RECOMMENDATION FOR A SPECIAL NATIONAL ESTIMATE ON POLAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A009200010023-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 4, 2013
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: February 14, 1957
• Content Type: MEMO

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/12/04 : CIA-RDP79R01012A009200010023-6
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NIMOBANDUN 701: Assistant Director, Current Intelligence
TUU Chief Sino-Soviet Staff
FEOM : Chief ICS Branch
SUBJBCT ?
Recommendation for a special national
estimate on Poland
1. We in *astern Suropean Branch are becoming in-
creasingly concerned over the Polish situation and believe
that a National Intelligence Estimate on Poland should be
undertaken immediately.
2. There are numerous signs that Soviet-Polish relations
are deteriorating at a more rapid pace than we anticipated
a few weeks ago and nay reach a critical stage in the next
few months. While this may not result in direct Soviet
military intervention in Poland, it is likely to precipitate
a situation requiring major US policy decisions regarding
Poland and the Gomulka regime.
3. Subsequent to the Iremlin's abortive attempt to
prevent the establishment of the Gomulka regime last October,
the USSR appeared to be reconciled to its existence at
least temporarily. /t probably counted on certain assets
(i.e. the Stalinist and opportunist Polish Communists whose
positions were jeoparised, Polish dependence on Soviet
economic aid, Soviet support for Poland's Oder-Neisse
frontier, etc) either to keep Poland within acceptable
orthodox limits or eventually to subvert the Gomulka
regime. It also may have believed that its capabilities
for restoring a Stalinist regime -in Poland would more
probably increase than decrease with the passage of time.
4. Gomulka policies to date, however, may well have
forced Soviet leaders to revise this estimate. The USSR
is undoubtedly alarmed by many of Oomulka's actions such
as the curtailment of the collectivisation program, the
dissolution of the Communist youth organisation, the agree-
ment with the Catholic church--all measures which will
reduce orthodox Comaunist strength in the country. Further-
more, Oomulka's efforts to establish contacts with Western
socialist parties and to obtain Western aid are evidences of
his intent to broaden his international contacts and support.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/12/04: CIA-RDP79R01012A009200010023-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/12/04: CIA-RDP79R01012A009200010023-6
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5. There are signs that Soviet leaders may well be
convinced that these moves are only the initial steps toward
the restoration of capitalism in Poland and that they must
move rapidly to undermine or destroy the present Polish
regime. The campaign to subvert Gomulka party supporters
has moved more and more into the open with the Soviet Embassy
in Warsaw playing a prominent role. There are also un-
confirmed reports that the USSR has threatened to withold
promised economic credits. Finally the Soviet bloc has
stepped up its ideological criticism of Poland to the point
that the Polish leadership, through its official government
and party press, has broken its silence and sharply rebuked
its Communist bloc critics. The issue has thus been joined
and no compromise is in sight.
6. We still believe that the USSR will probably avoid
any drastic military action in the next several months.
The rift between the two countries, however, is almost
certain to widen and Moscow may feel compelled to resort
to increasingly harsh measures. These could culminate in
an attempted internal Stalinist coup, or a sharpening of
the ideological dispute which would result in Poland's
secession or expulsion from thelsocialist camp."
7. In any event the situation will not stand still and
we believe it is almost certain to deteriorate more rapidly
than previously anticipated. We therefore believe a special
national estimate on Poland is required which will weigh
the various possible courses of action available to the
USSR and Poland and serve as a basis for the formulation
of American policy decisions.
E
STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/12/04: CIA-RDP79R01012A009200010023-6