrition, to the increased efficiency
of the security forces, and to the disinclination
of the country's rulers after Stalin's death to
relax the stringent Stalinist controls. There
are no known resistance groups in Rumania
today, but partisan activity throughout the
whole chain of the Carpathian Mountains con-
tinues to be reported. Some of the groups re-
ferred to as resistance elements are probably
nothing more than roving bandit groups, com-
posed of escaped criminals and lawless ele-
ments of the population. There are persistent
reports, sometimes admitted by the regime,
that security police and militia have been de-
ployed against "terrorist bands" throughout
the mountainous regions of Rumania. Other
reports indicate that in some instances So-
viet units in the area have been called upon
for assistance. Nevertheless, there is evidence
that partisan activity has been virtually
wiped out during the past two years.
18. There has, however, been no noticeable
decrease of unorganized and passive resistance
expressed in the form of economic sabotage,
occasional strikes, local disturbances, passive
resistance against grain deliveries and general
demands that the government provide im-
proved living conditions. To some extent, the
intellectual unrest of satellite neighbors has
affected the Rumanian intelligentsia but
never to the same degree as in Poland or even
East Germany.
19. There is evidence that Stalin's denigra-
tion engendered widespread confusion in the
higher ranks of the Rumanian Party, includ-
ing the Politburo. But First Secretary Ghe-
orghiu-Dej and his close followers have from
time to time intimidated individual Party
functionaries, thus checking any effective re-
sistance to the leadership.
20. The failure of the Hungarian revolt con-
tinues to have a depressing influence on large
segments of the Rumanian people. The feel-
ing seems to have been created that the Com-
munist regime is there to stay and that a
fate similar to that of the Hungarians would
befall Rumanians if they revolted. The peo-
ple's hope for liberation seems to be at the
lowest ebb. It is not, however, completely
extinguished, as 'continued passive resistance
demonstrates. Students continue passive re-
sistance through such means as displaying
intense interest in things Western and pre-
ferring Western to Eastern or even native
writers. Students and intellectuals devoted
considerable attention to the theories of Chi-
nese Communist leader Mao Tse-tung, but
probably no longer regard him as a mentor
in the quest for a greater measure of auton-
omy.
RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE
21. Active resistance since Stalin's death has
been confined to a few isolated cases of work-
ers demonstrations for higher wages and bet-
ter living conditions and to student manifesta-
tions in several universities during the Hun-
garian revolt. The general pattern of these
manifestations was uniform: inspired by news
from Hungary, students demanded economic
improvements and abolition or reduction of
compulsory courses in Russian and Marxism-
Leninism. When more basic anti-regime feel-
ings were revealed in meetings between stu-
dents and university Party officials, troops and
police were summoned and some youths were
arrested and subsequently tried. Isolated ex-
amples of tension among workers at this time
were also evident. There appears to have been
unrest among railroad workers in Bucharest,
who reportedly passed a resolution of sym-
pathy for the Hungarian workers.
22. In recent years less and less has been
heard of guerrilla activities even in the most
inaccessible areas of the country, although
elements of the former National Peasant
Party and Iron Guard may still exist. Re-
sistance activities are now largely limited to
disorganized, small-scale, virtually futile acts
of sabotage and other minor activities by in-
dividuals driven to desperation. As in the
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past, such open resistance activity could only
take place in the Carpathian and Transylvan-
ian ranges, which furnish the protection of
rough terrain and which border on the areas
inhabited by German and Hungarian minor-
ities, largely peasants, who have in the past
aided guerrilla bands. In the postwar period
isolated guerrilla bands have been active
chiefly in the Brasov-Zarnesti section, the
Fagaras range, the Dorbruja wasteland along
the Black Sea coast and the nearby Danube
Delta swamps, the Bristita-Nasaud section,
and the Bihor Mountains.
23. In the field of passive resistance, which
is well suited to the Rumanian character, the
people continue to take advantage of many
opportunities. Their lack of discipline has
been intensified; they have shown their dis-
satisfaction by abenteeism, sloppiness and low
productivity. Efforts by the regime to rem-
edy these conditions are often counteracted
through bribery of willing officials (an ancient
Rumanian pastime) and by padding the re-
ports of hours worked. Thus ingrained Ruma-
nian inefficiency is compounded by deliberate
carelessness or pretended ignorance. Per-
sistent offenders cannot all be jailed; they are
usually punished only by loss of salary on the
basis of nonfulfillment of norms. Further-
more, there are indications that Western in-
formation media such as VOA, BBC and the
French and West German radio stations con-
tinue to be popular and to exert considerable
influence in keeping alive the hope for even-
tual liberation. The people are reported to
have relied on Western information on the
rebellions in Poland and Hungary and on
official US statements, sometimes meeting
clandestinely to discuss the contents of West-
ern broadcasts.
ROLE OF EMIGRES
24. Since the Communist regime came into
power there have been three principal emigre
groups which have claimed to represent the
interests of the Rumanian people and to offer
guidance and assistance to organized and un-
organized resistance within the country. The
tangible results of these groups especially dur-
ing the past several years have been negligible
or non-existent. Factional strife within the
groups has completely vitiated them as a
rallying point for any kind of resistance ac-
tivities inside the country.
25. The Rumanian National Committee,
which has the official blessing of former King
Michael, is reduced to the role of maintaining
liaison with other emigre groups, and of serv-
ing as a waning symbol of royalist Rumania
and as a potential channel for Western sup-
port. The League of Free Rumanians, a
splinter group of the Rumanian National
Committee, maintains offices in many of the
Western countries and also liaison with other
emigre groups. The other major political exile
group interested in promoting internal resist-
ance is the militant Legionnaire, or Iron
Guard, group. It has a long history of vio-
lence and clandestine activity within Ruma-
nia and stands compromised in the eyes of
most Rumanians at home for its fascist, anti-
parliamentarian, and anti-Semitic position.
REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE
26. The regime's measures to frustrate any
attempts by resistance groups to threaten its
stability have been helped by a number of fac-
tors which are typical of the Rumanian scene:
lack of traditional revolutionary spirit; lack
of potential leadership which could organize
effective opposition; general popular fear of
police terror; habits and attitudes ingrained
under foreign domination for centuries; and
reliance on foreign powers for liberation.
Moreover, the people realize that the regime
has at its disposal strong police and security
forces and the support of Soviet troops and
that it will not hesitate to take prompt and
effective measures against Party and non-
Party individuals who show the slightest sign
of deviation or rebellion.
27. Following the Hungarian revolution, the
Rumanian regime adopted a fluctuating pol-
icy of appeasement and enforced controls.
However, since the shake-up of the govern-
ment hierarchy in July 1957, it has become
apparent that the regime's agitation and
propaganda agencies have increased their
manipulation of group and individual fears
and aspirations in order to keep the public
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firmly under control. The objective of the
regime appears to be to organize workers,
peasants, intellectuals and students into re-
sponsible, disciplined groups and to encour-
age the public to believe not only that the
regime will endure but that the Western coun-
tries regard it as established and respectable.
28. The regime has passed new laws which
make certain crimes, considered minor in the
past (such as hooliganism, indecency, ped-
dling without a license, short weight, pilfer-
age in government) , punishable with prison
terms rather than fines. New labor camps
have been set up, and it is believed in Ruma-
nia that individuals are being sentenced to
these camps for one to three years. Uncon-
firmed reports indicate that in the provinces
violators are sometimes arrested and judged
by security organs rather than by the regular
police and courts; many have been tried, sen-
tenced and transported to prison within sev-
eral days. On the other hand, concessions
have been made to alleviate such basic eco-
nomic grievances as starvation wages, unreal-
istic agricultural quotas and industrial norms.
These have included raising of minimum
wages, modifying delivery quotas, increasing
children's bonuses and old age pensions. The
morale of the Rumanian people is at a low
ebb as a result of police arrests, higher food
costs and persistent alarmist rumors.
CAPABILITY OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS
REVOLT
29. The Rumanian security apparatus under
the Ministry of Internal Affairs has an over-
all strength of 156,000, made up of the follow-
ing components: State Security Police (uni-
formed and plainclothes) , 43,000; Frontier
Guard, 35,000; and Militia (including Fire-
men) , 78,000. This apparatus is believed ade-
quate to maintain the present regime in power
and it will almost certainly continue to be
capable of coping with any small scale anti-
regime activity. However, it probably would
not be able to deal with an uprising such as
occurred in Hungary without the assistance
of Soviet troops. The presence of two Soviet
line divisions, which could be reinforced on
short order, and the memory of the Soviet
repression of the Hungarian revolt will be
major factors enabling the Communist regime
to maintain its hold on the country. With
the exception of those higher officers who are
good Communists, and have survived the
purges, the reliability of the Rumanian Army
(some 215,000 men) in case of uprisings is
questionable.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS
OF PEACE
30. Under present circumstances no level of
resistance potential in Rumania has the capa-
bility of developing into successful organized
resistance. The regime and the Soviet forces
in that country are capable of taking the
severest countermeasures against any attempt
to establish organized resistance. However, a
number of internal and external develop-
ments could increase the level of the current
unorganized resistance and dissidence. In-
ternally, the continuing economic depriva-
tions and the acceleration of agricultural col-
lectivization could increase the discontent of
the workers and peasants. Also, any signs of
friction within the top Party and government
hierarchy or of relaxation of police controls
would encourage certain segments of the pop-
ulation to become more vocal against the re-
gime. Externally, disturbances in the other
orthodox satellites or political and economic
successes in Poland and Yugoslavia could have
a telling effect on some groups in Rumania,
especially students and intellectuals.
31. From the 1955 Summit conference to the
Hungarian revolt, it was evident in Rumania
that the lessening of East-West tensions had
adversely affected anti-regime resistance.
Conversely, with the increase of these tensions
after the Hungarian revolt, unrest increased
considerably, including open demonstrations
by students and by some workers and wide-
spread confusion within the Party. There is
also evidence that many Rumanian Party and
government officials sympathized with the
Hungarian revolutionaries and that the revolt
had produced deep confusion in the Party.
While the purge of Chisinevschi and Constan-
tinescu in July 1957 did not affect the basic
stability of the regime, it did create some un-
certainty and confusion within the Party
ranks. Additional ideological disputes in Ru-
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mania and elsewhere in the orbit could be
expected to increase confusion and uncer-
tainty within the Party and to encourage the
resistance of the more vocal anti-regime ele-
ments, such as students, but in view of the
general apathy of the Rumanian people in
general, no build-up of popular demands
which might result in widespread revolt is to
be expected.
32. Only a further deterioration of the al-
ready bad economic conditions, combined
with a relaxation of security controls, could
spark spontaneous unrest. Since such a re-
laxation can hardly be expected, Rumanians
will continue to be prevented from openly dis-
playing their dissidence. Thus their discon-
tent can only take the form of active or pas-
sive clandestine opposition, ranging from acts
of sabotage to listening to foreign broadcasts,
from assaults on individual policemen or sol-
diers to the voicing of popular grievances and
from minor strikes to slow-downs in produc-
tion. At best, such activities will retard the
implementation of the regime's political and
economic programs; at the least, they will
have a nuisance value.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR
33. At the inception of war between Bloc and
non-Bloc countries (local or general) the re-
gime would impose more stringent security
controls which would preclude anti-regime
resistance activities. If the struggle became
so intense that the Bloc nations had to divert
their security forces to other tasks, or if West-
ern forces were within the country and ap-
peared to be winning, many Rumanians would
engage in espionage, sabotage, and other
harassing activities against the Communists.
However, it would be almost impossible for
anti-regime elements to undertake military
action. Rumania's geographical location ad-
joining the USSR, in addition to the national
character and temperament of the people ? a
lack of spirit to resist and the fear of reprisals
and further loss of their limited free-
dom ? would tend to restrict any independent
action. The topography of the country, how-
ever, would lend itself to guerrilla fighting,
and small bands of partisans could retard the
advance of Bloc forces by sabotage of lines of
communications and industrial plants. How-
ever, widespread, effective military action
could be undertaken only if substantial ele-
ments of the armed forces defected and took
to the mountains. In such an event, peasants
could be expected not only to assist the
fighting forces but also to augment their num-
bers considerably. Outside support, especially
in war materiel, would be needed by the fight-
ing groups in order to continue active for any
length of time. Nevertheless, small guerrilla
bands could manage to operate over an indefi-
nite period in sabotage and harassment.
34. Possibilities exist in Rumania for substan-
tial assistance to Western military forces in
both the military and political fields, were
they to invade that country. Desertion to the
West of large segments of the Rumanian
armed forces would in all probability occur,
particularly if Western invading forces were
initially successful; the anti-Communist pop-
ulation could also be expected to engage in
economic sabotage and other harassing ac-
tions. Resistance elements in Rumania could
facilitate the infiltration of agents by the
West for intelligence collection and other
operational activities. Successful escape and
evasion of Western personnel in Rumania are
possible but would depend largely on the for-
tunes and area of the war. The fortunes of
war could affect the degree of resistance, al-
though most Rumanians could be expected to
resist Soviet forces.
35. The Rumanians probably would make
some distinction in the nationality of the
Western forces. Their past political and cul-
tural ties with France and Italy might make
these countries more acceptable as allies, and,
in turn, increase the Rumanians' will to resist.
The attitude of Yugoslavia, Turkey, and
Greece would have a definite effect on Ruma-
nian resistance potential. If these countries
joined in the conflict at its beginning, the
Rumanian resistance groups would be encour-
aged to take a more active part. A consider-
able number of military units could be ex-
pected to desert to Yugoslavia. Also, resist-
ance to Soviet forces in neighboring Bloc
countries would encourage opposition to those
forces in Rumania.
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36. Although the people of Rumania would
not approve the use of nuclear weapons on
targets in Rumania, Western employment of
nuclear weapons in that country could have a
very significant psychological effect on the
people and could influence their attitudes to-
ward the attacking forces. Attacks on urban
areas resulting in heavy civilian casualties
would prejudice most Rumanians against the
West. Such adverse reactions might be re-
duced if nuclear attacks were limited to areas
important to the Soviet war effort and were
accompanied by a coordinated political war-
91
fare campaign. If nuclear attacks were made
primarily on military targets isolated from
larger populated areas, the will to resist might
be increased since such attacks could diffuse
and lessen the control strengths of the regime.
37. The Rumanians have a long history of
accepting foreign domination. Therefore, it is
almost certain that they will continue to en-
dure virtually any type of occupation. Re-
pressive occupation policies would undoubt-
edly decrease their will to resist but would, on
the whole, have little effect on their low resist-
ance potential.
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ANNEX K -USSR
PREAMBLE
1. Although dissatisfaction with various as-
pects of the Soviet system is widespread, the
gulf between such dissidence and resist-
ance, except among certain national minori-
ties, is greater in the USSR than in any other
Bloc state. Such dissidence as exists in the
USSR does not necessarily indicate opposition
to Communist ideology or the Soviet system.
It is rather a manifestation of discontent over
the neglect or denial by the regime of popular
needs or desires. Since the death of Stalin,
dissidence in the Soviet Union appears to have
decreased, except in some of the recently an-
nexed areas. There has been grumbling and
criticism, particularly following the 20th
CPSU Congress in early 1956. But, on the
whole, most of this criticism is not "counter-
revolutionary" nor does it seem to envisage
the overthrow of the Soviet state. On the
contrary, there has unquestionably developed
during the past four decades a widespread
identification with the Soviet national state
and many of its institutional features and
the people have come to identify the Soviet
state with the Marxist-Leninist ideology
which has shaped its character. Moreover,
the successes of the USSR during and after
World War II, and particularly the security
reforms, economic improvements and tech-
nological achievements since 1953, have en-
gendered a pride in the Soviet state and have
almost certainly strengthened the loyalty of
the population toward the regime, again ex-
cepting the recently acquired Western terri-
tories. Generally, Soviet citizens appear to
feel that their lot has improved and is going
to improve further. Therefore many of them,
especially the hard-core followers of the Com-
munist gospel, are probably quite willing to
accept privations in the name of Soviet patri-
otism. Such are the premises for an examina-
tion of dissidence in the USSR. They do not
rule out the existence of a resistance potential
but they obviously put it on a level that dif-
fers considerably from that of the other Sino-
Soviet Bloc countries.
BASIC FACTORS ,OF DISSIDENCE
2. The people of the USSR have had to endure
extraordinary hardships for many years. Im-
provements in their standards of living and
the relaxation of political terror since 1953
have served to decrease the intensity of dissi-
dence and considerably whittled down, if not
eliminated for the time being, actual resist-
ance potential. Thus, while the improvement
of living standards has lagged far behind the
over-all rates of economic growth, there is evi-
dence that the Kremlin now favors such im-
provement, mainly in order to increase labor
productivity, to remove the stigma of poverty
from Communism, and to generate more ac-
tive support by Soviet citizens. Heavy indus-
try, military requirements, and technological
developments will continue to have priority
but, barring unforeseen complications, the
present regime's economic reforms and in-
creased production will at least give the peo-
ple the reassurance that something is being
done for them. Many probably feel already
that they are better off now than they have
been for years. Discontent arising from eco-
nomic causes is likely to diminish as consumer
welfare improves over the next several years,
although this effect will be partially offset if
expectations which have been aroused by re-
gime promises are disappointed and if famil-
iarity with Western standards grows. How-
ever, the spectacular successes of Soviet sci-
ence have almost certainly strengthened the
allegiance of the people to the regime and are
probably attributed by many to the Soviet sys-
tem itself. Therefore it should not necessarily
be assumed that closer contacts with the West
would inevitably generate more dissatisfaction
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among the Soviet rank and file, which may
have come to believe that the eventual
supremacy of the USSR is certain and that
ultimately the Russian people will be better
off than the peoples in the free world.
3. There remain, however, some causes of dis-
sidence that may continue to create difficul-
ties for the regime. One is the agricultural
collectivization policy. Russian peasants re-
main overwhelmingly opposed to it, especially
so the peasants in the newly acquired Western
territories who have lived under Soviet rule
only since 1944. Realizing this, the Kremlin
has introduced reform measures that may
pacify many peasants and at the same time
raise their output. With the older generation
dying out, the younger agricultural workers
will probably not have as high a resistance
potential, at least as long as the USSR re-
mains generally successful in stabilizing and
furthering its economic and politica position.
Another problem is thought control. The
party, more powerful than ever, continues to
control virtually every facet of human
thought. Adherence or at least lip service to
the Party-sanctioned theories, laws, methods,
and esthetic positions is required eventually
of all. The loosening of intellectual strin-
gency during the past few years has relieved
a certain amount of pressure, but the Party
has made it quite clear, after the "thaw" set
in, that it will not tolerate deviations. Intel-
lectuals are no longer liquidated, however,
they are "persuaded" to return to the rightful
path. While most of them return to con-
formity, their public repentances appear ex-
torted and they probably nourish their griev-
ances in secret perhaps more intensely than
before.
4. The most disgruntled elements are almost
certainly the national minorities. The rein-
troduction of the policy of russification which
began in the thirties has created ill will to-
ward the Russians, especially since some of
the minorities were incorporated into or an-
nexed by the USSR against their wishes. Al-
though some of the more blatant forms of
russification have been abandoned by the
post-Stalin regime, the basic policy has been
retained. Russification now involves the
spread of the Russian language and culture
throughout the Soviet Union, praise of the
Russian people as the leading nationality in
the USSR, and the imposition of Russian
administrators and officials in key posts
throughout minority areas. Anti-Semitism,
though not as rampant as in the years just
before Stalin's death, is still widespread and
the regime not only does little to combat it
but by its attacks on Zionism actually encour-
ages it. (For a more detailed discussion of
the more important minority areas, see the
appendixes on the Baltic, Ukraine and Cau-
casus.)
MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS
5. Forced Labor and Exiles. There may still
be as many as 2,500,000 forced laborers ? in-
cluding both political and criminal ele-
ments ? in prison camps and an indetermi-
nate number of exiles who unquestionably
constitute a group that harbors the strongest
resistance potential. Although the number of
political prisoners has been reduced and
prison conditions ameliorated since 1953, the
forced laborers still live under very harsh cir-
cumstances, and the exiles are denied many
rights and opportunities accorded ordinary
Soviet citizens. Resistance potential is in-
herent in these elements, as reflected in the
Vorkuta and other labor camp strikes which,
incidentally, were organized and led by the
political prisoners. It is also possible that
large numbers of the many millions of labor
camp inmates who have been discharged have
a strong hatred for a government that mis-
treated them and might swell the ranks of
potential resisters.
6. Peasants. Dissidence among peasants has
traditionally been strong and has focussed
upon collectivization and the low living stand-
ards identified with it. These living stand-
ards have risen substantially since 1953 be-
cause of successive increases in the prices paid
for compulsory state deliveries, but they gen-
erally remain below what the peasant thinks
he could obtain from a free market. In addi-
tion, bureaucratic rigidities and frequent at-
tempts to eliminate their private plots and
personal livestock offend the peasants' sense
of individuality and tend to alienate them
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from the regime. Nevertheless, they have
been relatively free from police terror in re-
cent years, and while many peasants resent
the anti-religious policy of the government,
they probably care little about ideological
preachings and thought control.
7. Intellectuals. The intelligentsia, in gen-
eral, stands high in Soviet society in terms of
income and prestige, and many of them, par-
ticularly among the bureaucrats and engi-
neers, have a vested interest in the regime.
Most scientists, moreover, seem to enjoy both
official support and relative freedom of pur-
suit in their fields. The limited relaxation of
controls following Stalin's denigration em-
boldened intellectuals in many less favored
fields to protest against party controls, though
usually by implication only. These protests
revealed that virtually all prominent writers,
artists, composers, and scholars would wel-
come more freedom of expression. Although
the post-Stalin regime has somewhat relaxed
the extremely stringent Stalinist conformism,
it has basically maintained its doctrines, and
merely enforces them with greater flexibility
and leniency. Strictures on creative expres-
sion remain tight enough to cause widespread
dissidence among the more sensitive intellec-
tuals. However, the dissidence of Soviet in-
tellectuals is not necessarily one of hostility
against the Soviet system but is often directed
against the methods and interpretations of
the Communist gospel by the Soviet leaders.
8. Students, Youth. There has been evidence
of student dissidence, and there were demon-
strations in 1956 and 1957 by young people
against the discipline and the drabness of So-
viet life. These demonstrations were all the
more striking as youth has for years been con-
sidered among the firmest supporters of the
regime. Nevertheless, it appeared that as a
result of a higher intellectual level achieved
by improved Soviet education, of the atmos-
phere of relaxation following the death of Sta-
lin, the 20th CPSU Congress, and the Hun-
garian revolution youth has turned a critical
eye on the disparity between Communist
theory and practice. But in spite of the fact
that students at least are now better equipped
to think for themselves and that the regime
apparently allows for greater leniency in deal-
ing with young deviationists, it would be in-
correct to consider Soviet youth a generally
disloyal group. Youths remain Soviet pa-
triots even though their understanding of
ideology may be superficial and their adher-
ence to it perfunctory. The fact remains that
they as yet know little outside the USSR and
that their thinking is done through a filter
of state-defined ideological premises. It is
doubtful, therefore, that their dissidence con-
stitutes a serious threat to the regime's fu-
ture; it is much more likely to be directed to-
wards gradual reform of the regime than its
overthrow.
9. National minorities, constituting 45 per-
cent of the Soviet population of 206,300,000,1
have for many years provided centers of re-
sistance to Soviet Communism. Though the
degree of dissidence has varied sharply among
minority groups, no other groups inside the
USSR have fought so grimly against over-
whelming odds. In the first postwar years,
a reported 200,000 partisans in the Ukraine
and probably 100,000 in Lithuania battled So-
viet troops. The process of russification and
sovietization was carried out with determina-
tion by Moscow; entire minorities were trans-
planted from home areas and, in the process,
more or less destroyed as groups. By 1949, the
back of the resistance was broken, and follow-
ing the death of Stalin, a policy of appease-
ment was instituted. As will be seen in the
appendices, the minorities which had been
part of the Tsarist empire and thus become
components of the USSR have calmed down
and are not, at this time, believed to constitute
a threat to the Moscow regime. However,
the Western territories which were annexed
during or after World War II, while forcibly
pacified, still rank high in potential resistance
groups.
10. Industrial workers' grievances stem main-
ly from low pay, strict discipline, and bureau-
cratic arbitrariness. Among the workers, the
semi-skilled and unskilled ones, receiving
'Population estimate as of January 1, 1958, from
"The 1958 Annual Estimates. Political and
Demographic Composition of the Sino-Soviet
Bloc," (SECRET), prepared by the Air Research
Division, Library of Congress.
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much lower pay and fewer privileges than the
highly skilled, are probably the more disaf-
fected element. However, their living stand-
ard has recently improved and there is now
less emphasis on the harsh labor discipline
that was once a chief factor of dissidence
among workers during Stalin's rule. Gen-
erally, the resistance potential of this social
group cannot be presumed to be high and,
with further economic improvements as well
as over-all successes of the regime, may fur-
ther decrease.
11. Armed Forces. There is no evidence of
serious dissidence in the Soviet armed forces.
The permanent cadre of officers and noncom-
missioned officers (constituting about 20 per-
cent of total strength) is composed of ap-
parently reliable men who have been thor-
oughly indoctrinated; most of the officers are
Communist Party members. There is some
dissatisfaction among the conscripts, much of
which stems from the normal soldier's cus-
tomary causes of discontent ? low pay, strict
discipline, limited opportunities for social ac-
tivities, etc. Further, the attitude of the con-
scripts reflects the various causes of discon-
tent among the populace at large, but no
anti-regime activities have developed. The in-
crease of party control following the removal
of Marshal Zhukov has undoubtedly irritated
some elements of the military but not enough
to produce serious dissidence. Whether harsh
military discipline and the wide cleavage be-
tween the status of the officers and enlisted
men, and again between the junior and senior
officers, actually contributes to dissidence di-
rected against the regime is doubtful. Al-
though it may be true that soldiers do not like
compulsory indoctrination, it is also true that
at least some of it will sink into their con-
sciousness and that they regard such exer-
cises as an inevitable duty to their nation, of
whose achievements they are proud. On the
whole, it can be assumed that there is little
if any resistance potential to be found in the
Soviet armed forces.
INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE
12. Dissidence exists on nearly every level of
Soviet society, extending from simple grumbl-
ing to the rejection of the regime and its ideo-
logy. It is believed, however, that the latter
extreme occurs most often among people who
have suffered at the hands of the regime by ar-
rest, imprisonment, or persecution, or those
whose close relatives and friends have suffered.
The overwhelming majority of the people, par-
ticularly in the Russian component of the
USSR, are complaining mainly about personal
discomforts, which some, however, may well
attribute to the faults of the system. Even
before the Malenkov-Khrushchev innovations
and reforms contributed to a general decline
of dissidence, the regime had already estab-
lished such pervasive authority that the peo-
ple were forced to devote their energies to cop-
ing with existing conditions rather than tak-
ing steps to achieve an alternate solution.
Although active resistance ceased by 1950, dis-
sidence is still widespread. On the other
hand, much of what appears to be passive
resistance may be in large part nothing more
than a demonstration of time-honored Rus-
sian indifference or apathy.
13. Dissidence in many areas of the USSR is
not a factor of real significance, and the gulf
between dissidence and resistance is far wider
than elsewhere in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. In
the first place, the Soviet population has ex-
perienced Communist rule for four decades
and has, by and large, become accustomed to
it. In the second place, this rule is exercised
by compatriots, not by foreigners, and the
grievances of Soviet peoples, particularly the
Russians, are not reinforced by the emotional
power of injured nationalism. Whether a
crisis would change this attitude and create
or stimulate a resistance potential, would de-
pend on the type and duration of the crisis.
In a war, the vast majority of the Soviet peo-
ple could be expected to set aside their com-
plaints and defend their homeland. If, as a
result of a crisis, improvement of the living
standard should decline, it is possible that,
at least among some groups, minor types of
dissidence could grow into more serious ones.
In any event, opposition to the present re-
gime or its methods does not imply a desire
on the part of the people to reject all funda-
mental concepts on which the Soviet state
is built.
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TRENDS OF DISSIDENCE SINCE 1953
14. Since the death of Stalin and the demise
of Beria, a more relaxed political climate and
a number of measures taken to alleviate the
most serious causes of dissidence have con-
tributed to a decrease in dissidence, particu-
larly in the prewar territories of the USSR
but perhaps even, to some degree, in the new-
ly annexed territories. Among these meas-
ures were efforts to raise the living standards,
the easiing of arbitrary police state methods,
a gradual decrease of the labor camp popula-
tion, somewhat more freedom of expression
combined with a less fear-laden atmosphere,
and, though in a very limited way, increased
contact with countries outside the Bloc. The
20th CPSU Congress constituted the climax
of these developments and made all previous
relaxation moves by the Kremlin leaders offi-
cial.
15. However, some of the new methods proved
to be counter-productive inasmuch as they
stimulated questioning by Soviet citizens, who
began to express their doubts about the work-
ings of the Soviet system and its tactics. The
events in Poland and Hungary caused con-
siderable interest and questioning, particu-
larly among the intelligentsia. These events
among others hastened a certain retrench-
ment by the regime, of which the theoretical
bases were announced in the middle of 1956.
Mao's "hundred flowers" doctrine, too, led to
retrenchment in China, which must have been
added evidence that, whatever the nature of
their questioning and doubts, expression of
dissent and dissidence would meet with re-
gime counteraction.
16. Whether dissidence in the USSR will in-
crease or decrease in the future is hard to
predict. Continued improvements in living
standards and further gains in Soviet prestige
through technological or diplomatic successes
will tend to diminish it, particularly among
the majority which is largely unconcerned
with ideological issues or abstract considera-
tions of freedom. Students and intellectuals,
whose ranks are growing, pose a greater prob-
lem, since many of their questionings are more
fundamental. The regime, while ready to re-
trench from its more liberal policies when dis-
sidence finds mounting expression, apparently
still desires to refrain from total repression in
this area lest it stifle the "positive" initiative
which it is seeking to encourage. Thus an op-
portunity has appeared for dissidence to grow
so long as it remains quiescent and does not
seem likely, in the regime's view, to assume ac-
tive forms. If the current stabilization pro-
gram should succeed, dissidence may peter out
even in the new Western territories. If not,
the security apparatus of the Soviet regime
could easily keep such dissidence from grow-
ing into resistance.
RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE
17. Active and organized resistance was a seri-
ous problem during and just after World War
II. Thereafter, severe Stalinist repression
prevented any active resistance of significance.
Stalin's death gave new impetus to resistance
as demonstrated by large-scale unrest in some
Siberian prison camps. Again, some active re-
sistance erupted in 1956, such as riots in
Tbilisi, strike and work stoppages in Moscow's
Kaganovich Ball-Bearing Plant, and national-
ist demonstrations in Vilnyus and Kaunas in
Lithuania. These outbreaks were spontane-
ous and not necessarily subversive. Other-
wise, no organized resistance groups are be-
lieved to exist in the USSR, with the possible
exception of such religious sects as the Jeho-
vah's Witnesses, the Monashi, and others.
The Witnesses have been most active in the
western Ukraine and in Moldavia. The sect
was accused of taking orders from its parent
organization in Brooklyn, of preaching that
the United States is a democratic country, of
encouraging pacifism among draft-age youth,
and having advised its members during the
Hungarion revolution to fight against the So-
viet government. The group apparently was
able to survive as a tight-knit organization
for several years because of the total dedica-
tion of its members but its continued exist-
ence as an organization is questionable.
18. Whatever resistance still exists in the
USSR is almost certainly unorganized and
passive. Much evidence of unorganized re-
sistance to specific policies or ideological
tenets has come to light during the past two
years. It often has taken the form of public
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criticism of policies or concepts, mostly as
criticism of less basic matters; attempts by
writers, artists, and scholars to break through
official controls; insubordination toward offi-
cial discipline, from refusal to attend propa-
ganda lectures to hooliganism and crime; and
nationalistic grumbling by minorities. Un-
organized resistance is most likely to occur
in intellectual and student circles and has as
its object the greater liberalization of the So-
viet regime toward individual freedom.
19. Unorganized resistance is hard to evalu-
ate because it depends on the motivation of
the person who performs a particular act.
Much of what might be considered resistance
probably consists of individual criminal acts,
such as looting, robbing, and murder. The
murder or beating up of police informants,
tax collectors, and administrative officials may
perhaps be unorganized resistance but it may
also be an act of vengeance of an individual
in reponse to a particular situation and not
really pertinent to the question of unorganized
resistance. Reports of acts of violence in the
Soviet Union should be regarded cautiously
before being considered indicative of unor-
ganized resistance. Since the death of Sta-
lin, the population of the labor camps has
been tremendously reduced and various am-
nesties, beginning with that of April 1953,
released a large number of habitual criminals.
That individuals of this sort turn to violence
when released can be explained in too many
other ways for their actions to be considered
indicative of resistance potential.
ROLE OF EMIGRES
20. Anti-Soviet emigres seem to have played
a negligible role in directing or even inspir-
ing recent resistance activity within the So-
viet Union. The regime seems to have suc-
ceeded in isolating potential leaders of resist-
ance from foreign contacts. Most Soviet citi-
zens seem to have little knowledge of emigre
activities. Even if the Soviet public were bet-
ter informed concerning emigres, it is doubt-
ful that the latter could gain substantial sup-
port inside the Soviet Union. The feeling is
widespread that emigres have lost touch with
Soviet reality and no longer understand the
real problems facing the Soviet citizenry.
Many, in addition, would resent what they
consider the emigres flight to luxurious living
while their compatriots at home languished in
poverty. Some minorities, particularly the
Baltic peoples, may have more sympathy for
their emigres than the Russians do.
REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE
21. The regime seeks to inhibit dissidence by
a vast propaganda campaign designed to pop-
ularize the Communist Party and the Soviet
system and to discredit all Western countries
in the eyes of the populace. The regime also
maintains an ubiquitous secret police organi-
zation under the control of the Committee of
State Security (KGB) of the Council of Min-
isters of the USSR, for the purpose of main-
taining complete survelliance over the popu-
lation and ferreting out any individuals or
organizations exhibiting actual or potential
anti-regime tendencies. An estimated 400,-
000 militarized security forces (most of them
Border and Interior Troops) are kept in con-
stant readiness to quell summarily any anti-
regime uprisings. Punitive measures, includ-
ing mass deportation and forced labor in re-
mote areas of the USSR, serve both to remove
active resistance elements and to discourage
further resistance activity. Such measures
have been applied with special force in the
Baltic States, the western Ukraine, and the
Caucasus. The effectiveness of the govern-
ment's actions is reflected in the apparent
stability of the regime. While the present
trend in the Soviet Union appears to be to-
ward a less stringent application of security
controls than during the Stalin era, there is
every indication that the security apparatus
itself has lost none of its effectiveness.
CAPABILITY OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS
REVOLT
22. The regime has shown its ability to con-
trol local and sporadic disturbances. In the
event of a revolt in a national minority area,
Soviet military units in the area, which usual-
ly consist of cross sections of many Soviet
nationalities, would hardly be vulnerable, as
were the Hungarian and Polish forces, to any
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nationalist appeal. In case of a simultaneous
or rapidly spreading revolt in several heavily
populated areas, the Soviet regime, due to its
formidable security apparatus, would appear
to be in a better position to defend itself
than any other government in the world, un-
less it were dangerously weakened. While
even then it cannot be predicted that the en-
tire Soviet control system would collapse, it
is possible that the effectiveness of the securi-
ty apparatus would be greatly weakened.
MODIFICATION OF SECURITY APPARATUS
23. The Soviet security apparatus has under-
gone some modification since the death of
Stalin in 1953. That year the Ministry of
State Security (MGB) was absorbed by the
Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and in
1954 the Committee of State Security (KGB)
of the Council of Ministers was formed, al-
though without some functions formerly held
by the MGB. The MVD which inherited some
of the regulatory apparatus from the MGB,
including the militia (civil police) and the
security troops, lost some of its functions,
and control over local operations of some
of its remaining functions was decentralized.
While the ostensible purpose of these modifi-
cations was to restore "socialist legality" to
the police system and to increase the responsi-
bility of local governments for law and order,
Moscow is in a position to assert its direct
control over all security and law enforcement
agencies.
24. Modifications in the apparatus have been
primarily undertaken with two aims in view:
First, to deny to any given individual in the
Soviet hierarchy total control over the organs
of the secret police and to circumscribe to
some degree their power in society. The sec-
ond concern has been primarily one of allow-
ing Soviet citizens to relax as a whole and to
eliminate those secret police functions that
seemed ineffective in their coercive aspects for
the efficient operation of Soviet society. There
has been no indication of a greater hesitation
in undertaking investigation of significant
causes of subversion and treason. The size
of the security police apparatus was reduced
significantly after Stalin's death, but in the
99
summer of 1957 these forces were increased.
Available information does not indicate
whether the reductions of 1953-1954 period
exceeded the increase of the summer of 1957.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS
OF PEACE
25. Present capabilities for organized resist-
ance are virtually nonexistent. Even some-
what liberalized security controls are probably
more than adequate to stamp out any in-
cipient organized attempt to resist. Unor-
ganized resistance, chiefly passive, is likely to
diminish as the USSR becomes militarily and
economically stronger. With the exception of
some national minorities, the maximum that
can be expected from the overwhelming ma-
jority of the Soviet people, and particularly
the Russians, is dissidence of a type that is
not necessarily directed against the system as
such. On the other hand, in a monolithic
state, opposition to a part of the system can
be regarded as tantamount to opposition to
the system as a whole; the Soviet leaders
almost certainly so consider it. A steady
improvement in the living standard would
almost certainly reduce an important source
of dissidence, but not that of intellectuals and
students, for example. A deterioration in
living conditions would add to other sources
of dissidence and raise resistance potential
in time of crisis.
26. The relation between the level of dissi-
dence and a change in the degree of East-West
tensions is difficult to predict. Major devel-
opments in international relations will cer-
tainly affect the level of dissidence, but
whether it will increase or decrease depends
on the specifics of any given case. Tensions
attributable to Soviet foreign policy may well
raise the level of dissidence while tensions re-
sulting from moves generally considered to be
Western provocation may lower the level of
dissidence. A reduction in tension may re-
duce the amount of dissidence or at least
deepen the apathy of national minority
groups, but on the other hand it is likely to
stimulate further dissidence from intellec-
tuals and artists and in other of the elite levels
of Soviet society by turning their attention
from external dangers to internal problems.
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27. Whatever doubts in the regime and its
ideology might have been aroused by the de-
Stalinization campaign and the ensuing ide-
ological controversy, the loyalty of the people
to the Soviet state was not shaken. Further-
more, some of the doubts now existing may be
assuaged as the regime continues its stabili-
zation drive. In any case, independent think-
ing and a more objective approach to Marx-
ism-Leninism could not be expected to
strengthen resistance potential to the degree
that it would endanger the Soviet state. The
regime, while fostering a "creative," i.e., non-
dogmatic, approach to these problems, will
attempt to keep the arguments within a re-
gime-approved framework and to restrict the
scope and nature of the changes sought. The
regime, however, will not hesitate to revert to
harsher, oppressive measures to keep the peo-
ple in line if it appears necessary.
28. Certain kinds of external support, notably
those stimulating active, violent, and futile
resistance to the Communist regime, would
almost certainly be counter-productive in re-
spect to nearly all dissident elements in the
Soviet Union. However, support designed to
serve more modest aims, such as continued lib-
eralization, would be welcomed by disaffected
individuals and groups. The acceptability and
success of external support depend on many
factors such as the kind of support, identity
and source of support, the safety of the re-
cipient, the nature of "resistance" asked for,
the kind of reward involved, etc. General
expressions of encouragement designed for
the peaceful evolution of the system as are
possible for radio broadcasts, may also be wel-
come to some elements of the population, but
be taken by other, more militant dissidents as
abandonment by the West.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR
29. Anti-Communist or anti-regime resistance
in the USSR in wartime would depend largely
on the length, severity, and location of the war
and on the course of its military operations.
The mere initiation of hostilities would not
ipso facto increase the resistance potential.
It is almost certain that the regime's appeal
to Soviet patriotism would not fall on deaf
ears and that most of the Soviet peoples, with
the exception of some national minorities,
would work and fight for the defense of their
homeland. Moreover, security control would
undoubtedly be stepped up and dissidents
would find it more difficult to organize and
more dangerous to state their views than in
peacetime.
30. If the war were prolonged and the USSR
suffered major reverses, resistance potential
would probably increase. In view of Soviet be-
havior during World War II and considering
the fact that since then the USSR has become
far stronger and has acquired much more
prestige, it cannot be assumed that popular
suffering from great hardships, tensions, and
tighter controls would in itself catalyze dissi-
dence into resistance. Only if war damage
were sufficient to cause a breakdown of central
authority would organized resistance develop.
Short of this contingency, even if the regime
were weakened, anti-regime resistance would
still be regarded as treason and enough secu-
rity controls would remain to render organi-
zation or resistance very difficult.
31. Active resistance would become much
more likely if the tide of the war turned defi-
nitely against the USSR and foreign troops
entered the USSR. Until that point, many
anti-Soviet elements would be afraid to act,
remembering the severe penalties imposed on
collaborators with the Germans after World
War II. Particularly in minority areas along
the border, extensive anti-Soviet activity could
be expected as anti-Soviet forces approached.
Many natives inspired with the vision of liber-
ation would take to the woods and form parti-
san bands, as they did during and after World
War II, raiding supply lines, performing acts
of sabotage, providing intelligence and help-
ing in escape and evasion operations. Some
groups in other parts of the USSR would be
willing to offer assistance if communication
could be established with them. For example,
forced labor camps and colonies, representing
as they do concentrations of anti-Soviet ele-
ments, might be able to create disturbances in
the hinterland. Many exiled Germans, North
Caucasians, Crimean Tatars, and Halts in
Central Asia, the Altai territory, and Siberia
probably would be willing intelligence collec-
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tors. However, it would be difficult to organ-
ize active resistance in areas still under Soviet
control. Even if hard pressed on military
fronts, the Soviet leaders would make a deter-
mined, and probably successful, effort to
maintain control in the hinterland to prevent
resistance elements from becoming active be-
hind their lines.
32. In the event of an impending collapse of
the Soviet government, anti-Soviet elements
of the population, together with forced labor
camp inmates and forced exiles, could attain
significant resistance capabilities, particularly
with external support. But apart from these
elements, resistance among the broad masses
of the Great Russian people would be difficult
to organize. Patriotism, indoctrinated re-
spect for Soviet authority, and apathy prob-
ably would render them passive and disin-
clined to active opposition. Therefore, even if
the security apparatus were seriously weak-
ened, little resistance activity could be ex-
pected from the mass of the Great Russian
population beyond local harassing operations
and defections. Similarly, the most common
reaction to a foreign occupation of Soviet ter-
ritory probably would be passivity and suspi-
cion. Memories of the last war are still fresh
and the people have not forgotten the bru-
tality of the German occupation, as well as
the subsequent Soviet revenge for collabora-
tion. Since Soviet propaganda would try to
equate the activities of the invaders with those
of the Germans in the last war, occupation
policies would be crucial in determining the
attitude of the masses.
33. A limited amount of information on nu-
clear weapons effects has been released to the
Soviet public since 1954, but the campaign
appears to have minimized the effects of
atomic warfare. This effort has been accom-
panied by propaganda, probably to arouse
patriotism, picturing a nuclear war purely as
a measure in defense of the homeland and
reassuring the people of Soviet victory in such
a conflict. Although popular reaction to
atomic attack is extremely difficult to esti-
mate, such a familiarization program may
have the effect of leaving the populace so un-
prepared for the actual destruction and dislo-
cation that survivors would be demoralized
and that patriotic fervor might be over-
whelmed.
34. A nuclear attack on any scale is unlikely
immediately to either increase or decrease re-
sistance activities among the survivors to any
appreciable extent. However, within a short
period of time the extreme hardships brought
about by even a small nuclear attack would
tend to create actions of desperate elements
which, whether intended or not, would have
the effect of resistance. At the same time
inevitable disruption of the control structure
resulting from such an attack would reduce
the regime's capability to deal with such ele-
ments. If a limited nuclear attack were
planned and executed so as to reduce Soviet
administrative, political and military control
but to minimize general population casualties
in national minority areas, such as the Lat-
vian, Estonian and Lithuanian SSR's, the
Georgian SSR, and to a lesser extent the
Ukraine, it is probable that resistance activi-
ties in these areas would become greatly in-
tensified, particularly if they received external
support.
35. Such resistance potential as does exist
would probably not be affected by the question
of which side started the war. It can be taken
for granted that the Soviet government would
do all it could to shift the blame to the free
world in general and the United States in par-
ticular. It may be assumed that potential
resisters as well as many dissidents would
anticipate such propaganda and not pay too
much attention to it. The population as a
whole, even if impressed with Soviet argu-
ments at the beginning of the war, would in
the long run be influenced by the trend of the
war rather than by the question as to who
attacked whom first. Also, the nationality of
the attacking forces would probably have lit-
tle effect on long-range popular attitudes, ex-
cept that popular opposition to the invaders
would almost certainly be much stronger
against Germans than other nationalities.
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APPENDIX A
ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE BALTIC REPUBLICS
BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE
1. All the factors which engender dissidence
in the USSR are present in the Baltic repub-
lics ? collectivized agriculture, low standards
of living, pronounced income inequalities,
state control of thought and expression, and
fresh memories and continuing fear of police
terror. These alienating factors are inten-
sified manyf old, however, by the national con-
sciousness and historic experience of the Bal-
tic peoples.1 Resistance potential is probably
nowhere higher in the Soviet Union than in
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
2. The most important single factor in Baltic
opposition to Soviet rule is the experience of
national independence between the world
wars. The bitter memory of forced Soviet
annexation is intensified by the brutality of
Soviet rule, which brought the exile or liq-
uidation of hundreds of thousands of natives,
by the radical depression of living standards,
and by the imposition of the rule and immi-
gration of the traditionally hated and feared
Russians. Thus, anti-Soviet and anti-Russian
sentiments pervade all Baltic social strata
and groups. Outright Communist sympa-
thizers comprise only a minute fraction of the
native population. Many native Communist
Party leaders lived in the USSR when the Bal-
tic states were independent and returned only
upon Soviet annexation of their native coun-
tries; Balts in general look on them as rene-
gades.
3. The near unanimity of anti-Soviet feelings
among native Balts is to a certain degree offset
I Although in a strict ethnic sense the terms
"Baltic" and "Balt" should be applied only to
Latvians and Lithuanians, Estonians being of
Finnish stock, the term is used in this paper
to apply to all three, for convenience and on
geographic grounds.
by the greater political reliability of ethnic
Russians brought into the area since World
War II. The estimated proportion of the non-
indigenous population of Russians in the Bal-
tic republics ranges from a high of 40 percent
in Latvia to a low of 20 percent in Lithuania.
Since the position of Russians in these coun-
tries is dependent entirely on Soviet rule,
they have a strong vested interest in main-
taining the present regime.
4. Despite the intensity of anti-Soviet feeling
among most Balts, Soviet security measures
at present prevent any resistance greater than
individual or small-group passive resistance
and an occasional mass demonstration. Only
a radical alteration of the present situation,
such as war, a sharp relaxation of security
controls, or a breakdown of the Soviet sys-
tem itself would seem to make possible or-
ganized resistance on a large scale.
5. The de-Stalinization campaign and the
partial liberalization of the Soviet system
since Stalin's death (both of which were more
limited in the Baltic republics than in most
other areas of the USSR) brought some hope
to Balts, expressed mainly in the form of
rumors during the spring of 1956 that the
Soviet leadership might restore the Baltic re-
publics to autonomous, although satellite,
status. The events in Poland and Hungary
in the autumn of 1956 encouraged a few
nationalist demonstrations in Lithuania and
open anti-Soviet talk elsewhere. The regime
easily curtailed such public manifestations of
nationalism, however.
RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE
6. Reports in 1952 and 1953 indicated the pos-
sibility of small groups of organized resist-
ance in Lithuania. However, as in northwest-
ern Latvia, the few remaining groups were be-
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ing successfully penetrated by MVD provoc-
ateurs. It is doubtful if any unpenetrated
group existed after 1954. As a result, there
are no known organized resistance groups in
the Baltic area at this time. While there is
reason to believe that some former resistance
group members may still live in the forests of
southeastern Lithuania, there is no recent
evidence to indicate that an organization as
such exists. Acts of sabotage that occasional-
ly occurred up until 1953 appear to have been
the work of isolated persons.
7. The immediate objectives of any remain-
ing groups in the Baltic states probably would
be personal and organizational survival. A
secondary objective would be harassment of
Soviet forces and collaborators. Their ulti-
mate objective presumably would be the crea-
tion of a national state in which they could
resume a normal life. There is no known or-
ganized anti-Communist infiltration of the
armed forces, bureaucracy, or war industry.
Nonviolent resistance in the Baltic republics,
such as occurred during the Hungarian revolt,
when there was what appeared to be a spon-
taneous expression of nationalism, was prob-
ably not the work of organized resistance
groups.
8. The extent and nature of unorganized re-
sistance is unknown but believed to be de-
creasing in over-all signficance. Students ap-
pear to exhibit a potential for unorganized
resistance. In all three republics student un-
rest in the universities has been expressed
during 1956 and 1957 in demonstrations and
in the distribution of leaflets. Party leaders
have been criticized for neglecting student
ideological education.
9. Dissidence and passive resistance also ap-
pear to exist, but there is not sufficient evi-
dence to evaluate their extent and signifi-
cance. Newspapers in the Baltic states crit-
icize nonproduction in factories and kolkh-
ozes and there is the usual amount of self-
criticism in the papers. While these items
indicate that the Soviet regime is not satisfied
with conditions in the Baltic republics, only
a part of the acts can be attributed to purpose-
ful resistance. Passive resistance in the form
of a slow-down of production cannot be in-
creased perceptibly without incurring danger
of deportation or other acts of reprisal and
control.
10. Dissidence is widespread, but difficult to
detect and to evaluate except when the stim-
ulus of external events changes dissidence
into action. During the Hungarian revolt in
1956 widespread unorganized resistance was
shown in the overturning of a Stalin statue,
in demonstrations demanding withdrawal of
Red Army troops, in staging of parades, and in
singing the national anthems, most noticeably
in Lithuania, but reportedly in Estonia and
Latvia also. From these actions dissidence
appears to be widespread. The independence
spirit is still alive in the Baltic states, but
there is little opportunity to express it effec-
tively. Expression of dissident feelings has
been more successful in Lithuania than in Es-
tonia and Latvia. Moreover, Soviet popula-
tion transfers have reduced the number of
ethnic Estonians to about 75 percent of the
population, and ethnic Latvians to about 60
percent and Lithuanians to about 80 percent.
Replacement population transferees cannot be
expected to participate in resistance activities.
ROLE OF EMIGRES
11. Balts seem to know comparatively little
about the activities of emigres, and attempts
to resist Soviet domination do not seem to be
directly inspired by emigre activity. Many
Baits, however, derive satisfaction and encour-
agement from the knowledge that emigre
groups exist abroad, that many nations (in-
cluding the United States) do not recognize
the Soviet annexation of their countries, and
that the Baltic states still have formal diplo-
matic representation in exile.
REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE
12. The regime brought the organized resist-
ance of the Baltic states under control
through the use of militarized security forces
and Army troops. Suspect elements of the
population were deported during the 1945-
1950 period and later replaced by other ethnic
groups, mainly Russian. Subsequent penetra-
tion of resistance groups by security organs
along with the individual deportations, de-
pleted the Baltic states of resistance leader-
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ship, organization, and activity. Russifica-
tion of government organizations has proved
effective in keeping potential resistance in
check. Unorganized resistance has been con-
trolled in a similar manner. Passive resist-
ance has been inhibited through threatened
deportations, pardons to some deportees,
and improvement in the standard of living.
Feelings of dissidence are widespread but
cannot be evaluated accurately because the
populations have little opportunity to trans-
late dissidence into action. Until recent-
ly, even mildly anti-Soviet statements were
punished by arrest and long imprisonment.
Even now, persons who show evidence of lead-
ing nationalistic activity are arrested ? as
were the leaders of the November 1956 demon-
strations in Lithuania. Both because of the
strategic position of the area and the known
disaffection of the native population, security
measures in the Baltic have been even more
stringent than elsewhere in the USSR.
13. Milder methods are also employed by the
regime to reduce dissidence and achieve
ideological conformity. Party propaganda,
agitation, and indoctrination are continual
and virtually omnipresent. The regime offers
enticing rewards in terms of power and ad-
vancement to Balts who collaborate with it,
but the threat or exercise of repression re-
mains the most important means of prevent-
ing active resistance in the Baltic republics.
CAPABILITY OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS
REVOLT
14. The individual Baltic republic govern-
ments can suppress any localized revolt at
this time. Soviet troops and militarized
security forces stationed in the Baltic repub-
lics are of ethnic origins other than the local
republic in which they are stationed, and can
be expected to cooperate in the suppression of
any local revolt. It is therefore unlikely that
a Hungarian-type uprising could take place in
any of the Baltic states. The majority of
Baits live in rural areas while most of the
Russians and other non-Baits live in cities,
although in Estonia one can find in nearly
every kolkhoz some persons who are not
Baltic. Russians and non-Balts form at least
half the population of the Baltic capitals.
15. In both Estonia and Latvia revolts would
be difficult because there is no contiguous land
border with a foreign country that might sup-
ply help. Of all the Baltic countries, Lith-
uania has the best conditions for staging a
spontaneous mass uprising of some duration.
In addition to bordering on Poland, a foreign
country with a volatile and Catholic popula-
tion, the Lithuanians have a long history of
independence and of fighting for their rights
as they see them. Besides, the geography of
southeastern Lithuania, particularly the for-
ests and hills, provides a refuge from which
partisans can operate.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS
OF PEACE
16. There are no known organized resistance
groups in the Baltic states. Local capabilities
for resistance activities do not go beyond un-
organized, mainly passive, resistance or ? un-
der the most favorable conditions ? occa-
sional demonstrations with nationalist over-
tones. More violent types of demonstrations,
such as holding up Soviet supply vehicles,
were reported through 1954 but not since.
Such acts probably were the work of outlaw
elements, most of whom could not be de-
pended on at the present for specific action
or for organized action in the future.
17. A marked increase in East-West tensions
furnishing hope of liberation would probably
encourage more determined attempts at ac-
tive resistance. Such a development, however,
would probably be accompanied by an intensi-
fication of security measures and terror which
might neutralize most practical effects of the
increased determination to resist. A decrease
of East-West tensions would be likely to dis-
courage any sort of active resistance and to in-
crease fatalistic acquiescence to Soviet rule.
If accompanied by a liberalization of security
precautions and thought control, it might,
however, facilitate the spread and develop-
ment of nationalist sentiment.
18. While it is believed that there is no sub-
stantial organized resistance, either active or
passive, it is conceivable that some very small
isolated groups do exist, particularly in south-
eastern Lithuania. But it would be extremely
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difficult for them to expand. They have no
contact with the West and have lost contact
with friendly local populations through the
deportation of identifiable sympathizers.
Their survival efforts constantly require theft
and other unlawful acts which increase the
partisans' vulnerability and constantly in-
crease their isolation from any possible
sources of help, supply, or recruits. At the
present time, resistance in new forms is virtu-
ally impossible because resistance groups or
potential members must be supplied with
funds and equipinent and, most important,
an effective communications system with each
other and the West. The lack of communica-
tions prevents the identification and location
of real or potential resistance members. Un-
til an effective means of communication is
established, resistance in the Baltic states will
probably further decrease.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR
19. The outbreak of war between the Soviet
Bloc and the West would undoubtedly increase
resistance potential in the Baltic states.
Contrary to the passionate desire for peace in
almost every other portion of the Soviet
Union, many Balts hope for an East-West
war since they see in it their only hope for
liberation. It cannot be assumed, however,
that in any future war Baltic resistance could
be as widespread and effective as it was when
Germany attacked the USSR in 1941, at which
time the Baltic states had been under Soviet
rule less than a year and the Soviet armies
had to beat a hasty retreat.
20. The possibilities for active Baltic resist-
ance in any future war would depend largely
on whether a fighting front were located in
or near the area. If the front were remote,
anti-Soviet Balts might be able to form small
partisan bands in the forests to harass supply
lines and perform acts of sabotage. Many
Balts would be willing to assist evasion and
escape operations, although the presence of
non-Balts on collectivized farms would com-
pound the difficulties of such assistance.
Given an opportunity, many Balts would
probably be willing to perform espionage. So-
viet security measures, however, would proba-
bly be able to prevent large-scale organization
or military and political warfare of more than
nuisance value.
21. If an active front approached the area, on
the other hand, more widespread resistance
could be expected, though not approaching
the Baltic performance in 1941. Under anti-
Soviet occupation, native Balts would be un-
likely to participate in pro-Soviet partisan
activity and most would lend their hearty sup-
port to the liquidation of Russian partisans or
pro-Soviet native elements in the area.
22. Baltic resistance potential in wartime
would be little affected by such matters as the
nationality of the attacking forces or which
side initiated hostilities. Even German rule
would be considered preferable to Soviet (the
Nazi occupation of the area having been com-
paratively mild) , although Balts might resist
Soviet rule with somewhat greater determina-
tion if the attacking forces were non-German.
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APPENDIX B
ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE CAUCASUS
BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE
1. Any evaluation of disaffection in the Cau-
casus must take into account the differing
peoples of this area. While there are elements
of discontent common to all the indigenous
peoples of the area which unite them against
the regime, there are also factors which set
the Georgians, Armenians, and Azerbaidzhani
peoples apart from each other. The Georgians
and Armenians, for reasons of longer inde-
pendent nationhood and a common religion
(Christianity) , feel superior to the Azerbaid-
zhani, a Moslem people. At the same time,
the Georgians, because of a longer and more
unbroken period of independence than the
Armenians, feel superior to the latter, who
harbor a latent distrust of their mountain
neighbors.
2. The underlying basis for dissatisfaction and
discontent in Georgia, Armenia, and Azer-
baidzhan is to be found in an anti-Russian
attitude on the part of the native populations.
Such factors as non-Slavic lineage, distinct
languages, acceptance of Christianity in the
case of Georgia and Armenia antedating Rus-
sian acceptance by several centuries, and dif-
ferent cultural and historical heritages have
imparted to the Georgians and Armenians,
particularly the former,- a sense of national
distinctiveness which makes them look upon
the Russians as interlopers and late-comers.
The assistance rendered to the Georgian and
Armenian nations during critical periods in
their histories by the Tsarist regime has not
eliminated this feeling. In the case of the
Azerbaidzhani people, who prior to the Bol-
shevik Revolution had no real sense of nation-
hood, the anti-Russian bias stems from Rus-
sian colonization. This began in the eight-
eenth century, and reached its peak in the
late 1800's with Russian exploitation of the oil
resources around Baku. The ensuing develop-
ment of the area meant a dislocation of native
groups, a disruption of their traditional way
of life, and an incipient second-class citizen-
ship.
3. While difficult to document as to scope and
intensity, anti-Russianism is demonstrated by
the limited amount of social contact between
minorities and Russians. Certain areas of
large Caucasian cities appear to be separated
into Slavic and non-Slavic sections. Inter-
marriage does not appear to be too common
and is frequently frowned on. A more im-
mediate source for disaffection is Soviet Com-
munism in practice ? material hardships, low
living standards, the collective farm system,
the antireligious nature of the regime, thought
control, and the stifling of nationalism ? all
of which also engender discontent in other
parts of the Soviet Union.
4. Apart from the Party and government elite,
discontent would appear to extend to all strata
of the population in varying degrees. The
politically more mature Georgians have been
most vocal in expressing dissidence in the
post-Stalin period, followed by the Armenians
and the Azerbaidzhani in that order. Among
the Georgians, students and intellectuals are
the most noteworthy dissident elements. In
Armenia, the most disaffected group appears
to be the Armenians who returned to Soviet
Armenia in the early post-World War II peri-
od. Estimates of the numbers who returned
range from 25,000 to 100,000. Their disaffec-
tion results mainly from very poor economic
conditions and the fact that they are not com-
pletely accepted by the local population.
5. Discontent, though widespread, does not
appear to be intense enough to translate it-
self into resistance activity, particularly on
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an organized basis. Furthermore, the post-
war history of dissidence in the Caucasus sug-
gests that while there has been some resist-
ance, it has been on an unorganized basis and
without particular goals in mind. A new pat-
tern of dissidence as a result of the post-Sta-
lin policies of the regime is not discernible.
The relaxation of stringent police controls
has been welcomed. People express their
doubts and criticisms of the regime more
openly now. Such events as the de-Staliniza-
tion campaign, the Polish-Hungarian events,
and the Soviet leadership ousters of June
1957 have caused confusion and doubt about
the present policies of the regime. There are,
however, no signs of increased dissidence or
resistance. The population is aware that the
regime is willing and able to eradicate any
evidence of resistance.
RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE
6. A few small organized resistance groups
are believed to exist in Georgia, Armenia, and
Azerbaidzhan. There is no available informa-
tion on their strength, discipline, training,
facilities, or equipment. Furthermore, there
is no means of communication with these
alleged resistance groups. Such groups would
almost certainly be nationalistic in motiva-
tion. They would operate within the bound-
aries of their own national republics in most
cases.
7. Unorganized active resistance to some de-
gree by the people of the Georgian and Azer-
baidzhan SSR's has been reported. The most
serious known disturbance occurred in Tbilisi
in March 1956 when student meetings to
mark the anniversary of Stalin's death grew
into nationalistic demonstrations as a result
of the regime's refusal to permit honors to
Stalin. The demonstrations were eventually
put down by force, with casualties estimated
by various sources at from dozens to 500.
Apart from this incident, it is often difficult to
differentiate other reports of unorganized
active resistance from criminal, speculative
and blackmarket activities. Available evi-
dence indicates a great deal of dissatisfaction
with the Moscow regime. Intellectual dissi-
dence also has been shown in many Caucasian
literary publications which have been severely
criticized during the last year for nationalistic
deviations. Certain examples of this litera-
ture reflect a tone of criticism even stronger
than that which has been directed against the
regime by Russian writers.
ROLE OF EMIGRES
8. Although emigre groups have claimed con-
tact with resistance organizations inside
Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaidzhan, such
claims have not been substantiated in the
post-Stalin era. There was a contact between
an internal Georgian opposition element and
the Georgian government-in-exile, but this
has not been maintained in recent years. No
other external sources appear to have influ-
enced any of the internal resistance groups
since World War II.
REGIME MEASURES AGAINST RESISTANCE
9. In the past the Soviet government has dis-
persed from the Caucasus entire ethnic popu-
lations which it believed to be disloyal. Many
persons have been executed or given sentences
in labor camps in Siberia or Central Asia.
Moreover, the Soviet Union has a very effec-
tive internal security organization, with in-
formers in all walks of life and all ethnic
groups. These measures have been very effec-
tive in controlling active resistance. It is im-
probable that any national minority resist-
ance group of significant size could exist with-
out coming to the attention of the Soviet secu-
rity service. It follows that any major upris-
ing or riot must be essentially spontaneous in
origin, because any organization large enough,
with good communications, to foment such an
event would have been penetrated and neu-
tralized before the event could take place.
Since the death of Stalin, the technique of
dispersion of people has not been employed
and it is possible that the informant system
has been relaxed somewhat, but either of these
methods could be revitalized at any moment.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER CONDITIONS
OF PEACE
10. Even under present conditions of some-
what relaxed police controls, the Soviet secu-
rity system is more than adequate to prevent
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or stamp out any organized resistance activity
in the Caucasus. While individual, unorgan-
ized resistance might be encouraged by the
regime's relaxation of the rigid police terror
of the Stalin era, any indication that such acts
were becoming common or organized would be
enough to bring about increased security con-
trols to prevent the formation of organized
resistance. The factor most likely to affect
resistance potential would appear to be a
breakdown of the police and security control
system. Short of this, or of a fundamental
change in the leadership of the Soviet Union,
such events as an increase or decrease in East-
West tensions or ideological disputes within
the "socialist camp" would have little effect
on resistance activity. Any deterioration in
the economic condition of the population
would lead to increased discontent, but the
regime could easily prevent any organized op-
position to regime policies. Signs of external
support in any form to resistance groups in
the Caucasus would bring the sharpest reac-
tion and punitive measures against such
groups.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR
11. The opportunity for anti-regime resist-
ance under conditions of actual warfare would
depend considerably on the type and location
of war being fought. The outbreak of hostili-
ties would bring extraordinary security pre-
cautions into play on the part of the state.
As long as the theater of operations remained
outside the Caucasus, the likelihood of in-
creased resistance operations would remain
small because of the increased security meas-
ures. While some resistance groups might
become active, most likely in Georgia, as soon
as hostilities broke out, the vast majority of
the Caucasian population would probably
adopt a "wait-and-see" attitude. If the tide
of battle turned conclusively against the So-
viet regime, the potential for organized resist-
ance on an expanded basis would increase
accordingly. Otherwise, the memory of So-
viet punishment of World War II collaborators
would militate against large-scale organized
resistance movements.
12. The optimum conditions for organized re-
sistance would, of course, occur if the Cau-
casus became a theater of war or if the col-
lapse of central authority were imminent. If
either should occur, resistance activities would
probably range from disobedience of Soviet
laws to assistance to enemy forces in provid-
ing intelligence information, harassment of
Soviet security and armed forces, and help in
escape and evasion operations. Independent
military activity against Soviet forces proba-
bly would be beyond the capacity of resistance
groups, unless large-scale units defected along
with equipment and material. Such military
action would depend on direct outside sup-
port. Moreover, the troops of this area are
ethnic non-Caucasians.
13. With the exception of the Germans who
might encounter hostility because of their
World War II policies, only the Turks might
arouse Armenian antagonism; the Armenian
massacres in the late 1890's and during World
War I are not yet forgotten. The question of
the responsibility for the instigation of hos-
tilities would have little effect on resistance
activities. However, the occupation policies of
the invading forces would have a strong im-
pact on the local populations as far as their
willingness to engage in resistance activities
would be concerned. The Soviet postwar
propaganda campaign depicting the horrors
of German occupation in other parts of the
country was designed in part to overcome any
latent sympathy in such areas as the Cau-
casus for future "liberating" forces.
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APPENDIX C
ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE UKRAINE
BASIC FACTORS OF DISSIDENCE
1. Ukrainian nationalism continues to be an
important political problem with which the
Soviet regime must reckon. The Ukrainians
are the largest minority group in the USSR.
The political, economic and strategic impor-
tance of the Ukraine is second only to the
RSFSR. The best evidence of Soviet concern
over Ukrainian nationalism and its counter-
part, anti-Russian sentiment, is found in re-
curring appeals to root out "bourgeois nation-
alism."
2. The economic and political grievances com-
mon throughout the Soviet Union are at the
core of opposition in the Ukraine to Soviet
rule. Soviet sponsorship of the liquidation of
the rich peasant and of the collective farm is
probably resented more there than in some
other parts of the Soviet Union since the
Ukraine had a fairly large proportion of pros-
perous peasants. These various grievances,
shared with other Soviet peoples, count far
more in explaining existing dissidence in the
Ukraine than Soviet suppression of Ukrainian
nationalist aspirations. Opposition to the re-
gime there is first anti-Communist, and only
second anti-Russian.
3. Ukrainian reaction to the russification
efforts of the Soviet regime remains, however,
considerable. Ukrainians, whether Party
members or not, remember with bitterness
Stalin's purge of leading Ukrainian Commu-
nists who stood up for Ukrainian cultural
autonomy in the 1930's and resent the con-
tinuation of the calculated policy of staffing
a good portion of leading Party and govern-
ment positions in the Ukraine with Russians.
Stalin's glorification of Russian heroes and
the continued identification of Russian his-
tory with the Soviet state hurt Ukrainian
pride. While religious attitudes may be of
diminishing importance in the Ukraine as
elsewhere in the USSR, the liquidation of the
Ukrainian Autocephalous Church in 1930 and
of the Uniate Church in the newly acquired
western Ukraine after the war is a further
cause for resentment.
INTENSITY AND CHARACTER OF
DISSIDENCE
4. Ukrainian nationalist tensions, although a
continuing nuisance for the Soviet adminis-
tration, do not now represent any serious
threat to the regime. The nationalist resist-
ance organizations active in the years imme-
diately following World War II are now large-
ly, if not completely, quiescent. Only in the
event of a disintegration of Soviet central
controls might Ukrainian nationalism rise to
the surface and serve as a focus for an anti-
Soviet resistance movement.
5. The intensity of Ukrainian nationalist f eel-
ing is difficult to measure. A great many
Ukrainians, probably the majority, are loyal
members of Soviet society, particularly now
that living standards are gradually rising and
police controls have been slightly relaxed.
Russification has probably gone further in the
eastern Ukraine than in any other of the non-
Russian lands and has been much more suc-
cessful in industrial cities, which now contain
large numbers of Great Russians, than in
towns and villages. Russians and Ukrainians
have mingled together there for hundreds of
years and the educated members of society
know both languages equally well. Nation-
alistic sentiments increase as one moves west-
ward in the Ukraine away from the Russian
lands. Opposition to Soviet rule is believed
to be most intense in the territories absorbed
during World War II along the Soviet Union's
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western borders, where memories of Sovietiza-
tion are freshest. Resentment of the Russians
is not confined here to Ukrainians alone, but
is shared by such other minority groups in
the area as Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, and
Rumanians.
RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE
6. Armed resistance to the Soviet regime after
World War II was most intense in these west-
ern territories, particularly in the Carpathian
mountains. Ukrainian nationalist organiza-
tions active in German-occupied Europe dur-
ing the war mounted guerrilla operations
there against Soviet units, communications
lines, and collective farms in 1946 and 1947.
The Soviet authorities had crushed these
organizations by the late 1940's, but reports
received from Soviet defectors as late as 1956
indicating that the Banderovtsy (followers of
the Ukrainian nationalist Stefan Bandera) ,
are still active, remain unconfirmed. Most
likely there is no nationalist resistance move-
ment of any significance in the Ukraine at
this time, but the reports suggest that con-
tinued popular belief in the existence of these
organizations may be widespread. Although
there has been no evidence of an upsurge of
resistance activities since the death of Stalin,
such activities seem to have been implied in
radio and press appeals, as late as 1956, that
partisans in the Volynskaya Oblast surrender
voluntarily and receive pardons for their past
actions.
7. Unorganized resistance in the Ukraine
exists primarily in the western oblasts and is
conducted mainly by intellectuals. It is pas-
sive in nature and is manifested in resisting
russification, e.g., by advocating the use of
Ukrainian national feeling in literature. Re-
cent attacks on Ukrainian writers as being
national deviationists tend to confirm these
trends.
8. Since the suppression of nationalist aspira-
tions and resistance movements during the
Stalin regime, there is now no evidence to
indicate any nationalist movement. Since
the death of Stalin, the Soviets have treated
the issue of nationalism cautiously in the
Ukraine. Some attempts to conciliate nation-
al feeling can be found in their liberation of
former partisans from labor camps, the re-
habilitation of former Ukrainian Communist
writers suspected of nationalistic tendencies,
and the disappearance of some Party and KGB
officials who had been engaged in the sup-
pression of resistance. The celebration of the
.300th anniversary of the Union of the Ukraine
with Russia was officially observed with con-
siderable deference paid to the loyalty and
heroism of the Ukrainian peoples.
ROLE OF EMIGRES
9. Emigre groups have been of no material
assistance to resistance groups in the Ukraine.
The little contact that did exist with persons
in the Ukraine has been broken by capture
and/or liquidation of the Ukrainian individ-
uals involved. The contact between groups
in the Ukraine and emigre groups tends to
become unilateral; escapees augment the emi-
gre colony and intensify anti-Soviet feeling
in the non-Bloc countries, but there has been
no significant reverse flow or intensification of
anti-regime feeling in the Ukraine. However,
the mere existence of an active emigre group
may tend to buoy the hopes of those people
inside the Ukraine who are bitterly opposed
to the Soviet regime. Concern expressed by
the Soviets in this matter is reflected in So-
viet intelligence activities against Ukraine
emigre groups and the propaganda attacks
in the Soviet press and radio attempting to
belittle and thereby diminish any potential
effectiveness of these groups.
CAPABILITY OF REGIME TO SUPPRESS
REVOLT
10. Any revolt in the Ukraine could be easily
suppressed by the Soviet regime at the present
time. The existence of satellite regimes on
the western borders of the Ukraine has in-
creasingly tended to isolate this earlier hot-
bed of resistance, both materially and morally.
The ruthless suppression of the Hungarian
revolt has served as an illuminating example
of what would happen to a revolt that is not
materially aided by the West. The existence
of large numbers of border troops along the
entire western border of the USSR provides
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immediate forces to counter any revolt. In
addition, Soviet army divisions stationed
throughout the Ukraine can aid in suppres-
sion of revolts. Zakarpatskaya Oblast ap-
pears to offer the best terrain for possible re-
sistance, but its isolation from the remainder
of the Ukraine would probably localize any
revolt.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER
CONDITIONS OF PEACE
11. As long as Soviet police and security con-
trols remain relatively intact, there appears
to be no prospect for a resumption of active
resistance in the Ukraine. Barring an inter-
nal upheaval, these controls are likely to re-
main in force for the foreseeable future. Since
the suppression of the Hungarian revolt, there
is reportedly little sympathy for a violent
form of resistance. Instead, sophisticated
Ukrainian nationalists engage in a subtle form
of resistance by staying within the bounds of
the law and officially approved behavior.
This type of resistance is directed against fur-
ther russification and has as its objective the
maintenance and fostering of a Ukrainian na-
tional feeling. Apparently it is hoped that
this nationalism can be kept alive and that
it will serve as an ideological basis for a free
Ukraine in the future. Meanwhile, through
concessions gained by legal methods, life with-
in the Ukraine, although under a Communist
system, is becoming more tolerable, thus fur-
ther decreasing resistance potential.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR
12. In the event of war, Ukrainians would
probably not try to engage in large-scale re-
sistance activities while Soviet military con-
trols remained in force. They remember the
tragic results of their resistance to the So-
viet regime during World War II. They would
be unlikely to commit themselves to resistance
against the Soviet regime unless they were
convinced the USSR would lose the war. In
other words, Ukrainian dissidence could not
be expected to serve a potential enemy of the
USSR until the outcome of a war were largely
determined. In fact, most Ukrainian soldiers
would probably fight fiercely on the Russian
side.
13. As long as security controls remained firm,
an enemy could expect little or no help from
the inside. If, however, the political structure
should begin to crumble under the impact of
a war, resistance could and might very well
become active again. Pent-up opposition to
the Soviet regime could quite naturally be
channeled into demands for the dismember-
ment of the USSR. The Carpathian moun-
tains on the border of Hungary, Czechoslo-
vakia, and Poland, where Soviet controls are
less firmly established than elsewhere in the
Ukraine, would provide a convenient base for
launching resistance activities in the area.
Such a move would almost certainly require
foreign assistance.
14. The question as to who initiated the war
probably would matter little, nor would the
nationality of invading forces, with the ex-
ception of Germans, who almost certainly
would be fiercely resented even as a part of an
international force. Their presence on Ukrai-
nian soil would seriously impair the develop-
ment of anti-Communist resistance
15. While certain resistance activities such as
intelligence collection or escape and evasion
operations might be possible on a small scale,
no large-scale underground movement in the
Ukraine is likely to gain momentum until So-
viet power had been shaken at its foundations.
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