THE OUTLOOK FOR AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A008000010020-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 28, 2013
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: November 28, 1955
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2013/05/28 : CIA-RDP79R01012A008000010020-2
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
28 November 1955
STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 83.55
SUBJECT: The Outlook for Afghanistan
I. In the light of increased policy concern over the trend of
Afghan relations with the Seviet Bleep we have initiated a nentSNIE
updating our last Afghan estimate, NIE 53-54 of 19 October 19549 for
IAC censideration en 3 January. However, the old estimate appears
to have been quite close to the mark in assessing the outlook for
Afghanistan and the new paper will probably not differ materially
from it in basic thrust.
2. NIE 53-54 in essence concluded that Afghanistan was "highly
vulnerable to Soviet pressures" and that its ability to remain an
independent buffer state separating the USSR from the Indian sube
continent was being undermined as a result of Afghan receptivity to
Soviet lures, particularly in the economic and technical assistance
field. It estimated that Soviet attentions to Afghanistan-as part
of a general effort to counter Western gains elsewhere in the Middle
EasteSouth Asia areae-wouid "probably increase substantially" and
that consequent Soviet economic penetration might result in "a gradual
drift of Afghanistan -toward the Soviet orbit." It noted that
"Afghanistan will probably continue to accept Soviet aid offers" and
that "in doing so the Afghan leaders may misjudge their Ability to
curb Soviet political and subversive activity" and the willingness
and ability of the Western powers to bail them out in event of a
military or diplomatic crisis. Finally, NIE 53-54 pointed' out that
Afghaneakistani feuding--Which has played an important part in
Afghanistan's receptivity to Soviet lureseeehowed little promise
of lessening.
* This memo is to become a no for the DCI? for hie use in next
week's NSC briefing,
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47, LAI SECRET
30 }IE 53.54 nevertheless expressed the belief that the USSR
was unlikely to gain actual control of Afghanistan, at least within
the next few years. It estimated that the Afghan government%
dealings with the Bloc were part of a continuing effort to play the
great powers off 'against each ether to Afghanistan's advantage and.
that Afghanistan would probably seek to obtain additional Western
economic and possibly military aid to counterbalance assistance from
the Bloc. It concluded that the USSR was unlikely to exercise its
capability to take over Afghanistan militarily and that the small
proaCommunist elements in Afghanistan would probably not gain sufficient
strength to overthrow the government.
4. Afghanistan's growing dependence en the Soviet Bloc during
the peat year has underlined the dangers foreseen in the estimate.
Sawa 1954, Afghanistan has reteived the equivalent of more than $11
million in Bloc credits, together with technical assistance, for
development projects. Another $10 million credit has reportedly
recently been extended by Czechoslovakia. Deliveries of arms from
Czechoslovakia under a $3 million cash deal are already being made.
The Soviets have reportedly even offered to take over and complete
the American-financed and constructed Helmand Valley project, the
country's largest development project. Afghan barter trade with the
Blce has been increasing. Finally, the Afghan government is taking
steps to reduce its vulnerability to Pakistani economic sanctions by
rerouting the bulk of its foreign trade, both with the West and the
Bloc, through the USSR rather than via the traditional routes through
Pakistan.
5. These growing ties with the Soviet Bloc are the result net
of a deliberate Afghan decision te abandon its historic policy of
? non-commitment? but of Afghanistan% estrangement from Pakistan.
As forecast in our estimate, Afghan Prime Minister Daud has con-
tinued to court trouble with Pakistan over the Pushtun question. A
crisis arose early this year When an officially inspired gabul meb,
demonstrating in the cause of Pushtunistan? entered and damaged
the Pakistani embassy. The incident convinced the Pakistanis that
Daud would have to go, and Pakistan's blockade of Afghan trade from
April to September of this year was aimed in part at forcing Daud
out.. Far from thing so, however, the Pakistani challenge has
apparently strengthened Daud and increased his determination to
keep up the Pushtun feud with'Pakistan? and to cultivate Bloc
support in the controversy. The recent Lee Jirgah (Grand Tribal
Aesembly) appears to have firmly endorsed Daud e5 stand.
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SECRET
6. We believe that the basic dangers in the Afghan situation
remain substantially as dEpicted in NIE 53.54. However, the.
deterioration in Afghan.Pakistani relations during 19551as given
Daud additional incentive to seek Bloc assistance in strengthening
his position vis.a.vis Pakistan and has thus accelerated the Afghan
drift toward the Bloc. While the Daud government almost certainly
remains desirous of maintaining its independence, its apparent
determination to pursue its anti-Pakistan policies at almost any cost
has already led it to compromise its traditional buffer state position
in important respects?
7. The USSR, for its part, ie probably content to have Afghanistan
remain nominally independent so long as the latter% tendency to drift .
away from the West and toward the Bloc continues. As a result, the
Soviet Union is unlikely to take early action to secure firm control
of Afghanistan, either by 'aversion or direct military intervention,
However, it will almost certainly act Vigorously to maintain its present
favorable position. It would probably give Daud strong support
against any efforts to unseat him and in the event of major Afghan.
? Pakistani hostilities would probably be prepared to intervene with
force.
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ROBERT L. HEWITT
STAT
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/28: CIA-RDP79R01012A008000010020-2