ONE MEMORANDUM ON AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A008000010019-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 28, 2013
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: November 28, 1955
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
28 November 1955
MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: ONE Memorandum on Afghanistan
1. The DCI plans to include the Afghan situation in his
briefing of the NEC this week. The attached memorandum has been
prepared by the Board in that connection.
2. The memorandum is circulated at the request of the DCI
for your information and such oral comments as you may wish to
make at the IAC meeting on 29 November.
Distribution "A"
hJ
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PAUL A. BOREL
Deputy Assistant Director
National Estimates
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
28 November 1955
MEM0aANDUM F01: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : The Outlook for Afghanistan
1. In the light of increased p^licy concern over the
trend of Afghan relations with the Soviet Bloc, we have
initiated a new SNIE updating our last Afghan estimate,
NIE 53-54, of 19 October 1954, for IAC consideration on 3
January. However, the old estimate appears to have been
quite close to the mark in assessing the outlook for Af-
ghanistan.
2, NIE 53-54 in essence concluded that Afghanistan was
"highly vulnerable to Soviet pressures" and that its ability
to remain an independent buffer state separating the USSR from
the Indian subcontinent was being undermined as a result of
Afghan receptivity to Soviet lures, particularly in the
economic and technical assistance field. It estimated that
Soviet attentions to Afghanistan -- as part of a general effort
to counter Western gains elsewhere in the Middle East-South Asia
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area -- would "probably increase substantially" and that con-
sequent Soviet economic penetration might result in "a gradual
drift of Afghanistan toward the Soviet orbit." It noted that
"Afghanistan will probably continue to accept Soviet aid offers"
and that "in doing so the Afghan leaders may misjudge their
ability to curb Soviet political and subversive activity" and
the willingness and ability of the Western powers to bail them
out in event of a military or diplomatic crisis. Finally,
NIE 53-54 pointed out that Afghan-Pakistani feuding -- which
has played an important part in Afghanistan's receptivity to
Soviet lures -- showed little premise of lessening.
3. NIE 53-54 nevertheless expressed the belief that the
USSR was unlikely to gain actual control of Afghanistan, at
least within the next few years. It estimated that the Afghan
government's dealings with the Bloc were part of a continuing
effort to play the great powers off against each other to
Afghanistan's advantage and that Afghanistan would probably
seek to obtain additional Western economic and possibly mili-
tary aid to counterbalance assistance from the Bloc. It con-
cluded that the USSR was unlikely to exercise its capability
to take over Afghanistan militarily and that the small pro-
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Communist elements in Afghanistan would probably not gain
sufficient strength to overthr-v the government.
4. Afjianistants growing dependence on the Soviet Bloc
during the ?ast year has underlined the dangers foreseen in
the estimate. The NIE noted that Afghanistan had received
the equivalent of more than $11 million in Bloc credits, to-
gether with technical assistance for development projects.
Another
10 million credit has now reporteely been extended
by Czechoslovakia. Deliveries of arms from Czechoslovakia
under a $3 million cash deal are already being made. The
Soviets have reportedly even offered to take over and com-
plete the American-financed and directed Helmand Valley
project, the country?s largest development project. Afghan
barter trade with the Bloc has been increasing. Finally, the
Afghan government is taking steps to reduce its vulnerability
to Pakistani economic sanctions by rerouting the bulk of its
foreign trade, both with the West and the Bloc, through the
USSR rather than via the traditional routes through Pakistan.
* Total US loans and technical and economic aid to Afghanistan
since 1949 has been approximately $50 million. This in-
cludes two Export-Import Bank loans for the Helmand River
project 1421 million in 1949, and 0.8.2 million in 1954) and
some $8 million in technical assistance.
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5. These growing ties with the Soviet Bloc -- which will
almost certainly be strengthened during the forthcoming Khruschev-
Bulganin visit -- probably result not from a deliberate Afghan
decision to abandon its historic policy of non-commitment,
but from Afghanistan's estrangement from Pakistan. As forecast
in our estimate, Afghan Prime Minister Daud has continued to
court trouble with Pakistan over the Pushtun question. A crisis
arose early this year when an officially inspired Kabul mob,
demonstrating in the cause of Pushtunis tan, entered and damaged
the Pakistani embassy. The incident convinced the Pakistanis
that Daud would have to go2 and kakistan's blockade of Afghan
trade from April to September of this year was aimed in part at
forcing Daud out. Far from doing so2 however, the Pakistani
challenge has apparently strengthened Daud and increased his
determination to keep tp the Pushtun feud with Pakistan and to
cultivate Bloc support in the controversy. The recent Loe Jirgah
(Grand Tribal Assembly) appears to have firmly endorsad Daud's
stand.
6. We believe that the basic dangers in the Afghan
situation remain substantially as depicted in NIE'53-54.
How-
ever, the deterioration in Afghan-Pakistani relations during
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1955 has given Daud additional incentive to seek Bloc assistance
in strengthening his position vis-a-vis Pakistan and has thus
accelerated the Afghan drift toward the Bloc. While the Daud
government almost certainly remains desirous of maintaining its
independence, its apparent determination to pursue its anti-
Pakistan policies at almost any cost has already led it to com-
promise its traditional buffer state position in important
respects. In the presently unlikely event that Afghan-Pakistani
hostilities should develop, the Daud government would probably
seek extensive Soviet support without regard to the political
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cost.
7. The USSR, for its part, is probably content to have
Afghanistan remain nominally independent so long as the latter 's
tendency to drift away from the West and toward the Bloc con-
tinues. As a result, the Soviet Union is unlikely to take early
action to secure firm control of Afghanistan, either by sub-
version or direct military intervention. However, it will
almost certainly act vigorously to maintain its present favor-
able position. It would probably give Daud strong support
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against any effotts to unseat him or in the event of major
Afghan-Pakistani hostilities. The forthcoming Khruschev-
Bulganin visit will probably lead to a joint statement in
favor of peaceful coexistence and non-interferences but the
Soviets may go so far as to offer Daud a specific security
guarantee.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
(2 K
SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
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