PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A008000010001-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 23, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 10, 1956
• Content Type: NIE

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NIE 5 3-56
10 January 1956
?
MOW
CO iN
A:0 '
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 53-56
(Supplements NIE 53-54)
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN
AFGHANISTAN'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION
1
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of,.
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 10 January 1956. Concurring were the Special Assistant,
Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of
Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of
Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and
the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The
Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC and the
Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained,
the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
DOCt.ii..F.NT NO.
NO CLF fl."3.
C
_61
F I
:
COPY NO.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,ONE
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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June 1953.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
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to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN'S
INTERNATIONAL POSITION
THE PROBLEM
To estimate probable developments in Afghanistan's relationships with the Bloc,
Pakistan, and the West and the likely effects of these developments on Afghanistan's
independence.
SCOPE
This estimate is designed to supplement NIE 53-54, "Outlook for Afghanistan,"
dated 19 October 1954, and to bring up to date our assessment of Afghanistan's inter-
national prospects in the light of such developments as the deterioration in Pakis-
tani-Afghan relations and the increasingly active Soviet policy in the area. Internal
problems are discussed only insofar as they relate to Afghanistan's probable interna-
tional policies. The primitive nature of Afghan economic and social institutions and
the concentration of political power among a handful of leading members of the
royal family were discussed in NIE 53-54. A summary of pertinent portions of this
estimate is attached in an appendix, "The Nature of Afghan Society."
CONCLUSIONS
1. Afghanistan is currently drifting closer
to the Bloc. A continuation of this trend
would seriously threaten Afghanistan's
independence and its historic position as
a buffer state. However, the USSR is
likely to be content for some time to
maintain close relations with and assist
a "benevolently" neutral Afghanistan
rather than to accomplish a clear-cut
takeover either by recognizable subver-
sion or actual force. (Paras. 8, 14-19, 30-
35)
2. Afghan Prime Minister Daud's accept-
ance of extensive Soviet aid is motivated
by his desire to strengthen Afghanistan
in its controversy with Pakistan over the
Pushtunistan issue' and also to develop
Afghanistan economically. Daud has
won effective support for his policies in
the limited circle of politically significant
Afghans, and he is not likely to be ousted
in the foreseeable future. So long as he
remains in power he will probably con-
tinue to seek Soviet aid and support.
(Paras. 9-12, 14-17, 22-24, 34)
3. Nevertheless, Daud and the Afghan
ruling oligarchy almost certainly desire
to avoid Soviet domination, and will prob-
This issue results from Afghan demands that the
Pushtu-speaking Pathan tribesmen in West Pak-
istan's western areas be given an autonomous
state, Pushtunistan. These tribesmen are ethni-
cally akin to the dominant Afghan tribal group.
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2
ably continue to seek countervailing
Western material aid and political sup-
port ? attempting to use the threat of
growing Soviet ties as leverage. Afghan
leaders probably underestimate the de-
gree to which economic connections, tech-
nical aid, intimate diplomatic and cul-
tural contacts, and the like, can be used
under Communist direction to tighten
the bonds between Afghanistan and the
USSR, and make an escape from the con-
nection very difficult. The ability of the
Afghans to make such an escape would
depend not only on their own efforts but
also on the timeliness of Western offers
of countervailing support or Western will-
ingness to bail them out if their inde-
pendence is threatened. (Paras. 20, 25,
34, 36-38)
4. Meanwhile, as long as Daud continues
dedicated to the Pushtunistan cause, the
USSR will have a means, not available to
the West, of making itself useful or even
indispensable to him. Daud might reach
the point where he would choose to accept
Soviet support, at whatever political cost,
rather than be ousted. (Para. 35)
5. So long as Daud persists in his Push-
tunistan policies, Afghan relations with
Pakistan will remain strained. However,
neither side is likely to provoke hostilities
deliberately. Pakistan's concern over
growing Soviet influence in Afghanistan
may lead it to seek some amelioration in
its relations with the Afghans, but it is
I. THE PRESENT SITUATION
highly unlikely to make any real con-
cessions on the Pushtunistan question.
(Paras. 26-29)
6. US capabilities to induce Afghanistan
to alter its present policies are limited.
Increased US aid might lead the Afghans
to affirm their neutral benevolence to-
ward the US as well as toward the USSR,
but would probably also convince them
that flirtation with the USSR was a good
way to get US aid. A cut-off of US aid,
or other evidence of US unfriendliness
would be likely to drive the Afghans closer
to the Soviet Bloc as their only source of
economic assistance and political support
against Pakistan. In neither event are
the Afghans likely to abandon the Push-
tunistan issue, and US could not support
Afghanistan in this controversy without
alienating Pakistan. (Para. 37)
7. If Western support of the "northern
tier" concept should be stepped up, and
particularly if the US should adhere to
the Baghdad Pact, Soviet attempts to
counter these developments probably
would include increased efforts to insure
Afghanistan's orientation toward the
Bloc. Should US bases be established in
Pakistan or Iran the Soviets would prob-
ably seek to gain control over Afghan
foreign and military policy. However,
the character of Soviet actions would be
conditioned by the attitude of India and
other neutral states of the Middle and
Far East. (Para. 30)
DISCUSSION
8. Developments in Afghanistan -during the
past year have confirmed our previous esti-
mate that Soviet penetration of Afghanistan
was likely and that Afghanistan might drift
toward the Bloc. Not only have Soviet atten-
tions to Afghanistan increased during this
period, culminating in the Khrushchev-Bul-
ganin visit to Kabul in December 1955, but
the Afghans themselves have become more
receptive to Soviet lures. Moreover, the gov-
idilMarg
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ernment of Prime Minister Daud has shown
itself increasingly reckless with respect to its
relations with Pakistan and the West. A con-
tinuation of these trends would seriously
threaten Afghanistan's independence and its
historic position as a buffer state.
9. The Pushtunistan Controversy. Afghani-
stan's increased readiness to accept Bloc aid
does not represent a deliberate decision to
abandon its historic policy of noncommit-
ment. Rather it stems principally from the
Daud regime's desire to develop the Afghan
economy as rapidly as possible, and from its
estrangement from Pakistan. This estrange-
ment has become serious during the past year.
The Daud government has persisted in agitat-
ing for the creation, in Pakistani territory, of
an autonomous state ? Pushtunistan ? for
Pakistan's pustu-speaking tribesmen, who
are ethnically akin to the dominant Afghan
tribal group. Pakistan has refused to discuss
this question, on the grounds that its own
territorial integrity is involved and that the
Pathan tribes themselves have little or no
genuine interest in Pushtunistan. Both sides
have sought the support of the US and other
powers in the controversy.
10. Afghan-Pakistani relations have been
strained periodically over this issue since the
creation of Pakistan in 1947. The affair
reached a serious crisis in 1955. Early in the
year, Pakistan announced its intention to
merge all the provinces of West Pakistan ?
including Pathan and other tribal territory ?
into a single unit. The Afghans regarded
this as a direct threat to the Pushtunistan
scheme, and in March an officially-inspired
Afghan mob ransacked the Pakistani embassy
in Kabul and the Pakistani consulate in Ja-
lalabad. In April Pakistan, failing to receive
satisfactory amends from the Kabul govern-
ment, closed its consulates in Afghanistan,
and in May imposed an embargo on trade
with landlocked Afghanistan and on the
transit of Afghan imports and exports through
Pakistan. Pakistan's chief objective was to
force the Afghan ruling clique to replace
Prime Minister Daud, the leading exponent
both of the Pushtunistan scheme and of closer
ties with the Soviet Bloc. This embargo was
3
not lifted until September when both states
agreed on amends for the original incident
and promised also to refrain from propaganda
excesses with respect to one another.
11. The agreements reached in September,
however, scarcely touched on the real sources
of Afghan-Pakistani tension, and relations
between the two states remain extremely
strained. Pakistan proceeded in October with
the "one-unit" plan, which led the Afghans
to make vigorous but unsuccessful efforts to
enlist the aid of the US, the UK, and various
Muslim countries in preventing or at least
postponing implementation of the plan.
When these efforts failed, Afghanistan with-
drew its minister from Karachi; Pakistan, in
response, recalled its ambassador from Kabul.
Tensions along the Pakistani-Afghan frontier
increased as both sides stepped up the tempo
of propaganda recriminations. Pakistan re-
peatedly charged the Afghans with border
violations and with attempts to create dis-
turbances in Pakistan's tribal areas. So far,
efforts to bring the two states together for
talks, including President Eisenhower's offer
to the Afghan King to do what was in his
power to facilitate better understanding be-
tween Afghanistan and Pakistan, have failed,
and the opposing nations have appeared to be
at an impasse.
12. Domestic Support of Prince Daud. So far,
Pakistani pressures have failed either to cause
Daud to back down or to force his removal
from office. Daud has obtained at least the
acquiescence of the King in his policies and
has strengthened his position over the past
year. Those elements of the ruling oligarchy
who have misgivings about his policy of
accepting closer ties with the Soviet Bloc, and
who are disturbed by his anti-Pakistan ex-
tremism, appear to have been silenced. In
the recent Loe Jirgah 2 Daud succeeded in ob-
2 Extraordinary assembly of tribal leaders and
other notables. The Loe Jirgah is convened by
the Afghan government only on rare occasions
when questions of extreme national importance
are to be decided. The Loe Jirgah enjoys a
greater degree of independence and national
prestige than does the puppet parliament in
Kabul, and its decisions are of great significance
in Afghanistan.
vvidismitT
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rfigPliffitar
taming a two-to-one vote of approval for his
objectives. The assembly approved self-deter-
mination for Pakistan's Pathan tribes, and in
effect upheld the policy of securing arms from
the Soviet Bloc, on the grounds that Pakistan
had been receiving arms from other "great
powers." The result has been to endorse as
"national policy" the two policies with which
Daud has been most closely identified. Fol-
lowing the Loe Jirgah's action, Daud moved
swiftly to remove the defense minister, whose
first loyalty was to the King rather than to
Daud, and assumed the post himself. Daud,
who is a professional soldier with the rank
of lieutenant-general, has consistently sought
to place his supporters in key military com-
mand positions ever since he became prime
minister. His recent assumption of the Min-
istry of Defense, as well, further increases his
control over the armed forces.
13. Afghan-Soviet Relations. Increased Soviet
attentions to Afghanistan are probably part
of a general effort to counter Western moves
in the Middle East-South Asia area ? particu-
larly in the "northern tier" group of nations
(Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan) which be-
came members of the Baghdad Pact during
1955. In Soviet eyes, the "northern tier" de-
fense system .constitutes a potential Western
military base area along the USSR's south-
western flank. Soviet objectives probably in-
clude: (a) countering Western influence in
Afghanistan itself and winning the friendship
of the Daud regime; (b) demonstrating to
Asian nations the benefits of Soviet friend-
ship as contrasted to that with the US; and
(c) disconcerting the Pakistanis by enabling
the Afghans to press their quarrel with Paki-
stan with greater impunity.
14. The continuance of Daud's extreme anti-
Pakistan policies during the period of the
Pakistani blockade was facilitated by the will-
ingness of the Soviet Bloc to supply Afghani-
stan's trade and transit requirements on
advantageous terms. The Pakistani blockade
provided the Soviets with an unprecedented
opportunity to develop the foothold they had
already gained in 1953 and 1954. The Soviet
share of Afghan trade has been growing in
recent years. During 1955 it almost certainly
4
constituted substantially more than the 30-40
percent which we had estimated as the Soviet
share of Afghan foreign trade in 1954. There
has also probably been an increase in the
volume of Bloc-Afghan trade, accompanied by
a corresponding decline in Afghan trade with
other countries. A significant example is that
of petroleum imports, more than half of which
had probably been supplied from Western-
controlled sources before the Pakistani block-
ade. As a result of that blockade, and the
USSR's longstanding willingness to supply
Afghanistan's petroleum needs at prices sub-
stantially below those of the West, Afghani-
stan has become increasingly reliant on the
USSR for its petroleum products. A Soviet-
Afghan protocol signed in August 1955 calls
for a significant broadening in barter trade
of Bloc manufactured and capital goods for
Afghan agricultural and animal products.
There have been reports, which seem plausi-
ble, that the Soviets have offered to purchase
one-third of Afghanistan's cotton crop and its
entire output of karakul (Persian lamb)
skins ? traditionally Afghanistan's principal
foreign exchange earner in trade with the
West.
15. Afghanistan is now determined not to be-
come dependent again upon trade routes
through Pakistan and has been taking steps
to reroute the bulk of its foreign trade through
the USSR. A Soviet-Afghan transit agreement
concluded in June 1955 grants Afghanistan
transit privileges through the USSR ? the
only non-Bloc country to have received such
a concession. The arrangements provide
transportation at a price at least as favorable
as through Pakistan. In addition, the Af-
ghans are making efforts, with Soviet help,
to improve routes to the Soviet border on a
priority basis, and are also receiving Soviet
assistance in constructing a new port, Qizil
Qala, on the Oxus River (Amu Darya) which
will facilitate trade with and through the
USSR. Since the end of the Pakistani block-
ade, the government has continued to use
various pressures to encourage import and
export trade through the northern routes.
16. Soviet Bloc offers of economic, technical,
and other assistance to Afghanistan have
greatly increased during 1955, culminating in
410Wilfr"
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11 mew
the sweeping agreement made by the Afghans
with Khrushchev and Bulganin in mid-De-
cember for the equivalent of $100 million of
long-term Soviet credits for agricultural, irri-
gation, hydroelectric, and other development
projects. The agreement also calls for im-
provement of the Kabul and possibly other
airfields. It appears likely that the Afghans
agreed, during the Soviet leaders Kabul visit,
to prepare a 10 year economic development
plan for implementation of the Soviet assist-
ance program. Details of these projects and
terms of repayment are not yet determined.3
Several development projects financed by the
more than $11 million in Bloc credits extended
during 1954-1955 have already been completed
or are in process, and the Bloc is offering
substantial assistance in a variety of fields.
Afghanistan has granted the USSR a monop-
oly of sulphur exploitation, and is considering
a Soviet offer to undertake development of
important coal deposits. Bloc offers of eco-
nomic aid are doubly attractive to the Af-
ghans, since they allow repayment in Afghan
goods instead of foreign exchange, and the
projects so far carried out under them have
been such as to yield quick and tangible re-
sults, such as paved streets in Kabul, gasoline
storage facilities in Kabul and in the north,
and an asphalt plant. These characteristics
of Bloc assistance have led the Afghan gov-
ernment to make invidious comparisons with
the US-sponsored project for development of
the Helmand Valley ? a costly, long-term
scheme in an area remote from the capital,
financed largely by loans repayable in dollars.4
The Soviets have reportedly even offered to
take over and complete the American-financed
Helmand Valley project, and to pay off the
US loans advanced for the project.
17. Finally, the Bloc has offered to supply
arms to Afghanistan. Limited amounts of
small arms may have been delivered from
Czechoslovakia. Additional arms supplies,
3 See attached map, "Development Projects
Planned Under Soviet Aid to Afghanistan."
4US assistance since 1950 amounts to some $45
million, including $5 million in technical assist-
ance and about $40 million in Eximbank loans
for the Helmand Valley project ? about $25 mil-
lion of which has been expended to date.
5
possibly to the extent of $15 million worth,
may have been agreed upon during the
Khrushchev-Bulganin visit.
18. In the political sphere the USSR has
wooed Kabul by giving support to the Afghan
position on Pushtunistan. The news bulletin
published by the Soviet embassy in Kabul has
indicated sympathy with the Afghan claims,
and this was reiterated by Bulganin during
his Kabul visit and again more strongly in his
Moscow speech at the end of December.
19. The growth of Soviet-Afghan economic
ties has resulted in certain political gains for
the Bloc. By providing Afghanistan with al-
ternative sources of economic and military
assistance and trade outlets, the USSR has
done much to reduce Afghan vulnerability to
Pakistani and Western pressures or induce-
ments. Moreover, the prompt and circumspect
manner in which the Soviets have responded
to Afghanistan's needs ? there is little or no
evidence of subversive activities in connection
with Bloc assistance so far ? has almost cer-
tainly worked to some extent to disarm Af-
ghan suspicions of Soviet motives. Khrush-
chev and Bulganin were successful in secur-
ing Afghan agreement to a number of Soviet
policies, such as the admission of Communist
China to the UN.
20. For their part, the Afghans appear con-
fident of their ability to retain their independ-
ence in spite of their ties with the Bloc. There
is evidence that they have rejected a number
of Soviet aid offers, and they are apparently
still interested in Western aid as well. Prime
Minister Daud, as well as Foreign Minister
Naim, pointed out, following the Khrushchev-
Bulganin visit, that the Afghans intended to
remain neutral. Naim also stated that the
government intended to refrain from any crit-
icism of the Baghdad Pact. Finally, the Af-
ghan ruling clique regards the threat of closer
Soviet-Afghan relations as a useful instru-
ment for extracting concessions from Pakistan
and the West.
II. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS
21. Potential Opposition to Daud. Latent op-
position to Daud and misgivings over the trend
of his policies almost certainly exist within
01(018PIrr
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the royal family, among certain tribal leaders,
merchant groups, and mullahs, and to some
extent even within the armed forces. How-
ever, these elements lack organization and
leadership and the apparent success of Daud's
tactics so far have probably rendered such op-
position powerless for some time to come.
Daud may move to consolidate his position
even more firmly by further changing his
cabinet ? as he has already done in the case
of the Ministry of Defense ? to exclude those
whose first loyalties are to the King or mem-
bers of the royal family other than himself.
Moreover, any conciliation or softening in
Pakistan's stand would appear to vindicate his
tactics and would be exploited to the fullest
by Daud.
22. In these circumstances, Daud is unlikely
to be forced from power by the King or others
of the ruling oligarchy, such as the two lead-
ing elder members, Shah Mahmoud Khan and
Shah Wali Khan. The latter two are opposed
to Daud's policies, but their efforts, if any,
have been of the feeblest order. Moreover, the
King, while rumored to oppose Daud, has al-
ways supported him in various public state-
ments and in the deliberations of the parlia-
ment and the Loe Jirgah. Thus, while opposi-
tion to Daud exists within the ruling family,
it seems to lack effectiveness and strength.
23. If the ruling clique became convinced that
Daud's policies were leading to a loss of Af-
ghanistan's independence, its sense of nation-
al and self-preservation might lead it to
attempt Daud's removal. Daud would prob-
ably resist such efforts and would probably be
successful in view of his present power over
the armed forces, as well as the likelihood that
the USSR would extend him at least covert
support.
24. Tribal opposition to the Kabul govern-
ment is endemic, but the army is probably
capable of dealing with any tribal disturb-
ances short of a concerted and widespread up-
rising. As Daud's policies vis-a-vis Pakistan
and the USSR have been endorsed by the Loe
Jirgah, no such uprising is likely.
25. Afghan Foreign Relations. We continue
to believe that underlying Afghan foreign
policy there remains a determination to pre-
6
serve the country's independence by avoiding
complete commitment to either of the great
power blocs. Daud himself would probably
try to alter his course if he came to feel that
it was jeopardizing Afghan independence.
However, all present evidence indicates that
he is confident that he can, without undue
risk, use Bloc support to further his ambitions
with respect to Pushtunistan and Afghan eco-
nomic growth. Accordingly, we consider it
likely that Afghan foreign policies will con-
tinue much as at present so long as Daud re-
mains in control.
26. Relations with Pakistan. Daud probably
will continue vigorously to pursue his agita-
tion over Pushtunistan, particularly so long
as he has Soviet support. Afghan-Pakistani
relations are accordingly likely to remain
strained, or at best subject to sporadic ups
and downs. In addition to keeping up propa-
ganda on the subject and attempting to enlist
the support of other powers, the Afghans will
probably foster disaffection among the Pathan
tribes in Pakistan. It is unlikely that the
Afghans will deliberately precipitate open
hostilities with Pakistan, but the possibility
exists of further "incidents" like the attack on
the Pakistani embassy in Kabul last March.
Such incidents could lead to a complete rup-
ture of relations or even to hostilities, possibly
in the form of border forays short of all-out
war.
27. The Pakistanis, for their part, appear to
?recognize the danger of Soviet intervention
which would result from Pakistani-Afghan
hostilities, and will almost certainly refrain
from attacking Afghanistan unless confronted
with extreme provocation. Pakistan's con-
cern over developing Soviet influence in Af-
ghanistan may lead it to seek some ameliora-
tion in its relations with the Afghans. It
might for example be willing to discuss prob-
lems of trade, facilitation of transit through
Pakistan, reopening consulates, and restora-
tion of ambassadors, and possibly the prob-
lems of policing the border. However, Pak-
istan is unlikely to compromise on the Push-
tunistan issue. We believe it highly unlikely
that it would make a bonafide offer to hold
a plebiscite on the question.
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SECRET 7
28. It remains unlikely that Pakistan will
offer sufficient concessions to satisfy Daud,
particularly as long as the latter feels assured
of Soviet material and political support in his
anti-Pakistan activities. Thus, even if Pak-
istan's gestures resulted in temporary im-
provements in its relations with Afghanistan,
these would not be likely to prove lasting as
long as Daud remains in power and Soviet
policy continues as at present.
29. Despite the Daud regime's efforts to in-
crease its trade with the USSR, Afghanistan
is likely to remain dependent on Pakistani
trade routes for the export of fruits and nuts
from southern Afghanistan and imports re-
quired for the Helmand Valley project.
30. Soviet Policy toward Afghanistan. We
estimate that the USSR will continue its ef-
forts to exploit the situation in Afghanistan
and to increase the latter's dependence on the
Bloc. For some time to come, at least, the
USSR is likely to continue to offer economic
and technical assistance on favorable terms,
to encourage Afghan efforts to develop trade
and transit facilities with the Bloc, and to
extend support through arms sales and limited
political backing. Although the USSR could
easily take over Afghanistan, we continue to
believe that it will avoid such openly aggres-
sive tactics, particularly since a move of this
sort would alarm other Asian nations now
being wooed by the Soviets. In present cir-
cumstances the Soviets are probably content
to have Afghanistan remain formally uncom-
mitted so long as its present tendency to lean
toward the Bloc continues. If Western sup-
port of the "northern tier" concept should be
stepped up, and particularly if the US should
adhere to the Baghdad Pact, Soviet attempts
to counter these developments probably would
include increased efforts to insure Afghanis-
tan's orientation toward the Bloc. Should US
bases be established in Pakistan or Iran the
Soviets would probably seek to gain control
over Afghan foreign and military policy. How-
ever the character of Soviet actions would be
conditioned by the attitude of India and other
neutral states of the Middle and Far East.
31. The USSR would probably give Daud
strong support against any efforts to unseat
him. It will almost certainly foster strains
in Afghan-Pakistani relations, but not to the
point of encouraging full-scale hostilities.
Such a development would confront the USSR
with the choice between allowing Pakistan to
conquer Afghanistan or coming to Afghanis-
tan's defense with Soviet armed forces ? a
course which would be likely to have unfavor-
able repercussions for the Soviets throughout
free Asia and might lead to undesired com-
plications with the West.
32. In the unlikely event of open Pakistani-
Afghan hostilities, Pakistan could easily de-
feat the organized Afghan military forces al-
though Afghan tribal elements might carry
on guerrilla warfare against the Pakistanis
for some time. However, before suffering de-
feat, the Daud regime would probably request
Soviet assistance. Although the USSR would
probably be reluctant to intervene openly, it
might seek to block a Pakistani victory by
covert intervention, possibly using Soviet "vol-
unteers" ethnically akin to certain Afghan
tribal groups. Any such Soviet intervention
would draw Afghanistan still closer to the So-
viet orbit.
33. While there is no evidence of a Commu-
nist party in Afghanistan and the number of
Communist sympathizers probably remains
small, Soviet Bloc subversive assets and op-
portunities are likely to increase through the
introduction of Communist personnel in con-
nection with Soviet trade and assistance ac-
tivities. Soviet personnel are already acting
as advisors to the government petroleum
monopoly and possibly to other government
activities. In addition, the USSR may elect
to take payment in Afghan currency for cer-
tain Soviet goods and services, thus accumu-
lating a reserve of local currency which could
easily be used for subversive and political
purposes. If the USSR should initiate sub-
versive efforts, the most likely targets would
be certain discontented minority tribes ? par-
ticularly those in the north which are ethni-
cally akin to groups in the USSR ? and a
small number of urban intelligentsia who are
discontent with the backwardness of the coun-
try and the arbitrary methods of the govern-
ment and to whom radical solutions are prob-
SECRET
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viwatiot
ably increasingly attractive. For the foresee-
able future, however, we consider that the
USSR is not likely to make extensive use of
these opportunities, and will probably scrupu-
lously limit subversive activities in order to
impress the Afghans and other Asians with
the "benevolence" of Soviet assistance pro-
grams.
34. Afghan Relations with the USSR. Af-
ghanistan is likely to welcome continuing So-
viet political and economic support as a way
of avoiding complete dependence on Pakistan
and the West, as a means of extracting coun-
tervailing concessions from Pakistan and the
West, and as a benefit to Afghan economic de-
velopment. Moreover, since the USSR also
constitutes a natural market and transit route
for much of Afghan trade, Afghan-Soviet eco-
nomic ties will probably continue to be close.
And so long as Afghan-Pakistani relations re-
main strained by Daud's agitation of the Push-
tunistan controversy, the Kabul regime will
place particularly high value on Bloc support
and cooperation. In these circumstances, Af-
ghanistan will probably drift closer toward
the Soviet Bloc. Afghan leaders probably un-
derestimate the degree to which economic con-
nections, technical aid, intimate diplomatic
and cultural contacts, and the like, can be
used under Communist direction to tighten
the bonds between Afghanistan and the USSR,
and make an escape from the connection very
difficult. The ability of the Afghans to make
such an escape would depend not only on
their own efforts but also on the timeliness of
Western offers of countervailing support or
Western willingness to bail them out if their
independence is threatened.
35. We believe it unlikely that Afghanistan
will fall under direct Soviet control within the
next few years. Nevertheless there is a dan-
ger that the Soviet Union, while refraining
from actions to replace the present Afghan
government with one subject to its authority,
might come to exert a powerful voice in the
Daud regime itself. As long as Daud con-
tinues dedicated to the Pushtunistan cause,
the USSR will have a means, not available to
the West, of making itself useful or even in-
dispensable to him. Afghanistan's growing
8
dependence on Soviet diplomatic and econom-
ic support will place it under cumulative po-
litical and economic obligations to the Bloc
unless these are counterbalanced by strength-
ened ties with the West. Such Soviet ties
would be difficult to throw off without inflict-
ing a sharp rebuff to the USSR (possibly in-
cluding, for example, refusal to meet loan
repayments) and in effect confessing the
bankruptcy of Daud's Soviet policy. In these
circumstances, Daud himself may become in-
creasingly reluctant to offend the USSR. De-
spite his present almost certain desire that
Afghanistan remain independent, he might
reach the point where he would choose to con-
tinue to accept Soviet support, at whatever
political cost, rather than be ousted.
36. Afghan-US Relations. Notwithstanding
Prince Daud's present policy of increased re-
liance upon the USSR, we believe that he
will continue to want support and assistance
from the US, both for the economic and
political benefits, and as a counterbalance to
Soviet influence. Thoroughly schooled in the
technique of playing off great powers against
each other, the Afghan leaders almost cer-
tainly appreciate that a clear cessation of US
interest in Afghanistan would reduce to negli-
gible proportion both the latter's bargaining
power vis-a-vis the USSR, and its chances of
remaining independent. Indeed, Daud's pres-
ent acceptance of Bloc support is probably in
part designed to force the US and other West-
ern countries to step up their aid to Afghani-
stan and to adopt more pro-Afghan policies
on the Pushtunistan issue.
37. US capabilities to induce Afghanistan to
alter its present policies are limited. In-
creased US aid might lead the Afghans to
affirm their neutral benevolence toward the
US as well as toward the USSR, but would
probably also convince them that flirtation
with the USSR was a good way to get US aid.
A cut-off of US aid, or other evidence of US
unfriendliness would be likely to drive the
Afghans closer to the Soviet Bloc as their
only source of economic assistance and politi-
cal support against Pakistan. In neither
event are the Afghans likely to abandon the
&wort T
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T
Pushtunistan issue, and the US could not
support Afghanistan in this controversy with-
out alienating Pakistan.
38. Afghan Relations with Other Countries.
Since the UK has sided firmly with Pakistan
in the Afghan-Pakistani controversy, Afghan-
UK relations are likely to remain cool. Af-
ghanistan probably has little hope that the
UK could be brought to exert effective pres-
sure on a Commonwealth member for the
sake of Afghanistan. In any event, Afghan
interest in UK support is probably limited
since the Afghans now regard the US as hav-
ing replaced British power as a counterweight
for that of the USSR.
39. India may in the past have given covert
support to Afghanistan against Pakistan.
However, Nehru would probably prefer to see
the controversy quieted rather than to see a
continued growth of Soviet influence in Af-
ghanistan, if he became convinced that the
Issue was leading to such a development. It
is not likely, however, that India could exert
decisive influence with the Kabul government
either with respect to the Pushtunistan con-
troversy or with respect to the acceptance of
closer Bloc ties ? particularly so long as In-
dia itself is accepting increasing Soviet aid
and is also engaged in a quarrel with Paki-
stan over Kashmir. Afghan sensitivity to
Moslem opinion affords various Moslem states,
for example Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and
Iran, some influence in Kabul. However, since
these states have little sympathy with the
Pushtunistan scheme, their influence is not
likely to increase significantly in Afghanistan.
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MIttOK_.
APPENDIX
THE NATURE OF AFGHAN SOCIETY
Afghanistan is a primitive tribal kingdom
with a heterogeneous population and with
undeveloped economic resources. Of Afghani-
stan's population, variously estimated at eight
to 12 million, perhaps as much as one-third
is nomadic or seminomadic, and the tribal
system is strong. In common with other un-
derdeveloped countries of the Middle East and
South Asia, Afghan society consists of a great
majority engaged in primitive agricultural
and pastoral pursuits; a much thinner layer
of small landowners, petty traders, lesser
tribal leaders, and a few urban shopkeepers,
professional men, and government employees;
and a very small elite (probably not more
than two thousand) comprising the royal
family, big landowners, the principal tribal
leaders, large-scale traders, and wealthy busi-
nessmen. Communications are poor, and
there are few urban concentrations, the capi-
tal city of Kabul with a population of some-
thing over 200,000 being the largest.
As a result of the many invasions and mi-
grations which have traversed the area, the
Afghan population is ethnically heterogeneous
and the various groups have little in common
beyond adherence to Islam. Even in this re-
spect, the tribes have sectarian differences
as between the Sunni, Shia, and Ismaili sects.
Loyalty to the tribe, clan, or family is usually
stronger than loyalty to the nation. There is
a lack of national spirit and a general dislike
of the central government. National con-
sciousness is further weakened by the fact
that many of the tribes near Afghanistan's
borders are ethnically akin to similar groups
in adjacent areas of the USSR, Iran, and
Pakistan. The dominant ethnic-linguistic
group, both numerically and politically, is
composed of the Pathan tribes (also called
Pushtun and "true Afghans"), which are con-
10
centrated in southern and eastern Afghani-
stan. Afghanistan's ruling oligarchy stems
from the principal Afghan Pathan tribe.
Other ethnic groups, such as the Tajik, Ha-
zara, Uzbek, Turkomen, and Nuristani, have
little or no political power in Afghanistan and
for the most part have been forced to accept
a second class status within the nation.
The government, ostensibly a constitutional
monarchy, is actually an autocratic oligarchy
tightly controlled by the royal family. There
are no political parties. The members of the
royal family, who occupy the top positions in
the government, also maintain their hold on
the government machinery through appoint-
ment of lesser officials and flagrantly rigged
elections to the rubber stamp legislature.
There is complete state control of newspapers
and other media of communication, and a
large degree of state monopoly over the econ-
omy. While disputes do occasionally occur
within the ruling family, they are normally
settled within the group.
The only political forces of consequence
other than the Pathan tribes and the ruling
oligarchy are a few wealthy urban merchants
and traders, and the religious leaders (mul-
lahs). Religious opposition to former King
Amanullah's attempts at sweeping modern-
ization in the late 1920's was the primary fac-
tor in a successful revolt against him, and
Indicates the power potential of the religious
leaders. Some merchant and trading inter-
ests with large financial resources are influ-
ential in urban areas but would probably
assume political importance only in combina-
tion with army, tribal, or religious leaders.
While certain minority tribal elements and
some young reformists in Kabul and provin-
cial cities are probably dissatisfied with the
regime, they are not united and have little
opportunity to make their influence felt.
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Although much of its total area is waste-
land, Afghanistan's agricultural and pastoral
economy is normally self-sufficient in basic
foodstuffs, except for sugar. In the past, for-
eign trade has not been of major importance
to the Afghan economy, which has depended
on external sources to only a limited degree.
With growing Afghan desires for economic
development, foreign exchange requirements
have expanded with a consequent increase in
11
the significance of foreign trade. Afghani-
stan's major export and foreign exchange
earner has long been karakul (Persian lamb)
skins, but cotton has increased in importance
and, with recent declines in karakul sales, may
replace the latter as the principal export
article. Other exports are wool, fruits, and
nuts. Major imports are sugar, tea, cotton
cloth and other manufactured consumer
goods, petroleum products, and materials
needed for development.
s.assaiNr'
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DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS PLANNED UNDER SOVIET AID TO AFGHANISTAN
Selected railroad
All-weather road
. 28 DECEMBER 1955
US
RIV R
25 50 103 150
naleanad
BAGHL AN
0
SALANG PASS AND
'(PROPOSED ROAD ?35
05.1120, Ghee tel KASHMIR
(Status in Disputd)
OM.
Pe hewer
Rawalpindi
Pow
PAKISTAN
HELMAND RIVER
DEVELOPMENT AREA
0 e270'l 400 600 Mlles
0 ZOO APO 600 Plemstm
:zrza?
PAKISTAN
IM11nandi
NOTE
Reliably reported projects planned under the announced $100,000,000 Soviet credit to Afghanistan,
which is to run for ten years, include improvement of airfields at Kabul, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Bagh-
lan; improvement of the Oxus River port facilities at Qizil Qala; construction of a dam in the Ghazni
area; and road construction in the Salang Pass area. Location of the US-sponsored Helmand Valley proj -
ect is also indicated.
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60
CONFIDENTIAL
International boundary, demarcated
x - International boundary, undemarcated
International boundary, indefinite
- Province boundary
(i) National capital
0 Province capital
? Other city or town
Selected railroad
Selected road
Selected trail
A Principal Afghan-Soviet Trade and Transit Center
9
2.5
5.0 190
Miles
CONFIDENTIAL
15,0
6:5
To Klaipeda
on the
Baltic Sea
?
talinabad
/ 4 7".....2?
'1 Z.
\s?
Termez
Qizil
Qala
ES K
'IRAN
x Maimena
Nushki>/
.?
Mazar-i-
Sherif ?
400'
-35- 4r
-
1
?
KABULI
le1,5Iabed f,
Peia,KooI
Pesh,e;ar
.,
55
ARAL
SEA
Girishk
V' t!"
1 Sandernen
... v.? ?i-
Chemeni r - d ,,,.. ?,...- -.0-411tr. ' ? --'
,....,--
.04-?-dt "--,
o TEHERAN
BUI.
,.. m
....
.... ts,,,,
,7H.u:,m.Ar,'
KAi
,, ?.?....
e
J.?...?.,-...ri-,. Su 4.1
\,....)\.'Pl\\....' S' ' N
In P'"ushkeenistan --\.\---4" \r,
NEW DELHI?
SAUDI
ARABIA
-20 55
KARACHI
ARABIAN SEA
615
INDIA
Narboda
DIU
(Po
25137 12-55
CONFIDENTIAL
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leseiterr
VW4IM
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