SINO-SOVIET BLOC AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES THROUGH MID-1962

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• Publication Date: July 16, 1957
• Content Type: NIE

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t?-??
NIE 1-57
_ 16-July 1957
033872
N? 305
NATIONAL INT LLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 11-57
(Supersedes NIE 11-5-55)
SINO-SOVIET BLOC AIR DEFENSE
CAPABILITIES THROUGH MID-1962
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and
the Atomic Energy Commission.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 16 July 1957. Concurring were the Special Assistant, In-
telligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff,
Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval
Intelligence; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF;
the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; and the
Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC. The
Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained,
the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy
is for the information and use of the recipient indicated on the front cover and of per-
sons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination
may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department of
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b. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, for the Department of the Army
c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
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2. This copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with appli-
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3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain
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either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be
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June 1953.
4. The title of this estimate, when used separately from the text, should be classified:
CONFIDENTIAL
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
DISTRIBUTION:
White House
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Department of Defense
Operations Coordinating Board
Atomic Energy Commission
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T 0 P
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CONF DENT
Page Nos.
THE PROBLEM
1
FOREWORD
1
CONCLUSIONS
2
DISCUSSION
4
General Policy
4
PRESENT BLOC AIR DEFENSES
5
Operational Organization
5
Active Air Defense
5
Passive Defense
5
Weapons and Equipment
6
Fighter Aircraft
6
Antiaircraft Artillery
6
Guided Missiles
7
Early Warning, Ground Controlled Intercept, and
Fire Control Radar
7
Other Electronic Equipment
8
Strength and Deployment
9
Other Factors Affecting Air Defense Capabilities
11
Air Facilities
11
Logistic Support and Maintenance
11
Personnel and Training
12
Command and Coordination
13
Passive Defense
13
PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET AIR
DEFENSE SYSTEM
15
Soviet Estimate of the Air and Missile Threat to the Bloc .
15
Trends in Interception and Kill Capabilities
16
Fighter Aircraft
16
Guided Missiles
18
Antiaircraft Artillery
20
A'
CONFDEN11AU
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont.)
Page Nos.
Trends in Early Warning and Intercept Control Capabilities. . 20
Trends in Other Elements of Air Defense Capabilities . . . . 21
ANNEXES
A. Economic Impact of Air Defense Programs 23
B. Tables of Air Defense Equipment: Characteristics, Strength,
and Deployment 28
C. Maps 38
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E T
CONFIDENTIAL'
SINO-SOVIET BLOC AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES
THROUGH MID-1962
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the scale and nature of Sino-Soviet Bloc air defenses, and probable
trends and capabilities through mid-1962.
FOREWORD
This estimate is made within the framework of our previous judgments that the
USSR does not now intend to initiate general war deliberately and is not now prepar-
ing for general war as of any particular future date. It is based, moreover, on a judg-
ment that the USSR is reasonably assured that the US and its Allies are not now
planning the deliberate initiation of general war. The estimate assumes that these
conditions will prevail through mid-1962, and that neither domestic or international
political changes nor unexpected technological breakthroughs which would alter the
general trends in Bloc and Western military capabilities will occur during the period.
It also does not consider any change in military force levels which might result from
a disarmament agreement.
The estimate does not concern itself with the detailed strategy and tactics that
might be employed by US and Allied forces in attacks against the Bloc, nor does it
attempt to evaluate in detail the kill probabilities of Bloc air defense weapons against
attacking aircraft or missiles. Likewise, the reduction in Western offensive capabili-
ties which might result from an initial Soviet attack, and the reduction in Soviet de-
fensive capabilities which might result from the initial phase of a general war, are
not estimated.
An estimate of Soviet air defense capabilities over the next five years is subject
not only to the usual uncertainties inherent in future projections, but to additional
uncertainties arising from the probable emergence during this period of significant
guided missile capabilities, both offensive and defensive, in Western and Soviet forces.
On the basis of presently available evidence, the impact of these developments on So-
viet air defense programs during the period cannot be estimated with confidence.
Fairly broad margins of error must therefore be presumed to apply to the later years
covered by the estimate.
CONPIDENTIAC:
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CONCLUSIONS
GENERAL
1. We believe that air defense will con-
tinue to be given a high priority in the
Sino-Soviet Bloc. Primary emphasis is
placed on providing defense in depth for
key administrative, industrial, and mili-
tary centers within the USSR. All Bloc
forces with capabilities for air defense
are integrated into the over-all system.
(Paras. 16-21, 42, 57-58)
2. At present, the principal elements of
over-all Bloc air defense strength are large
numbers of fighter aircraft, early warn-
ing and ground controlled intercept ra-
dars, and antiaircraft artillery weapons.
Bloc fighter strength now totals about
14,000 aircraft, virtually all of which are
high-performance jet fighters. Of about
10,000 fighters in Soviet units, approxi-
mately 1,300 now have at least limited
all-weather capabilities. The USSR has
made great strides in radar development,
and large numbers of modern radars are
now in operation. Bloc AAA weapons are
capable of high rates of continuously-
pointed fire against high-performance
aircraft from low altitudes up to about
35,000 feet. (Paras. 22, 24-28, 35, 42,
47, 49)
3. A significant addition to Soviet air
defenses has been the introduction of
guided missile systems. Surface-to-air
guided missile installations are now oper-
ational in the Moscow area, and there is
some evidence that they are under con-
struction at Leningrad. Air-to-air guided
missiles could probably now be ethployed
with certain Soviet fighter types. (Paras.
29-31, 45, 89, 90)
4. The areas of high concentration of Bloc
air defense weapons and associated equip-
ment include that portion of European
USSR from the Kola Peninsula to the
Caspian Sea, East Germany, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and the Maritime and
Sakhalin areas of the Soviet Far East.
High defense concentrations are also at
some specific locations outside these areas,
such as Tashkent, Novosibirsk, and Kha-
barovsk. (Paras. 42-44, 47)
5. The principal current weaknesses in
the air defense system are: its limited
all-weather fighter capability; the low
traffic-handling capabilities of communi-
cations and control components; the
probable inadequacy of radar height-
finding capabilities at high altitudes and
inadequate low altitude radar coverage;
deficiencies in fighter armament; and
the limited early warning time available
in Bloc border areas. (Paras. 23-25,30-34,
36, 42, 50, 57-58, 93)
6. Large passive defense organizations
contribute to the Bloc's over-all readiness
for air defense. We believe, however, that
the general population is inadequately
prepared against large-scale nuclear at-
tack. (Paras. 59-68)
CURRENT CAPABILITIES
7. The following air defense capabilities
apply in general to the Bloc's air defense
system:
a. Against penetrations conducted dur-
ing daylight and in clear weather, at
altitudes between about 5,000 and about
35,000 feet, the capabilities of the system
are greatest. Above 35,000 feet they
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would begin to diminish, and above 45,000
feet would fall off markedly; at altitudes
below 5,000 feet, they would also be pro-
gressively reduced. (Paras. 26-27, 29,
32-34)
b. Against penetrations conducted at
night and under poor visibility condi-
tions, the capabilities of the system would
be considerably reduced. (Paras. 22,
24, 42)
c. Against varied penetration tactics
utilizing altitude stacking, diversionary
maneuvers, decoys, and electronic coun-
termeasures, the capabilities of the air
defense system would be diminished
through disruption and saturation.
(Paras. 24, 34, 36-38, 57-58)
8. The approaches to Moscow are by far
the most heavily defended area of the
Bloc. Moscow's defenses include nearly
1,300 jet day and all-weather fighters,
approximately 700 antiaircraft guns, and
some 57 surface-to-air guided missile
sites. The Moscow missile system, which
could include a limited number of nuclear
warheads, can probably direct a very high
rate of fire against multiple targets at
altitudes up to about 60,000 feet. Mos-
cow's defenses are thus estimated to have
a high capability to engage large-scale
attack under all-weather conditions, but
they probably remain vulnerable to very
low altitude attack. (Paras. 29, 45, 91)
9. The amount of warning time available
has a significant effect on the air defense
capabilities of the various areas of the
Bloc. Moscow and many other targets
in the interior could now be provided
with more than one hour's radar early
warning of attack by present Western
aircraft types. The more limited early
warning time available in Bloc border
areas would reduce the effectiveness of
the defenses of even heavily-defended
targets in such areas. (Para. 93)
10. The USSR is currently capable of
jamming and seriously disrupting West-
ern long-range radio communications.
It is also believed to have an appreciable
capability for jamming Western naviga-
tional and bombing radars. On the other
hand, operational Bloc air defense elec-
tronic equipment is vulnerable to jam-
ming. (Para. 40)
FUTURE TRENDS
11. There will probably be a significant
change in the composition of Soviet air
defense forces during the next five years,
primarily because of the influence of
guided missile systems. As suitable sur-
face-to-air missiles and associated equip-
ment become available in quantity, a
large portion of the medium and some
light antiaircraft artillery guns will prob-
ably be phased out of the defenses of stat-
ic targets in the USSR. At present, we can
estimate only that the USSR will prob-
ably not increase its present numerical
fighter strength, and that a decision will
probably be taken to begin cutting back
the number of Soviet manned intercep-
tors some time late in the period. The
numerical strength of Satellite and Chi-
nese Communist AAA and fighter forces
will probably continue to be augmented,
largely with older equipment retired from
Soviet service. (Paras. 79-81, 89-90, 92)
12. Significant developments in Bloc air
defenses will probably include: the intro-
duction of fighter aircraft with higher
performance and better armament, in-
cluding air-to-air guided missiles and un-
guided rockets, some possibly equipped
with nuclear warheads; an increase in
the proportion of all-weather fighters in
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Soviet operational units; the advent of
new surface-to-air guided missile systems
suitable for defense of static targets,
field forces, and naval vessels, and their
availability to additional major Soviet
cities and industrial areas, as well as mil-
itary units; extensions of early warning
and ground controlled intercept radar
ranges, and the availability of sufficient
radars to provide nearly complete early
warning coverage of the Bloc; increases
in the traffic-handling capacities of com-
mand and control components. (Paras.
76-86, 89-92, 95, 97-98, 100)
13. These developments will considerably
increase Bloc capabilities for all-weather
defense against Western manned aircraft
and cruise-type missiles. Nevertheless, at
the end of the period, warning times a-
vailable to Bloc targets in peripheral areas
will probably continue to be deficient for
fighter interceptors and marginal for sur-
face-to-air missile defenses against the
highest-performance Western aircraft
and cruise-type missiles. The Bloc will
continue to have difficulty in opposing
very low altitude attacks. (Paras. 72, 85,
93-95)
14. In the field of electronic counter-
measures, the advantage is likely to
fluctuate between the offense and the
defense. However, we estimate that
through the period of this estimate, Bloc
air defense electronic systems will still be
subject to progressive disruption by prop-
erly employed diversionary tactics, de-
coys, saturation techniques and other
countermeasures. (Paras. 100-101)
15. We believe the USSR will not be able
to place in operation a weapon system
capable of successfully intercepting bal-
listic missiles by mid-1962. (Para. 88)
DISCUSSION
GENERAL POLICY
16. The Soviet leaders probably believe that
the security of the USSR from air attack rests
primarily on their over-all political and mili-
tary posture. They hope to avoid situations
which could lead to a Western attack and they
hope that their offensive strength will deter
attack should such situations arise. They are
also trying to reduce the US threat by political
and diplomatic action intended to deny use
of the overseas bases which are presently
essential to a full-scale US attack on the Bloc.
Finally, if the Soviet leaders estimated that
war was imminent, they would probably
attempt to strike the first blow at Western
nuclear capabilities in order to reduce the
scale of an initial assault on the USSR.
Nevertheless, they almost certainly recognize
that these measures may be inadequate in
themselves to insure the security of the USSR,
and that they must therefore strive to achieve
a high level of air defense in case war should
OMIT.
17. Soviet concern with the air defense prob-
lem became apparent early in the .postwar
period, when the Soviet leaders evidently came
to appreciate that the primary military threat
the USSR faced was from growing Western
nuclear striking power. Air defense programs
were consequently given a high priority. Evi-
dence of this is found in the rapid develop-
ment of a jet fighter force, the early establish-
ment of an extensive Bloc early warning
screen, the continuing effort to modernize the
air defense system and the periodic and ex-
tensive air defense exercises. It is also appar-
ent that the Bloc's air defense system has
been organized and equipped so as to provide
defense in depth for key Soviet administrative,
industrial and military centers, with con-
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siderably less emphasis placed on the defense
of less essential strengths, especially those of
the Satellites and Communist China. We be-
lieve that Bloc air defense programs will
continue to be conducted within this broad
policy framework during the period of this
estimate.
PRESENT BLOC AIR DEFENSES
OPERATIONAL ORGANIZATION
18. There has been no basic change in the
organization of Bloc air defenses since publi-
cation of our last air defense estimate, NIE
11-5-55, in July 1955. In the USSR, the Min-
istry of Defense retains responsibility for mil-
itary air defense measures, while civil defense
is handled by the Ministry of Internal Affairs
(MVD) . Each European Satellite, Communist
China, and North Korea have independent
air defense systems modelled after the USSR's
and integrated into an over-all Bloc system.
We believe that this integration does not in-
clude unified command of Bloc air defense
forces as such, but there are established chan-
nels of communication for the transmission
of air defense operational information.
Active Air Defense
19. Within the Soviet Ministry of Defense,
the agency with primary responsibility for
active air defense of the USSR is PVO Strany,
literally Antiair Defense of the Country,
whose commander-in-chief is believed to be a
Deputy Minister of Defense. This agency,
with headquarters in Moscow, prepares over-
all air defense plans involving all appropriate
elements of the Soviet armed forces, and is
responsible for the integrated training and
combat effectiveness of the elements of PVO
Strany. Throughout much of the USSR, over-
all control of the air defense function is ex-
ercised by PVO Strany through a system of
air defense districts, corresponding generally
in size and importance to the major indus-
trial and military areas of the USSR and
grouped under two major regional headquar-
ters. The principal regional headquarters is
at Moscow, and a secondary headquarters re-
sponsible for the Far East is probably located
5
at Khabarovsk. Within the Soviet Fleets, Mil-
itary Districts, and major field commands
outside the USSR, there are air defense staffs
which coordinate their operations with PVO
Strany.
20. The forces utilized in the Soviet air defense
system include not only those directly associ-
ated with PVO Strany, but also appropriate
forces from other components of the armed
forces. Forces directly associated with PVO
Strany include Fighter Aviation of Antiair
Defense (IA PVO) , static antiaircraft artil-
lery gun units, static surface-to-air guided
missile units, and air observation, warning
and communication (VNOS) elements. Forces
from other components which are utilized
for air defense include tactical fighters, AAA,
and VNOS elements in Soviet Military Dis-
tricts and Groups of Forces; elements of So-
viet Fleets including fighter, radar, and visual
observer (SNIS) units and naval AAA; as well
as elements of the MVD. These various ele-
ments are integrated into a functioning air
defense system by the various district and
higher headquarters of PVO Strany.1
Passive Defense
21. The passive air defense of Bloc military
forces is apparently the responsibility of mil-
itary commanders, supported by the chemical
and other technical services. The civil de-
fense function is directed by civil defense
(MPVO) directorates in the various republics
of the USSR, under close policy guidance
from the MVD in Moscow. MPVO personnel
plan, program and enforce local air defense
policies and maintain liaison with appropriate
elements of the armed forces. They utilize
existing civil agencies, such as health and fire
departments, to implement passive defense
measures. The MPVO is believed to prepare
the over-all plans for the civil air defense
training and indoctrination programs con-
ducted by DOSAAF, a large paramilitary civil-
ian organization.
1 For a more detailed description of the operation-
al organization of the Soviet air defense system,
as well as its administrative organization, see
NIS 26, Section 83, January 1956.
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WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT
Fighter Aircraft
22. Soviet jet fighters have clearly been de-
signed primarily for the interceptor role, ex-
emplified by especially good climb and high
altitude capabilities. At present, Bloc fighter
forces are equipped with several models of jet
interceptors: the FAGOT, five versions of the
FRESCO, the FARMER, and two versions of
the FLASHLIGHT. While all these are em-
ployed as day fighters, FRESCO "D" has
a limited all-weather capability and only
FLASHLIGHT "A" and "C" are primarily all-
weather fighters. All currently operational
Bloc jet fighters have combat ceilings esti-
mated on the order of 50,000 feet or higher;
combat ceilings of the FRESCO "C" and "D"
and FARMER are on the order of 60,000 feet.
Without external fuel tanks, FRESCO "C" and
"D" are estimated to be capable of climbing
to 40,000 feet altitude in 3.7 minutes from
take-off. FARMER, the USSR's first super-
sonic fighter, is probably capable of reaching
this altitude in 2.6 minutes. The speed,
climb, and altitude capabilities of the heavier
FLASHLIGHT all-weather fighters are be-
lieved to be somewhat lower than those of
the latest operational day fighters.2
23. A disadvantage of currently-operational
Soviet fighters appears to be the relatively
low muzzle velocity and rate of fire of their
rather large caliber guns. Older models are
equipped with gun sights with manual range
input, but more recent models probably em-
ploy sights with radar ranging. The FLASH-
LIGHT is believed to be capable of employing
air-to-air unguided rockets or guided missiles.
24. Airborne Intercept Radar. There is con-
siderable evidence of the employment of air-
borne intercept (AI) radar in the FRESCO
"D" and FLASHLIGHT aircraft. Against an
aircraft of B-47 size, we estimate that the Al
radar in the FRESCO "D" has search capabili-
ties of 4-6 nautical miles (n.m.) and track ca-
pabilities of 1-2 n.m. at present. The FLASH-
LIGHT's Al radar is believed to be much more
2 For detailed estimates of the performance char-
acteristics of Soviet fighter aircraft, see Annex
B, Tables 1 and 2.
6
effective, with search and track capabilities
of 15-30 and 10-20 n.m. respectively.3
25. The performance of known Soviet IFF
equipment is considered reliable, but it prob-
ably cannot be depended upon to provide se-
cure identification in combat and the IFF
system probably has a low traffic-handling
capability. Most operational Bloc fighters are
equipped with IFF transponders.
Antiaircraft Artillery
26. The principal medium AA gun now em-
ployed in Soviet and some Satellite static de-
fenses is the 100 mm. gun, which is employed
with a remote control system and off-carriage
fire control radar and director. This system is
considered capable of continuously pointed fire
against high-performance aircraft at medi-
um and high altitudes up to about 35,000 feet.
Within the USSR, it probably has entirely
replaced the World War II model 85 mm. gun
in static defenses, although an improved ver-
sion of the latter is still used in tactical
defense of field forces. Since about 1955, the
USSR has also produced limited numbers of
a new 122 mm. gun. This weapon has a ca-
pability for continuously pointed fire up to 40.-
45,000 feet, but its slow rate of fire and the
relatively long time of flight of its projectile
outweigh its altitude advantage.
27. For mobile defense and low altitude
coverage, Soviet units are equipped with a
57 mm. automatic AA gun with both on-
carriage optical sighting and off-carriage ra-
dar fire control equipment. This weapon is
believed capable of engaging high-perform-
ance aircraft at altitudes up to 15,000 feet
under all weather conditions. In Soviet units
the 57 mm. AA gun is rapidly replacing the
obsolete, manually-operated 37 mm. gun.
The USSR also has a family of single, twin,
and quadruple barreled 14.5 mm. AA machine
guns. While manual operation of these guns
would limit tracking and aiming against in-
The Al ranges given assume a tail-cone ap-
proach towards the target aircraft. Much greater
ranges could be obtained if broadside approaches
were made, although it is not known whether
the Soviet fire control systems can take ad-
vantage of such increased ranges.
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dividual targets, they could deliver a high
volume of barrage fire for short periods.4
28. While we have no direct evidence that the
USSR is employing proximity fuzes in its AAA
ammunition, their development has been with-
in Soviet capabilities for some time and large
quantities could be available at any time dur-
ing the period of this estimate. It is also prob-
ably within Soviet capabilities to have devel-
oped an unguided surface-to-air rocket. Some
work on such rockets was reportedly per-
formed in the postwar period on the basis
of German designs. We have no evidence
that such a project was carried to completion,
and Soviet interest probably lagged follow-
ing the successful development of surf ace-
to-air guided missiles.
Guided Missiles'
29. In the Moscow area, a system of some
57 surface-to-air guided missile sites with a
total of about 3,400 launching pads has
been constructed since 1953. The sites are
arranged in two concentric rings with radii
of approximately 25 and 45 n.m. from the
center of the city. All sites are probably
now operational. From observations of these
sites and their "YOYO" guidance radars,
missiles, and other associated facilities, we
estimate that the USSR now possesses a sur-
face-to-air system capable of delivering a 600-
700 pound nuclear or HE payload to a max-
imum system altitude of 60,000 feet and
horizontal range of 25 n.m.6 Its guidance
system is probably of the command type with
4 For detailed estimates of Soviet AAA character-
istics, see Annex B, Table 3.
5 For detailed descriptions of estimated Soviet
surface-to-air and air-to-air guided missiles,
see Annex B, Table 4.
This range represents our estimate of the pres-
ent capability of the system. It probably had
a maximum horizontal range of 20 n.m. when
it first became operational in 1955. For a de-
tailed description of this system, see NIE 11-5-
57, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs
in the Guided Missile Field," 12 March 1957,
paragraphs 56-62. For appropriate nuclear war-
head capabilities, see NIE 11-2-57, Part I, "So-
viet Atomic Energy Program," dated 7 May 1957,
limited distribution.
7
a CEP at maximum range of about 190 feet,
or possibly a command and semiactive seeker
type with a CEP of about 50 feet. We esti-
mate that the guidance system at each site
probably has the capability to track and
engage 20 targets simultaneously. However,
the present guidance system has limited cover-
age in azimuth, requiring at least 12 sites
to give 360? protection around a target with
about 50 percent overlap between sites. Pres-
ent intelligence information gives some indi-
cation that the lower limit of its altitude
capability may be between 1,000 and 5,000
feet.
30. While there is no direct intelligence to
indicate successful Soviet completion of an
air-to-air guided missile, our assessment of
Soviet capabilities in the field leads us to
estimate that by 1955 the USSR could prob-
ably have had in operation a system, capable
of carrying a 25-pound HE payload to a max-
imum range of 2-3 n.m., with a CEP of 30 feet.
However, a system available by that date
would probably have had a simplified guid-
ance system using passive infrared homing,
and would therefore be limited to use in tail-
cone attacks under conditions of good weather
at engagement altitude.
31. Recently acquired intelligence indicates
that in 1952 the USSR had under development
an air-to-air missile guidance receiver of the
beam-rider type. We estimate that if pri-
ority development were pursued, the USSR
could probably now have an air-to-air system
employing this type of guidance in opera-
tional use. Such a missile would probably
be capable of carrying a 45-pound HE war-
head to a maximum range of about 5 n.m.,
with CEP of about 30 feet. It would be suit-
able for employment only by all-weather
fighters, and the FLASHLIGHT is estimated
to be the most likely present carrier.
Early Warning, Ground Controlled Intercept,
and Fire Control Radar
32. Accurate evaluation of radar detection
capability has proved extremely difficult even
where all technical factors are known. The
lack of much significant data on Soviet radars,
and the wide variation in circumstances of
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employment, requires the use of rather wide
brackets in estimating detection ranges. In
addition, in order more clearly to define the
nature of the estimates in the following para-
graphs, we set forth the assumptions under
which they were made:
a. That the aircraft will present less than
maximum echo area to the radar.
b. That standard radar propagation con-
ditions will exist.
c. That because of various degrading fac-
tors encountered under operational condi-
tions, the radar will achieve significantly less
than theoretical maximum ranges.
d. That the target aircraft is above the
radar horizon.7
33. Early Warning Radar Ranges. While
many types of radars are employed for long-
range early warning in the Bloc, those in most
widespread use at present are the TOKEN,
GAGE, DUMBO, and KNIFEREST. Under
the assumptions listed above, we estimate that
against currently-operational Western bomber
and fighter-bomber aircraft, approaching at
altitudes between the radar horizon and their
combat ceilings, reliable detection by Bloc
radars will probably occur within the follow-
ing range brackets:
Radar
TOKEN
GAGE
DUMBO and
KNIFEREST
B-47 Size F-86 Size
Aircraft Aircraft
80-180 n.m. 70-100 n.m.
about 160 n.m. 100-160 n.m.
50-140 n.m. 35-85 n.m.
34. GCI Radar Ranges. The significant Bloc
GCI radars are considered to be the TOKEN,
either alone or with ROCK CAKE height-
finder, and the GAGE with PATTYCAKE
heightfinder. DUMBO and KNIFEREST are
The radar horizon is directly analogous to the
optical horizon below which objects cannot be
seen due to the curvature of the earth. Thus
for any given heights of radar and target there
is a maximum range beyond which detection will
not occur under standard propagation conditions.
To illustrate, for a radar sited at sea level in
an area free of terrain obstructions, the radar
horizon will be at about 170 n.m. against a tar-
get at 20,000 ft. altitude, but will decrease to
about 85 n.m. against a target at 5,000 ft. alti-
tude.
8
occasionally used for GCI work, but their
performance is inadequate. Assuming the
same conditions as in the case of the early
warning radars given above, we estimate that
reliable GCI operations could begin some-
where within the following range brackets:
B-47 Size F-86 Size
Radar Aircraft Aircraft
TOKEN
50-110 n.m.
40-70 n.m.
GAGE/PATTYCAKE
70-90 n.m.
40-60 n.m.
TOKEN/ROCK CAKE
80-110 n.m.
50-70 n.m.
GCI positioning is dependent upon the abil-
ity to obtain accurate altitude information.
Available intelligence does not permit an ac-
curate assessment of the heightfinding capa-
bilities of these radars, although the TOKEN
apparently has rather poor heightfinding ca-
pabilities for altitudes above 35,000 feet. The
recent appearance of new heightfinders indi-
cates that the USSR is attempting to correct
this inadequacy. Actual control of intercep-
tion can be accomplished only within the
range at which the radar can track the Bloc
fighter. The use of transponder beacons in
interceptors would permit them to be tracked
to approximately the GCI detection ranges
for bombers, but we have no firm evidence
that the Bloc is employing IFF equipment for
this purpose. We estimate that the traffic-
handling capacity of any one Soviet GCI site
is limited to six simultaneous interceptions
under close control.
35. AAA Fire Control Radar. The WHIFF fire
control radar, a Soviet version of the US
SCR-584, is in general use with Bloc AAA
units, although a newer set, the FIRECAN,
has appeared recently. Other models of na-
tive design are believed to be available in
limited quantities in Hungary and possibly
Czechoslovakia. Current Bloc fire control
radars have effective ranges considerably in
excess of the ranges of the guns with which
they are employed; e.g., 30-50 n.m. in the
case of the WHIFF. Accuracy is estimated at
plus or minus 1.0-1.5 mils in azimuth and
elevation and plus or minus 15 yards in range.
Other Electronic Equipment
36. Communications. Soviet electronics re-
search and development establishments are
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capable of providing communications equip-
ment equal in quality to that of the West.
Until recently, the standard air-to-air and air-
to-ground communications equipment for So-
viet fighters was an improved version of a
World War II high frequency (HF) radio
system, supplemented after 1952 by four-
channel very high frequency (VHF) equip-
ment. There are indications that a ten-chan-
nel VHF system may now be available for
some Soviet tactical aircraft. There is as
yet no indication of the employment of ultra-
high frequency (UHF) systems for air-to-air
and air-to-ground communications.
37. For ground-to-ground communications,
the USSR employs all standard systems for
both military and civil defense needs. Land-
lines, high-speed radio-telegraph, and voice
radio communications network are in wide-
spread use in European USSR and the Satel-
lites, becoming gradually less dense in the
northern and eastern areas of the USSR.
During the past few years, the USSR has
also been using UHF relay equipment which
provides up to 16 voice or 48 teletypewriter
channels. In East Germany, this type of
equipment is probably functioning in an air
warning network linked to other Bloc coun-
tries.
38. Automatic Computation and Data Han-
dling Equipment. Air defense data handling
capabilities would be greatly increased by em-
ploying any of a variety of data link systems
known to be available to the USSR, including
television link equipment which could be em-
ployed to transmit data very rapidly or even
to transmit pictures of complete status boards.
The USSR is known to have developed high-
speed computers, which could play an impor-
tant role in these systems. With East Ger-
man assistance, the USSR is also developing
automatic data handling devices suitable for
air defense purposes. We have no evidence
that the above types of equipment are in
current use in the Bloc air defense system.
39. Radio Navigation Equipment. For the
major portion of its air navigation, including
approach and landing, the Bloc relies upon
radio homing aids. Ground direction-find-
ing sets and omnibeacons are now in use,
9
and we believe that GCA landing aids are
being installed at key fighter fields. There
is evidence that the development of more
precise navigation and landing aids, including
distance-measuring equipment, is under way.
40. Electronic Countermeasures. We believe
that at present the USSR has an appreciable
capability for jamming Western bombing and
navigational radars at frequencies up to
10,000 mc/s and possibly higher, and especial-
ly for jamming at the lower frequencies nor-
mally used in Western long-range radio com-
munications. Research is now being con-
ducted on magnetrons and probably traveling
wave tubes, suitable for jamming in the micro-
wave frequencies, but we know of no operation-
al equipment utilizing these tubes. Known
types of Soviet radio and radar equipment, in-
cluding acquisition and target-tracking ra-
dars, are vulnerable to jamming. The vulner-
ability of present Bloc radars is increased by
the concentration of their frequencies, pre-
dominately in the three narrow bands of 75-
85 mc/s, 2610-3100 mc/s, and 9200-9500 mc/s.
The USSR is aware of the effectiveness of
countermeasures against radar, and is capable
of developing devices which would render its
radars less vulnerable to jamming and spoof-
ing. We are unable to estimate the extent to
which such devices have been developed or
are presently incorporated into operational
equipment.
41. Bloc passive electronic intercept stations
are estimated to be capable of monitoring
Western electromagnetic signals through the
entire frequency spectrum from HF up through
10,000 mc/s. A number of passive intercept
stations with this estimated capability have
been identified along the borders of East Ger-
many and Poland. There is also evidence
that airborne and shipborne electronic recon-
naissance is being conducted by the USSR.
STRENGTH AND DEPLOYMENT 8
42. The large quantities of air defense weap-
ons available to the Bloc are deployed pri-
For details of the estimated strength and de-
ployment of Bloc air defense equipment, see
Annex B, Tables 5-7, and Annex C, Map 1.
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manly in defense of key Soviet static targets
and military forces, with proportionately
much smaller quantities allocated to other
Bloc nations. Total Bloc jet fighter strength
for mid-1957 is estimated at about 14,000 air-
craft, of which more than 10,000 are in So-
viet units, about 1,900 are in European Satel-
lite units, and about 1,900 are in Asiatic Com-
munist units. Operational Bloc AA guns are
estimated to total nearly 15,000 medium weap-
ons and nearly 19,000 light weapons, of which
almost 75 percent are in Soviet units. With
regard to the quality of weapons provided,
the USSR has likewise followed a policy of
satisfying the needs of its own units, especially
those within the USSR, before those of other
Bloc nations. For example, while approx-
imately 13 percent of total Soviet fighter
strength is now believed to comprise fighters
with at least limited all-weather capabilities,
other Bloc nations have been supplied with
these aircraft in only nominal quantities and
none are believed to have received FLASH-
LIGHTs. The 100 mm AA gun, which has
been issued to Soviet units since 1950, has
been issued in small quantities to certain of
the East European Satellites and to Commu-
nist China within the past two years. With
regard to early warning radar, however, high
quality equipment has been installed on the
Satellite borders to provide additional warning
time for key Soviet targets.
43. Fighter aircraft of the USSR are organ-
ized into about 320 regiments. Of these,
about 115 are in IA PVO with air defense as
their sole mission, while about 140 are in
tactical aviation and about 65 in naval avia-
tion, with air defense as one of their missions.
In addition, there are 53 fighter regiments
in European Satellite forces and 58 in North
Korean and Chinese Communist forces. The
USSR has replaced the piston aircraft in its
ground attack regiments with jet fighter
types. There is evidence that upon their re-
equipment these regiments initiated training
in interceptor operations, and they are now
considered as tactical fighter regiments, ca-
pable of performing both ground support and
air defense missions. Our estimate of the
number of Soviet aircraft and regiments avail-
able for air defense has been increased consid-
10
erably as a result of this development, but we
do not believe it reflects any continuing up-
ward trend in the total numerical strength
of the Soviet fighter establishment. At pres-
ent, the bulk of operational Soviet fighters
are FRESCOs; other Bloc fighter forces are
now almost completely jet-equipped, although
largely with older types.
44. The areas of greatest concentration of
Bloc air defense weapons and associated
equipment include that portion of European
USSR from the Kola Peninsula to the Cas-
pian Sea, East Germany, Poland, Czech-
oslovakia, and the Maritime and Sakhalin
areas of the Soviet Far East. Throughout
most of these areas, aircraft penetrating Bloc
air space would be within range of Soviet
fighters at all times. The heaviest concen-
trations of IA PVO fighters are in the Moscow,
Baku, and Leningrad areas, which account
for over two-thirds of estimated IA PVO
strength. Somewhat lesser concentrations
are elsewhere in European USSR and in the
Sverdlovsk, Tashkent, Novosibirsk, Lake Bai-
kal and Khabarovsk areas. Critical periph-
eral areas in Europe, the Black Sea Coast,
and the Soviet Far East are defended by
significant tactical and naval defense forces.
45. Moscow is by far the most heavily defended
area in the Bloc. Of the estimated total of
3,800 IA PVO jet fighters, nearly 1,300, or about
one-third are based within a radius of 250
n.m. from Moscow, with the greatest con-
centration believed to be on the western ap-
proaches to the city. Moscow is the only
Bloc target now known to be protected by a
surface-to-air guided missile system. The
Moscow missile sites are deployed so as to
provide over-lapping coverage of targets ap-
proaching in any quadrant, between about
25 n.m. and 70 n.m. from the center of the
city. Still closer to the city are AAA defenses
which may total more than 700 guns, the
bulk of them 100 mm guns, but including
some 122 mm and 57 mm guns. These de-
fenses are served by high concentrations of
radar sites, fire control, and communications
equipment.
46. Areas of significantly less dense air de-
fense concentration than those described in
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paragraph 44 include Albania, Bulgaria, Hun-
gary, Rumania, most of central and northeast
Siberia, and the interior of China. The areas
within 200 n.m. of the coast of China and
North Korea are well-equipped with air de-
fense forces but are severely limited in all-
weather capability. Portions of the Chukot-
ski Peninsula and the Arctic littoral have some
air defense capabilities.
47. We estimate that there are at present in
excess of 500 prime operational early warning
and GCI radar sites in the Bloc, employing
long-range early warning and heightfinder
radar types in various combinations. These
sites are supplemented by approximately 1,000
gap-filler radars. Early warning radars are
disposed around a major portion of the Bloc's
borders. Coverage of a penetrating target by
three or more radars simultaneously can prob-
ably be achieved throughout most of Euro-
pean USSR, the Satellites, and the Pacific
coastal areas. Gaps in peripheral early warn-
ing radar coverage appear in southwestern
China and the Soviet Arctic coast between
Dikson and the Chukotski, although the latter
may reflect gaps in intelligence.9
OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING AIR DEFENSE
CAPABILITIES
Air Facilities
48. Air defense requirements have played a
significant role in determining the priority
and scope of airfield development in the Bloc
during the past few years. Construction of
new air defense bases and improvement of ex-
isting ones has been undertaken to provide
greater flexibility for both current and future
deployment of Bloc fighter forces. The empha-
sis has been on the construction of long, perma-
nent surface runways with well-developed over-
runs. Whereas early runway construction at
jet fighter fields was generally to lengths
of 5,000-6,600 feet, the more recently built
runways frequently have been up to 7,200 feet
in length. A summary of the 544 airfields in
the Bloc with long, permanent surface run-
For estimated Bloc radar coverage, see Annex
C, Map 2.
11
ways is given in the table below. Approximate-
ly 300 of these fields are currently being used
for air defense operations.
Minimum Runway Lengths (feet) *
Area
9,000
8,000
7,000
6,000
5,000
USSR
8
50
20
175
45
European
Satellites
2
47
46
33
2
Asiatic Comm.
Nations
0
8
19
59
30
10
105
85
267
'77
*This table, referring to runway lengths only, is
not to be taken as a measure of the capability
of the fields to handle sustained military opera-
tions or operations under all weather conditions.
In addition, there are about 400 Bloc airfields
with runways over 4,000 feet in length which
could be utilized for fighter operations under
reduced safety margins.
49. The geographic distribution of these air-
fields is generally consistent with the areas
of greatest and least air defense concentration
described in paragraphs 44-46 above. How-
ever, airfield development work has been un-
derway in certain of the less well-defended
areas. Development of the airfield network
in Southern China opposite Formosa has been
in progress for the past three years and is
continuing. Considerable improvement in
basing facilities has occurred in the Soviet
Arctic since 1952, as the result of a wide-
spread construction program. Nevertheless,
the number of airfields in the Arctic littoral
suitable for air defense operations is still so
small that the extent of fighter operations
in that area would be governed by the limit-
ing conditions imposed by the utilization of
substandard bases.
Logistic Support and Maintenance
50. We estimate that the Soviet supply sys-
tem, transportation network, and local storage
facilities are adequate to meet immediate air
defense needs in many areas, since most anti-
aircraft installations, airfields, and radar sta-
tions are located adjacent to populated areas
and/or main transportation and communica-
tions lines. There are indications that main-
tenance procedures are exacting and care-
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fully supervised and maintenance of equip-
ment is believed to be good to excellent. Our
evidence on Soviet electronic equipment in-
dicates that it is generally reliable and well-
maintained.
51. Jet Fuel. Although we lack information
on the exact location of fuel storage points
in many areas, and on the amount of fuel
actually stored, we estimate that operational
Bloc airfields have an average capacity to
store sufficient fuel for 8-10 days sustained
combat operations. Operational Soviet jet
fighters are flown an average of only 10-15
hours per month, and we believe that this
is due in part to a policy of allocating con-
siderable quantities of fuel to reserve storage,
and in some areas to transportation deficien-
cies.
52. Jet Serviceability. We estimate that for
present Soviet jet fighters, an immediate
serviceability rate 10 on the order of 70
percent could be achieved without special
preparations. Following a 5-10-day stand-
down, this serviceability rate could be tempo-
rarily increased to about 80-90 percent for a
period of 7-14 days. Thereafter, serviceability
rates could be maintained at about 70 percent
for a period of four to six months under
sustained combat conditions, and would then
decline to 40-50 percent. Under extreme
weather conditions and in areas not served
by adequate transportation, such as in the
Arctic, the above serviceability rates would be
reduced.
Personnel and Training
53. We estimate that at present there are in
the Bloc approximately 1.4 million military
personnel engaged in active air defense func-
tions, either as their sole mission or as one
of their missions. Of these, more than 900,000
are Soviet personnel." In general, we believe
their technical skills and training to be ade-
quate, although we have insufficient evidence
to permit an assessment of the training of
certain categories of personnel, notably those
"A "serviceable" aircraft is one which is fully
prepared to perform its assigned combat mission.
11For a breakdown by area and function, see
Annex B, Table 8.
12
in the air warning services. Training stand-
ards in the Satellites and Asiatic Communist
nations are generally lower than those in the
USSR. Throughout the Bloc, however, per-
sonnel requirements are probably fulfilled on
a priority basis in accordance with the em-
phasis placed on air defense. The rate of
attrition due to personnel turnover is believed
to be low.
54. In the USSR there are about 24 flight
training schools for fighter pilots, which prob-
ably graduate a total of about 2,400 pilots per
year. Fighter pilots are believed to acquire
about 145 hours' flying time before reporting
to an operational unit; about 45 hours as
pilot candidates in DOSAAF and about 100
hours as student pilots in military flying
schools. Until recently, this training was in
trainer-type aircraft, but at present Soviet
training establishments have an estimated
1,100 jet fighter aircraft of tactical types,
which are being used for pre-operational train-
ing. Students receive little gunnery or night-
flying training. We believe there is no instru-
ment school as such for the training of fighter
pilots in the Bloc.
55. Once a Soviet fighter pilot has been as-
signed to an operational unit, he probably
averages only about 7-10 hours' flying time
per month.12 The details of the current op-
erational training program of the IA PVO are
not known. In 1950, training goals were to
acquire fully the technique of interception
and destruction of large hostile air formations,
but these goals probably now include inter-
ception and destruction of single aircraft and
small formations. Instrument training is
conducted in operational units. Night flying
has increased considerably and the standards
have probably been raised, but we believe they
are probably below US standards.
56. The training of Soviet AAA officers is con-
ducted in several basic and specialist schools,
including an AAA academy which holds
advanced courses for battery and higher level
commanders. Training for enlisted men is
conducted in unit schools. The annual train-
ing cycle for AAA units includes range firing,
'2 US fighter pilots average 20-30 hours per month.
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field firing exercises, and combined training
and maneuvers. Combat firing exercises are
conducted twice yearly, and jet aircraft are
known to have been used to tow targets for
such exercises. Combat alerts are conducted
throughout the year. During these alerts,
units in garrisons must be manned and in
regimental march formation in less than two
hours. When on the march, automatic weap-
ons crews must be able to fire within 10 sec-
onds from the wheels or within 40 seconds by
pulling off the road and putting the gun into
firing position. Medium gun crews are re-
quired to be able to deliver fire within 50 sec-
onds.
Command and Coordination
57. The size and complexity of the Bloc's air
defense orgapization, together with the vast
area over which it must function, has pre-
sented the USSR with a formidable control
and coordination problem. Within the Soviet
PVO organization alone there are a large num-
ber of control centers at various echelons, in-
cluding about 35 PVO district control centers
and 80-90 subdistrict control centers and as-
sociated filter centers for analyzing and trans-
mitting radar and visual warning information.
In addition, control centers probably exist at
each fighter division headquarters and at var-
ious AAA organizational levels. Over-all co-
ordination of the operations of the various air
defense components is accomplished through
a communications system which, in many
areas, probably includes parallel land-line and
radio links between early warning sites, GCI
sites, and control centers. In those areas
where land-line or point-to-point radio facil-
ities are lacking, the traffic-handling capacity
of the system is probably limited to about five
simultaneous raids at one reporting site.
58. It is probable that early warning sites
channel their reports through the subdistrict
filter center to the district control centers.
Coordination between local air defense forces
is probably accomplished on an information
basis at the subdistrict level, but major com-
mand decisions probably occur at the district
level. At the same time, information is prob-
ably passed laterally between district head-
13
quarters and vertically to Moscow or Khaba-
rovsk. In a local situation, the fighter divi-
sion commander probably has the authority to
commit as much as the alert flight, but in a
general situation, a decision to commit larger
forces probably would be made by a higher
echelon.
PASSIVE DEFENSE
59. The USSR has devoted increasing atten-
tion to the passive defense of both military
and civil personnel and facilities since the
Korean War period. Soviet military and civil-
ian passive defense programs give attention
to the problems of defense against nuclear,
biological, and chemical warfare. These pro-
grams are participated in by large segments
of both the civilian and military populations.
While selected control elements of the gov-
ernment may now have up-to-date protection
available to them, we believe that the general
population is inadequately prepared against
large-scale nuclear attack.
60. Camouflage and Deception. Bloc ground
forces are accustomed to night operations,
and camouflage of field forces and facilities
during maneuvers is routine in their tactical
doctrine and training. It must be assumed
that the USSR is aware of the techniques
used by the Germans during World War II,
such as the construction or simulation
through radar camouflage of false cities,
factories, etc. However, to date there has
been no evidence of such deceptive cam-
ouflage.
61. Dispersal. A trend toward somewhat
greater dispersal has been evident in Soviet
military forces in recent years. Revised
ground force tactical doctrine stresses the
need to present a concentrated target for
as short a time as possible, emphasizing the
rapid concentration of forces, timely seizure
of objectives, and rapid redispersal. The So-
viet navy is believed to be engaged in some
programs which will permit greater dispersal,
including the development of additional base
facilities and the construction of mobile sup-
port units such as submarine tenders and
fleet tankers. Current Soviet practice is to
base one to two air regiments at a field, and
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parking and revetment areas are generally
located relatively close to the landing strips.
However, dispersed parking areas are now
being added at some airfields. The estimated
availability of both permanent and natural
surface airfields is such that no more than
one regiment would probably be based at any
one field in wartime.
62. We have no evidence of a specific Soviet
program for the dispersal of governmental
and industrial installations. Some dispersal
is occurring naturally as a result of the in-
dustralization of additional areas. The re-
cently-announced decentralization of admin-
istrative control may have some bonus effect
from a passive defense point of view, although
present Soviet decentralization plans appar-
ently do not include the most critical defense
industries. To date there has been no public
mention of evacuation or dispersal of the gen-
eral population in the event of war.
63. Underground Installations and Shelters.
Underground military command posts and
filter centers have been reported in Hungary,
Bulgaria, and East Germany, and we assume
that such installations exist in major defense
centers elsewhere in the Bloc. Some airfields
are equipped with underground storage and
repair space. Our information is insufficient
to determine the extent of these facilities, but
they are probably not widespread.
64. The incorporation of air raid shelters into
newly-constructed buildings began in the
USSR in the late 1940's and became a major
national program at the time of the Korean
War. In most masonry apartment dwellings
built since 1951, it has been standard practice
to include cellar shelters designed to be gas-
proof and to withstand complete collapse of
the building. This program probably now af-
fords some degree of shelter for roughly one-
sixth of the urban population of the USSR,
and this proportion will probably rise to
roughly one-third by the end of 1960. In ad-
dition, there are shelters in factories and pub-
lic buildings.
65. Most existing shelters were not designed
for protection from high-yield nuclear weap-
ons. There are indications, however, that the
14
newer building shelters are of heavier con-
struction. So far as is known, there has been
no new construction of large underground
shelters separated from buildings. However,
the Moscow and Leningrad subways are avail-
able for use as shelters, and Vladivostok, Baku,
and Sevastopol have retained and improved
elaborate tunnel systems constructed during
World War II.
66 Training. Passive defense against air at-
tack is included in training programs through-
out the Soviet military forces. Field manuals
and pamphlets published for troop issue in-
clude defensive measures for nuclear, biologi-
cal, and chemical warfare. Soviet maneuvers
have included defensive tactics against such
weapons. Troop training stresses proper use
of protective equipment, and field decontam-
ination procedures, as well as discipline with
regard to contaminated areas, water, and food-
stuffs. The current issue gas mask is believed
to afford adequate protection against inhala-
tion of known BW and CW agents.
67. Civil defense training in the USSR has
been intensified since 1948 and especially since
1953, when recruitment in the civilian para-
military organization (DOSAAF) was stepped
up and air and chemical defense courses were
made a compulsory part of DOSAAF train-
ing. 13 These courses, probably in conformity
with standards set by the MPVO, embrace a
general knowledge of civil defense, including
alarm signals, types of attack, gas defense
and decontamination, first aid, and fire fight-
ing measures. Within the past several years,
Soviet authorities have released a limited
amount of information on the effects of nu-
clear weapons, and elementary nuclear and
biological defense instruction has been added
to the DOSAAF training program. Field
demonstrations are conducted and air raid
drills are prescribed, but there is no evidence
that drills have been conducted on a full-
scale, city-wide basis.
" DOSAAF, whose total membership is estimated
to be over 20 millions, has primary units charged
with organizing "self defense" groups in fac-
tories, institutions, collective and state farms,
machine tractor stations, schools, and dwelling
units throughout the USSR.
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68. In April 1957, the USSR publicized a civil
defense movie entitled Antiatomic Defense of
the Population. This is the first time a pub-
licly-released Soviet film has pictured a nu-
clear explosion. Widespread dissemination of
the film was urged.
PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
SOVIET AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM
69. In estimating the future development of
the Bloc air defense system to 1962 we have
taken a number of considerations into ac-
count: (a) the intelligence available on cur-
rent organization, weapons, and equipment,
which provides a base line from which to
estimate the possible future design and scale of
the system; (b) the requirements which we be-
lieve the Soviet leaders would probably adopt
for an air defense system in the light of their
estimate of the probable threat posed by West-
ern aircraft and missile capabilities; (c) intel-
ligence available on current Bloc research and
development programs and our estimate of
the Bloc's scientific and technical capabilities
to develop new weapons and equipment to
meet future requirements; (d) the economic
resources available and the cost considerations
the Soviet leaders would have to take into
account in building their future air defense
system. These considerations, taken togeth-
er, provide the basis for our estimate of future
Bloc air defense programs where direct evi-
dence is still lacking. This estimate is also
based on our belief that the Soviet leaders
will continue to give a high priority to air
defense.
SOVIET ESTIMATE OF THE AIR AND
MISSILE THREAT TO THE BLOC
70. On the basis of information we believe
they can acquire by overt and covert means,
Soviet planners can probably estimate fairly
accurately the general performance charac-
teristics, quantities, and world-wide disposi-
tion of the weapons and delivery systems the
US and its Allies could presently employ
against the Bloc. Within reasonable limits,
they can probably anticipate the dates at which
new US and Allied attack capabilities will ap-
pear. They recognize that the Bloc is geo-
15
graphically surrounded by Western air power
and that US heavy bombers and US and Allied
medium bombers, using inflight refueling as
neccesary, could reach any target in the Bloc
on two-way missions from existing overseas
or continental US bases. In addition, they
are aware that many of the important target
areas in the Bloc can be reached by Western
light bombers, fighter bombers, and carrier
aircraft operating from widely separated
bases. The great area of uncertainty for the
Soviet planners undoubtedly is the planned
employment of Western weapon systems. So-
viet planners almost certainly estimate that
in the event of general war during the period
of this estimate, the US and its Allies would
possess great flexibility in scale, direction, and
tactics of attack.
71. The USSR probably recognizes that at
present the gravest threat posed to the Bloc
is that of nuclear attack by manned bomber,
fighter-bomber, and naval attack aircraft em-
ploying high and medium altitude horizontal
bombing and low altitude toss or loft bomb-
ing. Of the more than 8,800 US and Allied
aircraft capable of striking the Bloc, the great
majority are capable of attacking between
very low altitudes and about 45,000 feet, at
speeds of 400-500 knots. A small number of
these aircraft have better performance capa-
bilities; Soviet planners would probably antic-
ipate attacks in peripheral areas by jet
fighter-bombers capable of altitudes up to
about 50,000 feet and speeds up to 600 knots.
A small part of the current threat would be
guided missiles, including short range ballistic
missiles and ground and naval launched sub-
sonic cruise-type missiles with altitudes up to
about 45,000 feet and ranges up to about
800 n.m.
72. The USSR would probably estimate that in
the 1960-62 time period, US and Allied capa-
bilities would include delivery vehicles reach-
ing higher speeds and altitudes. While the
capabilities of most attacking aircraft would
probably be within the limits set forth in the
preceding paragraph, Soviet planners would
probably anticipate that by 1962 several hun-
dred would have considerably greater altitude
and speed capabilities, ranging up to about
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60,000 feet and about 1,200 knots. While
they would probably expect some decrease in
the total numbers of Western manned air-
craft during the period, they would also ex-
pect a marked increase in both the numbers
and types of guided missiles. They would
probably estimate Western missile capabilities
for 1962 to include several thousand long- and
medium-range ground and naval launched
cruise-type missiles and decoys, including
some with supersonic speeds and altitudes up
to 70,000 feet; large numbers of short-range
ballistic missiles; large numbers of air-to-sur-
face missiles and decoys with ranges of 100
n.m. and greater; and small numbers of
IRBMs and ICBMs.
73. Soviet planners would have to assume that
high-yield nuclear payloads are now incor-
porated into the US weapons systems which
could be employed against the Bloc, and that
there will be a continuing increase in the
maximum yield capabilities, versatility, effi-
ciency, and numbers of US stockpile weap-
ons. In addition, they would expect continued
improvement in US and Allied weapon delivery
capabilities under all weather conditions, in-
creased capabilities of attacking aircraft to
defend themselves against interception, in-
creased employment and sophistication of
electronic countermeasures and penetration
aids, and further increases in US inflight re-
fueling capabilities.
74. Soviet planners almost certainly recognize
that, while a successful defense against sus-
tained high explosive attack can be achieved
by imposing a high rate of attrition on attack-
ing forces, attack employing high-yield nu-
clear weapons requires that their air defense
system achieve a high probability of denying
access to vital targets. The present defenses
of Moscow suggest that a concept of denial of
access has been adopted for the Soviet capital.
In the light of expected increases in the capa-
bilities of Western delivery vehicles, especially
in speed and altitude, and in Western weapon
yields, Soviet planners probably consider that
the size of the target danger zone (i.e., the
area around any given Bloc target into which
denial of penetration must be sought) will
increase as the period advances. Thus, their
16
programs for the development and deployment
of Bloc air defense equipment will probably
aim to achieve successful interception and kill
at increasing distances from vital Bloc targets.
Moreover, Soviet planners probably recognize
that their air defense system must be capable
of protecting Bloc air defense bases and re-
lated ground installations in order to insure
the sustained defense of vital targets.
75. Soviet planners will have to exercise a
fine degree of judgment in evaluating weapon
system utility as new offensive and defensive
systems are developed by both sides in a peri-
od of rapidly-changing weapon technology.
In many cases, choices will not be clear-cut
and complementary air defense weapon pro-
grams will be justified. Moreover, during this
period potential Western attacking forces will
comprise a wide variety of weapon systems,
of which the bulk will be existing or improved
models of currently-operational aircraft and
missile types and a small percentage will be
IRBMs and ICBMs. In view of present trends
in Bloc air defenses and the wide diversity of
Western attack capabilities and methods, we
estimate that during the time period con-
sidered in this estimate the Bloc will continue
to maintain a mixed force of air defense weap-
on systems.
TRENDS IN INTERCEPTION AND KILL
CAPABILITIES
Fighter Aircraft"
76. In order to oppose the highest-perform-
ance Western aircraft, the Bloc will need to
have in operation by about 1960 fighters with
speed capabilities of about 1,200 knots and
combat ceilings of about 60,000 feet. In ad-
dition, Bloc fighters will need to be provided
with improved Al gear, armament, fire con-
trol, and communications equipment, but at
the same time must achieve high rates of
climb to altitude. Prototype day and all-
weather fighters displayed by the USSR in
June 1956 appeared to emphasize high per-
formance characteristics at the expense of rel-
For detailed estimates of performance char-
acteristics of Soviet fighters, see Annex B, Tables
1 and 2.
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atively short combat radii. We estimate that
new Soviet fighters will probably be introduced
into operational units as follows: in 1957, the
FACEPLATE day fighter, which may be
entering production now; in 1958, the FIT-
TER day fighter, and in 1958, 1959, and
1962, new all-weather fighters. Of these all-
weather fighters, the 1959 model will probably
be an improved version of the FISHPOT proto-
type, but no known prototypes can be asso-
ciated with the new all-weather fighters esti-
mated for 1958 and 1962.
77. Based on an analysis of the prototypes ob-
served and on estimated Soviet capabilities in
aircraft development, we estimate that all
these new fighters will have combat ceilings
of at least 60,000 feet, will be supersonic, and
will be capable of climbing to 40,000 feet alti-
tude in four minutes or less. 15 Maximum
speeds of about 1,200 knots will probably be
achieved by day fighters in 1958 and by all-
weather fighters in 1959. The 1962 all-weather
fighter will probably be capable of operating
at altitudes up to 67,000 feet and of climbing
to 40,000 feet in less than two minutes. 16
Most of the new fighters will probably be capa-
ble of employing guided missiles, unguided
rockets, improved guns, or combination arma-
ments. We estimate that the effective range
of operational AT radar will not increase sig-
nificantly over that now estimated for the
FLASHLIGHT (see para. 24) , but that equip-
ment performance will be improved.
78. We believe that the primary emphasis in
the USSR's present fighter programs is on in-
troducing fighters with improved performance
characteristics, rather than on increasing the
numerical strength of the Soviet fighter force.
" Climb to altitudes nearer their combat ceilings,
using military power, would require considerably
longer time; for example, at military power, the
FACEPLATE would require 6.3 minutes to climb
to 50,000 feet, as compared with 3.8 minutes to
40,000 feet. On the other hand, at maximum
power, FACEPLATE's time to climb to 50,000
feet would be only 3.4 minutes, but with a re-
sultant sacrifice in combat radius.
16 All characteristics given are those estimated for
clean configurations. If rockets or missiles were
mounted externally, or if external fuel tanks
were employed to increase combat radii, per-
formance would be significantly reduced.
17
During the period of the estimate, the number
of all-weather fighters in Soviet units will
probably increase rapidly, but the USSR will
probably also consider the day fighter to be
of continuing value because of its compara-
tively greater reliability, ease of maintenance,
and lower cost, as well as its capability for
dual employment in air defense and tactical
support missions. On the basis of probable
Soviet requirements and production capabili-
ties, we estimate that by mid-1962 the Soviet
fighter force might have approximately 60
percent of its strength in all-weather fighters.
79. With regard to the over-all number of
manned interceptors to be maintained in So-
viet operational units, Soviet planners prob-
ably consider that as suitable surface-to-air
missiles and associated equipment become
available in quantity, the number of fighters
required for air defense missions will decrease.
Other factors which might contribute to a So-
viet decision to decrease the USSR's numerical
strength in manned interceptors include the
probable increase in the destructive power of
individual interceptors as improved arma-
ment and fire control systems become avail-
able, and the increased demands on industrial
capacity resulting from the advent of more
complex fighters. At present, we can esti-
mate only that the USSR will probably not in-
crease its present numerical fighter strength,
and that a decision will probably be made to
begin cutting it back some time late in the
period of this estimate. On this basis, we
hold estimated Soviet fighter strength con-
stant at about 10,000 aircraft through mid-
1962, recognizing that the timing of the So-
viet decision will depend largely on the USSR's
actual progress in the guided missile field.
80. European Satellite and Asiatic Commu-
nist fighter forces will probably continue to
increase in numerical strength during the
period. Our future estimates are based pri-
marily on recent evidence that increases have
been made in both the authorized and actual
strengths of some fighter regiments in the
Satellites and China. There is also evidence
that the Chinese Communists are now adding
a third regiment per fighter division. We
believe that these developments may represent
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continuing trends. In addition, it is probable
that Satellite ground attack regiments will
convert to tactical jet fighter regiments with
dual mission, following the recent Soviet pat-
tern. The bulk of any increase in fighter
strength in these countries will comprise older
models retired from Soviet forces as the USSR
introduces higher performance aircraft into
its own units. 17
81. The geographic distribution of Bloc fight-
ers will probably change somewhat during the
period, with more fighters becoming available
to the presently less well-defended areas. In
the USSR, as surface-to-air missiles are in-
troduced into the defenses of critical target
areas, fighter forces near these areas will prob-
ably be deployed outward in order to permit
the more effective employment of both fighters
and missiles.
Guided Missiles
82. Soviet planners probably believe that guid-
ed missile systems, particularly surface-to-air
systems, offer the greatest potential for deny-
ing final penetration to high-value targets by
aircraft and cruise-type missiles. Moreover,
of present weapon systems, the surface-to-air
missile alone has the potential for develop-
ment into an antiballistic missile system.
We therefore believe the USSR will make a
strenuous effort to develop, produce, and de-
ploy surface-to-air missile systems.
83. To oppose high altitude attack by US and
Allied aircraft and cruise-type missiles (in-
cluding air-to-surface missiles) , the USSR
would require improved surface-to-air systems
during the period of this estimate. By 1962,
effective altitudes of about 70,000 feet and
horizontal ranges of 50-100 n.m. would prob-
ably be required. On the basis of limited in-
formation on Soviet development programs
and our assessment of the state of the guided
missile art in the USSR, we estimate that the
USSR is probably capable of developing and
placing in operation during the 1959-1961
time period surface-to-air systems which could
deliver nuclear or HE warheads to these hori-
For numerical estimates of future Bloc fighter
strength, see Annex B, Table 5.
18
zontal ranges and to considerably greater alti-
tudes. 19 Both land-based and shipborne sys-
tems will probably be developed.
84. Moreover, we estimate that Soviet plan-
ners would probably have been interested in
developing a guidance system capable of 360?
traverse for static and mobile employment
with the 60,000 ft/25 n.m. missiles. Consider-
ing technically feasible alternatives for sur-
face-to-air missile guidance systems and the
relative cost per unit of various solutions to
the 360? guidance problem, we estimate that
the USSR would probably have developed a
command-type system permitting the use of
fire-units considerably smaller than those at
Moscow, but with a lower traffic-handling
capability per guidance radar. We estimate
that such a system could be operational in
1957.
85. The low altitude limit of the current Mos-
cow system will probably remain about the
same as at present, and low-altitude coverage
will probably be required to supplement both
this system and the more advanced high-
altitude systems. For defense of static tar-
gets, field forces, and naval vessels, the USSR
now requires low-altitude surface-to-air sys-
tems capable of interception at horizontal
ranges out to about 20 n.m., increasing to
about 35 n.m., as the period advances. We
estimate that a low-altitude system capable
of carrying an HE warhead could probably be
placed in operation in 1958, 19 but that its
maximum horizontal range during the period
to 1962 would probably be about 15 n.m.
86. To improve the kill capabilities of Bloc
fighters, improved all-weather air-to-air guid-
ed missiles will probably be developed. We
estimate that in 1958 the USSR could prob-
ably have in operation an all-weather missile
For detailed estimates of missile performance
characteristics, see Annex B, Table 4. For ap-
propriate nuclear warhead capabilities, see NIE
11-2-57, Part I, "Soviet Atomic Energy Program,"
dated 7 May 1957, limited distribution.
77 It is the view of the Assistant Chief of Staff,
Intelligence, USAF, that the USSR would be un-
likely to have an effective all-weather, land-
based, low altitude surface-to-air missile sys-
tem in operational use prior to 1960-1961. See
his footnote to NIE 11-5-57, paragraph 62.
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system capable of delivering a 50-pound HE
warhead to a maximum range of about 5 n.m.,
and that a system capable of delivering a nu-
clear or HE warhead to a maximum range
of 15-20 n.m. if launched at 60,000 feet could
probably be available in 1960.
87. Although we have little knowledge of So-
viet interest or activity in the field of unguid-
ed air-to-air rockets, we estimate that the
USSR could employ them with interceptors
during the period. Unguided air-to-air rockets
with HE warheads could now be available;
the USSR probably has the technical capabil-
ity to equip a large-caliber unguided air-to-air
rocket with a nuclear warhead in 1958-1959.
88. The required performance characteristics
of an antiballistic missile system are not fully
known. Considering the necessity to achieve
a kill before the missile enters the target dan-
ger zone, Soviet planners might establish anti-
missile system performance requirements for
initial interception at altitudes up to 300,000
feet and horizontal ranges out to 75 n.m., with
much greater system detection and tracking
ranges required. While an antimissile devel-
opment program will almost certainly be pur-
sued with great vigor by the USSR, we do not
believe it will be able to place in operation a
system capable of successfully intercepting
ballistic missiles during the period of this esti-
mate.
89. We estimate that series production of sur-
face-to-air guided missiles is now underway,
and that the USSR will probably produce such
missiles in large quantities. In the Moscow
area there are four and possibly six factory-
type facilities, at present in different stages
of completion, which appear to be partial
fabrication and final assembly plants for sur-
face-to-air missiles. In addition, there is some
evidence that surface-to-air launching sites
are under construction near Leningrad, and
there have been unconfirmed reports of missile
sites at a few other locations. Other than
the above, we have no current intelligence on
Soviet programs for the production or opera-
tional employment of air defense missile sys-
tems. Considering air defense missiles as a
high-priority element in an over-all Soviet mis-
sile program, we believe that the USSR might
19
produce, by mid-1962, sufficient missiles and
guidance equipment to accomplish an opera-
tional program about as follows: (a) equip
about 150 static and mobile missile units with
ground-launched missiles of the Moscow type;
(b) equip about 170 static and mobile missile
units with higher-altitude, longer-range mis-
siles; (c) equip about 175 static and mobile
missile units 20 with low-altitude missiles; (d)
equip about 10 cruisers and 16 destroyers
with surface-to-air missiles; and (e) equip all
Bloc all-weather fighters and some Bloc day
fighters with air-to-air missiles or unguided
rockets of various types. 21
90. We believe the surface-to-air missile de-
fense around Moscow to be a special case
dictated by the special importance of the city
to the USSR. Considering the restricted
azimuth coverage of individual sites and the
great expense of the 57 fixed installations, we
do not believe that Moscow-type surf ace-to-
air defenses would be deployed at a similar
level of defense in any additional Soviet areas,
except possibly Leningrad. During the next
year or two, it is probable that a few addition-
al critical areas in the USSR will be provided
with relatively high levels of surface-to-air
missile defenses, employing missiles of the
current Moscow type. Thereafter, the most
critical areas will probably be supplied with
improved systems, and a larger number of
critical areas, as well as field units, installa-
tions, and naval vessels will be provided with
lower levels of surface-to-air defense. By 1962,
many more of the major Soviet cities and in-
dustrial areas, as well as military forces and
20 In view of his estimate of a later operational
capability date for the low-altitude surface-to-
air system the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intel-
ligence, USAF, believes that the USSR is unlikely
to have produced sufficient missiles to equip as
many as 175 units by mid-1962. See his footnote
to paragraph 85.
21- These estimates are based primarily on a con-
sideration of Soviet requirements, resource avail-
ability and industrial capacity to produce air
defense missile systems as part of an over-all
Soviet military program. For further details
and a fuller description of the estimative meth-
od employed and the uncertainties involved, see
NIE 11-5-57, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable
Programs in the Guided Missile Field," 12 March
1957.
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installations, will probably be provided with
surface-to-air missile defense against manned
aircraft and cruise-type missiles. It is pos-
sible that some major Satellite targets will
also be so defended.
91. A limited number of nuclear warheads
could now be incorporated into Soviet surface-
to-air missiles. We estimate that some high-
altitude surface-to-air missiles, and possibly
some large caliber air-to-air rockets or guided
missiles, will be so equipped during the period
of this estimate. However, the estimated
availability of fissionable materials, and other
high-priority needs, would impose limitations
on the number of air defense weapons so
equipped.
Anti-Aircraft Artillery
92. Pending the availability and deployment
of adequate numbers of guided missiles, the
Bloc will probably continue to place consider-
able reliance on AAA, particularly for low-
altitude defense. It is possible that a multi-
barrelled, Gatling-type gun of about 30 mm
will be developed for low-altitude defense.
As guided missile systems become available
in greater quantity, the USSR will probably
phase out a large proportion of its medium
and some light AA guns, transferring them to
other Bloc nations.
TRENDS IN EARLY WARNING AND
INTERCEPT CONTROL CAPABILITIES
93. The speeds of currently operational US
aircraft are such that a large proportion of
critical Soviet target areas, including Moscow,
could now be provided with more than one
hour's early warning by ground-based radars
sited on the Bloc's borders, and some areas
could be provided with at least two hours'
warning. One of the most serious problems
Soviet air defense planners face is the marked
decrease in warning time that will result as
the speeds of Western offensive delivery vehi-
cles increase. Even assuming maximum the-
oretical radar ranges, Soviet planners prob-
ably estimate that by 1960-1962 Moscow might
be subjected to aircraft attack with only about
40 minutes' early warning from ground-based
radars, and that even the deepest interior re-
gions might not be assured of two hours' warn-
20
ing by such radars. The problem of adequate
warning against aircraft attack is already
critical in the case of important Soviet border
targets such as Murmansk, Leningrad, Odessa,
Baku, and Vladivostok. 22 Moreover, warning
time for all areas will be reduced radically
when Western weapon systems include long-
range ballistic missiles, against which the
USSR is unlikely to have effective defense
systems by 1962.
94. Soviet early warning requirements can be
expressed as ranging from full warning, based
on the time required to alert and effectively
employ the maximum serviceable air defense
forces, to alert warning, based on the mini-
mum time required to effectively employ those
air defense forces maintained in an alert sta-
tus. We are unable to judge accurately the
amount of time the USSR would require for
full warning, although we believe it might
be at least two hours. However, during the
period of this estimate, the alert warning re-
quirements for Soviet fighter interceptors
would probably be about 12-15 minutes, to
permit fighters in two-minute alert status to
make straight-line intercepts in the least
possible time against high-altitude aircraft
headed directly toward the fighter base. For
surface-to-air missile units in five-minute
alert status, about 9-11 minutes' alert warn-
ing would probably be required to permit ini-
tial engagement at maximum missile range.
The required performance characteristics of
associated radar equipment, based on a 500
knot attack at 45,000 feet in 1957 and a 1,200
knot attack at 60,000 feet in 1960-1962, would
be about as follows:
500 Knot Attack
Opposed by
interceptor
Opposed by
25 n.m. missile
1,200 Knot Attack
Opposed by
interceptor
Opposed by
50 n.m. missile
Opposed by
100 n.m. missile
Early Warning GCI Range
Range (n.m.) (n.m.)
150
100
315
240
310
80
215
22 For estimated current and future warning lines,
see Annex C, Map 2.
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95. Based on observed trends and estimated
Soviet capabilities in radar development, we
estimate that reliable early warning detection
ranges against B-47 size aircraft at high
altitudes will probably increase from the
TOKEN's present capabilities of 80-180 n.m.
to 200-260 n.m. in 1960, and that reliable
detection ranges will approximate 260 n.m. in
1962. Against F-86 size aircraft, reliable de-
tection ranges will be on the order of 120-170
n.m. by the end of the period. The reliable
detection capability of Soviet GCI radar
against B-47 size aircraft will probably in-
crease from 50-110 n.m. at present to 150-250
n.m. by 1962, and against F-86 size aircraft
from 40-70 to 90-140 n.m. By 1962, Soviet
GCI radars will probably be capable of ac-
curate heightfinding up to the combat ceil-
ings of Western bombers and cruise-type mis-
siles in operational use at that time. We esti-
mate that, through the period, these increas-
ing radar capabilities can probably meet the
alert warning requirements for those areas
where some defense in depth is available (i.e.,
areas where radars and defense weapons can
be stationed forward of the targets to be de-
fended) , and for peripheral areas as well, ex-
cept against the highest-performance aircraft
and cruise-type missiles. However, for the de-
fense of targets on the periphery of the Bloc
against the highest-performance Western air-
craft and cruise-type missiles, the alert warn-
ing capabilities of ground-based radars alone
will probably be deficient for fighter intercep-
tors and marginal for surface-to-air missile de-
fenses.
96. A further increase in Bloc warning capa-
bilities could be achieved by the employment
of airborne early warning systems, and there
is some evidence that the USSR is engaged in
the development of such systems. We also
have some evidence that individual Soviet
cruisers and destroyers in the Baltic and
Black Seas have been involved in air early
warning exercises. Although we have no evi-
dence that airborne early warning or radar
picket ships are being employed as a perma-
nent segment of the Bloc's early warning sys-
tem, we estimate that the USSR will probably
employ these methods for extending early
21
warning coverage in at least a few areas by
mid-1962.
97. The number of operational Bloc early
warning and GCI radar sites will probably
increase to a total of nearly 700 by mid-1962.
By that time, all prime early warning sites
will probably consist of an air search radar
and a heightfinder, supplemented by as many
as three gap-fillers providing low-altitude
coverage. All GCI sites will probably consist
of one air search radar and two heightfind-
ers. 23 As improved radars are introduced in-
to the heavily-defended areas of the Bloc, older
models will probably be deployed to areas
where coverage is now sparse or nonexistent.
By the end of the period, the Bloc will prob-
ably have complete ground-based radar cover-
age, with the exception of China's southwest
border and some inland portions of Siberia,
west-central China, and Mongolia.
98. Close control of interception will probably
be improved by increases in the traffic-han-
dling capability of communications equipment.
The improved GCI equipment estimated for
the period will probably have a traffic-han-
dling capacity of about 12 simultaneous inter-
ceptions. The limitations imposed by current
air-ground communications equipment will
probably be reduced by conversion to 8-12
channel VHF. This conversion will probably
be completed in Soviet forces by 1960, and
possibly in the Satellites by 1962. We also
believe it possible that air-ground data-link
equipment will be developed and placed in
operation by 1962.
TRENDS IN OTHER ELEMENTS OF AIR
DEFENSE CAPABILITIES
99. Air Facilities. Considerable emphasis will
continue to be placed on airfield construction
in the Bloc. Most newly-constructed fighter
fields will probably have runways in excess of
7,000 feet, and a program of extending shorter
fields will probably be pursued to keep pace
with the introduction of higher performance
aircraft. We estimate that a high priority
will continue to be placed on airfield construe-
For a detailed numerical estimate, see Annex
B, Table 6.
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tion in the northern and eastern peripheral
areas of the USSR. Airfield development will
probably also occur during the period in the
industrialized areas of the USSR lying along
the Trans-Siberian Railroad north of Mongolia
and Manchuria, but with considerably less
emphasis than in the Arctic areas. There will
probably be a considerable improvement in the
POL situation by 1962, with some increase in
airfield storage capacity.
100. Command and Coordination. Through-
out the period of this estimate, major efforts
will probably be directed toward improving
Bloc capabilities in regard to air defense re-
porting, command reaction, and coordination.
Ground-to-ground communications capacities
will be increased by the extension of land-
lines, microwave relay systems, teleprinter
links, and possibly scatter communications.
By 1962, a limited automatic data-handling
capability will probably exist in the more
critical areas. Despite such technological im-
provements, communications saturation prob-
lems will continue to exist. Increased auton-
omy for air defense controllers at the lower
22
echelons may result from the requirement for
rapid local command reaction.
101. ECM. Bloc ECM capabilities will im-
prove through 1962. At that time the USSR
could have equipment capable of jamming at
frequencies up through 18,000 mc/s and pos-
sibly higher, although its effectiveness cannot
be estimated. The USSR could also develop
devices to enable missiles to home on electronic
emissions. To decrease vulnerability to jam-
ming, Soviet radars will probably employ great-
er frequency spreading during the period,
and other antijamming techniques are prob-
ably now under development. Land-lines and
microwave links will be used increasingly dur-
ing the period. Nevertheless, defensive elec-
tronic systems will continue to be susceptible
to ECM, and in this field it is expected that
the advantage is likely to fluctuate between
the offense and the defense. We estimate
that through the period of this estimate, Bloc
air defense electronic systems will still be sub-
ject to progressive disruption by properly em-
ployed diversionary tactics, decoys, saturation
techniques, and other countermeasures.
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ANNEX A
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AIR DEFENSE PROGRAMS
Air Defense Costs, 1957-1962
1. The costs of the air defense programs which
we have outlined in the DISCUSSION have
been measured in aggregate terms. While
we recognize that monetary calculations of
Soviet military costs are only approximations,
they do permit the establishment of reason-
able magnitudes with which to weigh the eco-
nomic impact of the estimated programs.
Such calculations also serve as an indication
of the priority and effort which would be re-
quired and the possible effects on other mili-
tary and industrial programs. We estimate
that the total annual cost of Bloc air defense
programs would be about 62 billion rubles
($13 billions) for 1957, rising to a peak of
about 111 billion rubles ($22 billions) in 1961,
and then declining somewhat to about 104
billion rubles ($21 billions) in 1962. 1 Figure
1 shows how total costs are allocated through
time and by principal air defense function.
2. The estimated initial and operating costs
from 1957 to 1962 are detailed in Figure 2 by
subcategories of programs. ' The annual ini-
tial costs of Bloc air defense programs would
rise from about 36 billion rubles in 1957 to a
peak of approximately 70 billion rubles in
1961 and then decrease somewhat to about
60 billion rubles in 1962. It should be noted
that total initial costs exceed total operating
costs. Because the guided missile program
starts from a low base there is a very large
ratio of initial to operating costs through
1961. This ratio for other programs varies
somewhat from year to year according to the
quantity of equipment introduced into the air
defense system.
3. The over-all impact of these costs may be
illustrated as follows: if the total of all Bloc
For convenience of comparison among estimates,
1951 rubles are used throughout this analysis.
The dollar expenditures are based on price re-
lationships existing in the US in 1955.
military expenditures remains in conformity
with that estimated in NIE 11-4-56,2 the pro-
portion allocated to air defense programs
would rise from about 25 percent of the total
in 1957 to about 35 percent in 1961; expendi-
tures for military programs other than air
defense would have to decline somewhat be-
low our previous estimates. If, on the other
hand, expenditures for these other military
programs remain as previously estimated, the
result would be an increase of about six per-
cent in our estimate of total Bloc military
expenditures by 1961.
4. Most of the research and development,
specialized equipment, and highly trained
manpower needed for the air defense of the
Bloc will have to be provided by the USSR.
Initial Soviet air defense expenditures would
increase sharply through 1960 and operating
expenditures would increase by more than 80
percent (see Figure 3). The air defense pro-
grams of the USSR are estimated to constitute
28 percent of total Soviet military expendi-
tures for 1957. If total Soviet military ex-
penditures remain at the levels estimated in
NIE 11-4-56, air defense programs would take
an increasing share of the total, reaching 43
percent by 1961. If Soviet military programs
other than air defense were maintained at
previously estimated levels and additional re-
sources were provided to accommodate the air
Military expenditures by the USSR during the
period 1955-1961, were estimated in NIE 11-4-56,
"Soviet Capabilities and Probable Soviet Courses
of Action through 1961," published 2 August 1956.
Since corresponding agreed estimates of the mili-
tary expenditures of other Bloc countries do not
exist, tentative estimates have been made for
the purposes of the above paragraph. Even
should such tentative estimates prove to be con-
siderably in error, the conclusions arrived at
would not be materially altered, since expendi-
tures by the USSR are estimated to comprise
85-90 percent of total Bloc air defense outlays
(see Figure 3).
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defense programs, the 1961 allocation to air
defense would be 40 percent of total military
expenditures, compared with the 36 percent
estimated in NIE 11-4-56.
5. Air defense programs would thus constitute
an appreciable burden upon the Bloc's econ-
omy. We believe that the cost would be such
as to require either some diversion of indus-
trial resources from other military programs
as previously estimated, or an increase in total
military expenditures.
Electronics and Telecommunication Equipment
6. The electronics requirements for air de-
fense are very great, involving an increase of
approximately 300 percent between 1957 and
1961. These requirements would absorb a
substantial portion of the output of the elec-
tronics and telecommunication equipment in-
dustry of the Bloc throughout the period, de-
spite the fact that this industry is growing at
a rapid rate. Satisfaction of the demands of
the air defense programs would permit only
small increases in electronics production for
other military, industrial, and civilian pur-
poses. We do not believe that fulfillment of
electronics requirements would offer such an
obstacle as to make these air defense pro-
Annex A
grams impossible. We are certain, however,
that some quite difficult choices will have to
be made among military programs, industrial
automation, and consumer goods during the
period of this estimate.
Other Equipment
7. An examination of Soviet Bloc industrial
facilities available to fulfill air defense pro-
curement requirements reveals no other ap-
parent restrictions. The total poundage of
required fighter aircraft and engine produc-
tion would increase about one-third by 1961.
These demands are within the capacity of the
industry. Similarly, with the possible excep-
tion of electronics, the guided missile produc-
tion program is believed to be within the eco-
nomic capacity of the Bloc. Although the air
defense programs would not require major
portions of the supply of basic materials,
fulfilling their requirements would impose
further pressures on the already tight supply
of such commodities as steel and construction
materials. Manpower limitations seem un-
likely to place any general restrictions on
the program, although some qualitative prob-
lems might develop in the precision engi-
neering skills.
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NLE 11-57
Annex A
FIGURE 1
ESTIMATED SINO-SOVIET BLOC AIR DEFENSE PROGRAMS
1957 - 1962
(billion 1951 rubles)
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
Guided Missile Programs
8.6
13.1
23.8
39.4
44.4
34.6
Aircraft Programs
21.4
24.9
27.3
28.7
29.8
29.6
AAA Programs
12.2
12.2
12.1
12.1
12.0
12.0
Control & Warning Programs
3.7
4.1
4.7
4.8
5.0
5.1
Related Programs*
15.9
16.6
17.5
18.5
19.8
22.3
Total
61.8
70.9
85.4
103.5
111.0
103.6
* Represents a generalized estimate of those portions of reserve, militarized MVD,
research and development, and nuclear energy costs which would properly be
chargeable to air defense. The overwhelming bulk of these outlays are in R.
and D. and nuclear energy costs.
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NIE 11-57
Annex A
FIGURE 2
ESTIMATED INITIAL AND OPERATING COSTS
SINO-SOVIET BLOC AIR DEFENSE PROGRAMS
1957 - 1962
(billion 1951 rubles)
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
Initial Costs
Guided Missiles
7.0
9.6
17.8
30.5
31.4
18.3
Aircraft
12.0
14.5
16.3
16.6
17.2
16.6
AAA
.4
.4
.4
.4
.2
.2
Control & Warning
1.3
1.5
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
Subtotal
20.7
26.0
36.5
49.5
50.8
37.1
Related Programs*
15.9
16.6
17.5
18.5
19.8
22.3
Total Initial
Costs
36.6
42.6
54.0
68.0
70.6
59.4
Operating Costs
Guided Missiles
1.6
, 3.5
6.0
8.9
13.0
16.3
Aircraft
9.4
10.4
11.0
12.1
12.6
13.0
AAA
11.8
11.8
11.7
11.7
11.8
11.8
Control & Warning
2.4
2.6
2.7
2.8
3.0
3.1
Total Operating
Costs
25.2
28.3
31.4
35.5
40.4
44.2
Total Air
Defense Costs
61.8
70.9
85.4
103.5
111.0
103.6
* Considered as an initial cost item for purposes of general analysis, since the
overwhelming bulk is in R. and D. and nuclear energy costs.
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NIE 11-57
Annex A
FIGURE 3
ESTIMATED INITIAL, OPERATING, AND RELATED AIR DEFENSE COSTS
USSR Only
1957 - 1962
(billion 1951 rubles)
Initial
Operating
Related
Total
Percent
of Total
Bloc
Costs
1957
20
18
16
54
87
1958
24
21
17
62
87
1959
34
24
17
75
88
1960
48
26
19
93
89
1961
49
30
20
99
89
1962
34
33
23
90
87
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ANNEX B
TABLES OF AIR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT
Characteristics, Strength, and Deployment
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AMEMINNIIIIIIIIMIllr
O0 _ ?
0
CD
7j o 7 J a
T1 ? cn TOP SECRET T1 cn
NIE 11-57 ; co (T?
co a)
7:1 a Annex B 71 a
o o .
o T1 o
_. T1
TABLE 1
> >
o 1 0'
0 0-) ESTIMATED OPTIMUM PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET JET INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT o w
co 0 co 0
0) m (INTERNAL FUEL ONLY) (3) D
0 0 7
0-? 0_.
0 (DN 0 N
_, 0
0 (Calculated in accordance with US Mil C-5011A Spec except that fuel reserves are reduced to permit a maximum of 20 minutes o
a a
o 0 maximum endurance at sea level and aircraft operate at altitudes permitting maximum radius) o 0
o 0 o 0
6 ?< 1957
> 1957 6 ?<
-o FLASH- FLASH-
1958 1959 -o
>
-o FRESCO LIGHT A LIGHT C FACE- 1958
FITTER 1962 -o
Es) FAGOT A & B FARMER All- All- PLATE All- All- All- Es)
< Day Day FRESCO Day weather weather Day weather Day weather weather <
o Fighter Fighters C & D1 Fighter Fighter Fighter Fighter Fighter Fighter Fighter Fighter (1)
a a
(3, Maximum Speed (kts)
71 Sea Level 580 620 635 680 610 635 700 690' 1,810805 1,810500 1,484000 (3
, .:
o 35,000 ft 525 555 575 711} 540 575 895 860
71
o
(T 1,150 --- ---
) 40,000 ft 525 550 570 700 540 570 850 ---
cc, Combat Ceiling (ft) 2 51,000 54,800 58,900 60,900 49,300 54,700 61,300 60,000 60,400 62,000 67,000 (T)
Da
cc,
a)
(D (D
Combat Radius (nm) 225 300 215 245 450 295 215 250 140 130 200
@ Time to Climb to
?01 40,000 ft (minutes) 8 7.5 6.2 3.7 2.6 7.8 8.6' 3.8' 4.0' 3.5' 3.0' 1.7
Armament
N.) Guns 2x23 mm 2x23 mm 2x23 mm 2x23 mm 2x37 mm 2x37 mm 3x23 mm 2x37 mm 3x30 mm 1x37 mm
o
_.
1x37 mm 1x37 mm 1x37 mm 1x37 mm and and Or and or or
-1. 3x30 mm 3x37 mm lx30 mm
O-- and and and
Rockets 50x2"-3" 76x55 mm 2x325 mm 2x325 mm 2x210 mm 38x55 mm 2x210 mm
O-- or or OT or or or Or
0) 4x325 mm 2x210 mm 2x210 mm 2x325 mm 2x220 mm
or or or or or
Guided Missiles 4 AAM 4 AAM 2 AAM 4 AAM 2 AAM 2 AAM 4 AAM
1 FRESCO C is a day fighter, FRESCO D has a limited all-weather capability. FRESCO E is the same as D but without afterburner and would have about
the same performance as the A and B.
2 Combat ceiling is the altitude where rate of climb is 500 ft/min immediately prior to combat with maximum power.
8 Data shown at take-off gross weight (see DISCUSSION, para. 77 and footnotes).
4 Military power (without afterburner).
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9040/171-0Z -1A-09 ?
O ri 0 , ?
Fs 6 Ts '
7Ja 7j0
T1 ? cn TOP SECRET T1 cn
CO
NIE 11-5' 0 (1)
a)
Annex 1 7) 0-
71 a_
o . o
_. 5 _
-0
o o
_, -0
TABLE 2
0? ' 0'
0 (/) ESTIMATED OPTIMUM PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET JET INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT o w
co 0 co 0
o
0) D 0) D
(WITH EXTERNAL FUEL EXCEPT WHERE NOTED) o
o 7"'?
- 0_ (Calculated in accordance with US Mil C-5011A Spec except that fuel reserves are reduced to permit a maximum of 20 minutes a
o o
O 0 maximum endurance at sea level and aircraft operate at altitudes permitting maximum radius) 0 0
0 0 0 0
1957
1957
> FLASH- FLASH-
1958 1958 1959 >
P FRESCO LIGHT A LIGHT C FACE-
PLATE FITTER
P FAGOT A 84 B FARMER All- All- All- All- 1A9161 -2 33
8 Day Day FRESCO Day weather weather Day weather Day weather weather Es)
< Fighter Fighter ? Fighter Fighter Fighter 2 <
Fighter Fighters C az D 1 Fighter Fighter Fighter

a) a)
0_ Maximum Speed (kts)
(3 815000 1,484000
a
: Sea Level 580 620 635 680 610 635 700 690 800 (3:
71 35,000 ft 525 555 575 710 540 575 895 860 15
1:11805 1, 71
(D 40,000 ft 525 550 570 700 540 570 850 --- ___
62,000 ---
67,000 a)
(T) 59,500 54,000 59,600 60,000 60,400 (T)
ea Combat Ceiling (ft) 50,700 53,900 57,900 48,700 ea
(f) (/)
(D Combat Radius (nm)' 360 610 500 655 530 385 610 250 480 440 200 a)
@ Time to Climb to @
(-2,1 40,000 ft (minutes) 8 8.7 7.6 4.5 7.9 8.4 9?54 6.3' 4.0' 5.6' 5.1' 1.7 CY,
cr' 9
: ,-
o 1 o 1
o w ESTIMATED ACTUAL STRENGTH AND DEPLOYMENT OF CERTAIN SINO-SOVIET BLOC AIR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT 1 (MID-1957) o w
co 0 co 0
0) m (3) D
0 a JET
o o -
o N
a) JET FIGHTER AIRCRAFT FIGHTER ANTIAIRCRAFT
o N
a_ IN OPERATIONAL UNITS REGIMENTS RADARS ARTILLERY a_
0 C)
IV -0 Early
All-
o 0
Warning GCI
6 ' < AREA Day weather Total Sites Sites Gap-Filler Medium Light O)'<
? Northwestern USSR 1 1,380 220 1,600 50 22 27 80 900 1,300 >
-0 -0
P Western USSR' 1,760 320 2,080 65 38 58 127 2,850 4,450 -0
8
< West Central USSR 8 1,340 260 1,600 50 43 48 117 2,400 1,400
Es)
(D Caucasus 4 <
1,185 150 1,335 42 25 30 73 1,300
1,150
a 800 ,7 _ East Central USSR 5 470 50 520 16 12 6 36 80000 900 (D
0_
?:3: Far Eastern USSR 6
71 TOTAL WITHIN USSR 1,675 240 1,915 60 46 32 150
1, 2,550 15:
7,810 1,240 9,050 283 186 201 583 9 11,900 71
(D
(T) Soviet Forces in Eastern (D
a Europe 7 1,070 80 1,150 2,400
cc) (1,320) 36 Subordination not estimated 950
(14,300)
a) (TOTAL SOVIET) (8,880) (10,200) (319) --- --- --- (10,750)
Satellite Nations 9 1,865 55 1,920 53 9 Subordination not estimated 2,650 2,350
00
Pb
@
TOTAL EASTERN EUROPE 2,935 135 3,070 89 46 64 172 3,600 4,750
01
9 Asiatic Communist
: