THE OUTLOOK FOR AFGHANISTAN*

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A008000010018-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2013
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: November 30, 1955
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
30 November 1955
ME11011ADUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : The Outlook for Afghanistan
1. In the light of increased policy concern over the trend
of Afghan relationswith the. Soviet Bloc, we have initiated a
new SNIE updating our last Afghan estimate, NIE 53*..54, of 19
October 1954, for IAC consideration on3 January. However, the
old estimate appears to have been quite close to the mark in
assessing the outlook for Afghanistan.
2. NIE 5354 in essence concluded that Afghanistan was
"highly Vulnerable to Soviet pressures" and that its ability to
remain an independent buffer state separating the USSR from the
Indian subcontinent was being undermined as a result of Afghan
receptivity to Soviet lures, particularly in the economic and
technical assistance field. It estimated that Soviet attentions .
to Afghanistan -- as part of a general effort to counter Western .
gains elsewhere in the Middle East-South Asia area -- would "prob-
ably increase substantially* and that consequent Soviet economic
* rovised pursuant to IAC comments made on 29 November.
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-penetration might result in "a gradual drift of Afghanistan toward
the Soviet orbit." It noted that "Afghanistan will probably con-
tinue to accept Soviet aid offers" and that "in doing so the Afghan
leaders may misjudge their ability to curb Soviet political and
subversive activity" and the willingness and ability of the Western
powers to bail them out in event of a military or diplomatic crisis.
Finally, NE 53-54 pointed out that Afghan-Pakistani feuding --
which has played an important part in Afghanistan's receptivity to
Soviet lures -- showed little pramise of lessening.
3. NE 53-54 nevertheless expressed the belief that the
USSR was unlikely to gain actual control of Afghanistan at least
within the next few years. It estimated that the Afghan govern-
ment's dealings with the Bloc were part of a continuing effort
to play the great powers off against each other to Afghanistan's
advantage and that Afghanistan would probably seek to obtain addi-
tionalidestern economic and possibly military aid to counterbalance
assistance from the Bloc. It concluded that the USSR was unlikely
to exercise its capability to take over Afghanistan militarily and
that the small pro-Communist elements in Afghanistan would probably
not gain sufficient strength to overthrow the government.
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4. Afghanistan's growing dependence on the Soviet Bloc during
the past year has underlined the dangers foreseen in the estimate.
The VTR noted that Afghanistan had received the equivalent of more
than $11 million in Bloc credits -together with technical assistance,
for development projects. Another $10 million credit has new reportedly
been extended by Czechoslovakia. .Deliveries of arms from Czechoslovakia
under a $3 million cash deal are already being made. The Soviets have
reportedly even offered to take- over and complete the American-financed
and directed Helmand Valley projecti the country's largest development
project.* Afghan barter trade with the Bloc has been increasing.
Finally, the Afghan government is. taking steps to reduce its vul-.
nerability to Pakistani economic sanctions by rerouting the bulk of
its foreign trade, both with the West and the Bloc, through the USSR
rather than via the traditional routes through Pakistan.
5. These growing ties with the Soviet Bloc -- which will airiest
certainly be strengthened during the forthcoming Khruschev-Bulganin
visit -- probably result net from a deliberate Afghan decision to
* Total US loans and technical and economic aid to Afghanistan since
1949 has been approximately $50 million. This includes two Export-
import Bank loans for the Helmnnd River project (2I million in 19491
and 1.8.2 million in 1954) and some $8 million in technical assistance.
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abanden its historic policy of non-conmitment, but from Afghanistan's
estrangement from Pakistan. As forecast in our estimate, Afghan
Prime Minister Daud has continued to court trouble with Pakistan over
the Pushtun question. A crisis arose early this year when an officially
inspired Kabul mob, demonstrating in the cause of Pushtunistan, entered
and damaged the Pakistani embassy. The incident convinced the Pakistanis
that Daud would have to go,.and Pakistan's blockade of Afghan trade
from April to September of this year was aimed in part at forcing Daud
out. Far from doing so, however, the Pakistani challenge has apparently
strengthened Daud and increased his determination to keep up the Pushtun
feud with Pakistan and to cultivate Bloc sunport in the controversy.
The recent Loc- Jirgah (Grand Tribal Assembly) anpears to have firmly
endorsed Daud's stand.
6. Thus the Afghan obsession with the Pushtunistan question plays
into the hands of the Soviets whose assistance to the Afghans makes
it possible for the latter to press the Pushtunistan agitation with
greater safety, The Bloc can offer Afghanistan something the West
cannot -- an alternative to complete dependence on Pakistan for trade
outlets by making available transit facilities through the USSR and
by itself providing increasing quantities of essential imports, such.
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as petroleum products, which Afghanistan formerly obtained through
Pakistan. These favors, which costs the Soviet Union very little,
are probably valued by the Afghans as highly as the Egyptians value
the arms with which they are being provided by the Soviet Union at
equally negligible cost to the Soviets? The Soviet Union could, if
it so desired, aid Afghanistan in promoting agitation over Pushtunistan
by providing money, arms, and diplonatic support in the UN. Moreover,
its treaties with Afghanistan provide a good basis for a Soviet guar-
antee of the Kabul regime against any 'retaliatory acts by Pakistan.
7. We believe that the basic dangers in the Afghan situation
remain substantially as depicted in NTE 53-54. However, the deteriora-
tion in Afghan-Pakistani relations during 1955 has given Daud additional
incentive to seek Bloc assistance in strengthening his position vis-a-vis
Pakistan and has thus accelerated the Afghan drift toward the Bloc.
While the Daud government almost certainly remains desirous of main-
taining its independence, its apparent determination to pursue its
anti-Pakistan policies at almost any cost has already led it to com-
promise its traditional buffer state position in important respects.
If resent trends continue, Afghanistan may fall into the "Soviet camp"
even though remaining nominally independent. In the presently unlikely
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event that Afghan-Pakistani hostilities should develop, the Daud govern-
ment would probably seek extensive 'Soviet support without regard to the
political cost.
8. The USSR, for its part, is trobably content to have Afghanistan
remain nominally independent 50 long as the latter's tendency to drift
away from the West and toward the Bloc continues. Is a result, the
Soviet Union is unlikely to take early action to secure firm control
of Afghanistan, either by subversion or direct military intervention.
However, it will almost certainly act vigorously to maintain its present
favorable position. It would probably give Daud strong support against
any efforts to unseat him or in the event of major Afghan-Pakistani
hostilities. The forthcoming Khruschev-BuIganin visit will probably
lead to a joint statement in favor of peaceful coexistence and non-
interference, but the Soviets may go so far as to offer Daud a specific
security guarantee,
9, Should Afghanistan fall under Soviet control, considerable
political and psychological damage to the position of the free world
in the area would result. Moreover, the extension of the Communist
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Bloc to the borders of Pakistan would place the Communists in direct
contact with the tribal areas where they could promote serious sub-
versive action against Pakistan.
FOR THE WARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
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S.73CR771
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